

IRONCLAD

*Forging a New Future for
America's Alliances*

EDITOR

Dr. Michael J. Green



CSIS

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Ironclad

*Forging a New Future for
America's Alliances*

Editor

Dr. Michael J. Green

CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Center for Strategic & International Studies
1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
202-887-0200 | www.csis.org

Published by Rowman & Littlefield
A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing
Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, MD 20706
www.rowman.com

Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26–34 Stannary Street, London SE114AB

Copyright © 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passage in a review.

ISBN 978-1-4422-8114-1 (hb)
ISBN 978-1-4422-8113-4 (pbk)
ISBN 978-1-4422-8115-8 (electronic)

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	vii
<i>Patrick Buchan</i>	
Introduction: Why Allies?	I
<i>Dr. Michael J. Green</i>	
Part I. Alliances and Order	
1 Stresses and Strains on the Global Order	13
<i>Thomas Wright</i>	
2 What Is the Role of America's Alliances in Upholding the International Order?	20
<i>Dr. Kori Schake</i>	
3 Literature Review: Theories of Alliances and Alignments	29
<i>Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper</i>	
4 Values, Alliances and Partnerships, and the Indo-Pacific Order	40
<i>Dr. Daniel Twining</i>	
Part II. The Mechanics of Alliances	
5 The Role of Military Alliances: Deterrence and Reassurance	51
<i>Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken</i>	
6 Nuclear Weapons and Alliances: Deterrence and Reassurance for the Twenty-First Century	61
<i>Franklin C. Miller</i>	

7	Defense Industry, Technology Transfer, and Twenty-First Century Alliances <i>Dr. Dov S. Zakheim</i>	76
8	What Are the Implications of Cyber for Alliances? <i>Fergus Hanson</i>	84
Part III. Regional Alliances		
9	The Promotion of the Rules-Based Order and the Japan-U.S. Alliance: Meeting the Challenges of the Strategic Competition with China in the Indo-Pacific <i>Dr. Satoru Mori</i>	97
10	Adapting the South Korea-U.S. Alliance to Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century <i>Dr. Sue Mi Terry</i>	113
11	Australia's Alliance Strategy <i>Patrick Buchan</i>	128
12	Southeast Asian Alliances and Partnerships <i>Dr. Amy Searight</i>	137
13	Networking Alliances and Deepening Minilateral Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific <i>Richard Fontaine</i>	154
14	The Role of the Transatlantic Alliance in Establishing the Rules-Based Order <i>Dr. Gary Schmitt</i>	161
15	Adapting NATO for the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century <i>Heather A. Conley</i>	171
16	Middle East Alliances and Partnerships for the Twenty-First Century <i>Dr. Jon B. Alterman</i>	176

Part IV. Challenges

17	Competing for Allies: How, When, and Why States Flip Alliances <i>Dr. Gabriel Scheinmann</i>	183
18	China's Post-Alliance Architecture in Asia: Launch of an Ambitious Restructuring Process <i>Dr. Alice Ekman</i>	193
19	Alliances for the Twenty-First Century: Reinforcing the Rules-Based International Order <i>Alex Oliver</i>	205
	Index	225
	About the Editor and Authors	235
	About CSIS	241

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Alliances and American Leadership Project

As we know from historical experience, it has been U.S. leadership through its unparalleled system of global alliances that has ensured a world in which both international security and prosperity have risen to historically unprecedented levels. Like in any system or relationship, work must be done to adapt and improve these alliances, many of which stretch back to the closing days of the second world war. Reexamination—and where needed, adjustment—is required to assure their future success. This book seeks to contribute to that goal.

The work in collating, editing and publishing this collection is no small order. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Green in helping to make such a task possible. His guidance and advice throughout the drafting and publication process has been invaluable. I would also like to thank my former Research Associate, Mr. Jesse Barker-Gale, for his unceasing work in seeing the task through and to his successor Mr. Ben Rimland who ably shepherded the book to its final stages.

Finally, I would like to thank Mr. Andrew Shearer for his tireless efforts in establishing the *Alliances and American Leadership project* here at CSIS.

Patrick Buchan
Washington, D.C.
February 2019

INTRODUCTION

Why Allies?

Dr. Michael J. Green

Winston Churchill famously said that the only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them. Strategy requires centrality of purpose and the alignment of complex ends, ways, and means. The very word *strategy* derives from the Greek *strategos*, or “from the commander.” Unity of effort is difficult enough within a state, particularly a democracy with checks and balances designed to foil too much centralization of authority in the commander. With allies—and particularly democratic allies that have their own internal checks and balances and unique political rhythms—the problem can be even more vexing. And yet unity of effort with allies—enhanced by jointness and interoperability—is an enormous force multiplier. Effective alliances increase the prospects for successful prosecution of objectives in peacetime, complicate adversaries’ planning for coercive action, and increase the prospects for deterring and ultimately defeating aggression.

Napoleon understood the central importance and weakness of alliances well, which is why he preferred fighting against alliances so that he could seek out the seams between them and then defeat his adversaries in detail. He almost accomplished this at Waterloo but for the stubborn commitment of both Wellington and the Prussian field marshal Blücher, who defied their own staffs’ frantic appeals to abandon their coalition partners and defend the roads to Brussels and Prussia, respectively.

The mythology around George Washington’s famous admonition to avoid “entangling alliances” aside, Americans have also long understood the utility of alliances. The Founding Fathers learned the importance of

global alignments during the French and Indian Wars and applied the same geopolitical logic to secure French support and win independence 25 years later. When Washington urged his countrymen to reject alliances in his Farewell Address of 1794, he did so primarily because France and Britain were tearing apart U.S. politics at home, not because the new republic lacked for interests abroad. Even when there have been strong doses of U.S. isolationism, the target has been the Old World and not the Pacific or the Western Hemisphere. At the height of the America First movement in 1940, for example, a significant majority of U.S. citizens were willing to risk war to stop Japan in Asia, even as they rejected involvement in the war in Europe.¹ And when the United States has been attacked, as John Lewis Gaddis argues in *Surprise, Security and the American Experience* (2005), the U.S. people's instinct has been to expand their forward defensive commitments rather than retreat.² In 1948, before the formation of NATO and the "San Francisco" System of bilateral alliances in Asia, the United States accounted for over one-half of global economic output and was the world's most powerful nation. In 2019 the United States accounted for less than one-fourth of global economic output but nevertheless *remained* the world's most powerful nation—in large measure because of the alliances formed between 1949 and 1953 after the sobering experiences of being attacked at Pearl Harbor and then Korea.

Opinion polls suggest that the U.S. public continues to understand the importance of alliances. In fact, support for alliances has increased in the face of growing Chinese and Russian coercion—despite of the severe criticism of allies by President Donald Trump. For example, 85 percent of Americans responded in a 2018 Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll that they support the use of U.S. military force if an ally is invaded; 91 percent said that it is more effective for the United States to work with allies to achieve foreign policy goals, and 66 percent supported the United States making decisions with allies even if that meant the United States would sometimes go along with a policy that was not its first choice.³

1. Gallup Organization, *The Gallup Poll*, 1:297, cited in Michael Green, *By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 181.

2. John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 30.

3. Dina Smeltz et al., "2018 Chicago Council Survey—America Engaged: American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy," *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, October 2, 2018, 11–12.

Other polls by Pew, the German Marshall Fund, and Gallup indicate similar public support for alliances.⁴ CSIS research on congressional attitudes also indicates an undiminished appreciation of the importance of U.S. alliances on Capitol Hill.⁵

Nevertheless, leadership of alliances is a critical variable. Had Wellington and Blücher not been in command at Waterloo, Napoleon would likely have succeeded in splitting the allies and winning the battle. It is this leadership factor that has U.S. allies so anxious today. Donald Trump ran in 2016 on a promise to pull out of NATO, Japan, and Korea if he did not get better trade deals from those countries, and he has repeated this threat on multiple occasions while in office. It was President Trump's criticism of alliances that prompted Secretary of Defense Mattis to write a public resignation letter that seemed to update Washington's Farewell Address. As Mattis put it:

One core belief I have always held is that our strength as a nation is inextricably linked to the strength of our unique and comprehensive system of alliances and partnerships. While the US remains the indispensable nation in the free world, we cannot protect our interests or serve that role effectively without maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those allies.

Mattis is right, of course. Yet while it is evident that the public and Congress share his view of U.S. alliances, the saliency of those alliances to voters was not enough to cost Donald Trump the election. Moreover, simply maintaining alliances will not be enough in the face of rapidly growing Chinese and (in narrower but equally dangerous ways) Russian military capabilities across domains such as cyber and space, where the United States risks becoming less interoperable and joint with its allies as technology leapfrogs forward and systems of systems become more vulnerable. Nor is President Trump's disruptive approach to alliance

4. Frank Newport, "Trump's Foreign Policy and American Public Opinion," *Gallup*, July 12, 2018, <https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/237134/trump-foreign-policy-american-public-opinion.aspx>; Moira Fagan, "NATO Is Seen Favorably in Many Member Countries, but Almost Half of Americans Say It Does Too Little," *Pew Research Center*, July 9, 2018, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/09/nato-is-seen-favorably-in-many-member-countries-but-almost-half-of-americans-say-it-does-too-little/>.

5. Kathleen Hicks et al., *Beyond the Water's Edge: Measuring the Internationalism of Congress* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 31.

burden-sharing a complete departure from admonitions by former secretary of defense Bob Gates throughout the Bush and Obama years that allies—especially NATO allies—had to put more resources behind their defense. And finally, the peculiar early Cold War structure of U.S. alliances, particularly narrow bilateralism in Asia, is increasingly providing the seams that adversaries will seek to exploit to coerce or defeat democracies in detail, whether within Asia or Europe or between regional alliance networks on opposite sides of the globe. Even before the election of Donald Trump, in other words, there was a growing urgency to getting our alliances right.

This collection of essays by leading scholars and practitioners aims to explain the purpose and workings of U.S. alliances and to offer the beginnings of a blueprint for revitalizing and modernizing them in a complex new era of geopolitical competition. Andrew Shearer initiated the project after coming to CSIS in 2016 following distinguished service as national security adviser in Australia. He recruited the authors, organized public and private drafting roundtables, and initiated a series of technical expert workshops on alliance interoperability. He reentered government service in 2018 just as the volume was coming to fruition and therefore holds no responsibility for the final product other than inspiring the concepts and launching the empirical work.

The volume is divided into four parts: alliances and order, the mechanics of alliances, regional alliances, and challenges.

Tom Wright frames the volume in the first essay under alliances and order, explaining that the postwar alliance system created cooperation within the Western camp while pulling the democracies together to deter aggression from without. While acknowledging the internal challenges to alliances today, Tom notes that it was the threat from without that was always most important in motivating the U.S. public to reinvest in alliances, and for that reason he is cautiously optimistic about U.S. leadership going forward, given the threats to regional and global order posed in different ways by China and Russia. Kori Schake elaborates on the link between alliances and global order with the thesis that the alliance system itself has served as a tiller for U.S. leadership, and that it may be allies who collectively steady the United States after what is likely a temporary aberration in the U.S. political discourse on global affairs. She notes that China does not have this same willingness to be “righted” by allies and

therefore would face a serious handicap attracting them to a Sino-centric order that might take advantage of the current shortcomings of U.S. leadership. Dan Twining focuses in his essay on the importance of values in alliances at a time when China and Russia are attempting to undermine U.S. leadership through ideational instruments, rather than just hard power (military) instruments. This revisionism will fail, and China in particular could be incentivized to pursue more cooperative paths if it is clear that the ideational contest is not worth the fight. Dan notes that a flexible definition of alliances and partnerships that encompasses major democracies like India will be a critical part of how traditional treaty allies like the United States and Japan think about the Indo-Pacific going forward.

As Mira Rapp-Hooper notes in her essay on theories of alliances, political science theories of alliance formation, behavior, and dissolution tend to seek universal conclusions that could be applied as easily to the Peloponnesian or Napoleonic Wars as to U.S. alliances in the twenty-first century. To be sure, there are enduring truths about the teleology of alliances that are no less relevant today than they were 2,600 years ago (for example, the Thucydides dilemma faced by allies seeking to be neither entrapped nor abandoned—just ask any U.S. ally today), but Mira notes that aspects of U.S. political culture and the contemporary international system require a fresh and somewhat unique examination of the U.S. system of alliances. For one thing, as she notes, U.S. alliances have had a staying power that has defied theory—there was, for example, no shortage of articles and essays at the end of the Cold War predicting the demise of alliances that have since expanded and become even stronger.⁶ Readers will have to wait for Mira's forthcoming full-length treatise on alliances, but she frames the theoretical questions students and scholars should be asking and sets a helpful template for the subsequent empirical chapters in this volume.

The second section of the volume examines the mechanics of U.S. alliances. Tom Mahnken introduces the role of U.S. alliances in U.S. forward

6. George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, *The Coming War with Japan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Richard J. Samuels, *"Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5–56.

defense strategy and the challenges posed by the relative decline of key allies and the demands on interoperability posed by advancing military technologies. Frank Miller explains the centrality of nuclear, or extended deterrence, to the credibility of alliances and stability of the international system, and the need for modernizing U.S. weaponry and strategic cooperation with key allies like Korea that are now facing increased threats from nuclear-armed adversaries. Dov Zakheim explores armaments and technology cooperation, the lifeblood of enduring alliances, and argues for more open export control regimes to harness the globalization of defense-related technology and reassure U.S. allies on the front lines. Fergus Hanson closes the mechanics section of essays with an examination of the impact on alliances from cyber—from supply chain security to gray zone coercion and the challenges of defining offense and defense—suggesting why this domain will consume alliance coordination in the years to come.

The third section of the volume dissects the evolution of key U.S. alliances in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Given the Australia-U.S. lens of much of the volume, the section begins with Asia, though the transatlantic alliances are older and no less critical to global order. In fact, one of the persistent themes throughout this section is the need to network alliances within Asia and between Europe and the Pacific. Chinese and Russian revisionisms are different: China is a rising power with expansive regional ambitions but a continuing stake in a stable global order, while Russia is a declining power with a resentful view of regional interests and a disruptive approach to global order. Yet each of these powers shares a zero-sum perspective toward U.S. alliances that necessitates a global view between the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific network of democratic allies. In this still untapped solidarity lies a significant offset to the relative economic decline of some of the United States' major allies.

Satoru Mori's essay on the U.S.-Japan alliance opens the third section and reflects the prevailing view in Tokyo that Japan must now fully commit to a network of alliances bonded by common democratic values and the determination to maintain a military and economic edge in the face of Chinese competition. In a collection of essays on alliances during the Cold War, this would have been an almost heretical view, but Satoru's authoritative essay demonstrates how exogenous challenges to alliances are consolidating support for cooperation with the United States despite the disruptions of Donald Trump. Sue Mi Terry explains why the

U.S.-Korea alliance could face a “rocky road ahead” in the face of North Korean nuclearization, demands for burden-sharing, and Seoul’s delicate position, caught between Sino-U.S. strategic competition. Sue suggests a broadening definition of alliance missions to help it move beyond the original deterrence of North Korea to maintenance of regional and global order that reflects Korea’s phenomenal growth as an economy and democracy since the alliance was established in 1953. Pat Buchan’s essay on the role of alliances with the United States in Australia’s emerging strategy reinforces the argument that key U.S. allies are confident enough in the “ballast” in U.S. forward engagement to continue strengthening interoperability while simultaneously networking—particularly with Japan, in Australia’s case.

Amy Searight reviews the fits and starts in U.S. alliance formation in Southeast Asia, a region that was viewed—like the Korean peninsula—as less essential than Japan and Australia at the beginning of the Cold War. She concludes that after decades of drift and uncertainty, there has been a growing U.S. recognition that an eclectic mix of alliances and partnerships across the subregion will be critical in the face of growing Chinese pressure on both continental and maritime Southeast Asia. The challenge will be fitting that strategy to a complex mosaic of states that would ultimately prefer to focus on their own security and prosperity rather than becoming the objects of great power competition. Part of the approach will require deft networking across traditional bilateral alliances in Asia, including through “minilaterals” with Japan and Australia. This networking strategy is the focus of Richard Fontaine’s essay. Rather than representing a hedge against U.S. withdrawal, he suggests, the future of networked security in the Indo-Pacific depends on U.S. leadership, but it also represents a strategic play with enormous potential.

Gary Schmitt’s essay introduces the historic evolution of NATO and the unique advantages of the organization’s integrated command structure—something lacking in the Indo-Pacific. Yet NATO remains somewhat less favorable in U.S. public opinion than alliances in Asia, reflecting perhaps traditional suspicion of the “Old Country” as well as the organization’s lack of agility in the face of Vladimir Putin’s gray zone coercion from Ukraine to the Baltics. There is some truth to Donald Trump’s comparison of the treaty to an outdated 8-track tape, Gary acknowledges, yet there should be no doubt about NATO’s centrality to sustaining regional and global order going forward. Heather Conley puts NATO’s

challenges in perspective, noting that despite democratic backsliding among some member states and Donald Trump's shock to transatlantic solidarity, few founding members in 1949 would have anticipated the peaceful victory of the organization over the Warsaw Pact or its expansion to 29 members conducting missions well beyond Western Europe. She does not take those successes for granted, though, noting clouds on the horizon that will darken without renewed U.S. leadership in the future.

Jon Alterman rounds out the section on regional alliances with a look at U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Middle East—a region that frustrates European and Asian allies because it sucks in U.S. resources and attention yet remains vital to those same allies' prosperity and security. Jon notes the remarkable success the United States has had in forming alignments in the region, and the stunning failure it has had in building resilient societies, in marked contrast to the story in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. As the security and economic challenges mount in the Middle East, he adds, the United States will need the support of its alliances around the world, but he concludes that those alliances will be no substitute for a lack of U.S. willpower going forward. This is a theme across the section on regional alliances: there is a hunger for U.S. leadership and perhaps a greater willingness to share the burdens of security, but the latter will not happen without the former.

The last section introduces the exogenous and endogenous challenges to U.S. alliances. Gabe Scheinmann and Alice Ekman demonstrate how competitors will play the seams in alliances and seek to undermine this center of gravity to U.S. regional and global leadership. Gabe reviews the theory and history of wedge tactics in an original exposition on the playbook opponents can be expected to use. Alice then unpacks China's emerging strategies against U.S. alliances. One can take reassurance from both essays that U.S. alliances today are based on far deeper ideational and mechanical connectivity than the temporized Anglo-Prussian alliance Napoleon almost broke at Waterloo. Yet it is also clear that the competition will continue to unfold and expand into new domains and across all instruments of national power. Domestic support for alliances will be critical, and veteran polling expert Alex Oliver's final essay on public opinion within the democratic camp is encouraging in that regard. Alex notes the many stresses and strains in domestic attitudes toward specific aspects of alliance relations but emphasizes that there is no evidence of

a reconsideration of the importance of alliances and forward U.S. defense commitments in either the United States or the major democracies in Europe or Asia. After repeated warnings of the impact of Donald Trump's messaging in all the essays of the volume, Alex notes that publics have begun to make a distinction between the U.S. president and the strategic trajectory of the United States. How long that distinction holds and allies retain sufficient confidence in the "ballast" of U.S. strategic leadership is uncertain, though. This is all the more reason why the themes introduced in this volume need to be debated by the American people, whose internationalism is robust but whose distractions are heavy.

Part I. ALLIANCES AND ORDER

I. STRESSES AND STRAINS ON THE GLOBAL ORDER

Thomas Wright

The U.S. alliance system always had two purposes. The first, which remained consistent over the decades, was to create the conditions for peace and prosperity within the free world. It accomplished this by having the United States provide security for its allies to reduce regional security competition to negligible levels and by deepening political and economic cooperation between the members. The second purpose—responding to specific threats—has evolved over time. During the Cold War, it was to contain the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, it alternated between stabilization and intervention, fighting terrorist networks and their sympathizers, and upholding the regional security order in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

American presidents (until recently) and the foreign policy establishment tended to believe in the alliance system because of its first purpose of bolstering the free world. They found it useful in dealing with the threats of the day, although its immediate utility could change and vary over time. The problem, however, is that the American public has never really seen the first purpose as sufficient. To win their support, the second purpose has always had to be compelling. This was evident from the very beginning.

In the 1940s, the Truman administration struggled to secure congressional backing for an internationalist foreign policy. In late 1945 and 1946, the Congress opposed the administration's proposal for an interest-bearing loan to bail out the United Kingdom. Subsequently, there was significant resistance to creating international financial institutions, getting involved in European postwar security, and providing economic assistance to Western Europe. It was only when these proposals were sold

as part of a broader strategy to contain communism, with the ultimate objective of preventing it from penetrating the United States, that it became politically viable. The glue of anti-communism made the liberal international order possible. Without it, the United States may well have retrenched to its own shores.

After the Cold War, successive administrations were committed to the alliance system because they understood it is the linchpin of the U.S.-led order, which they wanted to preserve and lead. Understandably, they also wanted to harness the power of the alliance system to deal with the national security challenges of the day. This was also important in justifying America's global role to the public. People needed to see that NATO was of practical use. They did not see it as an end in itself.

The alliances were never as vital in these multiple missions as they were during the Cold War. They helped, but the United States saw them as one tool among many and often complained that the allies were not doing enough. Because the allies saw the new missions as less important than the Cold War threat, they reduced their military spending, further angering the Americans. Thus, after September 11, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke about "coalitions of the willing" so the United States would not be bound by formal alliance structures. During the Obama administration, the president and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized Europeans for not sharing more of the burden.

The dominant view was that the world had changed and was continuing to change in such a way as to render the old rationale for the alliances largely defunct. Yes, their very existence was a vital hedge against great power aggression, but that risk seemed to have reduced greatly. The long peace between major powers looked like it may be self-sustaining independent of the alliance system. In the 1990s and 2000s, successive administrations believed in the notion of convergence—as Russia and China participated in the global economy and grappled with the same problems as Western societies, they would gradually become responsible stakeholders in upholding the existing order, albeit while arguing for reform.

Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama all believed that the alliance system had to reweight its public priorities away from regional great power competition and toward transnational challenges, whether that be rogue states, failed states, terrorist networks, nuclear proliferation, or climate change. This is not to say they would abandon their first purpose—work on that would continue quietly, but

they would be largely judged on the second. Consequently, there was a significant gap between elite and public views of the alliance system, with the latter always shallower than the former.

Then the wheel turned again as China and Russia began to balance against the United States, reigniting regional security competition. The post-Cold War expectation of convergence began to unravel in 2007, when President Vladimir Putin denounced the West in his speech to the Munich Security Conference. In the seven years that followed, Russia invaded Georgia, modernized its military, annexed Crimea, invaded the eastern part of Ukraine, and began a campaign of active measures, including election interference, against the West. Meanwhile, China became much more assertive in pursuing its territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; the Chinese Communist Party consolidated authoritarian rule in China and would later abolish the term limit for the presidency; it embarked on an ambitious attempt to spread Chinese economic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative; and it became more strategically competitive with the United States.

The “era of convergence” came to an end because Russian and Chinese leaders believed that the liberal international order poses an existential threat to their regimes. As they see it, if liberalism thrives everywhere, authoritarianism is safe nowhere. The Chinese Communist Party has experienced how the free press exposed corruption at the heart of its elite. Putin knows that Russians may seek to emulate a successful color revolution in Ukraine or elsewhere in Russia’s neighborhood. They know that Western governments will always face pressure to back democracy activists overseas at precisely the moment that authoritarians are most vulnerable, regardless of what assurances or cooperative relations existed beforehand. And so, as China rose and Russia regained strength, they began to push back.

The return to rivalry was inevitable, if tragically so. The United States and its allies could not have addressed Chinese and Russian concerns because doing so would have brought the essence of the liberal order to an end. It would have given Moscow and Beijing a veto over democracy in other countries, not just their own. It would have accepted restrictions on the flow of information and political activity. And it would have returned the world to an era where a small number of people carved up the world, rather than a system where rules, values, and votes played a leading role.

We are now, once again, in a strategic environment where the second purpose of the alliance system is largely to balance against great power rivals. But this is not just a reversion to the status quo ante. In contrast to the Manichean “long twilight struggle” with communism, the American people do not know whether or why Russia or China pose such an existential challenge to the United States as to justify a strategic effort to balance against them. The foreign policy establishment has struggled to come up with a coherent explanation. And the alliances themselves are not necessarily equipped to deal with modern great power competition.

Clarity may take time. This new era of rivalry is still in its very early stages. While individual elements are visible, the causes, scope, nature, and stakes of the rivalry remain hazy and elusive. This is not unusual. New geopolitical eras are usually unclear at the beginning. The Soviet Union and the United States took until the Cuban Missile Crisis to really understand each other’s red lines and how to compete in a way that averted Armageddon. After World War I, it took over a decade to understand the fragility and vulnerability of the peace. The risks of German unification in 1870 took over 20 years to come into focus.

New geopolitical eras also present great risk. We can be blind to the trajectory of threats, just as President Obama failed to understand how far Vladimir Putin was willing to go in interfering in the U.S. electoral system until it occurred. It also increases the risk of inadvertent escalation and needless conflicts. In the 1960s, the United States intervened in Vietnam because it feared the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, when nationalism and anti-colonialism was what really motivated the North Vietnamese. As we grasp for analogies, looking for the familiar—thinking that this is a new Cold War or looking for an overarching one-size-fits-all narrative—we make mistakes.

With full awareness of our limitations in understanding our era in real time, we can make an educated guess as to the character and shape of the strategic environment in which the alliance system must now function.

The first observation is that while major war is always possible, modern great power competition is likely to unfold beneath that threshold. The United States, China, and Russia all have strong incentives to avoid direct confrontation with each other. The risks—of loss of life, the collapse of governments or regimes, and an adverse turn in international order—far exceed the potential gains. But each of the major powers has many other strategies and tactics they can employ, including many

that fall into the category of coercion and hard power. These include economic warfare, political and information warfare, proxy wars, cyberattacks, and active measures and covert operations. Elsewhere, I have labeled this “all measures short of war.” To maintain relevance in the twenty-first century, alliances must develop the capacity to deal with this full spectrum of threats in an integrated way. Unfortunately, the alliance structures currently lack many of the necessary competencies, such as economic and financial power and the ability to counter political interference.

The second observation is that great power revisionism is a particularly thorny problem that great powers and alliances have always struggled to deal with. Revisionist powers seek to acquire or influence territory through coercive measures—sometimes outright invasion but on other occasions coups, political interference, and using economic leverage. Revisionists tend to go after the non-vital interests of their rivals, which enables them to argue that the entire relationship should not be put at risk for the sake of something of limited value. The problem is that revisionist acts call into question the basic rules of the order and in the aggregate a number of non-vital territories can amount to a vital interest. For instance, one act of land reclamation in the South China Sea may be strategically insignificant, but hundreds or thousands could give China effective control over that area.

During the Cold War, the United States responded to Soviet revisionism by threatening general war in Europe, by resisting aggression or perceived aggression in Asia, and by waging an intelligence and covert war against communism globally. This strategy was effective in places but disastrous in others—it held the line in Western Europe and Korea but also led to the Vietnam War. Today, the United States struggles to cope with limited acts of aggression. Drawing a line to limit U.S. guarantees to allies has the unintended consequence of permitting aggression elsewhere. Reliance on sanctions means that the adversary may conclude the reward is worth the cost. Providing lethal military assistance has a deterrent effect but also runs the risk of escalation. Preventing acts of revisionism is one of the most difficult strategic challenges the allies will face in coming decades.

The third observation is that this new rivalry is not just about spheres of influence or defending the frontier. It is about how we live and the nature of our societies. As we saw earlier, the Russian and Chinese regimes

have concluded that unfettered liberalism internationally poses an existential threat to them. Other authoritarians, in the Arab world and elsewhere, share this mind-set. Their pushback is not confined to their own borders—it is about undermining liberalism in the West, whether it is in the form of interference in democracy, undermining a free media, coercing private companies, or bolstering vulnerable or rising authoritarians in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere. It is a clash of alternative models.

Ultimately, it may be this societal dimension that motivates democracies to engage in the competition. The American people have never been solely motivated by a desire to make the world a better place for its own sake. They have been moved to action to protect liberty at home. The policy elite wanted to create a postwar Western order organized around free trade, institutions, and forward deployed forces, but it was the fear of communism threatening the American way of life that created the consensus behind this plan. Today, progressives, centrists, constitutional conservatives, and others must take into account foreign forces hostile to their interests and beliefs.

The fourth observation is that the character of today's rivalry will be defined in large part by technological change just as the Cold War was defined by the nuclear revolution. Developments in artificial intelligence and quantum technology look likely to transform warfare, rivalry, and society in general. Technological breakthroughs could enable rising powers to leapfrog over the United States, and they may render military assets redundant. For instance, many experts have speculated that aircraft carriers may be particularly vulnerable to autonomous weapons, while changes in cryptography could eliminate America's edge in integrated operations. Breakthroughs in one technology may have an even greater impact when paired with breakthroughs in another. And, as with nuclear technology, military innovations will shape and alter civilian life.

These four features—competition beneath the threshold of major war, revisionism, a clash of models, and technological innovation—constitute the broad strategic framework in which the modern alliance system will operate.

There is, of course, a question hanging in the air: Will the United States remain committed to the alliance system? That this question even needs to be posed is rather astonishing—for over six decades, successive American presidents reiterated their commitment to the major alliances, especially in Europe and Asia. But Donald Trump's election as president of

the United States raises doubts about this commitment. He has openly questioned the benefit that Americans derive from the alliances, not just recently but over a 30-year period. He threatened to leave NATO at the 2018 NATO summit if his demands were not met. On other occasions, he suggested that his willingness to honor treaty obligations was conditional on defense spending. A senior official in his administration was quoted as describing Trump's foreign policy as "no friends, no enemies." His secretary of defense, Jim Mattis, resigned in December 2018 citing fundamental differences with the president on the importance of America's alliances. At the same time, the administration writ large has pursued policies that have sought to maintain and even strengthen the alliances, including by devoting more funding for deterrence operations in Eastern Europe.

There is simply no way of knowing in 2019 if the rise of a nationalistic America First movement is a temporary phenomenon or a long-term trend. Barring a major shock, it seems likely that Trump will maintain America's basic alliance commitments for the remainder of his first term, but beyond 2020 it is much less clear. If Trump is reelected or if another person wins on a similar platform, the world may conclude that the United States has fundamentally changed. At that point, we can expect real hedging to occur as countries adjust to the new reality. America would surely remain engaged in the world, but on very different terms—it would likely engage in transactional relations with friends and foes alike in pursuit of narrowly defined short-term interests.

Regardless of how this debate turns out, it seems likely that future American presidents will look for ways of demonstrating how the alliance system serves American interests. In this, they may benefit from the deteriorating international security environment. The United States finds itself on the front lines of the emerging great power competition, with attacks on the democratic process and political system, a technological arms race, and an unstable economic relationship with China. In such a world, alliances with like-minded powers will be easier to explain. The postwar system may find itself with a new lease on life.

2. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF AMERICA'S ALLIANCES IN UPHOLDING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER?

Dr. Kori Schake

U.S. government officials relish complaining about allies' shortcomings—stinginess with defense spending, stalling to avoid action-forcing decisions, resistance to supporting U.S. policies, and a dearth of alternative policy suggestions for hard problems. But Americans think too little about serious and legitimate questions about our own reliability and the potential effects on alliance relationships. Much as the United States may fulminate about our allies, we often fail to realize that allies have legitimate, enduring complaints about American behavior.

The United States' allies are not newly worried about the reliability of the United States; they have always been worried about the reliability of the United States,¹ and with good reason. Any time partners have an asymmetry of power, where one is reliant on the other in important ways, abandonment anxiety is a natural consequence—one needs something that is provided by another and fears it may be withheld.

The United States' allies have also traditionally and even simultaneously worried about the other extreme, of being pulled into conflict because the United States chooses it, when allies would rather compromise than fight, or the United States seeks to uphold global norms or

1. See, for example, Jeet Heer, "Trump's Mouth Has Made the U.S. an Unreliable Ally," *New Republic*, May 16, 2017; Zachary Keck, "Why Don't Allies Trust the U.S.?" *Diplomat*, October 29, 2013; "An Unreliable Ally," *The Economist*, March 6, 2008.

obligations at the expense of regional allies' interests.² Our partners fear both too little and too much U.S. activism.

And the United States' allies are much more worried than usual, with Donald Trump as president. His belief is consistent across several decades that allies are taking advantage of the United States and therefore alliances work to our detriment.³ His first foreign policy action as president was to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. His Korea policy seems blithely indifferent to the geopolitical—not to mention human—costs of a preventive war with North Korea. Allies fear he will be a wrecking ball for the international order the United States itself brought into existence after World War II. He appears spectacularly insensitive to the costs of calling the existing order into question, something that has not been true of previous U.S. presidents in the last 70 years.

U.S. indifference to the price tag for allies of erratic or cost-imposing behavior by the current guarantor of the international order understandably has allies questioning whether there may be alternatives to reliance on the United States. The debate is especially keen in Asia, which lacks the deep network of institutional relationships that integrate much of Europe and is the region most exposed to Chinese challenges to the existing order. But where China poses risks through its waxing power, Russia also poses significant risks even though its power is waning.

In the absence of another liberal security guarantor, or the ability to strengthen themselves so dramatically that revisionist states cannot impinge on their national security, countries allied to the United States would seem to have a narrow range of choice: make accommodation with challengers, web the United States in so tightly the president cannot extract it, or try to sustain the international order without U.S. leadership.

WHY AN ISOLATIONIST AMERICA BUILT AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Britain, in the time of its hegemony, excelled at creating temporary alliances of countries for limited purposes. The balance of power on the European

2. These seemingly contradictory findings routinely come through in Lowy Institute polls of Australian attitudes. See 2017 Lowy Institute Poll, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2017-lowy-institute-poll>.

3. Thomas Wright, "Trump's 19th Century Foreign Policy," *Politico*, January 20, 2016.

continent—the international effort that resulted in Wellington’s victory over Napoleon at Waterloo, for example—was a coalition of the willing, a fluid set of changing alliance relationships. What Britain began to experiment with late in its primacy was the model adopted by the United States in its hegemony: standing defense obligations. Unpopular as those proved for Europeans in World War I, the emergence of a hegemon willing to provide security guarantees both stabilized the international order and dramatically reduced the cost to allies and the hegemon alike.⁴

There is furious contention among political scientists over what has caused the exceptionally long period since World War II in which a great power conflict has not occurred. Leading explanations include the existence of nuclear weapons, which increase the damage to an excruciating threshold for the strongest powers, fresh memories of war’s horrors and the magnitude of recent suffering inhibiting politicians’ appetites for gain, or the strongest powers never intending war despite contending ideologies.⁵

Liberal internationalists contend that the cause of peace is that, out of the ashes of World War II, the United States “fostered a self-reinforcing pattern of cooperation and success.”⁶ The United States set and enforced rules that worked not only to its benefit, but also to the benefit of other states, creating a predictable environment by extending security guarantees that buffered the international order against crises and gave national politicians justification for taking unpopular decisions to advance a common good.⁷ The United States also voluntarily limited its own latitude of international action by constructing and ensconcing itself in international institutions that legitimated its power for other states.⁸ Playing by the rules of the U.S. order over time changed its participants’

4. Adam Tooze powerfully recounts the costs of the U.S. unwillingness in the interwar period. Adam Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931* (New York: Penguin, 2014), 8.

5. These theories have been advanced by Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1959), and Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977). For a devastating critique of each, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973).

6. Richard Baldwin, “The World Trade Organization and the Future of Multilateralism,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 30, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 106.

7. Michael J. Mazarr and Ashley L. Rhoades, *Testing the Value of the Postwar International Order* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 30.

8. G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” *International Security* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1988–1999): 43–78.

sense of their identity such that cooperative problem solving emerged as the norm.⁹ In crises, states in the U.S. order had both the inclination and the institutional means to cooperate, tamping down potential conflict.¹⁰

While the United States has not always been a benevolent hegemon, as it grew more powerful, it has grown more liberal.¹¹ The U.S. order has succeeded because it conjured an ecosystem in which peace and prosperity went together. The United States created a global operating system for the international order: rules, norms, and institutions.¹² The United States provided security, rewarded the rule of law and representative governance domestically, expanded trade internationally, established norms of behavior fostering cooperation, and created institutions that legitimate power by voluntarily constraining the action of the hegemon.¹³ States that opt into the U.S. order tend to become both the most prosperous and the least ravaged by war. Thus, the order had a network effect of becoming more attractive and successful the more “customers” (states adhering to an agreed set of domestic and international behaviors) chose to participate.

The cooperative and legitimated nature of the postwar U.S. order explains why, unlike previous hegemons, there has been so little effort by other powerful states to cooperate in opposition to America. There is actually very little evidence of countries balancing against the United States.¹⁴

It is sometimes difficult, now so far removed from the last world war, to remember that this international order was not the creation of soft-headed globalists, naïve about the world, but of the hard men who had fought Nazi Germany and imperial Japan. They sought to create a different kind of order that would defang the competition intrinsic among nations. They agreed to tithe into a system that would stabilize the order

9. The idea that national identities are political constructions is advanced by Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

10. Daniel Drezner, *The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 14.

11. For the long version of this argument, see Kori Schake, *Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).

12. Admiral Harry Harris, “Deterring Revisionist Powers,” lecture at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Center, March 3, 2017.

13. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

14. Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 18–21.

so as to not have to pay the much higher price of beating back violent challenges when they had acquired great dimensions. America is a principal beneficiary of the postwar order because we have not had to fight wars of the magnitude our country did in the first half of the twentieth century.

In addition to wars avoided, the cooperative structure of America's alliances also reduced the cost to us of every other international initiative we have undertaken. Our standing alliances create a presumption of participation by our allies in wars they may not have a direct interest in.¹⁵ While more cost-effective for allies (they would have to divert more national resources to defense in the absence of an American security guarantee), they provide additional resources for American military undertakings. They also reduce transaction costs during wars, because we have the familiarity of routine interaction among militaries of allied countries and therefore fight more effectively because of practice.

As a recent RAND study concluded, the United States has not been merely another great power: it has been the architect of a system of mutual advantage. This simple fact has carried significant geopolitical advantage. "Without the benefits and legitimacy conferred by such an order, vibrant U.S. leadership would likely become financially and strategically unaffordable."¹⁶

HAVE WE REACHED THE BREAKING POINT?

The success of the order, though, made the distribution of its costs and benefits unequal: as the United States' allies became more prosperous, their continued reliance on the United States to provide public goods that allies themselves were capable of providing chafed.¹⁷ Economist Mancur Olson anticipated the shifting center of gravity in the 1950s and used it as the defining example for the inescapability of recipients of nonexcludable benefits free-riding on the principal provider of the common good.¹⁸ Dwight Eisenhower, as allied-minded as any U.S. president, would be shocked to find U.S. troops returning to Europe to protect European

15. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen made this argument often while NATO secretary general.

16. Mazarr and Rhoades, *Testing the Value of the Postwar International Order*, xv.

17. Robert Gates, quoted in Michael Birnbaum, "Gates Rebukes Allies in Farewell Speech," *Washington Post*, June 10, 2011.

18. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

allies this strong and prosperous against a Russia this weak—in his testimony supporting the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe, Eisenhower emphasized that it was a temporary measure until European economies recovered sufficiently to provide their own military forces. That time has long passed.

The problem predates President Trump, even if he is more incendiary than other U.S. politicians in his demands for what he considers a more equal sharing of the burden. As frustrated as U.S. officials are with allies' lag, does that mean the center cannot hold? That is, will the U.S. recede from being the provider of guarantees, the enforcer of rules in the international order? What will it mean for the order if the United States no longer serves as its fulcrum?

There is beginning to be evidence that having some experience with the international consequences of President Trump's approach to alliances, the American people disagree with his policies. Support for maintaining existing U.S. alliances has increased among all American voters, including those who support President Trump.¹⁹ The majority of Americans continue to believe the NATO alliance is essential to our security, including 82 percent of Democrats and 60 percent of Republicans. A majority were also willing to commit U.S. forces if an ally were attacked. Typically, those numbers increase dramatically for U.S. respondents during crises or when political leaders invest in making the case to our public.

Numbers are likewise moving strongly positive about trade, another major element of the liberal international order to which President Trump objects. Substantial increases have been registered supporting the views that trade is good for the economy, that it helps “consumers like you” and (by a whopping increase of 17 percentage points since 2016) that trade is creating jobs in the United States. So, counterintuitive to their voting patterns, U.S. citizens may be concluding they like the U.S.-led order. My sense of the dynamic is that President Trump voiced widespread U.S. concern about trade and alliances and, as a result of him questioning their value, precipitated the public's thinking its way through the issues and coming to different conclusions than he advocates.

19. “U.S. Opinion on America First,” *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, 2017, <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/issue/public-opinion>.

Even if the United States recalibrates, enduring damage may already have been done to the postwar order. It may regain the willingness but lose the means to sustain the order. As historian Arnold Toynbee cautioned, great civilizations die by suicide, not homicide. The wheels appear to be coming off the U.S. experiment in democracy. Even if our institutions prove robust enough to endure the corrosion of norms that have sustained them, the U.S. government has not been functioning well: nine out of the past ten years, Congress has failed to pass a budget, leaving the government operating on temporary extensions of prior spending levels and leaching the ability to prioritize or manage activity; neither the executive nor legislative branches have demonstrated the ability to curb deficit spending, with national debt burgeoning to nearly 100 percent of GDP; and voters are averting their eyes from the fiscal irresponsibility and intergenerational unfairness of entitlement programs soaking up the majority of federal spending. The magnetism that has drawn countries to join the U.S.-led order is dimming.

And China continues to rise, its prosperity undimmed by the lack of political liberalization, the increasing aggressiveness of its military claims, its attempts to subvert domestic politics in other countries becoming more blatant, and the political and economic cost rising for countries that challenge its policies. Not only are allied countries consenting to Chinese rules of order, U.S. companies are as well.

Yet it is easy to overstate the likelihood of China supplanting the United States, and to understate the ability of free societies to solve their problems. The United States' allies have alternatives to meekly accepting Chinese dominion over the international order.

A Chinese-led order is not so attractive a prospect that it will come easily, even if the existing Chinese government proves able to sustain its grip on power and avoid an economic stall. The very attributes that have made the U.S. order cost-effective will make establishing and maintaining an alternative order expensive for China. The rules China wants to establish benefit China without limiting its power or expanding its benefits. Countries in the region prefer the current order, as their clinging to the United States demonstrates. China lacks an ideology with appeal to move publics; governments are likelier to incur opposition domestically for voluntary association with China. Many countries in Asia have begun to be prosperous enough and democratic enough that trade-offs between prosperity and freedom are debatable propositions rather than foregone

conclusions. As a result, China will have to enforce its primacy to a much greater extent than does the United States.

Even more daunting challenges would confront Putin's Russia. Like China, it is a model without the power of inspiration. Unlike China, Russia lacks money to splash around on infrastructure initiatives or bankrolling despots. What Russia has proved more willing than China to use is military force. Both countries intimidate their neighbors, attempting to coerce subjugation on their periphery, but China has proven much more cautious than Russia. China has, so far, settled for conjuring up islands to make territorial claims; Russia's invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimea, possession of a low-grade war festering in Ukraine, creation of intermediate-range nuclear force treaty violations, and the application of covert social media to interfere in U.S. elections are much riskier ventures.²⁰

Because we disparage allied military capabilities in our focus on burden sharing among allies, we often lose sight of the fact that the military power of the United States' allies could defeat any challenger except the United States itself. A rising China or declining Russia don't just have to succeed at peeling the United States off from its alliance commitments or calling the reliability of those commitments into question; they have also to defeat the considerable, consequential military forces of the free countries that will defend each other and defend the order.

Moreover, the United States and its allies have a wide range of tools to drive up the cost of infringements of the existing rules by China or Russia. Both have been interfering in the domestic politics of many countries. As Australia nobly demonstrates, free societies have the advantage of exposing that manipulation and stoking nationalist opposition to it. We also have the means to turn the tables on the Chinese and Russian governments by using their own means against them, countering their messages with messages of our own to their publics—and authoritarian governments may be more vulnerable to the risk because the legitimacy of their control is less. Both are also at greater risk than Western

20. Both countries' behaviors conform to Kahnemann and Tversky's prospect theory, which holds that humans run greater risks when losing than when winning; that "winning streaks" are a function of narrowing risk tolerance when successful, and "losing streaks" represent expanding tolerance for risk in order to recoup losses. Daniel Kahnemann and Amos Tversky, "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 5, no. 4 (October 1992): 297–323.

societies of ethnic or religious fracture because the state is so brittle in its insistence on homogeneity. We in the West often think of our diversity as a vulnerability, but homogeneity can be even riskier because it tends toward single-point failure.

Australia, Japan, and other U.S. allies show yet another aspect of resilience in the order by moving ahead with the Trans-Pacific Partnership despite U.S. withdrawal. Their common defense of the trading regime suggests the U.S.-led order may be sustainable in the absence of clear U.S. leadership. The patterns of cooperation continue to benefit more than just the United States, and the past near 80 years have produced vibrant states that have much greater appeal and power than they often give themselves credit for. Allies predominate in the leadership and lawmaking capability of international institutions (international as well as domestic, commercial, and electoral laws). Locking arms and upholding the order may be sufficient to the task of containing a belligerent China and Russia, filling the chasm left by a self-absorbed United States, at least for a while.

How long the order can be sustained in these circumstances probably depends on whether the current malaise in U.S. politics is an aberration or becomes the norm. But that too is amenable to influence by the United States' allies. It matters to Americans how we look to our friends. Germany has taken to public shaming of the United States; Canada's tack is to reach into the United States domestically to work with subnational actors—businesses and state governments—to pressure the U.S. federal government from within. Both are effective, in different ways and with different sectors of the United States. What they have in common is the ability to shift attitudes by utilizing their influence within the United States' body politic. That is, what China and Russia do clandestinely in our free societies to subvert them, the United States' allies have the ability to employ overtly and successfully within the United States. That may be the ultimate victory of the postwar international order the United States has created: our allies help us to right ourselves.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

Theories of Alliances and Alignments

Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper

The United States has used alliances in fundamentally different ways than other major powers before and since.¹ In the wake of World War II, after deciding it could no longer rely on homeland defense to keep the country safe in a world of long-range power projection, it granted a diverse and far-flung set of security guarantees, invoking the new UN Charter and its collective self-defense provisions.² It did so with three strategic objectives in mind: to deter major conflicts from breaking out in Europe or Asia;³ to better defend itself and its allies if conflict did erupt;⁴ and to assure new treaty partners that they would not succumb

1. For a far more in-depth exploration of this argument, see Mira Rapp-Hooper, *Shield of the Republic: The History and Hereafter of America's Alliances* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), chap. 1.

2. Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 158; Chapter VII, Article 51 states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" (<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>).

3. Bernard Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt, 1946), 76; Bernard Brodie, *The Anatomy of Deterrence* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1958), 3–5; Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 8; Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977), 11; Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988).

4. Stacie L. Pettyjohn, *US Global Defense Posture: 1783–2011* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012).

to an adversary attack, which, in turn, gave Washington a measure of control over allied national security policies.⁵

Major powers had, of course, concluded alliances before—there had long been cooperative endeavors in which members pooled their resources to prosecute conflict with a common enemy.⁶ Prior to the advent of long-range power projection and the body of international law, alliances tended to be formed with a particular theater or contingency in mind.⁷ They aimed to deter and defend against a particular war that the parties could anticipate, as opposed to guaranteeing the political independence and territorial integrity of the client state for an indefinite period of time.⁸ This led one leading scholar of international relations to deem them “temporary marriages of convenience.”⁹

America’s postwar security guarantees, in contrast, were broad in their scope, ambiguous in their content, and designed so they might never be used at all.¹⁰ The precise conditions under which they would be invoked and the actions that would be forthcoming were purposefully vague so as to reduce the chances of opportunism from allies and adversaries

5. Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses,” in *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation*, ed. Jeffrey W. Knopf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 14; Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Pacific in the Second Nuclear Age,” in *Strategic Asia, 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013); Jeremy Pressman, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).

6. Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 10.

7. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 8, 14; Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 5 (2000): 692–693; Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 211.

8. For a consummate example of this type of alliance specificity, see George Kennan’s treatment of the Franco-Russian alliance. George F. Kennan, *The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1984).

9. John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1995): 9.

10. See Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 10, for more discussion of the “guarantee” motive. This guarantee motive is certainly present in most asymmetric alliances (e.g., U.S.-ROK, U.S.-Japan)—the client is not expected to provide military assistance to the patron outside of its home territory. NATO also involves an asymmetric guarantee where nuclear weapons are concerned, but because it is a collective defense pact, member states can be called upon to assist the United States outside of Europe. Ironically, the only time NATO’s Article V has ever been invoked was on behalf of the United States following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

alike.¹¹ What had once been a tool for targeted deterrence, and for fighting and winning discrete conflicts, became a strategy for declaring American interests in a manner that would freeze the political status quo indefinitely—or at least that was the objective.¹² This was a momentous shift in the role that alliances played in geostrategy, particularly in peacetime.

While the Soviet Union had its own system of alliances within the Soviet bloc, the Warsaw Pact was hardly a consensual arrangement among sovereign states. The British had a handful of pacts with former colonies, but these were essentially tools for managing eventual UK military withdrawal. And while plenty of other countries conclude more symmetric defense pacts, they do not make broad, open-ended promises of security aid that are intended to apply indefinitely. The American alliance system therefore remains unique in the breadth and endurance of its alliance commitments, and, relatedly, in the overall importance of security guarantees to foreign policy strategy.

Academic literature on alliances, however, does not treat American alliance treaties as *sui generis*—this is simply not the nature of political science. In studies both quantitative and qualitative, the United States is just one of many hundreds of security patrons that have formed alliances throughout history. By lumping American alliances in with those of other states that did not seek and were not capable of employing security guarantees to such ambitious ends, we risk obscuring dynamics that are wholly unique to the American system.

Relatedly, the length in force of American alliances also means their underlying dynamics may elude many academic treatments. While international relations scholars have placed their focus on why and under what conditions countries form and break alliances, or the twin dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment that affect alliance management, this seminal scholarship does not necessarily speak to the dynamics that

11. James D. Morrow, "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (2000): 73; George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 132; Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 77–78. One obvious drawback to broader, less contingent agreements is that they may encourage moral hazard. See Brett V. Benson, *Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3–6, 71–90.

