The Key Ongoing Challenges that Help Shape the Outcome of the War
Afghanistan and the Uncertain Metrics of Progress: Part Three

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The Key Ongoing Challenges that Help shape the Outcome of the War

This analysis, which is Part Three of the seven part series on The Uncertain Metric of Afghanistan, highlights the unclassified graphics and tables that describe the key individual challenges that affect the course of the fighting and the ability to implement the new strategy. The metrics and narratives in this brief focus on six key sets of issues.

An Evolving Insurgency: Informal, Adaptive, Distributed Networks

The US and ISAF are making progress in defeating the insurgency in the field, and attacking its leaders and networks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most recent reporting, however, is by background briefing to the media, and is highly localized and anecdotal. While the summary metrics describing the Taliban and other insurgents have value, they ignore critical areas in the fighting.

As Part Six of this series shows, Claims about tactical victories at the local level may or may not be significant, since the insurgency can recruit and promote new volunteers, disperse, shift targets, move to more secure areas, or go underground.

Similarly, vague claims that insurgents are tired of fighting have little historical credibility. Even successful attacks on leaders and senior cadres usually only have a temporary effect.

Failures to look at popular, ANSF, and insurgent opinion about who is winning or losing, and the need to accommodate the insurgents in some political settlement, do not evaluate the Taliban and GIRoA in net assessment terms.

A focus on the areas where ISAF and the US are most active ignores Taliban and other insurgent gains and losses in other areas. It also ignores areas in Afghanistan where the threat forces may be exploiting a lack of ISAF and ANSF/GIRoA effectiveness, and the nature and impact of sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
An emphasis on temporary gains – particularly at the tactical combat level -- does not deal with the reality that the Taliban can win by outlasting ISAF and the US in a war of political attrition, and that it can maintain influence through shadow and sleeper structures, and low-level terrorism, assassination, extortion, kidnapping, night operations, and other forms of intimidation of officials, police, and the Afghan people.

Moreover, the way in which district and provincial numbers are aggregated does not spotlight the areas where Taliban and insurgent influence is increasing or static.

Focusing on Afghanistan to the exclusion of Pakistan denies one of the fundamental realities of the war.

Insurgent structures are networked with power brokers, a countrywide system of checkpoints and fees, elements in GIRoA and the ANSF, and Pakistani officials and officers. Analysis that only looks at the threat by group does not address their real world operational power structure.

Case after historical case has shown it is critical to maintain chronologies that show how given groups change their targets and tactics, and how well they adapt over time.

Mirror imaging Afghan popular perceptions to show they do not support the Taliban does not measure anger, resentment, and indifference to GIRoA, ISAF, and US values and actions. It also does not provide an adequate picture of why the Taliban and other groups attract volunteers and public support. Focusing on pay rather than ideology, status, faction, and religion creates similar problems.

**Casualties: A Perceptual Weapon**

The US and allied countries publish realistic death estimates for Afghanistan, within the severe limits imposed by the inability to measure civilians killed with any accuracy. Such estimates are inherently uncertain and controversial. They do not, however, cover wounded and injured for Afghan forces or civilians, and historically, these totals are around 5 to 7 times higher than the figures for those killed. Moreover, these data do not cover Pakistani forces and civilians, or the Taliban and other insurgents in Pakistan.
What is more important in an insurgency, however, is that current unclassified analyses and metrics do not cover critical aspects of Afghan and Pakistani patterns and perceptions of both casualties and other threats and violence, and do again do not report on the efforts of the Taliban to maintain influence through shadow and sleeper structures; suicide attacks and other bombings; and low-level terrorism, assassination, extortion, kidnapping, forced relocations, night operations, and other forms of attack and intimidation of officials, police, and the Afghan people.

Like counting the intensity of the war in terms of major acts of violence, this kind of reporting treats an insurgency as if it were something approaching a conventional war. Estimate and metrics are needed to show the full range of insurgent activities that threaten and intimidate, and not simply the number killed.

Survey data is needed on Afghan perceptions of the source and type of violence and intimidation for the full range of ISAF, ANSF, and insurgent actions. As these surveys showed in Iraq, they can provide a far better picture of how Afghans perceive the war, and the actions of the US and IASF to accomplish hold and build.

Such studies need to examine crime and corruption as part of the overall Afghan perception of GIRoA, ISAF, and ANSF ability to provide security. Before and after analysis is needed to measure the impact of clear, hold, and build. This is particularly important because peaks in the fighting are almost certain to create concern and anger while lasting security can quickly reverse such perceptions.

Reporting should regularly comparing ISAF, UN, ANSO and other estimates. As Iraq has shown, the data are often uncertain enough to require regular revisions, and perceptions are often based on estimates by other sources.

**Alliance: Unity of Effort versus National Caveats and “Branding”**

Avoiding any detail discussion of the differences and lack of unity in the alliance in military, civil-military, and aid operations may be politically correct, but it does little to improve unity of effort and effectiveness, and ensure that ISAF, the US, and allied countries do not pursue tactics and strategies they cannot implement.

Decoupling the UN and other national efforts to measure the size, integrity, and impact and effectiveness of aid efforts presents similar problems. So does the failure to analyze the integration of military and PRT efforts, and relevance
of aid activity to the course of the fighting and efforts to determine whether “hold” and “build” are receiving the right priority and effectiveness.

Analysis and metrics are also needed of the integrity of the military and civil contract efforts and fiscal controls. The flood of money into poorly managed efforts has been a driving force in abusive Afghan corruption, the growth of power brokers and private forces, and the growing disparity of income in Afghanistan. It also interacts heavily with the impact of narcotics.

Finally, in other cases, surveys of the different perceptions of national military and aid efforts have proved to be important ways to identify both successful and failed approaches to tactics and aid.

**Coping with the “Second Threat:” Afghan Governance and Corruption versus Popular Support in a War of Perceptions**

This section shows that important efforts were made to measure Afghan perceptions of GIRoA that have since ceased to be reported in unclassified terms. It is still clear that efforts to improve the integrity of GIRoA have lagged. It is also clear that the ability to work around this through rewarding effective ministries and central government officials, governors and provincial officials, their District-level equivalents, and local officials and Jirgas will be critical to achieving any successful forms of “end state” and transition.

NGO surveys reinforce these points. Corruption and power brokers are critical problems at every level, as is the lack of any effective presence of government officials and services, functioning courts and detention facilities, and regular police activity.

The metrics and analysis in past reports needed to be resumed and refined. The current failures and weaknesses in GIRoA – at every level – are as much a threat as the Taliban and other insurgents.

**Counternarcotics: Aid and Comfort to the Enemy? Or, Growing and Lasting Gains?**

Nearly a decade after the start of the war, far too much of the reporting on narcotics focuses on total volume of production. Moreover, past reporting has ignored the fact that much of the counternarcotics effort was corrupt, and drove production into Taliban controlled areas.
At the same time, it often took credit for drops or shifts in production that were the result of market forces, weather, and crop disease. As is the case with every form of civil aid activity, little accounting was made for expenditure, fiscal and management controls were minimal, and far too little effort was made to create credible measures of the total and marginal effectiveness of aid and other spending.

ISAF’s major gains in Helmand, market forces, weather, and crop disease have all combined to create an opportunity to limit production, but realistic analysis and metrics will be needed to determine effectiveness and trade-offs in creating other crops and forms of economic security.

Metrics and analysis need to focus far more on Afghan motivations and perceptions, and the impact of given programs, rather than simply estimate total crop area and output.

