Afghanistan and the Uncertain Metrics of Progress
Part Six: Victory is Possible But “Fragile and Reversible”

Anthony H. Cordesman

Last Updated: June 6, 2011
Introduction

The narratives and metrics in Part Six reflect significant tactical progress in Helmand and Kandahar – supported in detail by the metrics on the expansion of Afghan forces shown in Part Four and by some of the polling data in this brief. They also show progress in attacking insurgent cadres, in some important aspects of “hold and build,” and that the US and ISAFG are working with GIRoA to create a workable definition of transition and a state after 2014 that could define a meaningful form of victory.

Current Tactical Gains, but of Uncertain Strategic Value

At the same time, these indicators also show why senior commanders continue to describe progress as “fragile and reversible.” The tactical progress made to date seems significant, but it is important to realize that it may not be possible to achieve it on a national scale or to ensure that it can end the conflict in a way that achieves a stable transition, and has lasting strategic or grand strategic value.

Any survey of broad indicators that relies on metric has serious limits in coverage and depth, and classified reporting provides far more depth in many areas, but the unclassified data available from official sources that are used in this presentation have the following limits:

• The progress shown largely at the tactical level, and the unclassified narratives, maps and metrics provided to date are limited and have little detail.
• There are no data to show the degree to which ISAF forces actually have fully cleared or hold given areas, and ANSF and GIRoA forces are transitioning to take their place. There are no assessments of the impact of Pakistani and US efforts to limit insurgent use of sanctuaries in Pakistan or the flow of fighters and weapons from Pakistan to Afghanistan.
• There are no indications as to whether ISAF and the ANSF can scale up the tactical successes they have won to date within probable time lines, and succeed in either creating “clear, hold, build, and transition” in the full range of critical districts, or transition such victory into lasting GIRoA and ANSF ability to secure such gains.
• The data on the fighting focuses on patterns of violence, and not on extending GIRoA influence and control while eliminating that of the insurgents. They cannot reflect the fact that the Taliban and other insurgents are fighting a war of political attrition and seek to outlast ISAF rather than win in the field.
• There seem to be very real gains in attacking insurgent networks, but there is no picture of their overall effect and no serious unclassified narrative describing the impact of such gains either in the short-term or strategic level.
• There seems to be growing success in reconciliation but no effort is made to address the scale of that success in persuading Taliban and other insurgents in adopting new tactics, shifting areas of operation, finding new sanctuaries and dispersing within the population.
• There are no meaningful narratives and metrics on reconciliation efforts, and the success and scale of efforts to persuade fighter to come back to civil life or accept GIRoA. The scale and impact of detention efforts is not addressed.

• More broadly, unclassified narratives and metrics largely ignore Taliban and other insurgent capability to shift to new levels and types of violence designed to intimidate the population, attack key GIRoA and ANSF targets, avoid major casualties through indirect and suicide attacks. They do not analyze insurgent efforts to establish stay behind and sleeper networks, and use limited numbers of high profile attack to put political and popular pressure on GIRoA and on ISAF governments to compromise or leave Afghanistan.

Mixed Progress in Popular Perceptions

Positive as many of the tactical indicators are, history also shows that most successful insurgencies appeared at some point in their history to be decisively defeated in the field, but survived by outlasting their opponents and by winning at the civil, political, and negotiating levels.

There are important polling data that do indicate the new strategy can work where Afghans see tactical victory in “clear” translated into lasting security in the form of “hold and build.” Lasting security alone does seem to produce important shifts in Afghan support for GIRoA.

These positive polling results, however, are offset by other polls that show the intensity of the fighting, shifts in insurgent operations to new areas, and the failures of GIRoA have produced a nationwide loss of Afghan support for the war, and growing popular desire for ISAF to leave and some form of political accommodation with the Taliban. The polling data on popular support for participation in ISAF countries continues to drop and this is true in the US as well as allied countries.

At the same time, such results should be kept in perspective. It is too early for public opinion to broadly reflect tactical gains and the growing capability of the ANSF and some aspects of GIRoA’s civil operations. The peaks in the fighting necessary to defeat the insurgents mean Afghans see a peak in casualties and violence before they can see its potential impact in providing lasting security. If the US, ISAF, and ANSF are successful in 2011 and 2012, Afghan, US, and other allied public opinion may sharply reverse in favor of continuing the war to a successful level of transition.
Limited Progress in Civil Areas

Pakistan’s uncertain role in the war, Afghan politics and problems in governance, and uncertain US and allied support for the war do remain continuing major uncertainties – although the ability of the Taliban and Haqqani networks to sustain anything like the current level of operations shows that strategic uncertainty affects both sides.

The indications that GIRoA, ISAF, and the US can carry out the civil side of “hold, build, and transition” also lag and remain weak at best. Far too little official effort is exerted to analyze the value of current spending and to estimate the total cost of the war in terms of current operations and aid. The US does provide some data in budget reports, but there may be a massive future underfunding of current goals for aid and “hold and build.”

USAID, other donor governments, and the UN have still never provided any credible reports and metrics on the effectiveness of any aspect of the aid effort, or a clear picture of where money is actually going and with what level of control, transparency, and impact. This failure occurs after nearly ten years of war.

This is true of all forms of aid, but it is particularly true of the aid activity that is needed in the field to support “clear, hold, build, and transition” and demonstrate that the civil side of the new strategy is having at least preliminary success.

There are only limited data to show that civil aid programs have had any meaningful impact on hold and build, although new unclassified data have been released that GIRoA is now expanding its capability to provide services, establish a working presence, and provide an effective mix of policing and use of a formal and traditional justice system.

There are no such data dealing with the problems raised by power brokers, corruption, and the problems related to the quality and integrity of governance that limit popular support.

There are only limited assessments of the ability of ANSF forces to transition, and of the level of corruption and ties to power brokers that limit their effectiveness, or of their capability and that of GIRoA civil governance to make the transfer of responsibility real, rather than cosmetic.

It is clear that there have new major efforts to deal with corruption, and the massive corrupting impact of poorly managed civil and military contracting by the US and other outside governments. As yet, however, it is too soon to make any estimate impact of such measures or on when they are expected to go into effect.
Planning and Measuring Transition

All of these limits become steadily more important at a time when the US, ISAF, and GIRoA are in a political and strategic race to show that this progress can end in successful transition by 2014, reduce outside forces and expenditures to politically sustainable levels, and create a viable mix of GIRoA and ANSF capabilities.

There needs to be a credible picture of how the US and ISAF will transition to a real-world role by GIRoA and the ANSF, of what part of the cost of GIRoA and ANSF operations the US and its allies will have to fund through 2014 and beyond, and what prospects there are for some form of meaningful Afghan and Pakistan stability once the bulk of US and other ISAF forces are gone.

At present, far too much of the unclassified narratives and metrics that look beyond the current pace of the fighting provide little more than rhetoric. Real tactical progress is not coupled to credible overall strategic goals, transition plans, or any well-defined grand strategic outcome. Moreover, there is little or no picture of progress in reconciliation or the goals set for talks between GIRoA and the Taliban.

The US, allied states, and ISAF need to provide a full and far more detailed overview of how the strategy of “clear, hold, build, and transition” will work over time. This needs to be a credible grand strategic rationale for continuing the war that shows there is a reasonable probability that “Afghan right” can exist after major outside aid and forces are cut during 2014. No can ensure a stable end state in a country and region with so many problems and tensions, but there must be a credible and well-defined goal, with credible and well-defined costs. So far, the data and narratives describing progress in governance, economics, and building capable Afghan forces far short of what should be available.
The US, its ISAF Allies, and ANSF are Implementing the New Strategy and Moving Towards “Transition”

Finding the Right Priorities within Credible Time and Resource Levels
Afghanistan: Getting the Inputs Right

**Concepts & Approach**
- Comprehensive Civ-Mil Campaign Plan
- Unity of Effort and Partnering
- COIN Guidance
- COIN Contracting Guidance
- Tactical Directive
- Tactical Driving Directive
- Guidance on Reintegration
- Joint Night Raids Guidance
- Local Security Initiatives
- Transition Concept

**Organizational Structure**
- USFOR-A
- ISAF Joint Command
- NATO Training Mission
- Rule of Law Task Force
- Force Reintegration Cell
- Combined Special Ops Command
- Intel Fusion Cells
- Info Ops Task Force
- Anti-corruption Task Forces

**People**
- Amb Eikenberry
- Staffan de Mistura (UNSRSG)
- Amb Sedwill/Gass (NATO SCR)
- Amb Ušackas (EU Special Rep)
- LTG Rodriguez
- LTG Caldwell
- VADM Harward
- MG Jones
- AfPak Hands

**Resources**
- + ~93,000 ISAF Forces
- + ~1,000 Civilians
- Additional CERP Funding
- Afghan Infrastructure Fund
- Accelerated ANSF Growth
- Persistent ISR Platforms

Source: US Experts
Anaconda Strategy vs. Insurgents in Afghanistan

Source: US Experts
“Winning” Must Still Address Seven Centers of Gravity

• Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

• Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

• Building up a much larger and more effective (and enduring base for transition) mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

• Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy (and lasting stability) at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

• Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil and civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.

• Dealing with Pakistan both in the NWFP and as a potential failed state. Finding stable relations in India, Iran, “Stans,” Russia, and China

• Making effective trade-offs with other US domestic and security interests
Must Show Can Reverse Insurgent Momentum at a Broader Level:
Struggle for the Rest of the Population

Most Threatened Population Areas

![Map showing most threatened population areas.]

- Prevent GIRoA development and influence
- Limit population ability to choose

Elements of Insurgent Influence
- Shadow governance
- Population intimidated and/or coerced
- Insurgents have Freedom of Movement
- Friendly Freedom of Movement limited
- Infrastructure development disrupted
- Economic capacity truncated

Essential Security Influence

![Map showing essential security influence.]

- Create time and space
- Enable population opportunity to choose

Elements of Security Influence
- National thru local governance improved
- Security in key population centers
- Security connected between regions
- Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
- Major infrastructure projects ongoing
- Economic corridor sustainable

ISAF, May 2010
ISAF Concept of Operations: June 2010

Operation Bakhair

Operation Tajamu Va Tahjum II

RC(West)

RC(North)

RC(East)

RC(South)

RC(Southwest)

Security Forces
June 2009 22,555
June 2010 33,052

Operation Chashme Naw

Operation Cold Fusion III

Operation Mountain Cover

Operation Mahasera Kohi

Security Forces
June 2009 43,571
June 2010 91,576

Security Forces
June 2009 157,163
June 2010 331,572

Total Security Forces
June 2009 157,163
Jan 2011 331,572
During ISAF’s Winter Campaign, operational efforts focused on consolidating the gains made against the insurgency in the fall of 2010 in the following critical areas:

1) the Central Helmand River Valley in RC-SW, where comprehensive civil-military efforts were aimed at expanding Afghan Government security bubbles while bringing improved governance, development, and security to the more than 500,000 Afghans in the region

2) Kandahar City and its environs, where the Taliban-led insurgency originated;

3) Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan, where the insurgency continues to benefit from neighboring sanctuaries;

4) Baghlan and Kunduz, where ISAF is clearing insurgent areas of operation; and

5) Badghis, where ISAF continued expansion of the security bubble.

The 2010-2011 Winter Campaign was executed within the existing key terrain and area of interest strategic framework. To prioritize coalition efforts, 80 key terrain districts (KTDs) and 41 area of interest (AOIs) districts were initially identified with Afghan Government agreement.

Last quarter, the number of KTDs and AOIs was revised upward to 94 and 44, respectively, for a total of 138.

Key terrain is defined as areas the control of which provides a marked advantage to either the Government of Afghanistan or the insurgents. AOIs are defined similarly, but are of secondary importance to KTDs.

They are areas in which ISAF and the ANSF operate in order to positively impact KTDs and meet operational objectives.

The purpose of KTDs and AOIs is to ensure that limited resources are applied to areas where they will realize the greatest advantage.
SOF Effects: Degrading the Insurgency

**Effects on the Insurgency**

- In the Last 90 Days:
  - 121 Insurgent Leaders Removed
  - 505 Insurgents Detained
  - Instability among leadership is degrading insurgent operations
  - Reduced efficacy of Taliban “shadow governance”
  - IED networks being degraded

**Overview, June 2010**
Afghan 2015: Strategic Assessment

PRISM FOR POST-ISAF PROJECTIONS

CURRENT

- U.S.
- Coalition
- Int’l Organizations
- Global Power
- Regional Neighbors
- Afghans
- Multinational Corps

- Taliban
- Al Qaeda
- Other Insurgents
- Other Terrorists
- Transnational Crime

DEVELOPMENTS 2011-14

GLOBAL
- U.S. Public Diplomacy
- Afg-Pak
- Regional
- Socio-Economic

GLOBAL
- U.S. Public Diplomacy
- Afg-Pak
- Regional
- Socio-Economic

GLOBAL
- APRP
- Reintegration
- Shafafiyat
- Silk Road

2015 & BEYOND

OPPORTUNITIES

- GIROA Legitimacy
- Insurgent Defeat
- CN Success
- Effective Int’l Org

MOST LIKELY

- GIROA Succession
- ANSF Training
- ISAF Transitioned
- UNAMA Morph

PAK Failure
- Global Diversion
- LT Strike India

RISKS

- PAK Sanctuary
- No Coalition
- Regional Conflict

WORSE
In January 2010, participants at the London Conference pledged to develop a plan for phased transition to Afghan security lead. NATO and ISAF Foreign Ministers endorsed the Joint Framework for Inteqal (Transition) at Talinn in April 2010, and President Obama and President Karzai committed to the process in a May 2010 joint statement.

At the Kabul Conference in July 2010, the international community expressed its support for President Karzai’s objective that the ANSF should lead and conduct all military operations in all provinces by the end of 2014, support that was later re-affirmed by NATO and ISAF member nations at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010.

Inteqal is intended to be a conditions-based, irreversible process. It is governed by eight core principles:

- **Conditions-based**: Transition recommendations shall be based on an assessment of conditions on the ground. Transition is a process, not an event.

- **Bottom-up assessments**: Transition recommendations will be informed by local assessments, as well as by assessments from mentors of key Afghan Government institutions at the local level.

- **Start at the district, progress to the province**: Transfer of security will take place at the district level and progress to the provincial level.