12. For more on this, see Mira Rapp-Hooper, "Absolute Alliances: Extended Deterrence in International Politics," unpublished dissertation, Columbia University, 2014.

pervade an uncommon set of alliances—one that has been robust enough to outlast its original intended purposes.¹³

U.S. security guarantees have been resilient enough to survive major economic crises, conflicts, and even changes in the structure of the international system—namely, the collapse of the Soviet Union. Over the years, these guarantees have taken on many of the characteristics of formal institutions.¹⁴ But as they endure, the most relevant set of strategic alliance questions are those related to change over time—how do America’s alliances adapt to transformation from within as well as from without? How will these alliances meet new threats in familiar domains? To threats in entirely novel domains? To changed economic circumstances, or to the rise of a new major power competitor? To a new balance of power within the alliance itself? On these questions, the academic literature is far more hushed than we might expect, primarily because so few alliances have survived to face such charges.

This volume endeavors to address precisely this set of contemporary alliance queries. With contributions from leading scholar-practitioners, the compendium asks and addresses some of the most pressing questions about how American alliances might adjust to a quickly changing international order, to new domains, to emerging regional roles and missions, and to novel internal and external challenges. It proceeds in four parts.

ALLIANCES AND ORDER

Particularly since the 2016 election, strategists on both sides of the political divide have pondered the fate of the so-called liberal international order—the collection of norms, laws, and institutions supported by U.S. power, that have generally governed international politics since 1945. The

13. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland, 1979); Stephen M. Walt, *Origins of Alliance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Snyder, *Alliance Politics*; Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*.

14. James D. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” *International Organization* 52, no. 2 (1998): 269–305; Brett Ashley Leeds, “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation,” *American Journal of Political Science* (1999): 979–1002; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” *International Organization* 50 (1996): 379–406; Lisa L. Martin, *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

consensus prognosis is that this order is in peril.¹⁵ Scholars differ markedly in their diagnoses of the causes of the threat, however, as well as in their prescriptions for meeting it.¹⁶ In these incipient debates, the role of America's alliances has received relatively scant attention. Yet, as experts continue to diagnose how Washington should respond to a shifting international order, concerted alliance interrogation is warranted.

Particularly in the context of a quickly ascending and more muscular China, U.S. strategists must contemplate the relationship between American security guarantees and international order. When postwar planners first set out to craft the institutions and laws that would prevent conflict, they focused around the UN and its attendant institutions. Several years later, and once the early Cold War began to set in, alliances were layered on top of this apparatus, as American policymakers increasingly understood it to be insufficient for managing competition with the Soviet Union.¹⁷ In the eyes of many American strategists, U.S. alliances are a nearly immutable feature of geopolitics. But other major powers do not necessarily see these alliances as structural, and this has significant

15. Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, "The Day after Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order," *Washington Quarterly*, March/April 2018; Kori Schake, "The Trump Doctrine Is Winning and the World Is Losing," *New York Times*, June 15, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/opinion/sunday/trump-china-america-first.html>; Robert Kagan, "Welcome to the Jungle," *Washington Post*, October 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/welcome-to-the-jungle/2018/10/09/of8ffb58-cbc5-11e8-a3e6-44daa3d35ede_story.html?utm_term=.9231deb867f4; Thomas Wright, "The Foreign Crises Awaiting Trump," *The Atlantic*, January 20, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/trump-russia-putin-north-korea-putin/513749/>; Stewart M. Patrick, "An Open World Is in the Balance: What Might Replace the Liberal Order?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, January 10, 2017, <http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2017/01/10/an-open-world-is-in-the-balance-what-might-replace-the-liberal-order/>; Jeremi Suri, "How Trump's Executive Orders Could Set America Back 70 Years," *The Atlantic*, January 27, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trumps-executive-orders-will-set-america-back-70-years/514730/>; Richard N. Haass, "Liberal World Order, R.I.P.," *Council on Foreign Relations*, March 21, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/article/liberal-world-order-rip>.

16. G. John Ikenberry, "The End of the Liberal International Order?" *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (January 2018): 7–23; Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Liberal Order Isn't Coming Back: What Next?" *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas* 48 (Spring 2018); Heather Hurlburt, "Foreign Policy After Trump: The U.S. Has Homework to Do," *Lawfare*, June 26, 2018, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-policy-after-trump-us-has-homework-to-do>; Lissner and Rapp-Hooper, "The Day after Trump," 7–25.

17. See, for example, Michael J. Mazarr, "The Real History of the Liberal International Order," *Foreign Affairs*, August 7, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-08-07/real-history-liberal-order>.

implications for the role of alliances as the international order continues to change.

China sees international order as primarily deriving from the UN system.¹⁸ It views U.S. alliances as a policy choice, and one that has outlasted its Cold War purpose to become threatening to it.¹⁹ If America's alliances were universally acknowledged as an aspect of the international order, we would expect them to continue to be strong tools of deterrence and defense even as other aspects of the order are challenged. If, however, a rising China continues to dispute the role of U.S. alliances in the international system, we should expect direct challenges to these alliances and the role that they play in American strategy. Under such conditions, Washington will not only need to use its alliances for defense of its interests, but will need to defend alliances themselves.

ALLIANCE MECHANICS

With major geopolitical shifts in the international system and the order that is used to manage it, the mechanics of alliances are also changing. The U.S. alliance system was crafted primarily to deter two types of conflicts—major conventional and nuclear war. For the United States, nuclear weapons were at the center of its postwar alliance bargains. It possessed the world's deadliest weapons and hoped to prevent their spread. By promising to extend deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, to faraway friends, it reduced their incentives to proliferate these weapons, while also making it less likely that these countries would be attacked. The record of American conventional and nuclear deterrence efforts has been remarkable.

Conflict, by its nature, shifts with time. Deterrence success breeds adversary innovation.²⁰ Future American deterrence efforts will not look exactly like they have in the past. How exactly should American alliances

18. Michael Mazarr, Timothy Heath, and Astrid Cevallos, *China and the International Order* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018); Evan Feigenbaum, "Reluctant Stakeholder: Why China's Highly-Strategic Brand of Revisionism Is More Challenging Than Washington Thinks," *MacroPolo*, April 27, 2018, <https://macropolo.org/reluctant-stakeholder-chinas-highly-strategic-brand-revisionism-challenging-washington-thinks/>.

19. Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, "How China Sees America," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 5 (September/October 2012): 32–47; Mazarr et al., *China and the International Order*, 29.

20. Hal Brands, "Paradoxes of the Gray Zone," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, February 5, 2016, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/>.

apply to long-standing, but increasingly salient, domains like conflicts that occur below the conventional threshold? Where exactly do deterrent and defensive thresholds apply in newer domains, like cyberspace? International legal scholars agree, for example, that international law applies in cyberspace, meaning that the law of armed conflict, including that which sanctions alliances, should apply to some types of cyberattacks. But there is, as of yet, no consensus on where “attack” thresholds lie that would bring into force America’s alliances in a cyberconflict. Moreover, potential challengers like China hold different views of the very same law and are therefore likely to interpret thresholds differently.²¹

American planners will not be absolved of the need to strategize for nuclear and conventional defense and deterrence. But they will increasingly be inundated with other forms of conflict, and concomitantly barraged with questions about how American alliances apply. If, indeed, they endeavor to use alliances as deterrence in cyberspace and other, newer domains, this will also necessitate new forms of cooperation outside of government—in particular, between Washington and Silicon Valley. The mechanics of defense and deterrence in new and evolving domains cannot simply be imported from more familiar ones.

REGIONAL ALLIANCES

The remarkable endurance of American alliances means they have outlasted the foe and mission sets for which they were originally intended. In every region in which the United States has allies it is faced with questions about adaptation. These questions concern the strategic objectives of these alliances, the military postures that will allow them to deter and defend those interests in a contemporary context, and the diplomatic, military, and other ingredients of allied assurance that will be required to manage the relationships.

In Northeast Asia, the challenges facing American alliances are considerable. How must the U.S.-ROK alliance adapt to new nuclear defense and deterrence challenges posed by a North Korea with an increasingly mature nuclear arsenal? In particular, how can Washington assure Seoul

21. Julian Ku, “Forcing China to Accept That International Law Restricts Cyber Warfare May Not Actually Benefit the U.S.,” *Lawfare*, August 25, 2017, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/forcing-china-accept-international-law-restricts-cyber-warfare-may-not-actually-benefit-us>.

of the continued credibility of its commitments in the face of a deliverable North Korean ICBM capability? This is one of the most vexing tasks that allies can face in nuclear strategy.²² In the U.S.-Japan alliance, Washington and Tokyo must address profound questions about how to adapt the pact for abundant conventional challenges. In particular, China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities raise a slew of difficulties for the American ability to mount a direct defense of the First Island Chain, and China has chosen its defense posture to attenuate American security guarantees.²³ In Europe, Russia is stagnant at best, but its defense strategy places NATO's eastern flank at risk, raising a distinct set of questions about how the alliance can credibly defend itself.²⁴

In Asia, strategists increasingly recognize the structure of American alliances to be something of an anachronism. In the immediate postwar years, U.S. officials extended bilateral as opposed to multilateral treaties in Asia, largely because incipient allies had different primary security concerns, and many were anxious about the possibility of a rearmed Japan.²⁵ The demise of the Soviet Union, Tokyo's postwar record as a regional leader, and China's continued rapid ascent create ample incentives for deeper multilateral cooperation in Asia among U.S. allies.²⁶ This

22. Mira Rapp-Hooper, "Decoupling Is Back in Asia: A 1960s Playbook Won't Solve These Problems," *War on the Rocks*, September 7, 2017, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/decoupling-is-back-in-asia-a-1960s-playbook-wont-solve-these-problems/>.

23. Aaron Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014); Thomas G. Mahnken, "Weapons: The Growth and Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime," *Daedalus* 140, no. 3 (Summer 2011); Evan Braden Montgomery, "Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China's Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection," *International Security* 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 115-149.

24. David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016); Ulrich Kuhn, *Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2018); Michael Birnbaum, "If They Needed to Fend Off War with Russia, U.S. Military Leaders Worry They May Not Get There in Time," *Washington Post*, June 24, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-us-troops-could-get-stuck-in-a-traffic-jam-on-their-way-to-fend-off-war-with-russia/2018/06/24/2c8ed46e-52cf-11e8-a6d4-ca1d035642ce_story.html?utm_term=.4e3f773e1d6.

25. Victor Cha, *Power Play: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); Michael J. Green, *By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), chap. 7.

26. Richard Fontaine, Patrick M. Cronin, Mira Rapp-Hooper, and Harry Krejsa, *Networking Asian Security: An Integrated Approach to Order in the Pacific* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2017); Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Zack

incipient cooperation largely remains ad hoc and informal, making it more difficult for “networked” relationships to produce deterrence. How can these new configurations proceed in a manner that accounts for Asian allies’ resources and domestic political constraints while also making meaningful defense contributions?

In both Europe and Asia, the material capabilities of allies have been utterly transformed from their immediate postwar states. Since the inception of the American alliance system, U.S. presidents have worried whether allies were contributing enough to their own defense. Yet there can be no doubt that U.S. treaty partners are no longer war-torn countries in danger of imminent economic collapse or wholesale invasion—indeed, nearly all are consolidated, thriving democracies. The multitude of global challenges to American strategy and alliances has resurfaced the age-old question of whether allies are contributing fairly, and how they might spend more—or at least spend more efficiently.²⁷ This debate is unlikely to fade when the current occupant of the White House decamps.

Finally, evolving regional threats raise a novel set of questions about the role of American partners, as opposed to formal allies. While policymakers are wont to mention “allies and partners in the same breath,” defense partnerships are fundamentally different from formal treaty alliances. Simply by virtue of deciding to extend formal security guarantees to a select group of allies, American policymakers have engaged in a selection process that carries substantial signaling weight.²⁸ This, of course, does not mean that less formal defense partnerships cannot constitute important relationships—only that we should not expect them to function identically to a distinct form of statecraft. Particularly in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, however, U.S. policymakers are likely to seek to wring greater security efficiencies out of existing and

Cooper, *Federated Defense in Asia* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014).

27. Kathleen H. Hicks et al., *Counting Dollars or Measuring Value: Assessing NATO and Partner Burden Sharing* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).

28. On the signaling value of formal alliance, see Morrow, “Alliances,” 63–83; James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (1997): 68–90; Branislav Slantchev, “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises,” *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (2005): 534; Branislav L. Slantchev, *Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 61, 78–80; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*; Robert L. Jervis, *The Logic of Images* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

newer partnerships. Precisely how those strategies should be crafted and with what objectives will be essential to American strategy.

ALLIANCE CHALLENGES

As U.S. policymakers seek to adapt a remarkably resilient set of alliances to twenty-first-century threats, they must keep a watchful eye on a final set of questions—how might U.S. security guarantees be attenuated and broken? Ample academic literature has explored the reliability of alliances in wartime—that is, how often and under what conditions countries uphold pledges to support their allies when attacked.²⁹ It has also explored the conditions that may lead to formal termination.³⁰ Beyond the important insight that alliances may shatter amid considerable changes in the balance of power, however, far less attention has been given to the microprocesses that may attenuate and erode them more subtly, both from within and from without.

Over the course of the Cold War, the United States ended a few of its own alliances when they no longer suited its strategy, including its disbanding of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and its abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Pact. While the Soviet Union tested NATO in myriad ways, Washington has no experience with having its alliances broken by an adversary. If China continues to abjure American alliances as it ascends, what strategies is it likely to employ to drive wedges between the United States and its allies?³¹ How do these differ from the spoiling approaches Russia is likely to inflict on NATO, and what are Washington's best rejoinders?

Finally, and perhaps most important, America's own domestic political tumult makes its future role as a security guarantor uniquely

29. Alastair Smith, "Alliance Formation and War," *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 4 (December 1995): 405–425; Brett Ashley Leeds, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel, "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments," *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 461–476; Brett Ashley Leeds, "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties," *International Organization* 57, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 801–827.

30. Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, "Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?" *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 4 (November 2007): 1118–1132.

31. Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, "How China Sees America," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 5 (September/October 2012): 32–47; Michael J. Mazarr et al., *China and the International Order*, 29.

unpredictable. What does domestic public opinion suggest about Washington's future as an ally, and what does international opinion indicate about the degree to which the United States may be able to recoup its traditional alliance role? In a more competitive world with a newly mercurial United States, alliances themselves may be victims of the fracas, perturbed by both internal and external forces. If they are to survive another 70 years, sustainable strategies for alliance defense and resilience will be paramount.

4. VALUES, ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS, AND THE INDO-PACIFIC ORDER

Dr. Daniel Twining

The world of today is far more strategically competitive than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both the inaugural National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy released by the Trump administration argue that great power competition, not terrorism, is the top security challenge faced by the United States. Both Russia and China have made sustained, strategic investments in power projection capabilities that have eroded the United States' military lead. Both Moscow and Beijing seek to build expansive spheres of influence in ways that directly threaten the U.S. strategic position in Europe and Asia, hubs of the global economy and home to a majority of U.S. allies. Both countries have filled strategic space vacated by the United States over the past decade—Russia is a dominant military power in the Middle East for the first time since the 1970s, and China's assertion of suzerainty over South China Sea lanes carrying nearly 40 percent of global trade threatens U.S. economic access to the Asian littoral, a priority of U.S. grand strategy for 70 years.

But Russia and China are not competing against the United States through hard-power instruments alone. Both are conducting influence operations designed to enhance their global influence at the expense of the United States and its allies, including by weakening democratic unity and cohesion through forms of disinformation, media manipulation, and corruption of civic institutions in target countries. It is striking that Russia and China are using a tool kit that combines hard and “sharp”

power to expand their global influence.¹ This is not simply a material competition but also an ideological one. James Mattis, the U.S. secretary of defense, argued in the National Defense Strategy that “China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.”²

By contrast, the debate in the United States centers more narrowly around increasing defense spending and enhancing economic strength—and rather less on other forms of influence. But one source of comparative advantage, as the United States mobilizes to compete strategically against resurgent great powers, is the democratic identity of the United States and many of its allies, as well as the inclusive nature of U.S. alliances and partnerships. China and Russia hardly have allies; each has clients, but neither can mobilize a network of security partners that, in scope and scale, remotely resembles that led by the United States. Chinese “allies” such as Pakistan and North Korea are not embedded in multilateral security alliances like NATO; Russian “allies” such as Belarus and Armenia are often coerced into geopolitical neutralism by the presence of substantial Russian military forces on their territory or along their borders, without their consent.

This paper focuses on the role of alliances in maintaining the rules-based international order that has provided for a longer period of great power peace than any other, and that enabled a form of U.S. leadership that created extensive followership. It considers how U.S. alliances and strategic partnerships must be optimized to reinforce an international order that is under particular strain from the return of great power competition as China rises and places unprecedented pressure on the U.S. position in Asia. It pays special attention to the ideational basis of U.S. alliance leadership, arguing that democracies make the best strategic partners for the United States—and that values-based cooperation is a comparative advantage for the United States, even in a “realist” struggle for power and prestige in the international system, because of its reinforcing effects on U.S. security partnerships.

1. Christopher Walker, ed., *Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence* (Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy, 2017), <https://www.ned.org/sharp-power-rising-authoritarian-influence-forum-report/>.

2. Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

THE LINK BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY

Regimes that do not respect the rights of their own people are unlikely to respect the rights of their neighbors. Those that do not abide by the rule of law at home are less likely to act within the confines of international law abroad. Regimes whose domestic power is unbound by independent institutions are less likely to respect the sanctity of international institutions and the normative principles, such as peaceful resolution of disputes, that underlie them. The domestic politics of authoritarian great powers are organized hierarchically; similarly, countries like China and Russia seek to build hierarchies in international affairs by subjugating the rights of lesser powers. They often do so through the construction of spheres of influence, invoking historical claims to sovereign neighbors that share cultures or mythologizing a halcyon age of tributary relations that subject small states to the whims of big ones.

In fact, most independent nations today do not want to be part of any Russian or Chinese sphere of influence. They want to maintain their sovereignty and their autonomy of action in foreign affairs by protecting their freedom of choice, without being directed or compelled by a foreign capital. In Asia, geography as well as economic opportunity means that every power seeks serviceable relations with Beijing; but at the same time, most nations understand that undue dependence on the Chinese giant creates an asymmetry of influence that puts them at a disadvantage unless healthily balanced by close ties to countervailing powers, such as the United States, Japan, and India. Otherwise, smaller countries—and every country is smaller than China—risk an erosion of their sovereign independence and national security.

The United States enjoys several strategic advantages in its quest for partnerships to shore up security in the Indo-Pacific region. One, paradoxically, is its physical distance from the region itself as an offshore power. This allows U.S. military and diplomatic engagement to reassure Asian nations unsettled by regional military threats without posing an onshore challenge to their sovereignty. A second is the fact that the United States is a status quo power intent on stabilizing the regional order rather than revising it. The primary security challenges to the region emanate from two primary sources. One is a revisionist North Korea that seeks to develop the military capability to prevent the United States from meeting its alliance commitment to defend South Korea. The other is a revisionist

China that has sponsored the dangerously militant regime in Pyongyang, asserted sovereign control over international waters in the South China Sea, and seeks to edge the United States out of the region over time—including by constraining the freedom of sovereign Asian nations to align with the United States in defense of their security and the sanctity of the existing regional order.

A third U.S. advantage lies in its identity as a democracy that can build partnerships with Indo-Pacific powers rooted not only in common interests but in shared values. The key competitive dyads in the region are those between North and South Korea, Japan and China, India and China, and the United States and China. Each of these pits a democratic state against an authoritarian one. The most enduring U.S. bilateral alliances in the region are those between the United States and Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The most promising strategic partnership in the region, and the one that in the realm of defense cooperation has changed the most over the past 15 years, is that between the United States and India. Close behind it is the strategic partnership between Japan and India, which perceive an identical interest in preventing China from dominating the sea lanes linking the Indian and western Pacific oceans, and which oppose Beijing's efforts to construct a Chinese equivalent of a new pan-Eurasian Co-Prosperty Sphere.

By contrast, the U.S. military alliance with Thailand has been constrained by the return of military rule in Bangkok. The U.S. defense alliance with the Philippines has weakened under the erratic strongman rule of Rodrigo Duterte in Manila. U.S. defense cooperation with Vietnam has increased incrementally, naturally so given both countries' growing wariness of Chinese power and ambitions—but there is a natural ceiling to Washington-Hanoi collaboration imposed by the Leninist nature of Vietnam's one-party state.

THE ROLE OF ALLIANCES IN MAINTAINING THE RULES-BASED INTERNATIONAL ORDER

There are several kinds of alliances, and they merit distinguishing between. China and North Korea have enjoyed an alliance since China supported Kim Il-Sung's war of aggression to reunify the peninsula by force. Their alliance is motivated by China's strategic determination to retain North Korea as a buffer state to prevent the reunification of the Korean

peninsula—despite the will of the Korean people—in ways that leaders in Beijing fear could lead that more powerful Korea to align militarily with the United States. China and Pakistan enjoy an alliance motivated by Pakistan’s desire to play China off against Islamabad’s historic rival India, and similarly by China’s interest in shaping a balance of power on the subcontinent that precludes India from challenging China by tying it down in rivalry with its Muslim neighbor. Russia and China, long historical rivals, more recently have enjoyed a form of quasi-alliance that seems designed to check U.S. power in Eurasia and, more immediately, to ward off challenges to the internal control of both authoritarian regimes. In joint appearances, Chinese and Russian leaders frequently declare their mutual opposition to “color revolutions” and other forms of democratic political change that they believe (wrongly) Western powers foster as a means of encircling or undermining them.³

The United States enjoys distinct forms of alliance with Japan and South Korea. For a period after the Pacific war, the alliance was designed to contain Japan from reemerging as an independent great power that could again threaten the peace of Asia. During the Cold War, the United States also used its alliance to co-opt Japan’s industrial strength into the “free world” and prevent its capture by Soviet or Chinese communism. More recently, its Japanese alliance has enabled the United States to remain what Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called a “resident power” in Asia, reassuring Asian powers that the United States remains a security guarantor that can prevent the emergence of raw balance-of-power dynamics that could result from a U.S. withdrawal over the horizon.⁴

The U.S. alliance with South Korea originally formed to freeze the status quo following the Korean War. Since that time, it has incubated a South Korean economic miracle that has seen that country join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as one of Asia’s first industrialized societies. It has also protected a transition to mature democracy in South Korea that stands in stark contrast to the Orwellian dynasty that exists north of the Demilitarized Zone. Its purpose of

3. The author witnessed senior representatives of the Russian and Chinese defense ministries jointly warn against “color revolutions” on stage together at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

4. Robert Gates, “Challenges to Security in the Asia-Pacific,” speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 31, 2008, <http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1253>.

detering a tyrannical, militarized regime in North Korea from unifying the peninsula by force remains as relevant today as it was in 1953.

These and other U.S. alliances with Asian democracies such as Australia and New Zealand help uphold a form of regional order that is determined not by zero-sum contests for power in an anarchic, self-help world, but through predictable patterns and habits of cooperation that provide regional public goods such as freedom of the seas. The alliances operate at multiple levels. In the military domain, they raise the costs to any aggressor by aggregating the capabilities of some of the region's most sophisticated armed forces. In the diplomatic domain, they provide institutionalized channels of cooperation on issues such as proliferation that could otherwise destabilize the regional order. In the economic domain, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements that affect not only commerce between nations but regulatory regimes within them are reinforced by close military and diplomatic partnership. This is why astute observers understand that U.S. trade agreements are tools of grand strategy more than tools of simple economic exchange, and it is why Washington was unwise to retreat from its commitment to the Trans-Pacific Partnership—even if already President Donald Trump is suggesting he could return the United States to the negotiations.⁵

Institutionalized regional habits of collaboration, anchored in democratic alliance structures, in turn help promote global cooperation between the United States and its core Asian allies. This is evident in global bodies like the United Nations, in global clubs that regulate trade in dual-use technologies, and in multilateral processes designed to manage borderless threats such as climate change and migration. U.S. alliance structures also enable collaboration between regions—for instance, Prime Minister Abe of Japan has long cultivated the United States' NATO allies in Europe in a bid to construct what Foreign Minister Taro Aso, in 2007, termed an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” linking the eastern and western ends of Eurasia in new networks of security cooperation.⁶

5. Jacob Pramuk, “Trump: I Would Reconsider a Massive Pacific Trade Deal If It Were ‘Substantially Better,’” *CNBC*, January 25, 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/25/trump-says-he-would-reconsider-trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal.html>.

6. Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” speech to the Japanese Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, November 30, 2006, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speecho611.html>.

**ADAPTING THE ASIAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
TO ENCOMPASS INDIA**

For many decades, India was the missing link as a U.S. partner whose security ambitions were concentrated in Western Europe and East Asia. The U.S. alliance with Pakistan never linked to either the multilateral security architecture of the Atlantic alliance nor the hub-and-spokes interdependence of U.S. Pacific alliances. In many respects the United States and Pakistan have been engaged in a proxy conflict in Afghanistan ever since the 1990s, and the plot to attack the United States on September 11, 2001, was hatched in Pakistan, whose regime then sheltered the perpetrator of that plot, Osama bin Laden, for years—giving new (and ironic) meaning to the concept of the “alliance.”

Since the new century dawned, Japan, Australia, Southeast Asian nations, and the United States have all cultivated India as an emerging partner that, as it rises, could play a central role in managing the security order in the vast region stretching from East Africa and the Persian Gulf across into Southeast Asia. India is the United States’ natural ally in South Asia, in part because of the contrast between its dynamic democracy and the military-guided state to its northwest that emerged from Partition, elements of which have sponsored terrorist groups that have killed too many U.S. citizens and Indians alike. China enabled Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons, destabilizing the international nonproliferation order, and Pakistan today is home to infrastructure links including the Chinese-built port of Gwadar that support China’s blue-water power projection into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

While the Pakistan-China alliance has undercut U.S. interests on proliferation, terrorism, and democracy, a U.S. strategic entente with India advances them—whether those interests are defined as defeating violent Islamic extremism, safeguarding the sanctity of the Indian Ocean sea lanes that constitute the world’s energy superhighway, maintaining a workable balance of power in Asia that is not entirely displaced by China, and safeguarding an international order that continues to be governed by norms of democratic pluralism rather than authoritarian development. Only India possesses the ballast to potentially balance China in Asia, and any balancing coalition that excludes it will remain incomplete.

Indian leaders have their own reasons to forge security partnerships with countries including the United States and Japan. As recently as the

late 1980s, India was a peer to China in economic and military weight, with a rough balance between them. Thanks to decades of breakneck growth and strategic investment, China's economic and military power today surpasses that of its southern neighbor by a factor of four or five. India faces a unique period of strategic vulnerability as China pursues its superpower rise and redraws the strategic map of Asia through instruments like the Belt and Road Initiative and the development of maritime infrastructure across the Indian Ocean littoral. China's revisionism could prejudice India's own great power rise and economic development trajectory if New Delhi is passive while Beijing aggressively works to reorient the broader region around Chinese designs.

To preserve its security and strategic autonomy for the next few decades until its superior rates of economic and demographic growth provide it the resources to balance China more equally, New Delhi will of necessity form security partnerships with friendly Indo-Pacific partners to manage a sharpening security dilemma with its northern neighbor. India's historical traditions, including its anti-colonial struggle and the legacy of nonalignment, mean that these condominiums will not be called alliances—but India will clearly tilt in the direction of the Pacific democracies as it struggles to maintain sufficient strategic space to pursue its rise to world power. The best thing the United States and its allies can do to fortify their security network for a new era of great power competition is to include India, including in creative new arrangements such as the Quadrilateral Security Partnership linking India to the core U.S. alliances with Australia and Japan.

CONCLUSION

This raises a related point. The United States need not hold the line forever in an Asia buffeted by China's displacement of existing balances on account of its record-breaking rise. Rather, the United States needs to work with Asian partners to sustain a balance of power and values that preserves peace and constrains any Chinese bid for hegemony until such time as Asian powers can themselves sustain a regional balance of power that is acceptable to the democracies.⁷ China is undergoing a secular

7. Stephen Peter Rosen, "How America Can Balance China's Rising Power in Asia," *Wall Street Journal*, June 1, 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-america-can-balance-chinas-rising-power-in-asia-1433199409>.

slowdown as its 30-year “Asian miracle” winds down and the gravitational forces of advanced demography, industrialization, and socioeconomic change take hold. India is launching its own Asian economic takeoff, with demographic and developmental inputs that suggest its economic trajectory could mirror that of China over previous decades.

If India is successful in growing rapidly while China continues its secular slowdown, New Delhi will over time command resources to invest in world-class defense capabilities and the ability to project power as the dominant power along the Indian Ocean littoral. India already is an attractive partner to many great powers, even if it is so because of its potential rather than its actual power. As India becomes stronger, it will be a more materially capable partner to the United States, Japan, and other Asian democracies, including Southeast Asian heavyweight Indonesia. Its democratic identity means that it will not threaten the United States or Japan in the ways that China does. By reassuring the democratic Indo-Pacific powers while countervailing the influence of China, India ultimately could provide the strategic ballast that stabilizes the world’s new center of wealth and power—even should the United States’ military and economic share of global power diminish over time. But the resiliency of U.S. power and the continuing logic for a range of Indo-Pacific nations to work with it mean that even relative decline may not diminish strategic stability in Asia—as long as friendly powers fill the gap.

Part II. THE MECHANICS OF ALLIANCES

5. THE ROLE OF MILITARY ALLIANCES

Deterrence and Reassurance

Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken

Alliances have formed a central pillar of U.S. national security since World War II. Indeed, they have been central to the effectiveness of U.S. strategy in peace and in war. In peace, the United States' alliances have helped deter aggressors and have reassured U.S. allies in the face of coercion. In war, they have increased the political, strategic, and operational effectiveness of allied military operations. Alliance management has, however, been an enduring challenge, one that is likely to increase in the coming years. The United States and its allies now face a security environment characterized increasingly by competition with China and Russia and, with it, the increasing possibility of great power war. At the same time, long-term economic, social, and demographic trends are limiting the capabilities of many U.S. allies. This is being compounded by domestic political trends in the United States, including a portion of the U.S. public that is increasingly skeptical of the benefits of international commitments, including alliances. The United States and its allies will need to adapt to this reality to continue to safeguard peace and stability as the twenty-first century wears on.

ALLIANCES IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

At least since World War II, the United States has pursued a consistent set of national security objectives, even though different presidential

administrations have articulated them in different ways.¹ First and foremost, the United States has acted to defend its territory against attack. Indeed, the most basic responsibility of any government is to protect its territory and its citizens. In the case of the United States, this includes not only the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska, but also Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. The United States is also bound by treaty to defend American Samoa, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau.

Second, treaty obligations commit the United States to protect its allies. In Europe, this includes the countries of NATO; while in Asia, it includes Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. The United States is also obligated to help defend quasi-allies such as Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act requires the U.S. government both to provide arms and services of a defensive nature to Taiwan, and to maintain U.S. military capacity to resist coercion of Taiwan by China.

These relationships form the bulwark of a strategy of forward defense. They are built on both shared interests and shared values, and their strength and vitality ebbs and flows with these variables. Where the United States and allied interests coincide, and where shared values are at play, the United States and its allies have been able to operate much more effectively together than they would have been able to individually. Conversely, when interests diverge—such as over the wisdom of directly contesting China’s creeping annexation of the South China Sea by conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS)—or when values diverge—as with the Thai military’s intervention in politics—then alliance cohesion is jeopardized.

Since at least World War II, U.S. strategy has been predicated upon meeting threats to the United States as far from U.S. shores as possible through the forward stationing and rotational deployment of U.S. forces to United States and allied territory. However, whereas geographic depth has historically protected the U.S. homeland, the fact that the United

1. See, for example, Thomas G. Mahnken, “U.S. Strategy: Confronting Challenges Abroad and Constraints at Home” in *Strategic Asia 2017–18: Power, Ideas, and Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017); Thomas G. Mahnken, “The Australia-U.S. Alliance in American Strategic Policy,” in *Australia’s American Alliance*, ed. Peter J. Dean, Stephan Frühling, and Brendan Taylor (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016); and Thomas G. Mahnken et al., “Asia in the Balance: Transforming U.S. Military Strategy in Asia,” *American Enterprise Institute*, 2012.

States has territory and allies in Europe and the Western Pacific has historically forced U.S. planners to confront the tyranny of distance. During the years separating the two world wars, army and navy planners were consumed by the need to defend the Philippines, then a U.S. territory, from a much closer Japan. Today, U.S. soldiers and statesmen must consider how best to defend Japan, South Korea, and U.S. territories in the western Pacific from aggression by China and North Korea, and NATO's frontline states from coercion by Russia.

The United States has traditionally defended its allies through a strategy of extended deterrence and reassurance. Part of the U.S. commitment includes the pledge to use nuclear weapons in defense of allies.² Historically, one way to strengthen extended nuclear deterrence was to deploy—either permanently or episodically—nuclear weapons to the territory of U.S. allies. During the Cold War, such deployments were routine. However, in 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated ground-based nuclear forces with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Moreover, in September 1991 President George H. W. Bush's Presidential Nuclear Initiative unilaterally withdrew all ground-launched short-range weapons deployed overseas and ceased deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft under normal peacetime circumstances.³ For the next two decades the United States maintained nuclear-armed Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (TLAM-N) for extended nuclear deterrence in Asia. In 2010, however, the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review called for their retirement.⁴ Although the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for reconstituting such a capability and the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty raises at least the theoretical possibility of deploying ground-based intermediate-range nuclear weapons, there remains a considerable disparity in theater or nonstrategic nuclear weapons between the United States, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other.

2. Evan Braden Montgomery, "Extended Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age: Geopolitics, Proliferation, and the Future of U.S. Security Commitments," *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, 2016.

3. See the documents in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds., *Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities* (Washington, DC: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001).

4. *Nuclear Posture Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2010).

As the balance of power in Asia and Europe has shifted, Washington has faced growing calls by allies for reassurance. In recent years, for example, the United States has reaffirmed its extended deterrence guarantee to both Japan and the Republic of Korea.⁵ Such extended nuclear deterrence guarantees have helped promote stability in the face of provocation and have discouraged U.S. allies from taking destabilizing actions, such as acquiring nuclear weapons of their own.

Complementing extended deterrence is reassurance. The United States seeks to reassure its allies regarding its security commitments through a host of measures, including the deployment of U.S. forces to their territory and in the region, foreign military sales, and a variety of joint programs, including research and development, acquisition, training, and command arrangements. Reassurance and deterrence are distinct, though related, phenomena. Deterrence seeks to influence the mind of an adversary to convince him that the use of military force would be unproductive—that he would be unable to achieve his objectives or would suffer disproportionate losses in return. Reassurance seeks to influence the mind of an ally to convince him that an adversary will be deterred and that he will be protected if deterrence fails. Of the two, reassurance is often the more difficult task.

Although there were some comments at the end of the Cold War that the United States' alliances had become obsolete, the number of countries allied with the United States actually grew over the subsequent quarter century due to the expansion of NATO.⁶ Moreover, the United States' alliances have adapted themselves to purposes beyond those that were envisioned at their founding. NATO, an alliance founded to defend Western Europe against the Soviet Union and its allies, has engaged in out-of-area operations in Afghanistan. The Australia-U.S. alliance, similarly founded in the Cold War, was invoked by Canberra to help defend the United States after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Third, the United States has acted over decades to ensure access to the global commons in peacetime and command of them in wartime. It has done so not out of altruism, but out of self-interest: the free flow of goods

5. Keith Payne, Thomas Scheber, and Kurt Guthe, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia," *National Institute for Public Policy*, March 2010, <http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20Extend-Deter-for%20print.pdf>.

6. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *The Atlantic*, August 1990.

and information has benefited the U.S. economy. The free flow of goods, services, and information has undergirded economic growth and prosperity for decades. It has benefited others as well. It has lifted literally millions out of poverty and served as the midwife of globalization. U.S. FONOPS are only one means of doing so, but one that has been used repeatedly over the course of decades.⁷

Fourth, the United States has for the past century sought to preserve a favorable balance of power across Eurasia. The United States has repeatedly used force when its territory or allies were attacked and when a would-be hegemon has threatened the balance of power. The United States twice intervened on the European continent when it appeared that Germany was on the brink of dominating the continent. Similarly, the United States resisted Japan's attempt at hegemony in the Pacific. During the Cold War, the United States sought to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming a Eurasian hegemon. It is worth noting that even those who advocate a constrained U.S. role in the world more generally argue that the United States should prevent the emergence of a hegemon on the Eurasian landmass.⁸

Finally, the United States has acted for the common good by providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Indeed, the United States generally leads international relief efforts. The response to Typhoon Haiyan is but one of the most recent instances of such efforts. The United States is thus not only a global power, but also one that is active in the Asia-Pacific region.

ALLIANCES IN U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY

In pursuit of these objectives, the United States has, at least since World War II, followed a strategy based upon forward defense backed by power projection of the homeland. In peace and in war, the U.S. position in Asia and Europe has rested on a set of alliances, ground and air forces deployed on allied and U.S. territory, and carrier strike groups (CSGs) operating forward.

7. See the Lowy Institute's interactive map of U.S. freedom of navigation operations at http://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/fonops_maps/Overview.html.

8. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, updated edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014).

Significantly, the U.S. approach to demonstrating its presence, reassuring allies, and deterring aggressors mirrors its concept of operations in wartime. That is, the United States uses its most powerful naval assets—its CSGs—as instruments of peacetime presence, reassurance, and deterrence. In time of war, these forward-deployed naval forces would serve as instruments of power projection. It is worth noting that such a posture represents a historical novelty. Traditionally, sea powers (whether Britain in the eighteenth through twentieth centuries or the United States prior to World War II) relied upon small combatants such as frigates to show the flag and coerce adversaries; they kept their capital ships concentrated in home waters to train and prepare for a decisive fleet battle.

There is a danger that the vulnerability of U.S. forces, and responses to it, will undermine the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Asia. This is compounded by the fact that alternatives for demonstrating U.S. presence, such as the littoral combat ship (LCS), have limited military capability, whereas some of the most potent strike platforms, such as nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), may have limited value as instruments of presence and reassurance due to their inherent stealthiness.

THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The U.S. alliance system today is under strain for several reasons. First, for the first time in a quarter century, the United States faces the reality of great power competition and the small though growing possibility of great power war. This is a stark contrast to the situation the United States faced during the first decade after the end of the Cold War—a period Charles Krauthammer famously dubbed the United States’ “unipolar moment”—as well as the decade and a half following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks—a period dominated by non-state threats.⁹ This coincides with changes in the military-technical environment, particularly the growth and spread of precision weaponry, as well as the sensors and command and control networks needed to employ them to their greatest effectiveness. These developments collectively call into question the viability of the military strategy that the United States has been pursuing for decades.

9. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1990–1991.

Growing friction with both China and Russia makes it plain that the United States has once again entered a period of great power competition, a reality that the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy acknowledge. Not since World War II has the United States confronted expansive powers that hold significant military advantages within their regions and are active beyond them.

The rise of China, the growth and modernization of the Chinese military, and the Chinese Communist Party's confidence and muscle-flexing raise the prospect of a conflict over Beijing's maritime claims in the East China and South China Seas or across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing has already used maritime law enforcement vessels to bully neighbors, seize islands claimed by other nations, expand and militarize disputed maritime features, declare an air defense identification zone overlapping those of other nations in the East China Sea, and conduct aggressive interceptions of U.S. military aircraft flying in international airspace. Moreover, Beijing is increasingly active beyond Asia, including Africa and the Middle East. In the best case, the United States will have to pursue a long-term geopolitical competition with China; in the worst case, military conflict may result.

In Europe, Russia is challenging the post-Cold War status quo, and is doing so with military force, indicating an increased likelihood of conflict with frontline NATO states. It has already employed conventional forces against Georgia and Ukraine and has used economic pressure, cyberattacks, irregular "active measures," and nuclear threats to coerce others. As the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated, significant resistance to coercion can escalate to major armed conflict. Russia has also been militarily active outside of Europe, using the war in Syria to flex its geopolitical muscles, showcase new weapons, and develop and refine innovative operational concepts.

This challenge is markedly different from the Cold War. Whereas the former period was marked by bipolar competition, today the United States, in an era of relatively constrained budgets, is engaged in a tripolar competition with two loosely and perhaps opportunistically aligned great powers.¹⁰

10. See, for example, Thomas G. Mahnken, ed., *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); and Thomas G. Mahnken, "Arms Races and Long-Term Competition," in *Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional*

One dimension that deserves particular scrutiny is the temporal one. Russia has been increasingly active in recent years, but its position is declining due to demographic and economic trends. China, by contrast, has a growing economy (albeit one that is unlikely to continue to grow at historically high levels) and increasingly capable military forces. However, it seems impractical for the United States to ignore the challenge posed by Russia in the near term, just as it would be unwise to defer countering the challenges posed by China. Rather, the United States will need to develop separate, but interlinked, strategies for competing with each, individually and in concert, over the long term.

Great power war in the twenty-first century is likely to differ both from those of past great power conflicts as well as from more recent counterinsurgency campaigns in several key respects. In particular, they will include a lethality of a sort we have not seen since World War II, the absence of secure rear areas, and coalition mobilization difficulties that have not been seen in decades.¹¹

Economic and social trends indicate that great power competition and conflict in the twenty-first century will be distinct from its historical antecedents. Advanced economies are moving from the industrial age to the information age, with implications for industrial mobilization, although new technologies such as additive manufacturing promise new possibilities. Nevertheless, relatively small buys and long manufacturing times, coupled with the prospect of attrition warfare, call into question the robustness and resilience of current industrial approaches. In addition, the information age is providing new options for mobilizing and controlling domestic populations and influencing foreign leaders and citizens.

A second strain on the U.S. alliance system comes from U.S. allies. Many (though not all) of the United States' allies are in relative decline, in terms of both their economic power and their military might.¹² As a result, we are witnessing a growing chorus of voices questioning the value

Security, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 225–240.

11. See, for example, Mark Gunzinger and Bryan Clark, "Sustaining America's Precision Strike Advantage," *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, 2015, and Mark Gunzinger and Bryan Clark, "Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing America's Air and Missile Defenses," *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, 2016.

12. Hal Brands, "Dealing with Allies in Decline: Alliance Management and U.S. Strategy in an Era of Global Power Shifts," *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, 2017.

of U.S. allies. That chorus began in the Obama administration and has only gotten louder in the Trump presidency.

A third challenge comes from those in the United States who question the United States' international role in general and the value of the United States' alliances in particular. More than a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan has eroded the willingness of some Americans to support future major military operations. Some doubt the wisdom of the war in Iraq, while others question the effectiveness of U.S. national security institutions in waging wars once they have been launched. For some, the seeming inability of the United States to formulate and implement an effective strategy has raised larger questions about the efficacy of U.S. military intervention in general.

In addition, the Great Recession and the unequal distribution of the gains from the subsequent recovery have produced a mixture of anxiety and pessimism about the U.S. role in the world. A growing portion of the U.S. public questions why the United States is expending limited resources abroad when many continue to struggle at home. Others see the North American energy boom as an opportunity for the United States to disengage from its overseas commitments, particularly those in the Middle East.¹³ This thinking was a central feature of the 2016 presidential campaigns of both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders.

These concerns are manifested in public opinion surveys. For example, the main finding of the Pew Research Center's 2013 survey *America's Place in the World* was that "Growing numbers of Americans believe that U.S. global power and prestige are in decline. And support for U.S. global engagement, already near a historic low, has fallen further."¹⁴ Moreover, they are evident in the attitudes of the rising generation, which has come of age since the September 11, 2001, attacks. The 2013 Pew Research Center poll cited above found that members of the so-called millennial generation

13. "The Experts: How the U.S. Oil Boom Will Change the Markets and Geopolitics," *Wall Street Journal*, March 27, 2013, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324105204578382690249436084>.

14. Pew Research Center, "Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement Slips: America's Place in the World 2013," December 2013, 4. See also Dina Smeltz and Ivo Daalder with Craig Kafura, "Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment," *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, <http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/foreign-policy-age-retrenchment-0>; and Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Prudent, Not Isolationist, Public," *The Hill*, <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/207987-the-prudent-not-isolationist-public>.

(ages 18–29) were slightly more hesitant about U.S. international leadership. Younger U.S. citizens emphasized the need for the United States to select its priorities and match resources and capabilities with the mission.

Such attitudes are not without precedent in American history. Time and again after major conflicts, U.S. citizens have questioned whether it makes sense to continue their leadership role, and time and again, events eventually occur that remind them of what the world would be like without their participation. Recent times are no exception.

As a result, the United States today is experiencing the most active discussion of its role in the world since the end of World War II. With it comes a debate over the most appropriate military strategy to carry it out.

CONCLUSION

The United States and its allies will need to adapt to this reality to continue to safeguard peace and stability as the twenty-first century wears on.

First, there is a need to increase interoperability between the United States and its allies. For example, the United States and its allies should ensure the highest level of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) interoperability. Munitions are another area where interoperability between the United States and its allies is highly desirable, both for economies of scale and to avoid shortages in time of war.

Second, there is ample room for the United States and its allies to cooperate at the technological cutting edge. Staying ahead of the competition will be all the more important in the future, when many of the systems that have provided an edge in the past—including precision weaponry, C4ISR, and space capabilities—are spreading. The United States and its allies should work together to maintain their edge, both unilaterally and particularly in alliance, through the development of cutting-edge capabilities, including hypersonics, directed energy, unmanned and autonomous systems, and cyber and space capabilities.

Third, it seems likely that the growth and spread of precision strike capabilities will usher in an era of protracted wars. In such wars, logistical support will become all the more important. As a result, the United States and its allies should explore new logistical arrangements to support protracted operations in the face of a capable adversary.

6. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ALLIANCES

Deterrence and Reassurance for the Twenty-First Century

Franklin C. Miller

WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE, BUT ONLY TO A POINT

The concept that states align for purposes of mutual defense has been a feature of international relations for millennia. Similarly, the principles of deterrence have been employed by kingdoms and nations at least since Roman times. But the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945 fundamentally transformed how deterrence would be practiced ever after, and this, in turn, shaped the nature of future alliances.

Deterrence in the world before 1945 meant confronting a potential enemy with the prospect of losing enough blood and treasure to make a policy of aggression undesirable; sadly, history records that deterrence by conventional means worked only until an enemy's military leadership convinced its political leaders that it had found a way to minimize potential losses to an acceptable level while increasing the prospect of military victory. Even the massive losses of World War I were not enough to prevent World War II. Nuclear weapons, however, changed this forever. A nuclear-armed nation, even though its armed forces might be on the brink of battlefield defeat, nevertheless possesses the capability literally to destroy the aggressor's homeland and way of life. Aggression against a nuclear-armed state became measurably riskier. This had several consequences:

- Interactions between nuclear-armed states became more cautious.

- Nonnuclear-weapons states faced with potential aggression sought protection from nuclear-armed states.
- Nuclear-armed states providing protection for nonnuclear states from aggression by another nuclear-armed state assumed responsibilities that could potentially lead to their own annihilation.

None of these conditions were clearly understood, however, when the most consequential decision of the post-World War II world was made in Washington. Still possessing a monopoly of atomic weapons and still separated from potential enemies by the vastness of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Truman administration nevertheless reversed over a century and a half of a U.S. policy that had rejected “entangling alliances,” and instead embraced the defense of like-minded democracies in Western Europe and in Northeast Asia. Because the European and Asian geostrategic situations differed widely, however, Washington’s implementation of its new policy assumed very different forms.

COLD WAR DETERRENCE: NATO

In 1949, facing what they believed was an existential threat to Western liberal democracy, the leaders of North America and Western Europe birthed a new mutual defense pact dedicated not only to preserving territorial integrity, but, more fundamentally, to creating and maintaining a rules-based international system embodying the principles of the recently formed United Nations. Unwilling to bear the costs associated with building a conventional force able to defeat the Red Army, the alliance opted instead to rely principally on the deterrent might of U.S. nuclear weapons to deter Russian conventional aggression. Over the next several decades, the United States deployed short- and medium-range nuclear delivery systems and their associated nuclear warheads to Europe. In part to increase NATO’s military capability to use these weapons to repel a Soviet attack across the broad front the alliance shared with the USSR (and thereby to deter such an attack in the first place), the United States moved beyond equipping only U.S. forces with these weapons by developing “programs of cooperation” under which allied forces similarly possessed delivery systems to fire nuclear warheads which the U.S. would turn over to them in time of war should NATO decide to actually use nuclear

weapons militarily. (While Russia in recent years has maintained that this arrangement violates the Non-Proliferation Treaty, this charge is demonstrably false as a quick look at the NPT's negotiating record will show. The USSR supported these arrangements as one method of preventing Germany from developing its own nuclear weapons.) This commitment of U.S. "nuclear firepower" in Europe, along with the presence of several hundred thousand U.S. combat troops there, helped reassure allies that the United States would employ every military capability it possessed to prevent a Soviet invasion—even after the USSR developed nuclear weapons of its own and eventually nuclear forces that could hit the U.S. homeland. It also served to begin the inclusion of European allies in nuclear operational planning, and, ultimately, in nuclear policymaking—thereby responding to allies' requests that they be reassured that they would be included in any decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons in wartime. Notwithstanding occasional and bruising political controversies and debates within the alliance (usually brought about by the Soviets' deployment of new nuclear capabilities), NATO allies generally accepted that the United States would in fact defend them even it meant that the United States itself would be subject to nuclear attack (thereby answering as best it could the canonical question, "Would the United States trade a U.S. city for Berlin?"). This reliance on the United States served to make Washington first among equals within alliance policymaking circles, but it also served to discourage the vast majority of NATO nations from pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs—a goal that became a key feature of U.S. foreign policy during the Kennedy administration and has remained so ever since.

COLD WAR DETERRENCE: ASIA

The military threat to U.S. allies in Asia was of a different nature than that of a massive conventional ground force attack on allies' homelands. With the establishment of the People's Republic of China (which the U.S. government viewed at first, incorrectly, as similarly an extension of Soviet policy), the primary deterrence and defense goal of the United States in Asia was to prevent Beijing from invading Taiwan. After the Korean War, a second major objective was to deter Pyongyang from again invading the south. In both cases, the United States augmented its conventional forces in the region with nuclear weapons, but in neither case did the military

situation resemble that facing NATO; that is, there was no broad front similar to the massive expanse over which Soviet armies could strike NATO. In the case of Taiwan, PRC forces lacked amphibious capability to cross the Taiwan Strait; in Korea, the narrow width of the peninsula at the 38th parallel did not require the extensive deployments felt to be necessary in Europe, and so a “program of cooperation” with South Korean forces was never executed. U.S. deployments of nuclear weapons to support U.S. forces in South Korea were far smaller, numerically, than the forward-deployed stockpile in NATO Europe. As the Cold War progressed into the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan was altered; the North Korean threat to invade South Korea, while not removed, appeared less acute; and the United States-China relationship had moved from confrontation to cooperation. While the mission of deterring attack or intimidation by Russia on Japan evolved into a third objective consistent with the overall U.S. goal of preserving democratic values in Asia, this role was, certainly in its nuclear deterrent aspect, one that was more implicit than explicit given the evolution of Soviet behavior.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Continued extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is essential to maintaining peace and stability in both Europe and Asia for the foreseeable future. In providing this protection, however, the United States faces new challenges with respect both to deterrence and to assurance. The threats facing U.S. allies in both regions have changed significantly over the last 10 years and, consequently, the task of assuring worried allies has become more complex.