Moreover, integrated analysis is needed of the impact of the Taliban, corruption, and narcotrafficking. Narcotics need to be evaluated as a key force affecting hold and build and perceptions of GIRoA. It is particularly critical that this be done in evaluating the role of the police and justice system. There is little point in raising salaries, conducting anti-corruption drives, or simply cutting crop output if narcotics income is added to salaries, anti-corruption drives punish an easily replaceable few, and the destabilizing impact of narcotics on Afghan power structures continues by growing less and raising prices.

**IEDs: The “Stinger” of the Afghan Conflict**

Reporting on the trends in IEDs highlights a key threat, and measure of the intensity of serious conflict. It is also one of the few areas of consistently good unclassified reporting, although more needs to be done to highlight tends in key combat areas, rather than simply on a national basis.

Important (and useful) as IED casualties are, however, they are only one measure of casualties and violence and spotlighting them to the exclusion of other causes of casualties and perceived violence can creating misleading priorities.

**The Need for More Data and Transparency**

Virtually every expert on the Afghan War could add new points to this list. It is also obvious from many of these points that the metrics shown in this report can only hint at a few key trends and problems. In far too many cases, there are no
metrics and no reliable detailed histories – although the kind of metrics and analysis that should have existed are easy to derive from the summary of each problem.

At the same time, it is critical to stress that the other parts of this report show that major progress is being made in addressing many of the issues involved, and metric are only part of that story. For all of the spin and omissions that still surround reporting on the war, major progress has occurred over the last two years, and additional major efforts to correct these problems are underway.

They will be analyzed in the future parts of this report:

*Part Four: Hold and Build, and The Challenge of Development*
*Part Five: Building Effective Afghan Forces*
*Part Six: Showing Victory is Possible*
Key Ongoing Challenges:

An Evolving Insurgency: Informal, Adaptive, Distributed Networks
A Complex Mix of Weakness and Strengths

- **Weaknesses:**
  - Extreme ideology, hardline religious and social practices. No capability for development, largely Pashtun ethnicity.
  - Serious internal divisions rivalries.
  - Still have limited numbers.
  - Influence and control is usually tenuous and driven more by vacuum in GIRoA and ISAF presence and effectiveness.
  - Cadres have proved vulnerable. Many fighters driven more by need for income than true support.
  - Some argue fighters are tired, losing faith in leaders that stay in safe areas.

- **Strengths:**
  - Insurgency have eight years in which to learn; has same language and ethnicity as most of population it occupies; far less limited by “rules of engagement” that US, allies, and GIRoA.
  - Perceived as violent but honest. Can exploit corruption and lack of capability in Afghan government.
  - Major role in providing prompt justice. Able to exploit lack of aid and governance with minimal aid efforts and by paying fighters.
  - Adaptiveness, and lack of rigid hierarchy and central control, creates informal distributed networks that are very difficult to defeat and largely self-healing in replacing lost cadres and leaders.
  - Does not have to defeat US, ISAF, or GIRoA -- Just has to outlast them.
  - Ongoing links to ISI and Pakistani officials, partial sanctuary in Pakistan.
Main Areas of Insurgent Activity: April-July 2010

Does not include areas of lower levels of insurgent infiltration and influence

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 67
A Complex Mix of Informal, Distributed, and “Redundant Networks”

- We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
- Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
- Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
- AQ provides facilitation, training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Mullah Mohammad Omar’s Taliban regime in Afghanistan sheltered Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network following the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Omar’s group relocated to Quetta, Pakistan, in 2002, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and is now called the “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST). The QST, however, refers to itself as the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan and considers itself Afghanistan’s legitimate government. According to the ISAF commander, the QST’s aim is to capture the city of Kandahar, their philosophical home.

Almost all Afghan insurgent groups have sworn allegiance to Omar. According to U.S. military and Afghan estimates, the number of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan is more than 20,000, as reported in June 2010 by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

On June 10, 2010, the ISAF commander reported that coalition forces killed or captured 121 Taliban leaders during the preceding 90 days. The CRS report noted that several key Taliban figures have been captured or killed this year, including the February arrests of Omar’s top deputy and two Taliban “shadow governors” and the March arrests of Omar’s son-in-law and another notable QST member.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, pp. 66-67
Key Insurgent Groups: Haqqani Network

- Jalaludin Haqqani, the Minister of Tribal Affairs in the pre-2001 Taliban government, founded the Haqqani terrorist network.

- Sirajuddin (—Siraj“) Haqqani, Jalaludin‘s son and a senior leader of the Haqqani Network, maintains close ties to al-Qaeda. According to DoS, Haqqani admitted to planning a 2008 attack against a Kabul hotel that killed six people, including an American, as well as an attempted assassination of President Karzai in April that year.

- More recently, the Haqqani Network may have been responsible for a January 2010 attack near the presidential palace in Kabul, according to the CRS. Believed to be residing in Pakistan, Haqqani has coordinated and participated in cross-border attacks against coalition forces, according to DoS.

- According to a DoD press report, the younger Haqqani represents a style of leadership that is more aggressive than past leadership and often uses brutality as a means to secure power. He has been responsible for training, influencing, commanding, and leading the Haqqani Network, using kidnappings, assassinations, beheadings of women, indiscriminate killings, and suicide bombings.

- In March 2010, DoS offered a reward of up to $5 million—through a program administered by the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security—for information leading to the location and arrest of Siraj Haqqani. U.S. military and Afghan estimates set the number of Haqqani Network fighters in Afghanistan at approximately 1,000, according to the CRS. These fighters are mainly active in provinces around Khowst.

- In April-June, ISAF reported that joint ANP and coalition forces captured a Haqqani Network IED cell leader and several other insurgents in a compound in Khowst. The cell leader was responsible for emplacing IEDs, acquiring and distributing weapons, and coordinating suicide bombings against coalition convoys.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, pp. 66-67
Key Insurgent Groups: Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin

- Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the main mujahedeen leaders supported by the United States during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

- Active in Kapisa, Kunar, Nangarhar, and Nuristan, the HIG is allied with al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents,

- According to the CRS. It reported that U.S. military and Afghan estimates set the number of HIG fighters in Afghanistan at approximately 1,000.

- On March 22, 2010, representatives of the GIRoA and the HIG confirmed that they were holding talks, including meetings with President Hamid Karzai.

- Since 2007, Hekmatyar has expressed a willingness to discuss a cease-fire with the GIRoA; some of President Karzai’s allies in the National Assembly are former members of Hekmatyar’s mujahedeen party.

- In January 2010, Hekmatyar outlined conditions for reconciliation with President Karzai that included elections under a neutral caretaker government following a U.S. withdrawal.
Key Ongoing Challenges:

Casualties: A Perceptual Weapon
Critical Impact of Civilian Casualties

Civilian Casualties, whether ISAF or Insurgent are responsible, increases violence.

- When ISAF is responsible for civilian casualties kinetic activities increase by **25-65% for 5 months**
- When Insurgents are responsible for attacks kinetic activities increase **10 and 25% for 3 months**
Civilian Casualties vs. Security Incidents

The trend line for 2010 in the figure below manifests a decreasing trend in ISAF caused civilian casualties during a sample 12-week period, compared to the same time period during 2009. ISAF and coalition forces have experienced a reduction in civilian casualties in spite of a spike in total violence during the summer fighting season. Insurgent-caused CIVCAS increased during the summer months, in line with the seasonal violence trends. Figure 15 illustrates the total number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties during this reporting period. The drop in CIVCAS compared to last year is attributable to both ISAF and insurgents. Insurgent-caused CIVCAS from direct fire doubled during the second half of the reporting period compared to 2009, which is likely due to insurgent shift in TTPs to a much greater use of direct fire.