- **“Thin-out”**: As ANSF capabilities develop, ISAF will thin its forces in certain locations as conditions allow, and progressively shift from a partnering to a mentoring relationship that supports continued ANSF professionalization.

- **Retain headquarters elements**: Headquarters elements will be retained, even as combat elements thin-out, to facilitate and enable ANSF operations.

- **Reinvest some of the transition dividend**: As ISAF forces thin-out in one district or area, some of that “transition dividend” should be reinvested in other contiguous geographic areas or in the training effort to accelerate and/or enhance transition.

- **Transition institutions and functions as well as geographic areas**: Transition does not simply apply to geographic areas – it will also apply to key Afghan Government institutions, and functions such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

- **Ensure transition will be irreversible**: A successful transition of security responsibility requires that ANSF, under effective Afghan civilian control, will be capable of addressing security challenges on a sustainable and irreversible basis – albeit with some level of continued support.
Defining “Transition” (and Victory?) - II

The decision to begin security transition in a geographic area is determined by four conditions.

- First, the ANSF must be capable of handling additional security responsibilities with less assistance.
- Second, the security in the given area must be at a threat level that permits the population to pursue routine daily activities.
- Third, local governance must be sufficiently developed to provide a complementary layer of stability as ISAF assistance is gradually reduced.
- Fourth, ISAF must be properly postured to reduce its presence as ANSF capacity and capabilities increase and the security environment improves.

In November 2010, the Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) convened for the first time. Under the leadership of Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (appointed by President Karzai as the Chairman of the Afghan Transition Coordination Commission) and co-chaired by COMISAF General Petraeus and NATO SCR Mark Sedwill, the JANIB confirmed the 2011-2014 transition timeline and emphasized stability and self-sufficiency as goals of transition.

In February 2011, the JANIB recommended to the North Atlantic Council and the Afghan Government the geographic areas assessed as prepared to begin the transition process. Following endorsement by the Afghan Cabinet and NATO Defense Ministers, President Karzai announced in his March 22, 2011 Nowruz19 speech the first tranche of provinces and municipal districts to begin transition in July 2011.

The seven areas that will begin the transition process include the provinces of Kabul (excluding Sarobi District), Panjshir, and Bamyan; the municipal districts of Mazar-e-Sharif (Balkh Province), Lashkar Gah (Helmand Province), and Herat (Herat Province); and the Mehtar Lam Municipality not including the rest of the capital district (Laghman Province). In all, the areas announced include approximately 20-25 percent of Afghanistan’s population and reflects both a geographic and an ethnic balance.

In his Nowruz remarks, President Karzai linked peace, transition, and sovereignty in a tone that suggested cooperation with the international community. In his speech, he also listed certain prerequisites for transition, although he emphasized that transition was inevitable and irreversible. Those prerequisites included: adherence to Kabul Conference international aid commitments; a “one UN system” that is coordinated with the Afghan government; continued international support for major infrastructure projects; transformation of PRTs into contributing agencies for transition; preparation of proposals and plans to enhance good governance in the provinces and cities involved in transition; and legal and judicial reform. Dr. Ghani has actively engaged with ISAF and the international community on transition implementation planning, including the evolution of PRTs. This dialogue between Afghan, ISAF, and international community leaders will facilitate the transition process and will enable a transition of security to the Afghan Government by the end of 2014.

Defining “Transition” (and Victory?) - III

In addition to continued assistance from the United States and the international community throughout and beyond transition, the continued growth of the ANSF in quantity, quality, and capacity is essential to ensuring that Afghanistan is capable of meeting existing and future security challenges.

Continued ANSF growth to a force of 352,000, complemented by the expansion of the Afghan Local Police from 10,000 to 30,000 personnel, will allow transition to proceed at an acceptable level of risk, and will allow the ANSF to successfully take the lead for security across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Work is underway to understand the implications of the transition with respect to the CJSOR process and with a view to identifying opportunities that might exist for force reinvestment.

However, there are not expected to be any significant force reinvestment opportunities or redeployment dividends arising from the first or second tranches of transitioning provinces, as they will largely include areas that are already largely uncontested and therefore have minimal ISAF or USFOR-A force presence. Thus, there will remain a need to fulfill the outstanding requirements for trainers within the existing CJSOR.
The Threat in 2011

Ongoing Leadership and Tactical Losses in a War of Political Attrition
## Major Factions, Leaders in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Leader</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Ideology/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Regional Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large possibly in Afghanistan. Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan province, is about 65 years old.</td>
<td>Ultra-orthodox Islamic, Pashtun</td>
<td>Insurgent groups, mostly in the south and east.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haqqani Network</td>
<td>Jalaludin and Siraj Haqqani. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Said to be heavily influenced by elements within Pakistani military intelligence.</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Society (leader of “Northern Alliance”)</td>
<td>Burhanuddin Rabbani/ Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower house)/Muhammad Fahim/Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006). Ismail Khan, a so-called “warlord,” heads faction of the grouping in Herat area. Khan, now Minister of Energy and Water, visited United States in March 2008 to sign USAID grant for energy projects.</td>
<td>Moderate Islamic, mostly Tajik</td>
<td>Much of northern and western Afghanistan, including Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan</td>
<td>Abdul Rashid Dostum. During OEF, impressed U.S. commanders with horse-mounted assaults on Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the fall of that city and the Taliban’s subsequent collapse. Was Karzai rival in October 2004 presidential election, then his top “security adviser.”</td>
<td>Secular, Uzbek</td>
<td>Jowzjan, Balkh, Faryab, Sar-i-Pol, and Samangan provinces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb-e-Wahdat</td>
<td>Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan. Karim Khalili is Vice President, but Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival in 2004 presidential election and parliament. Generally pro-Iranian. Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan city. Still revered by Hazara Shiites is the former leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari, who was captured and killed by the Taliban in March 1995.</td>
<td>Shiite, Hazara tribes</td>
<td>Bamiyan, Ghazni, Dai Kundi province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun Leaders</td>
<td>Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and south; central government led by Hamid Karzai.</td>
<td>Moderate Islamic, Pashtun</td>
<td>Dominant in the south and east</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Union</td>
<td>Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi” ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry. Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.</td>
<td>Orthodox Islamic, Pashtun</td>
<td>Paghman (west of Kabul)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, CRS RTL30588, March 24, 2011,
The pressure from recent ISAF and ANSF operations is felt most acutely by the lower and middle levels of the insurgency living and operating in Afghanistan. This winter, senior insurgent leadership was increasingly challenged to keep subordinates committed to the fight. The majority of fighters and sub-commanders, operating in or near their home districts and villages, have reportedly felt removed from senior insurgent leaders who are perceived as living in relative safety outside the major conflict areas and who are benefitting financially from the fighting.

The dissonance between Pakistan-based senior leadership and the rank-and-file insurgents located in Afghanistan should not be overstated, but does suggest that seams within the insurgency may be widening. Despite this, senior Taliban leaders continue to voice confidence in their ultimate success.

The Taliban's main objective for 2011 is to regain momentum lost as a result of the U.S. surge and expanded ISAF and ANSF operations. It is assessed that their operational main effort will be to reclaim safe havens in southern Afghanistan in order to regain influence and dominance over the local population centers. They will likely focus on the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan as these areas are economically, socially, and psychologically important to the Taliban.

ISAF still does not fully understand the regenerative capacity of the insurgency. Although the death or detention of thousands of insurgents, in addition to the formal re-integration of hundreds of others over the past six months has had a disruptive effect, the insurgency has demonstrated a high degree of resilience in the past. The cumulative impact of ISAF operations on the insurgency will not be apparent until well into the 2011 traditional insurgency campaign season.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): Leaders based in Pakistan; operational presence in northern Afghanistan

Hezb-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG): Longest active but least effective of Afghan insurgent groups; led by Hekmatyar Gulbuddin; strongest operational presence in northeast

Taliban (TB): Largest Afghan Insurgent group; ruled from 1996-2001; operates throughout country but strongest in south and east; led by Mullah Omar and senior leaders in Pakistan

Haqqani Network (HON): Taliban affiliated insurgent group founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani; focused on Pakika, Paktiya and Khost provinces in AC-East and based in North Waziristan; responsible for several high-profile attacks in Kabul

Pakistani Militant and Terrorist Networks:
- Harakatul Jihad-e Islami, Harakat ut Mujahidin, Lashkar-e Janghvi, and Jaish-e Mohammad conduct attacks against the Pakistani Government and cooperate with terrorist groups.

Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT): Multi faceted terrorist group based in Pakistan; planned and conducted the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India

Al-Qaeda (AQ): Primary Safe Havens in North/South Waziristan; supports the Afghan insurgency; allies include HON, Taliban, and TTP

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Loosely affiliated groups that operate in several agencies across the FATA and in the settled areas; responsible for failed 1 May 2010 Times Square Attack

(2) AFPAK Threat Groups
In the east, the Haqqani Network (HQN) remains the most significant threat. HQN continues its efforts to increase influence and control in traditional operating areas in Khost, Paktika, and Paktiya Provinces, and to expand its influence in Kabul and its environs in order to conduct attacks in the capital. A series of high-profile attacks during this reporting period demonstrate HQN’s continued capabilities.

In the north, insurgents have attempted to expand operations to increase influence over the population and create the impression of a nation-wide insurgency while diverting ISAF and ANSF focus and resources away from their main operations in the south and east. However, insurgent capabilities have been degraded by ISAF and ANSF operations in Kunduz and Takhar Provinces, and the effort by the Taliban to expand the insurgency to the north has achieved limited effects.

Finally, in the west, the insurgents’ priority is to divert Afghan Government and ISAF attention away from the main focus areas of Regional Commands South and Southwest by conducting targeted attacks on ANSF and government officials in Herat and Farah Provinces.

The ALP program is also of particular concern to insurgent leaders in Farah, Badghis, and Herat Provinces, as it has been successful in limiting their freedom of movement.

Insurgents in Helmand Province will continue to try to regain lost safe havens by undermining reintegration efforts, intimidating the local population, and weakening government credibility. Insurgents have similar goals in Kandahar Province, where assassinations and intimidation are their tactics of choice.

The insurgency is also resorting to suicide attacks in Kandahar City in order to undermine and degrade ANSF capabilities. The insurgency is also attempting to re-establish a more effective presence in Uruzgan Province, where ALP sites have reduced their influence and disrupted their freedom of movement. Throughout these areas, Taliban senior leaders are focused on undermining local defense initiatives.

Insurgent 2011 Objectives

- Taliban
  - Distract ISAF with Increased Activity

- Al Qaeda and Affiliates
  - Exploit for Safe Haven

- Haggani Network
  - Increase Influence and Freedom of Movement

- Common Objective
  - Conduct High-Profile Attacks in Kabul

- Taliban
  - Regain Lost Safe Havens and Influence

Source: US Experts
Statement of the Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate Regarding the Inception of the Spring Operations.
In the Name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful:

*Fight in the Cause of Allah, those who fight you and do not be aggressive. Allah does not love the transgressors.* (S:II V:190)

To the Muslim and Mujahid Nation of Afghanistan!

Today, our sacred Jihad against all foreign invaders in Afghanistan successfully steps up to the threshold of its tenth year, with the help of the Almighty Allah (SwT) and your prideful Jihad and selfless sacrifices. With the approach of the spring, the Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan wants to declare the launching of the spring military operations christened as “Badar” to be waged against the invading Americans and their foreign Allies and internal supports.

For the purpose of success and effectiveness of the operations against the foreign invading forces and their defeated supporters, the following points must be born in mind:

1. As in the past, the Badar Operations will focus on attacks against military centers, places of gatherings, airbases, ammunition and logistical military convoys of the foreign invaders in all parts of the country.

2. Throughout the operations, the prior target of Mujahideen’s attacks must remain foreign invading forces, members of their spy networks and (other) spies, high-ranking officials of the Kabul Puppet Administration, both military and civilian, members of the cabinet, members of the parliament, Heads of foreign and local companies working for the enemy and contractors.

3. Since members of the American espionage agencies, government officials of the Puppet Administration and enemies of the Afghan people and Jihad have ensconced themselves in the so-called Peace Council and are trying to pave the way for the prolongation of the American occupation by cashing in on the name of Jihad, religion and tribal chieftainship; wants to prevent Mujahideen from waging Jihad against the invaders and are urging the Afghan Mujahid people to accept American slavery and surrender, therefore, members of the Council can be target of the Mujahideen attacks during the operations as, in view of their role, they are considered official members of the ranks of the enemy.

4. Strict attention must be paid to the protection and safety of civilians during the spring operations by working out a meticulous military plan. Utilizing all proven military tactics, the operations will focus on usage of advanced weapons against the air and ground forces of the invaders, tip-and-run attacks, and group offensives, city attacks, advanced explosives attacks, effective group and martyrdom seeking attacks by warrior Mujahideen.
5. The Spring Operations have been given the name of Badar in a hope that the Almighty Allah (SwT) may bestow on the Mujahideen victorious achievements versus all invading forces in Afghanistan like that which were bestowed on the believers during the historical battle of Badar in the 2nd Hijri lunar year. Some ardent diabolic chiefs of the polytheists were either killed or captured at the hands of the Mujahideen during the confrontation.

6. Before the launching of the Badar Operations, we call on all officials of the Kabul Administration, military officers, officials of the spy agency and all other employees to cut off their relations with the invaders and their supporters whatsoever, and join the Mujahideen for the cause of defense of the people and their own person.

7. All Afghan people should bear in mind to keep away from gatherings, convoys and centers of the enemy so that they will not become harmed during attacks of Mujahideen against the enemy or, as usual, the enemy may not avenge itself on them, following the operations of the Mujahideen.

8. The Spring Operations of Badar have been launched for the purpose of protecting the tenets of Islam and the religion from the claws of the invaders and salvaging the country and people from the foreign colonialism because the foreign invaders have committed unlawful aggression against the sovereignty of our country; have ignited the flames of war in the yard of our house; have destroyed orchards and houses with bombs and bulldozers; have martyred our countrymen and imprisoned them and have desecrated the holiest Divine Book of the Muslims, the Holy Quran.

Therefore, the war in our country will not come to an end unless and until the foreign invading forces pull out of Afghanistan and the cause of the war are obliterated. The Islamic Emirate considers this its legitimate right and religious obligation to defend its religion and country. The Jihad of the Islamic Emirate will continue with the help of the Almighty Allah and the support of the Mujahid people until the attainment of this legitimate right.

