Transitioning to a New Strategy: 2009-2010
Afghanistan and the Uncertain Metrics of Progress: Part Two

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Overview

Transitioning to the New Strategy

This report highlights graphics and tables that summarize the new strategy and campaign plan, the initial impact of the result build-up of US forces and changes in tactics and strategy on the intensity of the war, and early estimates of how the changes in strategy will impact on the US budget and the affordability of the war.

Setting the Stage: The Key Areas of Uncertainty that Shaped the New Strategy and Which Remain Key Challenges

The first chart highlights seven major challenges that drove the formation of the new strategy, that still affect every aspect of the war, that are reflected in the metrics shown in the other parts of this series, and where the US and other ISAF and donor governments need to do far more to provide credible and transparent unclassified reporting:

*Tactical victories against insurgents are meaningless unless they are used to provide the population with lasting security and the kind of stability, prompt justice, and governance that wins loyalty and leads most insurgents to reconcile.* Short term tactical successes and US-ISAF ability to secure the population in scattered areas do not measure the Taliban and other extremist capability to carry out terror and night campaigns, keep sleepers in place, move to different areas, and outwait the US and ISAF in a war of political attrition. As the metrics in this and the following reports show, these issues have not been addressed in meaningful form.

*The effectiveness of an alliance has nothing to do with the number of countries involved or the size of the forces involved. It depends on effective unity of effort in carrying out a strategy that can win.* ISAF has removed even its “map” of force strength from its web site. There is no listing of the national caveats that severely limit the role many national military contingents can play, and there are no effectiveness measures of the national forces involved. The same is true of the national Provincial Reconstruction Teams and civil-military efforts critical to implementing the “hold, build, and transition effort” essential to
providing the kind of stability, prompt justice, and governance that wins loyalty and leads most insurgents to reconcile. Ten years into the war DoD reporting does indicate that the number of major caveats has continued to grow, and there are no meaningful metrics that address any aspect of the effectiveness and coherence of ISAF efforts – either military or civil.

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The creation of effective Afghan forces is critical to providing security and the “clear and hold” phase of the war on a national level. It is equally critical to allowing “build” to provide stability, prompt justice, governance, and a functioning economy, as well as some form of transition where Afghan forces replace US and ISAF forces. The integrated NATO and US training mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) is the one aspect of reporting on the war that consistently provides transparent, credible metrics and narratives on the war. As Part Six shows, however, NTM-A is drastically short of the trainers it needs to succeed, and there is intense pressure to produce manpower numbers the possible expense of manpower quality. More seriously, there is no matching mix of transparent, credible metrics and narratives on the quality and effectiveness of Afghan forces once they leave formal training and enter the field, and little data on the quality of the partnering they need to succeed.

The unclassified effectiveness measures that are reported measure formal training and equipment resources and not performance in the field. Uncertain loyalties, ties to power brokers, retention and attrition problems, corruption are not addressed. The capability to both support the new strategy and support transition is not rated or analyzed in objective terms. Moreover, the police are rated independently from the rest of the justice system and the presence of effective governance – ratings that are virtually meaningless if the police are to play a key role in “hold, build, and transition” and free the Afghan Army to perform its military mission.

Effective Afghan governance at the national, provincial, district and local levels is equally critical to providing security and the “clear and hold” phase of the war on a national level. It is the core of creating the “build” capability necessary to providing stability, prompt justice, governance, and a functioning economy. So far, only limited progress seems to have occurred over the last
two years. Two election crises, and friction between Karzai and the US, have offset progress at the ministerial, provincial, district and local levels. A failure to create effective military and civil contracting systems led to both vast waste and a flood of funds into a unstable Afghan power structure that has turned the low-level corruption normal in grey economies into a crisis. While these mistakes are now being corrected, this effort comes late in the war and is not yet successful.

There is still inadequate coordination within the overall UN, national, and NGO aid effort. As Part Five of this series shows, there also is uncertain realism in setting either achievable mid and long-term goals that aid might actually achieve, or finding ways to allocate, manage, and measure the effectiveness of the short term civil and civil-military efforts that are critical to give tactical success in the “clear” mission lasting meaning through “build” and “hold.” The limited metrics and reporting on aid consists largely of uncoordinated spending activity, funding requests, project titles, and “spin” as to accomplishments that have little credibility. There is no evidence of fiscal responsibility, validated requirements, and above all lasting effectiveness – even in meeting the most urgent Afghan grievances and needs.

It is equally important to note that each ongoing challenge involves issues that raise serious issues as to whether the US, its allies, and GIRoA can create a successful transition to a lasting end state, and whether the future cost of the Afghan War represents the best overall international investment of US and allied national security and aid spending. As recent US metrics do show, there is no real prospect that the kind of ambitious goals set in the Afghan Compact, Afghan Development Plan, and various international conferences will be funded.

