Can Afghan Forces Be Effective in Transition?
Afghanistan and the Uncertain Metrics of Progress: Part Five

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Overview

The Seven Part Analysis of the War

The Burke Chair has prepared a seven-part analytic overview of unclassified metrics, and of their current content relates to the challenges in policy, plans, resources, and management of the war that now shape the prospects of victory. It should be stressed that such an analysis is only a way of flagging key trends and developments within the limits imposed by using unclassified official reporting. Moreover, metrics are not a substitute for the kind of narrative that is critical to understand the complexity of this war, and put numbers, charts, and maps in context. This is a case where facing the real-world complexity of the conflict is essential to winning it.

An overview of the strengths and weakness of unclassified metrics does, however, provide considerable insight into what is known about the war, and the many areas where meaningful reporting is lacking and the reporting available is deceptive and misleading. This is particularly true in the case of the metrics and narratives available on the ANSF, which represent the one area where the US, ISAF, and other sources have not sharply reduced the amount of unclassified data since mid-2010.

Part Five: Hold and Build, and the Challenge of Development

This report highlights the progress and challenges in creating the Afghan national security forces necessary to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents and allow a transition in which Afghanistan assumes responsibility for most military, internal security and police action.

The metrics in this section portray major progress in proving adequate funding for the Afghan National Security Forces, (ANSF) and in creating an effective training base and operation to support the creation of forces necessary to do the job. These improvement increasingly affect force quality as well as force quantity – although the increase in numbers still outpaces the improvements in quality.

At the same time, Afghan force development is moving at a pace that will require large numbers of trainers and partners, and substantial US and other outside funding and support well beyond 2014, and it is not yet clear whether the ANSF can really transition to a self-supporting force until after 2020. There are key shortfalls in foreign trainers and in partners for the police. Efforts to crease fully balance forces with adequate leadership command structures, and logistics/sustainability are just being put in place, Equipment and infrastructure are still being developed. Above all, it is too early to judge how well ANSF units will
perform without ISAF aid

**Shaping Transition: Creating an Effective ANSF and Laying the Groundwork for Transition**

*The key factor shaping the pace of current progress is the lack of resources through 2009. The charts on aid spending at the start of this report show that no serious effort was made to fund the creation of the ANSF until FY2007, that these funding streams were erratic in FY2008, and funding of the scale of effort required did not begin until FY2010 – nearly a decade after the war began. This gross strategic negligence was compounded by a failure to provide even minimally adequate numbers of trainers until CY2010, and a matching failure to provide adequate basic equipment and facilities.*

The responsibility for these failures lies largely with the US and occurred at the highest level of US national security decision-making in spite of warning and requests from at least one US Ambassador and senior commander.

A matching failure may still be coming. A political emphasis on getting enough Afghan forces for “transition” in 2011-2014 tends to force an emphasis on numbers, rather than force quality and creating a force that can retain the manpower it needs and operate as a balance forces without major US and ISAF support. Moreover, this form of transition omits the fact that the US and NATO must fund the ANSF indefinitely into the future and well beyond 2020. More broadly there are growing pressure to cut funding aid to the ANSF. This risks becoming a “worst of both worlds” approach to creating and funding a lasting ANSF capability.

**Shaping Transition: Racing Towards Larger Forces**

*The creation of effective Afghan forces is critical to providing security and the “clear and hold” phase of the war on a national level. It is equally critical to allowing “build” to provide stability, prompt justice, governance, and a functioning economy, as well as some form of transition where Afghan forces replace US and ISAF forces.*

The charts in this section show impressive progress in setting force goals large enough to do the job and in creating larger force numbers. They also, however, show how rushed some aspects of basic training process is, how critical it is to have highly qualified Afghan and foreign trainers, and that a force expansion this large depends on partner units to provide the experience and mentoring necessary to make up for so rushed a training process.
More detailed NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) data also show that attrition is still a problem in spite of recent pay increases – in part because forces are overcommitted and have not previously had proper opportunity for leave and recovery/follow-on training. This is now being corrected.

The full impact of such pressures only become apparent after regular training is completed. They make it absolutely essential to objectively measure quality and retention once units are in the field, and make the results transparent so they can be used to plan a workable and enduring transition.

**Shaping Transition: A Crisis in Trainer Numbers and Quality and No Meaningful Data on Partners**

NTM-A has created what seems to be solid training base for creating the kind of Afghan National Army needed for transition. There also is a steady increase in the number of Afghan training Afghans and Afghan combat elements that can operate with minimal outside support. As its data show, however, it is badly short of the foreign trainers it needs to succeed. Moreover, some estimates count pledged trainers as if they were there, and it is clear from the NTM-A figures that getting the right trainer quality will increasingly be more critical than simply increasing trainer numbers.

NTM-A does report ongoing progress, but some of this progress is in the number of pledged trainers, rather than trainers actually on the scene. It still seems to be short over 30% of critical trainers and over 50% of trainers overall – even if ISAF military with little prior training experience are counted as trainers. Moreover, time is critical as long as either 2010 or 2014 are treated as any form of deadline.

The data on these areas for the regular armed forces is not matched by similar detailed reporting on trainers for the various elements of the police forces.

Moreover, NTM-A is not responsible for partnering, and counting the quality of partners and partnering efforts. This is a critical omission in the metrics available on the ANSF.

**Shaping Transition: The Afghan National Army (ANA): Much Better Data on Numbers than Quality and Endurance**

Recent reports show a steady growth in the size of the Afghan Army and Air Force, and in many key qualitative aspects of formal
training. The critical problem is that there is no matching mix of transparent, credible metrics and narratives on the quality and effectiveness of any element of Afghan forces once they leave formal training and enter the field, and no meaningful data on the quality of the partnering they need to succeed.

The effectiveness measures that are reported on the ANA measure formal training and equipment resources and not performance in the field. Uncertain loyalties, ties to power brokers, retention and attrition problems, corruption are not addressed. A new rating system is supposed to have been developed, but its value and realism is not yet clear, and there are reports that provinces are being rate – sometimes favorably – on the basis of grossly inadequate coverage of a few districts.

The current and projected real world capability to support the new strategy and support transition is not rated or analyzed in objective terms. Even so, the ratings that are provided in the latest Department of Defense semiannual report (November 2010)

*Shaping Transition: The Afghan National Police (ANP): Numbers that Disguise Major Problems in Quality, Ties to Power Brokers and Corruption*

Once again, NTM-A provides data that shows the steady growth of the police force, and real progress in creating more effective training system. Some manpower data do, however, lump together the different elements of the police force do -- like the data on the ANA – highlight some of the problems in retention The data do not, break out progress by element of the police, or spotlight the failure to expand the Afghan National Civil Order Police to anything like the needed goal. ISAF indicates this critical paramilitary element of the police needs to be over four times its current strength.

Far more realism is needed in measuring police force quality – particularly because corruption and ties to powerbrokers crippled the effectiveness of much of the police. Moreover, current rating systems do nothing to link the analysis of the police effort to the presence and effectiveness of the rest of the justice system and the presence of effective governance. The end result is that current effectiveness ratings that are virtually meaningless if the police are to play a key role in “hold, build, and transition” and free the Afghan Army to perform is military mission.

The ANP also present more of a challenge than the ANP. ISAF initially tried to create a police force based on German models that were hopelessly underresourced and did not meet Afghan needs and values. This failure was followed by an equaled
underresourced effort by the US State Department that largely ignored the fact that insurgent influence now required a police that could deal with guerrilla warfare. A third transfer of effort then occurred to the US Department of Defense, which began to set more realistic goals for paramilitary and self-defense capability, but was never properly resourced and effectively increase the burden on the ISAF and US military training effort. The police training and expansion effort remained decoupled from a rule of law effort that focused narrowly on creating a new formal justice system at the top. This allowed the Taliban and local power brokers to become the de facto system for local justices. Courts and jails were often lacking or unable to operate.

All of these problems are now being corrected. The rule of law effort is being changed to emphasize putting the informal justice system to the formal system by giving GIRoA a role in validating decisions made by the informal justice system. There is also far more emphasis on creating an effective justice system at the local level through cooperation between the Afghan Local Police, ANP, village and local Shuras, and District officials.

The Afghan Local Police effort is closely tied to aid efforts in governance and development, as well as linked to the ANP, the MoI, and potential career opportunities for ALP personnel to join the ANP. Unlike the Sons of Iraq, the effort is managed through the MoI, and not funded directly by ISAF.

Moreover, steps are being taken to end the the lack of effective local governance in many Districts and Sub-Districts – an improvement which is an essential element in winning support for police and a justice system. The past lack of such a presence in many areas has meant all three elements of an effective justice system have not be actively present in much of the country – compounding the problems created by corruption, power brokers, and ethnic, sectarian, and tribal friction.

**Shaping Transition Looking Towards the Future of the ANSF**

This progress is still uncertain and much depends on whether the US and its allies will have the strategic patience to continue to fund and support the effort to 2014 and for many years afterwards. Better metrics and analysis are still needed to rate the creation and effectiveness of police forces – and that address problems like ties to power brokers, insurgents, and local factions, and the level of corruption, the problem of extortion and the abuse of power.

Most important, there is a need to provide clearly defined transition goals for the ANSF, and unclassified reporting does not post-2014 force goals for ANSF development. Moreover, planning is needed to identify the number of trainers and supporting forces that must remain after 2014, and the budget needed to support the ANSF after 2015.
Shaping Transition

Creating an Effective ANSF and Laying the Groundwork for Transition
Afghan Force Goals vs. Afghan Violence: 2004-2010

Number of average daily attacks per month

- Total average daily attacks
- Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces
- Average daily attacks against civilians
- Average daily attacks against ANSF

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Giving Iraqi Security Forces Priority Over Afghan Forces through FY2007

As of June 30, 2010, nearly $25.23 billion had been appropriated to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) for building the ANSF- almost 49.0% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. DoD reported that of this amount, more than $21.83 billion had been obligated, of which nearly $20.79 billion had been disbursed.6 Figure 3.4 displays the amounts made available for the ASFF by fiscal year. DoD reported that cumulative obligations as of June 30, 2010, increased by more than $1.56 billion over cumulative obligations as of March 31, 2010. Cumulative disbursements as of June 30, 2010, increased by nearly $2.37 billion over cumulative disbursements as of March 31, 2010.

As of June 30, 2010, DoD had disbursed nearly $20.79 billion for ANSF initiatives. Of this amount, nearly $13.62 billion was disbursed for the ANA and nearly $7.08 billion for the ANP; the remaining $0.09 billion was directed to related activities.10 As shown in Figure 3.6, of the funds disbursed for the ANA, the largest portion -- nearly $6.25 billion -- supported Equipment and Transportation. Of the funds disbursed for the ANP, the largest portion -- nearly $1.94 billion -- also supported Equipment and Transportation.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 46
Police did not know the law they were responsible
for.

Center, and Presidential Information Coordination
Coordination Center, the National Police Coordination
Center.

However, police did not know the law they were
responsible for.

Under

Figure 11. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Budget from Fiscal Year 2005 to Fiscal Year 2011.

Source: NTM-A, *Year in Review, November 2009 to November 2010*, pp. 18 & 19
Political Challenge Raised by Rising Cost of US Military Operations and ANSF Development
(In Current $US Billions)

In addition to funding allocated for ANA development, DOD has donated about $30 million in excess defense articles to the ANA since fiscal year 2003. Items donated include trucks and personnel carriers. These figures do not include certain operational costs, such as the personnel costs for U.S. service members assigned to the ANA development mission. Totals may not add due to rounding. Funding includes detainee operations. Totals include funding from a variety of DOD and State sources. Figures for fiscal years 2002 through 2006 consist of funding appropriated into several different accounts, while those for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 consist solely of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and International Military Training and Education funds.