9. The Badar Operations will begin throughout Afghanistan on May, the 1st 2011 i.e. 11 Saur Hijri solar year.

Success comes only from Allah, the Almighty.

Leadership Council
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

Source: ABC News, 30 April 2011.
AOG initiated attacks have soared this quarter, up by 51% from last year. This ‘gain rate’ is also larger than the 38% seen between the Q1 of 09-10. March 2011 saw 1,102 attacks, an average of 35 per day, surpassing even the August 2009 summer peak during Presidential elections. The data suggests that the deep winter down turn (noted at Q4 2010) was simply an ordinary operational pause, and was not reflective of a permanently degraded capacity as some had suggested at the time. Considering the variety of IMF tactics and strengths that have been brought to bear against the opposition at different periods throughout the 5.2 years recorded here, it is remarkable how consistent the growth rate has been and suggests that we need to think beyond the linear logic that a stronger IMF equals a weaker AOG, as this is clearly not the case. Instead, it is likely that a more complex ‘co-evolutionary’ relationship exists within which the counter-insurgency actually strengthens and exacerbates the insurgency, through forced adaptation, rather than defeating it. The end result appears to be a perpetually escalating stalemate which could sustain itself indefinitely, or until one side, or the other, transitions out.

The most volatile area, again, has been Loya Paktya (P2K) plus Ghazni - which corresponds to some of ISAF RC-EAST and AOG Miramshah Shura - which has seen an averaged growth rate of 287% per province. All four provinces in this area are ranked as “extremely insecure” and are likely to remain so throughout 2011. The northern half of ISAF RC-EAST (Nuristan, Kunar) remains ranked as “extremely insecure”, with at least one district (Waygal) entirely under AOG command. In the south, Uruzgan and Helmand are seeing above average growth rates, as AOG counter ISAF offensives, while Kandahar and Zabul remain steady and Nimroz sees decline. We continue to rank four of the five as “highly insecure” or above, with just Nimroz being slightly more accessible. The four provinces of the west have seen an averaged growth rate of 82% and we rank Herat as “deteriorating” as it is slated for early transition while seeing a 115% increase in attacks. In the north west, Faryab is ranked as “moderate” having the regional highest attack rate in absolute terms. Jawzjan and Balkh rank as “deteriorating” due to them having the regions highest percentage growth rates (175% & 121% respectively). Sar-i-Pul’s Sayyad district causes it to also be ranked as “deteriorating”. In the north east all provinces but Badakhshan have seen lower attack rates than Q1 last year but continue to be ranked as “moderate” and “deteriorating” due to the very high likelihood of a fresh AOG campaign in Q2.
Patterns in Major Acts and Sources of Violence Reflect Most Intensive Fighting Yet

Note: No metrics on lower levels of violence, areas of insurgent influence and control, or areas where insurgents are adapting tactics, or shifting AORs and ratlines

As of 18 March 2011

Chart displays enemy action and explosive hazards to include executed attacks; potential attacks (IEDs/mines found & cleared) are not included

Source: ISAF, March 24, 2011
Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED events. IED events include IED explosions, IEDs that were found and cleared, mine explosions, and mines that were found and cleared. Total security incidents were higher from October 2010 through March 2011 compared to the corresponding period in 2009-2010. ISAF assesses that this was primarily the result of: 1) the increased ISAF and ANSF troop presence; 2) the higher operations tempo challenging insurgent safe havens in southern and eastern Afghanistan; and 3) mild winter weather combined with Taliban leadership guidance ordering insurgents to continue operations throughout the winter. Direct fire and IED events continued to dominate the overall types of security incidents.

Source: US Experts
Enemy attacks decreased during the winter consistent with seasonal trends. They declined at a slightly greater rate than the decline in overall security incidents. At the end of March 2011, enemy attacks comprised approximately 70 percent of all security incidents. This is lower than the first quarter of 2010 (75 percent), a possible indication of ISAF and ANSF effects on insurgent operations.

Weekly Attack Trends

Chart displays enemy action and explosive hazards to include executed attacks; potential attacks (IEDs/mines found & cleared) are not included.

Source: US Experts
Overall, IED activity remained elevated during the reporting period. Elevated IED activity suggests that ISAF and ANSF operations have eroded insurgent capacity to conduct effective direct fire attacks. IED “found-and-cleared” rates currently remain above 60 percent, a level not seen since reporting began in 2007. ISAF assesses that this is attributable to several factors:

- Increased local national assistance turning-in devices primarily in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces;
- Improved detection technologies employed by ISAF;
- Hasty emplacement of IEDs by insurgents due to increased ISAF and ANSF presence, as well as improvements in intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance assets;
- Increased ANSF capability and capacity;
- Increased and improved ISAF and ANSF partnering; and
- Better IED awareness training for ISAF forces.


RC-SW continues to experience the highest levels of IED activity (40 percent overall), though this is slightly less than its overall share of national violence (45 percent).

RC-S experiences disproportionately high IED activity compared with its share of overall violence (33 percent vs. 20 percent).

However, IED found-and-cleared rates in RC-S are the highest among regional commands (70 percent).
Weekly IED Events: 1/08-5/11

Chart displays Explosive Hazard events to include executed and potential IED and Mine attacks.

Source: US Experts
Weapons/Explosives Caches Found and Cleared: 1/08-5/11

As of 19 May 2011

Other equipment that supports insurgent activities. Examples are unarmed/incomplete devices, IED paraphernalia, ammunition, radios, uniforms, as well as narcotics and explosive precursors.

Source: US Experts
The surge of ISAF and ANSF troops has enabled increased combined team presence in key areas resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of caches found during the reporting period. The 12-week average of caches found and subsequently cleared is currently at its highest level since reporting began in August 2009. These finds may potentially impact security trends and enemy-initiated attacks by depriving the insurgency of valuable resources that would otherwise be used in attacks on ISAF and ANSF forces.


Note: Major increase in caches reported by local Afghan, growing indications insurgents cannot replace and have supply problems

Cache: A facility or location where supplies are hidden or otherwise concealed and are not readily available. A cache may consist of weapons or other equipment that supports insurgent activities. Examples are unarmed/incomplete devices, IED paraphernalia, ammunition, radios, uniforms, as well as narcotics and explosive precursors.

Source: ISAF, March 24, 2011
Overall Regional Trends are Favorable Tactically, Far More Uncertain in Terms of Afghan Perceptions
The US Strategy Review in December suggested the IEA’s momentum had been blunted in some areas and, while not specifically mentioning Kandahar or Helmand, given that those are their focus areas it is reason- able to assume that they meant there.

Our quarterly attack rate figures for each province (above) do indeed show a substantial reduction of attacks in both between August and December. Kandahar dropping by 50%, in contrast to the usual 20%, and Helmand dropping by 40% in Q.4, a trend not seen since 2006. This demonstrates that the IEA have turned away from the battlefield earlier, and in greater numbers, than before but it does not provide an explanation as to why. The pressure of US operations could certainly be a factor here, anecdotal reporting suggests many commanders felt the areas to be too hot and sought sanctuary in other provinces or Pakistan, but so too could other more benign factors like the early onset of Ramadan and the normal seasonal downturn.

However, regardless of which explanation one prefers when you put the quarterly data in its annual context, which to us is a much more valid analytical period as it captures a full operational cycle rather than just the tactical to & fro, it becomes completely irrelevant. Over the full year the IEA expanded their attacks in both provinces, Helmand by a whopping 124% and Kandahar by a more conservative 20%, suggesting that in the bigger picture their capacity to conduct attacks has improved substantially. In light of this the deep down- turn could just as easily be interpreted as an early winter reprieve, after an intense summer fight, and would not represent any longer term degradation of capacity. If the 2011 spring offensives sustain, or build on, the level of violence achieved this year then it will be a sure indicator that the surge operations achieved little. If they do not then the US conclusions, in those provinces at least, will be validated.

Source: Afghanistan National NGO Safety Office (ANSO), ANSO Quarterly Data Report, Q.4
RC-SW had the highest level of violent activity among regional commands; however, in the first quarter of 2011, its relative share of overall violence was slightly reduced due to on-going operations in Regional Commands South and East. Surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) events have been reduced to minimal levels in RC-S and RC-SW, and indirect fire events have not had a significant impact.

RC-C remains a predominately secure environment, with only 15 events taking place in the first quarter 2011, the lowest levels since 2006. Seasonal security incidents by regional command remained relatively consistent.

Civilian Casualties by Region: UNAMA 2010

- CH: 3
- NR: 141
- NER: 167
- WR: 168
- CR: 231
- ER: 243
- SER: 513
- SR: 1310
Civilian casualties (CIVCAS) caused by ISAF and Afghan forces decreased by 20 percent during 2010 (558 in 2010; 697 in 2009) even though violence increased by 80 percent and ISAF force levels increased by 53 percent. Coalition-caused CIVCAS pose strategic risks that undermine ISAF's mission, jeopardize the coalition's credibility, and alienate the Afghan population; thus NATO and ISAF continue to proactively manage CIVCAS incidents to mitigate the occurrences and effects of these unfortunate events.

Casualties caused by ISAF close combat aviation (CCA) and close air support (CAS) were reduced during 2010, despite an increase in ISAF operations. These events comprised less than 4 percent of all CIVCAS in 2010. However, recent ISAF operations resulting in high-profile CIVCAS incidents reinforce the need for continued vigilance in CCA and CAS operations.

Insurgents were responsible for approximately 88 percent of civilian casualties, primarily a result of IED activity. The number of civilians wounded or killed by insurgent activity increased by 2.2 percent in 2010 from 2009 (2,597 in 2010; 2,567 in 2009), trends that were supported in a March 2011 report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan.24 Recent high-profile IED attacks by insurgents in Kandahar, Khost, Kunduz, Paktika, and Nangarhar Provinces caused significant numbers of civilian casualties in the first quarter of 2011.

Steady Progress in Attacking the Insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan: SOF, UAVs, and ALP
Special Operations: 17 February – 18 May 2011

90-Day Roll-up

- 1,478 operations
- 499 insurgent leaders killed/captured
- 2,395 insurgents captured
- 549 insurgents killed

Source: US Experts
Afghan Local Police Status

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Color</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>GIRoA-Validated/Operational</td>
<td>green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Tashkil signed, pending validation</td>
<td>yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Pending MOI Approval</td>
<td>red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Total Operational/Emerging Sites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than 6,000 Official ALP Members

Source: US Experts

Major Offensives in the FATA and KPK: 2008-2011

Centers of Gravity: Gains in Fighting in the South
ISAF Regional Operations in RC South and Southwest: 2011

REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTH

During late 2010 and early 2011, operations in RC-S continued to shift momentum from the insurgency to the Afghan Government and the coalition. The U.S. 10th Mountain Division headquarters assumed command of RC-S in November 2010 as the first U.S. division headquarters dedicated to RC-S. At the same time, the ANSF has seen an even more substantial uplift as a result of improved recruiting, force development, and professionalization. ANSF capabilities continue to increase through effective training and operational partnering with coalition forces. The surge in ISAF and ANSF forces, coupled with an increased operational focus and tempo, has resulted in important security gains throughout the Regional Command.

Following Operation Hamkari in late 2010, Afghan and coalition partners engaged in operations to consolidate, reinforce, and expand areas where hard-earned security gains were made. The ANSF have made important strides in their ability to plan and execute independent operations, and have become a significant threat to the insurgency’s ability to operate in the key terrain of RC-S.

Security gains in RC-S have been reinforced by the establishment of the Afghan Local Police, which has empowered communities in several locations. They contribute directly to security in partnership with the ANSF, district and provincial government, and the Afghan Ministry of Interior.

REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTHWEST

The current level of security in the Central Helmand River Valley (where the majority of the populace resides) requires a formidable security presence, a responsibility shared by ISAF and the ANSF.

There have been significant improvements in the overall security situation in Helmand and Nimruz Provinces since the previous reporting period. Forces in RC-SW continued to assist the Afghan Government in protecting the population, executing comprehensive COIN operations, enabling civilian partners, and disrupting the insurgency’s ability to harm the Afghan people.

The expansion of security into areas previously controlled by the insurgency in northern Helmand Province has proven challenging but achievable, as the increased tempo of operations and the surge of ISAF and ANSF forces have expanded security gains and provided the time and space necessary for local governance to expand and develop. The ANSF expansion has also permitted more counter-narcotics operations.

In the Lower Helmand River Valley, the ANSF and the coalition have reduced insurgent threats to local Afghan bazaars, allowing commerce to improve and the delivery of aid via District Development Plans to increase. Security gains, paralleled by improvements in governance and development throughout both Helmand and Nimruz Provinces, have enabled Lashkar Gah to be included among the first tranche of areas to transition to Afghan security lead in July 2011.

Operational Main Effort: RC-South

• Most significant Taliban influence over the population

• Protect the population in threatened or key areas

• Create time and space for governance to improve

• Create conditions for development, with freedom of movement and security along contiguous economic corridor

- Population Array
- Focus of Decisive Effects
- Population Protection
- Economic Corridor

Demonstrable, near-term stabilization of the south is critical to success
Civilian Assassinations and Executions in the South

In 2010, victims of assassinations in Kandahar included government officials, district shura members, participants in development programs, drivers of trucks delivering supplies to ISAF, off-duty police, suspected informants, and others.

In 2010, in the southern region, the AIHRC and UNAMA HR recorded three times as many civilians killed in AGE assassinations and executions as in 2009 (a 204 per cent increase).

In contrast, for all other incident types combined, the increase in civilians killed by AGEs was nine per cent. The overall 29 per cent increase in civilians killed by AGEs was due primarily to the surge in assassinations. While the Taliban had not announced its strategy until May, this trend was already visible in March, in the aftermath of the major Pro-Government clearance operations in Helmand and in the lead up to their clearance operations in Kandahar.

Assassinations also became increasingly widespread. In 2009, the AIHRC and UNAMA Human Rights recorded assassinations in 17 districts. In 2010, both organizations recorded assassinations in 30 districts. Kandahar district (which includes Kandahar City) had more assassinations than any other and here, too, insecurity increased everywhere: In 2010, sub-districts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 saw more assassinations, and no sub-district saw fewer.

The most alarming trend in 2010 was the huge number of civilians assassinated by Anti-Government Elements. Four hundred and sixty two civilians were assassinated representing an increase of more than 105 per cent compared to 2009.