Europe

In Mikhail Gorbachev's last year leading the Soviet Union, the confrontational stance that had marked the USSR's policy toward NATO gradually disappeared. The subsequent implosion of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the USSR itself, the transparency produced by a web of arms control treaties, and, finally, the severe economic crisis that gripped Russia all contributed to a relaxation of tensions in Europe and significantly reduced the political and military threat to the alliance. In response, the United States and its allies decreased their conventional

forces dramatically and, as part of an initiative launched in September 1991 by President George H. W. Bush, NATO agreed to cut the forward-deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile by eliminating all such weapons except a few hundred air-delivered bombs. Concomitantly, interest in and attention to nuclear issues within NATO capitals (including for the most part in Washington) largely disappeared except for a few centers of excellence. The reduced threat from the east led many in NATO to begin searching for a new reason for the alliance's continued existence: "out of area or out of business" was a commonly heard theme at NATO headquarters. All of this began to change in 2008.

In 2007, Vladimir Putin, firmly in charge of the Russian government and with his treasury filled with petrodollars, began making known his intention to restore Russia to great power status. Russia's 2008 invasion (and continued occupation) of the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia revealed weaknesses in Russia's conventional military forces, which Putin was determined to reverse. Ten years later, the modernization of Russia's conventional forces continues apace, providing new and impressive ground, naval, and air force capabilities. At the same time, Russia began an across-the-board modernization of its nuclear forces, which also continues to the present day. In addition to deploying at least two new types of ICBMs, two new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), a new class of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), new strategic bombers, and associated new dual capable air-launched cruise missiles, Russia is engaged in a deploying new shorter-range ground force, naval, and air-launched nuclear systems and warheads (many of which feature low yields). Russian military doctrine now features the use of nuclear weapons to win a conventional war, a concept that Russian military forces have been exercising for about a decade. Russia has used these new capabilities to seek to intimidate NATO governments, with senior Kremlin officials making explicit threats of nuclear strikes against NATO states backed up by Russian strategic bombers, often in attack formations, repeatedly violating allied air defense advisory zones. In addition, Russia has become a serial violator of arms control agreements, currently standing in violation of the Helsinki Accords, the Budapest Memorandum, the Istanbul Accord, the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992, the Vienna Document, the Open Skies Treaty, and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This has undercut transparency and raised concerns about Russian intentions, concerns that were heightened dramatically by

Russia's invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea and its initiation of a still-ongoing armed insurrection in eastern Ukraine. Russia's invasion of Crimea also showcased its sophisticated cyberwar and information-warfare capabilities, elements of which had been demonstrated previously in Russian cyberattacks on the Baltic states.

Many NATO governments, including several of those that founded the alliance (among them the United States) were both slow and reluctant to recognize the change in Russian policies and behavior. Rooted in an unwillingness to believe that Putin was in fact targeting NATO and that the threat-free environment that had prevailed since the breakup of the USSR had ended (and also sadly in a self-centered attitude that emerged in the economically well-off Western European states less proximate to the Russian border that the defense of their newer alliance partners whose borders were shared with Russia was not in their national interest), NATO began gradually to recognize the Russian threat. NATO Summit communiqués in 2012, 2014, and especially 2016 committed the alliance to rebuilding conventional forces and to investing in enhanced cyberdefenses. Notably, the 2014 and 2016 statements specifically called out the role of the U.S. deterrent guarantee and the value of the forward-based U.S. nuclear weapons; with the 2016 statement saying "The alliance will ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements."

Establishing such policies is a necessary precondition to responding to the changed politico-military environment in Europe, but it is just a first step. NATO faces significant challenges if it is to rebuild its deterrent capabilities.

The first of these challenges is to rebuild within alliance nations a recognition that, under Putin, Russia is seeking to intimidate and undermine NATO's democracies. Without this, without rebuilding political support for the alliance and its essential purpose of preserving Western liberal democracy and a rules-based international order, the practical steps described below will founder.

Second, the alliance must follow through on its plans to sustain and replace the existing forward-based nuclear forces in Europe. Today those forces consist of a set of aging, 1960s vintage, U.S. freefall B-61 nuclear bombs mated to a variety of U.S. F-15E, Dutch and Belgian F-16, and German and Italian Tornado dual-capable aircraft. The United States is in the process of developing a modernized version of the B-61 to replace

the antiquated electronics with twenty-first-century electronics and a reduced yield (although a “tail-kit” that improves the bomb’s accuracy allows the weapon to maintain its effectiveness). Critics in both the United States and Europe oppose this program, as does the Kremlin, which has begun a propaganda campaign (both with official statements and articles and commentaries in RT and *Sputnik*) to claim it represents a new and dangerous nuclear threat to Russia. A failure to follow through on the modernization of the B-61 will result ultimately in the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, a goal that motivates the Kremlin’s campaign. Eliminating the risk and burden-sharing role of European NATO allies in the shared nuclear deterrent role will, over time, weaken domestic support in the United States for the extended deterrent, as there will increasingly be questions as to why the United States should bear the sole burden and risk for providing the nuclear umbrella.

Inextricably linked to the B-61 modernization program is the replacement of the aging F-15Es, F-16s, and Tornados. The United States has begun replacing its aging fighters with the stealthy (but costly) F-35, although the Air Force has continually delayed the modifications necessary to allow the jet to carry B-61s (these are now scheduled to begin occurring in 2020). The Dutch, Belgian, and Italian governments had committed originally to procuring F-35s for the nuclear role, but a variety of bilateral European and domestic political issues have brought this into question. In a surreal turn of events, the French government (ostensibly a strong supporter of the U.S. forward-deployed deterrent) undertook a high-pressure lobbying campaign in 2017 on behalf of Dassault Aviation SA to persuade the Belgian government to abandon the F-35 in favor of the Rafale, a fourth-generation French fighter that is not certified to carry U.S. nuclear weapons. Similarly, European industry groups are pressing Rome and Berlin to abandon plans to buy F-35s in favor of converting the currently nonnuclear weapons-capable Eurofighter to carry nuclear weapons. The German government, which faces significant domestic antinuclear pressure from the left, has not yet decided how or whether to replace its aging nuclear-capable Tornados—although the F-35 has now been ruled out and the Eurofighter and US F-18 (also not currently nuclear-certified) are the two final candidates. To restate the concerns mentioned above, any decisions that resulted in one or more of the nuclear-capable allies abandoning that task could have major implications for alliance solidarity.

Fourth, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) needs to rejuvenate the alliance's nuclear operational capabilities. Critical skills such as the ability to conduct strike planning; practice dispersal of dual-capable aircraft; conduct realistic nuclear strike exercises; and support nuclear strike missions with tanking, electronic warfare, and other critical combat capabilities have atrophied and need to be rediscovered and restored. SHAPE could also usefully explore how other allies might be incentivized to participate in the DCA role through novel twenty-first-century arrangements.

Fifth, the Alliance must come—in the relatively near term—to a common position on whether a military response is required regarding Russia's violation of the INF treaty. Fundamentally, the treaty violation is a political issue. In December 2018 the United States, with the backing of the NATO Allies, declared Russia to be in violation of the treaty and called on Russia to return to compliance. Russia, with at least four battalions equipped with the treaty-busting, ground-launched cruise missiles, nevertheless—with the same insouciance it employed to deny that Russian troops were in Crimea or eastern Ukraine—claimed it remained in compliance. Accordingly, in February 2019 the United States announced that it was exercising its right under the pact's "Supreme National Interests" clause that it was withdrawing from the treaty with an effective date of August 2019. Moscow's decision to sign the treaty in 1987 resulted from its desire to eliminate the threat posed by NATO's counter-deployments of ground-launched cruise missiles and (especially) Pershing II ballistic missiles to counter the Soviet SS-20 missile. Based on this, some will argue that only a NATO decision to develop and deploy a new INF range system in Europe will cause the Kremlin to change course; that idea, however, presumes that alliance interests are best served by initiating a bruising political debate over nuclear policy in a now-enlarged—and less manageable—alliance over what existed in 1979. While Russia ultimately must face new dangers as a result of its decision to destroy the INF treaty, opening a new debate would be a perilous path to doing so, and it would certainly serve Putin's interests in the short term by offering new opportunities within the European body politic to fracture support for NATO. A better course of action would be for the United States to develop sea-based systems which could present an all-azimuth deterrent threat to Russia while avoiding new political controversy in NATO; importantly, such systems could also enhance the U.S. extended deterrence

posture in the Asia-Pacific region as well. The planned deployment of a new low yield warhead for the Trident II SLBM probably represent the best military counter to the new Russian INF system; the low yield Trident, designed and deployed explicitly to deter Russian small scale nuclear attack, could deter use of the INF system as well as other Russian threats.

Finally, any discussion of extended deterrence must conclude with the recognition that extended *nuclear* deterrence is only a subset of the larger commitment to mutual defense. Nuclear weapons are not an all-purpose deterrent. They are not designed to deter the increasingly sophisticated Russian information warfare activities, or small-scale cyberattacks, or small incursions by Spetznaz troops. NATO requires other capabilities to deter and repel such threats, and the alliance needs to rededicate itself to doing so *in the cause of the common defense*. NATO does not offer defense of the liberal democratic tradition and of the post-World War II rules-based international order on an a la carte basis: the European members of the alliance must follow through on their commitments to increase their military capabilities to deter to aggression on an “all for one, one for all basis.” As Secretary of Defense Mattis pointedly told his NATO counterparts in February 2017: “Americans cannot care more for your children’s future security than you do.”

Asia

The past 10 years have witnessed dramatic changes both to the threats facing the United States’ Asian allies and consequently to those allies’ need for reassurance about the viability of the U.S. extended deterrent guarantee.

CHINA

Under Xi Jinping’s dynamic leadership, China has been aggressively seeking to establish itself as the Pacific’s premier power. One aspect of this has been to undercut the existing international order in the Pacific by asserting territorial claims over wide swaths of both the South China Sea and the East China Sea, challenging the existing status quo. As part of this, China has claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, which have been administered by Japan since the early 1970s (and claimed by

Japan since the late nineteenth century). China has threatened (but never carried out) military action to take the islands; it has also extended its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) to cover the islands—thereby creating a dangerous overlap with both Japan's and South Korea's ADIZ. Chinese military aircraft and coast guard ships routinely penetrate the air over and waters surrounding the Senkakus, and the PLAAF also carries out hundreds of incursions annually into Japan's ADIZ. Another aspect of Beijing's ambitions has been a measured, but impressive and ongoing, modernization of all aspects of its military forces, deploying new air, naval, and ground capabilities and downsizing but professionalizing its standing forces. This modernization has extended to both strategic and tactical nuclear systems. China is currently upgrading its strategic forces by deploying two new types of road-mobile ICBMs, a new class of SSBNs, and a new SLBM. China also deploys a large force of dual-capable short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, the majority of which can threaten Japan—thereby providing an obvious capability for intimidation in a regional crisis. In addition, China has invested heavily in highly sophisticated cyberwarfare capabilities and in space surveillance and space control systems, all of which are of concern to policymakers in both Washington and Tokyo.

NORTH KOREA

The dramatic acceleration of North Korea's missile and nuclear warhead programs since Kim Jong-un's ascent to power has shaken the region and the world.

For Tokyo, the reality that Pyongyang has deliverable nuclear warheads has been driven home by the numerous North Korean missile tests that have either overflown Japan or landed off the Japanese coast.

For South Korea, the North Korean nuclear-tipped missile threat adds to a list already containing a massive conventional and chemical warhead artillery threat to Seoul, a cyberwarfare capability, and an aggressive special forces program that threatens disruptive attacks across the length and breadth of the country. While the threat of a classic invasion across the DMZ remains possible, at least in theory, the fact that the North Korean army has obsolete equipment, little training time, and is apparently in poor physical condition means the likelihood of this kind of attack is low.

RUSSIA

Putin's aggressive policies toward NATO have not been replicated in the Far East to any significant degree. Russian fighters, strategic bombers, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircrafts do, however, penetrate the Japanese ADIZ hundreds of times each year in efforts to test and intimidate Tokyo. Russia's across-the-board modernization of its conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces has necessarily brought newer systems into the Russian Pacific Fleet. And recently Russia has begun a propaganda campaign against Tokyo's decision to procure Aegis Ashore BMD systems to defend against the North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile threats by charging that this makes Japan complicit in violating the INF treaty (this is a long-standing and spurious Russian argument designed to deflect U.S. claims that Russia has deliberately violated the INF). All of this said, Tokyo worries about China and North Korea far more than it does about Moscow.

JAPAN

Even as these Chinese and Korean threats to Japan were beginning to develop, a revolutionary change was occurring in the Japanese national security bureaucracy. In the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, a new generation of young Japanese bureaucrats and diplomats rose to influential positions in Tokyo. Unlike the generation they were succeeding, who (due to the use of U.S. atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) never raised questions with U.S. officials about the U.S. nuclear umbrella and how it was implemented, these rising policymakers were intensely curious about how Washington thought about and carried out this policy. Because the Department of Defense refused to engage initially, these conversations occurred at first as a "Track 1.5" series between Japanese officials and recently retired U.S. officials. During its first term, however, the Obama administration converted the dialogue into a formal government-to-government consultation series, which became styled as the "Extended Deterrence Dialogue."

Among the questions the Japanese side wanted to explore were:

- Did U.S. war plans contain automatic response to specific enemy provocations/acts of war?

- How were potential U.S. nuclear targets selected, and by whom were they chosen?
- What was the philosophy behind the choice of such targets?
- How did the United States intend to use strategic systems to address theater escalation problems?
- Why did the United States choose not to station shorter-range nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region?
- How could missile defenses augment deterrence by retaliation?
- How would the United States respond to a major cyberattack on Japan?
- Finally, how could Tokyo be assured that the United States would “trade a U.S. city for Tokyo”?

Over the past eight years, many of these issues have been resolved as Japanese officials have visited U.S. nuclear bases, toured U.S. strategic systems, and engaged in consultations with senior U.S. officials in Washington and at Strategic Command headquarters in Omaha. As is the case with NATO, these ongoing discussions have become part of the essential fabric of the U.S.-Japanese extended deterrent relationship.

The fabric of the relationship has been strengthened significantly, as well, by the Abe government’s decision (acting on its reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution) that Japanese forces should provide mutual support for U.S. units that come under attack and has fostered participation by Self-Defense Force assets in realistic combined exercises with U.S. forces to achieve this goal. Similarly, given the Chinese and North Korean threats it faces, Japan has been investing increasingly in ballistic missile defense, acquiring the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 and Aegis missile defense systems, and deciding just recently (as mentioned above) to acquire the Aegis Ashore system. And, in response to China’s aggressive maritime claims, the United States has stated that defense of the Senkakus is guaranteed under the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Defense Treaty and has enhanced its freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

One issue Washington and Tokyo need to continue to discuss is Japan’s desire to obtain weapons with sufficient range to strike China or North Korea. The Japanese request is rooted in a concern that the United States might not respond with sufficient force (or be perceived by Beijing or Pyongyang as being willing to so) to conventional ballistic missile or cyberattacks on Japan. The United States, for its part, has traditionally

been reluctant to provide allies with the capability to strike the homeland of a nuclear-armed state.

SOUTH KOREA

Of all the extended deterrence relationships today, the U.S.-Republic of Korea relationship is perhaps the most fraught and dynamic—a product of the politics of the Moon administration, which took office in 2016, and of the canny but uncertain policies of Kim Jong-un. Unlike its predecessors, which viewed Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile activities with great alarm and looked to the United States to demonstrate its commitment to the defense of South Korea with visible and tangible efforts, the Moon government continues to seek diplomatic openings to the north to reduce the levels of threat and tension through a new “sunshine policy.” In his January 1, 2018, New Year’s Day speech, Kim Jong-un reached out to the south, offering new direct discussions and the possibility of using the upcoming Winter Olympics as a venue to kickstart better relations between the two Korean states. This flurry of diplomatic activity initially ran counter to the highly confrontational policies toward Pyongyang adopted by the Trump administration from its earliest days, a policy that grew ever more threatening as the north demonstrated significant (and surprising) progress on its long-range missile and nuclear warhead programs over the course of 2017. At the heart of this issue was the expressed view of the Trump administration that North Korea must relinquish its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and that military means can and will be used to accomplish this if Kim Jong-un refuses to comply. The clear risks associated with a U.S. strike on the north are tied to what the DPRK would do in response; that is, would it respond with a major conventional (and perhaps chemical weapons) attack on the south, or simultaneously on the south, on Japan, and on U.S. territory itself? Might Kim Jong-un order nuclear missile strikes against any or all of the three allies? Given the almost certain consequences for Seoul’s inhabitants, would President Moon acquiesce in a U.S. strike, especially if the diplomatic track appeared to be producing some degree of success? Could Washington contemplate military action that Seoul opposed? President Trump’s dramatic turn-about in 2018, opening a charm offensive with North Korea, has (at least temporarily) dramatically changed the entire situation. If the United States and North Korea can come to a peaceful accommodation which

ends the Korean War, reduces the North's military threat to South Korea and Japan, and eliminates North Korea's nuclear arsenal, Seoul's need for an extended deterrent will be reduced (if not eliminated completely). If Trump's outreach fails to achieve these goals—as many North Korea watchers expect—Washington and Seoul will once again have to determine how best to deter the threat. In this context, given the strong desire of the Moon government to continue reaching out to Pyongyang: How will failure to reach a common view between the Trump and Moon administrations affect not only the United States' extended relationship with South Korea, but in a broader sense other allies' views of the U.S. extended deterrent policy?

A BOTTOM LINE

The post-World War II rules-based international system is under the most significant pressure it has faced since its inception. Russia and China are challenging the system broadly. China's economic might and its "soft-power" investments are providing major inroads around the globe, including in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, and particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, China's significant military conventional capabilities, backed up, as all in the region recognize, by China's nuclear forces, pose a "hard-power" threat to promote Beijing's agenda should soft power prove ineffective. There is no other military counterweight to this threat other than the United States, something the Japanese government understands and appreciates. Russia, lacking any real soft power capability, is embarked on a campaign to reshape the politics of NATO Europe by both cyber and classic information warfare activities backed up by clear (and often crude) displays of conventional and nuclear military power, which are intended to intimidate NATO governments. Again, there is no other effective counterweight to this Russian campaign than the United States working through NATO. The EU could never mount a credible defensive force against Russia, and France, based on its classic national doctrine whose lineage dates to de Gaulle, will never truly extend its deterrent to cover its EU neighbors. To the degree that the Western Europe democracies continue to choose to maintain independence and freedom of action, the transatlantic link remains essential. Oddly, the extended deterrent relationship that has received probably the least amount of attention over the decades (because it appeared to be so firmly rooted in the situation

on the ground and the hostilities between Seoul and Pyongyang), is now proving the most problematic. As South Korea seeks to ameliorate tensions with its northern neighbor, the question of the U.S. role in helping to defend South Korea necessarily may be called into question. How this relationship evolves may have significant impact not only on the U.S.-ROK alliance but, if things go wrong, on the United States' other extended deterrence relationships.

7. DEFENSE INDUSTRY, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ALLIANCES

Dr. Dov S. Zakheim

U ntil the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, there was a consensus among both Republican and Democratic policymakers that the United States' web of allies and partners was a major factor in preserving the international security order. Whether confronting the Soviet Union, defeating aggression in Kuwait or the Balkans, maintaining freedom of navigation in international waterways, combating terrorism in Afghanistan or Africa, fighting piracy, or eradicating pandemics, it was U.S.-led alliances and coalitions of the willing that invariably took the lead in each of these undertakings. One area, however, has long and consistently been a source of frustration on the part of the United States' allies, partners and friends, namely, its restrictions on the transfer of military technology.

The web of limitations to the transfer of military-related technologies outside the United States came into force with the passage of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act. The Act led to the creation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which applied to items on the U.S. Munitions List. The system was hardly leakproof, however, particularly with respect to dual-use items. During the early years of the Reagan administration, however, the Department of Defense created the Defense Technology Security Administration, which successfully pressed for toughening the Department of Commerce's export control regime for dual-use systems.

Although these restrictions were targeted primarily at the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, they were unaffected by the end of the

Cold War. Instead, bureaucrats in the Department of State's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, often working in tandem with key staffers on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prevented the implementation of major reforms to the export-control regime. Senior U.S. officials and their counterparts among NATO allies in particular would complain that State imposed too many restrictions on too many items, took too long to process license requests, and denied and overly restricted licenses, thereby undermining U.S. industries' ability to sell munitions to legitimate customers. In addition, restrictions on the re-export of U.S. systems often meant that European manufacturers, particularly aircraft manufacturers, could not market their own products to third countries without U.S. permission if those products incorporated any degree of U.S. technology. In effect, Washington could veto allied sales to third countries if it chose to do so.¹

Reforming the export control system has been a long, agonizing, halting, and inconsistent process. During the latter days of the Clinton administration, the Departments of State and Defense announced a Defense Trade Security Initiative, which included a number of reforms to the export control system, geared primarily to speeding up the export licensing process. One major element of the initiative was a proposal to grant the UK and Australia exempt status similar to that already in force with Canada.

The reforms nominally came into force, but the process remained as hidebound as ever. Indeed, despite repeated promises that the UK and Australia would move "to the head of line," they too continued to suffer from the delays and restrictions that were endemic to the process. Moreover, as the United States began to ramp up its development and production of unmanned aerial vehicles, including those that carried weapons, potential foreign buyers found that even if they were able to clear the hurdles associated with technology transfer, they could not work around the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In one notable case, the United Arab Emirates was unable to acquire armed Predator UAVs, despite considerable support from high-level officials in DoD, myself included, because the Office of the General Counsel ruled that the armed UAVs were no different from missiles covered by the MTCR. Since the

1. For a discussion, see Dov S. Zakheim with Sharon Weinberger, *Toward a Fortress Europe?* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), 30–32.

Predator B's range and payload far exceeded the MTCR's limits of 350 kilometers and 500 kilograms, respectively, the OGC vetoed the sale.

Ongoing allied frustration with the U.S. export-control regime led the Defense Business Board (DBB) to examine best practices both among key allies and partners and within the commercial sector. At the same time, the export-control regime remained far too broad. The 2008 report contrasted the U.S. system with those of 15 U.S. allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, virtually all of which sought to design a control regime "that it is more effective and efficient to 'build higher walls around a smaller list of items.'"² The DBB also pointed out that other governments worked far more closely with industry in designing weapons intended for export. On the other hand, U.S. companies, wary of bureaucratic interference, would often move development of technology overseas to avoid ITAR regulations. Finally, it noted that whereas U.S. companies centralized the management of export controls and used automated procedures to maintain "smooth, credible and reliable processes," the bifurcated nature of the government's system, between the Department of Commerce for dual-use items and State for military items, and interagency rivalries that also affected DoD made improvements to the system exceedingly difficult.³

The DBB issued a number of recommendations to remedy the system. These included updating the Munitions List annually, with a focus on dual-use items; expanding the use of broader technology-sharing agreements with key allies and including broader licenses that incorporated multiple subsystems; creating a DoD revolving fund to pay for developing exportable versions of items developed in the department's acquisition programs; and, again within the DoD, automating standardized export reviews.

The Obama administration directed an interagency review of the system, which resulted in the 2010 Export Control Reform Initiative and incorporated some of the DBB's observations and recommendations. The initiative called for creation of a single consolidated control list, a single licensing agency, a primary export enforcement coordination agency, and

2. Defense Business Board, Task Group on Best Practices for Export Controls, "Report to the Secretary of Defense: Recommendations to Improve Export Control Rules and Processes Based on Commercial Best Practices of the United States and Those of Foreign Governments," October 2008, 5, http://dbb.defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2008/FY09-3_Best_Practices_for_Export_Controls_2008-12.pdf.

3. *Ibid.*, 6.

a unified information technology system.⁴ The DoD's USXPORT, an IT system that had been developed during the George W. Bush administration to reduce the department's reliance on paper copies in the export process, was identified as the government central export licensing database. Seven years later, however, while Defense, State, and Commerce were all using the system, other agencies, notably Treasury, were not. Moreover, as of early 2017, the Export Enforcement Coordination Center, also created under the 2010 initiative, had yet to coordinate the investigative export control enforcement and intelligence communities. Similarly, while the government undertook a review to determine whether items in the Munitions List previously labelled high-risk could be treated as lower risk and therefore moved from State's jurisdiction to that of Commerce, the entire Munitions List had yet to be reviewed.⁵ Finally, the government had yet to create a single licensing agency.

For its part, DoD has taken several steps to balance sales imperatives and security concerns. In 2015 the department issued guidance that clarified roles and authorities relating to its efforts to ensure that technology protections be designed into a system before a potential foreign sale. In addition, it created a Defense Exportability Pilot Program to facilitate sales while accounting for program protection. Moreover, DoD has actively worked to coordinate its efforts with other government agencies, including joint briefings to Congress.⁶

Defense technology transfer reform is more urgently needed than ever before. To begin with, it has become clear, even to those within the DoD technology community, that the defense industrial base no longer has a monopoly on defense technological innovation, if ever it did. Key NATO allies, notably France; other allies such as Israel and South Korea; and potential or actual adversaries, notably China, have a burgeoning technology base of their own. Indeed, China's defense industrial base owes much to the systematic IP theft from U.S. firms. To the extent that any of these states develop entirely homegrown systems, they are free to sell to

4. See James A. Hursch, director, DTSA, "Update on U.S. Export Control Reform and DoD's Technology Security Foreign Disclosure Reform," especially 2-3, <http://www.ideea.com/comdef12/speeches/Hursch.pdf>.

5. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others*, GAO-17-317, February 2017, 381-382, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682765.pdf>. See also <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Export-Control-Reform-ECR>.

6. *Ibid.*, 383-384.

most countries other than those under UN sanctions or in cases where such sales violate either the MTCR or the Wassenaar Arrangement,⁷ which imposes controls on transfers of conventional arms, dual-use goods, and related software and source codes.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that both China and South Korea have demonstrated their willingness to transfer military industrial technology to third countries. So too has Israel, though on a more limited basis, given its heavy reliance on U.S.-supplied weapons and systems. Nevertheless, homegrown Israeli technology is far more accessible than that of the United States. Major Chinese companies such as Alibaba are heavily invested in the “start-up nation”; in 2016 China invested \$16.5 billion into the Israeli hi-tech sector.⁸ For its part, South Korea is teaming with Israel to conduct operational testing on an active electronically scanned array radar being developed for the Korean KF-X fighter, which it hopes to export to third countries.⁹

Finally, the European Union has for decades promulgated plans to rationalize the industrial bases of its member states but has been slow in implementing them.¹⁰ In part due to uncertainty about U.S. attitudes—more specifically, those of the president—and otherwise due to anticipation of Brexit, the European Union agreed to the creation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). At a minimum PESCO calls for coordinating defense procurement and pooling money and military capabilities—and the only EU states, apart from Britain, that will not participate are Denmark, whose defense base is small, and Malta, whose base is nonexistent. PESCO may also be a first step toward a European Army, which the United States has long viewed as a threat to NATO cohesion; Jean-Claude Juncker, EU president, has tweeted that “PESCO lay[s] the foundations of a European Defense Union” and, in a clear swipe at the Trump administration, has added “Our security cannot be outsourced.”

7. Israel and China are not parties to the arrangement but claim to have aligned themselves to its provisions. Whether they do so in every case is difficult to determine.

8. Max Schindler, “Chinese Investors Flock to Israel for Unlikely Reasons,” *Jerusalem Post*, December 20, 2017, <http://www.jpost.com/Jpost-Tech/Chinese-investors-flock-to-Israel-for-unlikely-reasons-518600>.

9. Mike Yeo, “Tech Transfer: Korea, China Score Big In Exports,” *C4ISRNET*, July 23, 2017, <https://www.c4isrnet.com/top-100/2017/07/24/tech-transfer-korea-china-score-big-in-exports/>.

10. For a review of EU plans regarding defense as they stood at the beginning of this century, see Zakheim with Weinberger, “Toward a Fortress Europe,” 18–22.

At the same time as foreign defense technology and industry bases continue to expand, the U.S. government no longer holds a monopoly on high-technology development even within the United States' borders. Leading-edge technology is as likely, if not more so, to emerge from Silicon Valley, North Carolina's Research Triangle, or the research hubs around Boston or Austin than from the DoD. Moreover, foreign investors, notably China, have become increasingly involved in start-ups in these and other key U.S. research hubs. In the absence of governmental control over such investments as part of the process governed by the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS), dual-use technology can and does easily migrate from the United States.

All of these developments call for an urgent review of the United States' ability to balance its technology security concerns with both its ongoing efforts to increase its already massive arms export program and the need to maintain alliance cohesion. As is the case with so many of its other international security-related policies, however, the Trump administration is sending mixed signals on this score, particularly to the United States' allies and partners.

On the one hand, the president has been outspoken in his criticism of allies as "free riders." Though he no longer is mute about the United States' Article V commitment to its NATO allies, and indeed incorporated that commitment in the National Security Strategy, he continues to be perceived by the leaders of allies and partners as disinclined to work cooperatively within the international system. Foreign officials point to U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and the Paris Climate Agreement, as well as its isolation in recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital as evidence that the president's incendiary rhetoric does on occasion translate into action that undermines not only the United States' alliance relationships but the U.S.-led postwar international order. His critiques of individual allies such as Germany, Britain, and South Korea, and even harsh words for their leaders, has further unsettled the United States' long-standing relationships.¹¹ It is in this context that Juncker's tweet about "outsourcing defense" must be understood.

11. For an extended discussion of these themes, see Hal Brands, "The Unexceptional Superpower: American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump," *Survival* 59 (December 2017–January 2018): esp. 16–32, *passim*.

On the other hand, Mr. Trump has often attached great importance to U.S. arms sales to its friends and allies. And rightly so. The defense industrial base, which until the recent past viewed overseas arms sales as an adjunct to its primary market at home, has begun to attach greater importance to those sales in light of ongoing constraints on the U.S. defense budget. The long-term impact of the defense spending caps imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011, coupled with unrelenting growth in personnel and operations costs, have resulted in major strains on the acquisition budgets. Those strains are unlikely to be relieved unless and until the budget caps are finally removed, which may not happen until Fiscal Year 2022. Ramping up overseas arms sales is one way to ensure the health of the defense industrial base.

In a reflection of the administration's determination to expand overseas markets for the domestic defense industry, the United States is even going so far as to seek a change to the MTCR that would permit the sale of armed UAVs such the Reaper to friendly states on a case-by-basis.¹² Such sales would enable those states that are willing to step up their efforts to combat terrorism more effective means of doing so. In addition, enabling friendly states to fight terrorism more effectively would enable Washington to redirect its constrained defense resources to address the increasingly urgent, and far more costly, priority to confront a belligerent Russia and an assertive China.

The need to redirect resources to reflect a hierarchy of defense priorities has rarely been as pressing as it is today, and results from the same factors that constrain acquisition budgets. Those constraints cannot be relieved without a more explicit ordering of spending priorities. Allied participation in major conflicts, and the formulation of coalitions of the willing in more limited conflicts is imperative for the United States rather than optional. In this regard, how the United States formulates its arms export regime becomes a major policy concern.

U.S. arms are still, in general, the most highly developed in the world. For that reason, many of Washington's long-standing partners, and other states such as India, will continue to seek U.S. products. At issue, however, is whether those systems can be truly interoperable with those employed

12. Valerie Insinna and Aaron Mehta, "Here's How the Trump Administration Could Make It Easier to Sell Military Drones," *Defense News*, December 19, 2017, <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/12/19/heres-how-the-trump-administration-could-make-it-easier-to-sell-military-drones/>.

by U.S. forces, thereby maximizing the effectiveness of coalition operations against a common foe. As the Defense Business Board pointed out, a major reason to modify and update the export control regime—including through legislative action—is “the importance of enhancing partnership capacity [and] facilitating the U.S. military’s interoperability with allies.”¹³

As noted, however, the president’s stated attitudes toward the value of alliances undermine his own preference for U.S. domination of the arms market. Those attitudes, coupled with the growing technological prowess of states ranging from geographically tiny Israel to the emerging superpower that is China, and the willingness of these countries to sell their products with far fewer restrictions than the U.S. government imposes, could well result in the loss of U.S. sales to foreign competition unless the U.S. export-control regime is subject to comprehensive reform.

It is probably asking too much for Donald Trump to alter if not terminate his habitual use of his Twitter account, which is his favorite vehicle for confusing, if not chastising, the United States’ allies and partners. It is therefore not surprising that allied leaders and officials remain suspicious of U.S. reliability, resulting in, among other things, the creation of PESCO. Nevertheless, those same leaders and officials are beginning to recognize that tweets do not usually reflect U.S. practice on the ground, and they retain a concrete desire to maintain their long-standing security ties with Washington.

Further opening up the export control regime would help to reinforce allied confidence in the U.S. commitment to the common defense. Such a more flexible, less restrictive export-control process would provide a concrete signal that, presidential venting notwithstanding, the United States remains deeply committed not only to working with its allies and partners, but to facilitating cooperation to the greatest extent possible, to the benefit and long-term national security of all concerned.

13. Defense Business Board, “Recommendations to Improve Export Control Rules and Processes,” 8.

8. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF CYBER FOR ALLIANCES?

Fergus Hanson

HOW CAN ALLIES WORK TOGETHER MORE EFFECTIVELY TO ENHANCE COLLECTIVE CYBERSECURITY?

Taking this book's conceptual premise as a starting point—that alliances serve to establish (and maintain) international order, provide security and deterrence, and both reassure and restrain allies—what are the implications of cyber for alliances?

The short answer is plenty. With the Internet increasingly intersecting all aspects of modern societies—economic, social, cultural, security—it is little wonder that cyberissues should become important considerations for alliances.

National economies now depend on the internet for everything from trade to keeping the lights on. Opinions and attitudes are increasingly shaped and informed via online information exchanges, molding our societies and cultures. Our military kit is increasingly connected and vulnerable to cyberthreats, while cyberspace itself is becoming recognized as a military domain in its own right, with an increasing number of governments developing cyberattack capabilities.¹

The increasingly all-pervasive and often international nature of cyberissues means there are many areas for fruitful alliance cooperation to improve cybersecurity. Four particularly fertile opportunities are around supply chain security, foreign interference including information warfare, cybercrime, and gray zone cyberconflict.

1. <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf>, 5.

The recent Australian decision to ban Chinese vendors from participating in the 5G build-out² and restrictions introduced in the United States under the National Defense Authorization Act³ have highlighted growing concern about supply chain security and are prompting reevaluations elsewhere. The Australian ban prompted former Canadian intelligence chiefs to call for a similar ban there,⁴ with New Zealand and Japan announcing effective bans and various European states considering them.⁵ If a critical mass of allies and partners reject Chinese products on national security grounds, then an opportunity arises to rebuild a market for securely produced kit.

Supply chain security concerns span both hardware and software, and given the complexity of current supply chains, reimagining an overhaul is a daunting task. But two macro trends lend themselves to believing a more secure approach is possible.

The first is automation, which is leading to a reversal of the trend that saw companies accept higher political risk in return for accessing low-cost labor offshore. As robots begin to match labor costs, the logic for companies is to reverse this trend and move manufacturing to less risky places. That means hardware manufacturers at least will find it increasingly viable to manufacture in rule-of-law countries rather than places like China, where companies can be compelled to cooperate in state espionage activities.⁶

2. Michael Slezak and Ariel Bogle, "Huawei Banned from 5G Mobile Infrastructure Rollout in Australia," *ABC News*, August 23, 2018, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-23/huawei-banned-from-providing-5g-mobile-technology-australia/10155438>.

3. Jeff Mason, "Trump Signs Defense Policy Bill with Watered-Down China Measures," *Reuters*, August 13, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump/trump-signs-defense-policy-bill-with-watered-down-china-measures-idUSKBN1KY249>.

4. Robert Fife, Steven Chase, and Ian Bailey, "Trudeau Won't Say if Canada Will Follow Australia, U.S. in Blocking Huawei from Big Projects," *Globe and Mail*, August 23, 2018, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-pm-trudeau-hazy-on-whether-canada-will-join-allies-to-ban-chinas/>.

5. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-28/huawei-banned-from-nz-5g-upgrade-over-security-risk/10563736>; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japan-effectively-bans-chinas-huawei-zte-from-government-contracts-joining-us/2018/12/10/748fe98a-fc69-11e8-ba87-8c7facdf6739_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7a3a4ca6f912; <https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2179291/huaweis-troubles-grow-europe-more-countries-follow-us-shunning-it>.

6. Elsa Kania, "Much Ado about Huawei (Part 2)," *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, March 28, 2018, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/much-ado-huawei-part-2/>.

The second macro trend is the rise of economic nationalism that favors national production, particularly in the United States—the central alliance actor.

Together these trends have provided added impetus for allies to consider an overhaul of how they deal with supply chain risk.

A second opportunity for cooperation exists in countering adversary states' efforts to undermine alliance members' political systems. States like China and Russia are using different methods but are exploiting the same weaknesses, such as openness and trust, that are key features of our democracies.

A key underlying shift that has enabled this opportunity for adversary states has been the erosion of the gatekeeper role traditionally played by mainstream media in communicating with the public. The professional class of journalists who regulated the information environment in a one-way direction has had this gatekeeper function eroded through the introduction of the everyone-is-a-publisher world that has been achieved through the advent of social media. This explosion of information sources in an ecosystem that favors confirmation bias makes it difficult to agree on common facts and breeds polarization.

There is no walking this back. But, as the 2016 U.S. presidential election and subsequent elections have demonstrated, there is a need to wind back the completely laissez-faire world that allowed Russia to distort democracies' information environments on a vast scale. If alliances are going to hold together through these deliberate attempts to fracture them, they need to treat countering these attempts as a key priority. And as revelations surrounding Chinese interference in the Australian political system⁷ have highlighted, this goes beyond simply requiring platforms like Facebook and Twitter to remove Russian propaganda.

As the former senior adviser to Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, John Garnaut, noted in *Foreign Affairs*:

Australia is the canary in the coal mine of Chinese Communist Party interference. Over the past 18 months, the country has been shaken by allegations of the Chinese party-state working to covertly manipulate the Australian political system and curate the

7. John Garnaut, "How China Interferes in Australia: And How Democracies Can Push Back," *Foreign Affairs*, March 9, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-03-09/how-china-interferes-australia>.

wider political landscape. There are claims of Beijing-linked political donors buying access and influence, universities being co-opted as “propaganda vehicles,” and Australian-funded scientific research being diverted to aid the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Most notoriously, an ambitious young senator, Sam Dastyari, was exposed for parroting Communist Party talking points and giving countersurveillance advice to a Chinese political donor before being hounded into premature retirement.⁸

The Chinese Communist Party’s largely successful efforts to coerce global airlines into calling Taiwan a part of China is another example of its global effort to reshape reality to its liking, this time under its far-reaching social credit scheme. As Samantha Hoffman of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Center has noted, “The Chinese authorities said failure to classify the places [Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau] as Chinese property would count against the airlines’ credit records and would lead to penalties under other laws, such as the Cybersecurity Law.”⁹

At a civilian and intelligence level, alliances can play an important role in pushing back against this exploitation of the soft underbellies of our democracies. To counter Russian abuses, a systematic and concerted effort is needed to blunt its information campaigns and shore up our democracies. Work is needed on a range of fronts, from working with industry to identify and remove state-backed propaganda to supporting political parties to ensure they have strong cybersecurity defenses. At an alliance level, threat sharing is vital, as is working to impose costs on Russia.

Responding to China requires a slightly different approach. Leaving companies to fend for themselves, as happened in the case of global airlines, is clearly a losing strategy and needs to be replaced by coalitions of states, including allies, that push back collectively against Chinese Communist Party efforts to coerce companies. More work is needed to understand how China is working to undermine democratic political processes around the world. Australia is at the forefront of this confrontation with Chinese Communist Party influence efforts but is still just scratching the

8. Garnaut, “How China Interferes in Australia.”

9. Samantha Hoffman, “Social Credit,” *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, June 28, 2018, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/social-credit>.

surface. There is much work alliances could do to better understand and counter this activity.

The third area ripe for cooperation is cybercrime. While not a traditional national security issue, cybercrime is responsible for the vast volume of illicit online activity. As such it provides easy cover for state-based actors and drives a market for malicious cyberproducts.

Ever-increasing rates of cybercrime¹⁰ point to the inadequacy of the current approach. At a nation-state level, the reflexive response is to bolster local policing capability, but this is ineffective as this is largely an international problem. This makes cybercrime an attractive form of crime because the chance of being caught is extremely low. The rise of crime-as-a-service, allowing nonexperts to essentially buy and apply ready-to-use kit, is also expanding its attractiveness.

Existing responses all have limits. Improved cybersecurity is the most persuasive response, but it is difficult to raise levels sufficiently across all businesses in the economy, and even in advanced economies where cybersecurity standards are improving, cybercrime rates are increasing. The volume of cybercrime is so high that law enforcement is overwhelmed, driving an increasingly lawless online environment that is increasingly attractive to cybercriminals. And use by states of offensive cybercapability against cybercriminals is not a scalable or long-lasting response.

While state-based actors are a serious challenge, especially in relation to espionage, the vast bulk of cybercrime is carried out by non-state actors. The ease and low risk of cybercrime make it attractive to organized crime, terrorist networks, and ordinary criminals. The problem for states is that the online environment is so lawless they cannot change the dynamic alone.

To check and reverse the rate of cybercrime, the cost of carrying it out and/or the risk of being caught need to increase. Focused and coordinated action by allied states could start to reverse the trend. Relatively simple actions, such as resourcing efforts to trace all financial cybercrime, and then bringing law enforcement and diplomatic pressure to

10. See, for example, Dan Tehan, "National Press Club Address—Silent Dangers—Launch of the Australian Cyber Security Centre's 2017 Threat Report," *Australian Government*, <https://ministers.pmc.gov.au/tehan/2017/npc-launch-australian-cyber-security-centre-2017-threat-report>.

bear en masse to close destination bank accounts and track down perpetrators, is one option that could be tried.

The fourth area where cooperation could be valuably strengthened among allies is in pushing back against gray zone cyberconflict. U.S. Cyber Command released a “Command Vision for U.S. Cyber Command” in March 2018 that made the following two observations:

As the 2018 *National Defense Strategy* explains, adversaries are increasingly capable of contesting and disrupting America’s society, economy, and military. This is in part because of our growing reliance on cyberspace. Adversaries direct continuous operations and activities against our allies and us in campaigns short of open warfare to achieve competitive advantage and impair U.S. interests.

. . . The spread of technology and communications has enabled new means of influence and coercion. Adversaries continuously operate against us below the threshold of armed conflict. In this “new normal,” our adversaries are extending their influence without resorting to physical aggression. They provoke and intimidate our citizens and enterprises without fear of legal or military consequences. They understand the constraints under which the United States chooses to operate in cyberspace, including our traditionally high threshold for response to adversary activity. They use this insight to exploit our dependencies and vulnerabilities in cyberspace and use our systems, processes, and values against us to weaken our democratic institutions and gain economic, diplomatic, and military advantages.¹¹

The document proposed a very high-level program for countering this gray zone cyberconflict that involves “increasing resiliency, defending forward, and continuously engaging our adversaries.” It also laid out the need for expanding, deepening, and operationalizing partnerships, including with allies.

Similarly, the U.S. State Department’s “Recommendations to the President on Deterring Adversaries and Better Protecting the American People from Cyber Threats” calls for “a fundamental rethinking” around deterring malicious cyberactivities, and states, “The United States has

11. <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4419681/Command-Vision-for-USCYBERCOM-23-Mar-18.pdf>, 2, 3.

resolved to take clear and unequivocal actions, partnering with friends and allies when possible, to safeguard cyberspace and the benefits it offers.” One of its four suggested strategic responses is “building partnerships,” noting, “The imposition of consequences would be more impactful and send a stronger deterrent message if it were carried out in concert with partners.”¹² While these two documents are at the forefront of state thinking, they have likely accurately articulated the future direction of the Western response to hostile states’ actions in this gray zone. It is an area ripe for further collaboration among allies.

HOW ARE ALLIANCES ADAPTING TO MEET NEW CYBERTHREATS?

Alliances have been gradually adding cyberdimensions to their cooperation activities, often in response to major cyberincidents.

NATO, which has been steadily upping its cyberfocus, approved its first “Policy on Cyber Defense” in 2008 in the aftermath of the Russian cyberattacks on Estonia.¹³ In 2015, in the wake of further North Korean cyberattacks, the United States and South Korea announced plans to strengthen cybercooperation, including by establishing a hotline between the White House and the Blue House, the residence of the South Korean head of state.¹⁴

Unsurprisingly, the closest cooperation on both offense and defense has been among Five Eyes countries, which share very close ties and have preexisting collaboration mechanisms around signals intelligence. Members of this grouping have led in the transparent disclosure of these capabilities and appropriate restrictions on their use.¹⁵ Among the five partner countries, the United States is the clear leader, publishing annual budget details and doctrine, but others such as Australia and the UK have also made public statements disclosing their capabilities and discussing instances where they have been used, such as against the Islamic State.¹⁶ An interesting development on use cases was Australia’s official announcement on June 30, 2017, that it would be using its offensive cy-

12. <https://www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/eo13800/282011.htm>.

13. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm.

14. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/16/remarks-president-obama-and-president-park-republic-korea-joint-press>.

15. <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/australias-offensive-cyber-capability>.

16. See, for example, <https://www.ft.com/content/cea9d608-3e3f-11e8-b7e0-52972418fec4>.

bercapability to target organized offshore cybercriminals in certain circumstances.¹⁷ This was the first time a country had acknowledged this particular use for its offensive cybercapability and presents some opportunities for further joint efforts among allies to disrupt organized cybercriminals.

Alongside close Five Eyes cooperation, differentiated partnerships have also emerged among partner countries. In 2011, Australia and the United States agreed that a cyberattack on either of them would trigger the mechanisms contained in their security pact, the ANZUS Treaty¹⁸ (in 2016, NATO member states also agreed that a cyberattack could trigger collective defense provisions under Article V¹⁹). And in 2018, the two countries signed an MOU “to collaboratively develop tools and software to address cyber and other security threats.”²⁰

The UK and United States, meanwhile, in 2015 agreed to work more closely to improve the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and incident response. This included increased threat information sharing and joint cybersecurity and network defense exercises. They also agreed the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and MI5 would work with the U.S. NSA and FBI to establish a joint cybercell, with a presence in each country that would focus on cyberdefense topics and enable cyberthreat information and data to be shared faster and at higher volumes.²¹

An interesting public illustration of alliance adaptation to cyberthreats came after a recent string of public attributions. When the White House announced the attribution of WannaCry to North Korea on December 19, 2017, it was simultaneously announced that the “United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan have seen our analysis, and they join us in denouncing North Korea for WannaCry.”²² When NotPetya was attributed to Russia in February 2018, the White

17. <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/australias-offensive-cyber-capability>.

18. https://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2011/kr_mr_110916.aspx?ministerid=2.

19. https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/opinions_132349.htm?selectedLocale=en.

20. <https://au.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-australia-u-s-ministerial-consultations-2018/>.

21. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/16/fact-sheet-us-united-kingdom-cybersecurity-cooperation>.

22. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-on-the-attribution-of-the-wannacry-malware-attack-to-north-korea-121917/>.

House statement²³ did not list other countries, but a string of states joined the United States in making the link to Russia in what was dubbed “the largest coordinated attribution of its kind to date.”²⁴

The two cases highlighted a few interesting alliance issues. First, of these is the long lead time between the actual incident and the subsequent attribution—more than six months in both cases—a delay at least partly due to the time needed to line up allies and for them to conduct their own analysis. Second, the differing countries joining in making the two attributions points to the fluid nature of attribution coalitions. Japan, for example, joined in the WannaCry attribution but not the NotPetya attribution. In the case of WannaCry, major Japanese companies Honda and Hitachi²⁵ had been affected and the country at fault was its pesky, rogue neighbor. In the case of NotPetya, the country at fault was a giant neighbor that has a sensitive territorial dispute with Japan. Third, WannaCry and NotPetya show the limits of the size of coalitions that can be formed. Making attributions with a high degree of confidence requires significant capability and often involves the supplemental use of intelligence. That makes it hard to share findings widely, limiting the number of countries that can make attributions themselves or be trusted with sensitive intelligence materials.

The final point of note is that the attributions did not lead to the subsequent visible imposition of costs on North Korea or Russia (although the United States did link a round of sanctions on Russia in part to NotPetya).²⁶ For attributions to have any impact, there is a clear need for at least some visible costs to be imposed,²⁷ and this remains a clear area for future alliance cooperation. However, the problems discussed around timely attribution are only magnified when it comes to moving to the next step of imposing costs, as are the political challenges.

Existing alliance cooperation on cyberissues covers a fairly wide field including threat sharing, capability development, equity reviews, joint exercises, and incident response, as well as more high-level declarations that have brought cyberissues formally within the purview of alliances.

23. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-25/>.

24. <https://www.zdnet.com/article/blaming-russia-for-notpetya-was-coordinated-diplomatic-action/>.

25. <https://www.ft.com/content/aof5do47-2e20-3db9-b258-565d3be17bba>.

26. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/smo312>.

27. <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/deterrence-cyberspace>.

That said, the evolving nature of both offensive and defensive capabilities suggests demand for closer cooperation will only increase. A few key developments that will drive this include the growing number of states acquiring cyberattack capabilities²⁸ and the looming prospect of the first wave of deaths caused by cyberattacks as more and more potentially deadly items, like cars, come to depend on the Internet to operate.

IS THE EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY OF ALLIANCES ADEQUATE TO RESPOND TO CYBERCHALLENGES?

The demonstrated ability of alliance systems around the world to gradually add cybercooperation to their remits suggests existing machinery is largely working and evolving to address cyberthreats. However, the fact that governments around the world have felt the need to develop cybercooperation MOUs and establish new bodies—like NATO’s Cyber Rapid Reaction teams and the Cyberspace Operations Centre²⁹—suggest deliberative effort is required to make sure alliances keep pace with the changing threat landscape.