The need to objectively examine realistic end state and transition plans and the ability to achieve them. It is far from clear that it will be possible to achieve a successful end state in Afghanistan even if more modest and realistic goals are set for what ISAF, the UN, and US must accomplish. It is uncertain they can create the more limited “end state” defined in the ISAF campaign plan shown in this brief: “…the insurgency is defeated and no longer able to threaten the security of GIRoA. Afghanistan is stabilized, legitimate government extends to local levels, socio-economic programs benefit the majority of the Afghan people. GIRoA, with ISAF in support, is capable of assuming the lead for the provision of security. (ISAF, May 2010.)

Equal problems exist the those unclassified reports and metrics that risk making “transition” an exercise in political symbolism, rather than real world planning. Little effort is made to show how either 2011 nor 2014 can be realistic deadlines for reducing or ending the US and allied combat presence, or putting an end to major civil and military aid. In fact, one of the critical aspects of official plans, analyses, and metrics of the war is that they do not lay out a detailed or credible path forward to
A meaningful end state, or even reduced level of troop presence and aid expenditure. Far too many unclassified reports and metrics only describe vague conceptual end states – whose generalization are often in direct conflict with other official statements.

*Facing the reality that Pakistan is far more critical than Afghanistan.* Virtually all unclassified US, ISAF, and allied metrics and analyses focus on Afghanistan. They not address the critical role of Pakistan in shaping the fighting in Afghanistan and the extremist threat as an integrated part of the war, or involve matching analysis of the risks that Pakistan will become unstable or refuse to support the US and ISAF in ending Taliban, Al Qa’ida, and other extremist sanctuaries.

As is seen in Part Seven of this series, the US and ISAF have not produce unclassified analyses and metrics on the course of the war in Pakistan in ways that that show how Pakistan’s actions affects the war in Afghanistan, and Al Qa’ida’s role and sanctuary in Pakistan. This is critical because the stability of, and end state in, a nuclear armed Pakistan is far more important than the end state in Afghanistan, and the Afghan War loses most or all of its grand strategic purpose unless Pakistan becomes both friendly and stable. The same is true of reporting on the role of Iran and other Central Asian states, China, and Russia; and the limited amount of “end state” analysis ignore them completely.

*Dealing with the strategic cost-benefit of continuing the war.* No government has made a public effort to either estimate the future cost of the war in money and casualties, or to justify its strategic value relative to other uses of these resources. This is a critical failing, given the intense pressures on national security spending, shrinking forces in most countries, the risks in other regions of the world, and the severe limits to even US power projection capabilities.

**Seeking the Right Strategy and Campaign Plan**

All of these issues have to be considered in examining every aspect of the war, but especially the current strategy for winning it. No graphics can adequately summarize the details of this strategy, whose evolution is laid in far more detail in various ISAF reports, and the Department of Defense *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, April 2011, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/).
Even a brief review of the key graphics in this section does, however, reveal the emergence of a focused new strategy and an effort to create a more effective NATO, ISAF, UN and US effort. It is clear that NATO, the US, and ISAF did try to address most of the challenges that have just been discussed in formulating the new strategy, that it focused on the Afghan people and creating a meaningful “end state,” and no tactical victories that did much to alienate Afghans and nothing to build their loyalty. It is also clear that it set more realistic goals for such an “end state.”

There has, however, not been an adequate follow-up since mid-2010. The ISAF web site does little more than provide topic or daily data. The April 2011 edition of Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan does update key activities like efforts to define and plan transition, and the growth of the ANSF, but does not address many of the key analytic problems listed earlier.

Neither it, nor the President’s quarterly report to Congress, as yet provide a clear path towards each stage of transition, or address the major problems in creating a truly integrated civil military effort. They do not address the gap between the realism of the ISAF campaign plan and the more ambitious US and NATO “strategic framework” shown in some of the metrics in this section. For example, the bottom chart on page 17 shows that the there might be as much as a 70% shortfall in available aid resources in 2012-2013.

**Transitioning to the New Strategy**

The second section in this brief shows the initial operational focus of the new strategy. This is one of the few areas where unclassified reporting has been updated since mid-2010, and these new data placed in context in Part Six of this series. The problem is that there are so few supporting analyses and metrics that provide any consist picture of progress – of the lack of it – in any major part of the campaign now underway.

There have not been unclassified follow-ups to the reports and metrics ISAF and the Department of Defense issued from late 2009 through mid-2010 that have fully surveyed progress in terms of the level insurgent activity and influence by district, progress in governance, and progress in aid and development. There are also no indications as to whether limited areas of success can be scaled up on a national level. Reporting by ink spot is not a meaningful way of reporting on the success of the new strategy and the progress of the war.
Measuring the Rising Intensity of Combat Following the New Strategy: 2010-2011

The metrics in this section show the rising intensity of the fighting, and of its impact on security and stability as measured in terms of access to aid efforts, during 2009-2011. There is broad agreement the that level of the fighting – as measured in terms of major security incidents -- doubled over the previous year. There are also reports and metrics that show major progress in Helmand and a steady movement forward in the Kandahar area. There are also media and think tank reports that indicate major progress in the use of Special Forces and UCAVs.