Half of all civilian assassinations occurred in southern Afghanistan. Helmand province saw a 588 per cent increase in the number of civilians assassinated by Anti-Government Elements and Kandahar province experienced a 248 per cent increase compared to 2009.

In 2010, victims of assassinations in Kandahar included government officials, district shura members, participants in development programs, drivers of trucks delivering supplies to ISAF, off-duty police, suspected informants, and others.

In 2010, in the southern region, the AIHRC and UNAMA HR recorded three times as many civilians killed in AGE assassinations and executions as in 2009 (a 204 per cent increase).

In contrast, for all other incident types combined, the increase in civilians killed by AGEs was nine per cent. The overall 29 per cent increase in civilians killed by AGEs was due primarily to the surge in assassinations. While the Taliban had not announced its strategy until May, this trend was already visible in March, in the aftermath of the major Pro-Government clearance operations in Helmand and in the lead up to their clearance operations in Kandahar.

Assassinations also became increasingly widespread. In 2009, the AIHRC and UNAMA Human Rights recorded assassinations in 17 districts. In 2010, both organizations recorded assassinations in 30 districts. Kandahar district (which includes Kandahar City) had more assassinations than any other and here, too, insecurity increased everywhere: In 2010, sub-districts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 saw more assassinations, and no sub-district saw fewer.
Impact of Population-Centric Strategy
Overall Civilian Casualties in the South: UNAMA 2010

…the civilian casualty trends in Helmand and Kandahar provinces were markedly different. In Helmand, civilian casualties increased dramatically (78 per cent compared to 2009 from armed clashes between the Taliban and Pro-Government Forces and assassinations), while, in Kandahar, deaths and injuries of civilians increased by only 11 per cent (although civilian casualties in Kandahar were already high). The clearance operations by Pro-Government Forces in February 2010 in the central Helmand districts of Marja and Nad Ali were accompanied and followed by intense violence which accounts for a substantial portion of the overall increase in civilian casualties in that province. In contrast, clearance operations in the districts bordering Kandahar City — Arghandab, Dand, Panjwayi, and Zhari — between July and November 2010 did not lead to a similar spike in civilian casualties, although they resulted in large scale property destruction.

In an effort to promote improved security for Afghan civilians in 2011, UNAMA Human Rights and the AIHRC offer the following observations regarding the military operations in Marja and Kandahar. The initial strategic decision by Pro-Government Forces to choose as a main battle ground the densely populated rural environment of Marja, without the necessary Afghan policing and public protection capacities to follow, contributed to increased civilian harm. The decision to establish numerous bases and check posts in a populated area before it had been fully cleared further contributed to a dangerous dynamic in which armed clashes between Pro-Government Forces and the Taliban routinely affected civilians. Taliban assassinations of civilians and the use of civilians as human shields particularly in densely populated areas were not only unlawful tactics but lead to devastating results for the civilian population.

The contrast between Marja and Nad Ali and the districts surrounding Kandahar City may be due in part to lessons learned by Pro-Government Forces in Helmand that resulted in limiting civilian casualties while intensifying operations in Kandahar. Two factors appear to have been relevant in the Kandahar operations: Pro Government Forces engaged in more extensive consultations with communities prior to operations and carried out a series of smaller operations around Kandahar City; and more attacks in the Kandahar operations appear to have been pre-planned (as opposed to responses to Taliban opening fire or attacking). In addition, raids and attacks targeted Taliban fighters more precisely resulting in few civilian casualties.

UNAMA Human Rights and the AIHRC observed that the Kandahar operations resulted in the large scale destruction of homes, crops, and irrigation systems. Many houses were destroyed to dispose of IEDs and to improve the defenses of Pro-Government Forces’ bases. Military vehicles drove off roads to avoid IEDs but destroyed walls, gardens, and irrigation systems in the process and Pro-Government Forces destroyed buildings used for drying grapes to prevent their use as fortifications. Elders from Zhari and Panjwayi districts interviewed by UNAMA Human Rights and the AIHRC summed up civilians’ concerns: “So far, all of the operation’s results are negative, because they are destroying the people’s houses, their gardens, and their irrigation systems. As for the future we don’t know what brightness it might hold.”; and, “Imagine that I have a small house and garden. If you destroy those, and in the future, there is peace, then what good is this peace for me?”

While Pro-Government Forces showed care in avoiding civilian casualties during the Kandahar operations, international humanitarian law norms regarding the definition of military objectives, proportionality and precautions in attack do not appear to have been rigorously applied when civilian property was at risk. It is significant that clearance operations around Kandahar City led to fewer civilian casualties than those in central Helmand. However, the long-term consequences of these operations for the civilian population will depend on whether Pro-Government Forces establish sustainable security in those areas, and prioritize and fully fund rebuilding of properties. The longer-term result will also depend on whether the parties to the conflict act to prevent civilian casualties in the coming summer and predicted upsurge in combat in Kandahar and avoid replicating spring/summer 2010 in Marja. Few Kandahar residents offered more than cautious optimism about the future. As one elder from Panjwayi district told UNAMA Human Rights and the AIHRC in October 2010, “We want to see ‘one year security’, not ‘six month security’.”
Central Helmand: 6/09-6/10

- Central Helmand under insurgent control; Marjah insurgent-narco hub
- Restricted freedom of movement; Illegal checkpoints and IEDs
- Negative perception of GIRoA

Jun 2010

- Initiative shifting to Coalition; presence in every major village
- Increased freedom of movement; IED threat remains
- Attitude of population trending positive

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
Moshtarak Update (Marjah and Nad Ali): 2010

1 February 2010

- Limited access by GIRoA officials
- Activities limited to provincial center

- Schools: Limited or no attendance; madrasses open
- Clinics: Limited access; open only in Provincial Center

- Few bazaars open in Marjah and Nad’ Ali
- Limited access to goods

1 June 2010

- District Governors in place
- Councils functioning; limited by tashkil growth

- Schools: 81 teachers available; students returning to school
- Clinics: Many opening; two new clinics under construction

- Four major bazaars open in Marjah; 100 new shops
- Expanding availability of goods

Security Forces

ANSF
- 2,734
- 4,794
- +60% Increase

ISAF
- 2,107
- 3,157

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
Marjah is a Complex Civil-Military Challenge
Where It May Take 12-18 Months
More to Fully Establish “Clear, Hold and Build”
Kandahar in Context

- 2nd largest city (~850,000)
- Pashtun Heartland
- Taliban spiritual home
- Strategic / trading crossroads
- Historic / symbolic significance
- AQ historic link – Taliban era

Dominant Pashtun Influence

ISAF, May 2010
Kandahar: Plan Overview

June 2009
- Manage relationships: Powerbrokers and Political elite
- Protect, resource and empower District Governors, khans, maliks, mullahs
- Use the shura to gain trust and confidence of local communities

Rising Tide of Security
- City – Expanded, partnered ANP

August 2010
- Gradual increase of GI RoA influence in surrounding districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ISAF</th>
<th>ANSF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>7,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>11,850</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>20,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political Reform
- Manage relationships: Powerbrokers and Political elite
- Protect, resource and empower District Governors, khans, maliks, mullahs
- Use the shura to gain trust and confidence of local communities

Economic Opportunity
- Address principal sources of corruption and grievance: contracting, private security companies, land disputes
- Significantly expand electrical supply to meet rising demand

Progress over months; process not an event
Kandahar: Complex and Unique Challenge

- Heart of Pashtun south
- Historic Taliban capitol
- Hub of trade and commerce routes

Weak Government and Strong Powerbrokers

Economic Inequity

Complex Damaged Tribal Structure

Resilient and Complex Insurgency

Multiple contested surrounding districts

Highly populated (850K) city center

Each is difficult; collectively a unique challenge
Resilient and Complex Insurgency

**Kinetic Events**

2006: 957
2009: 2968

**Taliban operational emphasis:**
- Increase murder and intimidation campaign
- Increase targeting of GIRQA officials
- Increase IEDs; reduce freedom of movement
- Reposition beyond ANSF/ISAF areas
Tribes, Power Brokers, and Fragmentation

Struggles for power and influence both leverage and exacerbate tribal rivalries

Major Tribes and Subtribes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Durani</th>
<th>Panipai</th>
<th>Ghilzai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popalzai</td>
<td>Noorzai</td>
<td>Baluch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barakzai/Mohammadi</td>
<td>Alikzai</td>
<td>Hotak (Ghilzai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alikzai</td>
<td>Ishaczai</td>
<td>Khantee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community Rivalries & Disputes

ISAF, May 2010
Progress in the South as of April 2011

Assessing the surge

The following maps reflect an assessment by the U.S.-led NATO military command in Afghanistan of changes in Taliban control across the country’s south after operations conducted by American surge forces over the fall and winter.

Source: ISAF as shown in the Washington Post, April 17, 2011.
Focusing on Insurgent-Controlled Areas: April 2010 vs. April 2011

Taliban control across the country’s south after operations conducted by American surge forces over the fall and winter.

Source: ISAF as shown in the Washnginton Post, April 17, 2011.
Expanding Influence

April 2010

May 2011

Legend:
- Insurgent Controlled
- Contested
- GIROA Influenced

Source: US Experts
RC(S) Village Stability Operations (VSO)
Centers of Gravity
Fighting in the East
ISAF Regional Operations in RC East: 2011

Forces in RC-E continued offensive operations against insurgent networks during the reporting period, while simultaneously reinforcing and expanding security gains in 21 priority districts. These operations were essential in expanding security outward from Kabul and the key provincial capitals. The tempo of operations remains high in order to sustain momentum achieved during the Winter Campaign and to further increase security gains during the pivotal spring months.

In order to expand the Kabul security zone, ISAF forces in RC-E have concentrated their main operational efforts in eastern Wardak and Logar Provinces, and they are conducting key supporting operations to disrupt HQN in Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces. Operations are synchronized across seven maneuver brigade combat teams and with adjacent regional commands in close partnership with the ANSF and special operation forces. In particular, the partnership between ISAF and ANSF forces has been strengthened to near one-to-one levels.

Operations in RC-E continue to focus on the disruption of insurgent lines of communications, and the neutralization and defeat of critical insurgent support bases, staging areas, and operational areas. The expansion of the ALP into 13 districts in RC-E complemented ISAF and ANSF operations and expanded security at the local and community level.

Complementary border operations between ISAF, the ANSF, and the Pakistani military are improving, with on-going operations astride the border with Pakistan’s Mohmand and Bajaur Agencies. Operations there aim to disrupt the insurgents’ freedom of movement from their Pakistan sanctuaries into Afghanistan and to prevent unrestricted movement for insurgents through the area to the Ring Road and Kabul.

RC-E has seen an 18 percent reduction in indirect fire attacks, which is the most common insurgent tactic along the border. Deliberate targeting operations have also removed mid-level insurgent commanders, degrading their ability to attack coalition and Afghan forces successfully. Tactical gains in RC-E are translating into strategically-significant progress, as two provinces, Bamyan and Panjshir, and one provincial capital, Mehtar Lam, have met the security, governance, and development conditions sufficient for the initiation of the transition process, which will begin July 2011.

Despite this progress, it remains clear that the insurgency continues to enjoy sanctuary in the Pakistan border region, from where they can regenerate insurgent command and control and operational capacity.

2008: East Afghanistan - The US is No Longer “Winning” in the East
Afghan Popular Trust in the Afghan Government in RC East: April 2010

(Green is highest level of trust)

Source: Afghan Perception & Attitudes Survey

Centers of Gravity
Other Areas

(For Pakistan, See Part Seven of This Series)
ANA Laydown April 2011

Source: US Experts
ISAF Regional Operations in RC North, West, and Kabul: 2011

REGIONAL COMMAND – WEST
During this period, operations in RC-W focused on consolidating security gains made throughout the winter campaign, providing security to key population centers and commercial routes, and expanding security to allow for further socio-economic development and institution building. Security conditions in the major cities of Bala Murghab, Qala-e-Naw, Herat, and Farah have improved. Freedom of movement along Highway 1 has also improved, as well as the security along routes connecting the Iran-Afghanistan border crossing points of Islam Qalah and Torah Goudney with Herat City.

As recently announced by President Karzai, Herat City in RC-W is one of seven geographic areas that will be the first to begin the transition process in July 2011.

REGIONAL COMMAND – NORTH
During the reporting period, operations in RC-N focused on securing key terrain and protecting Afghans in the Pul-e Khumri and Baghlan-e Jadid Districts of Baghlan Province. This effort is central to the overall objective in RC-N: to expand the secured area along Highway 1 from the Salang Tunnel to Mazar-e Sharif and along Highway 3 to Kunduz City in order to create a stable and secure environment in the most densely populated districts. Improvements in security will allow the Afghan people to extend governance and foster development by opening up key commerce routes to unimpeded traffic.

Forces in RC-N also conducted operations to achieve two secondary objectives: maintain freedom of movement along Highway 1 from Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh Province to Maimanah in Faryab Province; and improve security in the Ghormach, Almar and Qaisar Districts of Faryab Province in preparation for the construction of the final section of Highway 1. ISAF forces, partnered with the ANSF, have made progress towards achieving these objectives. Attacks along Highway 1 between Mazar-e Sharif and Maimanah have been reduced and insurgent presence and freedom of movement remains limited.

The biggest remaining challenges are to ensure that recent gains are sustained and expanded in the Baghlan-Kunduz corridor, a vital effort to encourage the Afghan people to support the government and security forces. To accomplish this, RC-N will stress partnering and focus on building the capacity of newly-fielded ANSF units.

REGIONAL COMMAND – CAPITAL
Operations in RC-C focused on neutralizing insurgent networks through a robust partnering strategy with the ANSF and ALP. Partnered operations have successfully reinforced security around the capital, disrupted insurgent staging areas in outer districts, and blocked insurgent infiltration from neighbouring provinces. Sensational attacks in the capital have also been limited, which is particularly notable given that several high-profile events took place during this reporting period, including: Ashura in December 2010, the Parliamentary Inauguration in January 2011, the Liberation Day in February 2011, and the Afghan Nowruz Celebration in March 2011.

The public in RC-C has a positive perception of security throughout the province, and positive views of the national and local government’s provision of security are manifested in increased commerce and development in the region.