The fact that alliances are starting to grapple with cyberissues also does not mean the procedures for doing so are well oiled. The delays in making the WannaCry and NotPetya attributions highlight the need for alliances to practice new cyberrelevant procedures. Alliances have not yet had to confront a crippling cyberincident that causes serious disruption (such as disrupting major pieces of critical infrastructure) or deaths. When they do, the need to speed up cooperation mechanisms will almost certainly be identified.

The WannaCry and NotPetya attributions also demonstrated the value in exploring more fluid small “a” alliances, or perhaps groupings that join different alliance systems together in temporary coalitions.

Notwithstanding the adaption of existing alliance systems to the cyberthreat, new proposals have emerged to deal with the challenges. In May 2018, Estonia’s former president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, proposed “a new ‘Cyber NATO’, a coalition of liberal democracies, but not bounded or

28. <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf>.

29. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm.

restricted by geography in the way NATO is today, which can better respond to the ubiquity of threats.”³⁰

Another proposal has called for a “Proliferation Security Initiative for Cyber Cooperation” that would not involve the interdiction of cyber-weapons, but that might be used for “multilateral efforts to remediate effects of cyberattacks, to assist in attributing them to perpetrators, or to impose sanctions against such bad actors.”³¹

CONCLUSION

The international nature of many cyberthreats means alliances are often useful vehicles for responding to cyberchallenges and exploiting opportunities presented by this domain.

While many alliances have begun to consciously add cyberissues to their workplans, the dynamic operating environment and pace of new technologies coming online means further adaptation is both necessary and likely.

This essay has outlined four fruitful areas for future collaboration among allies. However, given the breadth of areas touched by this domain, these opportunities for alliance engagement are illustrative rather than exhaustive.

30. <https://news.err.ee/835995/ilves-at-cycon-2018-cyber-nato-coalition-of-liberal-democracies-needed>.

31. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/proliferation-security-initiative-cyber-cooperation> and https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3082907.

Part III. REGIONAL ALLIANCES

9. THE PROMOTION OF THE RULES-BASED ORDER AND THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE

Meeting the Challenges of the Strategic Competition with China in the Indo-Pacific

Dr. Satoru Mori

What are the fundamental challenges facing the rules-based order? What role can U.S. alliances play in addressing those challenges? What are the main tasks the Japan-U.S. alliance should undertake? These are the central strategic questions that the United States and Japan as well as other U.S. allies must address in order to develop a sensible strategy to promote a rules-based international order.

CHALLENGES TO THE RULES-BASED ORDER

The prevailing notion after the end of the Cold War was that the path to human progress was to achieve the status of market-based liberal democracies,¹ and the international order of liberal hierarchy,² or liberal hegemony, generally acquired legitimacy.³ Since the core principles of international society are conceived in terms of rightful membership—

1. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

2. On the concept of liberal hierarchy, see Christian Reus-Schmidt, “Liberal Hierarchy and the License to Use Force,” *Review of International Studies* 31 (2005): 71–92.

3. There were many times the U.S.-led liberal international order was said to be in crisis; but generally, its legitimacy has been maintained. See G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 232–277; Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal World: The Resilient Order,” *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 4 (July/August 2018): 16–24.

“an ‘inward-looking’ notion of legitimacy” that specifies the credentials for membership—and rightful conduct—“an ‘outward-looking’ set of ideas” about how members should relate to each other⁴—the post-Cold War liberal hierarchy can be understood as being composed of three broad types of states in the international system:

- Tier 1: Liberal democratic states whose internal and external conduct (i.e., exercise of power) is regulated by liberal norms.
- Tier 2: Nondemocratic states whose internal conduct defies liberal norms, but whose external conduct is partially regulated by liberal norms.
- Tier 3: “Rogue states” whose internal and external conduct reject liberal norms.

The notion of “liberal international order” was, on one hand, the description of interstate relations among tier 1 states, and on the other hand, the normative understanding among most states that tier 1 membership was the key to achieving modernity.

However, the 2008 global financial and economic crisis, the rise of China (the primary proponent of tier 2 of nondemocratic states), and the series of violations of fundamental norms like peaceful resolution of disputes, nuclear nonproliferation, and basic human rights committed by Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Syria—as well as rising anti-globalist and nationalist attitudes—caused deep suspicion about the legitimacy of the liberal hierarchy.

The rules-based order currently faces three types of challenges. First, some of the fundamental rules that have been embraced by liberal democratic states have not been enforced, and violations of the rules have not been met with sufficient responses to dissuade further violation. Russian aggression against Ukraine, China’s unilateral actions in the South China Sea, North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, and Syria’s massive violation of human rights are just some recent examples where rule violations continue. The implication of this trend is that international outcomes have become increasingly determined by unilateral exercise of power, not rules.

4. Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 25–29.

Second, the leading nondemocratic power—China—is enhancing its “functional economic legitimacy”⁵ by using the benefits of the international economic order to expand its influence to third countries through economic statecraft.⁶ China has been engaging in infrastructure projects under the rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to exercise influence through various phases such as finance, design and construction, and ownership and operation.⁷ Through this China appears to have been earning a political currency that dissuades recipient states from openly opposing its revisionist actions on the seas.

Third, incumbent regimes and political forces ruling the market-based liberal democracies are being challenged by domestic constituencies that have grown dissatisfied with globalization and the rules-based liberal international order that, together, have sustained the status quo. For example, many candidates in the 2016 U.S. presidential election criticized aspects of the status quo, while the vote for Brexit was mainly supported by those in the United Kingdom that were hurt by the flight of manufacturing resulting from globalization. The European far right has been opposing the free movement of people and goods.⁸ As a result, efforts to use resources and domestic support to defend the rules-based liberal order face considerable obstacles.

These three problems are cumulatively producing the fundamental problem of the erosion of legitimacy of the post-Cold War liberal hierarchy. The fundamental premise that the road to human modernity was

5. China has provided funds for domestic economic development without questioning the political legitimacy of any regime. In effect, China has been trying to enhance its legitimacy by demonstrating that it has the financial capacity to solve economic development issues, particularly those related to infrastructure, that are badly needed by developing states in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. G. John Ikenberry argues that the durability of an international order is affected by functionality: “the practical capacity of an international order to get things accomplished.” G. John Ikenberry, “The Logic of Order: Westphalia, Liberalism, and the Evolution of International Order in the Modern Era,” in *Power, Order, and Change in World Politics*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 102. In a sense, China is forging a low-standard alternative economic order by enhancing its functional economic legitimacy.

6. See Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016).

7. Jonathan E. Hillman, *Influence and Infrastructure: The Strategic Stakes of Foreign Projects* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).

8. For an illustrative discussion on anti-globalism, see Nikil Saval, “Globalisation: the rise and fall of an idea that swept the world,” *The Guardian*, July 14, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/14/globalisation-the-rise-and-fall-of-an-idea-that-swept-the-world>.

to liberalize politically and economically was in question, as China actively promoted tier 2's international legitimacy through its economic statecraft, and Russia actively undermined tier 1's domestic legitimacy through influence operations. In short, Russia and China are advancing the legitimacy of illiberal hierarchy. According to Freedom House's Freedom of the World Index, tier 1 has weakened—in 2018, for “the 12th consecutive year, according to *Freedom in the World*, countries that suffered democratic setbacks outnumbered those that registered gains.”⁹

In this light, the strategic competition with major revisionist powers will ultimately be about how to turn the tide on the shift in the relative legitimacy—both internationally and domestically—of the liberal democratic community (tier 1) and the group of nondemocratic states (tier 2). In other words, the goal of the strategic competition with revisionist states should be the promotion, protection, and enforcement of the liberal norms and values that should govern external conduct as well as domestic governance of states and that constitute the rules-based order. However, the range of norms and institutions that need to be promoted and enforced will likely be limited as there will be economic, political, and resource constraints. As a result, areas for competition will inevitably need to be prioritized.

U.S. ALLIANCES AND THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

Major U.S. allies like Japan deeply share a common interest with the United States in promoting the rules-based order that is underpinned by norms reflecting liberal values such as the rule of law, political and economic self-determination, the market economy, peaceful resolution of disputes, and freedom of navigation, among others. Therefore, the Japan-U.S. alliance should pursue the goal of enhancing the legitimacy of rules, norms, and values upheld by liberal democratic states in order to counter revisionist efforts by China.

The ends of the allied strategy should be to promote and forge a rules-based, open order rooted in the principle of respect for national

9. Michael J. Abramowitz, “Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis,” Freedom House, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018>. See also Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect,” *Journal of Democracy* 27 (July 2016): 5–17.

sovereignty in the Indo-Pacific region, and thereby prevent China from establishing regional hegemony—or illiberal hierarchy—without triggering a full-scale war, while at the same time maintaining appropriate levels of economic engagement with China. This will require Japan and the United States to continuously generate the politico-economic-diplomatic influence and military superiority needed to deter and counter a variety of Chinese actions and efforts aimed at establishing regional hegemony or legitimizing illiberal hierarchy in the Indo-Pacific region. In other words, the Japan-U.S. alliance will have to be capable of confronting all Chinese actions short of war while countering Chinese influence operations with effective measures on a continuous and sustainable basis, while also being capable of maintaining superiority in any armed conflict with China.

If the ultimate goal of the strategic competition is to revive the legitimacy of the market-based liberal democracy model, the task for the United States and its allies (the core of the liberal democratic community) should be threefold: (1) deter aggression of various kinds by revisionist states, (2) economically revitalize the liberal democratic core as well as increase economic options for growth to developing states, and (3) promote the adoption of liberal norms by third countries by countering Chinese actions that undermine liberal norms. Thus, the ways through which the alliance would achieve the ends stated above could entail at least three kinds of competition:

- **Military competition:** Maintaining military superiority to deter acts of aggression by China.
- **Economic competition:** Harnessing the economic vitality of the Asia-Pacific region through the expansion of a high-standard trade and investment zone while undertaking domestic economic reform at home to allow the middle class to more fully enjoy the benefits of globalization, free trade, and investment.
- **Geostrategic competition:** Advancing diplomacy and economic statecraft designed to counter Chinese influence in pivotal states in the Indo-Pacific region considered vital to securing open access to the region.

The basic approach to allied strategic planning between Japan and the United States should be focused on the issue of how to produce bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral unity of effort in these three types of

competition, and how to exploit asymmetries between Chinese weaknesses and allied strengths.

As stated earlier, the strategic competition with China will, in effect, be a contest over the legitimacy of norms of external conduct and domestic governance in the Indo-Pacific region. The competition over legitimacy played out as the Cold War over the latter half of the twentieth century. The dynamics of the strategic competition in the twenty-first century, however, will differ from the Cold War era because the competition will unfold within a different structure characterized by growing connectivity—the globalization of economic interdependence (goods), information and data flow (information), and transnationally operating non-state actors (people).

Expanding connectivity among liberal democratic states and nondemocratic states in the Indo-Pacific region will likely both dampen and intensify the contest over the strategic competition with China. First, the option of direct economic containment of China will likely be ruled out as a viable way to undermine China's competitiveness since the United States' and Japan's economic well-being already depend on the health as well as production of the Chinese economy. Moreover, many regional states deem economic transactions with China as vital to their economic growth. Second, the exploitation of the information domain will likely expand because it would be leveraged as a means to achieve information dominance and also undermine the opposing camp's domestic legitimacy through digital propaganda, thereby intensify the competition. Third, the effort to engage the rent-seeking elites who rule and govern third countries will intensify and even create the consequent effect of polarizing those targeted states. Japan and the United States must take this reality into account when formulating the ends, ways, and means of a competitive China strategy.

POSSIBLE STRATEGIC LINES OF EFFORT BY THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE

The Japan-U.S. alliance will need to meet the multifaceted challenge posed by the strategic competition with China. Possible lines of effort that ought to be pursued by the United States and Japan could be defined according to the three types of competition mentioned below.

Military Competition

Military competition should aim to continuously generate a military overmatch vis-à-vis China. In the age of the information revolution characterized by exponential datafication, expanding global connectivity, and the rise of intelligent machines, the components of deterrence are beginning to fundamentally shift. Dealing with short-term challenges while preparing to adapt to the future security environment is becoming ever more challenging when the “changing character of war,” brought about by the military application of artificial intelligence, big data analytics, quantum computing, and robotics, among other cutting-edge technologies, amplifies a state’s military abilities.

The United States and its allies will have to consider the shifting components of military power that are generated by disruptive technologies as well as innovative operational and organizational constructs. The ever-shifting global, technological environment appears to demand a larger order of change for military organizations engaged in long-term military competition. The following lines of effort will constitute the main fronts of the long-term peacetime military competition with China: (1) the effort to absorb and exploit cutting-edge, dual-use technology for military application in a quick and effective way; (2) the effort to devise new joint operational concepts that would capitalize on existing and emerging technologies to asymmetrically exploit the competitor’s vulnerabilities and counter its offensive; (3) the effort to reform military organizations to establish optimal command and control structures to effectively execute operations based on new operational concepts; and (4) the effort to recruit, nurture, and develop a human talent pool that would sustain critical advanced capabilities and operations.¹⁰ The alliance will have to innovate and evolve in order to generate strengths that can be used to exploit China’s weaknesses and induce China to invest in defensive rather than offensive capabilities.

With regard to technological research and development, while one needs to distinguish between what China aspires to and what China can

10. See Satoru Mori, “Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in the Age of Defense Innovation: The Challenges and Opportunities of Strategic Competition with China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Strategic Japan Working Paper, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/180402_Strategic_Japan_Satoru_Mori_paper.pdf?Ye5lj_WUpTZyYYWCWD9yAomgC_oeVylb.

actually achieve, ongoing Chinese efforts appear quite determined. The Chinese military-civil fusion approach is state-driven and directed by a national plan, which could prove effective.¹¹ China is also tapping into the U.S. commercial innovation ecosystem and advancing a wide variety of activities to conduct both legal and illegal technology transfer from the United States.¹²

Although the United States clearly leads in technology research and development, now is probably the time to bring down regulatory obstacles that hinder joint bilateral and multilateral R&D projects with its major allies. Section 881 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 has taken the United States a step forward by integrating the United Kingdom and Australia, in addition to Canada, into the national technology and industrial base (NTIB). Some of the major tasks for Japan would be to establish an effective mechanism to survey, invest, protect, and eventually exploit cutting-edge technologies that emerge in Japan; and to prioritize bilateral and multilateral R&D projects to satisfy Japan's defense needs. Japan, in the long run, should ultimately aspire to join the United States' NTIB. Expanding the DoD's global technological outreach program, and thereby creating an environment with higher potential for synergistic research and development, could be key as China will not be able to replicate alliance-based defense technological cooperation.

Regarding concept of operations, both China and the United States are moving toward joint operations and integrating their command and control structures while technological innovation progresses concurrently. The 2015 China Defense White Paper announced that the PLA's concept of operations was going to change from "local wars under informatized conditions" to "informatized local wars." At the center of this concept was the notion of system vs system operations (SvS operations or system confrontation) featuring information dominance, precision strikes, and joint operations.¹³ Further down the road, the PLA "anticipates a shift

11. The effectiveness of this civil-military fusion approach needs further assessment, but the magnitude and speed of the effort to acquire foreign expertise, and then using it to enhance Chinese indigenous capabilities, has been alarming on many fronts.

12. Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, *China's Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation*, Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, February 2017.

13. The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's Military Strategy*, May 2015, Section III.

toward future ‘intelligentized’ warfare, in which AI will be integral as information technology has been in today’s ‘informatized’ warfare.”¹⁴

The United States is developing a new joint concept of operations known as multi-domain operations (MDO). The *U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* document explains that the central idea is “the rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare to deter and prevail as we compete short of armed conflict. If deterrence fails, Army formations, operating as part of the Joint Force, penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems; exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy systems, formations and objectives and to achieve our own strategic objectives; and consolidate gains to force a return to competition on terms more favorable to the U.S., our allies and partners.”¹⁵ From Japan’s perspective, taking measures to enable the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to operate effectively with the U.S. forces that execute MDO will be a key challenge in terms of interoperability but also an opportunity for organizational innovation. The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) adopted in late 2018 embraced the concept of “Multi-domain Defense Force” that essentially aspires to combine capabilities in new domains—space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum—with traditional domains of land, sea, and air.¹⁶ In addition to the measures outlined in the NDPG, particularly crucial efforts would include integrating defense intelligence derived from various ISR platforms to enhance multi-domain situational awareness in a combined operations with the United States; assuring cyberresilience for ISR platforms and C4ISR networks; introducing autonomy into the JSDF battle network; conducting combined military exercises with the United States and other U.S. allies to execute MDOs in gray zone situations or under network-degraded conditions; and advancing military construction and exploring sea-basing options for dispersal locations within and around Japan. U.S. and Japanese forces would have to develop multi-domain task

14. Elsa Kania, *Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power* (Washington D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2017), 12.

15. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, December 2018), iii.

16. The Ministry of Defense of Japan, *The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond*, The Ministry of Defense, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf.

forces to explore new combined warfare concepts. Such efforts could create major opportunities to enhance allied interoperability.

With regard to organizational innovation, the key will be the integration of networks of the services. The Chinese government advanced two major organizational reforms of the PLA. First, it established a two-level joint operational command system with key decision-making nodes at the CMC and theater levels.¹⁷ Second, the PLA moved to integrate Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities into joint operations through the establishment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is responsible for conducting intelligence and reconnaissance activities for space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, which form the necessary information warfare infrastructure for “informatized local wars.”

For U.S. forces, there are at least seven different networks used by an average brigade combat team aside from the main command or communications network. The main task would be to pull the networks together so as to provide the commander with a more complete picture of the multi-domain battlefield including “cyber situational understanding.”¹⁸ Ultimately, the integration of the battle network would mean that all sensors and shooters would be connected to each other to create a “kill web.” The JSDF would have to develop a command and control system that would enable the effective execution of cross domain fires and MDOs. The optimal arrangement for commanding combined Japan-U.S. MDO from the gray zone to full-scale contingency would also need to be explored. The sheer complexity of operational maneuvers and the speed required to respond to cyberthreats will undoubtedly require both the U.S. forces and the JSDF to introduce artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and other advanced technologies into their battle network. Nurturing the necessary warfighters and workforce who are necessary to operate in and sustain capabilities in the new domains would be a critical task for both

17. Joint operations command centers (JOCCs) have been created at the Central Military Commission (CMC) level and at each of the five theater commands, which have been assigned operational authority over most combat forces, except the Rocket Force units that could be controlled by the CMC. Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, *Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2017), 24–28.

18. Mark Pomerleau, “What Commanders Will Need in Multidomain Operations,” *C4ISRNet*, August 27, 2018, <https://www.c4isrnet.com/show-reporter/technet-augusta/2018/08/27/what-commanders-will-need-in-multidomain-operations/>.

countries to compete with China in constructing the next generation military force.

Economic Competition

The economic competition should aim to enhance the economic competitiveness of the United States and its allies, as well as compel China to redress mercantilist policies that have market-distorting effects. First, while China steams ahead to advance its “Made in China 2025” and other national economic plans to achieve industrial dominance and independence, the United States and its major allies that form the core of the market-based liberal democratic community will have to revitalize their economy and strengthen their economic competitiveness. This will require undertaking necessary reforms that would accelerate the absorption of cutting-edge technologies—ranging from artificial intelligence to biotechnology and others—into various aspects of the economy and society to actively develop the next generation of economic power. Investment regulation and export control should be strengthened appropriately, but the ultimate determinant of the economic/technological competition would focus on generating economic competitiveness through the commercialization of technological innovation, such as those related to 5G.

Second, the United States, Japan, as well as European countries should continue strengthening WTO enforcement mechanisms against protectionist and mercantilist policies taken by member states like China. WTO rule evasion by China should be met with strict multilateral actions in order to compel China to abandon discriminatory and mercantilist practices.

Third, U.S. allies like Japan should aim to promote a high-standard trade and investment zone—based on the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership)—that should include as many states as possible in the Indo-Pacific region. As global supply chains span across entire regions, the case for high-standard multilateral trade agreements remains very strong. Thus, for the United States, rejoining the CPTPP will continue to be a major task. U.S. allies like Japan and Australia should take the lead in expanding the membership of the CPTPP. Since high-standard free trade agreements require costly and painful domestic economic reforms, leading states like Japan and Australia should assist countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and

others to undertake economic reform to meet the high standards required to join the CPTPP. The strategic implication of this type of undertaking is that it will help cultivate and nurture domestic political forces that will in turn aspire to embrace liberal economic norms and help sustain the legitimacy of the rules-based regional order in the Indo-Pacific. It will also allow regional states to diversify their foreign economic relations and depend less on trade with China.

Fourth, accelerating Indian economic growth should be a major goal in the economic competition with China. It is widely known that the Indian economy suffers from internal disparities among different regions, insufficient infrastructure, and opposing domestic forces to trade liberalization, just to name a few. However, a vibrant Indian economy with strong growth would not only help the global economy acquire a new engine of growth, but it too would also help regional states diversify their foreign economic relations. Too many states depend on the Chinese economy too much, and this unhealthy situation has enabled China to practice economic statecraft. India may have a difficult time competing with China in the area of manufacturing (where China has significant leads), but identifying areas where India could demonstrate competitiveness would be a task where Japan and the United States could assist. Propelling India as a major, market-based, liberal democratic player on global economic stage should be a long-term effort that should be pursued systematically by the United States and its allies that share a common interest in regaining the legitimacy of market-based capitalism.

These efforts by Japan and the United States are undoubtedly very broad but critical to enhancing the legitimacy of the rules-based economic order in the eyes of the middle class in their respective countries. To put it more plainly, the effort to win domestic political support for free trade and globalization will be critical to prevailing in the economic competition. In addition, in order to guard against excessive global market fluctuations, it may be necessary for national governments to reinstate adequately modernized economic and financial mechanisms that were once known as “embedded liberalism.”¹⁹ Whether market-based liberal democracies can deliver economically for themselves will have strategic

19. See Jack Snyder, “The Broken Bargain: How Nationalism Came Back,” *Foreign Affairs* 98, no. 2 (March/April 2019): 54–60.

implications beyond mere economic performance at home and will significantly affect the perception of third countries.

Geostrategic Competition

Geostrategic competition should ultimately aim to promote liberal norms and expand the number of states and entities that embrace those norms and counter Chinese actions that undermine them. There are at least three types of geostrategic competition, and there may be more to come.

- **Maritime competition:** Chinese actions on the seas designed to unilaterally impose its self-claimed rights are curbing and violating other states' rights. Creating an environment where states are able to enjoy rights guaranteed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas should be the objective of the United States and its allies. In order to achieve this, the United States, Japan, and other willing states would need to secure port access and generate maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific. They would also need to engage in coordinated maritime capacity-building for Indo-Pacific littoral states. Enhancing maritime domain awareness and maritime law enforcement capabilities of pivotal states such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and others would be key measures that will need to be undertaken.
- **Infrastructure financing competition:** China has been deploying its economic and financial resources overseas to create a creditor-debtor relationship with borrowing states; extracting concessions from the borrowing state in certain instances. This has the overall effect of undermining economic self-determination of borrowing states. The dual approach of providing alternative financing while at the same time selectively engaging high-consequence infrastructure projects where China is getting involved should be pursued. The United States and Japan should engage regional governments to inform them about Chinese proposals for infrastructure, construction, and financing. For projects that have high strategic consequences, Japan, the United States, and other interested parties should offer to provide joint financing schemes with the Chinese, and insist that international

standards such as openness, transparency, fiscal soundness, and economic viability should be met before that project advances.²⁰ The idea would be to engage, bind, and dilute Chinese presence in strategically significant infrastructure financing projects, and thereby countervail negative consequences of Chinese infrastructure financing.

- **Digital network competition:** China obligates its private companies to cooperate with public security authorities through its domestic law. As Chinese ICT companies expand their oversea markets in various forms such as 5G network equipment, fiber optic cables, smart cities, cloud computing, and others, it gains the capability to covertly access data on foreign countries. It has been pointed out that “[d]ata from countries that have purchased Chinese telecommunications equipment suggest that the espionage risk is real and cannot be mitigated effectively.”²¹ Furthermore, China has begun to export data governance regimes characterized by data localization and internet content control to other countries such as Vietnam.²² The United States and Japan would need to pursue several lines of effort. First, they should “define voluntary agreements on security standards for secure 5G networks,” and persuade undecided countries to adopt secure 5G.²³ First mover advantage is extremely high, and thus, the United States, Japan, and other like-minded states should rapidly pursue concerted diplomatic persuasion on this front. This effort could take the form of capacity-building through seminars for government officials charged with cybersecurity and digital network policy administration. Second, the United States and Japan will have to determine “how to securely connect and communicate over telecom networks in other countries using vulnerable equipment.”²⁴ Third, China’s regional infrastructure

20. Prime Minister Abe has been advocating that these principles be honored for infrastructure financing projects undertaken by various states, including China.

21. James A. Lewis, *How Will 5G Shape Innovation and Security: A Primer* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018), 10.

22. Brian Harding, “China’s Digital Silk Road and Southeast Asia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 19, 2019, <https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/chinas-digital-silk-road-and-southeast-asia/>.

23. Lewis, *How Will 5G Shape Innovation and Security*, 11.

24. *Ibid.*, 11.

projects, such as smart city construction and fiber optic cables, should be prioritized for heavy diplomatic engagement aimed at providing alternative financing, and secure equipment and networks. The United States and Japan could partner with like-minded states such as Australia and potentially European governments to facilitate financing and guiding private investments.

As discussed above, the geostrategic competition with China will be multi-faceted. Different competitions will require different partners. Thus, the United States will need to fully leverage its traditional alliance system, but it will also need to go beyond to pursue a multi-partnership approach. In all three competitions, identifying where the “pivotal states” are, assessing the trend of the competition to win those “pivotal states,” and devising strategies to generate favorable trends in the competition will be the central tasks for joint geostrategic planning.

As some of the pivotal states are nondemocratic, domestic political reform should not be made a strict condition for engagement. Diplomatic and economic agencies should devise tailored political capacity-building programs on a state-by-state basis that would be designed to further the end of acquiring friendly forces in those pivotal states. The United States and its major allies and partners like Japan, Australia, and possibly India should contribute to this effort through their comparative advantages over others. It should be emphasized that all efforts on these fronts should focus on how to make pivotal states adopt liberal norms of external conduct such as peaceful resolution of disputes and freedom of navigation and counter Chinese actions that substantially undermine the rules-based order.

CONCLUSION

The United States and its major allies have entered an era where they must make a concerted effort to reconstitute the legitimacy of liberal norms of external conduct and domestic governance. The United States and its allies should not take a defensive stand against the major revisionist states of China and Russia. Rather, they should take the offensive by: (1) deterring actions in gray-zone competition and use of force by revisionist states through concerted defense innovation; (2) revitalizing the economies of

the liberal democratic core states in order to enhance the legitimacy of the market-based liberal democratic model; and (3) promoting the rules-based order by supporting aspiring forces that are willing to embrace liberal norms in order to prevail in the three main geostrategic competitions. The United States and Japan will need to coordinate strategies and pool resources in order to advance these efforts in the Indo-Pacific region. Technology will be a major element with cross-cutting significance in all of the above-mentioned competitions; thus will require focused ally coordination. The success of this approach will depend on whether the concerted efforts to engage in the strategic competition will be able to generate a strong, sustained momentum among the regional states to embrace the liberal norms that underpin the rules-based order. This will surely require a long-term effort. The U.S. alliance network must now adapt to prove to the world once again the benefits of the liberal political system that tolerates diversity and the open-access liberal international order that regulates interstate relations on the basis that rules, not power, are the keys to human progress and liberty and peace among nations.

10. ADAPTING THE SOUTH KOREA-U.S. ALLIANCE TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Dr. Sue Mi Terry

The alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) dates back to the immediate post-World War II period, when Soviet troops occupied the northern part of the Korean peninsula and U.S. troops the southern part. Each established a government in its own image: the Soviets created a communist state based in Pyongyang and the United States a noncommunist state, which eventually became democratic, based in Seoul. When North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) invaded the south in 1950, the United States came to its aid and suffered more than 36,000 fatalities to push back the invaders. Thereafter the United States maintained tens of thousands of troops in South Korea and pledged, under a treaty signed in 1953, to come to South Korea's defense in the event it was attacked again. The United States even extended its nuclear umbrella to the south.

In return, South Korea has sent troops to fight alongside U.S. forces in every major war since 1953, including Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan, and generally served as a bulwark of U.S. strategic interests in Asia and the world. South Korea has sent peacekeeping missions to eight countries (including Lebanon and Haiti),¹ participated in counter-piracy

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "ROK-UN Relations," <http://un.mofa.go.kr/englihs/am/un/bilateral/policy/activities/>; U.S. Peace Corps, "Peace Corps Announces Collaboration with Republic of Korea on Volunteer Service and Global Development," *Peace Corps Times* 4 (2013), https://files.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/media/PCTimes2013_04.pdf.

operations off the coast of Somalia, and contributed to the fight against Ebola in West Africa.²

South Korea has also proven to be one of the United States' most dependable allies in the nontraditional security (NTS) arena.³ As international relations scholars such as G. John Ikenberry have argued, there are numerous nonsecurity benefits that stem from our military alliances. Stable and mutually agreeable security relations have spillover effects in other realms, paving the way for deeper economic integration and political cooperation.⁴ In the case of its alliance with South Korea, the U.S. benefits from an ally shouldering a burden in peacekeeping, foreign aid, and clean energy technology.⁵ South Korea, the twelfth-largest economy in the world and the United States' seventh-largest trading partner with a trillion-dollar economy, hosted the G20 Leaders' Summit in 2010, the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, and the Cyberspace Conference in 2013, and is a major player in climate change. South Korea is a committed member of various international nonproliferation regimes, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). South Korea has pledged more than half a billion dollars toward development efforts including health security, women's empowerment, and humanitarian assistance.⁶ People-to-people ties between the United States and South Korea have also never been stronger. South Korea is currently a top-three origin country for international students attending U.S. colleges and universities.⁷

2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "First Batch of the Korea Disaster Response Team (KDRT) Dispatched to Fight Ebola Returns Home," news release, January 26, 2015, http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=314825&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=oreign&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=234&titleNm=

3. NTS is defined as "those challenges that affect the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of nonmilitary sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime." Other NTS topics include public health, cybersecurity, and maritime safety.

4. G. John Ikenberry, "American Hegemony and East Asian Order," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58, no. 3 (2004): 356, https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/american_hegemony.pdf.

5. Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wolforth, "Don't Come Home America: The Case against Retrenchment," *International Security* 37, no. 3 (2017), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/dont_come_home_america.pdf.

6. U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations with the Republic of Korea," Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 17, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm>.

7. Ibid.

The long-standing U.S.-ROK alliance has withstood numerous changes of government and even a change in South Korea's form of government—in the 1980s South Korea transitioned from being a dictatorship to a democracy. The emergence of South Korea as a global leader has led to an increasingly dynamic U.S.-ROK alliance focused on future-oriented partnership opportunities including space, energy, health, climate change, and cyber.

Yet this alliance faces greater pressures in the twenty-first century, with the changing strategic landscape of Northeast Asia. China is growing more formidable, militarily and economically, supplanting the United States as the foremost power in Asia. At the same time, North Korea is also becoming more powerful militarily with its *de facto* status as a nuclear weapons power armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The United States, under President Donald Trump, has switched from threatening to wooing North Korea, while South Korea has gone even further in reviving a sunshine policy under President Moon Jae-in. Both North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and President Moon seek an end of war declaration and, eventually, a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War. If they are successful, such a treaty could cast into doubt the rationale for the U.S. troop presence in South Korea—and thereby call into question the future of the alliance itself. If the U.S.-ROK alliance is to survive for another 70 years, it will have to change with the times. Is such an alliance worthwhile from the standpoint of both parties? And if so, how should it be adjusted to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century?

A “ROCKY” ROAD AHEAD? CHALLENGES FOR THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE

The U.S.-ROK alliance's future is less clear today as it enters its eighth decade. Numerous challenges abound.

North Korea

The top challenge facing the alliance continues to be North Korea. Kim Jong-un has recently engaged in historic dialogue with the leaders of South Korea, China, the United States, and other regional powers. He has promised to work toward the “denuclearization” of the Korean peninsula and the normalization of relations with South Korea. The United States

has suspended joint military exercises with North Korea in the aftermath of the Singapore Summit, and President Trump has even raised the prospect of a peace treaty with North Korea and the possible pullout of U.S. forces from the south. Meanwhile, Moon and Kim held a third inter-Korean summit in September and agreed to work toward turning the Korean peninsula into a “land of peace free from nuclear weapons and nuclear threats.”⁸ Momentum is now building for significant concessions from the United States at the second Trump–Kim meeting (this one in Hanoi at the end of February). There is mounting pressure from North Korea, China, Russia, and South Korea—a four-against-one dynamic—to have the United States accept a declaration ending the Korean War and to lift economic sanction despite the fact, according to leaks from the U.S. intelligence community, that the north continues to expand rather than dismantle its nuclear program.⁹

The U.S. and South Korean dialogue with the north, which could lead to the formal conclusion of the Korean War, raises the important issue of what a long-term process of building a peace regime would look like on the Korean peninsula. Up for debate is the fate of U.S. troops in South Korea and other security and diplomatic arrangements that have come to be taken for granted over the past 70 years. Such changes will undoubtedly pose risks as well as opportunities for South Korea, the United States, and the Northeast Asian region.

Making sure that Washington and Seoul stay on the same page in dealing with the north in the future will be challenging—although not as challenging as in the past when the United States took a tougher line. It is clear that the Moon administration wants to deepen inter-Korean cooperation on the economic front and push for a peace declaration. The two Koreas have already opened the inter-Korean liaison office at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), an industrial park located in North Korea that opened in late 2004 and was closed by then-president Park Geun-hye in 2016. During the third summit with Kim, Moon promised to reopen the KIC “as conditions mature” and to open rail and road links

8. “Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018,” *Republic of Korea Cheong Wa Dae*, September 18, 2018, <https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Briefings/322>.

9. Courtney Kube, Ken Dilanian, and Carol E. Lee, “North Korea Has Increased Nuclear Production at Secret Sites, Say U.S. Officials,” *NBC News*, June 29, 2018, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/north-korea-has-increased-nuclear-production-secret-sites-say-u-n887926>.

to the north.¹⁰ The complex, which had generated 25–30 percent of North Korea's export revenue, previously provided the North Korean government with access to a stream of hard currency, estimated to be worth well over \$500 million in total.¹¹ Trump may well approve the reopening of the KIC, which, absent an exemption, would be in violation of the United Nations sanctions.

The problem is that the Moon administration, in pursuing various joint economic, cultural, and educational ventures with the Kim regime, is prioritizing improving inter-Korean relations over getting the north to denuclearize. This places South Korea, at least nominally, at odds with the United States, which still takes the position that denuclearization should precede normalization of relations. If inter-Korean engagement continues to accelerate without corresponding progress on denuclearization, this is likely to cause strain in the alliance. South Korea, for example, has recently proposed that the United States hold off on a demand for an inventory of North Korea's nuclear weapons and accept the verified closure of a key North Korean nuclear facility (Yongbyon) as the next step in the negotiations.¹²

South Korea's Relationship with Its Neighbors, China and Japan

China's rise influences virtually all aspects of South Korean foreign and economic policy. There are strategic dilemmas that South Korea faces in dealing with China involving power, economics, North Korea, and the U.S. alliance.¹³ South Korea has in recent years focused on improving relations with China, partially in an effort to address the North Korean problem. North Korea's dependence on China, which has accounted for over 90 percent of North Korea's trade with the world, has meant that

10. "Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018."

11. Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanlett Avery, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Brock R. Williams, and Jonathan R. Corrado, "U.S.-South Korea Relations," U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2017, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf>, 5, 14.

12. John Hudson, "South Korea Reveals Plan to Break Stalemate in U.S.-North Korea Talks," *Washington Post*, October 3, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/south-korea-reveals-plan-to-break-stalemate-in-us-north-korea-talks/2018/10/03/6302d2ff-859b-479e-8071-001b18c8af2c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.eebbe128590a.

13. Ellen Kim and Victor Cha, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea's Strategic Dilemmas with China and the United States," *Asia Policy* 21 (2016): 101–121.

South Korea must increasingly factor Beijing's actions and intentions into its North Korea policy.

At the same time, China has also emerged as South Korea's most important economic partner. The relationship between the two countries has completely transformed since their normalization of ties in 1992. Trade between the two nations, which amounted to only \$6.4 billion in 1992, grew over 20 percent annually to exceed \$200 billion in 2011.¹⁴ Today, bilateral trade between China and South Korea (\$1.24 trillion) is twice the level for U.S.-South Korea (\$66 billion) and South Korea-Japan trade (\$24 billion).¹⁵ For years now, China has also been the number-one location for South Korean foreign direct investment. The two countries concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) in 2015, and South Korea joined the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 over the objections of the Obama administration.¹⁶

The China-South Korea bilateral relationship has also expanded significantly in other areas. In 2001, China replaced the United States as the destination most visited by South Koreans.¹⁷ Chinese residents also visit South Korea more than any other foreign country; approximately four million Chinese tourists visit South Korea each year.¹⁸ The number of South Korean students enrolled in Chinese universities also more than tripled between 2003 and 2013—from 18,267 to 62,855.¹⁹ There is even nascent military cooperation between South Korea and China, although it remains far below the level between the United States and South Korea.

South Korean officials are thus reluctant to raise objections in public about Chinese behavior that does not directly affect South Korea. This can

14. Pilsoo Choi, Suyeon No, and Min Suk Park, "20 Years of the Korea-China Economic Relationship: Retrospect and Prospect," *KIEP World Economy Update* 2, no. 2 (2012).

15. "Korea, Rep. Trade at a Glance: Most Recent Values," *World Bank*, <https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/KOR>.

16. Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, "South Korea's Diplomatic Triangle," *Comparative Connections* 17, no. 1 (2015), <http://cc.pacforum.org/2015/05/south-koreas-diplomatic-triangle/>; "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Following the Money," *The Economist*, March 17, 2015, <https://www.economist.com/asia/2015/03/17/following-the-money>.

17. Jae Ho Chung, *Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 17.

18. Korea Tourism Organization, "Korea, Monthly Statistics of Tourism," December 2017, <https://kto.visitkorea.or.kr/eng/tourismStatics/keyFacts/KoreaMonthlyStatistics/eng/inout/inout.kto>.

19. Jeyup S. Kwaak, "More South Koreans Choose China for Education," *Wall Street Journal*, October 2, 2013, <https://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/10/02/more-south-koreans-choose-china-for-education/>.

be seen in South Korea's response to China's increased assertion of maritime claims in the South and East China Seas. Despite the U.S. calling on South Korea to be more vocal about China's assertive actions in the South China Sea, Seoul has been hesitant to do so. Seoul is primarily focused on gaining China's favor in its dealings with North Korea, and it will not take stands elsewhere that will interfere with that objective.

South Korea's relationship with China was damaged in recent years when Seoul agreed to install the U.S.-owned Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense platform in May 2017. Though both Seoul and Washington argued that the THAAD system had only defensive capabilities, Beijing was concerned about U.S. encirclement as well as the system's sophisticated radar capabilities. China used its economic clout to punish South Korean businesses when the antimissile system was deployed. Trips by Chinese tour groups to South Korea were suspended and Korean-owned businesses suffered boycotts and bans in China.²⁰

After a year of harsh sanctions, South Korea reached a compromise with China by agreeing to abide by "three no's," much to the consternation of the Trump administration. They are: (1) no additional THAAD deployments in South Korea, (2) no participation in a U.S.-led strategic missile defense system, and (3) no creation of a U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral military alliance. In essence, this move was interpreted as South Korea agreeing to at least symbolically distance itself from a U.S.-led strategy of containing China. From Beijing's perspective, this agreement reinforced its historic view of the Korean peninsula as part of the Sinic sphere of influence.

The Japan-South Korea relationship, meanwhile, is currently still among the most troubled relationships between liberal democracies because of lingering tensions over historical issues, such as the mistreatment of "comfort women" (sex slaves during World War II) and competing territorial claims over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands. While South Korea worked hard to deepen its relationship with China, at the same time it has devalued relations with Japan. It has, for example, permitted a currency swap agreement to expire in 2015 while allowing historical

20. Jonathan Cheng, "Chinese Retaliation over Antimissile System Has South Korea Worried," *Wall Street Journal*, March 3, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-south-korea-jitters-grow-that-china-is-punishing-it-1488519202>.

issues to paralyze relations.²¹ North Korea's 2016 and 2017 nuclear tests and missile launches did provide South Korea and Japan with a strategic rationale to increase cooperation bilaterally, as well as trilaterally with the United States. Since early 2016, the three countries have more closely coordinated their responses to North Korea's nuclear tests and missile launches, and in October 2016 Seoul and Tokyo concluded a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which the United States has welcomed because it could institutionalize trilateral defense cooperation. The two countries initially negotiated a GSOMIA in 2012, but Seoul withdrew at the last minute due to domestic opposition.

Adding to the tension, in 2017 the Moon government upended the comfort women deal of 2015 under former South Korean President Park Geun-hye. The agreement included a new apology from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the provision of 1 billion yen (about \$8.3 million) from the Japanese government to a new Korean foundation that supports surviving victims but is unpopular in South Korea.²² Because the agreement was concluded under the disgraced Park Geun-hye administration, Moon was under pressure not to honor the agreement. The relationship further soured when, in October and again in November 2018, South Korea's Supreme Court ruled that Japan's Nippon Steel and Sumimoto Metal Corporation must pay compensation to South Korean citizens for wartime labor. By December 2018, more than 1,000 former laborers were suing the Japanese companies, and in early January the South Korean Supreme Court approved their request to seize part of the local assets of Nippon Steel. The Japanese stance is that the 1965 normalization agreements nullify these claims. From Washington's perspective, the continued poor relationship between Seoul and Tokyo jeopardizes several important U.S. interests, including making trilateral cooperation over North Korea policy more difficult and hampering the ability to respond effectively to China.

21. Mitsuru Obe and Kwanwoo Jun, "Japan, South Korea to Let Currency Swap Program Expire," *Wall Street Journal*, February 16, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-south-korea-to-let-currency-swap-program-expire-1424088419>.

22. No text of the agreement was released, indicating the delicate nature of the issues. Instead, the agreement was announced in a joint public appearance in Seoul by South Korean and Japanese foreign ministers.

Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) Transition

The United States currently maintains 28,500 troops in South Korea, which has 625,000 active-duty military personnel of its own.²³ Command of these forces is complex given the many different actors involved. Under the current command arrangement, South Korean soldiers would be under the command of U.S. forces if there were a war on the peninsula. Under a 2007 agreement, however, the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC), which has been headed by the U.S. commander in South Korea, is to be replaced with separate U.S. and ROK military commands; the provisional name of the new U.S. command is Korea Command (KORCOM). The plan to transfer wartime operational control recognizes South Korea's advances in economic and military strength since the Korean War and is seen by many Koreans as important for South Korean sovereignty.

Unlike the previous two OPCON transition plans, the current plan lacks a target date, and it instead focuses on satisfying the necessary readiness requirements and threat conditions for both sides to feel comfortable with the transfer.²⁴ In October 2014, the United States and South Korea announced in a joint statement that the allies would take "a conditions-based approach" to the OPCON transfer and determine the appropriate timing based on South Korean military capabilities and the security environment on the Korean peninsula.²⁵ Concerns emerged about timing as South Koreans increasingly worried that their military was not fully prepared to cope with North Korean threats and that Pyongyang might interpret the OPCON transfer as a weakening of the alliance's deterrence.²⁶ Some military experts expressed concern that turning over control would lead to the United States reducing its overall commitment to South Korean security.²⁷

23. Defense Manpower Data Center, "Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by State/Country (Updated Quarterly)," June 30, 2015, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp.

24. U.S. Department of Defense, "Joint Communiqué: The 46th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting," Washington, DC, October 23, 2014, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/46th_SCM_Joint_Communique.pdf.

25. Ibid.

26. Song Sang-ho, "Allies Rack Brains over OPCON Transfer," *Korea Herald*, May 6, 2014, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140506000405>.

27. Lee Chi-dong and Roh Hyo-dong, "OPCON Transfer May Usher in Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Korea: Ex-General," *Yonhap News Agency*, November 18, 2013, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/11/18/13/0301000000AEN20131118000100315F.html>.

But given that Seoul is currently prioritizing rapidly thawing its relationship with the North, it is conceivable that the Moon government, which has already announced one of the largest defense budgets in recent history, could press for greater military independence and for OPCON transfer on a more abbreviated timeline, by 2020 if not sooner.²⁸ The United States will need to ensure that before OPCON transfer is complete, South Korea develops the command and control capacity to lead a combined and multinational force in high-intensity conflict, and that we can be confident that it has capabilities to respond to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat.

“America First” Policy

Finally, President Trump’s transactional “America First” orientation, protectionist policies, and questioning of the value of forward U.S. military presence pose a serious risk to the alliance. In addition to questioning the value of alliances and the existing global order in general, President Trump does not appear to prioritize our shared values, including human rights, democracy, free markets and trade, and the rule of law. President Trump has prioritized alliance burden-sharing as he repeatedly suggests that U.S. allies in Asia, including South Korea, should do more to defend themselves. Previous estimates have indicated that the South Korean government pays roughly 50 percent of the non-personnel costs of the U.S. troop presence in South Korea (more than \$800 million a year).²⁹ In addition, South Korea has paid \$9.74 billion for the relocation of several U.S. bases within the country and construction of new military facilities.³⁰ But will this be enough for President Trump? The U.S. and South Korea have just reached an agreement on a cost-sharing deal for U.S. troops that will increase the subsidy offered by Seoul from \$830 million to \$924 million (President Trump had initially demanded \$1.6 billion). However, this is only a year-long deal, meaning that negotiations for next year must begin soon—and there is no guarantee that

28. Manyin et al., “U.S.-South Korea Relations,” 25.

29. *Advance Questions for General Vincent K. Brooks, USA Nominee to be Commander, United Nations Command, Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command, and Commander, United States Forces Korea*, 114th Congress, 2nd Session (2016), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Brooks_02-19-16.pdf.

30. *Ibid.*

they will result in another agreement. His frustration over the cost of defending South Korea could combine with his desire to strike a deal with North Korea to lead him to withdraw some or all of the U.S. troops deployed in the south. President Moon, in return, might support such a move as part of his outreach to Kim.³¹

Another area of strain has been over U.S.-ROK trade. President Trump criticized the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) as a bad deal before negotiating marginal changes. Despite the modified agreement, Trump is likely to remain aggrieved about South Korea's trade surplus with the United States (\$9.8 billion in 2017) and South Korea's success in selling cars and other goods to U.S. consumers. Look for further trade friction in the future.

The very fact that President Trump has used such harsh rhetoric about South Korea, combined with his even harsher rhetoric toward North Korea in 2017, has combined to exacerbate doubts in South Korea about the value of the U.S. alliance in spite of approval for Trump's outreach to Kim Jong-un in 2018. The 2018 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that the percentage of South Koreans who believe that the United States takes their interests into account has declined from 36 percent in 2013 to 24 percent in 2018. That said, South Koreans still have a more favorable view of the United States (80 percent) than do Germany (30 percent), France (38 percent), Canada (39 percent), or Australia (54 percent). So the "Trump effect" has not been as toxic in U.S.-ROK relations as it has been for other U.S. allies.³²

LOOKING FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-ROK RELATIONSHIP

If the U.S.-ROK alliance is to survive for another seven decades or more, the United States should continue to work with South Korea to upgrade, modernize, and transform the alliance, broadening it from its original purpose of deterring and defending against a North Korean attack to a

31. For a collection of President Trump's view on troops in Korea, see Victor Cha's "Diplomacy or Coercion?" in *U.S.-China Relations: Manageable Differences or Major Crisis*, ed. David G. Brown et al. (New York: National Committee on Foreign Policy, 2018), Appendix I, "Donald Trump's Statements on Troop Commitments Related to South Korea," and Appendix II, "Donald Trump's Tweets on Troop Commitments Related to South Korea."

32. Richard Wike et al., "Trump's International Ratings Remain Low, Especially among Key Allies," *Pew Research Center*, October 1, 2018, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/>.

regional and global partnership that includes political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural cooperation. The United States and South Korea adopted a Joint Vision Statement in June 2009 that, for the first time, jointly pledged to pursue a security partnership that is reciprocal in nature and global in scope. In the Joint Declaration of 2013, the United States and South Korea further promised to strengthen and globalize their cooperation. The more the alliance expands beyond its original threat-based rationale to an alliance based on common values, such as democracy, human rights, and free markets, the less likely any future deal between the U.S. and North Korea or between the two Koreas could lead to the end of U.S.-ROK alliance.

There is still much unrealized potential for the alliance to harness in the pursuit of common causes. They include but are not limited to the following.

Donor Assistance

The two countries can work together on enhancing Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa, in particular, focusing on areas such as pandemic disease, education, and gender empowerment. South Korea's total ODA amounts to just 0.14 percent of the country's gross national income (GNI), far below the OECD's recommendation of 0.7 percent. Nonetheless, in the past decade, there has been a steady increase in South Korea's ODA budget despite the global financial crisis of 2009: it has risen from \$0.21 billion in 2009 to \$1.76 billion in 2013 and to \$2.2 billion in 2017.³³ South Korea's ODA disbursement goes to more than 100 countries around the world, with 20 to 25 percent going directly to Southeast Asian countries.

New Frontiers of Cooperation in Space and Artificial Intelligence

There are new frontier challenges such as in space and artificial intelligence that the two nations could cooperate on to draw new constituencies into the existing bilateral relationship. The future of the U.S.-ROK

33. Kwak Sungil, "South Korea's Development Assistance and Economic Outreach Toward Southeast Asia," *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies* (2015): 154, http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/south_koreas_development_assistance.pdf.

bilateral relationship could be increasingly driven by scientists and engineers—often young people—who may not otherwise be involved in the alliance. Focusing on these sectors also has the potential to unleash strong economic benefits. Space exploration, for example, will bring about new technology and promote the study of science and technology while creating high-paying, high-skilled jobs.³⁴ The United States and South Korea have already signed a legally binding space framework agreement, but there are still many more opportunities for future cooperation. The two countries can also work together on artificial intelligence—including how to foster proper use of emerging technologies classified as part of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Working together to share emerging technologies will bring benefits not only to the two countries but to the global economy.

Nonproliferation

South Korea has been a consistent and vocal supporter of strengthening the global nonproliferation regime, which is a set of treaties, voluntary export control arrangements, and other policy coordination mechanisms that work to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems. South Korea destroyed all of its chemical weapons stock by 2008 under the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which controls the trade in sensitive nuclear technology, and adheres to all international nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes. It also participates in the G8 Global Partnership and other U.S.-led initiatives, including the Proliferation Security Initiative. It hosted the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, a forum initiated by President Obama.