Such progress was almost inevitable, however, given the scale of US military build-up in these areas, and increase in resources. US military activity is far more intense, and the metrics in the next section show the cost of US military operations in Afghanistan has risen from $29 billion in FY2008 to a budget of $101 billion in FY2011 – a roughly 250% increase since the new strategy began to be implemented. What is not yet clear, for the reasons listed earlier, is whether this is reversing enemy gains and providing a lasting movement towards “hold,” “build,” and “transition.”

Uncertain Cost and Affordability

There is no way as yet to analyze the total cost of the war to Afghanistan or to ISAF, and comparable breakouts of the financial cost of the fighting to individual allied countries is not available on their Ministerial web sites.

The US data in this section, however, do provide metrics that are a warning of the steadily rising cost of the war, and the risk that the US and allied publics will not sustain such efforts. So far the US, ISAF, and participating allied countries do not attempted to explain and justify war costs. No public effort was ever made to cost the new strategy, and no in depth estimate seems to have been made of the cost to any major stop towards transition. Virtually every estimate of US costs also differs in detail from the others – and the estimates of aid costs are grossly inconsistent.

It is also clear that the US – which clearly leads ISAF spending on the war -- is under intense pressure to cut all federal spending. It shows that the direct cost of the Afghan War alone will be close to one trillion dollars by the end of FY2011. (It would be over $1.2 trillion if related longer-term medical and reset costs were considered.) It also seems likely that only full political accommodation or sudden collapse of the Taliban/Haqqani network could keep costs below $100 billion a year through 2014, and remove the need for major military and economic aid expenditures well beyond 2020.)
As noted earlier, this highlights the need to have a credible end state and transition plan for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to explicitly consider whether funding the overall war is the best global use of US strategic resources. The answer may still be yes, but current unclassified reporting does not even address the issue.

The Need for More Data and Transparency

Virtually every expert on the Afghan War could add new points to this list. It is also obvious from many of these points that the metrics shown in this report can only hint at a few key trends and problems. In far too many cases, there are no metrics and no reliable detailed histories – although the kind of metrics and analysis that should have existed is easy to derive from the summary of each problem.

At the same time, it is critical to stress that major progress is being made in addressing many of the issues involved, and metric are only part of that story. For all of the occasional omissions that limit unclassified reporting on the war, major progress has occurred over the last two years, and additional major efforts to correct these problems are underway.
“Winning” Must Still Address Seven Centers of Gravity

• Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

• Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

• Building up a much larger and more effective (and enduring base for transition) mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

• Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy (and lasting stability) at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

• Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil and civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.

• Dealing with Pakistan both in the NWFP and as a potential failed state. Finding stable relations in India, Iran, “Stans,” Russia, and China

• Making effective trade-offs with other US domestic and security interests
Seeking the Right Strategy and Campaign Plan
The ISAF View of Challenges and Risks

Critical Risks:
- Governance: Ineffective or discredited
- Pakistan: Insufficient steps to curb insurgent support and sanctuary
- Afghan ownership: Inability to mobilize and share responsibility

Key Challenges:
- Civ-mil disconnect in clear-hold-build campaign
- Divergence of coalition expectations and campaign timelines
- Waning domestic (coalition) political support
- Rejection of reconciliation by ‘spoilers’
- Resilient and growing insurgency
- Rejection or stagnation of ANP
But, ISAF Concludes the War is Still Winnable

The situation is serious -- significant change is required.

• We have a key advantage – Taliban is not a popular movement (yet); population is frustrated by GIRoA, we must make them believe ISAF / GIRoA can succeed

• Taliban represents an existential threat -- only they have sufficient organizational capability and support to pose a threat to GIRoA’s viability (they are most coherent in the south)

• Regional instability is rapidly increasing and getting worse

• New strategy will incur risks -- not properly executing the strategy has greater risk
  – Longer war
  – Greater casualties
  – Higher overall costs
  – Loss of political support

  • Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum requires protecting the population and changing perceptions

• Under-resourcing significantly elevates risk, increases lag time, and is likely to cause failure

• Success requires operating / thinking, in a fundamentally new way

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Campaign Strategy

Protect the Population.
- Prioritize effort in high-density population areas where insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Reduce civilian casualties.

Enable Afghan National Security Forces.
- Accelerate and expand indigenous security force capacity and capability. Partner at every echelon.

Neutralize malign influence.
- Identify and report corruption; forge responsible and accountable governance.

Support extension of governance.
- Gain active support of the population by empowering legitimate sub-national leaders with effective population security measures.