ISAF Regional Operations by Country in April 2011

Counter-Narcotics Operations

**Nationwide Opium Production (in metric tons)**

- **48% decrease from 2009 to 2010**

**Nationwide Drug Seizures (in kilograms)**

- **341% increase this quarter compared to the same period one year ago**

- **1st Qtr 2009**: 10,000 kg (Opium), 1,000 kg (Morphine), 500 kg (Heroin), 500 kg (Hashish)
- **1st Qtr 2010**: 5,000 kg (Opium), 1,000 kg (Morphine), 500 kg (Heroin), 500 kg (Hashish)
- **1st Qtr 2011**: 30,000 kg (Opium), 5,000 kg (Morphine), 2,000 kg (Heroin), 2,000 kg (Hashish)

---

Illegitimate narcotics industry is producing less opium. ISAF and ANSF are interdicting more illegal narcotics.

- 47,953 kilograms seized in March 2011 – a 715% increase from March 2010

Governors of Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, and Uruzgan are all pursuing eradication.

As of 9 April 2011

Source: US Experts
The Role of Pakistan as of April 2011

Within its borders, Pakistan has a pivotal role to play in U.S. efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates; to help bring about and ensure a durable political solution in Afghanistan; and to promote and sustain long-term regional stability so the United States does not again face a region that is home to terrorist sanctuaries.

Pursuing a long-term U.S.-Pakistani strategic partnership based on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust guides a whole-of-government, civilian-military effort. The long-term goal is for the U.S. strategy to lead to enduring linkages between the United States and Pakistan; stronger trade and investment ties; continued and deepened military and intelligence relations that support regional stability; and a secure Pakistan linked to its neighbors through a growing economy enabled by improved security.

There are significant hurdles to reaching that vision. The history of U.S.-Pakistani relations is fraught with negative perceptions on both sides, leading many in both countries to see the others’ pursuit of strategic objectives as being driven by transitory national security interests. To date, efforts on both sides have yielded some progress in improving this relationship. However, it will take a long-term relationship to overcome years of mistrust in order to achieve a long-term strategic partnership based on mutual interests.

The U.S. approach with Pakistan is to build an effective partnership that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests – while also demonstrating to Pakistan that the United States will remain a strong and long-term supporter of Pakistani security and prosperity. Central to this effort is aligning both U.S. and Pakistani interests in the near-term with respect to denying safe haven to all violent extremist organizations. Although great strides have been made in the U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relationship over the past two years, heightened sensitivities regarding Pakistani sovereignty can set back this progress.

…Operational and tactical coordination between ISAF, ANSF, and Pakistan’s security forces has improved in quality and quantity over the past two years; however, significant challenges remain in building mutual trust and cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, given the complex historical relationship between the two countries.

Insurgent capacity continues to be supported by sanctuaries and logistical support originating in Pakistan, and insurgents will likely retain operational momentum in areas where these support structures exist. Consolidating security gains made during the reporting period requires more progress with Pakistan to eliminate these sanctuaries. Although putting pressure on insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan would not be sufficient to end the Afghanistan conflict in the near-term, it would fundamentally alter the strategic balance of the conflict in favor of ISAF and the Afghan Government.

Pakistan’s military leadership has improved cross-border coordination with ISAF and the ANSF. Since October 2010, a series of high-level meetings between Afghan and Pakistan military leaders have gradually improved communication and cooperation, particularly in the border region. At the most recent high-level meeting, the 33rd Tripartite Commission in March 2011, ISAF and ANSF leaders met with Pakistani Army leaders in Pakistan for discussions on increasing cooperation and communication along the border.

Lagging Civil Progress But Some Positive Indicators
Progress, But A Lagging Civilian Surge

• Real gains in Afghan district and local governance, merit promotion, and civil service training,

• BUT,
  • Integrated civil-military plans remain conceptual on civilian side. No credible State or USAID reporting on efforts after 10 years of war.
  • US and allied military and PRT coordination uncertain and allied coordination often critically weak.
  • Little nationwide integration of war-related civil programs and most mid and long term aid.
  • Goal was to finish assessments of 42 critical Districts out of 80 by end 2010. Afghan Directorate of Local Governance completed 15, and now could take up to four years to complete all 80.
  • Funds for hiring more civilians did not flow into many Districts even when assessments were finished in the spring of 2010.
  • District Delivery Program is a “district discussion program.”
  • Local Governance Directorate reports officials far short of average of 45 required per District.
  • Two thirds of 1,100 US civilian officials in Afghanistan are in Kabul. Only 215 USAID hires out of 473 are in the field. (14 US and 2 FSN in RC-SW, 56 US & 3 FSN in RC-S, and 78 US and 18 FSN in RC-E as of 1/2011) Roughly 400 US civilians in field vs. 1,100 military in civil-military roles

Aid will Peak in FY2012
(CRS estimates in billions of dollars of budget authority)

Improvements in District Governance

Source: ISAF 5/2011
Deputy Provincial Governor Appointments

- Civil Service Appointments Board fills 12 Deputy Provincial Governor posts with merit-based appointments February 2011

Source: ISAF 5/2011

- 76% of Provinces will have DPGs selected on merit following current round (if approved by PoA)

- On-going merit-based selection of 14 Deputy Provincial Governor posts (23 May 2011)
District Governor Appointments

CSAB selects 38 District Governor posts through merit-based process in April 2011

- 23 Provinces with merit-based appointments (68%)
- 58 Districts with merit-based appointed DGs to date (16%)

Next District Governor Appointment Board expected in July 2011

Previous District Governor merit-based appointments

Source: ISAF 5/2011
Spring 2011: A New ISAF & Aid Approach to Fighting Corruption

- Improve intelligence and understanding of the problem
- Influence positive and negative actors
- Integrate law enforcement and military efforts
- Internationalize counternarcotics and anti-corruption efforts
- Institutionalize reforms
- Implement COIN contracting

We must make sure that we do not stop at merely fighting symptoms of corruption; rather we must take decisive action against its root causes.

President Karzai, London Conference

Source: ISAF, April 15, 2011.
2014 and Beyond: Enabling Socio-Economic Development

Source: US Experts
New Efforts in Reintegration
Reintegration

Source: US Experts
Reintegration Funding Profile

Overall Funding Profile
- ARP – $50.0M
- APRP – $141.1M

Available Balance
- ARP – $43.4M
- APRP – $133.4M

APRP Partitioned Balance
- Window A (ARTF) – $58.4M
- Window B & C (Multi Purpose) – $82.7M

5 Year Funding Profile
- ARP – Declining at unknown rate
- APRP – $239.0M

Funding Roles
- ARP – Start up & bridging – not sustainment
- APRP – Designed to meet all funding requirements short & long term

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th># of Projects</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th># of Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JTF-435</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>JTF-435</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-N</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>RC-N</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIC*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kabul*</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-W</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>RC-W</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 May 11

Source: US Experts
APRP-Funded Projects

Badghis
- MOLSA Vocational Training Center – Funded ($494K)
- OMAR - being revised following FOC
- MAIL (Livestock) - being revised for TC & FOC
- MRRD - being revised for TC & FOC

Kunduz
- MAIL (Water & Livelihoods) - being revised for TC & FOC

Baghlan
- HALO Trust – Funded ($1500K)

Other News:
- UNDP Small Grants Program under development: Potentially 90-160 Draft Proposals for consideration in upcoming weeks

17 May 11

Source: US Experts
## Money Summary

### APRP FUND TOTAL – $141.1M

**WINDOW A – $58.4M**
- United States 50
- Australia 06
- Finland 2.4

**WINDOW B – $73.9M**
- Japan 52
- Germany 13.6
- Italy 5.5
- Denmark 2.6

**WINDOW C – $8.8M**
- United Kingdom 8.8
- Estonia 0.04

### FOC APPROVED TOTAL – $7.7M

**WINDOW A – $0M**

**WINDOW B – $6.7M**
- Ministry Cells 1.5
  (NDS, MOPW, MRRD, MAIL, MOLSA, MOI)
- HALO 1.5
- HPC Budget 1.8
- Float Accounts 1.3
- Civil Society 0.1
- Badghis Vocational Training (MOLSA) 0.5

**WINDOW C – $1.0M**
- HPC Budget 1.0

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>World Bank</th>
<th>MRRD uses through National Solidarity Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Primary funding line for Joint Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Bare Trust</td>
<td>Joint Secretariat access for operational costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Experts
Reintegration – Policy issues

HPC Primary Tasks
- Support R2 Activities
- Develop amnesty/transitional justice framework
- Broaden dialogue with Afghan civil society
- Mobilize other nations and OIC to support R2

JS Primary Tasks
- Gain long-term financial commitment from current and new donors
- Operationalize capacity building strategy
- Develop gender mainstreaming policy and action plan
- Develop monitoring and evaluation system

Source: US Experts
FY11 Regional Command ARP Profile

RC North
- 9 Projects Approved - $1.6M
  - 1 Reintegration Safe House (Faryab)
  - 5 Reintegration Centers (Balkh, Sar E Pul, Jowzjan, Takhar & Samangan)
  - 1 Vocational Training (Faryab)
  - 1 Jowzjan Demob Training Stipend
  - 1 Bulk Draw

RC West
- 6 Projects Approved - $137K
  - 4 Bulk Draws
  - 2 PJSTs (Ghor & Farah)
- 2 Projects Pending - $511K
  - 1 Literacy Program (Qala E Naw)
  - 1 PJST (Herat)

RC South West
- 19 Projects Approved - $1.3M
  - 6 Bulk Draws
  - 2 PJSTs (Helmand & Nimroz)
  - 3 Media Projects (Helmand)
  - 8 DJSTs
- 1 Project Pending - $25K Bulk Draw

RC East
- 6 Projects Approved - $316K
  - 4 Bulk Draws
  - 1 PJSTs (Ghazni)
  - 1 Center Furniture (Ghazni)
- 3 Projects Pending - $110K
  - 2 Bulk Draws
  - 1 PJST (Kunar)

RC South
- 5 Projects Approved - $726K
  - 3 PJSTs (Zabul, Uruzgan & Kandahar)
  - 1 Uruzgan Peace Shura
  - 1 Bulk Draw
- 1 Project Pending - $15K Bulk Draw

56 Projects Funded with ARP for $6.3M by the RCs, JTF-435 & FRIC

Source: US Experts
The Road to Transition in 2014
Transition Background

NATO and International events provide political guidance for Transition.

• London Conference, January 2010.
  – International Community announcement for a Transition framework by July 2011

• NATO Foreign Ministerial, April 2010.
  – Provided political/military guidance for Transition planning and timelines

• Kabul Conference, July 2010.
  – The IC endorsed the Joint Framework for Inteqal (Transition)
  – Phase 1 (Assessment) and Phase 2 (Implementation – four stages)

• Lisbon Summit, November 2010.
  – Heads of State and Government announced that Transition will commence in early 2011
  – Lisbon Decision Sheet taskings:
    • Joint Assessment Template, suspense: 30 NOV 10 (missed suspense)
    • PRT Evolution Guidelines, suspense: 31 DEC 10
    • Action plan and Implementation Plan Templates, suspense: 31 JAN 11
    • Joint Assessment Report for provincial readiness for Transition, suspense: 28 FEB 11
    • Ministerial Commission pre-transition action plans, suspense: 28 FEB 11

Source: US Experts
Lisbon Goal for Transition

LISBON SUMMIT DECLARATION

"...Looking to the end of 2014, Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan."

- Prepare ANSF to shoulder this responsibility
- Align stabilization efforts to provide adequate governance and development to sustain transition and make it irreversible
- Change of mindset required
- Solidarity and Continuity

Source: US Experts
Inteqal: A Process Within the Campaign Plan

ISAF Transition Principles:

- Ensure a conditions-based process
- Conduct bottom up
- Start at district, progress to province
- “Thin out”
- Retain HQ

- “Reinvest” some of the transition dividend
- Transition institutions and functions, as well as geographic areas
- Ensure transitions will be irreversible

Source: US Experts
The JANIB Structure and Process

**JANIB Members:**
- Dr. Ghani (chair);
- COMISAF/SCR (co-chairs): consensus-based decision authority
- MoD, MoI, MoF, MoFA, MoJ, NDS, IDLG, Ambassadors (DEU, GBR, ITA, FRA, TUR, USA); UNSRSG (observer)

**Secretariat**
- Not formed

Secretariat performs an administrative role.

- Not happening like this yet.

**Assessment Working Group (AWG)**
- Merges assessment data, consults stakeholders, and develops a unified provincial report.
- Submits the joint report to the JANIB through the Secretariat.
- Consists of core group and security, governance, and development sub-groups

**Plans Working Group (PWG)**
- Develops planning templates.
- Supports the Provincial governor and his Provincial PWG (PPWG), comprised of relevant provincial stakeholders, to draft province specific Action/Implementation plans.
- PPWG provides plans to IDLG for submission to the JANIB.

**JANIB Deputies committee will be available to assist the Principals as required**

Source: US Experts
Transition Process

Conditions to initiate transition process:

• ANSF are capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF.

• Security is at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities.

• Local governance is sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced.

• ISAF is postured properly to “thin out” as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels remain constant or diminish.

Conditions to finalize transition process:

• Sustainable ANSF are responsible for population security and law enforcement, and they are accountable to serving the people.

• Provincial Governance is sufficiently inclusive, accountable, and acceptable to the Afghan people.

• Population has access to basic services and rule of law; establishing the foundation for sustainable licit economic growth.

• ISAF is postured to provide strategic overwatch and assistance needed for Afghan forces to achieve sustainable security.