- From fiscal years 2002 through 2010, DOD and State allocated about $20 billion in support of the ANA. DOD and State have requested an additional $7.5 billion in fiscal year 2011.
- Of the approximately $20 billion in U.S. funding allocated to date, about $17.9 billion, or nearly 90 percent, has come from the DOD-managed Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.
- Since its creation in fiscal year 2005, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund has supported a variety of activities related to ANA development in the following four categories: equipment and transportation, including procurement of weapons, vehicles, and communications items; infrastructure projects, such as construction of garrisons, depots, and training facilities; training and operation, such as establishment of training institutions and hiring of contractors to provide specialized training; and sustainment, including salary payments and maintenance of vehicles and facilities.
- Of the $17.9 billion in Afghanistan Security Forces Fund monies allocated to date, the largest portion—about $7.0 billion, or 39 percent—has been directed toward equipment purchases.
The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) directly supports funding to grow, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. For FY 2010, Congress appropriated $9.2B for the ASFF, which is available through the end of FY2011. As of March 31, 2011, CSTC-A had obligated 85 percent of this amount. In addition, NATO contributions into the ASFF totaled $100M. In February 2011, President Obama requested $12.8B in the FY2012 budget to continue to equip and sustain the ANSF. These funds are essential to the building, training, equipping, and fielding of the security forces. ASFF funds are allocated for the ANA, ANP, and related activities, and then are further broken down into infrastructure, equipment, training, and sustainment. As the ANSF grow, NTM-A/CSTC-A will focus its attention on investment accounts (infrastructure and equipment). Going forward, though, operation accounts (training and sustainment) will become increasingly more important. As part of the transparency effort associated with these funds, the Government Accountability Office, DoD Inspector General, and the SIGAR currently have 20 audits ongoing that are in various states of completion.

Source: CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook, Fiscal Years 2011-2021, January 2011, p. 77, and Department of Defense FY2011 and FY2012 defense budget summaries.;  
Section 1203 Report, April 2011, p. 41.
The international community also provides funding for the ANSF. In September 2009, the North Atlantic Council agreed to expand the NATO ANA Trust Fund beyond the limitations of ANA development to include funding for sustainment costs. Several nations have provided significant contributions to the NATO ANA Sustainment Trust Fund, totaling approximately $312M. Funds are transferred from the NATO ANA Sustainment Trust Fund to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund for execution. As of March 31, 2011, $0.1B has been transferred from NATO into the ASFF.

Funding for police salaries, as well as other police development programs is supported by the United Nations Development Program, which oversees the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA). From 2002-2010, the international community donated approximately $1.74B to LOTFA – $620M was contributed by the United States. The United States is currently working with NATO to expand the NATO ANA Sustainment Trust Fund to also include donations for police and for ANSF literacy programs.

The Afghan government budgeted about $290 million in solar year 1389 (2010) for the ANA—nearly one-fifth of the nation’s projected total revenues of $1.5 billion for the year, and an increase of about 17 percent from the approximately $250 million budgeted for the ANA the prior year. By comparison, however, annual U.S. funding for ANA sustainment has exceeded $650 million every year since fiscal year 2007 and rose to $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2010.

DOD budget documentation indicates that, beyond the $7.5 billion requested in fiscal year 2011, no additional funding is needed to support the ANA’s growth to 171,600.

According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, once the ANA reaches its current end goal, which has an October 2011 target date, the focus of funding efforts will turn to sustainment activities, such as salary payments and equipment replacement. However, as of August 2010, neither DOD nor NATO had completed an analysis of how much future funding will be needed to sustain the ANA. Prior GAO work has also found that DOD has not adequately analyzed future funding needed to sustain the ANSF.31

Furthermore, although DOD has produced a series of congressionally mandated reports since 2008 on the U.S. plan for sustaining the ANSF, these documents have not included estimates of the ANA’s future sustainment costs. While NTM-A/CSTC-A provided us with estimates indicating that sustainment of 171,600 ANA personnel would cost between $4.2 billion and $4.5 billion annually from fiscal years 2012 through 2014.

DOD officials stated that they had not reviewed NTM-A/CSTC-A’s analysis and did not consider the resulting estimates to be official DOD figures on future sustainment costs. However, these officials said that they were unaware of any analysis DOD had conducted of how much ANA sustainment will cost. Similarly, while NATO documentation states that the amount of funding needed to sustain 171,600 ANA personnel is under analysis, an official at the U.S. Mission to NATO confirmed that no such analysis had been completed as of August 2010. To date, the United States has been the major contributor of sustainment funds for the ANA, with more than $5 billion allocated since 2005. Officials at NTM-A/CSTC-A asserted that regardless of how much ANA sustainment costs, the total each year will be considerably less than the cost of maintaining a large U.S. and coalition troop presence in Afghanistan.
Affordable or Unaffordable ANSF?

**Projected ANSF Expenditures, 2008/09-2023/24**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008/09&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>2018/19</th>
<th>2023/24</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditures by Security Force ($ billions)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$3.2</td>
<td>$3.8</td>
<td>$5.0</td>
<td>$6.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>$1.5</td>
<td>$1.7</td>
<td>$2.1</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$4.7</td>
<td>$5.5</td>
<td>$7.1</td>
<td>$9.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditures Relative to Revenues (Percent)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>ANSF Expenditures as a Share of Projected GII&amp;A Domestic Revenues</td>
<td>449%</td>
<td>270%</td>
<td>195%</td>
<td>154%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Includes operating and investment expenditures.

- a. Estimated actual.
- b. World Bank manpower level assumptions: ANA strength increases to 240,000 by 2012/13; ANP strength increases to 160,000 by 2013/14. These differ from the troop levels agreed to at the January 2010 London Conference, which were 170,000 for the ANA and 134,000 for the ANP by October 2011.
- c. Macroeconomic assumptions: Afghanistan’s long-term GDP growth rate averages 6% annually; inflation decreases to 3% in 2012/13 and beyond; GII&A domestic revenue rises to 13% of GDP by 2023/24.


**Estimated Domestic Revenue Collection, 2006/07-2009/10 ($ billions, $ billions)**

Notes: Figures are preliminary estimates. A/ $1 = $1.


Sources: Ministry of Finance; Da Afghanistan Bank.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, pp. 92-93
Shaping Transition

Perceptions of the ANSF Are Mixed
Perceptions of Security By District and in Travel

How is the security situation in your mantaqa?

How safe do you feel traveling outside your mantaqa during the day?

Source: ISAF 5/2011
In nine of the fourteen research areas, more interviewees think NATO and Afghan Government forces are winning the war, as opposed to the Taliban insurgency. Only in the districts of Panjwayi and Maiwand (both in Kandahar province), and the district of Garmisir in Helmand province, do more interviewees think the Taliban is winning the war. High numbers of respondents in southern Afghanistan either do not know or have no answer, while very few do not know or do not answer in northern Afghanistan.

Source: ICoS, Afghanistan Transition: The Death of Bin Laden and Local Dynamics, May 2011
The majority of Afghan men interviewed in southern Afghanistan (69%) blame foreign forces for most civilian deaths, while 12% think that Afghan security forces kill more civilians than the Taliban. Only 10% of respondents think that the Taliban are responsible for a larger percentage of civilian deaths. This is contrary to UN assessments, which attribute 75% of civilian deaths to the insurgents and only 16% to both the international and Afghan forces.

Source: ICoS, Afghanistan Transition: The Death of Bin Laden and Local Dynamics, May 2011
ICOS conducted interviews with 600 Afghan men in six districts starting on May 3rd 2011, the day after Osama bin Laden’s death. Interviewees were asked if they had heard the news of Bin Laden’s death; whether it was good or bad news; whether it meant al Qaeda was finished; and what it meant for the Taliban’s fight in Afghanistan.

Sixty-eight percent of men interviewed said the death of Osama bin Laden is good news. High levels of respondents who do not think that Bin Laden’s death is good news are found in Kabul University, where 36% said it was bad news, and Marjah, where 71% said it was bad news.

Opinions of interviewees on the effect of his death on the future of al Qaeda are mixed. When asked if Osama bin Laden’s death means al Qaeda is finished, responses were split around 40%/40%, with the remainder having no answer. However, in Lashkar Gah and Marjah, higher numbers of interviewees do not believe his death means the end of al Qaeda. Fifty percent of respondents in Lashkar Gah, and 59% in Marjah, think Bin Laden’s death does not mean the end of al Qaeda.

Overall, almost 50% of interviewees believe Bin Laden’s death will hurt the Taliban, with the remainder split between ‘it will help them’, ‘no effect’ or no answer. The interviewees with the strongest belief that his death will help the Taliban are found in Lashkar Gah and Kandahar City, where about 25% of interviewees take that view. Small proportions of respondents in all areas actually think his death will actually help the insurgents.

Source: ICoS, Afghanistan Transition: The Death of Bin Laden and Local Dynamics, May 2011
Perceptions of Who Brings Security and Whether ANA Will Win

Who most brings security to your area?

“ANP” – Mar 2011

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<th>Percentage Range</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<td>10%–20%</td>
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<td>60%–70%</td>
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<td>70%+</td>
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Do you think the ANA will be able to defeat the insurgents in the next few years?

“Most likely/certainly defeat” – Mar 2011

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Range</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<td>0%–10%</td>
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<td>60%–70%</td>
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<td>70%+</td>
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Source: ISAF 5/2011
ABC Polling Shows that ANSF Development is Perceived as the One Positive Trend in US and ISAF Action

Some views of the U.S. and NATO performance are less negative. In the best rating, 53 percent say Western forces are doing better at training the Afghan Army and police. However far fewer see improvement at other key tasks – providing security (36 percent better, but 32 percent worse), providing reconstruction and development assistance (32 percent better, but 30 percent worse) and supporting local authorities (28-28 percent better/worse).

In another question, majorities think foreign forces are making at least some progress toward goals such as training Afghan forces to take over security (where a broad 84 percent see progress), strengthening Afghanistan’s government (69 percent) and preventing al Qaeda from re-establishing itself in Afghanistan (66 percent). Afghans rate US/NATO troops as the least successful in reducing corruption – but still a slight majority sees progress here.

In each of these, though, far fewer – no more than three in 10 – see “a great deal” of progress. For example, just 19 and 20 percent, respectively, see a great deal of progress in preventing a Taliban takeover or an al Qaeda resurgence – the chief aim of ISAF efforts.
Serious concerns regarding ANA and ANP loyalty and capacity

A significant number of Afghans interviewed in both the Tajik areas and the south believe that some members of the national security forces collude with the Taliban, which is corroborated by recent reports. It is of concern that over three-quarters of interviewees in Helmand and Kandahar think that Afghan police recruits are either helping or joining the Taliban, which is worrying in light of plans to transition areas to the Afghan security forces starting in 2011.

Approval ratings of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are markedly higher than approval ratings of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Over half of interviewees believe that the national army is effective, compared to just 38% who have a favourable opinion of the police force.

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ICoS, Afghanistan Transition, Missing Variables, November 2010, pp. 35-36
Are the Afghan security forces able to provide security in areas from which the foreign forces are withdrawing?

- **61% Unable**
- **31% Able**
- **8% No Answer / Don't know**

### Helmand and Kandahar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Able</th>
<th>Unable</th>
<th>No answer / Don't know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garmisir</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjah</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nawa</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lashkar Gah</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sangin</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar City</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panjwai</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhari</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>61%</td>
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**Are the Afghan security forces able to provide security in areas from which the foreign forces are withdrawing?**

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<td>23%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sangin</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar City</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panjwai</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhari</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Is it a good or bad thing that the foreign forces are starting to leave?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>No answer / Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garmisir</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjah</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawa</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lashkar Gah</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sangin</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helmand</strong></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar City</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panjwai</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhari</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**If yes, why do you think they are leaving?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>No answer / Don't know</th>
<th>They are taking many casualties</th>
<th>The war is too expensive</th>
<th>Leaving of their own choice</th>
<th>Their mandate/mission is over</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>They have been beaten by the Taliban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>68%</strong></td>
<td><strong>20%</strong></td>
<td><strong>4%</strong></td>
<td><strong>3%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Uncertain Faith in Afghan Army & Police?