Civilian casualties (CIVCAS) caused by ISAF and Afghan forces decreased by 20 percent during 2010 (558 in 2010; 697 in 2009) even though violence increased by 80 percent and ISAF force levels increased by 53 percent. Coalition-caused CIVCAS pose strategic risks that undermine ISAF's mission, jeopardize the coalition's credibility, and alienate the Afghan population; thus NATO and ISAF continue to proactively manage CIVCAS incidents to mitigate the occurrences and effects of these unfortunate events.

Casualties caused by ISAF close combat aviation (CCA) and close air support (CAS) were reduced during 2010, despite an increase in ISAF operations. These events comprised less than 4 percent of all CIVCAS in 2010. However, recent ISAF operations resulting in high-profile CIVCAS incidents reinforce the need for continued vigilance in CCA and CAS operations.

Insurgents were responsible for approximately 88 percent of civilian casualties, primarily a result of IED activity. The number of civilians wounded or killed by insurgent activity increased by 2.2 percent in 2010 from 2009 (2,597 in 2010; 2,567 in 2009), trends that were supported in a March 2011 report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Recent high-profile IED attacks by insurgents in Kandahar, Khost, Kunduz, Pakhtika, and Nangarhar Provinces caused significant numbers of civilian casualties in the first quarter of 2011.

## CRS Estimates of Afghan Civilian Casualties – April 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th># of Casualties</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan National Army</strong></td>
<td>Jan-March 2011&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>34 killed</td>
<td>8 wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>806 killed&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>775 wounded&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>292 killed</td>
<td>859 wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>259 killed</td>
<td>875 wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>278 killed</td>
<td>750 wounded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Afghan National Police** | Jan-March 2011<sup>e</sup> | 13 killed | 27 wounded |  |
|                           | 2010<sup>i</sup>  | 1,250 killed | 743 wounded |  |
|                           | 2009<sup>k</sup>  | 639 killed | 1,145 wounded |  |
|                           | 2008<sup>l</sup>  | 724 killed | 1,209 wounded |  |
|                           | 2007<sup>l</sup>  | 688 killed | 1,036 wounded |  |

UNAMA on Civilian Casualties – 11.6.2011

Last month was the most violent for civilians in Afghanistan in recent years as attacks by insurgents intensified, the United Nations mission in the country said today, reiterating its call for greater protection of civilians. “Parties to the conflict must increase their efforts to protect civilians now,” said Georgette Gagnon, the Director of Human Rights in the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in a statement. “More civilians were killed in May than in any other month since 2007 when UNAMA began documenting civilian casualties...“We are very concerned that civilian suffering will increase even more over the summer fighting season which historically brings the highest numbers of civilian casualties.

At least 368 civilians died in conflict in May with anti-government elements responsible for 301 or 82 per cent of the deaths, and pro-government forces blamed for 45 deaths or 12 per cent of the total. Nearly 600 civilians were injured. Twenty-two deaths or six per cent of civilian deaths in May 2011 could not be attributed to any party to the conflict as most of these deaths were caused by crossfire.

Civilian casualties attributed to ground combat have been on the rise since the beginning of the Taliban's spring offensive on 30 April. Pro-government forces are blamed for 45 civilian deaths or 12 per cent of the total, with ground combat responsible for half of the casualties.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continued to kill and injure the most Afghan civilians in May taking 119 lives and causing 274 injuries (40 per cent of civilian deaths attributed to anti-government elements). These devices caused 41 per cent of all civilian casualties in May. The large majority of IEDs in Afghanistan are pressure-plate devices which are indiscriminate in nature. They are often placed alongside roads and in busy commercial areas thus leading to civilian casualties. The widespread use by anti-government elements of these weapons is a violation of international humanitarian law.

The majority of the attacks were in areas where anti-government elements and pro-government forces expanded operations, particularly in the north and regions bordering Pakistan. Air strikes were blamed for 3 per cent of the total deaths in May, according to UNAMA.

Ground combat by pro-government forces caused six percent of all civilian deaths in May. Civilian casualties attributed to ground combat have been increasing since the beginning of the Taliban’s spring offensive. Air strikes caused three per cent of the total civilian deaths in May.

UNAMA is preparing its mid-year report on protection of civilians for release in early July which documents in detail the extent of and responsibility for civilian casualties for the first six months of 2011. However, as May was the deadliest month for Afghan civilians since 2007, UNAMA is releasing this interim statement calling for protection of civilians now.

Source: UNAMA 10.8.10
ANSO Patterns in Casualties: 2008-2010

ANSO: Conflict related civilian fatalities, by AOG/MF, 2008-2010

ANSO: ANA, ANP, IMF fatalities, 2009 -2010

ANSO: Leading causes of civilian collateral fatality, 2010

Conflict related civilian fatalities grew by 18% this year (above left), to a total of 2,428 persons killed, with 17% caused by IMF and 83% caused by AOG. The leading cause of death was roadside IED strikes (below) with 820 people dying this way, 58% of them in the Southern provinces. This reflects the increased volume of ‘pressure plate’ (VOIED) devices utilized as AOG sought stand-off strike capability against overwhelming IMF numbers. The IMF have succeeded in reducing both the volume and percentage of fatalities caused by them, although IMF airstrikes killed a comparable number to AOG suicide attacks. Within the security forces*, the ANP still account for the majority of fatalities (above right) with a roughly 5:1 ratio against ANA/IMF deaths.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 53
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th># of Casualties</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Civilians</td>
<td>Jan-March 2011</td>
<td>203 killed</td>
<td>A truck bomb at the office of a construction company and a suicide bomber at an Afghan National Army recruitment center resulted in the deaths of 56 civilians in March.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>356 injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,777 killed</td>
<td>Anti-government elements (AGEs), which include the Taliban and other individuals or groups who engage in armed conflict with the government of Afghanistan or members of the International Military Forces, were reported responsible for 75% of the civilian deaths and 78% of civilian injuries. The number of civilians assassinated by AGEs increased 105%, to 462 persons, compared with civilian assassinations in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,343 injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,412 killed</td>
<td>67% of civilian deaths were attributed to actions of AGEs (78% of these deaths were caused by improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,566 injured</td>
<td>25% of civilian deaths were attributed to pro-government forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2,118 killed</td>
<td>8% of civilian deaths were the result of cross-fire or improperly detonated ordnance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,523 killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of Afghan men interviewed in southern Afghanistan (69%) blame foreign forces for most civilian deaths, while 12% think that Afghan security forces kill more civilians than the Taliban. Only 10% of respondents think that the Taliban are responsible for a larger percentage of civilian deaths. This is contrary to UN assessments, which attribute 75% of civilian deaths to the insurgents and only 16% to both the international and Afghan forces.

Source: ICoS, Afghanistan Transition: The Death of Bin Laden and Local Dynamics, May 2011
In nine of the fourteen research areas, more interviewees think NATO and Afghan Government forces are winning the war, as opposed to the Taliban insurgency. Only in the districts of Panjwayi and Maiwand (both in Kandahar province), and the district of Garmisir in Helmand province, do more interviewees think the Taliban is winning the war. High numbers of respondents in southern Afghanistan either do not know or have no answer, while very few do not know or do not answer in northern Afghanistan.