Source: US Experts
Tranche One Update

**Tranche 1**
- Now a political process in Afghan eyes
- Geographically dispersed, ethnically diverse and politically neutral
- Transition is enabled by our Campaign objectives
- Tranche 1 is ~20-25% of the Afghan population
- Tranche 1 begins transition in Jul 11

Source: US Experts
Transition and Transformation

**Transition**
- 2011 to 2014
- Narrow agenda
- Capacity building & technical assistance
- Irreversible transfer of security responsibility to GIRoA
- NATO/ISAF influences and controls many of the levers
- Foundation for Transformation
- NATO/ISAF remit
- Produced by campaign plan

**Transformation**
- 2011 to 2024+
- Broad agenda
- Nation building
- Legal, economic, fiscal and institutional development
- ANDS
- Enduring commitments
- NATO/ISAF can influence, but does not control the levers
- IC remit
- Produced by IC support and GIRoA commitment

Source: US Experts
Key Transition Issues

**IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS**

- Transition Coordination Commission
- Guidance to Ministries / Provinces
- PG Bamyan (Sarabi) / Lashkar Gah (Mangal)
- Transition – Threat or Opportunity
- Stake-holder expectations
- Unity of effort
- Long-term commitment of IC
- Lack of Ministerial Links
- On-Budget funding / PRT Evolution
- Provincial budget capacity
- Reinvigorate Civil Service Commission
- Signature / Foundation Projects
- Loss of international assistance
- C2 Ambiguity
- RoL Credibility
- Transition versus Transformation
- Uncoordinated resource withdrawal
- OMID versus Transition
- Sub-national versus National

**MITIGATION**

- Ministerial Engagement
- ISAF & IC Outreach
- Combined Teams & Plans
- Issue & execute GMIC plan
- Key Leader Engagement
- Key Leaders to Provinces
- Socialize Transition Plans
- Support Minister Travel & Engagement
- Money On-Budget
- Transition Support Offices
- National Priority Programs
- CERF
- Kabul II and JCMB (Kabul Bank)
- Combined Planning
- Improve Access to Justice
- CISOR
- Capability Evolution
- CERP Incentives
- Greater plan synchronisation
- Invest in Human Capital
- Multiple Methods & Points of Influence

Source: US Experts
Some Afghan Polling Data Show Important Progress in a Population-Centric War

For all of the challenges, some polling data does show progress – although sometimes with critical qualifications
83 percent of Afghans report that they are within a half-hour of a road, up from 78 percent last year.

Seventy-three percent are within a half hour of a boys’ school, and 70 percent are within a half hour of a girls’ school.

While access to boys’ schools is unchanged since last year; access to girls’ schools has increased 6 points.

In comparison, 57 percent are within a half hour of a government health center – up 5 points since last year – and now only 14 percent have to travel more than an hour to get to a health center, a decrease of 6 points since last year.

Slightly more than half say that they are within a half hour of a public phone, again a rise from last year, of 8 points.

Access is more restricted to district government offices, courts, and banks: 46 percent, 35 percent, and 31 percent, respectively say that they live within a half hour of each of these. However, in each case this reflects more than a 10-point jump in access since last year’s survey.

Overall, just over half of Afghans (53 percent) say that their country is going in the right direction, about the same number as did last year, while 29 percent think that the country is going in the wrong direction.

Optimism is highest in the East and Central Kabul, where roughly 6 in 10 think, the country is headed the right way. Optimism is far lower in the South West and South Central regions, where just 39 percent and 44 percent respectively, think, Afghanistan is headed in the right direction.

Afghans who say that the country is moving in the right direction mainly cite reconstruction efforts (36 percent – up 15 points since last year) and better security (12 percent – down 17 points since last year).

Those who say that the country is headed in the wrong direction, cite insecurity (41 percent, up 5 points since last year) and administrative corruption (11 percent, unchanged).

More than 8 in 10 Afghans rate their overall living conditions positively and 63 percent say, these have improved in the past year, while only 7 percent say, they have gotten worse.

Close to 6 in 10 rate the roads, bridges, and other infrastructure in their area positively, and nearly half say that such infrastructure has improved in the past year, while just 19 percent say that it has gotten worse.

Slightly fewer than half of Afghans (47 percent) rate the availability of jobs and economic opportunities in their area as good; nonetheless 38 percent say, these have improved, versus 24 percent who say, they have gotten worse.

However, when asked what brings insecurity to their area, 31 percent mention unemployment first – an increase of 10 points since last year, and a sign of the interwoven challenges of security, infrastructure, economic development and confidence in government in determining Afghanistan’s future.
Afghan Ratings of ANA and Government Are Surprisingly High: 2009 vs. 2010

Afghans rate most national institutions favorably, and some of these ratings have improved since last year. Eighty-three percent report a favorable opinion of the central government, up 9 points. Eight in 10 have a favorable opinion of the ANA and 74 percent report a favorable view of the district government, both basically unchanged. While fewer, 57 percent, have a favorable opinion of the courts in Afghanistan, this is up by 10 points.

Overall, 76 percent say, the central government has a strong presence in their area, 73 percent say, the district government has a strong presence, 67 percent say, the ANA has a strong presence, and 54 percent say, the courts have a strong presence in their area. These compare with 80 percent who say, the police have a strong local presence. As noted, presence of the police is one of the two strongest independent factors in viewing the ANP favorable.

As with the ANP, favorable ratings of Afghan institutions are lower in the South West than in other regions. Only 71 percent in the South West view the central government positively, and 69 percent rate the ANA positively — 12 and 11 points lower than the national averages. In addition, fewer than half rate the district government or the courts positively, down by 18 points and 10 points respectively, from last year.

Afghan Views of Improving Security: 2009-2010

Despite the challenges in the country, most Afghans rate their personal security positively, and as improving. Eighty-nine percent say, they feel safe when walking alone in their community during the day, and 70 percent feel safe staying alone at home after dark, the latter up six points since last year. More than two-thirds give positive ratings both to the security from crime and violence and freedom of movement.

For each of these, moreover, more than half report improvements in the past year. Additionally, 57 percent rate their security from the Taliban specifically as good, and more say, it has gotten better than gotten worse in the past year, by a 20-point margin (45 percent versus 25 percent), a positive sign that security may be expanding in some areas.

Only 10 percent of Afghans say, they live in an area of high crime versus 38 percent moderate; the plurality, 49 percent, call theirs a low-crime area. Three times as many say that the amount of crime in their area has decreased over the past year, compared to those who say it has increased (43 percent versus 14 percent, while 29 percent, it has stayed the same).

Both crime rates and the public’s sense of security independently predict Afghans’ confidence in the ANP, and their views of the police as effective.

Afghan Views of Security Improve in Key Areas, But...

Last year in Helmand few – 13 percent – rated their security specifically from the Taliban and other armed groups positively. Now 58 percent do. The number who report killings by the Taliban in their area, 81 percent in early 2009, is 41 percent now.

Given the aid that has accompanied the allied efforts in Helmand, there have also been steep advances in positive ratings of living conditions overall and economic opportunities in particular, from 14 percent last year to 59 percent now. Positive ratings of local infrastructure have gained 1418 points. The number who report construction of schools has soared from 29 percent last year to 73 percent now, and construction of clinics and government offices similarly is up. Reports of a strong presence and ratings of the performance of the central and provincial governments and Afghan army and police have advanced by vast margins.

Yet even with these gains ratings of the United States are just middling – 43 percent in Helmand rate the performance of U.S. forces positively (up by 24 points) and 42 percent are confident in its ability to provide security (up by 15). Fifty-five percent in Helmand say attacks on U.S. forces can be justified, sharply up, possibly an effect of the mere presence of so many foreign fighters. And support for a drawdown of foreign troops to start before next summer has doubled, to 53 percent, another sign of discomfort with the heavy presence of these forces.

ISAF has targeted Kandahar for its next all-out effort, and there too, possibly in anticipation, positive views of the U.S. efforts are up – in terms of ratings of its performance, support for its presence, confidence in its ability to provide security and overall U.S. favorability.

At the same time, many of these are up from extremely low levels last year – for example, just 31 percent rate the performance of U.S. forces positively, though this is up from a mere 7 percent last year.

Kandahar has not seen the improvements in security, freedom of movement and economic opportunity cited in Helmand, so the gains in U.S. ratings at this point appear to be based more on expectations than on delivery. And there are plenty of challenges in Kandahar; the Taliban were based here, and continue to have more sympathy in Kandahar than anywhere else. Indeed 45 percent in Kandahar now express a favorable view of the Taliban, up 20 points from last year, and quadruple the group’s favorability in the country as a whole.

Underlying these results are sharp changes at the regional and provincial levels, underscoring the matrix of difficulties the United States, its allies and the Karzai government face.

In Helmand, the surge of Western forces has shown dramatic success in several respects. The number of Afghans living in Helmand who report Taliban engagements against government forces in their area has been cut in half, from 90 percent in early 2009 to 44 percent now. Reports of U.S. and NATO air strikes are down, as are reports of civilians hurt or killed by Western forces. Support for the U.S. presence and positive ratings of its efforts are up sharply, and ratings of freedom of movement and local security from crime and violence are dramatically higher – the latter from just 14 percent positive a year ago to 67 percent now.

Last year in Helmand few – 13 percent – rated their security specifically from the Taliban and other armed groups positively. Now 58 percent do. The number who report killings by the Taliban in their area, 81 percent in early 2009, is 41 percent now.

---

ABC NEWS/BBC/ARD/WASHINGTON POST POLL, AFGHANISTAN: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, Dec. 6, 2010
Afghan Ratings of ISAF and International Organizations Remain Mixed to Low, But Taliban Fares Much Worse

Afghans report less favorable views towards international organizations within their country. Overall, 56 percent have a favorable view of international aid organizations and this drops to 42 percent in the South West. Nationally, 41 percent have a favorable opinion of international forces.

The presence of these groups also is weaker than the presence of Afghan institutions – 42 percent report that international aid organizations have a strong presence in their area and 37 percent say, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/ international forces have a strong presence in their area.

The Taliban, meanwhile, continues to be highly unpopular in Afghanistan.

Only 13 percent of Afghans have a favorable opinion of the movement, essentially the same as last year – though this peaks at 40 percent in the South West.

Local militias and warlords don’t fare much better – just 18 percent have a favorable opinion of them overall, though this has risen by 6 points since last year.

Fewer than a quarter of Afghans say that the Taliban or local militias/warlords have a strong presence in their area, with a wide range—from 43 percent in the South West to 3 percent in Central Kabul.

Afghan’s Still Oppose Taliban Rule, But…

U.S. officials have suggested that corruption may push Afghans into the arms of the Taliban, and when Afghans are asked why some people may support the Taliban, 71 percent say “too much corruption in the government” might be a reason. But it’s important to note that only 11 percent say support for the Taliban is strong in their area, or that they personally support it.

Indeed the Taliban remain highly unpopular. Eighty-nine percent see the group unfavorably. Just 9 percent of Afghans would rather have the Taliban ruling the country – up from 1 percent in 2005, but still very low. And 64 percent call the Taliban the biggest danger facing Afghanistan – 50 points more than the next highest response, drug traffickers.

Nonetheless, as noted, support for negotiations with the Taliban has steadily increased since 2007, with nearly three-quarters now favoring a negotiated settlement. However, this support is conditional – just 37 percent call themselves “very” willing to support a settlement in general, and if it ceded control over some provinces to the Taliban, 61 percent say they’d oppose it.
But, Other Afghan Polling Data Are Negative or Warn that “Clear, Hold, Build, and Transition “Are Still Far From Sustainable Success
ISAF Surveys See No Afghans Do Not Yet See Any Broad Increase in Security

Source: ISAF, ANQAR Survey. May 2011
ISAF Surveys Do Not Yet See Growing Confidence in ANSF or Victory

Source: ISAF, ANQAR Survey. May 2011
Afghan Ratings of Local Conditions Decline Outside Helmand and the East

ABC NEWS/BBC/ARD/WASHINGTON POST POLL, AFGHANISTAN: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, Dec. 6, 2010
Overall Trends in Local Conditions: 2009 vs. 2010

Perceived Changes in Local Conditions
ABC News/BBC/ARD/Washington Post poll

- Security from crime and violence: 31% getting better, 40% getting worse
- Availability of jobs / economic opportunities: 22% getting better, 40% getting worse
- Freedom of movement: 32% getting better, 39% getting worse

ABC NEWS/BBC/ARD/WASHINGTON POST POLL, AFGHANISTAN: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, Dec. 6, 2010
Karzai and GI RoA Remain Far More Popular than the US and NATO/ISAF, But Support is Declining

Most Afghans rate the work of the present government, Karzai himself, the provincial government, the police and the Afghan army positively, most at virtually the same levels as last year.

The exception is that positive ratings of Karzai’s performance have lost 9 points, albeit to a still-strong 62 percent. His personal favorability, as opposed to work performance, is higher still, unchanged at 82 percent favorable. (Across the spectrum, 93 percent of Afghans rate Osama bin Laden unfavorably.)

Eighty-one percent say the level of support for the Afghan army in their area is high, unchanged from last year; and 76 percent say local support for the police is strong – 6 points higher than last year, and a numerical high.

Roughly two-thirds of Afghans rate the work of the police and army in their area positively, unchanged since last year and a sharp contrast to U.S. and NATO/ISAF ratings.

ABC NEWS/BBC/ARD/WASHINGTON POST POLL, AFGHANISTAN: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, Dec. 6, 2010
About as many Afghans prefer democracy, 37 percent, as an Islamic state, 39 percent. Last year preference for an Islamic state prevailed by 11 points. (The rest of Afghans, 23 percent, prefer a “strong leader” who rules for life with final say in politics.) Regardless, nearly three-quarters of Afghans say the country’s government should follow Islamic principles – but they divide evenly on whether it should do so very strictly, or somewhat strictly. Men are 11 points more apt than women to favor “very strict” adherence.

Whatever their preference for government, and despite their concerns about fraud, 77 percent say they’re confident a system of freely electing leaders can work in their country. But as with so many results, there’s a caveat: Just 27 percent are “very” confident of it.

In another result with potential policy implications for the West, given its frustrations with Karzai, Afghans divide about evenly on whether they think a system of popular rules and laws can best be established through the national and provincial governments, or instead through tribal elders – 52 percent pick the former, but 46 percent the latter.

There are telling divisions: Members of the more conservative Pashtun ethnic group favor leadership through elders, by 56-42 percent; this spikes to 73-25 percent in the East and 64-34 percent in the Southwest, both largely rural, Pashtun-dominated regions. Members of the other large ethnic group, Tajiks, favor leadership by government rather than elders, 58-41 percent. Preference for government also spikes in Kabul, in urban areas overall, and among those who say the central government has a strong presence in their area. Leadership by elders, in contrast, tends to be preferred by those who say the central government lacks a strong presence in their area, who oppose the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and who prefer an Islamic government.

For all these divisions, most Afghans by far, 77 percent, still think of themselves as Afghans first, rather than identifying primarily with their ethnic group - and despite the country’s troubles that’s up by 10 points from last year. That could be a positive sign for national cohesion; on the other hand, it also leaves open whether members of one ethnic group think of others as Afghans.
Islam Remains a Key Issue in Other Polls

Do the foreigners respect or disrespect your religion and tradition?