Taliban fighters are reported to be reassuring Afghan police and army units at remote checkpoints that they will not be attacked, provided that they give information on foreigners in the region, convoys travelling through, and so on. This allows the Taliban to gain all of the benefits of gathering intelligence on the roads without having to risk their own safety in doing so. This is less of a danger inside Lashkar Gah and Kandahar City, where Afghan security forces have more ability and will to resist an attack by the insurgents. However in rural areas and on remote roads, some under-resourced Afghan police and army units which do not have the confidence or willingness to stand up to Taliban attacks provide information, rather than risk being killed or abducted by Taliban fighters. This does not imply political support for the insurgency – it is simply a practical response to the exposed positions of the Afghan security forces.

Supporting this assessment, ICOS field research in October 2010 indicated that many ordinary Afghans do not have faith in their security forces. Only 52% of 1,000 Afghan men interviewed in Kandahar and Helmand believed the Afghan army was effective and just 38% thought so about the police. Particularly concerning for the current military dynamics is the fact that 61% of interviewees in October 2010 thought that Afghan security forces would be unable to provide security in areas from which NATO-ISAF was withdrawing.

Underlining the fears about duplicity and complicity, 81% believed that Afghan police were helping or joining the insurgency, and 69% thought the same of the army.

Source: ICOS, Afghanistan Transition Dangers of a Summer Drawdown, February 2011
Perceptions of Corruption and Quality of Life

Do you believe that corruption in the Government affects your daily life?

"Yes" – Mar 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>0%–10%</th>
<th>10%–20%</th>
<th>20%–30%</th>
<th>30%–40%</th>
<th>40%–50%</th>
<th>50%–60%</th>
<th>60%–70%</th>
<th>70%+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>JUN-09</th>
<th>SEP-09</th>
<th>DEC-09</th>
<th>MAR-10</th>
<th>JUN-10</th>
<th>SEP-10</th>
<th>DEC-10</th>
<th>MAR-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
<td>78.4%</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>83.7%</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
<td>81.2%</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How satisfied are you with your current quality of your life?

"Somewhat/Very Satisfied" – Mar 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>0%–10%</th>
<th>10%–20%</th>
<th>20%–30%</th>
<th>30%–40%</th>
<th>40%–50%</th>
<th>50%–60%</th>
<th>60%–70%</th>
<th>70%+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>SEP-08</th>
<th>DEC-08</th>
<th>MAR-09</th>
<th>JUN-09</th>
<th>SEP-09</th>
<th>DEC-09</th>
<th>MAR-10</th>
<th>JUN-10</th>
<th>SEP-10</th>
<th>DEC-10</th>
<th>MAR-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not satisfied at all / Somewhat dissatisfied</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>66.1%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>73.1%</td>
<td>72.1%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat satisfied / Very satisfied</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afghan Perceptions of Corruption

22. Is it your opinion that corruption among government officials or the police has increased over the last year or so, decreased, or has it remained about the same?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Increased</th>
<th>Decreased</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/13/10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/23/09</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12/09</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Beyond any corruption occurring in your local area, what is your view of the level of corruption [ITEM] - is that a big problem, a moderate problem, a small problem or not a problem?

11/13/10 - Summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Big/Moderate</th>
<th>Small/No problem</th>
<th>No opin.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>Big</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Within the government of this province</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. At the national level within the government in Kabul</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trend:

a. Within the government of this province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Big/Moderate</th>
<th>Small/No problem</th>
<th>No opin.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>Big</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/13/10</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/23/09</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. At the national level within the government in Kabul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Big/Moderate</th>
<th>Small/No problem</th>
<th>No opin.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>Big</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/13/10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/23/09</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABC NEWS/BBC/ARD/WASHINGTON POST POLL, AFGHANISTAN: WHERE THINGS STAND, December 6, 2010
### Afghan Experience with Corruption

12. Has it ever happened to you personally that a representative of (ITEM) has asked for money or other payment in exchange for favorable treatment in the performance of his official duties?

**11/13/10 - Summary table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Afghan National Police</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Afghan National Army</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The provincial government</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. (IF YES) The last time this happened, did you regard this as corruption or did you see it as acceptable behavior in this case?

**11/13/10 - Summary table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Corruption</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Afghan National Police</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Afghan National Army</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The provincial government</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12/13 NET:

**11/13/10 - Summary table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>---Asked for money/payment---</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Afghan National Police</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Afghan National Army</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The provincial government</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** ABC NEWS/BBC/ARD/WASHINGTON POST POLL, AFGHANISTAN: WHERE THINGS STAND, December 6, 2010
Shaping Transition

Racing Towards Larger Forces
**Promising Growth, Challenges Remain**

- Growth on track for 2010;
  - ANCOP attrition enduring concern
  - Entering historical summer lull

- ANA quality improving, however;
  - Leader development lagging
  - Officer & NCO shortages persist

- Keys to arresting ANP attrition:
  - Recruit-Train-Assign Model
  - Pay-Partner-Predictable Cycle
  - Leader Development & Literacy

- Ministerial capacity improving – projecting self sustaining in 2012
### ANSF and US Security Priorities: July 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
<th>Current Target</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>ANDS Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
<td>80,000 troops (plus 6,600 in training)</td>
<td>134,000 troops (by 10/2010) 171,600 troops (by 10/2011)</td>
<td>129,885 troops (as of 6/20/2010)</td>
<td>End of 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>82,180 police officers</td>
<td>109,000 police officers (by October 2010)</td>
<td>105,873 police officers (as of 6/20/2010)</td>
<td>End of 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups</td>
<td>All illegal armed groups disbanded in all provinces</td>
<td>98 of 140 DIAG-targeted districts declared compliant</td>
<td></td>
<td>March 20, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removing Unexploded Ordnance</td>
<td>Land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance reduced by 70% 90% of all known areas contaminated by mines or explosive remnants of war cleared All emplaced anti-personnel mines cleared</td>
<td>UN: Land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance reduced by 47% DoS: 685 million square meters of contaminated land remain</td>
<td></td>
<td>End of 2010 2012 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Priorities were originally based on Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) targets.


Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 53
**ANSF Development Plan: 2009-2011 as of 10/2010**

- **Total ANA Growth**
  - **Nov 09:** 97,011
  - **Sep 10:** 138,164 (+41,153 (+42%))
  - **Nov 11:** 171,600

- **Total ANP Growth**
  - **Nov 09:** 94,958
  - **Sep 10:** 117,342 (+22,384 (+24%))
  - **Nov 11:** 134,000

- **ANA Training Capacity**
  - **Nov 09:** 15,440
  - **Sep 10:** 17,750 (+2,310 (+15%))
  - **Nov 11:** 17,750

- **ANP Training Capacity**
  - **Nov 09:** 7,740
  - **Sep 10:** 10,661 (+2,921 (+38%))
  - **Nov 11:** 13,361

Source: NTM-A, *Year in Review, November 2009 to November 2010*, p. 8
NTM-A Goals for 2011

Accelerate Progress:

• Train Afghan Trainers
• Accelerate Leader Development
• Build Literacy and “Vocational Skills”
• Inculcate an ethos of Stewardship
• Develop Enduring Institutions, Systems, and Enablers

Challenges:

• Attrition: Army –2.68% (Jan 11); Police –1.8% (Jan 11); ANSF Goal = 1.4%
• Leadership Shortfalls:
  • Officers (v. Auth): Army –82.3%; Police –82.3%
  • Non-Commissioned Officers (v. Auth): Army –85.4%; Police –73.7%
• Literacy: ~ 58K in training; ~ 61K completed some training (1st to 3rd Grade)
But, No Clear End State or Transition Goal as of 2/2011

**Afghan National Army**
- **2009**: 97K, Infantry Centric, Unbalanced Force
- **2010**: 134K, More Balanced Force, Still Reliant on Coalition Forces
- **2011**: 171.6K, Critical Capabilities, Improved “Present for Duty” Strength, Professionalization, Self-Reliance
- **TBD**

**Afghan National Police**
- **2009**: 95K, Grow
- **2010**: 122K, Grow & Build Critical Support Capabilities
- **2011**: 134K, Expand Police Presence, Increased Professionalization
- **TBD**

NTM-A 5 February 26, 2011
ANSF Manpower Growth

During the reporting period, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continued to make significant progress, increasing in quantity, quality, and operational capacity. They have exceeded their growth goals due to increased recruiting and improved retention, and remain on schedule to meet their October 2011 goals of 171,600 and 134,000, respectively. As of March 2011, the Afghan National Army (ANA) force levels reached 159,363 soldiers – 4,375 ahead of the goal of 154,998. The Afghan National Police (ANP) also exceeded its growth goals, reaching 125,589 police – 3,589 ahead of its goal of 122,000. Notably, both the ANA and the ANP continue to reach and exceed growth benchmarks despite recent attrition rates above target levels.

Marked increases in the size of the ANSF have been paralleled by significant quality improvements, as U.S. and coalition forces in key terrain districts continue to live, train and operate shoulder-to-shoulder with the ANA and ANP. Currently, 96 percent of ANA and 83 percent of ANP units in key terrain districts are partnered with ISAF units, and 95 percent of all operations are conducted with partnered forces. In fact, in the major operations west of Kandahar in late 2010, Afghan forces comprised nearly 60 percent of the overall force.

ANSF Growth

Over 94,000 (49%) increase since November 2009

As of 7 May 2011

Source: US Experts
Shaping Transition

Continuing Problems in Foreign Trainer Numbers and Quality
Training Transition Forces

**JUL 10**

**OCT 10**

**JUL 11**

**Army Branch Schools**

- **Red:** IOC
- **Amber:** Coalition assistance req’d
- **Green:** Coalition oversight only

- Infantry
- Engineer
- Legal
- Military Police
- Logistics
- Religious/Cultural Affairs
- Intelligence
- Finance

- Artillery
- Human Resources
- Infantry
- Engineer
- Legal
- Military Police
- Logistics
- Religious/Cultural Affairs
- Intelligence
- Finance

- **Armour**
  - Artillery
  - Human Resources
  - Signal
  - Infantry
  - Engineer
  - Legal
  - Military Police
  - Logistics
  - Religious/Cultural Affairs
  - Intelligence
  - Finance

---

**SEP 09**

**OCT 10**

- **PoA Airlift (RW)**
- **RW CAS**
- **Battlefield Mobility**
- **CASEVAC**

- **HA / DR**
- **NEO**
- **PoA Airlift (RW)**
- **C-27 IOC/Dip Ops**
- **Battlefield Mobility**
- **CASEVAC/MEDEVAC**
- **RW CAS (Mi-17/35)**
- **Fwd Observers (FO)**
- **Instrument/Night Ops**
- **NVG Ops**
- **Air Assault**
- **RW Sling Load**
- **Air Drop (C-27)**

**OCT 11**

- **PoA Airlift (RW & FW)**
- **Battlefield Mobility**
- **C-27 FO/C/Diplomatic Ops**
- **Air Assault**
- **HA / DR**
- **NEO**
- **CASEVAC/MEDEVAC**
- **RW Sling Load**
- **Instrument/Night Ops**
- **NVG Ops**
- **Air Drop (C-27)**
- **RW CAS w/ FO (Mi-17/35)**
- **RW CAS w/ FO**
- **Tactical Training Det**