Support socio-economic development.
- Gain active support of the population by creating security conditions that provide space for community-based development opportunities. Connect econ corridors.
COMISAF Intent

Purpose
- Assist GIROA in defeating the insurgency
- Protect the Afghan population and separate insurgent influence
- Gain popular support for the government
- Allow sustainable progress and promote legitimacy
- Prevent the return of transnational terrorists and eliminate potential safe havens

Method
- Conduct the operation in three stages: A) Gain the Initiative; B) Achieve Strategic Consolidation; and C) Sustain Security.
- Gain the initiative and stop insurgent momentum in the next 12-18 months
- Establish closer cooperation with the International Community
- Achieve improved integration and CIV-MIL operational cohesion

Endstate
- Insurgency defeated to within GIROA’s capacity
- Legitimate governance extends to local levels
- Socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people
- GIROA, with ISAF support, is capable of assuming the lead for security

ISAF, May 2010
Campaign Design

Lines of Operation

PROTECT the Population
- Partner with ANSF to secure population centers
- Tailor force packages with mentor teams
- Isolate INS from population
- Reduce INS intimidation, coercion, persuasion
- Disrupt INS C2, operations and sustainment

ENABLE Afghan National Security Forces
- Recruit and train ANSF for COIN operations
- Build sustainable capacity and capability in ANSF
- Professionalize the force thru reform/accountability
- Identify corruption; assist GIRoA with detainee system
- Disrupt foreign sponsorship / support to INS in AFG
- Prevent narco-state; deny narco-profiteering
- Enhance Regional Cooperation

SUPPORT Extension of Governance
- Increase GIRoA institutional capacity; enhance RoL
- Enhance Provincial Reconstruction Teams
- Support formal and informal sub-national structures
- Support provision of essential services

SUPPORT Socio-economic Development
- Establish infrastructure and transportation networks
- Increase employment opportunities / alternative livelihoods
- Establish education programs
- Solicit Donors / establish Afghan Development Zones

Operational Objectives

Tier 1: Kandahar, Helmand, Khowst, Paktia, Paktika;
Tier 2: Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar River Valley, Kapisa, Wardak, Logar, Zabul, Uruzgan;
Tier 3: Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kunduz.

Phase 3 ends when the insurgency is defeated and no longer able to threaten the survival of GIRoA, Afghanistan is stabilized, legitimate governance extends to local levels, socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people, and GIRoA, with ISAF in support, is capable of assuming the lead for the provision of security.

Means
- GIRoA and ANSF
- NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations, UNAMA, Partners
- Funding: International Community, Donors, UN, NATO, EU

UNCLASSIFIED

ISAF, May 2010
Phasing of Progress Toward Stability

Operational Progress ➔ Civil Progress ➔ Strategic Progress

Upturn in Violence

Increased operational tempo results in temporary increase in violence

Governance lags security

Confidence lags both

Security Campaign

Governance Campaign

Afghan Confidence

Violence

Effects

Time

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
Strategic Framework for US Efforts: June 2010 - I

U.S. Goal: Disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return

Framework Documents
- Afghan National Development Strategy
- U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Afghanistan Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy
- Integrated Civilian Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan

Timeline of Selected Documents
- Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign Plan
- NATO OPLAN
- ISAF OPLAN
- U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Afghan National Development Strategy
- Afghanistan-Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy

Examples of U.S. and International Efforts; Key Oversight Issues

Security: U.S. and NATO efforts focus on stabilizing Afghanistan
- Average daily attacks in Afghanistan, 2004-2010
- Number of average daily attacks per month
- Security force and coalition forces
- Total average daily attacks
- Average daily attacks - Civilian
- Average daily attacks - Afghan National Security Forces

Goverance: U.S. and international partners focus on building accountable government
- Ministerial positions (April 2010)
- After two rounds of voting, as of April 2010 Afghanistan has filled key ministerial positions, yet some positions remain unfilled and are being led by acting ministers
- Efforts at the local level include the National Solidarity Program, which seeks to empower the grass roots of Afghan society by facilitating the establishment of elected governance bodies to help build and restore infrastructure

Development: U.S. and international partners provide substantial assistance to Afghanistan
- Anticipated funding and expected expenditures, 2008-2013
- Cumulative budget shortfall
- Assistance from donors
- Domestic revenue
- Total expenditures

Source:
- GAO analyses of Department of Defense data; Defense Imagery (photos)
Strategic Framework for US Efforts: June 2010 - II
Afghan 2015: Strategic Assessment

PRISM FOR POST-ISAF PROJECTIONS

CURRENT
- U.S.
- Coalition
- Int'l Organizations
- Global Powers
- Regional Neighbors
- Afghans
- Multinational Corps

- Taliban
- Al Qaeda
- Other Insurgents
- Other Terrorists
- Transnational Crime

DEVELOPMENTS 2011-14
- GILR and PAK
- US Public Diplomacy
- Regional
- Socio-Economic

GLOBAL
- Global
- US Public Diplomacy
- Regional
- Socio-Economic

AFGHANISTAN
- GILR and PAK
- US Public Diplomacy
- Regional
- Socio-Economic

2015 & BEYOND

OPPORTUNITIES
- GILR Legitimacy
- Insurgent Defeat
- CN Success
- Effective Int'l Org

- GILR Succession
- ANSF Training
- ISAF Transitioned
- UNAMA Morph

RISKS
- PAK Failure
- Global Diversion
- LT Strike India

- PAK Sanctuary
- No Coalition
- Regional Conflict

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Transitioning to the New Strategy: 2009-2010
ISAF Campaign Plan – June 2010