Cybersecurity

North Korean cyberattacks, such as the 2014 Sony hack and a 2017 attack on South Korean banks, have laid bare the potential magnitude of the cyberthreat. Other countries, such as Russia and China, pose even greater

34. Mark Lippert, "07/21/16—Transforming the Alliance through New Frontiers of Cooperation," *U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Korea*, July 21, 2016, https://kr.usembassy.gov/p_113_072116-2/.

threats, as the United States learned during the 2016 campaign. The United States and South Korea should work to promote common norms regarding cybersecurity in order to protect critical infrastructure, such as power grids, nuclear facilities, and banks, from cyberattacks. What is important is for both nations to put in place lasting structures and mechanisms—government and commercial—to sustain partnerships, support the rule of law in cyberspace, and share information.

Environment

South Korea has a proven ability to contribute as an idea leader by proposing green growth as an effective response to climate change. In December 2013, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) opened its headquarters in South Korea with the aim of channeling money from industrialized nations to developing countries to help them address climate change-related problems. It is designed to manage annual commitments that will escalate to a combined \$100 billion by 2020.³⁵ The United States has the potential to work closely in this area with South Korea, at least if President Trump rethinks his skepticism on global warming.

Reinvigorating U.S.-ROK-Japan Security Cooperation

The global work of the U.S.-ROK alliance should not be at the expense of cooperation in the region. Efforts should be made to reinvigorate U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation to address common threats in areas such as maritime security, missile defense, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and mine warfare. On the North Korean threat, regular policy coordination among Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul at the most senior levels will ensure more effective diplomacy and protect the interests of all three allies. To better prepare for contingencies, bilateral defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan should focus on improving information sharing and servicing of military equipment. The three allies should also expand trilateral exercises to counter North Korea's nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and proliferation threats. This type of coor-

35. International Institutions and Global Governance Program, "The Global Climate Change Regime," *Council on Foreign Relations*, June 19, 2013, <https://www.cfr.org/report/global-climate-change-regime>.

dination is all the more important if negotiations with North Korea make progress, so as to avoid disintegrating the alliance.

Improving U.S.-ROK-China Cooperation

Being sensitive to South Korea's desire not to alienate China, both the United States and South Korea could seek opportunities for trilateral consultations with China. China has an important stake in the outcome on the Korean peninsula. Even if a peace treaty were to be concluded between the United States and North Korea, Washington and Seoul could make a case that keeping Seoul within the framework of a U.S. alliance would dampen the competition between South Korea and Japan, which could destabilize the entire region and harm Chinese interests. Beyond North Korea and the issues concerning the Korean peninsula, there are also many areas of common interest including economic development, disaster relief operations, nuclear safety, joint peacekeeping missions, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics, cyberspace, and humanitarian assistance.

CONCLUSION

The United States and South Korea have developed a successful and "ROK-solid" partnership over the past 70 years. That alliance is now challenged by diverging U.S. and South Korea attitudes toward North Korea. The best way to avoid future fissures is to continue expanding the alliance beyond simply defending against North Korea to focusing on a wider array of challenges in the region and the world. U.S. and South Korean interests are closely aligned on most of the world's major challenges and it anchors security and prosperity across Northeast Asia and the international system as a whole. Renewing the U.S.-ROK partnership for the decades ahead will require continually expanding and rethinking the alliance.

II. AUSTRALIA'S ALLIANCE STRATEGY

Patrick Buchan

This essay seeks to unpack Australia's historical and contemporary approach to alliance management at a time when Australia's long-held core assumptions about its alliance with the United States are coming under strains not previously seen. What this essay most seeks to emphasize is the assumption on which Australia bases its strategic guidance, both historically and currently: that Australia will adjust its primary strategic focus to reflect the political and strategic options and actions of its senior alliance partner—initially the United Kingdom, and after 1941 the United States. In this regard, Australia seeks to remain a relevant, dependable, and trustworthy ally.

It is impossible to grasp Australian strategic policy without understanding Australian alliance policy. They are inextricably interlinked. Australian strategic policy *is* alliance policy—in summary, ally with a more powerful benefactor. At the dead center of Australian strategic and alliance policy (from the earliest days of European settlement) lies the concept of reliance on a “great and powerful friend.”¹ It is deep within the Australian strategic cultural DNA. Though despite the many claims that this strategy betrays a lack of imagination and indeed a level of maturity, it was and remains a calculated and hardheaded decision based on strategic reality and a desire to uphold the Western-led liberal status quo which has served Australia's interests so well.

In pursuing this objective, Australia orients itself to both the strategic environment (over which as a middle power it has little control) and to

1. The term “great and powerful friend” has appeared in Australian news and political commentary for decades, e.g., “Australia Must Look beyond the U.S. and Make Some New Strategic Friends,” *Australia Financial Review*, July 31, 2018, <https://www.afr.com/news/economy/high-time-australia-makes-some-new-strategic-friends-20180731-h13cyt>.

the strategic orientation of its senior alliance partner. This gambit comes at a cost to its regional relationships and occasionally its sovereignty. But this long-term alliance strategy has served Australia's interests well over almost two centuries.

Since the time of European settlement in 1788, it is best to conceive of Australia's strategic policy as occurring over four distinct phases. Each of these unique strategic phases has had one constant theme: the centrality of and reliance on a senior ally to meet Australia's strategic and defense needs. Implicit and alongside this is an understanding that close friend New Zealand would never be able to fulfill this role. Indeed, unique among American allies, Australia is the only bilateral junior alliance partner which is itself also a bilateral senior alliance partner. This theme must be understood to appreciate the way Australia approaches its alliance engagement with the United States and how Australia interacts both regionally and globally.

From Australia's earliest days, a fear of abandonment by its senior partner (first Britain, then the United States) has prevailed in Australia's strategic calculus. Under the first period of Australian strategic policy (roughly covering the period from 1788 to 1920), known as the "imperial defense strategy," Australia sought to ensure its own security by maximizing and encouraging British imperial collective strength and a sense of imperial community (especially among the colonies of Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand) to ensure an interconnected imperial security (and trade) relationship. It was essentially collective defense within the empire minus a binding treaty relationship. To ensure imperial unity and security, Australia, as the senior antipodean colony, would come to the aid, through military mobilization, when and if any territory or colony of the empire was under threat.²

This strategy leveraged Australia's own defense needs and requirements against paying a limited imperial (alliance) commitment through hosting British garrison forces, British expeditionary army and naval forces, and deploying its own colonial militia and regular forces to imperial conflicts in Sudan, China, New Zealand, South Africa, and most notably (and tragically) during the First World War.

2. "Defence White Paper 2009," *Department of Defence*, <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/discusspaper.html.asp#imperial>.

Following the contraction of Britain's global reach after the First World War, Australian strategists faced a triple conundrum—a rising imperial Japan, a reluctant United States, and a Britain greatly diminished in strategic capacity. Australian strategic policy at this point evolved to a new more nuanced alliance policy during the years between the wars. Known within strategic circles as the “Singapore strategy,” Australia (along with Britain) would deploy its forces and focus on Singapore to protect Australia's trade routes and ensure great power presence in the region.³ Then as now, deeply embedded within Australia's strategic DNA was the desire to offset its limited sovereign capability and capacity by engaging and enmeshing a senior alliance partner in its region. Australia would necessarily assume the role of willing junior alliance partner.

The catastrophic fall of Singapore and the global decline of Britain as a great power brought about Australia's realignment with the United States and the next phase of its strategic alliance policy. Australia now oriented toward a “forward defense” posture. In concert with its new senior ally the United States, Australia would meet its defense needs by deploying its forces throughout Southeast Asia.

It was through this prism that Australia's then–prime minister Curtin, in an editorial piece in late 1941, declared a new chapter in Australia's strategic and alliance outlook: “without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.” Despite the dramatic impact this statement (and indeed orientation) had on the Australian psyche, it was in fact not as dramatic a shift as many at the time believed. At its core, Australia's alliance policy had not changed—although the senior alliance partner had changed, the strategic underpinning remained as always (as it does to this day) that Australia would pursue an alliance-first policy as its means to ensure its strategic policy.

Following the Allied victory in 1945, Australia sought to cement its wartime security relationship with the United States as a radically altered postwar strategic order emerged. For Australia this was achieved by signing the ANZUS Treaty along with New Zealand and the United States

3. “A Bitter Fate: Australians in Malaya and Singapore,” *Department of Veterans' Affairs*, <https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/multimedia/publications/bitter-fateaustralians-malaya-singapore/chapter-1-singapore-fortress>.

in September 1951 in San Francisco. By signing ANZUS, Australia (and New Zealand) sought to ensure three key strategic objectives:

1. Ensure American engagement in the Asia-Pacific region to check against any resurgence in Japanese militaristic behavior;
2. For the United States to act as security guarantor against the decline of the European colonial powers in Asia; and
3. To check the expansion of both Soviet and Chinese communism, against which Australia and New Zealand alone would have very little capability to deter or prevent.

For the United States, ANZUS acted as a further spoke in its hub-and-spokes alliance model to check and, as needed, roll back communism in line with its overall containment strategy as well as open new trade and political relationships.

Through paying its alliance premiums, Australia would maintain and (where possible) deepen U.S. regional engagement, uphold the American-led order, and actively demonstrate support and leadership to pro-U.S. nations in the region. From Korea to Borneo and Malaya, this alliance approach served Australia's strategic and defense planning requirements. However, Australian sacrifice in the Vietnam War tested Australia's relationship with the United States.

Indeed, the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the subsequent fall of Saigon in 1975 necessitated a further recalibration of Australian alliance engagement. Although misunderstood as a strategy that placed self-reliance at the core of Australian planning requirements, the post-Vietnam "Defence of Australia (DOA)" concept relied heavily on the United States for both capability and acquisition, and in the event of armed attack, direct U.S. support.

Although explored from the mid-1970s, it was not until 1987 that the concept became formal policy in the 1987 White Paper. At its core, DOA is a strategy based on the Australian military's capacity to defend Australian interests, rather than a foreign expeditionary-oriented defense force. Over time, this strategy has grown; however, self-reliance is a fundamental aspect of Australian defense policy. In the years since its development, the DOA concept has evolved and Australia's expeditionary capacity and activities have expanded greatly. While it is not correct to say that Australia has completely discarded the DOA concept in the rapidly evolving strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific, it remains a core

tenet alongside Australia's long-term alliance strategy as a core element of Australian thinking.⁴

With the advent of the Trump administration, and for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War, Australians are genuinely concerned about (and questioning the relevance of) Australia's long-standing alliance with the United States, for at the very core of Australian strategic culture lies the fear of abandonment by a great and powerful friend—it is at the very top of the strategic nightmare list.

Although Australian policymakers remain firmly committed to the alliance with the United States, we are seeing the durability of the “self-reliance” trend in Australian strategic policy. We see it manifested most clearly in the emergence of a hedging strategy, seen most notably in the pursuit of a close defense relationship with Japan.

Building on the efforts of previous Australian governments, the Howard government sought to expand and build on strong economic ties with Japan to include a security and defense relationship, signing the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.⁵ Additionally, the two sides began an annual “2 + 2” ministerial-level meeting, with defense topics ranging from law enforcement to maritime security. Seeking to expand interoperability, the two sides concluded an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in 2013 and are currently discussing a reciprocal visiting forces agreement.

To further deepen this alliance relationship, Australia has also vigorously pursued service-to-service level engagement with Japan. In 2018, the two air forces undertook exercise “Bushido Guardian,” the first bilateral exercise between the two on Japanese territory, which involved air combat exercises near Misawa airbase in Aomori prefecture.⁶ Australia has also recently deployed a P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to Kadena airbase to monitor North Korean sanctions violations,

4. See “Self-Reliance” in “Defence of Australia 1987,” *Department of Defence*, <http://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/wpaper1987.pdf>.

5. “Australia-Japan Bilateral Relationship,” *Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*, <https://dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/Pages/australia-japan-bilateral-relationship.aspx>.

6. Jesse Johnson, “Australian Air Force and ASDF to Hold First Joint Drills in Japan,” *Japan Times*, August 31, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/08/31/national/asdf-royal-australian-air-force-hold-first-joint-drills-japan-amid-chinas-pacific-push/#.XE9c1xKjcs>.

a testament to the growing closeness between the Australian and Japanese military services and defense bureaucracies.⁷

Though Japanese feelings were bruised when the Turnbull government selected the French Naval Group rather than Mitsubishi Heavy to supply the replacement to the Collins class submarine, both Canberra and Tokyo recognized the need to continue momentum in the bilateral defense relationship; indeed, Japan itself is in the midst of a hedging strategy of its own.⁸ From Tokyo's perspective, Canberra is the ideal partner to fulfill its own hedging policy.

Both nations are exploring how to regionalize collective self-defense through the quadrilateral security dialogue alongside India and the United States. Through the Quad, Australia is able to hedge against American decline by strengthening ties to India and Japan while simultaneously pursuing its American alliance engagement.

As one senior former Australian Labor Party politician wrote in December 2018, "Australia needs to confront the possibility that the 'America First' approach of our most important ally is not an anomaly that will be gone in two years, and that U.S. alliances may now fall into mistrustful neglect."⁹ While the Australia-U.S. alliance continues to receive strong bipartisan support in Australia, there is widespread concern about the unpredictability, values, and interests of the Trump administration.

In the wake of the public revelations of the now infamous January 2017 phone call between President Trump and then Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, a flurry of public debate was ignited in both Australia and (to a lesser degree) the United States on the current state and more importantly the future of the Australia-U.S. alliance in the age of America First. Although the current juncture in the relationship is yet to play itself out, Australia's strategic elites are playing out a sensible approach in both restraint and engagement.

7. Franz-Stefan Gady, "Australia Deploys P-8A Poseidon to Japan to Enforce North Korea Sanctions," *The Diplomat*, December 7, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/australia-deploys-p-8a-poseidon-to-japan-to-enforce-north-korea-sanctions/>.

8. A thorough discussion of Japan's hedging strategy is beyond the scope of this essay, but for a closer look, see Ben Rimland, "North Korea: Decoupling the U.S.-Japan Alliance," *Tokyo Review*, September 5, 2017, <https://www.tokyoreview.net/2017/09/north-korea-us-japan-alliance/>.

9. David Feeney, "The Ostrich Sticks Its Head in the Sand and Thinks Itself Safe: Australia's Need for a Grand Strategy," Strategic and Defence Studies Center, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, series paper 46, December 2018, 4.

For many Australians, and indeed for Australia's friends in the United States, the call provided a moment to pause and reexamine the alliance, its utility, and its relevance. Alliances, like any relationship, require periodic review, reflection, and examination—even if the circumstances that lead to any such reflection result from a disconcerting event or trend. However, after the heated rhetoric of the 2016 presidential campaign and then-candidate's Trump's pronouncement of an America first agenda, alleged NATO freeloading, and his call for Japan's nuclear armament—the question that many in Australia began to ask was: Are we the next in the queue to be sidelined as an unreliable and unneeded ally not willing to carry its fair load?

Following what many Australians viewed as the Obama administration's lack of follow-through regarding the Asia-Pacific "rebalance," the American people's understandable loss of patience with endless overseas commitments, and a sense of resignation in many quarters (in both Australia and the United States) that China's rise had become a strategic inevitability, it appears to some that the United States may be in the early phases of walking back its long-held security commitment to Australia. This has rankled many in Australia given Australia's strong support of the United States since the very early days after the September 11 attacks, and indeed through every war and conflict over the past century.¹⁰

In the two years since the most public breakdown in alliance relations in memory, especially noteworthy given that it occurred at the apex of the alliance leadership and was leaked to the global media, the balance of opinion seems to suggest that the phone call moment was not a signal of American retrenchment from Australia, but more an indication of the president's temperament and personality style—and the belief that Trump felt he was being taken advantage of, especially as it related to the key campaign platform of reducing America's immigration and refugee intake. With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps it was unwise for Mr. Turnbull to have raised the issue during his first call with the new American president. Despite all this, doubts remain in significant quarters of Australian opinion about this administration and the future trajectory of

10. Hugh White of Australian National University has long been at the forefront of scholars flagging the relative decline of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. See, for example, Sam Roggeveen, "Review: Hugh White's 'Without America,'" *The Interpreter*, December 12, 2017, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/review-hugh-white-without-america-o>.

American global engagement, and although support for the alliance remains strong, importantly it is not inexhaustible.¹¹

With this new reality in Washington, Canberra's foreign policy establishment has come to a sensible conclusion and strategy: the alliance has sufficient ballast underpinning it to withstand this jolt to the system; with smart engagement, Australia can ride the present administration out. Australia has wisely chosen to double down on its engagement with the Trump administration and further deepen its engagement with the permanent national security establishment in Washington.

On the political front, Australia has further sought to diversify its alliance engagement through smart and targeted diplomacy. Australia is building on and expanding its engagement efforts in Congress (especially with key members and senior staff in both the House and Senate foreign relations and armed services committees), with the Washington think tank community, and crucially it has avoided pronouncements that could appear to personally criticize President Trump and his senior staff—which many European and Asian leaders have indeed publicly done.

This deft handling strategy, designed to avoid further public or private ruptures in the alliance, has been further reinforced by the Australian government's commitment to its force presence in Iraq (and until recently in Syria) and its commitment to keeping a force presence in Afghanistan. Australia has further built on its strong commitment to train the Iraqi Army while increasing Indo-Pacific regional engagement through military steady-state activity, infrastructure development, and greater diplomatic presence.

These efforts are designed to demonstrate to Washington Australia's commitment to the alliance, display to China its muscular middle-power force projection capabilities, and avoid the ire that many close allies in Europe have been subject to as "alliance free riders." It is a solid demonstration in the exercise of crafty middle-power diplomacy, and one that other middle-power allies, keen to demonstrate to Washington their alliance credentials, would do well to replicate.

In the age of Trump and a revisionist China, Australia's long-held and deepest fear of abandonment has become heightened nearly 30 years after the end of the Cold War and the long peace this era ushered in. Only time will tell if that fear is to become a strategic reality. Australian professor

11. *Ibid.*

Hugh White put the current Australian alliance dichotomy clearly when he noted “the issue for Australia today isn’t whether we should step back from the alliance with America, but whether America is stepping back from the alliances with us. Or to put it a little more precisely, the question is whether we can be sure that America will play the same strategic role in supporting Asian security that it has for the past few decades.”¹²

This question of the “great and powerful friend’s” commitment will continue to plague Australian planners as well as other U.S. allies. Short of a major break from Washington, which at this stage looks unlikely, Australia will continue to strongly support its alliance with the United States to promote its own security needs. It will, however, continue to deepen its relationships throughout the region, most notably with Japan, which is universally seen by the Australian strategic establishment as Australia’s closet and most capable Indo-Pacific ally whose strategic goals (and relationship with the United States) most align with Australia’s. Looking forward, Australian policymakers will seek to maintain a strong connection to historical strategic lodestars as they chart their way through an uncertain future.

12. Hugh White, “ANZUS in the Age of Trump,” *Strategist*, December 1, 2016, <http://www.aspistartegist.org.au/anzus-age-trump>.

12. SOUTHEAST ASIAN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Dr. Amy Searight

In the early days of the postwar period U.S. policy planners set about reorganizing the world by creating an institutional framework that would promote peace and prosperity and contain the growing communist threat. American planners focused their efforts on two key regions—the North Atlantic and Asia-Pacific. In Europe and the North Atlantic the United States established a collective security defense treaty under NATO. In the Asia-Pacific, a collective security mechanism was also considered and actively pursued, but was ultimately rejected in favor of a series of bilateral security treaties with Asian partners.¹ This hub-and-spokes alliance system became the foundation, along with the global economic architecture anchored by the Bretton Woods institutions, for a U.S.-led regional liberal order that broadly served the interests of the United States and its regional allies and partners for next seven decades.

Southeast Asia has played a critical role in this alliance system and the rules-based order, although its role has shifted quite a bit over time. Early on, as the Cold War intensified, America's Southeast Asian allies played an increasingly vital role in U.S. efforts to contain communism and balance against its key strategic rivals, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. In the aftermath of the war, the United States quickly forged close military relations with two of its oldest friends in the

1. On U.S. choices of multilateral security for Europe and bilateral security arrangements for Asian partners, see Amy Searight, "The United States and Asian Regionalism: The Politics of Reactive Leadership," in *Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions*, ed. Vinod K. Aggarwal and Seungjoo Lee (New York: Springer, 2010); Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010): 158–196.

region—the Philippines, its former colony, and Thailand, its oldest diplomatic partner in Asia. The Philippines had fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States to defeat Japan in the Second World War, and it welcomed a security alliance with the United States as the best way to rebound from the devastation of the war. Thailand, strategically located in the heart of Southeast Asia, had a centuries-old tradition of balancing external powers and was the only country in Southeast Asia that had avoided being colonized by Western powers. Facing a newly dangerous neighborhood under growing threat of expansionist communism fueled by anti-colonialism, Thai rulers chose to deviate from Thailand's traditional omnidirectional foreign policy and align militarily with the United States. The Philippines and Thailand became two of the five treaty alliances of the United States in Asia, along with Japan, Australia (and New Zealand),² and South Korea.

The strategic value of these Southeast Asian alliances has waxed and waned over the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, for both the United States and its alliance partners. Over time, as alliance objectives shifted and threat perceptions changed, the United States and its Thai and Philippine allies found their interests aligning or diverging in different ways.

From the U.S. perspective, the alliances served two primary purposes when they were forged. First and foremost, they served to balance against regional rivals in Asia—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which were viewed as vying for regional domination by supporting communist insurgencies throughout Asia. In the effort to deter these rivals and defeat expansionist communism in Southeast Asia, the allies provided diplomatic alignment and occasional contributions to the fight, but most critically they offered overseas bases for forward deployment of U.S. forces, which was critically important to the United States' ability to overcome the tyranny of distance to the far reaches of Southeast Asia. A second, sometimes overlooked objective for U.S. postwar strategists was to channel defense capabilities in ways that would promote peace and stability in an area riven by neighborhood rivalries and border disputes. With the United States largely providing for external defense, the Philippine (and to a lesser extent Thai) armed forces could

2. New Zealand was a member of the 1951 trilateral ANZUS treaty, but was suspended from ANZUS in 1986 after it declared itself a nuclear-free zone and refused entry of U.S. nuclear vessels to its ports.

focus on internal security threats rather than rearming and stoking tensions with their neighbors over territorial disputes and other issues.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of China to the West, American concern over balancing these rival powers diminished, and the strategic value of the alliances with Thailand and the Philippines declined in importance. The network of overseas American bases in Southeast Asia was dismantled as the Thais asked the United States to withdraw permanently stationed forces after the United States pulled out of Vietnam, and the Philippines followed suit in the early days of the post-Cold War period. The United States sustained its military presence in Southeast Asia by building partnerships with countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which granted access for port visits and engaged in joint military training. But as the strategic stakes appeared to diminish in the 1990s and early 2000s, U.S. strategists increasingly viewed its alliances and growing network of security partnerships in Southeast Asia primarily as vehicles for promoting public goods through training and capacity building rather than balancing against strategic rivals. The United States focused defense cooperation on addressing nontraditional security threats such as responding to large-scale natural disasters, countering piracy, and stopping the spread of pandemic disease. September 11, 2001, brought counterterrorism to the fore as a key alliance objective, and the United States refocused its efforts with its allies and other regional partners on capacity building and intelligence sharing to counter indigenous Southeast Asian Islamic terrorist groups such as *Jemaah Islamiya* (JI), largely based in Indonesia but with cells in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, and the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines.

U.S. alliance objectives shifted again a decade ago when China began asserting its maritime claims and aggressively flexing its muscles in the South and East China Seas, sparking a return to regional rivalry, this time focused on China's apparent interest in undermining U.S. regional influence and challenging key precepts of the U.S.-led regional liberal order. The United States sought to shore up its alliances and forge new partnerships in the region to balance against China, with a particular focus on building maritime security capabilities to deter Chinese maritime coercion. As a claimant state to disputed maritime features in the South China Sea, the Philippines was a natural alliance partner to focus on, but the United States also sought to deepen defense cooperation with Singapore,

expand maritime defense relations with Malaysia and Indonesia, and build a new security partnership with Vietnam. In addition, for the first time the United States placed ASEAN at a central point in its Southeast Asian strategy, seeking to bolster ASEAN's institutional role as a norm-enforcer and upholder of the regional rules-based order.

For Thailand and the Philippines, the domestic costs and external benefits of the alliances also shifted over time. For both countries, the postwar bargain underpinning their alliance with the United States entailed an external security guarantee and generous U.S. military and economic aid, in exchange for hosting U.S. bases on their soil and aligning closely with the United States diplomatically. Over time the trade-offs inherent in this bargain became more costly to Thai and Filipino leaders. Most importantly, uncertainty over the reliability and credibility of the United States as a security guarantor eroded political support for the alliance over time.

Contributing to this dissatisfaction was the amount and quality of military assistance provided by the United States, which the Philippines found lacking early on while the Thais resented the decline of military support in the mid-1980s.³ Third, the loss of sovereignty that came with hosting U.S. military bases led to frictions and domestic resentment that built over time, in particular in the Philippines, where anticolonial nationalist sentiment has always been strong. Finally, being a U.S. military ally constricted diplomatic freedom of movement and inhibited the ability to forge mutually beneficial relationships with other regional partners. Both countries over time sought to diversify their regional partnerships, investing heavily in ASEAN diplomacy and normalizing relations and deepening ties with the PRC.

EARLY COLD WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE UNITED STATES CHOOSES ALLIES AS THE STRATEGIC STAKES INTENSIFY

The United States had a military presence in the Philippines dating back to 1898, when it defeated Spain in the Spanish-American War and annexed

3. Ricardo T. Jose, "The Philippines during the Cold War: Searching for Security Guarantees and Appropriate Foreign Policies, 1946–1986," in *Cold War Southeast Asia*, ed. Malcolm Murfett (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2012); Lewis M. Stern, "Diverging Roads: 21st-century U.S.-Thai Defense Relations," *Strategic Forum* 241 (2009), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/104199/SF241.pdf>.

the Philippines. Japan's invasion of the Philippines delayed plans for its independence, and the Philippines fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States to liberate the territory from Japan. Emerging from the war devastated and destitute, the Philippines readily agreed to the U.S. proposal to maintain its military bases on its soil. The republic's first president, Manuel Roxas, saw defense cooperation with the United States as the best way to ensure economic reconstruction and protection from external military threats.⁴ The two countries quickly concluded a Military Bases Agreement in 1947, which granted the U.S. basing rights for a period of 99 years (subsequently amended to 25 years in 1966), as well as a Military Assistance Agreement in 1947, which committed the United States to provide military equipment, training, and technical assistance. The two sides agreed that the United States would take on the obligations of external defense, while the Philippines armed forces would focus on maintaining internal security. This freed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to focus on defeating the communist guerrilla movement known as the Huks, which posed a growing threat to internal peace and security.

However, the Philippine government wanted a clearer commitment from the United States that it would defend the country if it were attacked. Filipinos were hoping for a regional military alliance that would have an automatic obligation to respond to an armed attack similar to the commitment in NATO.⁵ The Philippines proposed a "Pacific Pact" that would include the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, and the idea was picked up by George Kennan's policy planning staff and expanded to include Japan and South Korea. John Foster Dulles actively pursued the proposal, viewing a regional multilateral alliance that included Japan as the best way to rearm Japan without alarming its Southeast Asian neighbors.⁶ However, the multilateral security proposal fell by the wayside when Japan balked at the idea and Australia and New Zealand were at best lukewarm to the idea of an alliance with their former

4. Jose, "The Philippines during the Cold War," 50–51.

5. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v07p2/d316>; Jose, "The Philippines during the Cold War," 62.

6. President Syngman Rhee also proposed a Pacific Pact in his Korean Independence Day speech on March 1, 1950, but he made clear his proposal was not initially intended to be a military alliance, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/1951-07-01/pacific-pact-looking-forward-or-backward>.

enemy. The Philippines was disappointed when it was subsequently excluded from alliance negotiations among the United States, Australia, and New Zealand for the ANZUS treaty.

The Philippines redirected its efforts to seek a bilateral defense treaty that would clarify Washington's security commitment to defend the Philippines from external aggression. The resulting Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), signed in 1951 and ratified by the Philippine Congress in 1952, included language that declares that "an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety," and calls on each party "to meet the common dangers *in accordance with its constitutional processes*." It also stipulates that the parties "will consult . . . whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific."⁷ Filipinos recognized that the commitment to *consult*, and to act subject to *constitutional processes*, fell short of the automatic guarantee to respond militarily to defend Philippine sovereignty they had wanted. Over time this ambiguity in the U.S. security commitment would continue to erode confidence in the credibility and value of the alliance.

Thailand was the United States' oldest diplomatic partner in Asia, having signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1833, and the United States took a friendly and supportive stance toward Thailand in the immediate postwar period. Initially the United States focused on Thailand as an economic partner for Japan's postwar recovery, but with the communist victory in China's civil war in 1949, the invasion of South Korea by the north in 1950, and an array of communist insurgencies taking hold in Indochina, the strategic stakes for the United States in Thailand and Southeast Asia more broadly intensified. Staunchly anti-communist, and in close proximity to a resurgent communist China, Thai leaders felt a keen sense of vulnerability, and they welcomed the American economic and military aid that began flowing to the country. Thailand's leader, Field Marshal Phibun Songkram, began to align his foreign policy closely to the United States. In 1950 Thailand became the first Asian nation to recognize the Bảo Đại regime in Vietnam, and when war broke out on the Korean peninsula Thailand quickly offered to send 4,000 Thai soldiers to fight under United Nations flag, becoming the first Asian

7. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/philoo1.asp.

country to contribute troops to the UN war effort. Soon thereafter the United States began providing large amounts of economic aid to Thailand, and in October 1950 the two countries signed military agreements establishing a Military Assistance Program (MAP) and a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG, which was redesignated in 1963 as the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group or JUSMAG). U.S. military assistance to Thailand increased rapidly, climbing from \$10 million in 1951 to about \$56 million by 1953.⁸ In 1954, following the division of Vietnam into North and South, Thailand signed the Manila Pact and became a founding member the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), a U.S.-led collective security pact meant to deter further communist expansion in the region. SEATO was headquartered in Bangkok, signifying Thailand's status as a frontline state in the effort to contain communism.⁹

SEATO would prove a structurally flawed and ineffective security mechanism and would be disbanded in 1977.¹⁰ For the Thais, the most pressing issue was that SEATO did not provide a direct security guarantee from the United States for the defense of Thailand, since any action was predicated on collective agreement of SEATO members. By the early 1960s, communist advances in the civil war in Laos intensified the Thais' security concerns, since from their perspective Laos served as a critical buffer state between Thailand and China and North Vietnam, and they were deeply disappointed with SEATO's failure to act to prevent communist takeover of Laos. Thai leaders conveyed their insecurity and frustration and threatened to end the special relationship with Washington and resume a more independent foreign policy. The Kennedy administration sought to shore up wavering Thai confidence in the alliance

8. <https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/blog/post-war-thailand-onset-cold-war-southeast-asia/>.

9. In Manila in September 1954, the United States, the UK, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand signed the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty (SEACDT), also known as the Manila Pact. The SEACDT gave rise to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO, the aim of which was to "stem the tide of communism in Asia." Despite its name, only two Southeast Asian countries—Thailand and the Philippines—were members. The organization had serious structural flaws and never functioned effectively as a collective mechanism due to the very different interests of its members and the need for collective approval for any member to take action.

10. The Philippines and Thailand issued a joint communique in July 1975 calling for the dissolution of SEATO, citing the "new realities of the region," referring to the communist victories in Indochina. Both countries normalized diplomatic relations with the PRC in the same year.

through a joint communiqué between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Thai foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, that pledged that the United States would come to Thailand's aid if it faced an armed attack.

The 1962 Rusk-Thanat Communiqué effectively bilateralized SEATO for the United States and Thailand, and it remains as the primary legal basis for the bilateral security alliance. This makes Thailand unusual among U.S. allies, since there is no formal mutual defense treaty and no status of forces or visiting forces agreement underpinning the alliance. Alliance relations are instead based on precedent, shared understandings, and good will. This makes the alliance unusually flexible and adaptable, but it also provides thin legal grounds for maintaining access and activities if political relations sour.

The apex of the U.S.-Thai alliance came with the major escalation of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. The United States needed airfields and other facilities to prosecute the war, and Thailand was willing to oblige by providing land and, unofficially, permitting unrestricted use of the bases for overseas operations. At the peak of the war, 50,000 U.S. servicemen were stationed and 600 combat aircraft were deployed at seven major bases and a host of other facilities in Thailand. Utapao was a particularly critical air base, capable of handling all U.S. military aircraft including B-52 bombers, U-2 reconnaissance planes, and larger transport aircraft. American fighters and bombers operating out of U.S. air bases accounted for 80 percent of all air strikes in Vietnam and other parts of Indochina.¹¹ The United States also provided massive economic aid through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), one of the largest in the world from 1965 to 1970.¹²

American bases in the Philippines were also critically important for the war effort in Vietnam, particularly Clark Air Base, which was the largest U.S. military air base overseas, and Subic Bay Naval Station, which was one of the few deep-water ports in the region capable of hosting an

11. Sutayut Osornprasop, "Thailand and the Secret War against Laos: The Origins of Engagement," in *Cold War Southeast Asia*, ed. Malcolm Murfett (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish: 2012).

12. John W. Finney, "U.S. Pays Thailand 50-Million a Year for Vietnam Aid," *New York Times*, June 8, 1970, <https://www.nytimes.com/1970/06/08/archives/us-pays-thailand-50million-a-year-for-vietnam-aid-terms-of-secret-a.html>; see also <https://is.cuni.cz/studium/predmety/index.php?do=download&did=129671&kod=JMM595>.

aircraft carrier. Clark and Subic Bay became major strategic supply and logistic hubs for the U.S. military during the Vietnam War. Ferdinand Marcos, the newly elected president of the Philippines, reversed his campaign pledge by agreeing to the U.S. request to send a Philippine contingent to the Vietnam War, although the deployment of a civic force “touched a raw nerve among Philippine students and intellectuals” and deepened public skepticism over the value of the alliance.¹³

AFTER VIETNAM AND THE EARLY POST-COLD WAR YEARS: ALLIANCES ADRIFT

The American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1974 presaged the declining relevance of Southeast Asia to the United States and an extended period of stagnation in its alliances with Thailand and the Philippines. For U.S. strategists as well as the American public, the long and costly entanglement in Vietnam had discredited the domino theory, and Southeast Asia seemed a distant region of marginal value to core U.S. interests.

The end of the Vietnam War sent the U.S.-Thai alliance adrift, and although close defensive cooperation remains, the strong strategic foundation for the alliance has never fully recovered. In 1975 the Thai government asked the United States to withdraw from its bases in Thailand, and by 1976 all U.S. bases were closed.¹⁴ Although Thailand continued to grant access to some strategic facilities like Utapao air base and Sattahip port for air transits and port calls, the political relationship became more distant.¹⁵ Thailand sought to rebalance its security relationships by investing heavily in ASEAN diplomacy, which it had played a key role in launching in 1967. Thailand also moved quickly to normalize relations with China in July 1975 and began seeking reconciliation with the new communist regimes in Indochina.

Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and its installation of a Hanoi-backed regime in December 1978 led to a resurgence in the U.S.-Thai alliance for

13. Jose, “The Philippines during the Cold War,” 76–77.

14. The Thai decision to close U.S. military bases arose from their very negative reaction to the *Mayaguez* incident, in which the U.S. made a unilateral decision to base operations out of Utapao to rescue the crew of the container ship USS *Mayaguez* who had been seized by the Khmer Rouge in May 1975, weeks after the fall of Saigon.

15. Interviews with several senior defense officials based in Thailand in the 1970s and 1980s.

the next several years. The United States stepped up its military assistance, including expanded training and “friendship prices” for military hardware. It was during this period that Cobra Gold was launched in June 1982, an annual joint bilateral military exercise hosted by Thailand that has been steadily multilateralized since the 2000s, and now represents the largest multilateral military exercise in the Indo-Pacific theater.

U.S.-Philippine alliance relations during this period were shaped largely by domestic developments in the Philippines, although pent-up distrust of U.S. alliance commitments and resentment over U.S. base relations played an important role. As Philippine democracy slid into dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s and 1980s, Washington largely stood by without publicly condemning Marcos’s repression and corruption. The public assassination of Benigno Aquino and the outpouring of massive “people’s power” demonstrations eventually led the Reagan administration to withdraw support from Marcos in 1986, clearing the way for his resignation and the return to democracy with the election of Corazon Aquino, Benigno’s widow.

Many Filipinos were disappointed with how long it had taken the United States to condemn Marcos, and this fueled the long-standing streak of anti-colonial nationalism and anti-base sentiment in the Philippines. With the lease for U.S. military facilities under the Military Base Agreement set to expire in 1991, negotiations over renewing the base agreement ignited an intense domestic debate over the desirability and strategic utility of maintaining U.S. bases on Philippine soil. Many Filipinos argued that the end of the Cold War obviated the need for U.S. bases as protection against external threats. Ironically, the internal security focus fostered by the United States in its early division of labor with the AFP had attenuated the external threat perception of the Philippine defense establishment, who were then less able to articulate a compelling case for maintaining U.S. bases.¹⁶

On the U.S. side as well, the end of the Cold War had lessened the perceived strategic imperative for maintaining bases in the Philippines. The United States debated domestically whether maintaining a robust forward-deployed presence in Asia was worth the cost after the defeat

16. Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2011), 44–49; Renato de Castro, “Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era: The Ordeal of the Philippine Military’s Modernization Program,” *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no. 1 (October 1999): 119–137.

and transformation of its Cold War rivals, and the George H. W. Bush administration was not willing to overcompensate the Philippines to renew the leases for its bases. Mount Pinatubo intervened dramatically into the equation with a volcanic eruption in 1991, which rendered Clark Air Base inoperable and shifted the focus of negotiations to Subic Bay Naval Facility. In the end, the Philippine Senate voted against renewing the leases on the bases, leading to the withdrawal of U.S. forces permanently stationed at Subic Bay and elsewhere in the Philippines in 1992.

NEW SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE “NEW WORLD ORDER”

The U.S. departure from Subic Bay and Clark Air Base sent shockwaves around the Pacific and led many in the region to question the future of U.S. strategic engagement in Asia. Singapore in particular was concerned about the void left by the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia and the risk that an ascending China would seek to fill the vacuum. As a littoral city-state with a deeply ingrained sense of vulnerability based on its small physical size, history, and geostrategic location at the confluence of the South China Sea and Malacca Strait, Singapore has long sought to promote a stable balance of power to maintain regional stability and the open commercial access that underpins its economic success. To this end, Singapore has vocally supported a robust American security presence in the region, and it sought to countervail against the declining U.S. security presence in Southeast Asia by offering the use of its military facilities to the U.S. Air Force and Navy through a 1990 Memorandum of Understanding. In 1992 a naval logistics unit was relocated from Subic Bay to Singapore, and in 1998 Singapore announced that it was constructing a new deep-water pier at Changi Naval Base specifically designed to accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers. A subsequent U.S.-Singapore Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 2005 and an Expanded DCA (2015) further expanded access for U.S. military forces and identified new areas of defense cooperation.

Singapore has thus in many ways stepped into the functional role of a traditional ally, offering the U.S. military access to facilities (if not permanent bases) based on a shared set of objectives in sustaining a forward-deployed U.S. military presence in order to maintain a balance of power and regional stability. It also provides a strong diplomatic voice in support of the U.S. strategic presence in the region as well as upholding

pillars of the rules-based regional order, including freedom of navigation and an open economic architecture. Yet Singapore is quite clear that it prefers to maintain its status as a non-ally. It wants to maintain its freedom of maneuver with China, and it would prefer to see accommodation between the United States and China so that it is not forced to choose.

Although Singapore stands out as a major strategic partner, the United States has built other partnerships in the region over the past three decades that have grown increasingly important to its Asia strategy. Malaysia and Indonesia began granting access to the U.S. Navy after 1992, which helped to compensate for the loss of U.S. bases in the Philippines, and bilateral military cooperation with these countries began to increase substantially. Thailand remained the major facilitator of U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia during this period, providing regular access for air transits, port calls, and exercises like Cobra Gold.¹⁷

The “new world order” heralded by President George H. W. Bush in 1991—“a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations”—shifted the U.S. objectives for its alliances and partnerships in a new direction.¹⁸ The focus on deterring and defeating powerful regional rivals was replaced by the United States as a lone superpower seeking to enforce a rules-based system and provide international public goods by building coalitions and partnering with other nations. In Southeast Asia, working with allies and partners to address nontraditional security challenges like counter-piracy, disaster response, and pandemic disease became the central objective of defense cooperation. September 11, 2001, brought a laser-like focus on counterterrorism. Southeast Asia was home to several indigenous terror networks, like the al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the southern Philippines, and regional partners and allies were receptive to working more closely with the United States in its efforts to dismantle these networks. Thailand also played an important role in the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by provided access for increased use of Utapao and Sattahip for transiting U.S. forces from Okinawa to the Middle East.

17. Interview with senior defense official based in Thailand in the 1990s.

18. President G. H. W. Bush, televised speech announcing the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, January 17, 1991.

The counterterrorism effort in the Philippines helped to revitalize the alliance, as the United States deployed several hundred special forces troops to the southern Philippines to provide training, logistics, and intelligence support to the AFP. This assistance built on the Philippines' decision to resume U.S.-Philippine military engagement a few years earlier. After a "cooling off" period in U.S.-Philippine military ties following the eviction of U.S. forces, the Philippines came to realize the loss of U.S. military presence on its soil had opened the door for China to probe for Philippine weakness in defending its claims in the South China Sea. By 1994 China had built structures on Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, and occupied the feature, reinforcing its control with further construction on the reef in 1999. This led the Philippines to negotiate a Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States in 1999, which allowed U.S. troops to resume exercises and defense engagements.

THE ROLE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS IN THE RULES-BASED ORDER

The return of regional rivalry to the forefront of United States-Asia strategy over the past decade has shown the strengths and limitations of America's network of alliances and partnerships in the region. China's opportunistic approach to asserting its claims in the South China Sea had led to naval battles with Vietnam in the Paracel Islands in 1974 and 1988, and diplomatic clashes with the Philippines over its encroachment on Mischief Reef and other claims in the 1990s. ASEAN grew increasingly involved and began elaborating a set of norms aimed at restraining aggressive unilateral Chinese behavior, culminating in the Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea (DOC), signed by ASEAN and China in 2002. The DOC called on parties to practice restraint, and to refrain from unilateral changes to the status quo and the use of coercion to settle disputes. The United States largely stood by during these developments, viewing them as internal regional matters.

However, by 2009 the United States began to view China's behavior in the South China Sea as a manifestation of China's larger ambitions to dominate Southeast Asia and marginalize U.S. influence. China had begun asserting its expansive maritime claims under the so-called nine-dash line, with an aggressive legal and diplomatic approach backed by its

rapidly growing maritime enforcement capabilities. Around the same time Beijing began warning Washington that the South China Sea was an issue of sovereignty and a “core interest,” which the United States should respect and not get involved.

The network of partnerships the United States had built up over the previous two decades was now viewed as critically important to enforcing a norms- and rules-based approach to dissuade China from pursuing aggressive expansionist policies. The Obama administration also began to put ASEAN at the center of its regional diplomacy, seeking to strengthen ASEAN’s normative role in supporting a rules-based order. The United States also stepped up maritime security cooperation and broader defense engagements with key partners such as Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. With Malaysia, for example, the U.S. Marines launched an annual bilateral amphibious exercise with Malaysian counterparts and began training in Malaysian training areas, while the Navy increased port calls of U.S. destroyers and aircraft carriers. Defense cooperation with Singapore has continued to deepen in recent years. Singapore now hosts regular rotational deployments of U.S. littoral combat ships, and P-8 surveillance flights operate out of Singaporean air bases for patrols over the South China Sea.

Washington also doubled down on efforts to build new security partnerships with key strategic players in the region, such as India and Vietnam, that could help balance against China and promote a rules-based order. Vietnam became a focal point of Washington’s Southeast Asia strategy. Although historical irritants and distrust remained in the bilateral relationship and tempered the pace of engagement, the two countries shared a strong interest in countering China’s maritime ambitions, and defense cooperation began to rise steadily. Frequent high-level visits by senior defense officials, including secretaries of defense and their Vietnamese counterparts, helped to boost defense ties, and a 2015 Joint Vision Statement on Defense Cooperation committed the two countries to greater operational cooperation. In 2016 the United States lifted its arms embargo on lethal weapons to Vietnam, removing a major irritant in the relationship. Port visits and naval engagements increased, and in 2018 the USS Carl Vinson visited the commercial port at Danang, the first visit of a U.S. aircraft carrier since the Vietnam War.

In contrast to the strikingly positive trajectories of these security partnerships under the shadow of rising Chinese assertiveness, the tradi-

tional treaty allies of the United States in Southeast Asia—Thailand and the Philippines—have shown the opportunities and pitfalls of alliance relationships in an era when democracy and human rights have also come to the fore of U.S. foreign policy priorities. The United States and Thailand signed a Joint Vision Statement for Defense Alliance in 2012, an attempt to strengthen the alliance on a firmer political foundation, with a focus on regional security cooperation. Optimism over this new chapter in U.S.-Thai security relations proved short-lived, however, when the military overthrew the elected civilian government May 2014. The coup continued a long tradition of military coups in Thailand, a habit of Thai political culture that had not disrupted close alliance relations in the Cold War but has become a much more difficult issue for the alliance in recent decades. Thai military coups in 1996, 2006, and 2014 were met with legislatively mandated U.S. restrictions on some key aspects of military cooperation, including curtailing training and education opportunities and limiting arms deals. The 2006 and 2014 coups were publicly criticized by the United States; Cobra Gold was delayed in 2006 and scaled back in 2014. Although defense engagements resumed to near normal levels by the end of the Obama administration, the public condemnation by a treaty ally was greatly resented by Thai leadership, and has cast the alliance further adrift.

The U.S.-Philippine alliance has undergone an even more dramatic whiplash-trajectory in recent years. The Aquino government negotiated an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Obama administration in 2014, which would provide access for rotational troop deployments on military facilities throughout the Philippines. The EDCA was a lynchpin in a broader U.S. strategy to negotiate a network of access arrangements with allies and partners for rotational deployments, which would enhance the U.S. regional presence with a geographically distributed and operationally resilient force posture, while also expanding opportunities for enhancing engagements with partners, including training, joint exercises, and building interoperability and partner capacity. Singapore's agreements to host rotational deployments of littoral combat ships and P-8 flights, as well as Australia's offer to host U.S. Marines in Darwin and U.S. aircraft at Tindal air base on a rotational basis were also part of this broader regional strategy.

In the case of the Philippines, however, hopes that EDCA would usher in much closer and more effective security cooperation between the

United States and the Philippines were dashed by the election of Rodrigo Duterte as president in 2016. President Duterte sought to temper defense cooperation with the United States and seek an accommodation with China over disputed maritime claims. Duterte was deeply skeptical of the reliability of the U.S. alliance commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty, based on long-standing dissatisfaction with the language of the treaty and the lack of clarity in U.S. assurances over the years on the scope of its treaty obligations. The alliance relationship was further soured by Washington's criticism of human rights abuses in Duterte's prosecution of his drug war, which caused Duterte to further distance the Philippines from Washington, while the Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana began calling for a review of the Mutual Defense Treaty with an eye toward strengthening its obligations or perhaps scrapping them. The Trump administration has sought to mend the alliance by softening its criticism of human rights abuses and assuring the Philippines that it is prepared to intervene in an armed attack by China in the South China Sea.¹⁹

Democracy and human rights concerns will remain a significant challenge for the United States in seeking to strengthen its network of regional allies and partners in Southeast Asia, a region filled with many states that have imperfect democratic or illiberal political systems, and in many cases are prone to weak governance and corruption. China offers an attractive alternative to some leaders seeking to avoid criticism over these shortcomings, and it greatly complicates U.S. strategy seeking

19. In a visit to Manila in March 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo clarified the geographic scope of U.S. obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty and suggested that the U.S. was ready to intervene militarily if the Philippines was attacked by China, stating at a press conference that "as the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our mutual defense treaty." This was the first time an American official gave this public assurance that disputed territories in the South China Sea are covered by the MDT. Pompeo also emphasized the strategic importance the United States now places on Chinese maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea, saying "China's island building and military activities in the South China Sea threaten [Philippine] sovereignty, security and therefore economic livelihood, as well as that of the United States." Regine Cabato and Shibani Mahtani, "Pompeo promises intervention if Philippines is attacked in South China Sea amid rising Chinese militarization," *Washington Post*, February 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pompeo-promises-intervention-if-philippines-is-attacked-in-south-china-sea-amid-rising-chinese-militarization/2019/02/28/5288768a-3b53-11e9-b10b-f05a22e75865_story.html?utm_term=.e96ccfcb987.

both to build up partnerships to balance against China, while upholding norms of democracy and good governance that serve its strategic interests in the long run.

The other major challenge is the unwillingness of Southeast Asian partners and even allies to stand in clear strategic alignment with the United States. On the one hand, American allies and partners welcome the United States as an external balancer and a provider of public goods, including freedom of navigation, access to maritime commons, and support for a rules-based order. However, all countries in the region, including our allies and closest partners, are increasingly hedging against China's rise. They seek closer economic and political ties with China, and are reluctant to openly criticize Chinese behavior, and many are hesitant to publicly support U.S. freedom of navigation operations and other American efforts to support the rules-based order. The sense that the United States is withdrawing from active regional and global leadership under Trump's "America First" foreign policy only exacerbates the challenge of building a resilient network of partners and allies that can act as a bulwark against a rising revisionist China.

13. NETWORKING ALLIANCES AND DEEPENING MINILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

Richard Fontaine

In a notable departure from recent practice, the Trump administration declared in its 2018 National Defense Strategy that interstate strategic competition, rather than terrorism, now represents the primary concern in U.S. national security.¹ Indeed, the return of great power competition is increasingly focusing foreign policy minds in Washington, and concerns about the future intentions and capabilities of both China and Russia have spurred new defense and diplomatic planning. It is in this context that the imperative to expand allied and partner security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific takes on greater urgency.

Deepening cooperation with and among the United States' five treaty allies in the region, as well as with its less formal security partners, can help meet and mitigate threats, balance power, and prevent the Indo-Pacific's reversion to a might-makes-right arena for interstate competition. As the National Defense Strategy puts it, "Every day, our allies and partners join us in defending freedom, deterring war, and maintaining the rules which underwrite a free and open international order."² This is true globally, but perhaps nowhere more critically than in the Indo-Pacific.