**Legend**

- **HA:** Humanitarian Assistance
- **DR:** Disaster Relief
- **NEO:** Noncombatant Operations
- **NVG:** Night Vision Goggles
- **CAS w/ FO:** Close Air Support with Forward Observer
- **CASEVAC:** Casualty Evacuation
- **MEDEVAC:** Medical Evacuation
- **RW & FW:** Rotary Wing & Fixed Wing

But, Critical Shortfalls Exist in Trainer Numbers

NTM-A Institutional Trainer Sourcing Progress

### And, in Key Trainer Skills

#### Figure 14. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan priority trainer progress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prioritized Capabilities</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Suggested Manning</th>
<th>Pledges</th>
<th>In-Place</th>
<th>Progress Since (SEP10)</th>
<th>Shortfall After Pledges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUP Training Sustainment Site (Shaheen, Costili)</td>
<td>APR 10</td>
<td>16, 19</td>
<td>SWE (9)</td>
<td>EST (4)</td>
<td>ROU (10)</td>
<td>7, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCP Training Center (Mehtar Lam)</td>
<td>APR 10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>JOR (17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCP Consolidated Fielding Center (Kabul)</td>
<td>DEC 10</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP Regional Training Centers (Barayam, Jalalabad, Gardez)</td>
<td>APR 10</td>
<td>6, 38, 21</td>
<td>JOR (38), USA (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>USA (6)</td>
<td>6, 12, 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP Training Centers (Spin Boldak, Shouz, Sheberghan)</td>
<td>JUL 10</td>
<td>35, 15, 15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ROU (28)</td>
<td>7, 15, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17 Air Member Team (Kandahar, Shindand, Jalalabad, Kabul, Herat, MeS)</td>
<td>MAY 10</td>
<td>23, 23, 19, 7, 19, 23</td>
<td>LTU (8), LVA (2), UKR (2), HUN (16), ESP (8)</td>
<td>HUN (7), ITA (17), COL (17)</td>
<td>11, 0, 19, 7, 0, 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-27 Air Member Team (Kabul, Kandahar)</td>
<td>MAY 10</td>
<td>17, 17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GRC (7)</td>
<td>10, 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTF Advance Fixed Wing AMT (Shindand)</td>
<td>SEP 11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ITA (5)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Medical Academy (AFAMS) (Kabul)</td>
<td>OCT 10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FRA (12)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF National Military Hospital (Kabul)</td>
<td>OCT 10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GRC (16)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Military Hospitals (Kandahar, MeS, Herat)</td>
<td>FEB 10</td>
<td>18, 18, 18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BGR (10)</td>
<td>8, 18, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal School (Kabul)</td>
<td>JUN 10</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>NOR (3), SWE (2), FIN (2), SWE (2), NOR (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMTC HQ Senior Advisor Teams (Kabul, Shorabak, Gardez, MeS)</td>
<td>SEP 10</td>
<td>7, 7, 7, 7</td>
<td>HUN (3)</td>
<td>USA (13)</td>
<td>HUN (1), GBR (7), TUR (1)</td>
<td>0, 0, 0, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMTC Trainers (Kabul, Shorabak, Shindand, MeS)</td>
<td>JAN 11</td>
<td>38, 38, 38</td>
<td></td>
<td>USA (1)</td>
<td>GBR (20), TUR (1), HUN (20)</td>
<td>36, 18, 38, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN Academy (Kabul)</td>
<td>FEB 10</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>ITA (3), AUS (2), FRG (4), GBR (1)</td>
<td>AUS (4), ITA (2), USA (43), FRA (1), GBR (1)</td>
<td>COL (10)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>819</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NTM-A, *Year in Review, November 2009 to November 2010*, p. 27.
Even Counting Pledged Instructors Who Are Not There

While the United States has deployed additional forces to temporarily alleviate the shortage in instructors for the ANA, these efforts do not fully address the ANA’s instructor shortage. NTM-A/CSTC-A documentation notes that, due to the presence of additional U.S. personnel, the ANA’s average instructor-to-trainee ratio in basic training improved from about 1 instructor for every 79 trainees as of November 2009 to approximately 1 instructor for every 24 trainees as of November 2010—a key factor, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A, in improved marksmanship qualification rates among ANA trainees. (Fig. 11 shows one such U.S. soldier providing marksmanship training to ANA recruits.) However, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A, while U.S. forces on temporary deployment have improved the quality of ANA basic training, these personnel were not intended to provide instruction in the advanced skills that the ANA must acquire by the time it grows to 171,600.27 Similarly, a November 2010 NTM-A/CSTC-A document noted a particularly serious shortage in the number of instructors needed to teach the ANA specialized skills and stated that unless critical instructor positions are filled between December 2010 and July 2011, the ability of the ANA to develop skills it needs to start assuming lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s security may be delayed.

The ANA is also facing shortfalls in coalition training teams needed to develop the skills of new army units once they are fielded. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, field-based training of the ANA is vital given that army forces completing unit training have limited capability. For example, NTM-A/CSTC-A data indicate that of the first 12 new ANA units fielded since the adoption of the new capability assessment system, 11 were assessed as either dependent on coalition forces for success or ineffective. Given the generally low level of capability that ANA units have upon completing unit training, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials stated that they expect newly formed units to receive substantial training in the field from training teams and partner units. However, shortages exist in the number of training teams available to assist in ANA development. NTM-A/CSTC-A documentation specifies that a total of 205 training teams are needed to complete fielding of a 171,600-person ANA by October 2011. However, as of September 2010, the total number of training teams fielded or pledged by coalition nations was 164—41 fewer than the number needed. According to IJC, given the serious challenges that the ANA faces, the ability of army units to develop greater capability will be delayed if they lack training teams to provide field-based training.
ANA Instructor & Training Shortfalls: 3/2011

Following the November 2010 Lisbon Summit and associated NATO Global Force Generation Conference, troop-contributing nations confirmed pledges for 104 additional institutional trainers, decreasing the trainer shortfall to 770. NATO subsequently released CJSOR v10.1 to capture adjustments in trainer requirements, containing a total requirement of 2,778 institutional trainers. However, shortfalls still exist. The current shortfall in institutional trainers is 740, with 1,371 deployed trainers in-place and 667 confirmed pledges.

CJSOR Trainer Status (Version 10.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>In-Place</th>
<th>Pledged</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,778</td>
<td>1,371</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the remaining 740 unfilled institutional trainer positions, the figure below summarizes the departments that are affected by the shortage. While NTM-A/CSTC-A has made great progress in training the ANSF, the continued shortage of required trainers will delay both institutional transition and professionalization of the ANSF.

The United States currently sources 1,166 non-CJSOR trainer positions. In order to temporarily address the NATO CJSOR shortfall, and fill the U.S.-sourced, non-CJSOR requirements as quickly as possible, the United States deployed entire units. The United States also provides an additional 963 personnel to provide skills not found in the deployed units. This brings the total U.S. sourcing to 2,129.

NTM-A/CSTC-A CJSOR (Version 10.1) Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Percent Sources</th>
<th>Trainers Short</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continuing NTM-A Warnings About Trainers: 24/4/11

“We passed a significant milestone this week - we are now at 50% of our authorized number of Coalition trainers, the highest we've been since NTM-A was activated in November 2009.

However, the lack of the other 50% of Coalition trainers/advisors with key skills (critical gaps, in medical, logistics and engineers) threatens to slow progress in ASNF development at the time when we need to be accelerating.

We continue to make significant progress growing the fielded forces, yet the development of their supporting logistics system is lagging.

The absence of these skilled trainers and advisors is slowing the development of functional sustainment systems - at echelon above Corps, Army and Police supply depots and training centers--and the indigenous capacity necessary to effectively manage them.

We continue to maximize contractors where we can but at a significant financial cost. Only by filling our critical shortfalls with the right grades and skills from the coalition can we properly develop a professional, sustainable and enduring logistics system for the ANSF. These trainers and advisors are also central to our anti-corruption efforts and providing the necessary safeguards and oversight to ensure stewardship of our investment.”
Shaping Transition

The Need for Further Improvement at the MoD and Top Command Levels
In May 2009, all of the assessed departments within MoD and the General Staff were rated as requiring significant coalition assistance to accomplish their missions (CM-3) except for two (Inspector General and Budget & Finance) rated as requiring some coalition assistance to accomplish their missions (CM-2B); and one (Reserve Affairs) rated as existing but unable to accomplish its mission (CM-4). As of the end of the CM reporting period in January 2011, three departments were rated CM-4, four were new and not assessed, eleven had achieved a CM-3 rating, nineteen had achieved a CM-2B rating, eight had achieved a CM-2A rating, and one had achieved a CM-1B rating (the CM-1B rating is pending final Commander NTM-A transition decision approval).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CM-4</td>
<td>The department or institution exists but cannot accomplish its mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-3</td>
<td>Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-2B</td>
<td>Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-2A</td>
<td>Department or institution capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-1B</td>
<td>Department or institution capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-1A</td>
<td>Department or institution capable of autonomous operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shaping Transition

The Afghan National Army: Progress in Quantity
ANA Missions & Status in 2/2011


- **Strength**: 152 K (as of 29 JAN 2011); Approved Growth 171.6K by NOV 11
- **Growth of ~ 55K since NOV 09
- **Structure**:
  - 6 Corps
  - 1 Capitol Division (Kabul)
  - 1 Special Operating Forces (SOF) Command
  - 1 Ground Forces Command HQ
- **Air Force**: 57 Aircraft (as of 15 FEB 2011) (10) C-27; (35) Mi-17; (9) Mi-35; (3) AN-32
- **11 of 12 Branch Schools Open**
  - ~ 24K Soldiers in Training per day on average
  - ~ 7K Soldiers complete training per month on average
  - ~ 137 Concurrent Courses at 27 Separate Training Sites (see map)
  - ~ $6.8B Planned Infrastructure Development for > 300 Units
- **Fielded since Nov “09**: 71,616 Weapons; 11,536 Vehicles; 22,721 Communications Assets
Since November 2009, the Afghan people have responded to ANA's recruitment drive, and subsequently the ANA grew by more than 37,000 personnel. During this period, ANA consistently met or exceeded all monthly recruitment goals. As of August 2010, the ANA exceeded its October 2010 goal of 134,000 personnel, by 7,106 personnel. If current trends continue, the ANA will meet the 2011 goal of 171,600 personnel at or ahead of schedule. One risk to the projected ANA growth is attrition. In July and August, attrition rates increased over the 12-month average, 3.0 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. If attrition rates remain elevated, the ANA will not meet its October 2011 growth goals.

To reduce high attrition rates, the MoD and NTM-A conducted a review of the most likely causes of attrition within the ANA, and devised a plan to address them. The review identified the following factors as contributing to attrition trends: the seasonal impact of work available in farming and construction; poor management of leave time; and the lack of accountability of unit commanders across the ANA for their strength management. Despite these negative factors, two positive factors were identified as slowly reducing attrition at the same time: the pay increase in December 2009 and greater leadership in select units. Several proactive measures are being implemented to improve attrition rates. First, command emphasis has been a priority of the Chief of the General Staff (CoGS), and new commanders have been formally counseled.
From January to October 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A data show that the ANA met or exceeded its recruitment target in all but 2 months, with recruitment averaging over 6,500 soldiers per month. This was more than twice the average monthly recruitment figure of approximately 3,000 reported for the preceding 10 months. Overall, the total number of personnel recruited between January and October 2010 exceeded the total recruitment target for those months by over 6,000.