**Strategic Main Effort:** Grow the ANSF

- **Badghis-Ghormach**
  - #4 – Islam Qal’eh
  - #7 – Torah Ghundey
- **Central Helmand**
  - #5 – Zaranj
- **Kandahar**
  - #2 – Wesh (Chaman)
- **Kunduz-Baghlan**
  - #3 – Hairatan
  - #6 – Shayr Khan Bandar
- **Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman**
  - #5 – Ghulum Khan
- **Paktika, Paktiya, Khost and Ghazni**
  - #1 – Tor Kham
- **Operational Main Effort**
  - Kunduz – Baghlan
- **Economy of Force**
  - Paktika, Paktiya, Khost and Ghazni

**Shaping/Supporting Effort**
- **Badghis-Ghormach**
- **Central Helmand**
- **Kunduz-Baghlan**
- **Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman**
- **Paktika, Paktiya, Khost and Ghazni**

**Key Terrain District**
- Area of Interest Districts
- Border Crossing Point

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
3.3: Operations

3.3.1: Regional Command – East (RC-E)

RC-East operations over the past six months included: building and reinforcing Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) competence, capacity, and credibility in a partnered effort to protect the population; connecting credible and benign governance to the people; supporting sustainable development; gaining freedom of movement for the Afghan population; and neutralizing the insurgents. RC-E operations are combined and unified, partnered ANSF and Coalition military operations, and collaborative civil-military efforts with U.S. interagency and international partners – civilian, governmental, and non-governmental organizations – at all levels. Through combined and unified action, RC-E increased the Combined Team’s depth of coverage over the populace, reaching out to the district and village leaders. The ANP are the RC-E priority of effort to connect Afghan governance to the populace. Governance and development initiatives are aimed at creating tangible and measurable progress, and they support efforts to improve security and promote sustained stability.

Major operations during the period strived to deny enemy safe havens and staging areas, and disrupt enemy freedom of action. In Nangahar, Konar, and Laghman provinces, RC-E emphasized improved service delivery, civil training programs, and stability projects in key population centers. RC-E operations improved security conditions for Parliamentary elections.
Must Show Can Reverse Insurgent
Momentum at a Broader Level:
Struggle for the Rest of the Population

Most Threatened Population Areas

Elements of Insurgent Influence
- Shadow governance
- Population intimidated and/or coerced
- Insurgents have Freedom of Movement
- Friendly Freedom of Movement limited
- Infrastructure development disrupted
- Economic capacity truncated

Create time and space
Enable population opportunity to choose

Elements of Security Influence
- National thru local governance improved
- Security in key population centers
- Security connected between regions
- Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
- Major infrastructure projects ongoing
- Economic corridor sustainable

ISAF, May 2010
Operation Omid (Hope)

Zaranj

Torah Ghundi

Islam Qalah

Hafratan

Sher Khan Bandar

Tor-Kham

Gulum Khan

Weesh (Chaman)

Decisive Operation

ISAF, 25.1.2011
Measuring the Rising Intensity of Combat Following the New Strategy: 2009-2010
ISAF Warns that “Time is Running Out....”

- The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces.

Kinetic Events by Geography

- Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.
- Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.
- The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09).

DOD attack data as of March 2010 show that the pattern of enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan has remained seasonal in nature, generally peaking from June through September each year and then declining during the winter months (see fig. 1). As the graph indicates, while attacks have continued to fluctuate seasonally, the annual attack “peak” (high point) and “trough” (low point) for each year since September 2005 have surpassed the peak and trough, respectively, for the preceding year. Similarly, while attack levels have fallen since their August 2009 peak, they remain higher than comparable figures from prior years. For example, total attacks against coalition forces between September 2009 and March 2010 increased by about 83 percent in comparison to the same period last year, while attacks against civilians rose by about 72 percent. Total attacks against the ANSF increased by about 17 percent over the same period.

Source: GAO, 4/2010
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): Leaders based in Pakistan; operational presence in northern Afghanistan

Hezb-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG): Longest active but least effective of Afghan insurgent groups; led by Hekmatyar Gulbuddin; strongest operational presence in northeast

Pakistani Militant and Terrorist Networks: Harakat ul Jihad-e Islami, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Lashkar-e Janghvi, and Jaish-e Mohammad; conduct attacks against the Pakistani Government and cooperate with terrorist groups

Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT): Multi-faceted terrorist group based in Pakistan; planned and conducted the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India

Al-Qaida (AQ): Primary Safe Havens in North/South Waziristan; supports the Afghan insurgency; allies include HQN, Taliban, and TTP

Haqqani Network (HQN): Taliban affiliated insurgent group founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani; focused on Paktika, Paktya and Khost provinces in RC-East and based in North Waziristan; responsible for several high-profile attacks in Kabul

Taliban (TB): Largest Afghan insurgent group; ruled from 1996-2001; operates throughout country but strongest in south and east; Led by Mullah Omar and senior leaders in Pakistan