Source: ICoS, Afghanistan Transition: The Death of Bin Laden and Local Dynamics, May 2011
Coalition KIAs: 2001-January 2011

### Coalition Military Fatalities By Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>232</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>295</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1461</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>2301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coalition KIAs: By Province as of January 2011

Coalition Forces Wounded in Action

WIA

[Graph showing the number of wounded in action (WIA) over time from January 2004 to April 2010, with a 12-month moving average line.

The graph illustrates a significant increase in the number of WIA cases, particularly prominent from late 2008 onwards.]
## CRS Estimates of Allied Casualties in Afghanistan – April 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th># of Deaths</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th># of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Non-U.S. Coalition Fatalities** 864


a. Countries listed indicate the nationality of the military forces, not of the individuals. For example, Fijians who were killed while fighting in French forces are counted as French. Similarly, citizens of other nations who fight in American military forces are counted as Americans.

---

DoD US Casualties in Afghanistan – June 8, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>Non-Hostile</th>
<th>Wounded in Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>11,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Civilians</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>*1,503</td>
<td>*1,245</td>
<td>*258</td>
<td>*11,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>*4,421</td>
<td>*3,489</td>
<td>*932</td>
<td>*31,922</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CRS Estimates of US Casualties – April 2011

### Table 1. Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. Fatalities and Wounded
(as of April 6, 2011, 10 a.m. EDT from October 7, 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fatalities In and Around Afghanistan</th>
<th>Fatalities in Other Locations</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
<th>Wounded in Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hostile&lt;br&gt;</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hostile</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 10,855</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 2. American Casualties by Year through April 6, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
<th>Total Wounded in Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>2,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>5,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 through April 4</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

*a. “Fatalities in and around Afghanistan” includes casualties that occurred in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.*

*b. “Other locations” includes casualties that occurred in Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.*

*c. Fatalities include two Department of Defense civilian personnel.*

*d. According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 31 August 2005, a “hostile casualty” is a victim of a terrorist activity or a casualty as the result of combat or attack by any force against U.S. forces, available at [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/).*

*e. The above-named reference defines a “nonhostile casualty” as a casualty that is not directly attributable to hostile action or terrorist activity, such as casualties due to the elements, self-inflicted wounds, or combat fatigue.*
JEIIDO Estimate of US IED Casualties in Afghanistan: 2005-2010

Cumulative Through End 2010: Total US KIAs = 617. Total US WIAs = 5,764

Key Ongoing Challenges:

IEDs: The “Stinger” of the Afghan Conflict
This slide shows the 5 provinces with the most IED activity during March 2010, which accounted for 80% of the IED activity in Afghanistan.
IED Incidents in Afghanistan
Jan 2004-May 2010

Source: IDA Scrubbed SigActs (CIDNE)
NOTES:
1) Effective IED Attacks are those that caused Coalition Force (CF) and/or Host Nation (HN) casualties. Ineffective IED attacks caused no casualties, and include detonations with no casualties, early detection, pre-detonations, and turn ins.
2) Data source (CIDNE Tampa SIGACTS) was pulled on 2 Jan 2011. All data, including totals for preceding months, are subject to revision as new reporting becomes available.

- IED efficacy has decreased despite an increased OPTEMPO
- IED severity has decreased
- IEDs are less lethal against US forces -- US KIA per Effective IED Attack have decreased, but Non-US Coalition Force KIA remains relatively constant
Overall, IED activity remained elevated during the reporting period. Elevated IED activity suggests that ISAF and ANSF operations have eroded insurgent capacity to conduct effective direct fire attacks. IED “found-and-cleared” rates currently remain above 60 percent, a level not seen since reporting began in 2007. ISAF assesses that this is attributable to several factors:

- Increased local national assistance turning-in devices primarily in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces;
- Improved detection technologies employed by ISAF;
- Hasty emplacement of IEDs by insurgents due to increased ISAF and ANSF presence, as well as improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets;
- Increased ANSF capability and capacity;
- Increased and improved ISAF and ANSF partnering; and
- Better IED awareness training for ISAF forces.

RC-SW continues to experience the highest levels of IED activity (40 percent overall), though this is slightly less than its overall share of national violence (45 percent). RC-S experiences disproportionately high IED activity compared with its share of overall violence (33 percent vs. 20 percent). However, IED found-and-cleared rates in RC-S are the highest among regional commands (70 percent).

Key Ongoing Challenges:

The Alliance: Unity of Effort versus National Caveats and “Branding”
The Need for Unity of Effort: ISAF in a “Nationwide” War

Source: NATO/ISAF: [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html), as of 21 June 2010
At least 4,715 of 18,835 fully committed allied forces leave in 2011
### NATO/ISAF Manning as of March 4, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO Countries</th>
<th>Non-NATO Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>90000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Listed ISAF: 131,983**

Note: U.S. force totals in Afghanistan are approximately 98,000. Non-U.S. forces in the table total 41,700. In addition, the NATO/ISAF site states that troop numbers in this table are based on broad contribution and do not necessarily reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time.

Sources: Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, CRS RTL30588, March 24, 2011,
### Provincial Reconstruction Teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location (City)</th>
<th>Province/Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Gardez</td>
<td>Paktia Province (RC-East, E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Jalalabad</td>
<td>Nangarhar (RC-E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Khost</td>
<td>Khost (RC-E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Asadabad</td>
<td>Kunar (RC-E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sharana</td>
<td>Paktika (RC-E). with Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mehtarlam</td>
<td>Laghman (RC-E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Jabal o-Saraj</td>
<td>Panjshir Province (RC-E), State Department lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Qala Gush</td>
<td>Nuristan (RC-E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Farah</td>
<td>Farah (RC-SW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner Lead (most under ISAF banner)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Qandahar</td>
<td>Qandahar (RC-S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Lashkar Gah</td>
<td>Helmand (RC-S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Tarin Kowt</td>
<td>Uruzgan (RC-S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Herat</td>
<td>Herat (RC-W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Qalah-ye Now</td>
<td>Badghis (RC-W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Mazar-e-Sharif</td>
<td>Balkh (RC-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Konduz</td>
<td>Konduz (RC-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Faizabad</td>
<td>Badakhshan (RC-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Meymaneh</td>
<td>Faryab (RC-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Chaghcharan</td>
<td>Ghowr (RC-W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Pol-e-Khomri</td>
<td>Baghlan (RC-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Bamiyan</td>
<td>Bamiyan (RC-E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Maidan Shahr</td>
<td>Wardak (RC-C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Pul-i-Alam</td>
<td>Lowgar (RC-E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Shebergan</td>
<td>Jowzjan (RC-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Charikar</td>
<td>Parwan (RC-E)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** RC = Regional Command.
Key Ongoing Challenges:

Coping with the “Second Threat:” Problems in Afghan Governance
War of Perceptions

People have to believe that the future under GIRoA will be better.

- Detectable increase in confidence of GIRoA
  - Improved access to basic services
  - Improved Rule of Law
  - Better access to education
  - More opportunities for legitimate employment
  - Belief that corruption is being addressed
- Growing security and confidence in ANSF
  - People feel safer
  - ANSF trusted; leadership viewed as responsive
- Greater freedom of movement
- GIRoA viewed as empowering ANSF
Winning Popular Support is As Much a Challenge as the Threat

Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010

Governance is a Main Effort: A Real Campaign Plan or An Empty Slogan?