In addition, NTM-A/CSTC-A reports that retention of ANA personnel who have fulfilled their contracts has generally continued to meet the monthly target of 60 to 70 percent. A typical ANA contract lasts for 3 years. At the end of a contract, ANA personnel are given the opportunity to reenlist. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, between January and October 2010, the ANA met its overall retention target in 7 out of 10 months.
In October 2010, the ANA exceeded its goal of 134,000 personnel by 10,638 and is ahead of its goal to meet its 171,600 objective by the end of October 2011. However, during the past 12 months, 70 percent of those eligible either re-enlisted at the end of their term of service or rejoined having previously left the ANA. Although recruiting and retention are continuing at a strong pace, attrition is a concern. If the levels of attrition seen throughout the last five months continue, there is a significant risk to projected ANA growth. Recent studies show that the core causes of attrition in the ANA are poor leadership and accountability, separation from family, denial of leave or poor leave management, high operational tempo, and ineffective deterrence against AWOL.

Source: US Experts
ANA Laydown January 2008

Source: US Experts
ANA Developments

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 62-61
### ANA Pay Reform 11/2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer rank</th>
<th>Monthly rates before reform</th>
<th>Monthly rates after reform</th>
<th>Increase in monthly salary</th>
<th>Percentage increase in salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$945</td>
<td>$45</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant general</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major general</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier general</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First lieutenant</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second lieutenant</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted rank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant major</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master sergeant</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant first class</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff sergeant</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.

Note: The pay figures above are for personnel with less than 3 years of service at their current ranks. ANA personnel receive a longevity-based pay increase every 3 years served at rank.
Cost Per Afghan Soldier

Total cost for ANA soldier with M16
Armor=$1,431
M16=$976
Clothing=$422
Equipment =$166
Total = $2,995

Body armor = $1,431
Kevlar Helmet
Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) and Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates

Equipment = $166
Canteen Duffel bag Elbow pads
Entrenching tool
First aid kit
Knee pads
Poncho
Rucksack and frame
Sleeping bag
Sleeping mat
Other

Weapon = $976 M16 rifle

Clothing = $422
Berets
Cold weather gear
Field jacket and liner
Mechanic coveralls
Physical training clothing Belts Undergarments
Uniform
Wet weather set
Boots (steel toed, combat, and cold weather)
Other
### Army, Navy, US Marine Corps, and Air Force

#### Annual Operational Costs Per Troop in Afghanistan and Iraq FY2005-FY2011

Request in thousands of dollars per troop per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>FY09</th>
<th>FY2010 Amended Request in BA, 2-1-10</th>
<th>FY2011 Request, 2-1-10</th>
<th>FY05-FY09 Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Strength(^a)</td>
<td>18,129</td>
<td>20,424</td>
<td>23,154</td>
<td>30,103</td>
<td>42,117</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>26,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Operational Costs(^b)</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRAQ</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Strength(^a)</td>
<td>142,574</td>
<td>117,640</td>
<td>145,066</td>
<td>156,534</td>
<td>141,155</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>140,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Operational Costs(^b)</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Comparing Afghanistan and Iraq Operational Costs

| | Afghanistan less. Iraq Operational Costs | % Difference | Afghanistan less. Iraq Operational Costs | % Difference |
| | | | | |
| | 130 | -67 | 56 | 123 | 198 | -108 | 63 |
| % Difference | 27% | -15% | 10% | 20% | 15% | 30% | -16% | 12% |

### Average Operational Costs for Both War Wars

| | Average Strength for Both Wars\(^a\) | Average Operational Cost for Both Wars\(^b\) |
| | | |
| | 160,703 | 367 |
| | 138,064 | 499 |
| | 168,219 | 518 |
| | 186,636 | 525 |
| | 183,272 | 450 |
| | 184,000 | 559 |
| | 145,000 | 726 |
| | 167,379 | 472 |

\(^a\) Reflects average for each fiscal year of monthly troop levels reported by DOD.  
\(^b\) Operational costs include appropriations for military personnel and Operation and Maintenance excluding training of Afghan and Iraq security forces.

Cost Per Afghan Battalion

Total = $22 million

Approximately

- Transportation: $17,575,371
- Weapons: 2,407,807
- Communications: 1,812,443
- Other: 203,174

Total: $21,998,795

Transportation
- Trucks
- Water trailer
- Ambulance
- Forklift
- HMMWVs
- Other

Weapons
- Pistols
- M16 rifles
- Sniper rifles
- Machine guns
- Grenade launchers
- Mortars
- Other

Communications
- Radio (handheld, manportable, programming kit, vehicle mounted)
- Radio base station
- Switchboard
- Tactical field phone
- Other

Other
- Generators
- Mobile kitchen
- Binoculars
- Compass
- Tool kits

Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; GAO (photo).

Note: M16 rifle costs are included in both figure 3 and figure 4.
Army Training Sites

Masar-e-Sharif
- RMTC Sep 2011
  Capacity - 1750
- Combat Spt School – July 2011
- Engineers School – Oct 11
- Signal School – 2012
- MP School – 2012

Kandahar
- RMTC
  Capacity - 1750
- CA School (2012)

Kabul
- KMTC
  Capacity - 10000
- Log School
- MoD – HQs Army Dev Advisors
- LOGCOM – Advisors
- ANAREC – Advisors
- NMAA
- Command and Staff College
- Infantry Battle School
- Arty School
- Combat Service Spt School (Nov 2010)

Herat
- RMTC
  Capacity – 1450
- Shindand
  Capacity - 350

Shindand
- RMTC (Sep 2011)
  Capacity – 1750

Shorabak
- Joint Security Academy Shorabak (JSAS)
  Capacity 100
- RMTC
  Capacity 1750

Gardez
- RMTC (Sep 2011)
  Capacity - 1750

Khost
- RMTC
  Capacity - 600
- Gardez
  RMTC
  Capacity - 1750

Darulaman
- RMTC
  Capacity - 1750
- Infantry Branch School (Jul 2010)
- CTAG-A HQ/ANATC HQ

Gamberi
- RMTC (Sep 2011)
  Capacity - 1750

Average of 24K Soldiers Under Training Every Day
ANA Training Comparison: 2009-2010

Developing the systems and institutions to professionalize and grow the force

Source: NTM-A
ANA Literacy Training Program: 2009-2010

- **Nov 10**: 30,000 Students
  - **Jul 10**: 13,674 Students
    - **295% Increase in attendance**

- **Nov 10**: 11,085 1st Grade Completions
  - **Jul 10**: 7,129 1st Grade Completions
    - **3,619% Increase in Training**

- **Nov 10**: 320 Instructors
  - **Jul 10**: 304 Instructors
    - **11% Increase in Instructor Capacity**

- **Nov 10**: 6,176 3rd Grade Graduates
  - **Jul 10**: 1,324 3rd Grade Completions
    - **>5000% Increase in Literacy**

- **Nov 09**: 2,596 Students
  - **Nov 09**: 288 Instructors

---

**Literacy training .... Rapid start .... Monumental task .... Key to professionalization of the ANA**
Armored Vehicle Developments

- **Afghan & US Partnership**: The US Government has announced the donation of up to 490 Armored Security Vehicles worth $600M for the Afghan Army. The donation includes support equipment, spare parts, and training support.

- **Armored Vehicles**: Provides the ANA with armor capability in 9 variants: Armored Personnel Carriers with gunner protection and turret, as well as command & control, mortar, ambulance, engineering, maintenance, and reconnaissance variations.

- **Proven Capability**: This is an improved version of the M1117 vehicle that the US Army already uses. The vehicles will be produced in Louisiana by Textron Marine and Land Systems. M1117 has been in US military inventories since Sept 2000.
  - **Sustainable and Reliable**: Has 70% commonality with US Army ensuring an enduring long term relationship and a proven record of sustainability and reliability
  - **Improvements for Afghanistan**: Enhanced Survivability provides protection from IEDs, equivalent to MRAP/MATV
  - **Seven Quick Reaction Forces**: These vehicles will provide the Afghan Army with a force that can rapidly respond to threats anywhere in the country or along the border

- **Delivery**: Delivery of the first vehicle is scheduled for Nov 2011. Complete delivery is estimated for December 2012.

Armored Capability for the Afghan Army
Shaping Transition

The Afghan National Army: Some Progress in Quality and Endurance but Still A Long Way to Go
Progress and Focus Areas (as of 17 May 11)

**Progress:**
- Public Perception
  - All Volunteers
  - Retention & Pride of Service
- Capable Security Ministries
  - Budgeting and Execution
  - Strategic Planning & Policy Development
- Professionalization
  - Literacy
  - Leader Development
  - Vocational Training
- Training Institutions
  - Afghan Trainers
  - Standardized Courses

**Focus Areas:**
- Accountability
- Transparency
- Logistics Network

*Significant progress ... challenges remain*

Source: US Experts
Where the ANSF Are Today

100% mandatory literacy training

Living wage and incentive pay

11/12 vocational schools opened

Trained leaders increased by 500%

95% weapon qualification rate

NATO Weapons, high quality equipment

Afghan-made uniform items

Greater retention

Source: US Experts
Significant Progress in Quality

**ANSF QUALITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nov 11 (Projected)</th>
<th>2,797</th>
<th>97%</th>
<th>20,980 seats</th>
<th>30K+</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Today</td>
<td>2,160</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>13,361 seats</td>
<td>24,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1,701</td>
<td>+ 60%</td>
<td>+ 5,621</td>
<td>+ 24,525</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nov 09</th>
<th>459</th>
<th>35%</th>
<th>7,740 seats</th>
<th>381</th>
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</table>

**Set the foundation to professionalize the force, but it will take time**

Source: US Experts
According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, a high attrition rate is the primary challenge the ANA faces in meeting its present goal of growing the force to 171,600 personnel by October 2011. For instance, in the 12-month period from November 2009 to October 2010, the ANA lost over 30,000 soldiers due to attrition. This means that, in addition to the recruits needed to grow the force, the ANA also had to recruit 30,000 soldiers to fill these vacant slots. NTM-A/CSTC-A plans have accounted for the need to achieve this additional recruiting, noting that in order to grow from the July 2010 force size of just over 134,000 to the 171,600 goal—an increase of about 37,000—the ANA will need to recruit and train over 86,000 personnel. Additionally, absenteeism remains a challenge to fielding an ANA force as planned. Specifically, IJC data indicate that the number of ANA present for duty continues to fall below the number of ANA assigned to units. In September 2010, for example, IJC reported that, across the ANA, only 69 percent of soldiers were present for duty. In some units, such as the 215th Corps in southwestern Afghanistan, the ratio of present for duty was even lower. An analysis of data provided by IJC indicates that, from January to September 2010, on average, over a quarter of the ANA was absent during any given month.

NTM-A/CSTC-A data indicate that, as of October 2010, the ANA consisted of 144,638 personnel. NTM-A/CSTC-A has also reported that the ANA lost over 4,000 personnel in October 2010 due to attrition. Furthermore, NTM-A/CSTC-A data show that nearly 300 ANA personnel whose contracts ended in October 2010 decided not to reenlist. In sum, approximately 4,300 personnel were dropped from the ANA payroll in October 2010 either because of attrition or nonreenlistment. NTM-A/CSTC-A reports that the ANA recruited almost 8,000 new personnel in October 2010. However, the first 4,300 of these new recruits did not count toward net growth of the force, since they were needed to offset the loss of approximately 4,300 personnel due to attrition and nonreenlistment. Consequently, out of the roughly 8,000 recruits from July 2010, 3,700—less than half—counted toward net growth.
Despite some progress, the ANA is continuing to face shortfalls in non-commissioned officers (NCO) needed to provide leadership to ANA units in the field. As of October 2010, about one-quarter of NCO positions in ANA combat units were unfilled. This represents an improvement since our last report,24 when we found that, between November 2007 and February 2008, the proportion of unfilled NCO positions ranged as high as 50 percent. In spite of this improvement, NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that it considers the ongoing shortfall of NCOs to be a major challenge, noting that development of leaders is essential to improving ANA capability.
As of November 2010, the ANA had less than half of the authorized equipment amount on hand for 17 of 48 equipment items (35 percent). This is a slight improvement since the GAO 2008 report, when it found that there were 21 of 55 equipment items (38 percent) for which army units had less than half of the required amount on hand. Additionally, as of November 2010, the ANA had an average of about 72 percent of the authorized amount on hand per equipment item, as compared with an average of about 60 percent on hand per equipment item at the time of our last report. This improvement notwithstanding, shortages remain in weapons, vehicles, communications items, and protective equipment.