As the region returns to its historical position as the world's economic and demographic center of gravity, its geopolitical importance will only

1. U.S. Department of Defense, "2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America," January 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

2. *Ibid.*

grow. This phenomenon, coupled with China's rising power, will also likely make it the key field on which the future of the U.S.-backed rules-based order will be contested. Indeed, the regional order is already under pressure in multiple domains.

Yet just when the stakes are rising in Asia, American defense credibility there is under mounting pressure. A congressionally mandated review of U.S. strategy found that countries like China were "routinely [challenging] the credibility of U.S. security commitments, and U.S. capability development is not keeping pace with challenges by potential competitors, resulting in the regional balance of military power shifting against the United States."³ Defense budget woes in Washington, a shrinking military-technological gap between the United States and potential adversaries, and perceptions of relative U.S. disengagement from Asia together have sown doubts about the long-term sustainability of U.S.-backed security guarantees.

Chinese actions threaten the U.S. presence and key relationships as well. Beijing's growing blue-water navy, long-range precision strike capabilities, and militarized land reclamation projects are all improving China's ability to project power throughout the region. Increasingly sophisticated tools of influence, from cyberespionage to information operations, threaten to erode a regional order based on rules in favor of one based on strength—and all without ever rising to a threshold that would provoke a more direct confrontation. And the ever-growing economic dependence of key nations in the Indo-Pacific—including the United States' treaty allies—offers Beijing opportunities for "soft" forms of coercion.

Thankfully, the region does not need to start from scratch in developing a response. Growing uncertainty over the durability of China's economy and suspicion of its strategic intentions have prompted many of the region's countries to begin hedging their geopolitical bets, including by increasing defense budgets, seeking to diversify trade and investment, and pursuing novel diplomatic engagements.⁴ They are also deepening

3. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Zack Cooper, and John Schaus, *Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnership* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016), 4.

4. Richard Fontaine, Patrick Cronin, Mira Rapp-Hooper, and Harry Krejsa, "Networking Asian Security: An Integrated Approach to Order in the Pacific," *Center for a New American Security*, June 2017; Patrick M. Cronin, Richard Fontaine, Zachary M. Hosford,

security ties with the United States and with one another. The result is an emerging regional security structure that, at its best, can be adaptable and inclusive in order to tackle modern threats.

This growing security network is set to augment, rather than replace, the United States' traditional "hub-and-spokes" system of bilateral alliances in Asia. In this network, American alliances can be embedded in a growing system of flexible security partnerships—especially those between and among countries like Japan, Australia, India, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Moving toward a more densely connected security network is a cost-effective way for the United States and its partners to advance their interests and uphold the regional rules-based order. It is also fully consistent with a strategy of encouraging U.S. allies and partners to assume a greater share of the burden for their security.

The new era of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific forms the backdrop against which the move toward a more networked security architecture becomes critical. Washington and its partners should encourage the trend toward deeper intra-Asian defense and security ties and look for new ways to deepen its alliances and forge new security partnerships.

WHY NETWORK IN ASIA?

Multilateralism has historically been a hard sell in the Indo-Pacific region. In contrast to Europe, Asia is geographically diffuse, countries have fewer common political affinities, and they have rarely faced the same sense of urgent, Cold War-style threat that the Soviet Union's neighbors did.⁵ All of these factors are becoming quickly attenuated, however, by the region's fast-changing geopolitical environment. Economic interdependence has made the continent "smaller" than ever, while increasingly democratic governments find their interests and affinities overlapping (if

Oriana Skylar Mastro, Ely Ratner, and Alexander Sullivan, "The Emerging Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties," *Center for a New American Security*, June 10, 2013, 5.

5. John S. Duffield, "Why Is There No APTO? Why Is There No OSCAP? Asia-Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective," *Contemporary Security Policy* 2, no. 2 (August 2001): 69–95; Kai He and Huiyang Feng, "'Why Is There No NATO in Asia?' Revisited: Prospect Theory, Balance of Threat, and U.S. Alliance Strategies," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 2 (January 2011): 227–250; Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2010): 158–196.

not broadly aligning). North Korean provocations, China's coercive behavior, and the need for disaster response do not add up to a Soviets-in-Europe-style threat that might spur the creation of a formal, NATO-style multilateral defense pact. But together, they have opened the door to less formal bilateral and minilateral activities and relationships that together make up a new form of Asian security network.

The United States in recent years has welcomed the development. Then-secretary of defense Ashton Carter, for instance, in 2016 offered a vision of increasingly capable U.S. allies in Asia linking together with both each other and with non-allied but like-minded partners.⁶ The resulting economies of scale, he indicated, would make cooperation on mutual security interests less costly both fiscally and politically. In addition, as information and access become as or more powerful than traditional, material forms of state power (e.g., weapons or wealth), the ability of thoroughly networked states to traffic in scarce knowledge with other trusted state collaborators, or to broker communications between unfriendly parties, increasingly helps define influence in the region.⁷

JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA: PARTNERS IN NETWORKING

Japan and Australia constitute two high-capability "nodes" that should be central to any Indo-Pacific security network. Tokyo and Canberra have found incipient security networking appealing, given both its relative informality and its potential for substantive cooperation. As a result, the two have pursued closer collaboration with each other as well as with countries such as South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and India. Both Japan and Australia depend on stable economic relations with China, and neither wishes to be seen as directly antagonizing China. As a result, they are each pursuing a variety of regional activities and engagements, ranging from joint exercises and military exchanges to contingency planning and intelligence sharing. The fact that these ties are decidedly *not* binding alliances is an important consideration in their

6. Ashton Carter, "The Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Security: Building a Principled Security Network," *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 6 (November/December 2016), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-10-17/rebalance-and-asia-pacific-security>.

7. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery, "Network Analysis for International Relations," *International Organization* 63, no. 3 (July 2009).

construction; they are security supplements. For Japan and Australia, as for the United States' other treaty allies in South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, the bet is on networked security with the irreplaceable backstop of their U.S. security guarantee.

Tokyo has been a prime mover in the emergence of an Indo-Pacific security network. In decades past, historical baggage over Japan's prewar foreign policy prevented the country from enjoying close relations with many of its neighbors—and was likely a factor in the region eschewing multilateral defense alliances in the years after World War II.⁸ More recently, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has linked his legacy to normalizing Japan's security agenda—from developing a legal basis for acting in collective self-defense to establishing the legitimacy of its Self-Defense Forces.⁹ An adjunct to these efforts has been Tokyo's drive to enhance its security relationships across the region.

Japan has pursued exchanges, joint exercises, and some interoperability with capable partners like South Korea, India, and Singapore. As a high-capability military power, it has invested significant diplomatic and fiscal capital in building partner capacity, especially in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. While there will remain constraints on Japan's ability to act militarily, its increased activism is striking, as is the appetite for collaboration among actual and potential partners. Even in South Korea, the security partner most sensitive to the legacy of Japan's wartime activities, Seoul and Tokyo are today far more prepared to cooperate in the event of a contingency on the Korean peninsula than was the case just a few short years ago.¹⁰

Like Japan, Australia has used its high-capability U.S. alliance as a foundation upon which to build new security relationships with Indo-Pacific neighbors. Canberra has deepened its security relationships with Southeast and Northeast Asian nations alike, and is pursuing closer defense ties with India. It has signed new agreements with Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and India, and is increasing security cooperation with Vietnam. The 2016 Defence White Paper commits

8. Duffield, "Why Is There No APTO?" 69–95.

9. David A. Graham, "Shinzo Abe Bets on America's Fading Memories," *The Atlantic*, April 29, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/shinzo-abes-bet-on-americas-fading-memories/391814/>.

10. Hiroyuki Ishida, "Japan Ready for N. Korean Emergency," *Inquirer.net*, April 14, 2017, <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/889181/japan-readying-for-north-korea-emergency>.

Australia to doubling the training it provides for international military students over the next 15 years, to expanding its participation in multinational exercises, and to expanding defense liaison exchange programs with other countries in the region.¹¹

The two emerging security nodes differ; Japan enjoys significantly greater defense capabilities than Australia, while the latter's are perhaps more flexible. Canberra is also seen by many as a less historically complicated partner than Japan for some collaborative undertakings. Yet Australia itself is increasing its defense budget, procuring new submarines and other platforms, and redirecting its military focus from the greater Middle East to its own neighborhood.

After Japan and Australia, India is the logical third node in an Asian security network. Over successive administrations, U.S.-India ties have grown to include joint exercises, logistics sharing, military exchanges, joint military research and development, and more. In the meantime, New Delhi has elevated its bilateral relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Vietnam to the level of strategic partnerships and conducted bilateral military exercises with Singapore, South Korea, and others.¹²

THE FUTURE OF SECURITY NETWORKING: CHINA'S RESPONSE

The success of any regional security network will turn on its ability to hedge against bad behavior without inciting still more of it. It is likely that *any* effort at growing an Indo-Pacific security network will be interpreted by Beijing as encirclement, and cries of containment may have an inhibiting effect in countries otherwise interested in greater security cooperation.

Including China in certain exercises, such as those focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, would demonstrate that the emerging network is not simply zero-sum, and not only for the benefit of the United States. Similarly, while Washington should endorse the Asian security network concept, it need not publicly trumpet it at every opportunity—or inject the United States into every security relationship in Asia.

11. Commonwealth of Australia, Ministry of Defence, "2016 Defence White Paper," February 2017, <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-defence-white-paper.pdf>, 121.

12. Richard Fontaine, "Networking Security in Asia," *Washington Quarterly*, Fall 2017, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1370359>.

Spurring the evolution of the United States' security system in Asia—from hubs and spokes to an interconnected, cross-braced series of relationships that make up an array of activities and memberships—is and should be the focus of U.S. policymakers. A networked Asian security architecture would allow U.S. allies and partners to do more in more places, to achieve goals more cheaply, and to respond to threats more comprehensively—all while taking on a relatively greater share of the burden of their own security. Despite downside risks associated with such an evolution, including the possibility that the United States could be drawn into adventurism and regional rivalries, such an effort can serve as insurance against instability and coercion, precisely when the danger of both is on the rise.

The success of security networking in Asia will also depend on an enduring American commitment to the region. A stable, peaceful Indo-Pacific governed by a rules-based order remains critical to U.S. security and economic interests. That, in turn, will be more likely in the presence of a self-sustaining security network, one built on intra-Asian defense ties and that can stand apart from the United States—but will still need U.S. commitment and leadership to establish.¹³

13. This and the previous paragraph draw on Fontaine, "Networking Security in Asia."

14. THE ROLE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN ESTABLISHING THE RULES-BASED ORDER

Dr. Gary Schmitt

A standard account of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is that it was established to meet the threat posed to Europe by Stalin's Soviet Union and that, in the absence of that threat, it has struggled to adjust to the post-Cold War world. It is also the conventional view that NATO, as an alliance and as a bureaucracy, has been less than adept over the decades in meeting evolving security challenges. As the current U.S. president might suggest, NATO is, like an 8-track tape player, "obsolete."¹ Of course, there is more than a grain of truth in these characterizations. But such standard accounts often overstate or miss important truths about the alliance.

NATO's birth in 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty was driven by the menace posed by the Soviet Union. Economically on its knees, politically unstable, and with its various militaries demobilized, Western Europe faced a Stalin-led Kremlin with a Red Army still massive in size and in an increasingly dominant position in Central and Eastern Europe. If the challenge was to be met, it could not be done in the absence of the United States, which, while also demobilizing at a staggering rate in the aftermath of World War II, was the only power with sufficient economic and military potential to plausibly be the cornerstone for a multination effort to meet the Kremlin's challenge.

If this multilateral effort was to take place, two fundamental things would have to occur. First, Washington's elected leadership would need

1. Quoted in "Trump Says NATO Is Obsolete but Still 'Very Important to Me,'" *Reuters*, January 15, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nato-obsolete-idUSKBN14ZoYO>.

to overcome its quasi-isolationist tendencies—no sure thing given Truman’s views of the United States’ role in the world and that of a Dewey-led Republican Party—and, second, the capitals of Western Europe would have to set aside long-standing, often bitter enmities among themselves.² Combined with the multifaceted character and the scale of the strategic problem facing the West, nothing was inevitable. Although the “lesson of Munich” was part of the strategic debate at the time, it was not yet dominant, and various softer forms of appeasement policies toward Moscow were alive as well. However, if there was to be a global order worth its name, the history of the first half of the twentieth century indicated that leaving Eurasia exposed to open-ended competition among nation-states was an invitation to instability and, at some point, great conflict. What tipped the scales both in the United States and in Western Europe was a relatively rapid series of events: the communist coup in Czechoslovakia (1948), a ground blockade of West Berlin (1948), the first test of an atomic weapon by the Soviets (1949), and, not long after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, the Korean War (1950).

The allies’ success in coalition warfare during World War II created considerable momentum in establishing a new peacetime alliance structure. Most senior security officials had learned the formative practices of working with others just a few years before. Moreover, as with the wartime coalition, the focus was not just about the military defense of Europe and North America. As such, it stretched beyond the terms of a traditional security pact in which one nation agreed to come to the aid of another if that nation were attacked. Notably, before the most famous of the treaty’s articles—Article 5, in which “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”—Articles 1–3 place that commitment within the wider horizon of the Charter of the United Nations.³ By signing the treaty, the allied nations were pledging to “contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations

2. To be fair to Truman, while he voted for the Neutrality Acts in the mid-1930s, he followed President Roosevelt’s lead in moving away from that position as the threat from Nazi Germany grew. Nevertheless, after the war, he called for a dramatic cut in military spending and force structure overseas, believing perhaps that whatever role the United States might play in the post-World War II period could be done by some form of “off-shore” balancing.

3. The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ustoo0004-o828.pdf>.

by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.⁴ In addition, they were to work “to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”⁵ In short, the treaty’s terms laid the groundwork for an institution that saw itself as being more than just a military alliance to deter the Soviet Union. While that might have been its primary goal, it was doing so within the broader framework of a U.S.-led effort to establish a postwar liberal order that was competitive and sustainable when faced with the Soviet political, economic, and military empire that lay behind the Iron Curtain. NATO was, in connection with the Bretton-Woods Agreement (1944), the Truman Doctrine (1947), and the Marshall Plan (1948), part of a larger strategic vision that saw economic prosperity, security, and liberal governance as essential to the preservation and growth of a then-nascent Western community.

In this respect, it is not too surprising that NATO got its institutional and political side in order before it began the difficult work of creating a command structure and developing operational plans to meet the threat posed by the Red Army. The treaty was signed in April 1949. By early fall the members had established the North Atlantic Council (NAC), consisting of member states’ foreign ministers; a defense committee, with member states’ defense ministers; and a committee composed of military chiefs of staff.⁶ A few weeks later, the alliance added an economic committee, with allied finance ministers as its members, and a deputies’ council to assist the NAC with its political and diplomatic work. Actual military plans and command structures would come later.⁷

What was relatively unique about NATO from the start was its creation of an integrated command structure during peacetime, with multiple members’ militaries subordinated to alliance commands whose chiefs were not necessarily their own. And while reaching a consensus on major

4. *Ibid.*, Preamble.

5. *Ibid.*, Article 2.

6. North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué of the First Session of the North Atlantic Council (Terms of Reference and Organisation)*, September 17, 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17117.htm.

7. North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, November 18, 1949, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c491118a.htm>.

policy choices and their implementation could take time and generate plenty of heated debate, the alliance's ability to come to a consensus time and again on matters that moved the strategic ball forward was, as described below, noteworthy. The ability to pool, in effect, elements of sovereignty and put shorter-term interests aside for a longer-term goal was a habit of state conduct generated by the alliance's ends and institutional arrangements. Although considerations of *realpolitik* were never completely submerged by members—especially as the European members regained their footing after World War II—NATO was essential in creating a pattern of behavior and trust that had an impact beyond the narrow workings of the alliance itself.

In fine, NATO was essential in creating peace and stability in a part of the world where it was necessary if a larger liberal order was to emerge. Less appreciated, however, is how the alliance, in the way it organized itself and functioned, helped inculcate normative patterns among the members that made the expansion of other multilateral, liberalizing institutions more feasible. It is a reach to say that NATO established the Western community, but it is perfectly correct to see the alliance as a critical element in making that community possible both materially and behaviorally.

How, over the years, the alliance went about making that contribution is often a story of fits and starts. Negative accounts of these efforts abound, especially at the time they were unfolding. Yet what is impressive, in retrospect, is the constancy with which NATO adjusted the changing political and military conditions that the alliance faced.

In the early 1950s, galvanized by the Soviet explosion of a nuclear device and the Korean War, NATO accelerated the development of plans to meet the Soviet threat in Europe. In December 1950, the NAC appointed General Dwight Eisenhower to be the alliance's first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and, within a few weeks, it established headquarters commands for Central and Northern Europe, with a Southern command to follow shortly thereafter. Member countries also ramped up spending on their militaries, despite most still struggling economically. France and the United Kingdom increased their defense budgets by more than a third.⁸ The alliance's decision to allow West German rearmament

8. From 1951 to 1952, the United Kingdom's military expenditures rose from \$17,889,972,010 to \$23,746,081,470 (an increase of 32.74 percent). France's military expen-

and integration into NATO proved equally significant. Member states recognized that the decision was essential to establishing a coherent and effective defense posture in Europe, and they managed to do so even as the memory of occupation and devastation by German forces was still fresh.

The alliance faced its next big challenge with the election of Dwight Eisenhower to the Oval Office and his adoption of the “New Look” strategy, which played down conventional military deterrence in favor of early escalation to nuclear weapons. Arguing that deterrence based on nuclear weapons would be less costly than attempting to match the Soviet’s advantage in conventional forces, the White House moved NATO to adopt the new strategy in 1957. Plans now called for building up a store of theater nuclear weaponry and making contingency plans for the use of retaliatory strikes by the United States from its strategic arsenal if necessary. In addition, to adjust to this new strategy, NATO began to devise new tactics and to restructure its conventional forces to enable them to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

It did not take long, however, before defense and security analysts challenged the operational and strategic wisdom of the alliance’s prioritizing massive nuclear retaliation. With the passing of the Eisenhower team and the arrival of the Kennedy administration, NATO militaries were asked to adapt to a new strategy. This strategy, one of “flexible response,” attempted to slow the ascent to the use of nuclear weapons and placed greater emphasis on conventional force planning. The change was also supported by the growing sophistication of the analytical tools and intelligence available to member states for force planning and for understanding the character of the Soviet military threat. The result was greater fidelity in seeing what improvements in force structure, weapon systems, and deployments might be necessary to deter the Warsaw Pact.

Given the United States’ dominant role economically, diplomatically, and militarily, it is no surprise that much of the momentum for changes within NATO has come from policy decisions made in Washington. And hence, it is also no surprise that, as the United States became preoccupied with the war in Southeast Asia, Watergate, an oil crisis arising from the Middle East, and a flagging economy, key allies doubled down on a policy

ditures rose from \$12,238,989,000 to \$16,509,286,570 (an increase of 34.89 percent). For raw data, see Max Roser and Mohamed Nagby, “Military Spending,” *Our World in Data*, <https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending>.

of détente with Moscow. Much of the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s can be described as the “wilderness years” for NATO. Seeming to take advantage of this lull in U.S. leadership, Soviet-sponsored adventurism abroad rose, along with continuing improvements in Soviet military forces—perhaps the most notable for NATO being the deployment of a new class of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SS-20s) in the European theater. Solid-fueled and accurate, the missiles gave the Red Army a precise targeting capability that could pinpoint key NATO installations and be launched with little or no warning.

To counter the SS-20 deployments, NATO decided on a “dual track” approach in 1979 that consisted of deployments of U.S. ground-based cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II intermediate-range missiles in theater as well as an offer to negotiate limitations on such systems with the Kremlin.⁹ Facing massive antinuclear demonstrations throughout Europe—fueled in part by worries over the new Reagan administration’s harder line toward the Kremlin and significant covert political warfare operations by Soviet intelligence—the alliance nevertheless stuck with its decision and, by mid-November 1983, U.S. GLCMs were being deployed in the UK and Pershing IIs in West Germany.

The 1980s also saw development within the United States, and then NATO, of new defense strategies to deal with advances in the Soviet Union’s battle plans for Central Europe. The U.S.-developed “AirLand Battle” doctrine, which combined advanced air defenses, deep fire capabilities, and maneuver warfare for ground forces, sought to counter the Warsaw Pact’s plans for a blitzkrieg-style campaign designed to advance quickly through and over NATO’s forward lines.¹⁰ Once again, by the mid-1980s, NATO had adopted the change in plans and operations. And while these new strategies were never put to use against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces as the Cold War came to a close, they demonstrated considerable value when the U.S.-led coalition, including key NATO allies, swept through the Soviet-style forces of Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf War (1991).¹¹

9. The deployment of Soviet SS-20s to the European theater and the subsequent NATO “dual track” approach is detailed by Raymond L. Garthoff, “The Soviet SS-20 Decision,” *Survival* 25, no. 3 (2008): 110–119.

10. For an outline of the AirLand Battle, see John Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict,” presentation, December 1986, <http://www.ausairpower.net/JRB/poc.pdf>.

11. For a comprehensive overview of the various adaptations made by NATO from its inception until the end of the Cold War, see Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993).

With the subsequent collapse of the Soviet empire, the question for NATO became: What next? With the Cold War concluded, many believed that NATO's rationale for continuing to exist no longer held. Others argued that the alliance was too valuable to toss aside but acknowledged that it would have to adjust to new geopolitical realities. As Richard Lugar, the longtime member of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, put it in 1993, for NATO, it was "out of area or out of business."¹² Since then, NATO has conducted out-of-area military operations in the Balkans throughout much of the 1990s, maintained an anti-piracy mission off the east coast of Africa starting in 2009, launched an air campaign that brought down Muammar Qaddafi's regime in Libya in 2011, and, most significantly, after the attack on the United States by Islamist terrorists on 9/11 and the first-ever invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, sent thousands of troops to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban and train Afghan security forces.

Of course, of no less significance during the transition from the Cold War to its end was the decision to tie German unification to continued membership in NATO. This was by no means a certain outcome, and it required a considerable amount of statecraft, not only with Moscow but within the alliance.¹³ And, similarly, in the latter half of the 1990s, the alliance, again with considerable deliberation, moved to open up membership to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁴ In keeping a unified Germany within the alliance and expanding membership, NATO was removing from the scene a potentially problematic, geopolitical gray zone in which the countries of the region might once again stand between powerful neighbors east and west.

Never happy that the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe had thrown in their lot with the institutions of the liberal West, Russian president Vladimir Putin made his intentions clear more than a decade ago that he would attempt to challenge this security architecture.¹⁵ Since

12. Quoted in Ronald D. Asmus, "Reinventing NATO (Yet Again) Politically," *NATO Review*, June 2005, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/analysis.html>.

13. For background on the deliberations involved, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *German Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

14. Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

15. Vladimir Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," speech, Munich, Germany, February 10, 2007, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>.

then, he has waged a cyberattack against Estonia in 2007, invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, and conducted campaigns of political warfare in key member states.¹⁶ Since Ukraine, NATO has adjusted to this new threat from the east by: moving troops into the Baltic states, stationing U.S. armored forces in Poland, expanding military exercises and air patrols, stipulating that cyberdefense is a core task of the alliance's collective defense responsibilities, increasing defense spending commitments across the alliance, and resurrecting a regional command (Atlantic) and a logistic command to address the new environment.¹⁷ At the same time, NATO has intensified its ties to non-alliance members, such as Sweden, and stayed committed to training missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁸

In fine, although it can be argued that the alliance is slow at times to respond to new circumstances and, when it does, does not always take the steps necessary to fully meet those new circumstances, it certainly cannot be said that over the decades NATO has not made multiple major adjustments in response to changes in the security environment and demands from Washington. Given the multilateral character of the alliance, its policymaking by consensus, and the uneven leadership provided at times by the United States, NATO has proven quite adept at meeting diverse and evolving challenges.

In 2012, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the European Union, with the justification that the EU offers “probably the most dramatic example

16. Alina Polyakova and Spencer P. Boyer, *The Future of Political Warfare: Russia, the West, and the Coming Age of Global Digital Competition* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fp_20180316_future_political_warfare.pdf.

17. Valentina Pop, “US Allies Boost Defense Spending, NATO Says,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 7, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-allies-boost-defense-spending-nato-says-1528398225>; Eoin Micheál McNamara, “Securing the Nordic-Baltic Region,” *NATO Review*, 2016, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in-2016/security-baltic-defense-nato/EN/index.htm>; Jonathan Stearns, “NATO to Boost Command Sites, Cyber Policy with Eye on Russia,” *Bloomberg*, November 8, 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-08/nato-to-boost-command-structure-cyber-policy-with-eye-on-russia>.

18. Ryan Hendrickson, “Sweden: A Special NATO Partner?” *NATO Review*, April 23, 2013, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/partnerships-nato-2013/Sweden-partnerships/EN/index.htm>; Robin Emmott and Idrees Ali, “At U.S. Urging, NATO Agrees Training Mission in Iraq,” *Reuters*, February 15, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-nato/at-u-s-urging-nato-agrees-training-mission-in-iraq-idUSKCN1FZIE5>.

in history to show that war and conflict can be turned so rapidly into peace and cooperation.”¹⁹ In handing over the medals to the EU’s top three officials—the Commission president, the Council president, and the president of the EU Parliament—Nobel Prize chairman Thorbjørn Jagland stated that the European Union had been instrumental in making “a continent of war (become) a continent of peace.”²⁰

Without suggesting that the EU did not deserve its award, it certainly can be argued that NATO officials should have shared both the stage and the prize with the EU three. NATO largely provided the security and, in turn, the basic stability on the continent that allowed the political integration and cooperation that took place subsequently.²¹ The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949. The European Coal and Steel Community came into being in 1951, while the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community (EC) followed in 1958. In both cases, its signatories—Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—were members of NATO first. Indeed, the vast majority of new members to the EC or the European Union have always been closely aligned with membership in NATO.

And even though NATO has no treaty-specific mandate when it comes to a member’s domestic rule, the decision not to expand eastward in Europe after the Cold War’s end unless the countries asking for membership were liberal and democratic has reinforced NATO’s original pledge to enhance the “free institutions” of the West. Imagine a Europe in which the nations of Central and Eastern Europe had never become members of the transatlantic alliance and, whatever the current problems in sustaining that standard in some nations, it is not too difficult to see how much worse the situation would be in what remains a continent of vast economic and political interest to the United States.

19. Thorbjørn Jagland, “Award Ceremony Presentation for the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize,” speech, Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2012, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/presentation-speech.html.

20. *Ibid.*

21. This underlying point is made by German foreign minister Joschka Fischer in a speech delivered at Humboldt University in Berlin in May 2000, in which he argued that the United States’ commitment to “stay in Europe” was one of “two historic decisions” that “altered Europe’s fate for the better” and set the ground for “the idea of European integration.” Cited in Robert Kagan’s *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage, 2004), 92.

Overall, NATO's mutual security guaranties have proved instrumental in encouraging states and peoples to put aside traditional rivalries in the name of greater regional cooperation. Moreover, and less appreciated, the alliance has helped establish habits of state behavior that have generally reassured member states that the greater powers would not simply ignore the concerns of lesser powers, while the lesser powers would not frustrate alliance decision making in those instances where its own interests were often secondary to the larger geopolitical issues of the day. In short, NATO has provided a public good that has assisted the democracies of Europe in advancing cooperative liberal efforts and institutions. At the same time, U.S. global leadership has been constrained minimally by alliance partners because the United States' greater power has been seen as indispensable to peace and stability in Europe, where there is no single power capable of taking on that leadership role. Security "free-riding" by allies is a perennial problem, but that irritant has to be set against the willingness of allies to offer diplomatic and military assistance when needed. It is a delicate balance that Washington and allied capitals must keep in mind but one that, in the past few years, is at risk of being forgotten.

NATO is an institution that has helped keep both sides of the Atlantic from backsliding into less than helpful, sometimes dangerous, historical patterns. But institutions and the norms they inculcate can and do break and, once broken, as with Humpty Dumpty, putting them back together can be an impossible task.

15. ADAPTING NATO FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Heather A. Conley

Few imagined in 1945, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, that the need for a collective defense alliance would exist just four years later in 1949. As the post-World War II world came into focus, it was clear to U.S. geostrategists such as George Kennan and General George C. Marshall as early as 1946 and 1947 that the wartime ally—the Soviet Union—had rapidly transformed into an adversary. This was demonstrated in the crisis over Berlin, to which the United States responded with the allied airlift in 1948. In rapid fashion, one year later, 10 Western European nations, the United States, and Canada assembled in Washington, DC, to sign a treaty that would create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and significantly define the world order. At its creation, the NATO alliance was born of and dependent on continued adaptation.

Why was NATO necessary then and why is it still necessary today? British Prime Minister Winston Churchill observed that “without victory, there is no survival.” As Churchill knew all too well, without allies, there can be no victory. Churchill understood—as he desperately tried to convince President Franklin D. Roosevelt to come to the aid of Britain during the London Blitz—that survival depends on military victory and victory depends on the willingness of allies to commit their military forces to ensure and secure your country’s survival. This principle serves as NATO’s core commitment, “that an attack against one is an attack against all [Article 5].” Although NATO does not directly prescribe the manner in which a member would come to the aid of another, it is the explicit promise that they will come and therefore the nation will survive.

For its first 40 years of existence, the existential nature of the Soviet threat—an invasion of West Germany or the nuclear annihilation of the U.S. or Europe—fortified the alliance and focused it on one essential task: deter Soviet attack in one specific geographic area (the North Atlantic). Even with this single goal, it was not easy to maintain cohesion. Moreover, because ensuring geostrategic advantage was paramount to maintain NATO's preeminence, NATO continued to add allies to ensure security, first by including Turkey and Greece in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.

The Soviet threat to NATO remained constant, but NATO needed to adapt to both an evolving Soviet nuclear posture and the international political environment. The alliance responded in the 1967 Harmel Report to the political needs of its members, particularly West Germany, to pair dialogue (*détente*) with Moscow with NATO's deterrence policy. The transparency of conventional forces and the development of confidence-building measures were the bedrock of more transatlantic adaptation, which occurred outside of NATO with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act alongside human rights and economic development in the formation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. But even this adaptation did not prevent serious internal debate regarding the deployment of U.S. intermediate nuclear forces in Europe in the 1980s to counter growing Soviet nuclear capabilities. Despite its age, the alliance still suffered growing pains.

At the end of the Cold War and in the following decade, NATO lost both its unifying purpose and its geographic focus. Simultaneously, NATO became known more for its partnerships with non-NATO members, while NATO members sought to reduce defense spending in the resulting peace. Initially, NATO members attempted to stay out of the conflict that consumed Yugoslavia in 1990, a stance that became increasingly unsustainable. In 1995, after the Srebrenica and Markale massacres, NATO intervened in the Bosnian War, conducting a bombing campaign around Sarajevo. Additionally, NATO intervened in the Kosovo conflict in 1999. For the first time in its post-World War II history, Germany deployed forces outside of its borders, and NATO forces remain in Kosovo to present day. Additionally, 1999 saw the admission of three former members of the Warsaw Pact (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) to NATO.

On September 12, 2001, NATO made its most significant adaptation: for the first time in its history, NATO invoked its Article 5 commitment

after the terrorist attacks against the United States. NATO deployed forces to Afghanistan, leading the International Security Assistance Force, and 17 years later NATO forces remain in Afghanistan as a part of Operation Resolute Support. NATO trained Iraqi security forces as well. U.S. senator Richard Lugar captured the tension inherent in a regional defense organization, declaring in 1993 that if NATO could not go “out of [its] area,” it would go “out of business.”¹ Needless to say, NATO didn’t go out of business.

In 2004 and again in 2009, NATO enlarged to admit more countries from Central and Eastern Europe and states from the former Yugoslavia. The alliance grew to 28 members. In 2010, faced with the threat of missile proliferation, NATO allies agreed to develop a ballistic missile defense capability to defend NATO countries against missile attack, with a U.S. commitment to contribute its missile defense capabilities to the NATO effort. In 2011 and under the auspices of a UN Security Council resolution, NATO took over responsibilities for a bombing campaign in Libya, Operation Unified Protector. Afghanistan and Libya are very far afield from defending the North Atlantic. The alliance was stretching to address very different tasks such as counterinsurgency and training missions for Iraqi forces.

NATO’s adaptation and enlargement came about mostly due to the wishes of its strongest member, the United States. This feature was, by design, a result of U.S. military strength and its nuclear umbrella (although NATO members France and the United Kingdom are also nuclear powers). Although the United States had to convince allies and make adjustments to its own policy positions to achieve allied consensus, decisions were largely taken in support of U.S. interests and objectives. This was possible only because the United States’ allies had a fundamental belief that Washington shared their values and that U.S. objectives were in the enlightened self-interest of the transatlantic community.

By 2013, NATO was at another crossroads: having spent over a decade in Afghanistan; having discovered that even a limited bombing campaign over Libya exposed serious shortcomings in NATO capabilities and munitions, so that the U.S. had to militarily support even the most capable

1. Richard G. Lugar, “NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business,” remarks delivered to the Open Forum of the U.S. State Department, August 2, 1993; and Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Building a New NATO,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993): 28–40.

of allies; and uncertain about the future policy direction of the United States as it increasingly focused on Asia and rhetorically promised military action in Syria but was unwilling to militarily extend itself further. The alliance's future was uncertain.

And then Russia illegally annexed Crimea and launched its forces and proxy groups into eastern Ukraine. Suddenly, NATO returned to its founding mission statement to defend Europe against a Russian threat. The United States' reflexes engaged, deploying U.S. forces to Europe. The 2014 NATO Summit, which six months prior had been threatened by uncertainty, was a display of unity that has since evolved into the deployment of four NATO battalions to the three Baltic states and Poland, reinforcements to southeastern Europe, and the reinstatement of a third strategic command for the North Atlantic and a logistics command dedicated to NATO's ability to mobilize forces across its now 29 members.

With 29—and soon to be 30 with the membership of the Republic of North Macedonia—members and with forces deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Poland, the three Baltic states, and Romania in 2018, how did NATO last for 70 years (an anniversary that NATO will celebrate on April 4, 2019)? What are its enduring features?

1. The commonality that all members are democracies (although some NATO democracies are currently under duress);
2. The ironclad commitment to defend European and North American NATO members against attack (Article 5) with proof that it can invoke Article 5 as it did after the September 11th attacks;
3. U.S. political and military leadership to drive NATO's agenda and increase NATO's overall military capabilities;
4. NATO's ability to grow its membership yet remain cohesive (a daunting task considering the geographic and cultural characteristics of 29—soon to be 30—disparate countries);
5. Its general acceptance of similar threat perceptions by alliance members but retaining flexibility to encompass a wide range of views as well as the ability of any NATO member to seek a consultation (Article 4) with the alliance on any issue it believes relevant to its security; and
6. When 29 countries, three of which are permanent members of the Security Council and nuclear powers, join on any issue, it is

already a powerful international coalition. When the alliance is divided, it is unable to respond to international challenges.

None of these enduring features can be taken for granted but unfortunately they have been for quite some time.

The story of NATO is one of adaptation through U.S. leadership—a leadership that shares its military strength to increase American strength, security and prosperity. It is not a leadership that operates on a quid pro quo or “pay to play” basis. Over the past 15 years, U.S. leadership has increasingly become transactional which has contributed to growing transatlantic resentment and division. Adaptation and leadership go hand in hand.

We are witnessing the acceleration of these negative trends in the conduct of American leadership at the 2018 NATO Summit and its declared willingness to contemplate withdrawing from NATO should members not pay “their bills.” NATO members are so severely backsliding democratically and are under the growing influence of malign forces that questions are being raised about their alliance credentials. Malign actors seek to penetrate their economic and democratic systems. NATO has always been tested as an alliance throughout its 70 year history but without reliable American commitment to NATO, NATO’s mission—while more relevant than ever and its future may dim.

If the 12 leaders who gathered in Washington, DC, on April 4, 1949, to sign the Washington Treaty could have looked into the future and seen what NATO would become some 70 years later, they would never have imagined that the alliance they created could have grown to 30 members, nor have reached as far afield geographically as Afghanistan. I am sure they would not be able to fathom the collapse of the Soviet Union either. But they would have understood that time and geopolitical change does not diminish the principle that allies mean victory, and victory means survival.

16. MIDDLE EAST ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Dr. Jon B. Alterman

There is no number system in the world in which three is greater than 73. And yet in Syria an alliance of three governments has run circles around an alliance of 73, imposing its order on a violent and chaotic situation.

Pessimists may look at that equation and conclude that alliances are overrated, and that going forward, the United States should worry less about having the world on its side. But if the conflict in Syria teaches us anything, it is that the United States needs to put more energy into building its alliances, since the world we will face after Syria will have a greater, not a lesser need for them.

The United States largely stood on the sidelines for the first several years of the Syrian civil war, only engaging in September 2014 after the Islamic State group (ISG) brutally killed two U.S. journalists. When the United States did intervene, it was always to defeat the ISG, not to fight Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. Still, the goals were related. It is no coincidence that Assad has been fighting an increasingly radicalized jihadi opposition. In fact, he nurtured the rise of the ISG and harshly repressed peaceful elements of the Syrian opposition. He believed, apparently, that his best hope for survival lay in fighting a foe even more unpalatable to the world than he was.

The Obama administration considered Assad's survival improbable and did not do much to hasten his departure. In the long run, though, Assad had to go, because policymakers believed his survival—and his brutality—would only nurture more Islamist extremism. It built a mighty

coalition—first 60, then 65, and now 73—to fight the ISG, and it covertly supported a collection of forces intended to create a non-radical Syrian opposition.

But the United States was half-hearted in its Syrian ambitions, and it came up against determined opposition, not just from Assad's government but from Iran and Russia as well. The three shared a distrust of insurgent publics, and they saw the United States and its allies as enemies of their interests. To their way of thinking, Syria's repression was perhaps regrettable but certainly necessary. For Assad, the issue was existential. The alternatives for Iran and Russia—a Syria controlled by radical forces or another Sunni-led pro-U.S. ally that crushed one of their few footholds in the region—were completely unpalatable.

As such, the three countries constituted a partnership, but not an alliance. They shared interests, but with few shared values and no broader vision, they are united by what they want to prevent, not what they want to create.

Consider how different that is from the world that the United States helped create in the twentieth century. United with allies in two world wars, the United States worked to craft a rules-based system that did much more than resist the Soviet Union. It encouraged free-market economic development, high levels of trade, and democratic governance. Billions of dollars of U.S. assistance went into Western Europe and Northeast Asia. While the United States military was deployed as a deterrent to aggression, that was not at the core of U.S. strategy. True security came from free societies that were resilient and democratic, and that had strong interests in sustaining the sort of international system that the United States had engendered.

The United States could have opted for a system that stressed bilateral ties, in which it was always the dominant power. Arguably, such a system would mean that the United States would always get its way. The United States, instead, took the opposite tack, trying to create a body of allies that could act collectively and that largely agreed with U.S. aims and ambitions, and which would contribute to achieving them.

The benefit to the United States lay partly in the financial and military contributions allies made. They brought money and troops to the table. Even more important, though, was the way that amassing allies reduced conflict. In part, allies aligned their interests even more deeply with the

United States. Allies were also more likely to cooperate with each other, with goals and policies in sync. Equally importantly, a large web of allies raised the cost for anyone to defy the United States.

In some ways, the quest for allies has had tremendous success in the Middle East. The Soviet Union had never been very effective in its regional partnerships—it built the Aswan High Dam for Egypt just before ties withered, had close ties to Syria, and sustained South Yemen until the entire country was absorbed by the North in 1990. By that time, the Soviet Union had collapsed under its own weight, and the cost of maintaining far-flung client states seemed a luxury Russia could ill afford. In contrast, by 2000, virtually every country in the region had a strong relationship with the United States or was seeking to strengthen its relations with the United States. Iran, which had long been estranged, was reaching out through President Mohamed Khatami, and even Libya under Muammar Qaddafi was seeking to end its isolation. It looked like the United States had swept the board.

Where the United States was less successful in the Middle East, though, was in developing resilient societies. Israel is, in some ways, the exception. It started as a country with a strong socialist tradition and Soviet ties and developed into a robust—if often boisterous—society with a strong free-market economy and indisputable pro-U.S. credentials. The United States has built broad and deep intelligence and security ties, and economic and cultural ties are equally robust. On a societal level, though, the United States did not “make” Israel into what it has become. The trajectory of Israeli society has many drivers, and while direct and indirect U.S. government assistance has played a role, it was often following trends rather than leading them.

Elsewhere in the region, the record has been much more mixed. Egypt became a close partner in the late 1970s, but its politics have often seemed stuck in the late 1950s, when generals in suits ruled the country. The Gulf monarchies were vital security partners and global energy suppliers, but their embrace of more open societies has been tentative at best. Jordan’s king, following in the footsteps of his father, has cast himself as a staunch ally against terrorism in all its forms and a strong voice for peace in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Jordanian society is tightly controlled by the security services and parliament has little actual power.

Whereas the United States has sought to build partnerships with societies across much of the world, the partnerships in the Middle East

have largely been with governments, and even more narrowly with individual leaders. Military basing rights, and often large military sales, have helped spread the U.S. footprint, and they have contributed to the interoperability of partner militaries with U.S. forces. While the United States has extended “major non-NATO ally” status to seven Middle Eastern states, in many cases it seems to reflect an aspiration more than a reality.

Some have argued that the U.S. reliance on friendly autocrats has contributed to ongoing interstate violence in the Middle East, nurtured extremist movements, and entangled the United States in conflicts rather than resolving them. That analysis makes large assumptions about what the Middle East would look like without U.S. involvement, and similarly large assumptions about the impact that U.S. engagement has had on the region’s leadership and societies. There was conflict within and between Middle Eastern societies long before the United States came to the region, and the number of actual wars has been limited. U.S. mediation has defused many conflicts that could have turned into larger ones, and it has ended conflicts swiftly that could have turned into much longer ones. Still, there is no *pax Americana* in the Middle East, and the region has seen significantly more turmoil in the last 50 years than East Asia, where the United States has also played a major role.

For the United States, many of the key benefits of an alliance network have come from securing broad international assistance in resolving the region’s conflicts rather than ensuring that the region has fewer conflicts. Close partnerships in the region, and connections to an array of global powers, pushed Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, and they caused Libya to give up its weapons of mass destruction without firing a shot. Explaining why he abandoned Soviet patronage and made peace with Israel, former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat famously observed, “The United States holds 99 percent of the cards.” He was right. Or at least, he was right then.

Facing the challenge of Syria, the United States government had the choice of what kinds of goals it wished to pursue with its allies. It was intentionally modest. In fact, Syria policy was like a silhouette, more defined by what it didn’t seek to do rather than what it did. The alliance existed far more on paper than in reality, and the barriers to entry were left low to inflate the numbers, thereby diluting the purpose. For example, Latvia and Estonia sent 10 trainers each, and Slovakia sent a \$21,000 donation.

Partly by choice, and partly by necessity, the U.S.-led coalition in Syria has been largely symbolic. It has given an international imprimatur to

what is manifestly a U.S. effort, rather than a U.S.-led one. The United States seems neither to have demanded much nor received much from its friends.

The proper answer to the weakness of the Syria coalition is not to abandon coalitions, but to embolden them. We will need them. Consider, for example, the challenges that Iran poses to regional security. As President Trump rightly points out, Iran's neighbors do not feel threatened solely by the development of nuclear weapons. Iran's regional activities are a major concern, as is Iranian missile development. Alarm over former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's antics drove the world together on Iran policy. The result was a broad coalition that crafted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to handle the nuclear file. It not only had a strong Western backbone, but it had Chinese and Russian support as well.

If the United States were to lash out against its coalition, as it seems tempted to do, the consequences would be large. Even friends would be torn between bandwagoning with the world's largest economy and balancing against the world's most awesome and unconstrained power. Some would seek to teach the United States a lesson for abandoning multilateralism; others would pursue their own self-interest after judging the United States unable to take on a world that wasn't following its lead. It is easy to think of ways a U.S. abandonment of the JCPOA could go wrong, and hard to think of many ways it could go right. If it went wrong, it would play right into the hands of Iranian conservatives desperate to diminish global U.S. influence, and also into the hands of U.S. enemies in other capitals who seek the same.

The United States cannot do everything, nor can its alliances. An alliance is no substitute for will or for strategy. But with a will and a strategy, there are very few things that the United States seeks to do where an alliance isn't a large force multiplier. As the United States thinks about negotiations over the future of Syria, it needs to summon both a will and a strategy. It needs to have real allies helping as well. And it will need those allies when it confronts other challenges in the Middle East as well.

Part IV. CHALLENGES

17. COMPETING FOR ALLIES

How, When, and Why States Flip Alliances

Dr. Gabriel Scheinmann

Why do states sometimes betray their allies and “flip” to the opposing side? Alliances may be common, yet alliance defections are rare despite their substantial benefits. As evidenced by Italy’s betrayal of its Germanic allies during World War I or the American leveraging of the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, driving and exploiting divisions in a hostile alliance can have a momentous impact on the balance of power. If the advent of the nuclear age has made great power conflict more costly and thus a less attractive means for achieving international goals, the realignment of one country’s strategic orientation can reap major benefits at both lower risk and reduced cost.

Understanding why some alliance flip attempts succeed while most fail can help explain changes in the balance of power. While the traditional alliance literature interprets alliance fluctuations as a function of changes in threat perception or wedge strategies, these factors alone cannot explain what enables a state to change its international colors. Instead, states are more likely to flip when the state’s political regime is strongly cohesive and its existing alliance is weakly cohesive. Strong regime cohesion enables the state to flip alliances without domestic repercussions, while weak alliance cohesion erases any institutional shackles that would maintain the alliance beyond the interests it serves. Given the challengers to the current vast American alliance system, alignment flips are likely to be an even more attractive proposition for American competitors in the years to come.

WHY DOES FLIPPING MATTER?

Flips have a long history of being rare, impactful, and largely the prerogative of great or regional powers tussling over the allegiances of smaller states. Thucydides recounts how the First Peloponnesian War (460–445 BCE) was prompted by the Athenian-led defection of Megara, on the Isthmus of Corinth, from the Spartan-dominated Peloponnesian League.¹ During the War of the League of Cambrai from 1508 to 1516, first France flipped sides, from supporting the papacy to allying with Venice, and then Venice switched sides in 1513, agreeing to France's offer to partition Lombardy between them.² A century and a half later, King Louis XIV of France similarly offered rewards to a number of other European powers during the Dutch War (1672–1679), successfully flipping Great Britain, Sweden, the Rhine League, and even Leopold I.

Modern examples of successful flipping are also rare but emblematic of the high-reward nature of the enterprise. Under French and British prodding, Italy and Romania abandoned the Triple Alliance in favor of the Triple Entente in the early stages of World War I, changing the scope of the battle. As an overture to World War II, Hitler temporarily pried the Soviet Union out of its traditional alliance with France, thus securing his eastern front while he invaded the Low Countries and France itself. The Cold War can be viewed as a geopolitical competition over the allegiances of smaller states. The United States and the Soviet Union rarely confronted each other directly, but wrestled, in various ways, over the fealties of nearly all other states. It was a flipping competition par excellence, played across several continents, featuring several high-profile flips, most notably the Nixon administration's exploitation of the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1970s and the transformation of Egypt from being the prime Soviet proxy and Arab bloc leader to an American and Israeli partner, through the Camp David Accords and subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Cataloguing nonevents is difficult, but examples of flops—failed flip attempts—and fleeting flips are common. For example, Soviet attempts to split the Scandinavian NATO members, Norway and Denmark, from

1. Lawrence A. Tritle, *A New History of the Peloponnesian War* (West Sussex, UK: Blackwell, 2007), 12.

2. Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 89.

the anti-Soviet alliance failed notably.³ Despite the alliance—as well as its obligations—sometimes being a source of controversy both within these countries and within NATO itself, neither issue rose high enough to warrant the consideration of Soviet appeals as a means to improve positioning. A combination of an asymmetric Soviet power ratio as well as domestic opposition may well have contributed to the limitation on foreign troops in Norway or Denmark’s refusal to station nuclear weapons on its soil, but these reservations were accommodated within NATO and were not successfully exploited by Moscow.⁴ Examples of fleeting flips include Germany’s flip of the Soviet Union in 1939 (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) and Iraq’s flip of Jordan in 1990 (keeping Jordan out of the Gulf War). While the impetuses for these flips are different—deception on Germany’s part, short-term survival on Jordan’s—they do have one thing in common: They did not last. Hitler famously broke his nonaggression pact with Stalin less than two years later, while the Hashemite Kingdom was quickly absolved of any wrongdoing by the United States and showered with aid shortly thereafter.

ALLIANCE FACTORS

At its simplest, a flip is a state’s defection from its existing alignment to an opposing one. The phenomenon may be basic, but it has engendered only limited scholarship.⁵ The existing literature on why and how states enter and exit alliances typically centers on questions of threat, both external and internal. Structural realists contend that alignment behavior is motivated by a balance-of-power or balance-of-threat logic, noting that states “flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them.”⁶ Yet they generally concede that leaders’ agency and strategy

3. Robert K. German, “Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security Policy,” *International Security* 7, no. 2 (Fall 1982).

4. Nikolaj Peterson, “Denmark and NATO, 1949–1987,” *Forsvarsstudier* 2 (1987): 27–28.

5. Evan N. Resnick, “Strange Bedfellows: U.S. Bargaining Behavior with Allies of Convenience,” *International Security* 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/2011); Daniel Nexon, “The Balance of Power in the Balance,” *World Politics* 61, no. 2 (April 2009); Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” *International Security* 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011).

6. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 127; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 21–26.

matter. Stephen Walt contrasts the countervailing coalition spurred by Hitler's extraordinarily aggressive ambitions with the lack of balancing against Bismarck's careful defense of the European status quo, even as both acquired more power.⁷ "Flexibility of alignment," Ken Waltz similarly writes, "means both that the country one is wooing may prefer another suitor and that one's present alliance partner may defect." As a consequence, "a state's strategy must please a potential or satisfy a present partner" and "suitors alter their appearance and adapt their behavior to increase their eligibility" as allies.⁸ Glenn Snyder also argues that alliance solicitation—the existence of alternatives—engenders pervasive concerns "about the danger of being abandoned; hence all must take care that the ally does not become disillusioned and restless."⁹ The perpetually shifting abandonment–entrapment dynamic, known as the "alliance security dilemma," presents incessant opportunities for rival states to engineer flips.