- Commitment from the Afghan government
  Reinforce key CIVMIL partnerships with GIRoA at all levels

- GIRoA capacity to deliver services
  Channel International Community resources through GIRoA ministries

- Contracting and corruption
  Scrutinize new contracts and broaden range of beneficiaries

- Ability to mitigate malign powerbrokers
  Strengthen legitimate political bodies; reduce informal influences
Deputy Provincial Governor Appointments

Civil Service Appointments Board fills 12 Deputy Provincial Governor posts with merit-based appointments February 2011

76% of Provinces will have DPGs selected on merit following current round (if approved by PoA)

On-going merit-based selection of 14 Deputy Provincial Governor posts (23 May 2011)

Source: ISAF 5/2011
In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives—a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).

Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading in the right direction, 59% of Afghans responded “yes” This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.
Trends in Key Districts: 12/09 vs. 4/10

Support for Afghan Government

Comparative Security

Improvements in District Governance

April 2011

April 2010

Source: ISAF Joint Command District Trend Tracker, Governance

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

Source: ISAF 5/2011
District Governor Appointments

CSAB selects 38 District Governor posts through merit-based process in April 2011

- 23 Provinces with merit-based appointments (68%)
- 58 Districts with merit-based appointed DGs to date (16%)

Next District Governor Appointment Board expected in July 2011

Previous District Governor merit-based appointments

Source: ISAF 5/2011
Winning the War of Perceptions

The war will be lost without better civil-military coordination, and a far more honest, capable, and actively present GIRoA:

- Need immediate progress in governance, prompt justice, jobs, and economic opportunity in the field as part of each operation.
- Police, rule of law, and formal and informal justice efforts must be integrate and proactive at the local level.
- Military and PRT cooperation must be far better and more operationally relevant.
- UNAMA/UN, national, and NGO aid efforts need to focus on real world short and mid-term needs to get to long term. Need far more focus on validated requirements, Afghan perceptions, measures of effectiveness, and honest contracting.
- Corrupt and incapable Afghan officials, officers, and power brokers need to be excluded from outside funding and support, kept under constant pressure, and “outed.”
- Honest and capable Afghan officials, officers, and local leaders should be rewarded and encouraged at Ministerial, provincial, district, and local levels.
- The US, ISAF, UNAMA, and all aid workers must address their role in causing corruption and waste, and funding the Taliban. The civil side of the war needs ruthless national, UN, and ISAF accountability and transparency.
Key Ongoing Challenges:

Corruption versus Popular Support in a War of Perceptions
COMISAF Campaign Plan Lines of Operation

**Lines of Operation**

- **Protect the Population**
- **Support Development of ANSF**
- **Neutralize Insurgent Networks**
- **Neutralize Criminal Patronage Networks**
- **Support Legitimate Governance**
- **Support Sustainable Socio-Economic Development**

**Campaign Objectives: 2014**

- Population safeguarded from violence, coercion, intimidation, and predatory groups.
- ANSF leading in population security and law enforcement serving the Afghan people.
- Insurgents neutralized to a level with which ANSF can deal; reintegration and reconciliation initiatives reduce insurgent ranks substantially; cross-border movement of insurgents/explosives reduced significantly; extremist safe havens in Afghanistan denied.
- Corruption reduced such that it no longer presents a fatal threat; continued anti-corruption progress assured.
- Governance sufficiently inclusive, accountable, and acceptable to the people.
- Licit economy expanding; IC economic support channeled through GIRoA ministries.

*Source: US Experts*
The Challenge of Corruption

GIRoA’s High Office of Oversight (HOO) has attributed corruption in Afghanistan to several factors:

• Legacy of a quarter-century of conflict
• Erosion of state institutions
• Irregular financing of the conflict from various sources
• Worsening tensions among ethnic and tribal groups
• The growth of informal and illicit economic activities

The HOO also has noted that the growth of the drug trade and the influx of international aid have created more opportunities for corruption within the country.

Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) released the results of a corruption survey in June 2010 which found that Afghans consider corruption to be the third-largest problem in the country, following security and unemployment.

Approximately 75% of respondents believed that the problem of corruption became more significant over the course of 2009: 28% of adults paid a bribe to obtain a public service.

70% of Afghans perceived corruption as a common way of doing business with their government; however, 90% of respondents stated that they felt guilty for taking part in corrupt activities.

The average bribe that respondents paid in 2009 was Af 7,769 ($156), according to the survey; this amount represents 31% of the average annual income in Afghanistan ($502).

Afghans who earned less than Af 3,000 ($60) a year reported the highest exposure to bribery; they listed corruption as the largest problem in Afghanistan.

• The IWA survey showed that the highest levels of corruption occur in connection with the following government services: registration and issuance of ID cards and passports
• Police services
• Justice in the court system
• Respondents also reported increasingly high levels of corruption in the health and education sectors, where bribes tend to entail larger sums of money
Official Corruption: A Problem in Your Area?
ABC News/BBC/ARD/Washington Post poll

NET Problem | Big problem

2006: 78% (55%) | 2007: 72% (45%)
Early 2009: 85% (63%) | Late 2009: 95% (76%)
Now: 85% (50%)
Perceptions of Corruption and Quality of Life

Do you believe that corruption in the Government affects your daily life?

How satisfied are you with your current quality of your life?

Source: ISAF 5/2011
22. Is it your opinion that corruption among government officials or the police has increased over the last year or so, decreased, or has it remained about the same?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Increased</th>
<th>Decreased</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/13/10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/23/09</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12/09</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Beyond any corruption occurring in your local area, what is your view of the level of corruption - is that a big problem, a moderate problem, a small problem or not a problem?

11/13/10 - Summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>----Big/Moderate----</th>
<th>------Small/No problem-----</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>Big</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>NET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Within the government of this province</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. At the national level within the government in Kabul</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trend:

a. Within the government of this province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>----Big/Moderate----</th>
<th>------Small/No problem-----</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>Big</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>NET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/13/10</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/23/09</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. At the national level within the government in Kabul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>----Big/Moderate----</th>
<th>------Small/No problem-----</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>Big</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>NET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/13/10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/23/09</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afghan Experience with Corruption

12. Has it ever happened to you personally that a representative of (ITEM) has asked for money or other payment in exchange for favorable treatment in the performance of his official duties?

11/13/10 - Summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Afghan National Police</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Afghan National Army</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The provincial government</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. (IF YES) The last time this happened, did you regard this as corruption or did you see it as acceptable behavior in this case?

11/13/10 - Summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Corrupt</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Afghan National Police</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Afghan National Army</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The provincial government</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12/13 NET:

11/13/10 - Summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>---Asked for money/payment---</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Afghan National Police</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Afghan National Army</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The provincial government</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Spring 2011: A New ISAF & Aid Approach to Fighting Corruption

- Improve intelligence and understanding of the problem
- Influence positive and negative actors
- Integrate law enforcement and military efforts
- Internationalize counternarcotics and anti-corruption efforts
- Institutionalize reforms
- Implement COIN contracting

We must make sure that we do not stop at merely fighting symptoms of corruption; rather we must take decisive action against its root causes.”