Although the ANA’s equipping levels have slightly improved, IJC documentation indicates that not all pieces of equipment that the ANA has on hand are considered ready to be used in operations. According to IJC, while factors such as enemy action and normal wear and tear can lead to equipment being deemed unserviceable, an additional factor is that the ANA continues to lack responsibility for its equipment. In addition, a senior NTM-A/CSTC-A official stated that the ANA’s nascent logistics system gives it limited ability to maintain or repair the equipment it receives. Similarly, IJC and SIGAR30 have both identified the ANA’s weak logistics system as a significant challenge to development of capable army units. Consequently, although IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A are working to institute programs to address these challenges, concerns exist about the extent to which the ANA will properly maintain the equipment items it receives.
Afghan Ratings of ANA Are High, but Not Rising: 2009 vs. 2010

Afghans rate most national institutions favorably, and some of these ratings have improved since last year. Eighty-three percent report a favorable opinion of the central government, up 9 points. Eight in 10 have a favorable opinion of the ANA and 74 percent report a favorable view of the district government, both basically unchanged. While fewer, 57 percent, have a favorable opinion of the courts in Afghanistan, this is up by 10 points.

Overall, 76 percent say, the central government has a strong presence in their area, 73 percent say, the district government has a strong presence, 67 percent say, the ANA has a strong presence, and 54 percent say, the courts have a strong presence in their area. These compare with 80 percent who say, the police have a strong local presence. As noted, presence of the police is one of the two strongest independent factors in viewing the ANP favorable.

As with the ANP, favorable ratings of Afghan institutions are lower in the South West than in other regions. Only 71 percent in the South West view the central government positively, and 69 percent rate the ANA positively – 12 and 11 points lower than the national averages. In addition, fewer than half rate the district government or the courts positively, down by 18 points and 10 points respectively, from last year.
IJC partnering and partnered operations have successfully increased the quality of the fielded force. However, significant challenges remain. Partnered units continue to rely heavily on ISAF to control operations and long-term planning is often ineffective due to the focus on current operations. Staff members' low literacy levels hinder their ability to use computers, effectively manage staff functions, and exercise command and control. Partnering is essential to provide necessary supervision and oversight of planning for supplies (i.e., fuel and ammunition).

Figure 5: ANA Operational Effectiveness by Corps and Brigade (September 2010)

*Ratings are made with the RDL system.*
ANA Capability in the Field as of 4/2011

Afghan Uniformed Police: Districts and Precincts

Army Kandaks Assessment

Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool Ratings

As of 14 Apr 11
Next ANSF assessment available on 2 June 2011

Source: ISAF, May 2011
### ANA Readiness Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating definition level</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective with advisors</td>
<td>Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations within their own battle space and maintaining regional security with limited guidance from training team only. Partnered unit assistance is no longer needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective with assistance</td>
<td>Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations and maintaining regional security with limited assistance from partnered unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent on coalition forces for success</td>
<td>Unit capability is dependent on partnered unit presence/assistance to execute and sustain operations and maintain regional security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>Unit is not capable of executing or sustaining operations even with partnered unit presence/assistance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From September 2010 through February 2011, the number of fielded ANA *kandaks* and *kandak* equivalents grew from 136 to 157, an increase of 15 percent over the reporting period. The ANA also improved in quality. The number of *kandak*-equivalent formations rated as “Effective with Advisors,” the second highest rating, grew from 32 to 52 during this period, and those rated as “Effective with Assistance” rose from 39 to 64, increases of 63 percent and 64 percent, respectively. Through the end of this reporting period, 74 percent of ANA *kandaks* were rated as effective with assistance or better, up from 52 percent during the previous reporting period. Moreover, from September 2010 to February 2011, the total number of *kandaks*, headquarters, and general support units rated as “Effective with Advisors” rose from 42 to 61; and those rated as “Effective with Assistance” rose from 49 to 85. Currently, no units have been validated as “Independent.”

During the major floods in Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan last summer, the AAF flew 400 missions and transported over 188 tons of supplies. During the 2010 parliamentary elections, it recorded 225 flight hours and transported over 67,000 kgs of supplies to remote locations. It also rescued survivors of the Salang Pass avalanche, supported search and recovery operations following an airliner crash, and delivered generators and supplies to schools. In January, the AAF flew the first training sorties at Shindand Air Base in Herat Province, the new home for AAF training. The ANA took a lead role in security efforts in and around Kabul during the January inauguration of Afghanistan’s new parliament. Despite being an obvious target for insurgent attack – and numerous schedule changes to which the ANA had to react – the events proceeded without incident.

Key challenges still remain. Not all ANA units and leaders are sufficiently mature, experienced, or professional – qualities that take time and discipline to develop. As well, the ANA’s ability to sustain itself and to improve its combat enablers requires focus and effort. There can be no doubt, however, that the force is indeed growing in quality, quantity, and capacity. With continued persistence on the part of ISAF and its Afghan partners, the ANA will continue to progress.

During the first quarter of 2011, Commander IJC assessed that that the ANA overall continues to show steady improvement in the field. ANA units are conducting more independent operations, are becoming increasingly proficient, and are gaining the trust of the people. Recently, they have shown noticeable improvement in their AWOL and Present for Duty rates. Increases in the number of personnel available for duty have positively impacted operational effectiveness. Units are beginning to implement their own measures to limit AWOL soldiers, such as personnel tracking. Coalition and ANA forces control much more territory than they did a year ago, and ANA units (and their ANP counterparts) have been a significant contributor to the combined team success.

Nonetheless, key challenges remain. ANA units are still too dependent on coalition forces for operations, and specifically logistical support. The ANA lacks a sufficient number of personnel trained in the specialized skill sets of intelligence, maintenance, and medical support. A lack of literacy is a particular limitation to personnel assigned to these specialized-skill areas. In some cases, a lack of understanding by Afghan commanders of how best to utilize personnel trained in these specialized skills sets leads them to divert them to infantry duties. ISAF continues to work with the Afghans to address these concerns by providing additional specialized training and literacy education.

Operational effectiveness of individual ANSF units is assessed through the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). The CUAT collects both quantitative data and a qualitative assessment of a unit’s operations, personnel, leadership, maintenance, supply, equipment readiness and accountability, and other aspects of its functioning. Each area receives a rating, known as a Rating Definition Level (RDL), and the unit receives an overall rating for its operational effectiveness. The RDL range currently includes Not Assessed, Established, Developing, Effective with Assistance, Effective with Advisors, and Independent. "Independent" denotes a unit that is capable of the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from Coalition Forces. “Effective with Advisors” means that the partnered coalition unit does not exceed a limited guidance role. Units that are “Effective with Assistance” are those that are capable of executing operations and providing regional security with varied partnered unit assistance. A “Developing” unit is one whose capability is dependent on partnered unit presence and assistance. Finally, an “Established” unit is one which is not capable of executing or sustaining operations even with partnered assistance.

Units are evaluated by their partners/mentors every six weeks. Typically, unpartnered units are not assessed; however, on occasion, a Regional Command may choose to send an assessment team to an unpartnered ANSF unit to complete an assessment.

Regional Support Commands & Partnering

RSCs engage with IJC & ANSF senior leaders to identify and support operational requirements
In March 2011, 225 out of 268 (83 percent) priority ANP units across Afghanistan were partnered (Figure 14); and 173 out of 180 (96 percent) ANA units were partnered (Figure 15). Moreover, ANSF and ISAF partnered units are also increasingly conducting operations together. From April 2010 to March 2011, the number of major operations that were partnered rose from 54 percent to 95 percent across all the regional commands.

There are three descriptive terms used to describe the various types of partnering and mentorship. “Embedded partnering” is the most intensive form of partnering, where the ANA or ANP share the same battle space with their ISAF partners and live on the same installation. Embedded partnering results in a unified, combined force with Afghans often in the lead; builds trusting relationships quickly based on shared risks and responsibilities; capitalizes on the combined team’s strengths and offsets each other’s weaknesses; and allows the population to see coalition forces as supporting (not leading) ANSF. Embedded partnering is arguably the most effective training approach; however, it requires a greater number of ISAF troops to support and is typically leveraged for Afghan units that require additional training assistance. Ideally, as Afghan units become more capable, independent, and effective, the intensity of partnering relationships is not as critical, and the same objectives can be achieved through regular partnering or mentoring.

“Partnering” describes a specific form of combined operations. Specifically, a “partnered” unit describes an assigned relationship between an ISAF unit and an ANSF unit where both share the same battle space but do not live together. The ISAF partner unit shares the goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF unit, but also works together with the ANSF to defeat the insurgency. The ISAF partner unit shares comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, and intelligence with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership includes an active mentoring role and primary oversight responsibility. Proximity enables partnered units to establish a deeper personal and working relationship that allows them to plan, train, and coordinate operations, and to support one another in accomplishing assigned tasks.

“Mentoring” refers to an assigned relationship between an Afghan unit and an ISAF advisory team – typically called an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) for ANA units and a Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (POMLT) for ANP units. The ISAF partner unit shares no operations guidance, strategy, information or intelligence with its ANSF counterpart. Still, while not as focused as partnering or embedded partnering, the mentoring relationship is still extremely valuable. It is normally applied for Afghan units that, while capable, still require advanced professional development and advice in the field, as well as enabler support. Each POMLT and OMLT is normally deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum of six months. POMLTs are typically composed of 15-20 personnel and OMLTs are typically composed of 11-28 personnel (depending on the type and function of the partnered ANA unit).
Shaping Transition

The Afghan Air Force: Progress but Years of Help are Needed
In June 2010, President Karzai redesignated the Afghan National Army Air Corps as the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Although the name change does not currently make the AAF independent from the ANA, the move affirms Afghan intent to eventually return the air force to its former independent status.

The AAF’s long-term development strategy envisions an air force that can support the needs of the ANSF and the Afghan Government by 2016 – capable of Presidential airlift, air mobility, rotary and fixed-wing close air support, casualty evacuation, and aerial reconnaissance. The AAF also plans to be able to sustain its capacity through indigenous training institutions, including a complete education and training infrastructure. The air fleet will consist of a mix of Russian and Western airframes. Afghan airmen will operate in accordance with NATO procedures, and will be able to support the Afghan Government effectively by employing all of the instruments of COIN airpower. This plan is ambitious and belies a continuing tension between aspirations and affordability.

In January 2011, the AAF had 56 of its planned fleet of 146 aircraft, including 35 Mi-17 helicopters, nine Mi-35 attack helicopters, nine C-27 airlifters, and three An-32 airlifters. The AAF fleet reflects the Afghan Government’s COIN airpower priorities. The Mi-17 is an effective rotary-wing airframe due to its durable structure and lift capacity at high altitude. The Mi-35 provides an indigenous, albeit limited, close air support capability for the ANSF. The C-27 is the AAF’s first modern, all-weather-capable aircraft.

In conjunction with the AAF, NTM-A/CSTC-A has planned and requested funding for a comprehensive aircraft acquisition and modernization plan. By 2016, the Mi-17 fleet will grow to 56. Discussions are under way to extend the service life of the Mi-35, which will allow this airframe to remain in the AAF inventory through 2016. Finally, key acquisitions include:

- Replacement of the AAF’s Antonov An-32 by the 20 C-27A aircraft, a turboprop, fixed wing lifter. Nine C-27A’s are currently on-hand, and 11 will be delivered by 2012.
- Procurement of six initial flight training rotary wing aircraft with expected delivery by October 2011.
- Procurement of up to 32 “Cessna-like” fixed-wing aircraft for initial flight and basic fixed-wing screening with expected delivery beginning in October 2011 and completion by FY2013.
- Potential procurement of up to 20 aircraft for fixed-wing close air support.