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Loosely affiliated groups that operate in several agencies across the FATA and in the settled areas; responsible for failed 1 May 2010 Times Square Attack
The War Becomes Real:
Total Weekly Kinetic Events 7-08 to 9-10

3.6: Violence and Kinetic Events

One indicator for illustrating violence levels is kinetic events (KEs). Total kinetic events increased nearly 55 percent over the previous quarter and 65 percent compared to the third quarter, 2009, as Figure 12 below indicates. The overall increase was driven primarily by increased incidents of direct fire. Insurgent-initiated attacks also increased this quarter by over 60 percent, and direct fire attacks comprised the majority of this increase. The rise in violence is partly attributable to the increase in Coalition Forces and ANSF as well as greater operational tempo. The sharp increase in insurgents’ use of direct fire attacks may be significant, as it suggests capacity limitations for the insurgents.

Kinetic Events (KE) include Direct Fire (DF), Indirect Fire (IDF), Surface to Air Fire (SAFIRE), Improvised Explosive Device (IED) events. IED events comprise IED exploded, IED found/cleared, mine strike, mine found/cleared, and turn-ins.

There have been increases in all methods of attacks, except IEDs, which were lower in August 2010 than they were in August 2009, and direct fire (DF) is increasing at a higher rate than indirect fire (IDF). This is possibly due to the amount of resources it takes to attack utilizing IDFs versus DF and IEDs. Overall kinetic events are up 300 percent since 2007 and up an additional 70 percent since 2009. Total kinetic events increased nearly 55 percent over the previous quarter and 65 percent compared to the third quarter, 2009, as Figure 12 below indicates. The overall increase was driven primarily by increased incidents of direct fire. Insurgent-initiated attacks also increased this quarter by over 60 percent, and direct fire attacks comprised the majority of this increase. The rise in violence is partly attributable to the increase in Coalition Forces and ANSF as well as greater operational tempo. The sharp increase in insurgents’ use of direct fire attacks may be significant, as it suggests capacity limitations for the insurgents.


As of 18 March 2011

Chart displays enemy action and explosive hazards to include executed attacks; potential attacks (IEDs/mines found & cleared) are not included.

Source: ISAF, March 24, 2011

Cache: A facility or location where supplies are hidden or otherwise concealed and are not readily available. A cache may consist of weapons or other equipment that supports insurgent activities. Examples are unarmed/incomplete devices, IED paraphernalia, ammunition, radios, uniforms, as well as narcotics and explosive precursors.

Source: ISAF, March 24, 2011
Consistent with the five year trend (above) attacks by armed opposition groups continue to rise. This year they were 64% higher than 2009, the highest inter-annual growth rate we have recorded (see inset graph above). If averaged, the total of 12,244 armed operations (mostly small arms ambushes, below right) represents roughly 33 attacks per day, every single day of the year. In September this rate jumped to more than 50 attacks per day, or 1,541 operations, as they ramped up their efforts to disrupt parliamentary elections that month. The year followed a familiar pattern with Jan/Feb starting slow, as AOG remobilize from the winter retreat, followed by seven solid months of expansion and a rapid de-escalation back to December. The final month closing out at 47% higher than December 2009.

UN Estimate of Security Incidents Per Month: 1/2003 to 7/2010

Source: United Nations Department of Safety and Security
Major Increases in the Impact of US Air Power

**OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM/International Security Assistance Force**

### Close Air Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Sorties w/Weapons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>13,962</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>19,092</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>26,474</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>33,869</td>
<td>15%</td>
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**Weapons Releases**

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<tr>
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<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<td>Jan</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>159</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>335</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>517</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>467</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>770</td>
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<td>719</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>257</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>880</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>5,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,198</td>
<td>5,051</td>
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**OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM/OPERATION NEW DAWN**

### Close Air Support

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**Weapons Releases**

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<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
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<td>Nov</td>
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<td>Dec</td>
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**Combined Data**

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<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<td>Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties</td>
<td>6,165</td>
<td>7,832</td>
<td>11,202</td>
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<td>56,179</td>
<td>51,945</td>
<td>52,905</td>
<td>63,324</td>
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<td>Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)</td>
<td>205,816</td>
<td>270,007</td>
<td>251,738</td>
<td>264,839</td>
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<td>Airlift Passengers</td>
<td>1,075,583</td>
<td>1,177,533</td>
<td>1,269,710</td>
<td>1,301,740</td>
<td>1,369,002</td>
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<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>8,182,066</td>
<td>16,576,297</td>
<td>32,267,606</td>
<td>60,400,000</td>
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<td>Tanker Sorties</td>
<td>12,391</td>
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<td>15,875</td>
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<td>17,465</td>
<td>17,296</td>
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<td>Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>871</td>
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<td>1,076</td>
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<td>79,798</td>
<td>86,288</td>
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<td>9,701</td>
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</table>

The Key Risk is Still in the South: UN Security Ratings in March 2010

Security map (as at 30 March 2010) and opium cultivation in Afghanistan by province, 2010

Source security map: UNODC
Source cultivation: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
The War is National: District Security Ratings in November 2010