President Karzai, London Conference

Source: ISAF, April 15, 2011.
Anti-Corruption Concept

In close coordination with Afghan leaders and members of the International Community:

- Focus on corruption that threatens the viability of the Afghan state
- Improve contracting and development assistance
- Prosecute and sanction individuals, networks and entities (e.g. businesses)
- Ground anti-corruption efforts in an understanding of Afghan politics
- Influence key stakeholders in state weakness to support improved transparency and accountability
- Strengthen “islands of integrity” and connect positive actors
- Promote a culture of lawfulness
- Internationalize anti-corruption and counter-narcotics efforts
- Emphasize transparency and cooperation

Source: US Experts
Creating ISAF-GIRoA Common Understanding of the Threat from Corruption

- **Corruption**
  - The misuse of positions of power for personal gain.

- **Criminal Patronage Networks (CPNs)**
  - Organizations comprised of individuals, businesses, and other entities that engage in systematized corruption in and out of government and across public and private sectors.
  - Comprised of individuals who act in concert to protect fellow members and preserve freedom of action.
  - These networks engage in criminal and illicit enterprises and pursue particularistic agendas that degrade security, weaken governance, hinder economic development, and undermine rule of law. The networks often overlap and form alliances of convenience to achieve mutual interests.

- **Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)**
  - A complex organization with a highly defined command-and-control structure that produces, transports, and/or distributes large quantities of one or more illicit drugs

- **Nexus Target**
  - Persons, places, organizations or entities (e.g. businesses) that engage in illegal narcotics trafficking and/or other illicit activities that strengthen or support violence and instability associated with insurgency, terrorism, or other forms of violent resistance to authority and/or the state.

Source: US Experts
Shafafiyat Mission

- Shafafiyat in coordination with the International Community and in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:
  - develops a common understanding of the threat corruption poses to the viability of the Afghan state;
  - plans and coordinates anti-corruption efforts; and
  - integrates ISAF anti-corruption activities with those of key Afghan and International Community partners, to support the development of an active and honest administration.*

*H.E. President Hamid Karzai, London Conference, January 2010

Source: US Experts
Keys to Success

Work with key Afghan leaders and institutions to:

• Improve information and understanding
• Implement COIN contracting
• Influence positive and negative actors
• Integrate law enforcement and military efforts
• Internationalize counternarcotics and anti-corruption efforts
• Institutionalize reforms

Source: US Experts
Impunity Risks State Failure

State Institutions and Justice

- CRIMINAL NETWORKS
- FACILITATE
- UNDERMINE
- FUND
- PROTECT
- CREATE CONDITIONS
- Self interest
- Capital flight

Warlordism and Civil War
WEAKENS THE STATE AND UNDERMINES SOVEREIGNTY

Source: US Experts
Conditions That Preserve Impunity

- Political protection
- Ethnic divisions
- Inadequate Coalition and GIROA cooperation
- Lack of confidence in future of Afghan state
- Intimidation that obstructs justice

“As the success of the security transition depends upon building the institutions of a state bound by rule of law, we must judge all our efforts by whether they are enhancing the capability and effectiveness of the Afghan state, or if they are actually reducing its capability.”

H.E. Hamid Karzai, Feb 2011

Source: US Experts
Cases of Impunity

- Kapisa Chief Prosecutor and former Governor
- Nangarhar Chief of Police and Chief Prosecutor
- Former Surgeon General
- Former Afghan Air Force Commander

"The Government of Afghanistan is committed to end the culture of impunity and violation of law and bring to justice those involved in spreading corruption and abuse of public property."


Source: US Experts
Working Together to Break the Cycle of Impunity

- Determine how we can work together to strengthen the state and weaken criminal networks
- Insulate law enforcement and judiciary from intimidation, coercion, and interference
- Extend and enforce merit-based appointments in government and security forces
- Gain control of borders and airports

“Politics is constraining [our] ability to prosecute high level corruption cases.”
Mohammad Ishaq Aloko, March 2011

Source: US Experts
Improving Accountability: Update

• Vendor vetting

• Investigations and sanctions

• Priorities and next steps
  – Publish joint contracts and corruption white paper
  – Expand joint investigations

Joint Investigation Success

• Global Strategies Group was being forced to pay a bribe to an Afghan national employed by US Army Corps of Engineers

• Personal Security Contract awarded to Global for $175M provides security for reconstruction projects in Afghanistan

• Subject: employed by the Corps Public Affairs office

• Bribe was to allow air movements for Global at Kabul international airport

• Special Investigator General Afghanistan Reconstruction staff joined the case and provided $20,000 for the operation

• Afghan District 10 Police arrested the subject and agreed to prosecute

“Where our money goes is as important as the service provided or product delivered. Upon identification of linkages between contractors and criminal networks, we must take appropriate actions.”

General David H. Petraeus, COMISAF, 8 Sept 2010

Source: US Experts
Improving Accountability: Update

• Vendor vetting:
  – Companies vetted: 300; 20 rejected; $50.4M contract value

• Investigations and sanctions:
  – Contract fraud cases opened: 128
  – Fines imposed: $29 million USD
  – Individuals convicted: 38
  – Total companies/individuals debarred and suspended: 158; since 12 Mar 2011: 19

• Priorities and Next Steps:
  – Establish Acquisition Accountability Office
  – Extend vendor vetting to Afghan and international partners
  – Enact U.S. Wartime Contract legislation

“Where our money goes is as important as the service provided or product delivered. Upon identification of linkages between contractors and criminal networks, we must take appropriate actions.”

General David H. Petraeus, COMISAF, 8 Sept 2010

Source: US Experts
Expanding Afghan First

- Simorg Homa (transformers)
  - Trained assembly line workers on 2 May
  - Hired 25 of 200 additional employees including female Financial Vice President
  - Accepted orders
  - Developed local testing and certification capability

- Aziz National Furniture received 4 large orders from coalition entities
  - Hiring new employees

Source: US Experts
Expanding Afghanistan First Contracting

Omish Homa Industrial Group

Simorg Homa Industrial Group, was created from the joint venture of Ehsan Construction (Afghanistan) & ELMA GmbH (Austria) to manufacture electrical transformers.

Ceremonial Signing:
- The ceremonial signing of the international joint venture brought together an Austrian JV partner, ELMA GmbH, with 60 years experience in the manufacture and testing of transformers and an Afghan construction company: Simorg Homa.
- The signing followed a full day of meetings at ISAF between the JV partners, Tiger Team, USACE, the US Embassy and USAG.
- Speakers at the ceremony included LTC Tom Ficklin (Tiger Team & SDO-A), Col.Ferrar (Deputy Commander Programs), Dr. Daud Yar (Director of Policy and Oversight, Office of National Security Council), General Pakhi Elam (Director of Presidential Information Coordination), Zabi Ehsan (President Simorg Homa), & Alfred Horvath (President ELMA GmbH).
- The joint venture is expected to directly employ 200 Afghan skilled & semi-skilled workers.
- A facility and will import transformer-related products.