Assembling an experienced, professional AAF, including an instructor cadre that can provide pilot and technical training, is the focus of NTM-A/CSTC-A’s “Airmen Build” line of operation. By the end of March 2011, AAF manning should reach 4,728 Airmen – an increase of 630 airmen over the December 2010 strength. The Afghans and NTM-A/CSTC-A continue to research opportunities to bolster both the AAF NCO and Officer Corps in an effort to develop the force in both quantity and quality as it grows to the proposed 2011 end strength of 8,017 personnel (March 2012). Attrition stands near 1.4 percent per month, which is an acceptable level to maintain professional and technical skills. Factors limiting growth include education levels, English language requirements, and pilot training – factors that also limit the AAF’s ability to produce personnel who are able to perform the technically advanced specialties required for aircraft maintenance and airfield support.

Afghan Air Force Progress

Steady progress...challenges with pilot training, English language, technical skills, and aircraft acquisition lead times
Air Strength & Training and Operations Sites

- Shindand Air Base
  - Air Wing & Training Ctr
  - Detachment
  - 3 x Mi-17

- Kabul
  - AAF HQ & Air Wing
  - 22 x Mi-17 (3 x Presidential Airlift)
  - 9 x Mi-35 (CAS)
  - 9 x C-27 (2 x Presidential Airlift)
  - 3 x An-32
  - Air Interdiction Unit (AIU)
  - 20 x Mi-17
  - Pohantoon-e-Hawayee (PeH)

- Mazar-e-Sharif
  - Detachment
  - 2 x Mi-17

- Kandahar
  - Air Wing
  - 5 x Mi-17

- Herat
  - Detachment
  - 3 x Mi-17

Current AAF Inventory
- 35 x Mi-17
- 9 x Mi-35
- 9 x C-27
- 3 x An-32

Total: 56 aircraft

Planned: 146 aircraft (2016)
(90 Western aircraft)

Over 4,000 AAF airmen in training and operating every day across AFG
Mi–17 Force

Afghan & US Partnership: The US Government will donate 21 Mi-17 v5 helicopters worth $365M.

- Adding to the Fleet: The 21 Mi-17s will complement the current fleet (35) expanding tactical mobility
- Spare Parts and Sustainment: Additionally, the U.S. is donating spare parts, ground support equipment, tools, weaponry (guns and rocket pods), and maintenance manuals building a lasting relationship of support

Versatile Helicopter Fleet: The modern Mi-17v5 aircraft is well suited for the rugged Afghan environment.

- Most Modern and New: These new helicopters are the most modern version of the Mi-17 aircraft available and are part of a reliable, and well-established aircraft line.
- Enhanced Capabilities: The helicopters provide a broad spectrum of capabilities including: Tactical airlift, air-to-ground fire suppression, air assault, troop movement, Presidential airlift, and Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) missions.

National Capabilities: First of the 21 aircraft deliveries will be late 2011 with all 21 complete by 2012.

- Locations: This fleet will support operations throughout the country from seven airfield locations in Kabul, Shindand, Kandahar, Mez-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, and Gardez.

Key to an Enduring Afghan Air Force
Cessna Light Aircraft Force

**Afghan & US Partnership:** The US Government announced a donation of 32 Cessna Light Lift Aircraft ($88.5M)
- **Supporting Afghan Forces:** The training aircraft will be based at Shindand Flying Training Center and the remaining aircraft will be stationed at airfields throughout Afghanistan
- **Sustainable:** The USG is also providing maintenance support, training devices, spare parts, support equipment, tools, & manuals
- **US Air Force:** The USAF has options to purchase 15 C-208’s as part of its Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA) program

**Six Cessna 182T (C-182) Initial Trainers:** Will assess student pilot aptitude to progress through pilot training and to teach basic flying
- **Deliveries:** Start in February 2012 and completed by January 2013
- **Cost:** The individual cost of the C-182 is $524K per aircraft

**Twenty Six Cessna 208B (C-208) Light Airlift:** Will meet the light airlift needs of the Afghan Air Force
- **The C-208:** A 10-seat single engine plane to carry passengers or cargo
- **Deliveries:** Start in August 2011 and completed by September 2013
- **Cost:** The individual cost of the C-208 is $2.2M per aircraft

Enabling Afghan Transition and Deepening Afghan/US Partnership

NTM-A May 30, 2011
Shaping Transition

The Need for Further Improvement at the MoI Level
MoI Capability Milestone Level: 3/2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff/Special Staff</td>
<td>2A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>2B</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal Affairs/LEGAD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Surgeon Medical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Info, Comms &amp; Tech</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training Mgmt</td>
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<td>Acquisition &amp; Procurement</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
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<tr>
<td>Counter Narcotics</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM of Strategy and Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDPSU</td>
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<td>Anti-Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
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Overall, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is assessed as requiring significant coalition assistance to accomplish its mission, resulting in a rating of CM-3; the MoI achieved this status in 2009. During the reporting period, the majority of departments remained static in CM ratings, while some improved and some regressed.

With the retirement of the Parliamentary Affairs Department, and the addition of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) departments, there are now 26 ministerial development plans. The March 2011 Ministerial Development Review Board rated 14 departments as CM-3, six as CM-2B, three as CM-2A (Public Affairs, Policy Development, and Operations Planning), and one as CM-4 (Facilities). The ALP and APPF remain unassessed. Finally, the Review Board approved the addition of a Civil Service Ministry Development Plan.

Since his appointment in June 2010, Minister of Interior Bismillah Kahn Mohammadi has taken proactive measures to attack corruption, introduce efficiencies, improve security, increase accountability and transparency, eliminate waste, and decentralize and delegate authority to trustworthy leaders. He championed both the Inherent Law for Officers and NCOs and the ANSF Retirement Act, which were published as law in March 2011. Introduction of retirement regulations and their enforcement led to the retirement of 57 general officers, and replacement of over 30 top ministerial and provincial leaders including three of four deputy ministers and the chief of staff. He has also introduced and promoted core values, a system of discipline and rewards, mandatory basic education, and a robust literacy program. All of these efforts have had a significant positive impact on the professional development and progress of the MoI.

Shaping Transition

The Afghan National Police: Rising Numbers but Continuing Problems in Quality, Ties to Power Brokers, and Corruption
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE

The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) continues to be the premiere police force in Afghanistan and has improved substantively since the last reporting cycle. ANCOP is meeting its growth objectives through increased recruiting, reduced attrition, and a predictable deployment schedule. The March 2011 total strength for ANCOP exceeds 9,348 personnel, including students in training. Officer and NCO development increased with attendance at commander and staff courses, logistics and specialty training, and literacy training at all levels. Increased unit leadership capabilities, a dedicated training cycle prior to deployments, and command emphasis on quality of life improvements are largely responsible for ANCOP progress.

AFGHAN BORDER POLICE

As of March 2011, the ABP end strength was 19,865. ABP is on track to meet all growth objectives for officers and ABP patrolman, but remains short of non-commissioned officer objectives (3.3K of 4K assigned). NTM-A/CSTC-A is considering options to reallocate training space to close this gap. ABP attrition has consistently remained below 2.5 percent per month over the last 12 months, and was at a 12-month low of 1.5 percent in March 2011.

High attrition continues to challenge the Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Civil Order Police, which experienced attrition rates of 1.5 percent and 2.9 percent respectively in March 2011. It is noteworthy that the ANCOP rate decreased modestly from a high of 6.5 percent in February 2010. The MoI is taking measures to implement policies to address the contributing

AFGHAN UNIFORM POLICE

As of March 2011, the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) end strength is 66,927. AUP is on track to meet all growth objectives for officers and AUP patrolman, and is capable of achieving 98 percent of its 2011 NCO objectives under current training fill rates. NTM-A/CSTC-A and MOI continue to push the recruiting base to ensure all available training seats are used. AUP attrition remains the lowest of all police pillars at 0.7 percent in March 2011. It has averaged 1.1 percent attrition since October 2009, which is below the attrition objective of 1.4 percent.

Police ANP Mission: The Afghan National Police is primarily responsible for maintaining civil order and law enforcement. The police will work with the people to actively combat crime and disorder (including terrorism and illegal armed activity); prevent the cultivation, production and smuggling of narcotics; and fight corruption. The police will ensure the sovereignty of the State and protect its borders. (Afghan National Police Strategy, dated December, 2010)

- Strength: 118.8K (as of 08 FEB 2011); Approved Growth 134K by NOV 11
- Growth of ~ 24K since NOV 09
- Structure: (4) Main Pillars, (2) Sub Pillars
- 59 Concurrent Courses at 37 Separate Training Sites (see map)
  - ~ 8.5K Police in Training per day on average
  - ~ 4.1K Police complete training per month on average
  - ~ $4.5B Planned Infrastructure Development for > 700 Units
- Fielded since Nov „09: 17,728 Weapons; 6,790 Vehicles; 76,208 Communications Assets
Main Pillars:

- **Afghan Uniform (Civilian) Police (AUP)**—(~ 62K as of 14 FEB 2011): (7) ANP Regional Zones, (34) Provinces, Traffic Police, and Fire and Rescue Department

- **Afghan National Civil Order Police (Gendarmerie) (ANCOP)**—(~ 7.9K as of 14 FEB 2011): COIN with military support; nationally deployable; (4) Brigades; (21) Battalions (Kandaks)

- **Afghan Border Police (ABP)**—(~ 19K as of 14 FEB 2011): Border Security Zone (up to 50Km into Afghanistan); Border Posts; Customs Operations

- **Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP)**—(~6K as of 18 FEB 2011): Investigative and Police Intelligence capacities

Sub Pillars:

- **Afghan Public Protection Force**—protect key infrastructure, facilities, construction projects and personnel; assumes responsibilities from Private Security Companies (PSC) across Afghanistan

- **Afghan Local Police**—secure local communities; temporary capability; no arrest or investigative authority; cannot use in offensive operations; “neighborhood watch with guns”
Since 2002, the international community has contributed about $1.5 billion to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which is administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to fund recurrent ANP costs — primarily salaries, allowances, and benefits. The following chart shows funding through September 30, 2010:

![Donations total $1.4 billion](chart)

- Other ($215.3 million)
- Canada/CIDA ($79.6 million)
- Japan ($324.6 million)
- European Commission ($334.8 million)
- USA ($441.1 million)

Source: SIGAR analysis of UNDP’s quarterly and annual LOTFA reports.

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.
ANP Disbursements Through September 30, 2010

Disbursements Total About $1.26 Billion

- $1.15 billion or 91%
- $50.4 million or 4%
- $42.4 million or 4%
- $16.5 million or 1%

Source: UNDP’s quarterly and annual LOTFA reports.

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.
ANCOP remains a top priority. Current attrition rates are the principal challenge for ANCOP growth. Attrition declined from 11.7 percent in December 2009 to 1.7 percent in August 2010 but still hovers above the target goal of 1.4 percent. The attrition challenge is compounded by poor recruiting, which has fallen short of expectations.

The attrition challenge is compounded by poor recruiting, which has fallen short of expectations.
In late October 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A discovered a procedural discrepancy in the personnel accounting process for ANP resulting in some double-counting. As a result, the end-strength numbers for August-October 2010 were restated. NTM-A/CSTC-A subsequently sponsored an assessment team that validated current accounting processes and corrective actions. They validated both the ANP end-strength and the accuracy of the November and December 2010 strengths. As of March 31, 2011, the ANP reached an end-strength of 125,589, exceeding by 3,589 the expected March position of 122,000.