Some scholars argue that states will also use alliances to mitigate internal threats. Steven David argues that states "omnibalance"—they ally with those who will best protect them from all threats, whether internal, external, or both. The regime's leaders calculate "which outside power is most likely to do what is necessary to keep them in power."¹⁰ During the Cold War, very few Third World regimes fell as a result of foreign invasions (Pol Pot, Manuel Noriega, Idi Amin); most were overthrown from within. David cites Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam's decision to ally with the USSR and Egypt's Anwar Sadat's decision to ally with the United States as examples of states that flipped because their new allies were more willing to provide them with the necessary security against internal threats.¹¹ States may be willing to defect from their current alliance even if it leaves them worse off relative to external threats as long as it leaves them better off relative to internal ones.¹² Whatever the motivation,

7. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 25.

8. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 165–166.

9. Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 19.

10. Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 235.

11. *Ibid.*, 245–251.

12. Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (December 1992): 32–33.

regimes are simply unlikely to risk damaging their rule for the sake of an improved alliance.

WEDGE STRATEGIES

In contrast to these structural arguments, some scholars focus on the strategies chosen by states to drive wedges or flip a state in a rival alignment. Whereas strategies of accommodation seek to lure the target out of its existing alliance by offering inducements, strategies of confrontation seek to cause cracks in the alliance by exposing the natural differences in the interests of its members. While the mechanisms are distinct, both play on the abandonment-entrapment dynamic and can pay large dividends.

Strategies of accommodation can take several forms. In *How Enemies Become Friends*, Charles Kupchan outlines a four-step transformation sequence: unilateral accommodation, reciprocal restraint, societal integration, and the generation of new narratives and identities.¹³ Although his work focuses on pairings with compatible social orders and cultural commonalities—cases include the Anglo-American rapprochement and the Swiss Confederation—the concept of unilateral accommodation is one such wedge strategy. Like Kupchan, Timothy Crawford also posits that a “selective accommodation” strategy—appeasing, compensating, or endorsing the target state’s desires—can divide opposing coalitions.¹⁴ States can also “bandwagon for profit,” that is, ally with the more powerful side in order to reap the potential gains, such as war spoils.¹⁵ For example, in 1498, Venice, after first forming a balancing alliance against France, flipped to France’s side, “lured by the prospect of gaining more territory on the Italian mainland.”¹⁶ Two centuries later, Louis XIV successfully offered cash subsidies to England’s Charles II in return for the latter’s breaking of his alliance with the United Provinces.¹⁷ In more recent history, Nazi Germany secured the military cooperation and coordination

13. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*, 6.

14. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions,” 167–175.

15. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit.”

16. R. B. Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy, 1451–1789* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1928), 28.

17. Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648–1815* (London: Longman Group, 1983), 26.

of both the Soviet Union and Italy by promising both respective shares of the spoils—parts of Poland and the Baltic states for Moscow and parts of France for Rome.

States can also implement coercive strategies in order to achieve an alignment shift. A state could switch sides out of fear, preferring to appease the divider state rather than face military, economic, or diplomatic hardships. For example, Turkey, a neutral power for most of World War II, declared war on Germany and Japan in February 1945 under heavy Allied pressure. Cold War–era concerns about the “domino theory” in Southeast Asia or “Finlandization” in Europe were also manifestations of such logic. More recently, American pressure on Syria in the run-up to the 1991 Gulf War and on Pakistan in the weeks before the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan forced both states to abandon their existing alliances and join the U.S.-led coalitions.

A NEW THEORY OF FLIPPING

The above examination of alignment behavior helps elucidate the two critical factors in the ability of a target state to flip: regime cohesion and alliance cohesion. A completely cohesive regime has a monopoly over the use of force. Its leader has complete decision-making autonomy and is less vulnerable to political rivals. In a strongly cohesive regime, we can expect to see vast agreement between its leading actors, fewer machinations for power, as well as longevity and stability. In contrast, a regime that does not control all of the state’s security forces and whose leader is unable to execute its political decisions and is highly concerned about political rivals is not cohesive. In this case, the most potent threat to the regime is actually internal. If a regime can base its alignment decisions on external factors and not internal threats, then it is more willing to attempt an alignment transformation that could otherwise leave it internally exposed.

Meanwhile, alliance cohesion can broadly be measured along three axes: fulfillment of alliance obligations and objectives, the “stickiness” of the alliance institutions, and shared values or a common ideational outlook. First, alliances with specific, costly, and established obligations and that share a common outlook on goals and strategies are more cohesive.¹⁸

18. Patricia A. Weitsman, “Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and Triple Entente,” *Security Studies* 12, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 85; Charles A. Kupchan, “NATO

Second, manifold, rooted, and highly developed alliance institutions, such as formal councils, regular military exercises, and the basing of troops in the partner's country, are indicative of strong alliance cohesion and can help sustain the alliance even if its underlying rationale has changed.¹⁹ Third, alliances between states with shared ideological approaches or identities are likely to be more cohesive, for they can augment the security-based rationales of most alliances. These bonds can help drive a common purpose, reduce the likelihood of major disagreements, and build trust. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-centric alliance system has broadly been maintained at least partly due to a common liberal outlook.

Free from both internal and external constraints, the state is then able to flip its geopolitical position through realignment with its former adversary. The pace and sequence of the evolution of the factors varies by case, but the flip occurs shortly after the factors are aligned. In the case of Egypt, American efforts dated back to the Eisenhower administration, but only succeeded after the 1967 war had shattered the initially strong cohesion of the Soviet-Egyptian alliance and Sadat had consolidated power through the elimination of his main rival. Likewise, the Sino-Soviet alliance was never cohesive, but it was not until Mao had outmaneuvered a series of rivals that had emerged from the political turmoil of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution that he became receptive to U.S. engagement efforts. The Franco-British flip of Italy from its three-decade alliance only prevailed when Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance had become devalued and Prime Minister Salandra managed to co-opt or cast out any political rivals. Finally, Great Britain's postwar half-flip away from Japan followed Lloyd George's stunning postwar election romp and the concentration of power among a small and united cabinet. Had the United States been interested in consolidating the relationship, Britain would have gladly done so. In each case, the respective alliances became less cohesive and the regime became more cohesive over time.

and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior," *International Organization* 42, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 323; Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances* (New York: Wiley, 1973), 101.

19. Galia Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon: NATO Under Unipolarity," *Security Studies* 15, no. 2 (April-June 2006): 284.

PREPARING FOR A NEW ERA OF FLIPPING?

The United States remains the world's sole global superpower, albeit no longer unrivaled. The rise—or return—of Russia and China has reignited long-dormant competitions for power, prestige, and influence in a variety of theaters. Russia has reemerged as a potential adversary in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Meanwhile, China has challenged American military dominance across the Asian littoral and American economic, financial, and diplomatic leadership globally. Largely unable to accost the United States directly, would-be rivals have taken to driving wedges between America and its allies. If anything, fluidity in the distribution of power in the international system incentivizes flipping because challenger states seek to accelerate their rise through the acquisition of allies.

As part of this contest, the competition over the allegiances of smaller powers will intensify. Given the extant state of the current international system, the United States will likely be on the defensive side of this game as Russia and China hunt for U.S. allies to flip. By one count, the United States is treaty-bound to defend 69 countries, making up 75 percent of global economic output and 25 percent of the global population.²⁰ Moscow and Beijing will likely see the high-reward, low-risk endeavor of flipping as a wise strategy to accelerate the changing balance of power in their neighborhoods. Although the United States can still mount an offensive—the nascent and fragile flip of Burma away from China—it is far more likely to be engaged in the Sisyphean enterprise of keeping as many of its allies onside as it can.

The flipping game is already afoot. The Australian political elite openly debate the wisdom of being tethered to the United States when it only serves to irritate their larger and ever-closer economic partner, China.²¹ Whereas Australian troops have fought side by side with their American

20. Adam Taylor, "Map: The U.S. Is Bound by Treaties to Defend a Quarter of Humanity," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/30/map-the-u-s-is-bound-by-treaties-to-defend-a-quarter-of-humanity/?utm_term=.985c9e508bcf; Michael Beckley, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts," *International Security* 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015): 7–48, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf.

21. Hugh White, "Australia's Choice," *Foreign Affairs*, September 4, 2013, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/australia/2013-09-04/australias-choice>.

counterparts in every war over the last century, the United States now worries whether Australia will do so in the future.²² The Filipino president has cozied up toward Beijing, explicitly at Washington's expense.²³ While it is too early to determine how substantive this move is, it is another example of how power transitions can spark frenzied flipping. China has made similar moves with regard to South Korea and Thailand.²⁴

Russia has likewise undertaken efforts to peel off U.S. allies. The two-decade Russian-American competition over the alignment of Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, echoes the Great Game between the British and Russian Empires in the nineteenth century.²⁵ Russia's limited invasions of both Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 successfully blocked their defection to the West. More recently, Moscow has cultivated closer ties with Turkey, a member of NATO, despite the Turkish downing of a Russian fighter jet in late 2015 and the murder of the Russian ambassador to Turkey by a terrorist in late 2016.²⁶

22. Tom Westbrook, "Australia Must Choose between United States and China: U.S. Army Official," *Reuters*, August 31, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinese-australia-usa-idUSKCN1173AX>.

23. Jane Perlez, "In China, Rodrigo Duterte and Philippines May 'Pivot' away from U.S.," *New York Times*, October 17, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-china-us.html>; Martin Petty and Neil Jerome Morales, "Philippines' Duterte Calls U.S. Envoys 'Spies' over Alleged Ouster Plot," *Reuters*, December 29, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-usa-idUSKBN14I14R>; Richard Javad Heydarian, "Will Duterte Really Abandon the U.S. for China?" *National Interest*, December 28, 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-duterte-really-abandon-the-us-china-18879?page=show>.

24. Ron Corben, "Thailand Expanding Relations with China amid Pivot to Other Nations," *VOA News*, December 27, 2016, <http://www.voanews.com/a/thailand-expanding-relations-with-china-amid-pivot-to-other-nations/3652487.html>; Victor Cha, "A Path Less Chosun: South Korea's New Trilateral Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 8, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-10-08/path-less-chosun>.

25. Dmitry Solovyov and Matt Spetalnick, "Russia-U.S. Rivalry Spreads to Ex-Soviet Central Asia," *Reuters*, October 30, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-centralasia-usa-russia-idUSKCN0SO26720151030>; Corey Flintoff, "Courtied by the U.S. and Russia, Uzbekistan Ignores Critics," *National Public Radio*, January 10, 2015, <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/01/10/376135811/courtied-by-the-u-s-and-russia-uzbekistan-ignores-critics>.

26. Nick Tattersall and Alexander Winning, "As Turkey's Coup Strains Ties with West, Détente with Russia Gathers Pace," *Reuters*, August 6, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-russia-idUSKCN10H05A>; Keith Johnson and John Hudson, "NATO Plays It Cool as Russia and Turkey Grow Closer," *Foreign Policy*, August 20, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/10/nato-plays-it-cool-as-russia-and-turkey-grow-closer-putin-erdogan-coup/>.

Inside the European Union, Moscow has identified Hungary, another NATO ally, as ripe for partnership.²⁷

Warmer ties with a slew of other Middle Eastern countries, notably Israel²⁸ and Egypt,²⁹ are also concerning for Washington.

The 2017 Trump administration National Security Strategy rightly identified China and Russia as competitors in a range of domains. However, the United States should acknowledge that it is also at the dawn of a new era of alliance competition, whereby these two powers and others are seeking to create and exploit divisions within the U.S. alliance system in order to weaken the U.S. outlook. Thankfully for the United States, democracies are harder to flip than autocracies. Whereas authoritarian regimes can more easily concentrate power and have more tools at their disposal to weaken rivals, political power in democracies is more distributed and institutions tend to be more powerful than individual leaders. While most U.S. allies today are also liberal democracies, democratic erosion in some Eastern and Southern European countries is worrisome: as some of these regimes either eliminate or co-opt domestic sources of power such as the intelligence services, the security services, the judiciary, and the media, it is more likely that Russian attempts to exploit divisions will succeed.

27. Andrew Higgins, "Intent on Unsettling E.U., Russia Taps Foot Soldiers from the Fringe," *New York Times*, December 24, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/24/world/europe/intent-on-unsettling-eu-russia-taps-foot-soldiers-from-the-fringe.html>; Paul Hockenos, "Vladimir Putin's Little Helper," *New Republic*, April 19, 2016, <https://newrepublic.com/article/132778/vladimir-putins-little-helper>.

28. Armin Rosen, "Why Israel and Russia's Relationship Continues to Warm," *Tablet*, June 8, 2016, <http://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/204802/why-israel-and-russias-relationship-continues-to-warm>.

29. Yaroslav Timoslav, "Egypt Juggles Its Friendships as Russian Influence Surges," *Wall Street Journal*, October 13, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/egypt-juggles-its-friendships-as-russian-influence-surges-1476366166>.

18. CHINA'S POST-ALLIANCE ARCHITECTURE IN ASIA

Launch of an Ambitious Restructuring Process

Dr. Alice Ekman

The presidency of Xi Jinping marks an acceleration of regional and global governance initiatives. Xi's immediate predecessor, Hu Jintao (2002–2012), had already started to shape the framework of a neighborhood policy to consolidate China's participation in various existing multilateral regional mechanisms and position China as an active contributor to global governance reform in general terms. But China's ambitions to reshape the regional and international order have never been as high as under Xi Jinping's leadership. Beijing seeks to lead the reform of global governance and sees the coming years as a key period to achieve results. Not only did China reinforce its participation in existing institutions and summits (it has hosted a diverse array of multilateral summits and forums in recent years: G-20 in 2016, BRICS summit in 2017, SCO summit in 2018, among others); it also, simultaneously, created new multilateral institutions and forums in which to play an active role, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the Belt and Road Forum. If China has become more active in restructuring economic governance, it is also increasingly investing in security governance. In particular, China's opposition to the alliance system is official and clearer, year after year, since 2013. Analysis of recent official communications clearly indicates that China is unhappy with the current organization of the region and has the political determination, under Xi Jinping, to restructure it toward a post-alliance direction. This chapter analyzes this action plan, taking into account China's current doctrine toward alliances in general,

its conception of regional security governance in particular, and its effort to promote them in Asia. More specifically, it analyzes China's "new type of security partnership," which is actively promoted by Xi Jinping today. So far this initiative has remained largely unnoticed, in comparison with the "Indo-pacific" one, but may have significant consequences for security governance of the region and world.

CHINA'S INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM: REORGANIZING REGIONAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE

Since 2013, China has clearly called for the creation of a new security architecture in Asia. The May 2015 white paper on China's military strategy explicitly advocates promoting "the establishment of a regional framework for security and cooperation."¹ This call was reaffirmed in October 2016 and detailed further in China's white paper, published in January 2017, on security cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Since then, Chinese officials have repeatedly declared, in one way or another, that the region needs to be restructured. For instance, on February 16, 2019, at the 55th Munich Security Conference, Politburo member Yang Jiechi declared that "China supports security dialogue among the Asia-Pacific countries and efforts to explore a regional security vision and architecture that fits the reality of this region."²

At the same time, China launched a series of ad-hoc institutional initiatives, which, if bridged, could progressively contribute to the shaping of the previously mentioned new security architecture. In practical terms, China is investing in the existing regional security institutions and mechanisms in which it has, or could have, a significant influence, and building bridges between them. These institutions include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA),³ and the ASEAN-centered meetings (ARF, ADMM+, etc.). China also considers some regional secu-

1. "China's Military Strategy," The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, May 2015, Beijing. Part III: "Strategic Guideline of Active Defence."

2. Full text of Yang Jiechi's keynote speech at the 55th Munich Security Conference, Xinhua, February 17, 2019.

3. Beijing has been trying, under its presidency, to revive the CICA, which includes more than 20 states (but excludes Japan and the United States). It was at the CICA summit in Astana in May 2014 that Xi Jinping made his first public announcement of the building of a new Asia-Pacific security architecture.

rity forums it has created (such as the Xiangshan Forum)⁴ as essential parts of this network, as well as all the multilateral track 1.5 and track 2 forums, seminars, and workshops that China is planning to organize or co-organize in the coming years on the topic of regional security governance. China's restructuring of the regional security governance is flexible and does not require the creation of a new, formal, regional security institution per se. It is an "institutional bridging" process rather than a creation process.

The institutional bridging process usually follows the same pattern:

- Significant financial contribution (to the CICA, SCO, among other institutions).⁵
- More cooperation among secretariats of concerned institutions.
- An active shaping of the agenda, which encourages coordination among multilateral and national agendas as well as the alignment with China's priorities as much as possible.⁶

For Beijing, the link between old and new institutions is not a source of concern; it is naturally established via an alignment of their agendas with China's own national priorities. Beijing not only welcomes overlap between the agendas of various institutions, but even encourages them. For instance, China has prioritized infrastructure development on its foreign and domestic policy agenda, and has moved it up to the agenda of as many multilateral institutions and informal fora as possible—often quite skillfully.

China's diplomacy is also increasingly proposing to regional actors:

- The development of regional and international security exchanges and dialogues.

4. In recent years, China has been trying to consolidate the Xiangshan Forum, an annual Beijing-based regional security dialogue, which it promotes as a potential alternative to the Shangri-La Dialogue. Although it did not take place in 2017 due to, according to official communication, the 19th Party Congress, it did take place on a rather large scale in 2016, and a larger-scale edition of the forum was organized in October 2018.

5. For instance, Xi had indicated at the June 2017 summit in Astana that China will make an additional contribution of 10 million RMB to the SCO.

6. This increasingly includes an integration of the Belt and Road label in the multilateral discussions and final communiqués, or at least the inclusion of the "connectivity"/"infrastructure development" topic, and the signing of related Memorandum of Understanding.

- Training of officials, including PLA/police/custom/law enforcement officials.⁷
- The hosting and organization of regional security forums.
- The continued investment in subregional cooperation mechanisms.
- The creation of a development bank in most institutions or multilateral cooperation frameworks in which China has a significant influence (SCO, BRICS).
- The creation of “think tank networks” under the institutions or cooperation frameworks (SCO, CICA, others).

The above pattern may be observed in other institutions and cooperation frameworks in the coming years, given that China’s diplomacy is pattern-based: once the central government has decided to promote an initiative, it is done in more or less the same way in a diversity of institutions, countries, regions, etc.

CHINA’S CONCEPTUAL ACTIVISM: RETHINKING SECURITY IN ASIA

China’s institutional activism has developed in parallel with a strong conceptual activism, which provides clarification on the new regional security architecture announced. Shortly after his accession to power, Xi Jinping unveiled his “Asia for Asians” security concept (“Asian community of common destiny”), which advocated for the establishment of a “new security concept” that could become a concept of reference beyond the region and should be, according to official communication, a “common, integrated, cooperative and sustainable security concept.”⁸ Official documents⁹ aiming at clarifying the concept emphasized the central role of the UN as well as the need to approach disputes through negotiations, which is nothing new.¹⁰

7. For instance, Xi Jinping declared at the SCO summit in Astana in June 2018: “China offers to train 2,000 law enforcement officers for all parties in the next three years through China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation and other platforms to enhance law enforcement capacity building.”

8. “Spotlight: ‘China View’ Helps Build a Better World,” *Xinhua*, August 29, 2017.

9. Such as “China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept,” <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm>.

10. *Ibid.* More generally, at the UN, China is opposed to regime change.

Most important, Chinese officials (from the People's Liberation Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among other institutions) made it clear that the new regional security architecture—re-labeled “new type of security partnership” since 2018—should not be based on any alliance system, according to official communication, but rather on a network of partnerships.¹¹

Under Xi Jinping, China is officially rejecting the concept of “alliance.”¹² To be sure, since the creation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the country's diplomacy has never embraced the concept of alliances. But in recent years, the rejection of the alliance system is clearer and appearing on a frequent basis in Chinese official communication.¹³ It is noteworthy that China does not only oppose the U.S. alliance system, which it considered illegitimate—in particular in its neighborhood—, but also any alliance system, in general terms.¹⁴ As Chinese think tanks underline in informal discussion: an alliance is a format that is “too biding,” with “too many obligations attached,” that is “not flexible enough,” “old-fashioned,” etc.¹⁵ When asked if China has allies today, the majority of Chinese officials and think tank researchers interviewed answered negatively.¹⁶ Some mentioned the treaty signed with North Korea, but were prompt to underline that it was signed “a long time ago” and may not be

11. For instance, this talking point has been heard at the 2016 and 2018 editions of the Xiangshan Forum, the high-level security conference held in Beijing. Also, Xi Jinping, in his opening speech at the last Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Qingdao on June 10, 2018, declared “We have forged a constructive partnership featuring non-alliance, nonconfrontation, and not targeting any third party.”

12. At the 17th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore in June 2018, General He Lei from the People's Liberation Army referred to China's “new security concept” and “new security architecture in Asia” that would be based on “partnership rather alliance,” as did Chinese participants to most security conferences (including the previous Shangri-la Dialogues, author's observations, 2016–2017).

13. The word “reject” itself is used in official speeches, such as in a recent speech made by State Councilor and Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe: “The Chinese side proposes upholding mutually beneficial cooperation while abandoning the mentality of zero-sum game, being committed to openness and inclusiveness while rejecting alliance and confrontation, seeking extensive consultation and joint contribution while opposing unilateralism, and sticking to mutual respect while never engaging in ‘the big bullying the small.’” Wei said in his speech at the 8th Xiangshan Forum, Beijing, October 25, 2018.

14. Some Chinese officials have informally underlined that, according to them, alliance is a constraining type of system, full of obligations, not suited to China's need and interests. Interviews and informal discussions on the topic, Beijing-Paris, 2016–2019.

15. Interviews and conversations in Beijing, Shanghai and Paris in 2016–2019.

16. Interviews and conversations in Beijing and Paris (Chinese delegations' visit) in January–October 2018.

considered an indicator that China and the DPRK are formal allies.¹⁷ To be sure, China considers that alliance, in general, is not an option for the country. Beijing does not plan to sign any formal alliance treaty with any country in the short or long run.

All in all, what seems to guide China's approach toward regional governance is the current leadership's willingness to challenge U.S. leadership in the region. But China's plan in the region is not to replace the U.S. alliance system with its own, but rather a different type of security partnership that would be more flexible.

CHINA IS NOT ALONE

A form of cynicism toward China's initiatives is observable among part of the American and European policy-making community. China's public announcement of its new regional security architecture, or more explicitly, its "new type of security partnership in Asia," often remains unnoticed.¹⁸ When it is, it is often not taken seriously—partly due to the communication style of Chinese representatives, especially senior PLA representatives, which appears repetitive to many participants. These public announcements are not just mere talking points though, they are made after a lengthy, ongoing period of internal strategic brainstorming¹⁹ that should not be underestimated.

China is strategically thinking about the ways it can restructure the region, and more specifically about the partners it can rely on to do so. In particular, China hopes to build this "new type of security partnership" with the support of Russia. The two countries share an ambition to build an architecture that becomes an alternative to the U.S.-led alliance system in the greater Eurasian region and beyond. Both countries are increasingly cooperative at the institutional level but also at a more practical, militarily level, which includes the frequent conduct of joint military exercise. In September 2016, Russia and China carried out exercises in the South China Sea—just over a year after exercises were jointly conducted in the Mediterranean. In July 2017, Russia and China also carried out joint

17. Interview with a senior Chinese think tank official, Paris, October 2018.

18. Author's own observations at several regional security forums, including Shangri-la Dialogues 2017 and 2018, Singapore and Xiangshan Forums 2015, 2016, and 2018, Beijing.

19. Conducted by institutions such as China's Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) and China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CISS).

exercises in the Baltic Sea. Most recently however, in September 2018, China participated in the large-scale Vostok military exercise conducted in Siberia. Interestingly, according to one official communication, the bilateral relationship itself is increasingly labeled as a “non-alliance.”²⁰

In addition, China also aims at integrating ASEAN countries as much as possible in its regional governance initiatives, as well at integrating itself in ASEAN-organized forums and summits of various kinds.

Overall, careful observations of participation at China's security forums show that China is not alone and is able to gather a large number of countries around its concepts and initiatives: the 2018 edition of China's Xiangshan forum, themed that year “Building a New Type of Security Partnership of Equality, Mutual Trust and Win-Win Cooperation,” gathered high-level representatives from ministries of defence (minister or deputy minister level) from countries as diverse as Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Serbia, Vietnam, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Cambodia, Belarus, Nepal, etc. The forum also hosted a high-level delegation from North Korea. Some representatives of these countries were grateful to China for the invitation and significant speaking time, especially those who are not usual participants at this kind of high-level forum.²¹

Betting on the Mistakes of the “West”

Quite symmetrically, a form of cynicism toward the U.S. allies' initiatives is also observable among the Chinese policy-making community: “The West is doing enough mistakes on its own, that we don't even need to point at them,”²² said a Chinese participant, informally, referring to the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran deal and other multilateral agreements. Following the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Xi Jinping has increasingly positioned China as the supporter of free-trade and globalization. The main official argument is that China is “against

20. See for instance Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's declaration in July 2017 following Xi Jinping's visit to Russia: “In the development of bilateral relations, China and Russia have kept deepening their comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination on the basis of non-alliance, non-confrontation and not targeting third countries, which is becoming a paradigm for new-type relations between major countries.” Xinhua, July 8, 2017.

21. Observations and informal exchanges with Xiangshan Forums participants, October 2018, Beijing.

22. Informal discussion with the author, 17th IISS Shangri-la Dialogue, Singapore, June, 1–3, 2018.

unilateralism and protectionism.”²³ Although domestic economic reform (such as reform of the state-owned enterprises) and an overall opening up of the Chinese market appears to move at a slower pace than expected by foreign companies and states, Beijing is still promoting this communication line with confidence in recent months, in the context of the Sino-U.S. trade tensions.

In general terms, to develop its post-alliance restructuring, China is betting on the perceived “mistakes of the U.S.,” as well on divergences among allies in the region. With the on-going development of the “Indo-Pacific” strategy, Chinese officials and researchers are keen to identify and underline divergences of definition and approach currently existing among members of this country grouping. The rare questions asked by Chinese representatives at the 2018 edition of the Shangri-la Dialogue were actually pointed to as the potential divergent definition of the “Indo-Pacific concept” (between India and Japan, for instance).²⁴ China is also betting on divergences existing domestically within the political elite and/or population of some allies of the United States. As a matter of fact, China is fully aware that a divergent approach toward the United States exists in countries such as South Korea or the Philippines, and has progressively improved its knowledge and understanding of the local political debates and is better able to anticipate a foreign policy shift in these countries related to electoral calendar.

China is also diversifying its institutional and personal ties with countries of the region and beyond, considering that government-to-government ties are only one channel of bilateral relations to be complemented—or bypassed in the case of bilateral tensions—by other channels. In particular, in 2017 Xi Jinping has called for the reinforcement of party-to-party ties, and indicated that the Communist Party of China will invite “15,000 members of foreign political parties to China for exchanges” in the next five years.²⁵ Although he is doing so with all types of parties—not just between communist parties—he is focusing on developing countries, in the framework of its “South-South cooperation,” which does not hesitate to play on the anti-Western resentment of formerly colonized countries.

23. An expression frequently mentioned by a diversity of Chinese leaders, including Xi Jinping, in 2018.

24. Xiangshan Forum, October 2018, Beijing.

25. Xinhua, December 1, 2017.

In addition to exchanges with foreign government and party representatives, China's diplomacy increasingly engages with foreign representatives from the private sector, think tanks, or local authorities, among others. The ongoing diversification of the channels of bilateral and multilateral exchanges is developed after what Xi Jinping calls a "new type of international relations" (新型国际, *xinxing guoji guanxi*)—a concept that indicates China's ambition to reconsider the way states interact with each other.

Strong Interrelation between China's Economic and Security Governance

To promote its post-alliance restructuring of Asia, China is also betting on its economic attractiveness and centrality in the region. For China, economic and security governance are strongly interrelated, and an initiative in one field is conducive to an initiative in another.²⁶ China considers economic partnership as the basis of this new regional security network. The development of the now well-known "Belt and Road Initiative" (B&R) is reflecting this approach.²⁷ The B&R is now at the core of the new and informal institutional network China is currently building at regional and global levels.

If B&R is foremost a way of addressing short-term economic issues (overcapacities, economic slowdown, etc.), it is increasingly seen in Beijing as a tool to restructure regional and global governance. The B&R official action plan published in March 2015 already explicitly called for the creation of a "balanced regional economic cooperation architecture" and "new models of international cooperation and global governance." In Beijing, researchers are asked to analyze how B&R could further promote the restructuring of global governance and over the last two years Chinese officials are increasingly promoting "policy coordination" (政策沟通—*zhengci goutong*) as a core dimension of the "Belt and Road Initiative." In practical terms, this led so far to the creation of B&R informal bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms of various kinds such as high-level

26. According to China's official communication, economic development is a precondition to "regional peace and stability."

27. On this, see A. Ekman, ed., "La France face aux nouvelles routes de la soie chinoises," *Etudes de l'Ifri*, October 2018. Updated English version of this global report on B&R to be published in March 2019.

annual B&R forums,²⁸ B&R platforms for commercial dispute arbitration, and so on. As a matter of fact, the global governance dimension of the Chinese project is increasingly noticeable on the ground, as B&R is now presented by Chinese officials as a multilateral “platform” for the gathering of senior domestic and international actors of various spheres (business, government administration, the military, think tanks, etc.) and in various fields (construction, transport, energy, telecommunications, etc.).

Beijing also encourages both multilateral organizations but also countries to sign “Memorandum of Understanding” on the “Belt and Road Initiative.” It is unclear, so far, what the concrete advantages of this official endorsement will be for the signing countries. In the long term, China may thank them by facilitating their access to China’s leaders, summits, forums (preferential invitation, speaking time, and overall treatment granted to representatives of signing countries to China’s multilateral forums), and infrastructure (for instance, prime access to China’s satellite system Beidou or data centers). If this scenario is confirmed, through advantages granted to B&R supporters, China could consolidate and enlarge its “circle of friends” (中国的“朋友圈, zhongguo de pengyou quan)—an expression already used by Xi Jinping²⁹—and reinforce these countries’ support to both China’s economic and security governance initiatives. In any case, given that B&R is designed as a work-in-progress project that can develop in a variety of directions, the potential for creating B&R-related summits and cooperation mechanisms are unlimited.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD A BLURRED POLARIZATION OF THE REGION AND THE WORLD

Considering China’s institutional and conceptual activism described above, there is no doubt today that the country wishes to restructure the region and the world toward a post-alliance direction. In a nutshell, China’s current approach to security governance can be characterized by the following features: flexible (loose partnership rather than formal alli-

28. For instance, China hosted in May 2017 in Beijing the “Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation,” a high-level gathering that was widely advertised by Chinese officials and media. And it had previously organized similar forums on its national territory and abroad, including in Europe (“Silk Road Forum” held in Madrid in 2016, in Warsaw in 2016, among other large-scale forums).

29. Cf. for instance Xi’s New Year Speech, Xinhua, December 31, 2018.

ance), hybrid (economic and security governance intertwined), large geographical scope (Eurasia and beyond), and long-term planning (by 2049).

China's ambition to promote a post-alliance regional order appears unrealistic today given the central and structural role that the U.S. alliance system continues to play in the region. But Beijing is fully aware that such restructuring can only be a long-term process, and is developing it by enlarging its "circle of friends" step by step. China's official launch of the "new type of security partnership" is only the first step of a long-term action plan that will continue to unfold in the coming years under the mandate of Xi Jinping.

China can already count on the support of various countries, either because such countries are unhappy with the presence and influence of the United States and its allies in the region (such as Russia), or because such countries are already in China's sphere of economic and political influence (such as Cambodia or Laos). China can also count on some countries simply because they themselves do not have a clear-cut position and vision regarding regional governance, or do not have the economic means to support such a vision (which is the case of several Southeast and Central Asian countries). In general terms, the fact that China is promoting an apparently flexible, not fully institutionalized, and constantly evolving regional governance architecture (be it through the "Belt and Road Initiative" or its "New type of security partnership") makes it hard for countries to shape a clear-cut position toward this architecture.

The polarization of the region and the world has already reinforced in the context of Sino-U.S. tensions: some countries can be clearly identified as U.S. allies and partners (especially members of the "Indo-Pacific" grouping), while others can be identified, more clearly than before, as China's friends. Members of China's "circle of friends" may include:

- countries who have agreed to sign China's Memorandum of Understanding on B&R
- countries represented at the highest level at China's multilateral summits and forums (B&R forum, Xiangshan forum, among others)
- countries fully in line with China's position on the South China Sea or other issues China considers of "core interest"
- countries who are purchasing China's military, security, and technology equipment (tanks, missiles, drones, Beidou satellite system, artificial intelligence capabilities, "smart/safe city" packages, etc.)

If this polarization is an on-going trend that is likely to consolidate as China further promotes its security partnership in the region and the world, it is also likely to be an ambiguous one. The line between a U.S.-led alliance and China-led partnership may become unclear—as Beijing hopes to revise security governance and welcome overlap of security ties. According to official communication, all countries are welcome in China’s “new type of security partnership,”³⁰ including countries who are currently security allies—or strong security partners—of the United States. This potentially means that some countries may become increasingly more ambiguous in their security cooperation. They could even be more willing to develop new security ties with China, Russia, and its “circle of friends,” in addition to the United States and its allies—its traditional security partner. For China, this ambiguity is not a problem. On the contrary, it is encouraged. For the United States, however, this ambiguity is likely to represent a growing issue.

30. According to official communications made at 8th edition of the Xiangshan Forum, Beijing, October 25, 2018.

19. ALLIANCES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Reinforcing the Rules-Based International Order

Alex Oliver

W*hat Are the Major Trends in Public Opinion toward Alliances in the United States and in Allied Countries?*

The alliances of the United States have been the single most important web of strategic relationships across the globe since the middle of the twentieth century. In Asia, postwar alliances with Japan, Australia, and South Korea are the modern foundation of each of those nations' security. Formal defense relationships with the Philippines, Thailand, and Taiwan fill similar roles, complemented by security arrangements or cooperation with Singapore, Malaysia, and New Zealand. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) draws in 29 nations of the North Atlantic region in a political and military compact to guarantee the security of its members. In Africa, the United States has a number of defense and security arrangements including with Morocco, Cameroon, and Niger. It also maintains a complex set of security and defense arrangements in the Middle East, including a Strategic Cooperation Agreement with Israel and military assistance and security cooperation with other Middle Eastern nations including Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, and Egypt.

Many of the United States' alliance relationships, formed in the aftermath of the Second World War and strengthened during the Cold War, are facing sustained internal challenge and criticism. While criticism is expected from the United States' strategic competitors, it is more surprising when it comes from political leaders in both the United States

and among its allies. President Donald Trump has been critic-in-chief, inflaming sentiments among allies by questioning NATO members' defense commitments, disparaging NATO itself (calling it a "foe" on trade), as well as other "freeloaders"¹ on U.S. security guarantees and on trade, including its Asian allies Japan and South Korea.² He has been accompanied in these attacks by a small chorus of political leaders in allied nations in Europe and Asia, from Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte³ to former UKIP leader Nigel Farage.⁴

The question of whether publics across the allied countries share this alliance skepticism of some political leaders is another matter.

ALLIES DISTINGUISH THE UNITED STATES FROM ITS PRESIDENTS

Publics have been polled on alliances and sentiment among alliance nations in both the United States and its allies for more than 40 years.⁵ Attitudes to the U.S. system of alliances would be expected to vary both by region and by country, but there are some common trends. The time frames of these polls are important: a focus on developments in the past two years since President Trump's 2016 election win can be misleading. President Barack Obama was enormously popular in many allied nations; confidence in him reached levels as high as 93 percent in NATO ally Germany in 2009, 91 percent in France, and 86 percent in the United Kingdom in the same year, 94 percent in the Philippines in 2013, 88 percent in Korea

1. Thomas Wright, "The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Crisis Of US Foreign Policy," *Lowy Institute*, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2016-presidential-campaign-and-crisis-us-foreign-policy>; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44434558>; <https://www.playboy.com/read/playboy-interview-donald-trump-1990>.


2. Margaret Talev, "Trump Was Asked Who the Biggest US Foe Is. He Mentioned the EU First," *Bloomberg*, July 15, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-15/trump-calls-european-union-a-u-s-foe-citing-trade-tensions>.

3. "Duterte on US Alliance: 'Do You Really Think We Need It?'" *South China Morning Post*, October 11, 2016, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/2027165/duterte-us-alliance-do-you-really-think-we-need-it>.

4. Jack Montgomery, "Farage Backs Trump on NATO 'Freeloaders,' Warns EU Is Real Threat to Alliance's Future," *Breitbart*, July 12, 2018, <https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2018/07/12/farage-backs-trump-nato-freeloaders-warns-eu-real-threat-alliances-future/>.

5. Including surveys by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs since 1974, Gallup since 1989, Japan Cabinet Office since 1978, Australian Election Study since 1993, Pew Global Attitudes since 2001, Lowy Institute since 2005, Asan Institute for Policy Studies (Korea) since 2010, among many others.

Figure 19.1. Confidence in U.S. Presidents



Source: Pew Global Attitudes surveys.


in 2015, and 84 percent in Australia in 2016.⁶ Following President Trump's inauguration, many nations' confidence in the United States slumped dramatically (see figure 19.1).

Taking a longer view of attitudes to the United States and its presidents, rather than focusing on the two years of the Trump administration, presents a different picture. Apart from publics in France, Germany, and Canada, attitudes toward President Trump, while very negative, are more positive than their lows during the George W. Bush era, and most are on a rising trajectory. For example, UK public confidence in former president Bush in 2007–2008 dropped to 16 percent, and now sits at 28 percent. At 32 percent, President Trump enjoys 9 points higher confidence among Australians than former president Bush did in 2008.⁷

6. Pew Global Attitudes surveys, latest data, July 2018, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/#interactive>.

7. Ibid.

Figure 19.2. Favorability toward United States



Source: Pew Global Attitudes surveys.

However, sentiments toward the United States as a nation have been far more positive, and much more consistent, than confidence in individual U.S. presidents (see figure 19.2).⁸ Among key allies—the Philippines, Israel, South Korea, Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom—majorities view the United States positively. While favorability scores are negative (and falling) in NATO allies France, Canada, and Germany, they remain higher in France and Germany than at their nadir in 2002 after George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” address in the preface to the Iraq War. Only Canadians have a dimmer view of President Trump than they did of former president Bush in the early 2000s.

Attitudes toward the United States and its alliances can therefore be assessed at three different levels: attitudes toward U.S. presidents, attitudes toward the United States itself and affinity for U.S. citizens, and attitudes toward individual alliances.

The divergence, or disconnect, between attitudes toward individual U.S. presidents and attitudes toward the United States itself and individual alliances is reflected in national surveys. In Japan, for example,

8. Ibid.

Cabinet Office surveys since 1978 have asked Japanese publics about their “affinity” toward the United States, and the results have been remarkably consistent.⁹ In late 2017, 78 percent of Japanese people expressed an affinity for the United States. This was 7 points lower than the near 40-year high in 2012, but 10 points higher than the low of 68 percent in 1986. The same poll found an overwhelmingly high proportion (95 percent) of Japanese saying the “future development of relations between Japan and the United States is important for the two countries, and for Asia and the Pacific.”¹⁰ Other polls confirm that the United States’ influence on Japan is viewed positively even under an unpopular U.S. president, with 50 percent of Japanese saying the United States has a positive influence on Japan and only 20 percent viewing it negatively in 2017.¹¹

In Australia, long regarded as among the United States’ most reliable allies, there is a similar disconnect between Australians’ feelings toward the United States and their confidence in its current president. Few Australians (30 percent) have confidence in President Trump to “do the right thing regarding world affairs,” placing him ahead of only Russia’s Putin and North Korea’s Kim in a 2018 sample of leaders.¹² In tandem, Australians’ trust in the United States “to act responsibly in the world” has also plummeted to its lowest point across 12 years of polling on the question.¹³ Yet Australians’ sentiments toward the United States remain warm at 67 degrees on the Lowy Institute “thermometer” of feelings toward countries, warmer than the low point of 60 degrees in 2007.¹⁴

In South Korea, the latest Pew Global Attitudes survey has revealed a lift in sentiment toward the United States in 2018, with 80 percent of South Koreans expressing favorable views of the United States, up 5 points

9. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Overview of the Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy, December 2017, <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h29/h29-gaiko/summary.pdf>.

10. *Ibid.*

11. United States Studies Center (USSC), Asian Research Network Survey on America’s role in the Indo-Pacific, May 2017, 11.

12. Lowy Institute Poll 2018, 5, <https://lowyinstitutepoll.lowyinstitute.org/australias-global-relations/>; this result is almost identical to the 2018 Pew Global Attitudes data, which found 32 percent of Australians had confidence in the U.S. President, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/#interactive>.

13. Lowy Institute Poll 2018, 5, <https://lowyinstitutepoll.lowyinstitute.org/australias-global-relations/>.

14. Lowy Institute Poll 2018, 33, <https://lowyinstitutepoll.lowyinstitute.org/feelings-towards-other-nations/>.

since 2017 and 34 points higher than the low point of 46 percent in 2003.¹⁵ While President Trump is unpopular, with a score of around 30 percent confidence (Pew polling) or 3.8/10 favorability (Asan Institute 2018 survey),¹⁶ Kim Ji-yoon from the South Korean think tank Asan Institute noted in 2017 that “President Trump’s low favorability has not influenced how [South] Koreans see the United States, which proves just how much [South] Koreans value the United States as a military ally and consider the U.S. in a positive light.”¹⁷

WAR AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

Sentiments toward President Trump may be less negative generally than they were toward former president George W. Bush in the mid-2000s, but there is a clear difference in the context. At the low point in the Bush presidency’s popularity, the United States was several years into both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Its allies were fatigued by the wars’ costs and disillusioned about the cause.¹⁸ President Trump has no such war to blame for his unpopularity or negative sentiments toward his country. According to Gallup polling, he is the only post-World War II president to have commenced his presidency with net negative approval ratings among U.S. citizens.¹⁹

Gallup polling shows, however, that war is not a reliable indicator of attitudes to U.S. presidents: the fluctuating popularity of Presidents Johnson and Nixon throughout the Vietnam War are evidence of that. Two years into the Trump administration, it is premature to predict how either U.S. citizens or foreign publics will judge him in the future. However, the disconnect between approval of presidents and sentiment toward the United States and its alliances suggests that those alliances can withstand unpopular U.S. leaders.

15. Pew Global Attitudes data.

16. Asan Poll 2018 of South Koreans and their neighbors, 12.

17. Kim Ji-yoon, “Changing Tides: THAAD and Shifting Korean Public Opinion toward the United States and China,” *Asan Institute*, March 2017, <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/changing-tides-thaad-and-shifting-korean-public-opinion-toward-the-united-states-and-china/>.

18. For example, 61 percent of Australians in 2013 believed the war in Afghanistan was “not worth fighting,” and 59 percent disagreed in 2012 that the Iraq War was “worth the costs”; Lowy Institute polling, 2012–2013.

19. <https://news.gallup.com/interactives/185273/presidential-job-approval-center.aspx>.

ALLIANCES STILL SEEN AS CRITICAL FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY

Attitudes to the U.S. alliance system are, unsurprisingly, affected by the major geopolitical and economic shifts of this century. Less predictable are the responses to these developments among allied publics. In the east, China's growing economic power, military assertiveness, and influence are being felt in different ways across the Indo-Pacific; North Korea's nuclear belligerence has threatened South Korea, provoked the United States, and unnerved other Asian neighbors. To the north, Russia has made incursions into Ukraine, annexed Crimea, been implicated in the downing of MH17, allegedly poisoned Russian critics on UK territory, and interfered in U.S. election processes. Israel remains isolated in a hostile Middle East. Across the West, the threat of international terrorism disturbs many nations. It ranks either highest or among the highest threats in Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, the United States, and parts of Europe, particularly those countries such as Britain, France, and Germany, which have experienced recent Islamist terror attacks.²⁰

Adding to these forces straining the global order, the United States has elected a leader whose appeal to the publics of many of its allies falls dramatically short of that of his predecessor. Yet in response to these rapid shifts and unsettling events, public support for security alliances with the United States has endured, and in some countries even firmed.

Also facing the existential threat of North Korea's escalating nuclear program in 2017, an overwhelming 96 percent of South Koreans viewed their alliance with the United States as "necessary," in 2017²¹ and 65 percent of the South Korean public in 2018 saw the United States as the most important nation for South Korea's security (up 7 points since 2017).²² South Korean support for THAAD, the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile defense system, firmed in 2017 (51 percent approved, 38 percent disapproved).²³

20. Anthony Wells, "YouGov Data Reveals What Europeans Think Are the Most Important Issues Facing the EU," *YouGov*, May 11, 2018, <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2018/05/11/yougov-data-reveals-what-europeans-think-are-most-/>.

21. Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2017 polling.

22. Asan Poll, 2018, 16, <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/changing-tides-thaad-and-shifting-korean-public-opinion-toward-the-united-states-and-china/>.

23. *Ibid.*

South Koreans also express confidence in the U.S. resolve to act on the North Korea threat. A majority of South Koreans (51 percent) in 2018 said the United States “will take an active role in solving North Korea’s nuclear related problems.”²⁴ Only 27 percent said South Korea itself will take an active role, and just 12 percent saw China taking that role.²⁵ Despite, or perhaps because of, China’s economic retaliation in response to the THAAD deployment,²⁶ the United States was also regarded as more important to South Korea economically than China in 2018, with 53 percent saying the United States is the most important, compared with 34 percent saying China is the most important to South Korea’s economy.²⁷ South Koreans’ favorable sentiments toward the United States (80 percent favorable) are higher in 2018 than between 2002 and 2009,²⁸ and in the context of continuing rivalry between the United States and China, most South Koreans choose strengthened ties with the United States (68 percent) over ties with China (23 percent).²⁹

Japan’s public faces a similarly existential threat from North Korea, but also perceives the numerous challenges posed by an increasingly assertive China. On the question of affinity toward China, Japanese attitudes have cooled dramatically since China’s opening up in the 1970s.³⁰ Nearly 8 in 10 (79 percent) express no affinity toward China, compared with 15 percent at the low point in 1980.

Although Australia’s strategic environment is different from Japan’s, China features strongly in both. While Australia shares no land borders with its Asian neighbors, the Australian people have expressed concerns this century about potential threats from the region, including more recently from China. Around half (46 percent) of the population sees China

24. *Ibid.*, 17

25. *Ibid.*, 17

26. “South Korea’s Lotte to Sell China Shops in Face of Boycott,” *Straits Times*, September 15, 2017, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-koreas-lotte-to-sell-china-shops-in-face-of-boycott>; “South Korea’s Lotte Group Offers Golf Course for THAAD Missile Development,” *South China Morning Post*, February 27, 2017, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2074395/south-koreas-lotte-group-offers-golf-course-thaad-missile>.


27. Asan Poll, 2018, 16.

28. Pew Global Attitudes data.

29. Asan Poll, 2018, 24.

30. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Overview of the Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy,” December 2017, <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h29/h29-gaiko/summary.pdf>, 7.

Figure 19.3. Japanese Affinity toward China



Source: Japan Cabinet Office Surveys, 1978–2017.

as a likely military threat in the next two decades.³¹ China's political influence in Australia is a topical issue,³² but it is perceived as a more diffuse threat, with 41 percent of Australians seeing it as a critical threat to Australia's interests, ranking well behind terrorism, North Korea's nuclear program, climate change, cyberattacks, and the risk of a global economic downturn.³³

China became Australia's largest trading partner more than a decade ago, and Australians appear torn between China as the underwriter of their economy and the United States as their security partner. They ranked the two relationships as being of equal importance in 2016 and 2017 Lowy Institute polls.³⁴ As with the Japanese, however, "equal importance" for Australians does not equate to equal affinity for China and the United States. On the Lowy Institute's "feelings thermometer," Australians rate the United States at 67 degrees of warmth, while China ranks a cooler 58 degrees.³⁵ When asked who Australia's "best friend in the world" was in 2017, 17 percent of Australians nominated the United States, while only 8 percent nominated China.³⁶

In Australia, public sentiments toward the U.S. alliance are, like the Japanese public's, far more consistent and more positive than attitudes to individual U.S. presidents. In 2018, 76 percent of Australians rated the U.S. alliance as either "very" or "fairly" important to Australia's security—up 5 points since 2016 and 13 points higher than at the lowest point in 2006 (63 percent).³⁷ In the 15 years of Lowy Institute polling, overall support for the alliance has never fallen below 90 percent.³⁸

Among the United States' key NATO allies, attitudes to the NATO alliance remain strongly positive even while people in the UK, France, and Germany are disdainful of the Trump administration and on balance unfavorable toward the United States generally (see figure 19.4). Once

31. Lowy Institute polling, 2009–2018.

32. John Garnaut, "Australia's China Reset," *The Monthly*, August 2018, <https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2018/august/1533045600/john-garnaut/australia-s-china-reset>.

33. Lowy Institute Poll, 2018, 8.

34. Lowy Institute Poll, 2016, 2017.


35. Lowy Institute Poll, 2018.

36. New Zealand ranked highest with 53 percent nominating it as "best friend"; the United Kingdom and United States shared second ranking, each nominated by 17 percent of Australians; Lowy Institute Poll, 2017, 22.

37. Lowy Institute Poll, 2018.

38. Total "very," "fairly," and "somewhat" important, Lowy Institute polling, 2005–2018.

Figure 19.4. Views of NATO



Source: Pew Global Attitudes surveys.

again, there is a strong divergence between attitudes toward an individual U.S. president, attitudes toward the United States, and attitudes toward alliances with the United States. Only 30 percent of Germans were favorable toward the United States in 2018 and 10 percent had confidence in its president, but 67 percent (up 11 points since 2016) expressed a favorable view of NATO. Similarly, 60 percent of the French population support NATO; while 38 percent express favorable views of the United States and just 9 percent have confidence in its president.³⁹ Apart from Turkey (the most anti-NATO population polled by Pew), Greece is the only nation whose public is on balance unfavorable toward NATO.⁴⁰ Conversely, support in Canada, Germany, and Poland hit historic highs in 2017. The United States ranked as Britain's most important ally by 59 percent of British people in a 2018 YouGov survey.⁴¹

39. Pew Global Attitudes custom analysis, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/custom-analysis/indicator/37/countries/39,74,81,175,205,224,231,233/>; <http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/#interactive>.

40. Ibid.

41. YouGov survey results, July 2018, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/fqnuyosidj/GB%20PublicFirstResults_180717_Trade.pdf.