Joint Venture Projects

Afghanistan

Omid High School Renovation (Kabul)
- Afghan-led design solution
- Contract valued at $985,000
- Benefits 1,500 students
- Projected completion within 9 months

Source: US Experts
Focusing on Borders and Airports

54% of Afghan revenue generated from customs receipts

- Criminality and inefficiency remains at major airports
  - Extortion of commercial carriers
  - Exploitation of lax bulk cash rules
  - Inconsistent customs enforcement
  - True revenue potential not realized

- Hairatan and Integrated Border Management Model project
  - Memorandum of Understanding not signed between MoI and MoF
  - Criminal Networks in control
  - High level political support necessary
  - Must displace criminal organizations with state institutions

Borders and airports are key terrain, not just in terms of geography and military importance but in terms of revenue generating capacity – effective control here is critical for State viability

Source: US Experts
Taking Back Borders and Airports

- Develop joint MoD-MoI-MoF-NDS-Coalition plan to dismantle criminal networks
  - Mobilize special police units
    - Direct investigations into borders and airports
  - Replace corrupt officials
  - Recruit and vet new cadres
  - Brief plan at the Senior Security Shura in July/August
- Follow through on Hairatan Border Project

Source: US Experts
Key Ongoing Challenges:

Counternarcotics: Aid and Comfort to the Enemy? Or, Growing and Lasting Gains?
The National Cost of Narcotics

- Obstructs justice
- Retards economic development
- Undermines state institutions
- Strengthens organized crime
- Victimized the Afghan people
- Perpetuates insecurity
- Destroys state reputation
- Empowers warlord politicians

“We cannot allow this country to be influenced by mafia and narcotics-related activities. It kills our economy. It destroys our reputation. So we are going to work against it.”

H.E. Hamid Karzai

Source: US Experts
Costly Efforts: Counternarcotics Have Been 8% of All Aid

The DoD CN fund provides support to the counter-narcotics effort in the following ways: Supporting military operations against drug traffickers, expanding Afghan interdiction operations, building the capacity of Afghan law enforcement—including the Afghan Border Police with specialized training, equipment, and facilities. As of June 30, 2010, nearly $1.43 billion had been appropriated to DoD for counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan—almost 2.8% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance.

As of June 30, 2010, more than $2.68 billion had been allotted to INL for INCLE-funded efforts. More than 5.2% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. INL reported that of this amount, nearly $2.13 billion had been obligated, of which nearly $1.68 billion had been liquidated.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 48, 50
Going South & Aiding the Taliban: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends in Afghanistan 2002-2009

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2002-2009 UNODC
Security Incidents from Poppy Eradication

Source: SIGAR, January 2010, p. 119
But, Recent Fighting has Drastically Reduced Output in Taliban Controlled Areas

Opium cultivation in Afghanistan, 2008-2010

Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, UNODC, 2010, p. 4
In 2010, opium production in Afghanistan decreased by almost half (48%) compared to 2009 and was lower than in any year since 2003. This was due to a strong decline in opium yield in the main cultivation areas in the South and West of the country, while the overall area under opium poppy cultivation remained at level of 2009.

Potential opium production in Afghanistan had a 48% decline in 2010 compared to 2009 and was lower than in any year since 2003. This was due to a strong decline in opium yield in the main cultivation areas in the South and West of the country, while the overall area under opium poppy cultivation remained at level of 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>Production 2009 (mt)</th>
<th>Production 2010 (mt)</th>
<th>Change 2009-2010 (mt)</th>
<th>Change 2009-2010 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>NA*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>+35</td>
<td>+167%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-eastern Region</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>+37</td>
<td>+195%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Region</td>
<td>Poppy-free</td>
<td>Poppy-free</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Region</td>
<td>6,026</td>
<td>2,979</td>
<td>-3,047</td>
<td>-51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Region</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>-347</td>
<td>-42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (rounded)</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,900</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,600</strong></td>
<td><strong>-3,300</strong></td>
<td><strong>-48%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In 2009, no specific regional production figure was calculated for the Central region due to a low number of yield measurements in that region.
In 2010, the average farm-gate price of dry opium at harvest time (weighted by production) was US$ 169/kg, a 164% increase from 2009. The rapid increasing trend is a market response to the drastic reduction of the opium production which is due to the spreading of the opium disease in the major growing areas. After a steady decline between 2005-2009, opium price started a rapid increase in 2010 reaching nominal levels observed only at the end of 2004, a year when opium cultivation was also heavily affected by diseases. The long-time trend of opium price observed in the two provinces of Nangarhar and Kandahar shows that the price trend in 2010 followed a similar trend observed in 2004, but that the peak is still far from the very high levels reached in 2001 and 2003 when the market was affected by the lowest level of production. Price trends in the next months will show how the opium market will be affected by the production decrease in 2010, however, the current high price may play an encouraging factor for farmers to cultivate opium. In 2009 data on farmers motivation to cultivate opium had started to show an increasing number of farmers stopping opium cultivation due to its low sale price. It is worrying that the current high sale price of opium in combination with a lower wheat price may encourage farmers to go back to opium cultivation.

Security Versus Opium Cultivation in 2010

Security map (as at 30 March 2010) and opium cultivation in Afghanistan by province, 2010

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, UNODC, 2010, p. 29
Massive Price Increases Drive Resurgence in Opium Cultivation

Farmers in Afghanistan usually cultivate crops twice a year in irrigated areas, typically growing maize, rice, vegetables or cotton after harvesting opium or wheat. Some farmers grow cannabis after the first summer harvest. None of Afghanistan’s licit agricultural products can currently match the gross income per hectare from opium.

During ORAS, respondents were asked about the market prices of agricultural commodities. A comparison of prices collected during ORAS 2010 and ORAS 2011 shows significant increases in the price not only of opium but also to a lesser extent, of wheat and maize, two important staple crops. Between February 2010 and February 2011, dry and fresh opium prices increased by 306% and 251% respectively.

Figure 3  Regional average price of dry opium collected from traders, February 2005 – March 2011

Figure 4  Average farm-gate prices for dry opium, September 2004 – March 2011

Expected Opium Cultivation in 2011

Source: Afghanistan Opium Survey: Winter Rapid Assessment, April 2011, UNODC, 2010, p. 6
US Reporting on Progress in Counternarcotics as of April 2011

According to the UNODC, the total area devoted to opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2010 was unchanged from 2009, and the number of poppy-free provinces remained static at 20.

However, there was an overall decline by almost 50 percent in both total opium yielded and total opium produced – a decline that resulted primarily from disease that affected opium plant development.

As part of the overall CN effort to reduce poppy production and narcotrafficking, ANSF and ISAF CN components maintained the high pace of CN operations from the previous reporting period, a result of effective collaboration between ISAF and the ANSF.

During the reporting period, the ANSF, ISAF, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF)– Nexus, and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), conducted a robust campaign of law enforcement and CN operations, resulting in the seizures of: 38,184 kilograms (kg) of opium; 4,776 kg of morphine; 6,749 kg of heroin; 124,574 kg of hashish; 8,102 kg of solid precursor chemicals; 13,924 liters of liquid precursor chemicals; and the arrest of 267 suspects.

The first three months of 2011 period saw an 82 percent increase in seized opium, a 156 percent increase in seized morphine, a 5 percent decrease in seized heroin, a 423 percent increase in seized hashish, a 5 percent increase in seized solid precursor chemicals, a 196 percent increase in seized liquid precursor chemicals, and a 29 percent decrease (a total of 111 individuals) in the total number of suspects arrested. Of note, while heroin seizures are down, targeted seizures tied to on-going narcotics trafficking investigations are up. This upward trend is the outcome of an effective strategy to combat both drug flow and broader narcotics networks.