The map shows the 02 September 2010 security district assessment results. The arrows indicate positive or negative change compared to the 18 March 2010 security district assessment. The change captured in the above figure is a district that changed to or from a “satisfactory” rating. A “satisfactory” rating is equal to green (secure environment) or yellow (occasional threats). The proportion of the population residing within the 124 key terrain and area of interest districts living in areas rated as “satisfactory” remains relatively unchanged over the past three quarters, (a “satisfactory” rating comprises the highest two rating levels, “Secure Environment” and “Occasional Threats.”) The map in Figure 10 below depicts the current ratings of the 124 key terrain and area of interest districts as assessed by IJC. The arrows indicate districts that have increased to or decreased from a rating of “satisfactory” compared to June 2010. In RC-East, three districts’ ratings decreased from June to September 2010. In particular, the Nawah ye Barakzai district in RC Southwest improved its security rating.

The War is National: ANSO (NGO) Security Ratings by Provide in January 2011

ANSO: Provincial Insecurity Rating, December 2010
(Rating based on analytical assessment and not just incident rate. Total AOG attacks for 2010 indicated in map)

ANSO Growth in Attacks by Province: 2009 vs. 2010

This table provides raw AOG attack rate data per province for 2009 and 2010, plus the percentage growth rate, per province. The average referred to is the 64% overall growth rate countrywide. Notable is that of the 10 provinces in RC-North six of them saw above average growth from 107%-252%. As a bloc, the provinces of P2K (Paktya, Paktika & Khost) plus Ghazni saw the sharpest deterioration with an average 158% increase of attacks across all four. Only five provinces saw less violence than last year with one being the capitol.

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<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>SAR-E PUL</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>252%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHAZNI</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>234%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKTYA</td>
<td>180</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAKTIKA</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>897</td>
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<tr>
<td>HELMAND</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>1387</td>
<td>124%</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAGHLAN</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>222</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAKHAR</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>115%</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARYAB</td>
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<td>293</td>
<td>114%</td>
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<td>SAMANGAN</td>
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<td>BALKH</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>107%</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHOST</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>90%</td>
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<tr>
<td>URUZGAN</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>82%</td>
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<td>NANGARHAR</td>
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<td>FARAH</td>
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<td>BAMYAN</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>-82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Uncertain Cost and Affordability
Putting The Economic Burden of Defense Spending into Perspective (% of GDP)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2011 to 2021, January 2011, p. 79
Funding Iraq at the Expense of the Afghan War: FY2001-FY2011
(In Current $US Billions)

CBO Estimate of Cost of Afghan War to US: FY2001-FY2011
(In Current $US Billions)


9/13/21
Estimated Appropriations Provided for U.S. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and for Other War-Related Activities, 2001 to 2011

(Billions of dollars of budget authority)

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</tbody>
</table>

Total Budget Authority 14 19 88 110 79 118 170 187 154 164 159 1,263

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: * = between zero and $500 million.
CBO “Guesstimate” of Future U.S. Cost of Both Wars

Table 1-7. Continued

| Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. |
| Notes: Negative numbers indicate an increase in the deficit; positive numbers indicate a decrease in the deficit. |
| GDP = gross domestic product; AMT = alternative minimum tax; * = between -$500 million and $500 million. |

| a. This alternative does not extrapolate the $159 billion in budget authority for military operations and associated costs in Afghanistan and Iraq provided for 2011. However, it incorporates the assumption that future funding for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere would total $118 billion in 2012, $83 billion in 2013, $54 billion in 2014, and about $35 billion a year from 2015 on—for a total of $496 billion over the 2012–2021 period. (See Box 3-2) |
| b. Excluding debt service. |
| c. Under this alternative, appropriations for 2011 for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are extrapolated according to the rules that govern CBO’s baseline. |
| d. The estimates are from the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and CBO and are preliminary. |
| e. This alternative incorporates the assumption that legislative action extends title I of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (which extended for 2011 and 2012 income tax provisions enacted in 2001, 2003, and 2009) and title III of that act (which modified estate and gift taxation for 2010 through 2012). It does not incorporate the assumption that the AMT is indexed for inflation. The effects of that alternative are shown separately. |
| f. This alternative incorporates the assumption that the exemption amount for the AMT (which was increased through the end of 2011) is extended at its higher amount and, together with the AMT tax brackets, is indexed for inflation after 2011. In addition, the treatment of nonrefundable personal credits (which was also continued through the end of 2011) is assumed to be extended. |
| g. The combination of extending certain income tax provisions scheduled to expire on December 31, 2012, and indexing the AMT for inflation reduces revenues by more than the sum of those alternatives considered alone. The total shown here includes an additional revenue loss of $657 billion over the 2013–2021 period resulting from the interaction of the two policies. |
| h. These estimates include the impact of extending about 80 expiring provisions. Many of those credits are set to expire at the end of 2011 and many have been extended previously, such as the research and experimentation tax credit and the tax credit for ethanol-blended motor fuels. The additional first-year depreciation deduction of 50 percent for business equipment is set to expire at the end of 2012. |

CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2011 to 2021, January 2011, p. 23
The Future Cost of Underspending: Guesstimate of Annual and Cumulative Cost of “Worst Cost” Success in the Afghan War: FY2010-FY2020
(In Current $US Billions)

--Extremely intense fighting with dropping allied support.
--"Supplemental" in FY2010
--Make decisive gains by FY15.
--US and ISAF withdrawal cautiously

--Maintain significant support funding of Afghan forces and government through FY2020 & beyond
--DoD pays cost of police as well as armed forces, and protection of remaining civil & military advisory presence though

Key Elements of Progress
2009-2010
Progress in Many Key Areas - I

- Clear recognition of the seriousness of the war, and that it must be won on a population-centric, rather than kinetic level.
- Viable approach to strategy that can deal with the realities of this war and is flexible and adaptive enough to adjust to the insurgent response.
- Growing operational understanding that the goals for Afghan development have been fundamentally unrealistic in timing and scope, and acceptance of a much more limited and practical endstate based on Afghan priorities and perceptions and key needs for security and stability. However, this understanding is still far from a realistic management of goals and expectations, but is moving towards acceptance of the fact that we must plan for "Afghan good enough" and not "Afghan unachievable."
- Fundamental reorganization of the intelligence efforts to provide far more honest reporting, better metrics and judgments, and the kind of "net assessment" and civil-military approach necessary to understand what is happening and to support a meaningful campaign. This is supported by considerably more realistic strategic assessments that still have a long way to go to getting it right -- perhaps a year more -- but still prove to be major progress.
- Build up of a US force large enough to deal with the most critical threats, and a de facto recognition that -- as was the case in Iraq -- the US must lead to win, rather than hope for allied efforts that will not come.
- Deployment of US forces on the basis of overall strategic priorities, rather than by zone of operations. In addition, a real partnership with the British, and an understanding that we must play a role in the center and north, rather than rely on our allies, or see continued insurgent gains.
- Progress in providing civilian assets in the field. While still badly short of what is needed, it represents the core of the effort required.
- Shifts in aid and civil/governance efforts that give priority to key security and stability needs, and lay the groundwork for building up more effective governance and economic progress at the key district and population center level.
- Sufficient progress in the counter-IED effort to prevent it from being the Taliban's equivalent of the Stinger.
- Growing understanding that the primary problem the US faces in strategic communications is to build transparency, credibility, and trust in the US public, Congress, allies, and media and to do so in ways that have lasting credibility and impact, rather than spinning the war in ways that build ignorance and mistrust.
Progress in Many Key Areas - II

• Growing understanding that the US, ISAF, and aid funds and contracts are the main source of today’s unacceptable level of Afghan corruption and wealthy power brokers, but the steadily improving efforts to control the flow of aid and contract money. Specifically, limiting it to the Afghans who use it properly and focusing on the effectiveness of our efforts rather than the size and rate of spending. While it is probably a year away from broad effectiveness and two years away from the level of control that is really needed, it still proves to be some significant progress.

• First real effort to adequately resource and organize the ANSF development effort. While there are still serious problems, they seem to be solvable over time and this effort is already making real progress at the ANA level.

• Acceptance of the need to create Afghan forces and structure of local governance that

• Growing understanding that the US country effort must be a truly integrated civil-military effort, or we will lose the war. There is at least some progress in reorganizing the US country team both in Kabul and the field. Though this is still about a year or so from the effort we need, it shows real progress.

• Some matching progress on the part of our allies, and in restructuring the ISAF/PRT effort in the field.

• Serious efforts in the field to go from a conceptual approach to shape-clear-hold-build to actual operations in Helmand, and the beginning of operations in Kandahar. A new degree of coherence in similar efforts in RC East. This is all still experimental and uncertain -- particularly in the ability to sustain progress over time -- but is also inevitable given the limited level of effort when the new strategy was put in place.

• Real, if still imperfect, progress in making Pakistan a meaningful partner in the war.

• Deployment of enough UCAV, Special Forces, and other intelligence assets to pose a continuing threat to insurgent networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. More effective use of "counterterrorism" tools as well as counterinsurgency tools.

• Changes in counternarcotics tactics: moving away from the focus of broad eradication that effectively drove narcotics into the control of the Taliban to a focus on higher level traffickers and networks and key areas of insurgent control.

• Serious effort to find a working balance between the real world limits imposed by the Karzai and Pakistani governments, and finding the practical work arounds to these limits. Though an extremely uncertain process, and some impossible efforts to transform the Afghan and Pakistani power structure exist, it is still better and less pointless confrontation.
But, “Winning” Must Still Address Seven Centers of Gravity

• Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

• Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

• Building up a much larger and more effective (and enduring base for transition) mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

• Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy (and lasting stability) at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

• Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil and civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.

• Dealing with Pakistan both in the NWFP and as a potential failed state. Finding stable relations in India, Iran, “Stans,” Russia, and China

• Making effective trade-offs with other US domestic and security interests