- 52% Disrespect
- 30% Respect
- 18% No Answer / Don't know

60% said that it was wrong. This is a concerning figure.
So Does Working With Foreigners, Although There is Some Improvement

Why do you think the foreigners are here?

Do you think that working with foreign forces is right or wrong?
And “Democracy” is Poorly Understood

Nearly half of all respondents cannot name anything good about democracy. A further 15% are actively opposed towards a democratic system, believing that it is either a lie or does not work. Only a quarter of interviewees cite elections and human rights as the good things about democracy.

What are the good things about democracy?
Overall Afghan Support of the US (And NATO/ISAF) Continues to Decline

Last year, amid a prominent campaign led by Gen. Stanley McChrystal to reduce civilian casualties, the number of Afghans who said attacks against American forces could be justified fell to 8 percent. Now it’s increased sharply, to 27 percent, back near its previous levels.

Those views are associated with conflict levels. The number saying violence against U.S. forces can be justified is up sharply, by 28 points, to 40 percent, in provinces where conflict has been most intense, and by 29 points, to 36 percent, in areas where violence is less intense but has been worsening, …The view is less prevalent, and has grown less steeply, where there’s little conflict reported, and is essentially unchanged where violence has diminished.
Support is Heavily Impacted by Casualties, Although Less So in Areas Where New Strategy Has Main Focus

Violence is a clear driver of public attitudes. Four in 10 Afghans now report fighting between the Taliban and government or foreign troops in their area, up 7 points from early 2009. Forty percent report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area, 28 percent within the last year. Thirty-two percent report local bombing or shelling by U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces, numerically a new high – and nearly three-quarters call such air strikes unacceptable, again up 7 points from December 2009.

In a critical measure, as noted above, more Afghans continue to say Western forces have gotten worse rather than better at avoiding civilian casualties, 39 percent vs. 30 percent. That's improved from a 43-24 percent negative result last year, but it remains a problem, given the extent to which such casualties erode support for the U.S. and NATO mission. And another measure hasn’t changed: Thirty-six percent of Afghans report someone in their area killed or seriously hurt by Western forces, including two in 10 who say it’s happened within the past year.

Concurrently, as noted, blame on the United States and ISAF for the violence in Afghanistan has risen. Twenty-four percent now chiefly blame U.S. forces, the U.S. government or NATO/ISAF forces for the country’s violence – a steep rise from just 10 percent last year. Blame on the Taliban, meanwhile, while higher, has declined from 42 percent last year to 33 percent now.

It matters: Support for the presence of U.S. forces doubles (to 74 percent) among those who blame the country’s violence on the Taliban, al Qaeda or foreign jihadis, rather than on Western forces or the Kabul government. Similarly, support for the U.S. presence loses 19 points where coalition air strikes are reported, 17 points where the Taliban are most active, 16 points where local security is rated negatively and 15 points where civilian casualties have occurred.
Perceptions of Who Causes Civilian Casualties Are Critical

In one basic measure, just 43 percent of Afghans now express a favorable opinion of the United States, down 8 points to a new low; and fewer, 32 percent, rate the U.S. performance in Afghanistan positively, tying the low. Both are at about half of their peak in 2005.

Only 36 percent now express confidence in U.S. and NATO forces to provide security and stability in their area, down 12 points from last year and down by a vast 31 points since 2006. And one in four now blames the United States or its NATO allies for the country’s violence, more than double the level a year ago. Backing for the surge of Western forces has cooled: Last year 61 percent of Afghans supported the U.S. and NATO sending additional troops to their country; today that’s fallen to 49 percent. And more now say the United States is playing a negative rather than a positive role in Afghanistan, 43 percent to 36 percent, a switch from last year.

For all the effort, the survey finds reports of Taliban activity on the rise – down in some areas, but up in more of them. And just 33 percent overall say the broadly unpopular Taliban have been weakened in the past year – down from the 40 percent who said so a year ago.

The Taliban, along with al Qaeda, still bear the brunt of the blame for Afghanistan’s violence, and 74 percent of Afghans continue to say it was good for the United States to have invaded nearly a decade ago. But that’s down 9 points since last year and down 14 points from its high in late 2006. And 73 percent now favor a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, a number that’s grown by 13 points since 2007 as fighting has continued – even though more than six in 10 reject the notion that the Taliban have adopted a more moderate stance. (A third do see it as more moderate, up from a quarter.)
And, Most US and ISAF Public Opinion Does Not Support Continuing the War

International public opinion is largely opposed to the war in Afghanistan. A 47-nation global survey of public opinion conducted in June 2007 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found considerable opposition to the U.S. and NATO military operations in Afghanistan. In only 2 out of the 47 countries was there a majority that favored keeping military troops in Afghanistan - Israel (59%) and Kenya (60%).[1] On the other hand, in 41 of the 47 countries pluralities want U.S. and NATO military troops out of Afghanistan as soon as possible.[1] In 32 out of 47 countries clear majorities want U.S. and NATO military troops out of Afghanistan as soon as possible. Majorities in 7 out of 12 NATO member countries want troops withdrawn as soon as possible.[1][2][3]

The 24-nation Pew Global Attitudes survey in June 2008 again found that majorities or pluralities in 21 of 24 countries want U.S. and NATO military troops removed from Afghanistan as soon as possible. In only 3 out of the 24 countries - the U.S. (50%), Australia (60%), and Britain (48%) - did public opinion lean more toward keeping troops there until the situation has stabilized.[4][5] Since then, public opinion in Australia and Britain has shifted, and the majority of Australians and Britons now also want their troops to be brought home from Afghanistan.[6][7][8][9] Of the seven NATO countries in the survey, not one showed a majority in favor of keeping U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan - only one, the U.S., came close to a majority (50%). Of the other six NATO countries, five had clear majorities of their population wanting U.S. and NATO troops removed from Afghanistan as soon as possible.[5]

The 25-nation Pew Global Attitudes survey in June 2009 continued to find that the war in Afghanistan is unpopular in most nations[10] and that most publics want American and NATO troops out of Afghanistan.[11] The 2009 global survey reported that majorities or pluralities in 18 out of 25 countries want U.S. and NATO to remove their military troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible.[10] (Changes from 2008 included Tanzania, South Africa, and Australia having been replaced by Israel, Kenya, the Palestinian Territories, and Canada in the survey, and shifts in opinions in India and Nigeria.) In only 4 out of 25 countries was there a majority that favored keeping U.S. and NATO military troops in Afghanistan - the U.S. (57%), Israel (59%), Kenya (56%), and Nigeria (52%).[10] Despite American calls for NATO allies to send more troops to Afghanistan, there was majority or plurality opposition to such action in every one of the NATO countries surveyed: Germany (63% opposition), France (62%), Poland (57%), Canada (55%), Britain (51%), Spain (50%), and Turkey (49%).[12]

In Europe, poll after poll in France, Germany, Britain, and other countries show that the European public want their troops to be pulled out and less money spent on the war in Afghanistan

Wikipedia, “International public opinion on the war in Afghanistan,”
US Support for the War is Steadily Declining

In March 2011, just 31 percent of Americans said the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting, a new low. Sixty-four percent said it was not worth fighting, and 49 percent felt that way "strongly," both record highs in ABC/Post polls.

In the Post-ABC News survey released Monday, April 25, 2011, 49 percent of respondents said they disapprove of Obama’s management of the war and 44 percent voiced approval. The disapproval mark is the highest on record in Post-ABC News polling. Overall, the figures have essentially flipped since January, the last time the poll asked the question. In that survey, 49 percent approved of Obama’s handling of the Afghanistan war and 41 percent disapproved.

Last month, the survey revealed that nearly two-thirds of Americans think the war is no longer worth fighting, the highest number recorded in response to that question. The steadily waning support for the war — and Obama’s stewardship of it — might have political implications as the president fights for reelection.

The poll released Monday showed that a majority of self-identified independents — 53 percent — disapprove of Obama’s handling of the war.

Independents were an essential part of the coalition that elected him in 2008, and the White House has been seeking to win back those voters as 2012 nears.

The last time the Post-ABC News poll recorded such high dissatisfaction among independents over Obama’s management of the Afghanistan war was in November 2009, the month before he announced his new surge strategy. It is only the second time that a majority of independents have said they disapprove of his approach.

Partisan lines are also deeply drawn over the issue.

Although half of the Republican respondents in last month’s poll said the war remains worth fighting, nearly 70 percent of Republicans in the latest survey said they disapprove of Obama’s handling of it.

Among Democratic respondents, 30 percent disapproved.

The telephone poll was conducted April 14 to 17 among a random national sample of 1,001 adults. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3.5 percentage points.

ISAF and Other Support Has Long Been Low, But Trends Mixed from Spring 2009 to Spring 2010

June 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spring 2009</th>
<th>Fall 2009</th>
<th>Spring 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pew Research Center Q49.

June 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. anti-terror efforts</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pew Research Center Q38 and Q49.

June 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan: Keep or Remove U.S. and NATO Troops?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pew Research Center Q49.

British and Canadian Publics Do Not Support the War: 2011

Britain

For more than a year, a majority of Britons has expressed opposition to the mission in Afghanistan. This month (February 2011), only 31 per cent of respondents are backing the military operation, while 60 per cent are against it.

This month’s result matches the high level of opposition to the mission, which was recorded in October 2010. Respondents in London (63%) and Scotland (62%) are more likely to reject the military operation.

Canada

For the first time since the war began, three-in-five Canadians (63%) voice opposition to the mission in Afghanistan.

Support for the military effort has dropped to the lowest level recorded (32%).

This month’s numbers represent a drastic shift from a survey conducted a year ago, where 47 per cent of Canadians backed the war.
Even in Alberta, which has traditionally been supportive of the military operation in previous surveys, support has dropped to just two-in-five respondents (43%). Quebecers, as has been the case for the past year, remain staunchly opposed to the mission (75%).
The majority of French people are opposed to the country's military intervention in Afghanistan and want a withdrawal of French forces, a recent poll has shown.

According to the poll taken by the IFOP by telephone in December 2010, with a sampling of 1856 persons, representative of the French adult population, 62 percent of those questioned oppose the French military presence in Afghanistan while 23 percent support it.

Fifteen percent of those questioned said they had no opinion.

The poll indicates that the longer the conflict lasts in troubled Afghanistan, the less popular it becomes among French people.

The poll confirms a previous IFOP poll in January 2010, which indicated that 80 percent of those questioned opposed the sending of French military reinforcements to Afghanistan to satisfy a public request from the United States, which was then preparing to send new troops.

The French contingent in Afghanistan numbers 3,750 men and women. A total of 52 French soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan since the war began in October 2001.

The deadliest attack came in the summer of 2008, when a Taliban ambush in the eastern valley of Uzbin killed 10 French soldiers and wounded 21 others.

Deaths of civilians in NATO and US attacks have raised anti-US sentiment in Afghanistan and the rest of the Islamic world. It also fueled tensions between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his Western allies.

The majority of French people are opposed to the country's military intervention in Afghanistan and want a withdrawal of French forces, a recent poll has shown.

According to the poll taken by the IFOP by telephone in December 2010, with a sampling of 1856 persons, representative of the French adult population, 62 percent of those questioned oppose the French military presence in Afghanistan while 23 percent support it.

Fifteen percent of those questioned said they had no opinion.

The poll indicates that the longer the conflict lasts in troubled Afghanistan, the less popular it becomes among French people.

The poll confirms a previous IFOP poll in January 2010, which indicated that 80 percent of those questioned opposed the sending of French military reinforcements to Afghanistan to satisfy a public request from the United States, which was then preparing to send new troops.

The French contingent in Afghanistan numbers 3,750 men and women. A total of 52 French soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan since the war began in October 2001.

The deadliest attack came in the summer of 2008, when a Taliban ambush in the eastern valley of Uzbin killed 10 French soldiers and wounded 21 others.

Deaths of civilians in NATO and US attacks have raised anti-US sentiment in Afghanistan and the rest of the Islamic world. It also fueled tensions between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his Western allies.
January 2011 Netherlands: The overwhelming 70% majority of Dutch oppose the new military training mission in Afghanistan that their government is trying to propose, and only a minority 25% would support it - a significant increase of opposition from another Maurice de Hond poll that was reported only days earlier. The bulk of the contingent, 450 out of 545, would be made up of soldiers. The poll, reported on January 10, 2011, found that not one of the major political parties had majority support for the proposed extension. Even half of the ruling VVD party's voters oppose the proposal, and for the other ruling party, Christian Democratic Appeal, opposition is even higher, with a majority 53% of CDA voters now against the proposed mission.

January 2011 Netherlands: The majority 58% of Dutch oppose the new military training mission in Afghanistan that their government is trying to propose, while only 34% would support it. The Maurice de Hond poll that was reported on January 6, 2011 showed that the majorities of voters for the Labour, Socialist, GroenLinks, Liberal VVD and PVV parties are all opposed to the latest proposed extension, while only supporters of one party, the Christian Democrats, support it.

October 2010 Sweden: The plurality 47% of Swedes want their country to bring its troops home from Afghanistan, while only 36% think they should stay there. The Sifo poll for Aftonbladet was conducted October 18, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of Swedish soldiers killed in the war stood at five.

August 2010 Norway: Half of Norwegians want their government to pull their troops out of Afghanistan, in a dramatic drop of support. The plurality 49.4% of Norwegians want the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan, while 36% thought the soldiers should stay there. The InFact poll was conducted at the beginning of August 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of Norwegian soldiers killed by the war stood at 9.