Success in Narcotics Seizures: 2010-2011

Quarterly Comparison of Narcotics Seizures

Criminal Patronage and Protection System

Source: US Experts
Working Together to Address the Problem

- Continue to remove officials that facilitate drug trafficking
- Focus on key traffickers and their protection network
  - Investigate and prosecute (mobilize Afghan law enforcement)
  - Expose behavior; shift to licit activity
- Work together to impose international sanctions
  - Seize / recover drug money and assets
  - Restrict travel
  - Cut off international contracts with businesses
- Strengthen institutions (especially MoI, Customs)
  - Enforce merit-based hiring
  - Establish and enforce vetting procedures
  - Remove corrupt Ministry of Interior officials
- Implement recommended actions on borders and airports

“There is a strong link between terrorism and drugs ... its trafficking is the main source of funding for anti-government elements.”

Eng. Mohammad Ebrahim Azhar,
Deputy Minister of Counter-Narcotics, April 2011
Key Ongoing Challenges:

Overdependence on Contractors
Past Over-Reliance on Contractors
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Assessment (June 2011)

Heavy reliance on a few contractors; Between FY2007-2009: USAID obligated $3.8 billion to 283 contractors and entities; $1bn to just two – Louis Berger International and Development Alternatives Inc; $625 million (17 percent) for just 17 grants
• Separately State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) obligated $2.3 billion to four contractors; DynCorp International accounted for over 80 percent


GAO finds “oversight inadequate at times, thus raising questions about the agencies’ ability to ensure accountability for multibillion dollar investments”
• SIGAR warns “the large US investment in Afghanistan remains at significant risk of being wasted or subjected to fraud and abuse”

Lack of qualified contracting officers. USAID has 85 contracting officers with 3+ years experience, currently 10 in Afghanistan with plans to scale up to 18 (improvement from 3 in 2007) but still inadequate for task. In fact adequate ratio would probably require entire USAID overseas workforce for just Afghanistan
Past Lack of Fiscal Responsibility & Oversight
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Assessment (June 2011)


- **GAO finds** “oversight inadequate at times, thus raising questions about the agencies’ ability to ensure accountability for multibillion dollar investments”

- **SIGAR warns** “the large US investment in Afghanistan remains at significant risk of being wasted or subjected to fraud and abuse”

- **Lack of qualified contracting officers.** USAID has 85 contracting officers with 3+ years experience, currently 10 in Afghanistan with plans to scale up to 18 (improvement from 3 in 2007) but still inadequate for task. In fact adequate ratio would probably require entire USAID overseas workforce for just Afghanistan

- **Lack of adequate controls have resulted in massive fraud** – In 2010 massive fraud uncovered at Kabul Bank (loans amounted to 5% of Afghan GDP). USAID had only one qualified officer overseeing $92 million contract with Deloitte to provide technical assistance to the bank. USAID later concluded Deloitte should have known of serious problems and alerted USAID in Kabul

- **Former USAID Kabul Mission Director:**

  “Because of the ill planned downsizing of USAID’s technical staff over the past years and the difficulty in finding senior technical Foreign Service officers to serve in Afghanistan, the management of the Kabul Bank Deloitte contract was relegated to a junior officer. While he worked to the best of his ability, this important project demanded strong technical oversight and similar programs of this level of strategic importance will demand senior management expertise and a different system with USAID to ensure the availability of senior technical staff.”

- **Similarly, INL** has just one contracting officer overseeing almost $800 million over 5 CivPol task orders.
Most of USAID “on-budget aid” ($2.08bn) provided through ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) or through Afghan Ministries ($307 million)

- Jurisdictional issues complicate independent monitoring
- World Bank has capacity issues – constrained by 100 in-country personnel
- Afghan Ministries have “significant vulnerabilities” that can facilitate fraud and waste
- Some conditionality now attached – FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act required certification of improved efforts to fight corruption and better governance better Economic Support and INCLE funds could be disbursed

Capacity Building Using Technical Advisors

- Inflated salaries for technical advisors draw away talent from civil sector, including doctors and teachers
- Last fiscal year budget for vocational and higher education was $35 million compared to State/USAID capacity-building spending of $1.25 billion (large portion to technical advisors)
- Each advisor costs between $500,000 to $1 million
- Drivers, assistants, translators for aid projects earn upward of $1,000 a month compared to $50-100 for teachers, health workers and administrative staff
- Various problems including unaccountability, imposing their own vision, using high-tech unsustainable methods, loyalty to Afghan Ministry instead of US government
- Over-reliance on advisors and minimal oversight
- Standardizing salaries essential step to creating parity, stimulating civil-sector development efforts
According to FPDS, DOD obligated approximately $11.8 billion on contracts in the Afghanistan theater of operations in FY2010, representing 15% of total obligations in the Afghanistan theater of operations. From FY2005-FY2010, DOD obligated approximately $33.9 billion on contracts primarily in the Afghanistan theater, representing 16% of total DOD obligations for operations in that area.

Source: Moshe Schwartz, Joyprada Swain, Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis, CRS, R40764, March 29, 2011
US Forces vs. Contractors in Afghanistan: 2007-2010

Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports; Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by Amy Belasco; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground” monthly reports to Congress.

Source: Moshe Schwartz, Joyprada Swain, Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis, CRS, R40764, March 29, 2011
### US Contractors in Afghanistan by Nationality 2007-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter Ending</th>
<th>Total Contractors</th>
<th>U.S. Nationals</th>
<th>Third Country Nationals</th>
<th>Local Nationals</th>
<th>Troop Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2007</td>
<td>29,473</td>
<td>3,387</td>
<td>2,864</td>
<td>23,222</td>
<td>24,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2007</td>
<td>36,520</td>
<td>5,153</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>27,552</td>
<td>24,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2008</td>
<td>52,336</td>
<td>4,220</td>
<td>4,678</td>
<td>43,438</td>
<td>28,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>41,232</td>
<td>4,724</td>
<td>4,121</td>
<td>32,387</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2008</td>
<td>68,252</td>
<td>5,405</td>
<td>4,381</td>
<td>58,466</td>
<td>33,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2008</td>
<td>71,755</td>
<td>5,960</td>
<td>5,232</td>
<td>60,563</td>
<td>32,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2009</td>
<td>68,197</td>
<td>9,378</td>
<td>7,043</td>
<td>51,776</td>
<td>52,300</td>
</tr>
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<td>June 2009</td>
<td>72,968</td>
<td>10,036</td>
<td>11,806</td>
<td>51,126</td>
<td>55,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2009</td>
<td>104,101</td>
<td>9,322</td>
<td>16,349</td>
<td>78,430</td>
<td>62,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2009</td>
<td>107,292</td>
<td>10,016</td>
<td>16,551</td>
<td>80,725</td>
<td>69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2010</td>
<td>112,092</td>
<td>16,081</td>
<td>17,512</td>
<td>78,499</td>
<td>79,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>107,479</td>
<td>19,103</td>
<td>14,984</td>
<td>73,392</td>
<td>93,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2010</td>
<td>70,599</td>
<td>20,874</td>
<td>15,503</td>
<td>34,222</td>
<td>96,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 2010</td>
<td>87,483</td>
<td>19,381</td>
<td>21,579</td>
<td>46,523</td>
<td>96,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Moshe Schwartz, Joyprada Swain, Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis, CRS, R40764, March 29, 2011
Managing Contractors During Contingency Operations

Lack of sufficient contract management can prevent troops from receiving needed support and lead to wasteful spending. In addition, some analysts believe that lax contractor oversight may lead to contractor abuses, which can undermine U.S. counter-insurgency efforts.

Questions have been raised about DOD's ability to effectively manage contractors during contingency operations. Some analysts assert that DOD has not adequately planned for the use of contractors. These concerns highlight the importance of careful management and oversight of contractor operations in support of military operations.