NATO publics also see the United States as a reliable ally, despite their periodic mistrust of U.S. presidents. In 2017 Pew surveys, majorities in all NATO members surveyed said that “the U.S. would use military force to defend a NATO ally if it got into a serious military conflict with Russia.”⁴²

In Asia, U.S. allies are similarly optimistic about the United States coming to their defense if attacked, with majorities in Australia (73 percent), Japan (78 percent), and South Korea (85 percent) seeing U.S. action as either somewhat, very, or extremely likely.⁴³

U.S. SUPPORT FOR ALLIANCES REMAINS FIRM

U.S. citizens themselves still believe the U.S. alliance system works strongly in their favor, despite President Trump’s professed skepticism, and they eschew an isolationist U.S. foreign policy. In 2018 polling by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 70 percent of U.S. citizens—the highest majority since 1974—support the United States “taking an active part in world affairs.” Almost all U.S. citizens (91 percent) believe it is more effective for the United States to work with allies and other countries to achieve its foreign policy goals, although they rank “defending our allies’ security” as a less important foreign policy goal than “preventing the spread of nuclear weapons,” protecting U.S. jobs, or improving the United States’ global standing and reputation.⁴⁴

They are also unfazed by their president’s complaints about allies’ freeloading on the United States for defense, with 75 percent (unchanged since 2016) saying the United States should either increase its commitment to NATO or “keep [its] commitment to what it is now.”⁴⁵ A Gallup poll in 2017 found 80 percent of U.S. citizens supported the NATO alliance, up 16 points from 64 percent in 1995; this was the highest support for NATO measured since 1989.⁴⁶

42. Pew Research Center, “NATO’s Image Improves on Both Sides of Atlantic,” May 2017, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/05/23/natos-image-improves-on-both-sides-of-atlantic/>.

43. USSC, 2017 Six Nations Survey Data, <https://assets.ussc.edu.au/view/d6/a1/27/ad/d4/ee/a2/bf/1e/84/d3/dd/8d/7a/3b/56/original/959a3d253927020boed1a1bd671e65306f29b4f4/2017-Survey-on-Americas-role-in-the-Indo-Pacific-dataset.pdf>.

44. Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA), “2018 Survey: America Engaged,” 25.

45. *Ibid.*, 16.

46. Gallup, “Most Americans Support NATO Alliance,” 2017, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/204071/americans-support-nato-alliance.aspx>.

In 2017, most U.S. citizens (78 percent) supported either increasing or maintaining U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific, as well as in Europe (72 percent).⁴⁷ And as “the ultimate indicator of commitment to allies,” large majorities are in favor of using U.S. troops “if a U.S. ally is invaded” (85 percent) and “if another country seizes territory belonging to a U.S. ally” (73 percent).⁴⁸ U.S. citizens’ approval of using U.S. troops in specific conflicts, such as in defense of South Korea (64 percent) or Japan (64 percent), has risen sharply since 2015.

ALLIES’ AND U.S. CITIZENS’ SUPPORT FOR U.S. ALLIANCES EXTENDS TO U.S. BASES

Support for alliances also extends to hosting U.S. forces within allies’ territory. In a joint survey in 2016, majorities of South Koreans (62 percent) and Australians (53 percent) favored basing U.S. military forces in their countries.⁴⁹ In 2017, around a third of Koreans supported an increase in the U.S. military presence in Asia-Pacific.⁵⁰ Six years after it was announced, the Force Posture Agreement between Australia and the United States⁵¹ to base U.S. forces in the northern Australian city of Darwin enjoys the strong support of Australians, with less than one in five (18 percent) saying U.S. troops’ access should be “decreased or removed.”⁵² And despite the expense of hosting U.S. forces in Japan (estimated at ¥191 billion in 2015), 68 percent of Japanese in November 2016 supported maintaining existing levels of support.⁵³

Although President Trump has questioned the value of U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea, the majority of U.S. citizens think the United

47. CCGA, 2017 data, 33.

48. CCGA, 2018 data, 2, 27.

49. Asia in the Age of Uncertainty: Public Opinion in the Asia Pacific, Results of 2016 Multinational Survey, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/asia-age-uncertainty>, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/asia-age-of-uncertainty-report_20170201.pdf.

50. USSC, 2017 Six Nations Survey Data.

51. “The Force Posture Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America,” Sydney, August 12, 2014, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATS/2015/1.pdf>.

52. USSC 2017 Six Nations Survey Data, 29.

53. Craig Kafura, “Public Opinion and the US-Japan Alliance at the Outset of the Trump Administration,” <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/public-opinion-and-us-japan-alliance-outset-trump-administration>.

States should maintain those bases. Seventy-four percent favor long-term bases in South Korea, 65 percent favor bases in Japan, and support for these bases has risen strongly since 2012.⁵⁴

CHINA'S RISE, U.S. DECLINE?

Predictions about the future trajectory of U.S. power frequently accompany observations about the inexorable rise of China.⁵⁵ Perceptions of a waning United States might prompt U.S. allies to reexamine their alliance relationships. However, the strength of support for alliances involving the United States suggests that such a reexamination is not occurring, and projects such as the Lowy Institute's 2018 Asia Power Index show that China's preeminence, even in Asia, has yet to be realized.⁵⁶

Like its allies, U.S. citizens are evaluating their relationship with China. Despite China's economic importance to the United States, however, U.S. citizens prioritize "building . . . strong relations with traditional allies like South Korea and Japan, even if this might diminish our relations with China" (66 percent in 2018), while only a quarter (26 percent) put a higher priority on "building a new partnership with China, even if this might diminish our relations with our traditional allies."⁵⁷ The strategic competition between the United States and China articulated in the 2017 National Security Strategy⁵⁸ is reflected in the reticence felt by U.S. citizens about future relations with China.

The question of whether publics perceive the United States to be in decline as an inevitable corollary of China's rise is important, however, as perceptions of future power may play into and reinforce the course of international relationships. The Pew Organization's Global Attitudes

54. CCGA, 2018 data, 19.

55. For example, Fareed Zakaria, "The Decline of U.S. Influence Is the Great Global Story of Our Age," *Washington Post*, December 28, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-decline-of-us-influence-is-the-great-global-story-of-our-times/2017/12/28/bfe48262-ebf6-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.143116084f81; Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline," *International Security* 36, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 41–72, <https://myweb.rollins.edu/tlairson/china/chinavisionusdecline.pdf>.

56. <https://power.lowyinstitute.org/>.

57. CCGA, 2018 data, 17.

58. White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," December 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>, 2.

project has attempted to answer this question, asking foreign publics whether China “will never replace the U.S.,” “has already replaced the U.S.,” or “will eventually replace the U.S. . . . as the world’s leading superpower.”⁵⁹ In none of the 51 countries surveyed did majorities or pluralities believe that China was already the world’s leading superpower. For 18 of the 51 nations surveyed, pluralities believed China would eventually replace the United States, while pluralities or majorities in the remainder took the view that China would never replace the United States as the world’s leading superpower.

Britain, Canada, France, and Germany are among those allies whose people see China as eventually taking the United States’ place as the leading superpower, and yet publics in each of those countries remain positive about their alliance relationships. In a 2017 survey replicating this question, Australia was the only Asian nation apart from China in which a majority of the population saw China as eventually overtaking the United States,⁶⁰ yet Australians’ support for the ANZUS alliance remains firm.

Regardless of the actual or perceived trajectories of U.S. and Chinese power, people of many countries believe the world will be better served with the United States as its leading power. Of 25 countries surveyed by Pew in 2018 there was only one—Tunisia—in which a majority of the population thinks “it would be better to have China as the world’s leading power.” For the remaining 24 countries, an average of 63 percent prefer the United States as the world’s leading power.⁶¹

RESISTING POPULISM AND NATIONALISM, PROMOTING THE RULES-BASED GLOBAL ORDER: ALLIANCES AND VALUES

Overall, U.S. and allies’ support for alliances remains firm, despite antipathy toward the U.S. president in some quarters and the power shifts that challenge U.S. global leadership. While the present alliance system

59. Pew Global Attitudes, [http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/?qid=1041&cntIDs=&stdIDs=:latest data, 2015](http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/?qid=1041&cntIDs=&stdIDs=:latest+data,+2015); the question has been replicated in other surveys including the Lowy Institute Poll, 2013; USSC 2017 Survey Dataset, 168.

60. USSC 2017 Survey Dataset, 168.

61. Pew Global Attitudes Survey, http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/pg_2018-10-01_us-image_0-010/.

has strong support among allies' populations, however, it is not invulnerable. Other forces are in play.

Immigration is seen as one of the most pressing issues facing Europe among 11 EU countries.⁶² Anti-immigration sentiment, stirred up in part by fear of terrorism, is rising in Europe, with majorities in all but two and pluralities in all 10 European nations polled by Chatham House in 2017 agreeing that "all further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped."⁶³ Terrorism ranks as either a high threat or the highest in parts of Europe, particularly in those countries that have experienced recent terror attacks such as Britain, France, and Germany.⁶⁴ "International terrorism" also ranks either highest or among the highest threats in Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and America.⁶⁵

Seeking receptive audiences among those who feel short-changed by globalization and threatened by high immigration flows and terrorism, populist politics are gaining some traction both West and East. Anti-globalization, protectionist, and nationalist attitudes are evident particularly in Europe and North America, both reflected in and fuelled by populist politicians' rhetoric and policy platforms. Populist politicians now lead some European nations such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Austria, and have made gains in others such as Italy and Germany.⁶⁶ Some hold fears for the health of democracies in such conditions.⁶⁷

Despite their president's rhetoric, U.S. citizens in 2018 appear to be resisting protectionist, isolationist, and populist forces, according to 2018

62. Wells, "YouGov Data Reveals What Europeans Think."

63. Matthew Goodwin, Thomas Raines, and David Cutts, "What Do Europeans Think about Muslim Immigration?" Chatham House, 2017, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/what-do-europeans-think-about-muslim-immigration>.

64. YouGov 11-country survey, April 2018, https://d25d2506sf94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6qz917s9ky/EUIResults_Europe_April2018_Toplines_FINAL_180430_w.pdf.

65. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Dataway, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, East Asia Institute, Lowy Institute for International Policy, NPO, "Asia in the Age of Uncertainty. Public Opinion in the Asia Pacific, Results of 2016 Multinational Survey," January 2017, 29–33.

66. William A. Galston, "The Rise of European Populism and the Collapse of the Center-Left," *Brookings*, March 8, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/08/the-rise-of-european-populism-and-the-collapse-of-the-center-left/>.

67. Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, "The Danger of Deconsolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 27, no. 3 (July 2016), <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Foa%26Mounk-27-3.pdf>.

polling by the Chicago Council. Only a third of U.S. citizens want the United States to stay out of world affairs, and record numbers see international trade as good for the nation, its economy, and its people.⁶⁸ They perceive illegal immigration as a low-order threat, and 70 percent say legal immigration into the United States should either be increased or kept at its present level.⁶⁹ U.S. citizens are not attracted to autocrats.⁷⁰

Allies in Asia-Pacific also seem not to have succumbed to nationalism or protectionism, although they fear terrorism. According to 2017 polling in Asia, “nationalist” scores for Australia, Korea, and Japan are moderate, in comparison with higher scores for Indonesia, India, and China.⁷¹ Australians in 2017 were more pro-globalization than they were in 2006, and significant majorities in both Australia and Canada have favorable views on free trade.⁷² In Europe, however, anxiety about immigration makes it a leading issue across nations including Britain.⁷³ For the first time in several years of polling, Lowy Institute found a majority in Australia opposed to the current rate of immigration, although in earlier years most Australians saw the benefits of immigration.⁷⁴ Canadians, by contrast, see multiculturalism and “accepting refugees” as their most important contribution to the world.⁷⁵

Such differences, while subtle, hint at minor fault lines that might become fractures in the web of alliances which the United States supports.

As yet, the prevailing sentiment across most allies’ publics has not shifted in favor of wholesale protectionist or nationalist policies. Should these forces gather pace, however, there is a danger to the alliance system, because allies are bound not just by shared security interests but by shared values. While a lack of shared values underlies Australians’ wari-

68. CCGA, 2018 data, 5.

69. *Ibid.*, 24; Pew Organization, “Shifting Public Views on Legal Immigration into the U.S.,” June 28, 2018, <http://www.people-press.org/2018/06/28/shifting-public-views-on-legal-immigration-into-the-u-s/>.

70. CCGA, 2018 data, 2, 5, 14.

71. USSC, 2017 Six Nations Survey Data, 20.

72. Canada’s World Survey 2018, Environics Institute, https://www.environicsinstitute.org/docs/default-source/canada%27s-world-2018-survey/canada%27s-world-survey-2018--final-report.pdf?sfvrsn=17208306_2_41; Lowy Institute Poll 2017, 19.

73. Wells, “YouGov Data Reveals What Europeans Think.”

74. Lowy Institute Polls, 2015, 2016, and 2018.

75. Canada’s World Survey 2018, 33.

ness of China,⁷⁶ shared values and ideals are the strongest rationale for their alliance with the United States.⁷⁷

Strong democratic systems, respect for a rules-based global order, the rule of law and individual freedoms, and an openness to global trade and orderly immigration to foster economic prosperity characterize these allies' relationships more than mere shared languages, history, and culture. When policy and public opinion shift toward nationalism and isolationism, shared values recede and the will to collective action necessary to combat threats to the rules-based order becomes much weaker.

Collective action is what the alliance system now needs the most. As Charles Edel put it in mid- 2018,

A rules-based order means that it is not simple raw power that determines outcomes. . . . Given the intensifying challenges that various authoritarian regimes are putting on the international order created by America and its friends, and the shocks generated by Donald Trump, it will take working in concert with other like-minded states to defend and renew the rules and behaviours that will ensure our future prosperity and security.⁷⁸

Allies can and should work harder to extend their relationships beyond security dependence to broader economic and strategic engagement within and beyond their borders. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a good example: like-minded countries, including members of the U.S. alliance system, cooperate in their regions to draw other countries into their sphere and reinforce the beneficial liberal order. The U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, in this context, is directly counter to its own interests.

CONCLUSION

On the evidence of public opinion polling this century, the alliance system fostered by the United States since the end of the Second World War remains critically important for publics in allied nations. Those alliances have a strength that withstands antipathy toward individual U.S. leaders, even those as unpopular as the current U.S. president, Donald Trump.

76. Lowy Institute Poll, 2016, 12.

77. Lowy Institute Poll, 2011 and 2015.

78. Charles Edel, "The Future of the US-Australia Alliance," *The Strategist*, July 3, 2018, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-future-of-the-us-australia-alliance/>.

Public opinion toward the United States and U.S. citizens among allies is not inextricably linked to opinions of U.S. presidents, and the shock that President Trump has inflicted on attitudes toward the United States in the first two years of his administration should not be overstated. Among most allies, in fact, public opinion on President Trump and the United States is more favorable than it was in the final years of the second Bush administration.

The alliance system is not in imminent danger of disintegrating, if public opinion is a guide. Alliances are still seen as critical to national and global security, whether in North America, Europe, or Asia. In the face of challenges to the existing global order in Northeast Asia from China and North Korea, from Russia's aggression in Europe, and from terrorism globally, support for alliances is, if anything, firming as this century unfolds. In almost all countries, including among allies, publics believe the world is better served with the United States as its leading power, even as that relative power declines in relation to a rising China.

The strength of alliances lies in more than mere security interests; they are underpinned by shared values, ideals, political systems, histories, cultures, and shared investment in a predictable rules-based order. Where these alliances may be vulnerable, however, is in global shifts more subtle than the increasing assertiveness and economic dynamism of China, the belligerence of North Korea, or the aggression of Russia. The emergence of populist, nationalist, and protectionist sentiment and policy among some allies—and within the United States itself—may begin to corrode the shared values which have sustained alliance relationships. It is here that the focus should be to buttress and reinvigorate the alliance system in order to preserve it for the future.

INDEX

Note: Information in figures is indicated by page numbers in *italics*.

- Abe, Shinzo, 45, 72, 120, 158
- adaptability of alliances, 35–36, 51, 86, 156
to cyberthreats and security, 90–94
ROK, U.S. and, 113–27
of security network, 46
in space, 124–25
- AI. *See* artificial intelligence (AI)
- alignment behavior, 153, 183, 185–86, 188, 191, 195
- alliances
adaptability of, 35–36, 51, 86, 156
alignment behavior of, 153, 183, 185–86, 188, 191, 195
American policymakers and, 38
in Asia, 47, 221
authoritarianism and, 27, 44
balance of power within, 32, 38
China and, 46, 198–200
China and Russia lacking, 41
Cold War and, 4–7
cyberthreats and security, 35, 92
defense strategy for, 53–54
democratic values protected by, 87
interoperability of, 1, 4
Middle East and, 190, 205, 211
within NATO, 174
reliability of, 72
shared values of, 45
strategic competition for, 183–92
through Warsaw Pact, 34, 64
treaties protecting, 52
Trump threatening, 3–4, 18–19, 21, 214
U.S. domestic public opinion on, 39
U.S. export control system and, 77–78
U.S. military and, 217
USSR within, 31–32, 36, 38, 40, 44
in WWII, 162
- America First
Asia and, 2, 19
Australia-U.S. alliance impacted by, 133–34
Trump and, 122, 153
- ANZUS Treaty, 130–31, 142
- Aquino, Benigno, 146
- Aquino, Benigno, III, 151
- Aquino, Corazon, 146
- arms market, U.S., 81–83
- artificial intelligence (AI)
as Fourth Industrial Revolution, 125
international order and, 18
for security, 85
- ASEAN, 199
- China and, 149
- Obama and, 150
- rules-based order and, 140
- Thailand valuing, 145
- Asia
alliances in, 47
America First policy impacting, 122–23
balance of power in, 44, 46–47
Cold War in, 63–64
economic and social trends in, 211–12
economic competition in, 48, 117–18
multilateralism in, 141, 146, 156–58
regional order in, 42–43, 45, 203
security network in, 160, 196–97
strategic competition in, 119, 198–202
U.S. alliance system and, 6–8, 157
U.S. military in, 42–43, 52, 57, 217
- Asia-Pacific region
alliances in, 221
challenges and threats to, 74
economic competition in, 101

- nationalism in, 221
- Obama and, 134
- Australia
 - alliance policy of, 28, 85, 129
 - challenges and threats to, 214
 - China, Japan partnering, 157
 - Chinese Communist Party against, 86–87
 - defense strategy of, 129–31
 - in Indo-Pacific region, 135
 - Japan partnership with, 132
 - military power of, 158–59
 - as security node, 159, 165, 167
 - UK and, 77
 - Vietnam War and, 131–32
- Australia-U.S. alliance
 - America First impacting, 133–34
 - cyberwarfare and, 60
 - in Indo-Pacific region, 136
 - strategic policy of, 130
 - Trump threatening, 132–34, 207, 209
- authoritarianism, 15, 18
 - alliances and, 27, 44
 - challenges and threats of, 43–44, 46
 - influence of, 41
- balance of power
 - across Eurasia, 55
 - within alliances, 32, 38
 - in Asia, 44, 46–47
 - in Europe, 21
- Bảo Đại, 142
- Bashar al-Assad, 176
- Belt and Road Initiative, China (BRI), 15, 47, 201–3
- bilateral relationships
 - in Indo-Pacific region, 43, 45
 - in post-Cold War era, 36
 - R&D and, 104
 - of ROK, 118, 120
 - SEATO supporting, 144
 - U.S.-ROK alliance as, 124–25
- Brexit, 80, 99
- BRI. *See* Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- Bush, George H. W., 65, 147, 148
- Bush, George W., 4, 14, 53, 79, 207–8, 210, 223
- C4ISR. *See* command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR)
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 3, 4, 225, 227–28
- challenges and threats
 - to American strategy, 34, 37–38
 - in Asia-Pacific region, 74
 - to Australia, 214
 - of authoritarianism, 43–44, 46
 - from China, 69–70
 - against democracy, 42
 - to democratic values, 86
 - democratic values exploited by, 86–87
 - to EU, 220
 - to international order, 66–69, 74–75, 211
 - to Japan-South Korea alliance, 119–20
 - of Kim Jong-un, 73
 - to liberal international order, 97, 99
 - in postwar order, 24–28
 - to regional alliances, 37
 - to rules-based order, 153, 222
 - of Russian Pacific Fleet, 71
 - U.S. alliance system and, 56–59, 115–16, 223
 - to U.S. security, 28, 40
- China, 15, 57
 - alliances and, 41, 46, 198–99
 - ASEAN and, 149
 - against Australia, 86–87
 - BRI of, 15, 47
 - challenges and threats from, 69–70
 - economics and, 99n5, 101, 108–9
 - against global order, 3, 5
 - great power war with, 51, 218
 - hegemony of, 47
 - illiberal hierarchy advanced by, 100
 - international order and, 15, 21, 193, 201, 203
 - Japan and, 69, 213
 - Korea and, 43–44
 - leadership of alliances and, 26–27
 - maritime infrastructure of, 139
 - military of, 40, 57–58, 70
 - opinion polls about, 219
 - regional order and, 155, 200
 - rules-based order threatened by, 150, 155
 - security and, 194–98
 - security network of, 204
 - against U.S. alliance system, 34, 153, 190
 - U.S. public opinion of, 218–19

- China-South Korea alliance, 118–19
- Churchill, Winston, I, 171
Roosevelt and, 171
- climate change, Trump on, 126
- Clinton, Bill, 14, 77
- Cold War, 165
alliances and, 4–7
Asia in, 63–64
NATO during, 162–63, 172
Russian military after, 57
U.S. alliance system and, 14
USSR in, 13, 16–17
- “color revolutions,” 44n3
- command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance (C4ISR), 60, 105–6
- communism, 15–16, 18, 138, 143, 200
- competition
ideology as, 41
for international order, 13–19
for military technology transfers, 79–80
peace and, 23
security threatened by, 51
with USSR, 33
- Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP), 107
- counterterrorism, Philippines and, 149
- CPTPP. *See* Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
- Crimea, Russia annexation of, 174
- CSIS. *See* Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)
- Cuban Missile Crisis, 16
- Curtain, John, 130
- cyberthreats and security, 84
adaptability of alliances to, 90–94
malware and, 91–93
NATO against, 90, 93–94
partnerships against, 88–90
postwar tactics and, 17
by Russia, 66, 168
in space, 70
U.S. alliance system against, 35, 60, 84,
90–91, 92, 125–26
- “Defence of Australia (DOA),” U.S. and,
131
- Defense Business Board, U.S. (DBB), 78
- defense industry, 79, 82, 83
- defense strategy
of Australia, 129–31
of EU, 74, 80
evolution of, 13–19
global commons as, 54–55
against gray zone cyberconflict, 89
in Indo-Pacific region, 155
of Japan-U.S. alliance, 103–6
NAC as, 163
nuclear weapons impacting, 61–62
in peacetime, 55–56
of Philippines, 142
of Russian military, 65
space and, 105–6
for U.S. alliance system, 13, 53–54
of U.S.-Japanese partnership, 72
of U.S. military, 34, 165–66, 168
of USSR, 62–63
in U.S. territories, 53
- Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
See North Korea (DPRK)
- democratic values
alliances protecting, 87
challenges and threats to, 42, 86
in Europe, 169
NATO maintaining, 170
- Department of Defense, U.S. (DoD), 71,
76–79, 81, 104
- DOA. *See* “Defence of Australia (DOA)”
- domestic public opinion, U.S.
on alliances, 39, 134
of China, 218–19
on foreign policy, 220–21
on Iraq war, 59
NATO and, 216
on Trump, 223
on U.S. alliance system, 216
of U.S. military, 2
- DPRK. *See* North Korea (DPRK)
- Duterte, Rodrigo, 43, 206
U.S. alliance system and, 152
- economic and social trends
in Asia, 211–12
of great power war, 58
in Indo-Pacific region, 155
of international order, 175
nationalism and, 86
- economic competition
in Asia, 117–18, 201
in Asia-Pacific region, 101

- China and, 108–10
 within international order, 47
 liberal international order sustained by, 108
 littoral strategy for, 40
 postwar tactics and, 17
 technological advancement as, 107
- economic development
 in China, 99n5, 101
 of India, 108
 in peacetime, 55
 security network strengthened by, 157
 through U.S.-ROK alliance, 44
- Eisenhower, Dwight, 24–25, 165, 189
 NAC led by, 164
 endurance, of U.S. alliance system, 31–33, 35
 enforcement mechanisms, within U.S. alliance system, 107
- EU. *See* European Union (EU)
- Eurasia
 balance of power across, 55
 U.S. alliance system in, 197–98
- Europe
 balance of power in, 21
 democratic values in, 169
 U.S. alliance system in, 173–74
 U.S. and, 7–8
- European Union (EU)
 challenges and threats to, 220
 defense strategy of, 74, 80
 Nobel Peace Prize and, 168
- evolution, of national defense, 13–19
 evolution, of NATO, 161
 export control, 83
- financial investment, ODA, 124
- 5G networks, as technological advancement, 85, 110
- Five Eyes countries, 90–91
 flipping alliance partners, 183–91
- foreign policy
 of Truman administration, 13
 of Trump, 25, 217
 U.S. public opinion on, 220–21
 of Xi Jinping, 201
- Fourth Industrial Revolution, AI as, 125
- Gates, Robert, 4, 14, 44
 global commons, as defense strategy, 54–55
- global cooperation, UN and, 45
 global operating system, for peace, 23
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, 64
- gray zone cyberconflict, defense strategy against, 89
- great power war
 China and Russia creating, 51
 economic and social trends of, 58
 revisionism in, 17
 between U.S. and China, 218
- Great Recession, 59
- growth, of Chinese power, 155
- guarantee motive, 30n10
- hegemony. *See* leadership
- Howard, John, 132
- Hu Jintao, 193
- Hussein, Saddam, 166, 179
- ideology, as competition, 41
- Idi Amin, 186
- illiberal hierarchy
 China and Russia advancing, 100
 in Indo-Pacific, 101
- India, 46–47
 economic growth of, 108
 within U.S. alliance system, 48
- Indian Ocean, Chinese littoral strategy for, 47–48
- Indo-Pacific region, 40–42, 46, 48
 alliances in, 43–45
 Australia in, 135
 Australia-U.S. alliance in, 136
 bilateral relationships in, 43, 45
 defense strategy in, 155
 economic and social trends in, 155
 illiberal hierarchy in, 101
 maritime infrastructure throughout, 47
 security network in, 156–60
 U.S. in, 200
 U.S. military in, 146
- information warfare
 international order impacted by, 58
 as postwar tactic, 17
- infrastructure development, in China, 195–96
- INF Treaty. *See* Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
- inter-Korean relations, 116–17
- Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 53, 65, 68–69, 71

- international order, 41
 AI and, 18
 American policymakers preserving, 76
 challenges and threats to, 66–69, 74–75, 211
 China and, 21, 193, 201, 203
 competition for, 13–19
 economic and social trends of, 175
 economics within, 47
 information age impacting, 58
 NATO and, 7, 14, 69
 new technologies and, 18
 in post-Cold War era, 57
 prosperity of China and, 26–27
 reliability, of alliances within, 67
 as rules-based, 41
 Russia and China against, 15
 security guarantees and, 33
 technological advancement of, 93–94
 U.S. alliance system preserving, 97
- interoperability
 of alliances, 1, 4
 military technologies and, 6
- Iran
 in Syria, 177
 Trump on, 180
- Iraq war, U.S. public opinion on, 59
- Islamic State group (ISG), U.S. alliance system against, 176–77
- Islamic terrorist groups, in Southeast Asia, 139, 148
- Israel, technological advancement of, 80
- Japan
 Abe leading, 45, 72, 120, 158
 Australia partnership with, 132, 157
 China and, 69, 157, 213
 military power of, 158
 NATO and, 45
 as security node, 159, 165, 167
 Trump and, 3
- Japan-South Korea alliance, challenges and threats to, 119–20
- Japan-U.S. alliance, 2, 28, 36, 209
 defense strategy of, 103–6
 rules-based order and, 102–12
 strategic competition of, 100
- JCOPA. *See* Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
- job creation, space exploration as, 125
- Johnson, Lyndon B., 210
- Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as nuclear deterrence, 180
- Juncker, Jean-Claude, 80
- Kennedy, John F., 63, 143, 165
- Kim Ji-yoon, 210
- Kim Jong-un, 115–16, 209
 challenges and threats of, 73
- leadership
 of China, 26–27, 47
 Russia and, 27
 through security guarantees, 22–23
 of Trump, 153
- liberal hierarchy, 102
 tiers of, 98
- liberal international order, 31–33, 97n3
 challenges and threats to, 97, 99
 economic competition sustaining, 108
 NATO stabilizing, 164
 as rules-based, 98
 USSR and, 163
- littoral strategy
 for economics, 40
 for the Indian Ocean, 47–48
 of U.S. military, 56
- Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 180
- malware, 91–93
- Mao Zedong, 189
- Marcos, Ferdinand, 145–46
- maritime infrastructure, 109
 of China, 139
 throughout Indo-Pacific, 47
- market-based liberal democracy model, strategic competition within, 101
- Mattis, Jim, 3, 41, 69
- MDO. *See* multi-domain operations (MDO)
- MDT. *See* Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)
- Middle East, 165, 176–80
 alliances and, 190, 205, 211
- military
 of China and Russia, 40
 interoperability and, 6
 in peacetime, 103
 technology transfers and, 76–78
 of UK, 31
 of U.S.-ROK alliance, 121
- military power
 of Australia, 158–59
 of Japan, 158

- of NATO, 62–63
- as strategic competition, 103–6
- modernization
 - of Chinese military, 57, 70
 - of nuclear weapons, 66–67
 - of Russian military, 15, 65
- Moon Jae-in, 73–74, 115–17, 120, 122
- Moxas, Manual, 141
- multi-domain operations (MDO), R&D for, 105–6
- multilateralism
 - in Asia, 141, 146, 156–58
 - of NATO, 164, 168
 - R&D and, 104
 - for security networks, 94
 - in U.S. alliance system, 45–46
- Munitions List, U.S., 76–79
- Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)
 - Pompeo on, 152n19
 - of U.S.-Philippine alliance, 142
- Mutual Defense Treaty, of U.S.-Japan alliance, 72
- NAC. *See* North Atlantic Council (NAC)
- Napoleon, 1, 3, 5, 8, 22
- nationalism
 - in Asia-Pacific region, 221
 - economic, social trends and, 86
 - of Philippines, 146
 - rules-based order threatened by, 222
 - in Vietnam, 16
- NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
- "new security concept", 197n12
- 9/11, 54, 56, 148
 - Pakistan and, 46
 - U.S. alliance system and, 139
- Nixon, Richard, 184, 210
- Nobel Peace Prize
 - EU and, 168
 - NATO and, 169
- nondemocratic states, in liberal hierarchy, 98
- nonproliferation, DPRK supporting, 125
- North Atlantic Council (NAC)
 - as defense strategy, 163
 - Eisenhower leading, 164
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2
 - after 9/11, 172–73
 - alliances within, 174
 - in Cold War, 162–63, 172
 - against cyberwarfare, 90, 93–94
 - democratic values maintained by, 170
 - evolution of, 161
 - international order and, 7, 14, 69
 - Japan and, 45
 - liberal international order stabilized by, 164
 - military power of, 62–63
 - multilateralism of, 164, 168
 - Nobel Peace Prize and, 169
 - nuclear deterrence by, 64–69
 - nuclear weapons and, 165
 - opinion polls of, 215
 - opinion polls on, 214–15
 - in post-Cold War era, 137, 167
 - Russian military and, 66
 - strategic policies of, 25, 168
 - Trump and, 3
 - Trump on, 206
 - U.S. domestic public on, 216
 - U.S. leadership of, 175
 - against USSR, 54, 166
 - WWII and, 161–64, 171
- North Korea (DPRK)
 - international security and, 42
 - nuclear weapons of, 36, 70, 117, 120
 - Trump and, 73, 115–16
 - U.S. alliance system and, 7
- NotPeya malware, 91–93
- nuclear deterrence
 - JCPOA as, 180
 - by NATO, 64–69
 - since WWII, 61–62
 - by U.S., 34, 53–54
 - against USSR, 172
- nuclear weapons, 6–7, 18
 - defense strategy impacted by, 61–62
 - of DPRK, 36, 70, 117, 120
 - modernization of, 66–67
 - NATO and, 165
 - peace and, 22
 - of Russian and U.S. militaries, 65
- Obama, Barack, 4, 14, 16, 53, 59, 71
 - ASEAN and, 150
 - Asia-Pacific region and, 134
 - Bashar al-Assad and, 176
 - DBB and, 78

- Southeast Asian alliance and, 151
- U.S. alliance system and, 206
- Official Development Assistance (ODA), financial investment through, 124
- Operational Control (OPCON) transitions, U.S.-ROK alliance and, 121–22
- opinion polls
 - about China and U.S., 219
 - about Trump, 210
 - Americans and, 2–3
 - NATO and, 214–15, 215
 - on U.S., 207–8, 209, 211, 218–19
 - U.S.-ROK alliance and, 212
- Osama bin Laden, 46
- Pakistan, 9/11 and, 46
- Park Geun-hye, 116, 120
- partnerships
 - American policymakers and, 37
 - between China, Japan, Australia, 157
 - against cybercrime, 88–90
 - for international security, 41–43
 - U.S.-ROK-China and, 127
- peacetime
 - defense strategy in, 55–56
 - economic growth in, 55
 - global operating system for, 23
 - military in, 103
 - nuclear weapons and, 22
- Permanent Structured Cooperation, EU (PESCO), Trump and, 80, 83
- Phibun Songkram, 142
- Philippines
 - counterterrorism and, 149
 - defense strategy of, 142
 - nationalism of, 146
 - Trump and, 152
 - U.S. military and, 140–41
- policymakers, American
 - alliances and, 38
 - international order preserved by, 76
 - partnerships and, 37
- Pol Pot, 186
- Pompeo, Mike, on MDT, 152n19
- post–Cold War era
 - bilateral relationships in, 36
 - international order in, 57
 - NATO in, 167, 172–73
 - in Southeast Asia, 138–39
 - strategic competition in, 102
 - U.S. alliance system in, 189
 - U.S.-Thai alliance and, 145
- postwar tactics
 - breaking point of, 24–28
 - economics and, 17
 - for security, 53
 - U.S. alliance system and, 16–17
- prospect theory, 27n20
- prosperity, of China, international order and, 26–27
- prosperity, U.S. alliance system and, 24
- proxy wars, as postwar tactic, 17
- Putin, Vladimir, 7, 15–16, 65–66, 167, 209
- Qaddafi, Muammar, 175, 186
- quantum technology, 18
- R&D. *See* research and development (R&D)
- Reagan, Ronald, 76, 166
- regional order
 - in Asia, 42–43, 45, 203
 - challenges and threats to, 37
 - China and, 155
 - Indo-Pacific in, 43–45
- reliability, of alliances, 72
 - within international order, 67
 - U.S. and, 20, 216
- Republic of Korea. *See* South Korea (ROK)
- research and development (R&D)
 - bilateral relationships and, 104
 - for MDO, 105–6
 - multilateralism and, 104
 - for technological advancement, 102–3
- restrictions, on military technology
 - transfers, 76–78
- revisionism, in great power war, 17
- rogue states, in liberal hierarchy, 98
- ROK. *See* South Korea (ROK)
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., Churchill and, 171
- rules-based order
 - ASEAN and, 140
 - challenges and threats to, 153, 222
 - China threatening, 150, 155
 - Japan-U.S. alliance and, 102–12
 - nationalism threatening, 222
 - in South China Sea, 149
 - U.S. alliance system and, 148, 177, 205
- Russia
 - allies and, 41
 - Crimea annexed by, 174

- cyberwarfare by, 66, 168
- as domestic threat to U.S., 28
- great power war created by, 51
- illiberal hierarchy advanced by, 100
- INF Treaty violated by, 68–69
- leadership of alliances and, 27
- military power of, 40
- in Syria, 177
- against U.S., 3, 5, 190–91
- Xi Jinping and, 199n20
- Russian military
 - after Cold War, 57
 - challenges and threats of, 71
 - modernization of, 15, 65
 - NATO and, 66
 - nuclear weapons of, 65
- Sadat, Anwar, 179, 186, 189
- sanctions
 - as postwar tactic, 17
 - UN and, 80
- Sanders, Bernie, 59
- SEATO. *See* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
- security networks
 - adaptability of, 45–46
 - AI for, 85
 - in Asia, 160, 196–97
 - Australian alliance policy for, 129
 - of China, 204
 - China region and, 194–98
 - competition threatening, 51
 - economic development strengthening, 157
 - hegemony through, 22–23
 - international order and, 33
 - NPRK and, 42
 - partnerships for, 41–43
 - in Southeast Asia, 147
 - of U.S. alliance system, 29–30, 44, 52, 211
 - U.S.-Philippine alliance and, 149
 - U.S. strategy for, 53
- security networks, Indo-Pacific region, 156–158
 - Australia, Japan as nodes in, 159, 165, 167
 - U.S. alliance system in, 160
- September 11, 2001. *See* 9/11
- SHAPE. *See* Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
- Singapore
 - Australian alliance policy and, 130
 - U.S. military and, 147–48
- South China Sea
 - rules-based order in, 149
 - U.S. military in, 150
- Southeast Asia
 - American strategy in, 140
 - Islamic terrorist groups in, 139, 148
 - Obama and, 151
 - post-Cold War era in, 138–39
 - security in, 147
 - U.S. alliance system in, 137–38, 145–46, 149, 153
- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 143n9
 - bilateral relationships supported by, 144
 - against communism, 143
- South Korea (ROK)
 - bilateral relationships of, 118, 120
 - economics and, 44
 - in support of nonproliferation, 125
 - as U.S. alliance, 73–75
- Soviet Union
 - alliances within, 31–32, 36, 38, 40, 44
 - in Cold War, 13, 16–17
 - competition with, 33
 - within international order, 32, 36, 38, 40, 44
 - liberal international order and, 163
 - NATO against, 54, 166
 - nuclear deterrence against, 172
 - nuclear weapons of, 62–63
 - .*See also* Russia
- space
 - adaptability of alliances in, 124–25
 - cyberthreats and security in, 70
 - defense strategy and, 105–6
 - as job creation, 125
 - technological advancement and, 60
 - U.S.-ROK alliance and, 115
- spheres of influence, 17, 40, 42
- strategic competition, 156
 - for alliances, 183–92
 - in Asia, 119, 198–202
 - financing infrastructure as, 109–10
 - of Japan-U.S. alliance, 100
 - within market-based liberal democracy model, 101
 - military power as, 103–6

- in post-Cold War era, 102
- trade as, 107
- Trump and, 154
- within U.S. alliance system, 111–12
- strategic policy
 - as Australian alliance policy, 128
 - of Australian-U.S. alliance, 130
 - of NATO, 168
- strategy, America
 - challenges and threats to, 34, 37–38
 - in Middle East, 178
 - in Southeast Asia, 140
- supply chain security, 85
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 68
- Syria
 - Iran and Russia in, 177
 - U.S. in, 176–77, 179
- technological advancement
 - as economic competition, 107
 - 5G as, 110
 - of international order, 93–94
 - of Israel, 80
 - quantum technology as, 18
 - R&D for, 102–3
 - space and, 60
 - in U.S. alliance system, 60
- technology transfers, military and, 76–80, 79–80
- Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), U.S. military and, 119, 210–12
- Thailand, 138, 145
- TPP. *See* Trans-Pacific Partnership
- trade, as strategic competition, 107
- Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 21, 28
 - Trump against, 45, 81
- treaties, for alliances, 52
- Truman, Harry S., 62
 - foreign policy of, 13
- Trump, Donald, 2, 6, 8–9, 59, 76, 126
 - America First and, 122, 153
 - arms market and, 83
 - Australia-U.S. alliance threatened by, 135, 207, 209
 - DPRK and, 73, 115–16
 - foreign policy of, 25, 217
 - international leadership of, 153
 - on Iran, 180
 - Korea and, 116–17
 - on NATO, 206
 - opinion polls on, 210
 - PESCO and, 80, 83
 - Philippines and, 152
 - strategic competition and, 154
 - as threat to alliances, 3–4, 18–19, 21, 132–34, 214
 - against TPP, 45, 81
 - U.S. public opinion on, 223
 - U.S.-ROK alliance threatened by, 122–23
- Turnbul, Malcolm, 133
- UK. *See* United Kingdom (UK)
- UN. *See* United Nations (UN)
- United Kingdom (UK)
 - Australia and, 77
 - against cyberwarfare, 91–92
 - military of, 31
- United Nations (UN), 29, 33–34, 45
 - sanctions and, 80
- United States (U.S.)
 - Asia, Europe, Middle East and, 6, 8
 - Australian alliance policy with, 132
 - challenges and threats toward, 40
 - China-South Korea alliance and, 119
 - China threatening, 3, 5
 - DOA and, 131
 - global operating system by, 23
 - in Indo-Pacific region, 200
 - within international order, 59
 - leadership of, 3–9, 25–26, 60, 175, 218–19
 - military power of, 27
 - NATO and, 25
 - nuclear deterrence by, 34, 53–54
 - nuclear weapons of, 65
 - opinion polls and, 2–3, 207–8, 209, 211, 219
 - power war with China, 218
 - reliability of, 20, 216
 - Russia, China against, 190
 - security network and, 44, 52
 - security provided by, 52
 - in Southeast Asia, 153
 - supply chain security, 85
 - in Syria, 176–77, 179
 - territories of, 52
- U.S. *See* United States (U.S.)
- U.S. alliance system
 - in Asia, 157
 - Australia and, 28
 - challenges and threats to, 56–59, 223

- China against, 34, 153
- Cold War and, 14
- domestic public opinion on, 134
- Duterte and, 152
- endurance of, 31–33, 35
- enforcement mechanisms within, 107
- in Eurasia, 197–98
- in Europe, 173–74
- flipping partners and, 190–91
- India within, 48
- Indo-Pacific region security network and, 160
- international order preserved by, 97
 - against ISG, 176–77
 - Japan and, 28
 - Korea within, 7
 - in Middle East, 178–80
 - multilateralism in, 45–46
 - 9/11 and, 139
 - Obama and, 206
 - in post-Cold War era, 189
 - postwar tactics and, 16–17
 - prosperity and, 24
 - public opinion on, 216
 - rules-based order and, 148, 177, 205
 - security and, 29–30, 211
 - shared values in, 52
 - in Southeast Asia, 137–38, 145–46, 149
 - strategic competition within, 111–12
 - technological advancement in, 60
 - Thailand and, 142
 - two purposes of, 13
- U.S. export control system, 77–78
- U.S.-Japan alliance
 - defense strategy of, 72
 - Mutual Defense Treaty of, 72
- U.S. military, 27
 - alliances and, 217
 - in Asia, 42–43, 52, 57, 217
 - defense strategy of, 165–66, 168
 - in Indo-Pacific region, 146
 - littoral strategy of, 56
 - Philippines and, 140–41
 - public opinion of, 2
 - Singapore and, 147–48
 - in South China Sea, 150
 - THAAD and, 119, 210–12
 - Thailand and, 143–44
 - in Vietnam War, 144–45
 - U.S.-Philippine alliance, security and, 149
 - U.S.-Philippine alliance, MDT of, 142
 - U.S.-ROK alliance, 30n10, 73–75, 113–14
 - adaptability of, 113–27
 - as bilateral relationship, 124–25
 - challenges and threats to, 115–16
 - cybersecurity and, 125–26
 - economic development through, 44
 - OPCON transitions and, 121–22
 - opinion polls and, 212
 - shared values of, 126–27
 - space and, 115
 - Trump threatening, 122–23
 - U.S.-ROK-China, as partnership, 127
 - U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance, 126
 - U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral military alliance, 119, 126
 - USSR. *See* Soviet Union
 - U.S. territories, 52
 - nuclear weapons in, 53
 - postwar tactics and, 17
 - U.S.-Thai alliance, 142–43
 - post-Cold War era and, 145
 - against Vietnam, 144
 - values, shared
 - of alliances, 45, 52
 - of U.S.-ROK alliance, 126–27
- Vietnam
 - Australia and, 131–32
 - nationalism in, 16
 - U.S. military in, 144–45
 - U.S.-Thai alliance against, 144
- WannaCry malware, 91–93
- Warsaw Pact, 31, 64, 76, 165, 166, 180
 - alliances through, 34, 64
- Washington, George, 1–2
- World War I (WWI), communism after, 138
- World War II (WWII)
 - alliances in, 162
 - NATO and, 161–64, 171
 - nuclear deterrence since, 61–62
- WWI. *See* World War I (WWI)
- WWII. *See* World War II (WWII)
- Xi Jinping, 69, 193–94, 196, 199n20, 200–201

ABOUT THE EDITOR AND AUTHORS

Dr. Michael J. Green is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and director of Asian Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He served on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) from 2001 through 2005 and has authored numerous books and articles on East Asian security.

Dr. Jon B. Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS in 2002, he served as a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. He also previously served as an expert adviser to the Iraq Study Group (also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission).

Patrick Buchan is a fellow with the Alliances and American Leadership Project, with a focus on Indo-Pacific security at CSIS. Prior to CSIS, Patrick served over three years as Australia's representative on the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) in Washington, DC, where he was responsible for alliance strategy in the Indo-Pacific. He has held several positions in both the Defence Department and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Heather A. Conley is senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director of the Europe Program at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS in 2009, she served as executive director of the Office of the Chairman of the Board at the American National Red Cross. From 2001

to 2005, she served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau for European and Eurasian Affairs, with responsibilities for U.S. bilateral relations with the countries of northern and central Europe. Ms. Conley began her career in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. She received her BA in international studies from West Virginia Wesleyan College and her MA in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Dr. Alice Ekman is head of China Studies, Center for Asian Studies, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) and associate professor at Sciences Po, Paris.

Richard Fontaine is president of the Center for a New American Security. Richard previously served as foreign policy adviser to Senator John McCain and has worked at the State Department, National Security Council, and on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Fergus Hanson is the head of the International Cyber Policy Centre at ASPI. He is the author of *Internet Wars* and has published widely on a range of cyber and foreign policy topics. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Professional Fulbright Scholar based at Georgetown University working on the uptake of new technologies by the U.S. government. He has worked for the UN, as a Program Director at the Lowy Institute, and served as a diplomat at the Australian Embassy in The Hague. He has been a Fellow at Cambridge University's Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Pacific Forum.

Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken is a senior research professor and the director of External Programs at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, as well as the Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College. From 2006 to 2009, he served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for policy planning and is currently serving on the staff of the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel.

Franklin C. Miller is principal of The Scowcroft Group. He is an internationally recognized expert on nonproliferation, defense, nuclear energy and policy issues, and export control. Mr. Miller served for 31 years in the U.S. government, including 22 years in the Department of Defense—serving under seven secretaries in a series of progressively senior positions—and four years as a special assistant to President George W. Bush and as senior director for defense policy and arms control on the National Security Council staff. Mr. Miller currently serves on the Defense Policy Board and the U.S. Strategic Command Advisory Group. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a director of the Atlantic Council of the United States. Mr. Miller received his BA (Phi Beta Kappa) from Williams College in 1972. He received an MPA from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School in 1977.

Dr. Satoru Mori is a professor at Japan's Hosei University and a visiting scholar with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is a former Japanese Foreign Ministry official, and holds a PhD from the University of Tokyo. Prior to joining CSIS, Satoru was a visiting researcher at Princeton University and George Washington University.

Alex Oliver is director of research at the Lowy Institute, having previously directed the Lowy Institute's program on diplomacy and public opinion. Alex has authored pieces for a wide range of international publications including *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. Prior to joining the Lowy Institute, Alex was a senior associate specializing in intellectual property and consumer law with Mallesons Stephen Jaques Solicitors.

Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper is a lecturer and a senior research scholar in law at Yale Law School, as well as a senior fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center. She studies and writes on U.S.-China relations and national security issues in Asia.

Dr. Kori Schake is the deputy director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). She was a distinguished research fellow at the Hoover Institution and is the editor, with Jim Mattis, of

the book *Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military*. She has served in various policy roles including at the White House for the National Security Council; at the Department of Defense for the Office of the Secretary and Joint Chiefs of Staff; and at the State Department for the Policy Planning Staff. During the 2008 presidential election, she was senior policy adviser on the McCain–Palin campaign.

Dr. Gabriel Scheinmann is the executive director of the Alexander Hamilton Society, an independent, nonpartisan, not-for-profit, membership organization dedicated to promoting constructive debate on basic principles and contemporary issues in foreign, economic, and national security policy. Before joining AHS, Dr. Scheinmann worked at CSIS as a research analyst and then served as the policy director at the Jewish Policy Center, where he co-edited a journal of international affairs. He is a widely published author on U.S. national security and foreign policy, including in the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Post*, and *Foreign Affairs*. He received his PhD and MA from Georgetown University and his BA from Harvard College.

Dr. Gary Schmitt studies U.S. national security and strategic issues at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he also directs AEI's Program on American Citizenship. Gary was previously a minority staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and executive director of the president's Intelligence Advisory Board. Gary holds a PhD in political science from the University of Chicago and a BA in politics from the University of Dallas.

Dr. Amy Searight serves as senior adviser and director of the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS. Most recently, she served in the Department of Defense (DoD) as deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia, from 2014 to 2016. Prior to that appointment, she served as principal director for East Asian security at DoD and as senior adviser for Asia in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). She holds a PhD in political science and an MA in East Asian studies from Stanford University, and she graduated magna cum laude from Williams College with a BA in political economy.

Dr. Sue Mi Terry is a senior fellow at CSIS and teaches at the Asian Studies Program at Georgetown University. Sue was previously an analyst of Korean issues at the Central Intelligence Agency and director for Korea, Japan, and Oceanic affairs at the National Security Council.

Dr. Daniel Twining is president of the International Republican Institute. He previously served as counselor at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and as a member of the U.S. secretary of state's Policy Planning Staff. These are his personal views.

Thomas Wright is the director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution. He is also a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. Previously, he was executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a lecturer at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, and senior researcher for the Princeton Project on National Security.

Dr. Dov S. Zakheim is a senior advisor at CSIS. He was under secretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer from 2001 to 2004 and deputy under secretary of defense for planning and resources from 1985 to 1987.

ABOUT CSIS

Established in Washington, D.C., over 50 years ago, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to providing strategic insights and policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world.

In late 2015, Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees. Mr. Pritzker succeeded former U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), who chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees from 1999 to 2015. CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2000.

Founded in 1962 by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS is one of the world's preeminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security; regional study; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and trade to global development and economic integration. For eight consecutive years, CSIS has been named the world's number one think tank for defense and national security by the University of Pennsylvania's "Go To Think Tank Index."

The Center's over 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look to the future and anticipate change. CSIS is regularly called upon by Congress, the executive branch, the media, and others to explain the day's events and offer bipartisan recommendations to improve U.S. strategy.

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).