June 2010 Italy: The overwhelming majority 79% of Italians want their country to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan starting either immediately (35%) or in 2011 if conditions permit (44%). Only 20% think that it is too early to set a timetable and that their military should stay as long as it takes. The majority 59% of Italians want either all their troops withdrawn (the 35% plurality), or the number reduced (24%). 34% support keeping the number at current levels, and only 4% support a troop increase. The Transatlantic Trends survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States was conducted over the month of June.
June 2010 **Canada**: Opposition to the war in Afghanistan reached a record high in Canada. The majority 59% of Canadians oppose their country's military involvement in Afghanistan, up from 56% in April, and the highest level of opposition registered yet for the question used. Support fell to 37% from 39% in April. "Strong opposition" to Canada's involvement in the war, held by the plurality of Canadians, increased to 33%, while "strong support" dropped down to a minority of only 13%. Nearly half of Canadians, 48%, believe it was a mistake to send military forces to Afghanistan, while 34% thought it was not. The plurality 30% of Canadians think the war will eventually end in a negotiated settlement that gives the Taliban a small role in the Afghan government, 13% see the Taliban having a significant role in the Afghan government, 16% think the U.S.-led forces will be militarily defeated, while only 6% continue to expect a clear military victory for the U.S.-led forces. The majority 57% of Canadians also think that their government has not been providing enough information on the war in Afghanistan. The Angus Reid poll was conducted June 11–12, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of Canadian soldiers killed in the war stood at 147.[68][69]

June 2010 **Japan**: The majority 53% of Japanese want the U.S.-led military forces removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible", while a 35% minority believe the U.S.-led military presence in that country should continue until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 **Spain**: The plurality of Spaniards, 49%, want the U.S.-led military forces to be removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible", while 43% think the U.S.-led military forces should stay in that country until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 **Pakistan**: The majority 65% of Pakistanis want the U.S.-led military forces to be removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible", while only a very small 7% minority believe the U.S.-led military presence in that country should continue until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 **United Kingdom**: Under half, 49%, of Britons think the U.S.-led forces should stay in Afghanistan until the situation stabilizes, while almost as many Britons, 45%, want their troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan "as soon as possible". The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 **China**: The majority 54% of Chinese think the U.S.-led military forces should be removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible", while only an 18% minority believe the U.S.-led military presence in that country should continue until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 **France**: The majority of people in France, 52%, want the U.S.-led military forces to be removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible". 47% think the U.S.-led military forces should stay in that country until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]
June 2010 **United Kingdom**: The majority 73% of Britons want their country to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan starting either immediately (33%) or in 2011 if conditions permit (40%). Only 26% think that it is too early to set a timetable and that their military should stay as long as it takes. The majority 65% of Britons want either all their troops withdrawn (the 40% plurality), or the number reduced (25%). Only 27% support keeping the number at current levels, and only 7% support a troop increase. The Transatlantic Trends survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States was conducted over the month of June.[61]

June 2010 **Germany**: The overwhelming majority 79% of Germans want their country to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan starting either immediately (35%) or in 2011 if conditions permit (44%). Only 20% think that it is too early to set a timetable and that their military should stay as long as it takes. The majority 67% of Germans want either all their troops withdrawn (the 50% plurality), or the number reduced (17%). Only 24% support keeping the number at current levels, and only 7% support a troop increase. The Transatlantic Trends survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States was conducted over the month of June.[61]

June 2010 **France**: The majority 75% of French citizens want their country to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan starting either immediately (36%) or in 2011 if conditions permit (39%). Only 23% think that it is too early to set a timetable and that their military should stay as long as it takes. The majority 57% of French citizens want either all their troops withdrawn (the 40% plurality), or the number reduced (17%). 37% support keeping the number at current levels, while only 4% support an increase. The Transatlantic Trends survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States was conducted over the month of June.[61]

June 2010 **Australia**: Australians are growing increasingly frustrated with the war in Afghanistan and nearly two-thirds of Australians want their government to withdraw their country's military from Afghanistan. The majority 60% of Australians want their troops withdrawn from the war in Afghanistan, while only a minority one in four think they should stay at their current level. Demand for a withdrawal was from both sides of the political landscape. Both the majority 61% of Labor supporters and the majority 55% of Coalition supporters want their troops to be withdrawn. The poll conducted by Essential Research was published by coincidence on the same day that three Australian commandos were killed in a helicopter crash in Afghanistan, bringing the number of Australian military deaths in the war to 16.[65][66][67]
Opinion in Other Countries: 2010-2011 - IV

June 2010 - **Poland**: 44% of Poles want the U.S.-led military forces to be removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible", while 42% believe the U.S.-led military presence in that country should continue until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 - **Jordan**: The overwhelming majority of Jordanians, 81%, want the U.S.-led military forces to be removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible". Only a 13% minority believe the U.S.-led military presence in that country should continue until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 - **India**: Under half, 42%, of Indians, the plurality, believe the U.S.-led military presence in Afghanistan should continue until the situation stabilizes, while 35% want the U.S.-led military forces to be removed from that country "as soon as possible". The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 - **Turkey**: The majority 67% of Turks want the U.S.-led military forces to be removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible", while only an 11% minority believe the U.S.-led military presence in that country should continue until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 - **Indonesia**: The majority 62% of Indonesians want the U.S.-led military forces to be removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible", while only a 19% minority believe the U.S.-led military presence in that country should continue until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 - **South Korea**: Just under half, 49%, of South Koreans believe the U.S.-led military presence in Afghanistan should continue until the situation stabilizes, while 38% want the U.S.-led military forces to be removed from that country "as soon as possible". The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 - **Russia**: The majority 53% of Russians think the U.S.-led military forces should be removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible", while only 24% believe the U.S.-led military presence in that country should continue until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 - **Germany**: The majority 58% of Germans want the U.S.-led military forces to be removed from Afghanistan "as soon as possible", while 40% believe the U.S.-led military presence in that country should continue until the situation stabilizes. The Pew Global Attitudes poll was released June 17, 2010.[71]

June 2010 - **United Kingdom**: The majority 55% of Britons oppose their country's military involvement in Afghanistan, while 38% support it. The majority 56% of Britons also believe their country erred in sending military forces to Afghanistan almost nine years ago. Asked about the eventual outcome of the war, the plurality 34% expect a negotiated settlement that gives the Taliban a small role in the Afghan government, 15% expect a negotiated settlement that gives the Taliban a significant role in the Afghan government, 11% expect a clear victory by the U.S.-led military forces, and 10% expect their defeat. The Angus Reid poll was conducted June 4–7, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of British soldiers killed in the war stood at 292.[73]
Opinion in Other Countries: 2010-2011 - V

May 2010 - **Australia**: The majority of Australians remain opposed to their country's military involvement in Afghanistan. The majority 54% of Australians want their country to not "continue to be involved militarily in Afghanistan, up from 51% in 2009, while 43% thought it should, down 3% from 2009. The majority 55% said they were not confident that their country's aims in Afghanistan were clear, and only a minority 26% thought the war in Afghanistan was "the greatest threat to Australia's security at the moment". The annual poll reflected the third year in a row with majority Australian opposition to their country's military involvement in Afghanistan. (In 2007, the poll found Australians divided on the issue, with 46% opposed and 46% in support.) The 2010 Lowy Institute Poll released May 31, 2010 was conducted in March 2010.¹

May 2010 - **New Zealand**: Over three quarters of New Zealanders, a large 77% majority, want a total or partial withdrawal of their country's troops from Afghanistan. The plurality 40% of New Zealanders call for a total withdrawal of their military forces from Afghanistan, 37% call for a partial withdrawal. Only a small 10% minority wanted all troops to stay there. New Zealand's military contingent in Afghanistan consists of 70 SAS soldiers based in Kabul. The Research New Zealand poll was conducted May 18–25, 2010.

April 2010 - **United Kingdom**: Over three in four Britons, a large 77% majority, call for the withdrawal of their country's military forces from Afghanistan, and an end to British combat operations there, within a year. Less than one in seven disagree. The numbers reiterated the findings from six months before in November 2009 when the large 71% majority of Britons called for the withdrawal of their troops within a year, and when almost half called for an immediate withdrawal. The majority 51% of Britons think that the continued presence of British troops in Afghanistan increases, rather than diminishes, the risk of terrorism in the United Kingdom. The IoS/ComRes poll was conducted April 16–17, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of British soldiers killed in the war stood at 281.

–15, 2010.¹

April 2010 - **United Kingdom**: The majority 59% of Britons oppose their country's military involvement in Afghanistan, and less than a third, 32%, support the operation. The majority 60% of Britons also believe their country erred in sending military forces to Afghanistan almost nine years ago. Asked about the eventual outcome of the war, the plurality 32% expect a negotiated settlement that gives the Taliban a small role in the Afghan government, 16% expect a negotiated settlement that gives the Taliban a significant role in the Afghan government, 12% expect a clear victory by the U.S.-led military forces, and 9% expect their defeat. The Angus Reid poll was conducted April 9–12, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of British soldiers killed in the war stood at 281.¹

April 2010 - **Germany**: The majority 62% of Germans want their troops to be brought home from the war in Afghanistan. The Stern-Forsa poll was conducted April 8–9, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of German soldiers killed in the war stood at 43.

March 2010 - **Canada**: The overwhelming 79% majority of Canadians oppose their troops staying in Afghanistan in a combat mission beyond the end of next year, rejecting the U.S. request for Canada to reconsider its decision to withdraw its troops in 2011. Less than one in five, only 16%, would support such an extension. The majority 80% of Canadians think the violence in Afghanistan will be same (50%) or worse (30%) at the end of 2011, while only 6% think there will be a decrease in the violence. The Angus Reid poll was conducted March 30–31, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of Canadian soldiers killed in the war stood at 141.
February 2010 - **United Kingdom**: The majority 63% of Britons want their next government, to be elected in a general election expected in May, to commit to removing their country's armed forces from Afghanistan by the end of this year. The majority 64% of Britons also think the war in Afghanistan is unwinnable. The response to the question was virtually unchanged from November 2009, suggesting that Operation Moshtarak, the massive 15,000-strong military offensive, has not swayed public opinion. The Newsnight / ComRes poll was conducted February 19–21, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of British soldiers killed in the war stood at 263.

February 2010 - **Netherlands**: The majority two-thirds of the Dutch, 66%, think Deputy Prime Minister and Labour leader Wouter Bos is correct in firmly opposing another extension and insisting on the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan by the end of year, as scheduled and as had been promised. Bos stated: *"By the end of this year, the last soldier should have left Uruzghan. We're keeping our promise to the Dutch people."* The plurality 49% of Dutch voters want their troops withdrawn and the mission completely ended, while 38% supported looking at other options. The Synovate poll for NRC was conducted February 17–18, 2010.

February 2010 - **United Kingdom**: The majority 52% of Britons oppose the war in Afghanistan, and the majority 55% believe their country made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan. The majority 55% of Britons also state they have a clear idea of what the war in Afghanistan is about, but at the same time almost half of Britons, 47%, feel that the British government has not been giving them sufficient information about the war. Only 29% think the government has provided the correct amount of information. The Angus Reid poll was conducted February 16–17, 2010.

February 2010 - **Canada**: 49% of Canadians oppose the military operation in Afghanistan, while 47% support it. The majority 53% of Canadians think their government provides too little information about the war in Afghanistan, while only 29% think it has provided the right amount of information. The Angus Reid poll was conducted February 16–17, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of Canadian soldiers killed in the war stood at 140.

February 2010 - **Netherlands**: The majority 58% of Dutch want their troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan, while 35% support keeping them there. At the time of the poll, the number of Dutch soldiers killed in the war stood at 21.

February 2010 - **Netherlands**: According to a monthly poll by the Dutch ministry of defence, only 33% of Dutch people support the Dutch military participation in Afghanistan, while 36% oppose it.

February 2010 - **Canada**: The overwhelming 80% majority of Canadians want their military to leave Afghanistan as scheduled in 2011. The Harris-Decima poll was conducted February 1–10, 2010.

January 2010 - **Netherlands**: Just under half, 49%, of respondents in the Netherlands support their country's military role in Afghanistan, while nearly as many, 45%, do not. The margin of error of the poll was not reported. The Maurice de Hond poll was conducted January 30, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of Dutch soldiers killed in the war stood at 21.

January 2010 - **Germany**: Nearly two thirds of Germans and majorities amongst all political party groups reject the increase of German troops in Afghanistan. The majority 65% of Germans oppose sending more of their country's soldiers to Afghanistan, while only 29% support it. Their government, however, announced a further increase. The large majority of Germans, 76%, think the US-led military effort in Afghanistan will fail, while only 18% think it will succeed. The Politbarometer/Mannheim poll for public broadcaster ZDF was conducted January 26–28, 2010.

January 2010 - **France**: The majority 56% of French voters want their country's troops to leave Afghanistan, while 41% disagree. The majority 85% of French voters think the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating, while a minority 13% believe it is improving. The BVA/Canal+ poll was conducted January 26–27, 2010. At the time of the poll, the number of French soldiers killed in the war stood at 39.
January 2010 - **France**: An overwhelming 80% majority of people in France oppose sending any more of their country's troops to Afghanistan, while only a minority 20% support doing so. The Ifop-Humanité poll was conducted January 20–22, 2010. The poll was published as a conference on Afghanistan opened in London, and Britain's Sky News reported French President Nicolas Sarkozy saying "France will not send another single soldier".

January 2010 - **Germany**: An overwhelming 80% majority of Germans oppose sending any more German troops to Afghanistan. The Forsa Institute poll was conducted January 20–21, 2010. Despite knowing this, German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced a week after the poll that she would deploy yet another 500 troops to Afghanistan, with still another 350 on stand-by. Even among supporters of her own political party, the majority 77% opposed sending more soldiers, while among supporters of the other political party forming her center-right coalition, opposition to sending more soldiers was even stronger still at 86%. The majority 70% of Germans demand a withdrawal by 2015: The plurality 32% of Germans call for an immediate withdrawal, another 24% call for a withdrawal by the end of 2011, 14% want a deadline of 2015. Only 25% said they should remain longer.

January 2010 - **Czech Republic**: The majority 53.7% of Czechs oppose sending any more of their country's troops to Afghanistan as their government has proposed. The SANEP poll was conducted January 5–21, 2010.

January 2010 - **Denmark**: Support for military involvement in Afghanistan slipped below 50% in Denmark. A plurality 48.7% of Danes support the military operation, while 41.1% of Danes want their troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan, and 10.2% are undecided. The Jyllans-Posten / Ramboell Analyse poll was conducted January 11–14, 2010.

January 2010 - **Germany**: A new record number of Germans want their country to pull its military from Afghanistan immediately. The majority 71% of Germans want their country's troops withdrawn from Afghanistan "as soon as possible", and only a minority 27% support the military involvement in Afghanistan. An overwhelming 83% of Germans oppose their government sending any more troops to Afghanistan. The ARD/Infratest poll was conducted January 4–5,