The MoI is automating its human resource records and developing personnel management systems to improve ANP accountability. However, the MoI cannot determine the actual number of personnel that work for ANP because it has been unable to reconcile personnel records or verify data in four different personnel systems and databases.

As of September 30, 2010, the number of ANP records in the different systems, databases, and processes ranged from 111,774 to 125,218.

The MoI’s systems and databases contain basic ANP personnel, biometric, identification card, and registration information. However, these systems and databases are decentralized and the records and data in them are incomplete, unverified, and unreconciled.

Since 2002, UNDP has disbursed almost $1.26 billion from LOTFA to fund ANP salaries and other costs. Although the MoI continues to make progress automating the payroll and payment processes, the MoI’s payroll system currently provides little assurance that only those ANP personnel who work are paid and that LOTFA funds are only used to reimburse eligible ANP payroll and other costs. As of September 2010, about 21 percent of ANP were still paid by cash and neither MoI nor UNDP have verified payroll data and cannot confirm that only ANP who work have been paid.

UNDP, as the LOTFA administrator, has overall responsibility for oversight and monitoring of LOTFA funds and the reimbursement of eligible ANP costs. However, UNDP cannot confirm that LOTFA funds reimbursed only eligible ANP costs and its reports do not provide sufficient evidence that all audit findings are resolved; thus, additional procedures are needed to improve the oversight and monitoring of ANP payroll costs and LOTFA funds. Until these issues have been addressed, there is limited assurance that only ANP personnel who worked received pay and that LOTFA funds were used to reimburse only eligible ANP costs.

The MoI is developing personnel and payroll systems to support the ANP. Current efforts to account for, automate, and centralize all personnel and payroll data and records will further aid the sustainment of ANP. However, the MoI will continue to face challenges gathering personnel and payroll data, centralizing the data within a system, and integrating into other systems until long-standing issues with security, infrastructure, and coordination are addressed.
Counting the Police: As of September 30, 2010

Table 1: Number of ANP Human Resource/Personnel Records as of September 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of ANP Human Resource/Personnel Data</th>
<th>No. of ANP Records</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manual MoI human resource records</td>
<td>111,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel identification card/registration database</td>
<td>125,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSTAT report - Assigned(^a)</td>
<td>120,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS)</td>
<td>113,225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MoI Human Resources and Biometric Center.

Note: \(^a\) Does not include more than 8,100 non-*tashkil* ANP that are reported by MoI Human Resources.

Table 2: Number of Registered ANP and Status of HRIS database as of September 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP Rank</th>
<th>Identification Card/Registration Database</th>
<th>HRIS</th>
<th>Not Yet Included in HRIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>22,698</td>
<td>16,709</td>
<td>5,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>25,761</td>
<td>7,556</td>
<td>18,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolmen</td>
<td>76,759</td>
<td>76,759</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>125,218</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,265</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,953</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MoI Registration ID Unit.

Note: Total includes 1,700 officers and sergeants in both databases but no longer on the force.
ANP Partnering and Operational Effectiveness

Development of the ANP continues, with particular focus on increasing the operational effectiveness of the force. Development of the AUP fielded force continues to be a challenge.

One unit is assessed as "Independent", six as "Effective with Advisors" and "Effective with Assistance", with seven still "Dependent on Coalition Forces for Success" as shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8: ANP Operational Effectiveness (September 2010)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective w/ Advisors</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective w/ Assistance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent on CF For Success</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corruption and the perception of corruption continue to negatively affect the reputation of the AUP among the Afghan population. Only a few areas have positive popular perception ratings of the AUP.

Despite some efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to eliminate corruption and improve rule of law, overwhelming reports of corruption continue. If corruption activities continue to go unchecked at current levels, they threaten to keep the population separated from the government. Corruption at the provincial headquarters and district headquarters (PHQ/DHQ) level negatively affect the trust of the populace.

However, as Table 6 shows, 16 of 17 AUP provincial headquarters are partnered (94 percent) and 74 of 81 (91 percent) key terrain district units are covered, meaning they have some form of partnering or mentoring.

As of late September, U.S. law enforcement advisors were embedded to provide intensive, on-the-job, subject matter expertise for partnered ANP units in key terrain districts. We do not have data on police in non-key terrain provinces. The territorial organization of the ANP mirrors that of the ANA Corps. The AUP are arrayed in six zones with 19 Provinces with either key terrain districts or area of interest districts.

HQ ISAF polling from June 27, 2010 indicates that people perceive improvement on security due to AUP in last 6 months in the following percentages: Badakshan (80 percent), Badghis (77 percent), Panjshir and Sar-e Pul (59 percent both), Laghman (58 percent), Parwan (56 percent), Faryab (55 percent), Samangan (54 percent), Balkh (51 percent).
ANP Capability in the Field as of 23/2/2011

Afghan Uniformed Police: Districts and Precincts

Army Kandaks Assessment

Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool Ratings

As of 14 Apr 11
Next ANSF assessment available on 2 June 2011

Source: ISAF, May 2011
In March 2011, 225 out of 268 (83 percent) priority ANP units across Afghanistan were partnered.

There are three descriptive terms used to describe the various types of partnering and mentorship. “Embedded partnering” is the most intensive form of partnering, where the ANA or ANP share the same battle space with their ISAF partners and live on the same installation. Embedded partnering results in a unified, combined force with Afghans often in the lead; builds trusting relationships quickly based on shared risks and responsibilities; capitalizes on the combined team’s strengths and offsets each other’s weaknesses; and allows the population to see coalition forces as supporting (not leading) ANSF. Embedded partnering is arguably the most effective training approach; however, it requires a greater number of ISAF troops to support and is typically leveraged for Afghan units that require additional training assistance. Ideally, as Afghan units become more capable, independent, and effective, the intensity of partnering relationships is not as critical, and the same objectives can be achieved through regular partnering or mentoring.

“Partnering” describes a specific form of combined operations. Specifically, a “partnered” unit describes an assigned relationship between an ISAF unit and an ANSF unit where both share the same battle space but do not live together. The ISAF partner unit shares the goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF unit, but also works together with the ANSF to defeat the insurgency. The ISAF partner unit shares comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, and intelligence with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership includes an active mentoring role and primary oversight responsibility. Proximity enables partnered units to establish a deeper personal and working relationship that allows them to plan, train, and coordinate operations, and to support one another in accomplishing assigned tasks.

“Mentoring” refers to an assigned relationship between an Afghan unit and an ISAF advisory team – typically called an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) for ANA units and a Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (POMLT) for ANP units. The ISAF partner unit shares no operations guidance, strategy, information or intelligence with its ANSF counterpart. Still, while not as focused as partnering or embedded partnering, the mentoring relationship is still extremely valuable. It is normally applied for Afghan units that, while capable, still require advanced professional development and advice in the field, as well as enabler support. Each POMLT and OMLT is normally deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum of six months. POMLTS are typically composed of 15-20 personnel and OMLTs are typically composed of 11-28 personnel (depending on the type and function of the partnered ANA unit).

The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and the Afghan Border Police (ABP). Generally, the AUP train and perform traditional community policing functions. In contrast, ANCOP undergo more intense training, are better armed, are deployable around the country, and have a paramilitary capability that makes them uniquely well-suited for COIN operations. Finally, ABP perform border control and customs functions.

The number of assessed AUP units has increased. Of the priority AUP field units assessed (those that are not headquarters), 52 of 152 were rated as “Effective with Advisors”; and 65 were rated as “Effective with Assistance” (Figure 17). During the most recent CUAT cycle, there was only one unassessed partnered unit because it was new. The overall trend in effectiveness for ANCOP kandaks is improving with fewer unassessed units and more units rated “Effective with Advisors.” The number of units with this rating has increased from three to ten since September 2010 (Figure 17). Moreover, this year over 20 additional ANCOP units will thicken as personnel now in the training pipeline join their assigned units.

The trends are also positive within the ABP, with more units reporting via the CUAT. Eight out of 34 ABP kandaks are currently rated as “Effective with Advisors”; and 14 are rated as “Effective with Assistance.” There are currently four unassessed ABP units from RC-South. Partners should join these units in summer 2011.

Police Training Centers

- Officer Training
  - Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)
  - Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
  - Afghan Border Police (ABP)

- Training Sites with multiple courses:
  - ANCOP, AUP, Speciality Courses

2009 Training Capacity: 7,740
2010 Training Capacity: 13,631
2011 Training Capacity: 20,980

Personnel assigned to CTAG-P: 847
Afghan Trainers: 1147
Number of Training Centers: 37
Average Concurrent Courses: 59
Training Seats: 11,252
Current percent fill: 87%

Average of 8.5K Police Under Training Every Day
ANP Training Comparison: 2009-2010

Developing the systems and institutions to professionalize and grow the force
ANP Developments

ANP TRAINING GRADUATES BY PROGRAM

Graduates: 10,974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic &amp;</td>
<td>2,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSA Cycle</td>
<td>1,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP Basic and NCO</td>
<td>1,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer’s Course (6-month)</td>
<td>1,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused Border Development Basic</td>
<td>932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused District Development</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Police Basic and NCO</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Specialized Training</td>
<td>1,732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ANP WEAPONS FIELDED

Total Weapons: 6,821

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon System</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9MM Rndgpin</td>
<td>2,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47 Assault Rifle</td>
<td>3,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Weapon Systems</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP-25/30 Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPK Machine Gun</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKM Machine Gun</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7 Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSHK Heavy Machine Gun</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These weapons were transferred to ANP forces from 4/1/2010 to 6/23/2010.

ANP RADIOS AND VEHICLES FIELDED

Vehicles
- Light and medium tactical vehicles: 988
- Up-armed HMMWV: 818

Radars
- VHF radios: 1,531
- HF radios: 119

Note: Up-armed HMMWVs include M1151, M1152, and M1152 ambulance models. Very High Frequency (VHF) radios include various configurations of Motorola or ICOM radio systems. High Frequency (HF) radios include various configurations of CODAN radio systems.


Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 62-64
Infrastructure, equipment, local acquisition, contract management, funding, logistics, and maintenance are on track but challenges remain.
Local security programs supporting the Afghan Government have been successful in protecting remote area populations, preventing their exploitation by the insurgency, and expanding government influence. These programs integrate bottom-up village and district defense systems, and serve as a complement to top-down, national-level ANSF development. U.S. Special Operations Forces launched the VSO initiative in early 2010, and in September 2010, the Ministry of Interior assumed control of the ALP initiative. The two programs are complementary, and the insurgency increasingly views them as a significant threat to their ability to influence the population.

**VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS**

The VSO initiative is a bottom-up Afghan Ministry of Interior program that facilitates local security and development at the village level, connecting the local population to district governance. VSO is grounded in the tradition of rural Afghan villages providing for their own security, and focuses on Afghan communities with the will but not the means to resist the insurgency through grass-roots initiatives, especially in areas that have limited ANSF and ISAF presence.

The VSO model uses Afghan and ISAF personnel living in the community full-time to help improve security, governance, and development in more remote areas of Afghanistan. The VSO initiative follows a four-phase process: shape, hold, build, and transition. The shape phase begins with an assessment of the village and surrounding area and ends with the establishment of a U.S. special operations force VSO site within the village. This phase is characterized by the building of rapport, trust, and relationships. During the hold phase, VSO personnel focus on protecting the population and laying the foundation for follow-on development and governance efforts.

The build phase links villages to district and provincial governments through institutional arrangements, such as district and provincial *shuras* and carefully-designed and managed development projects using CERP funds and other resources. Finally, the transition phase expands the influence of village stability to other areas throughout the district, while transitioning responsibility for security, development, and governance to the Afghan Government.

**AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE**

President Karzai established the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program under the Afghan Ministry of Interior in August 2010. The program incorporated previous village-level defensive programs, e.g., the Community Defense and Local Defense Initiatives. The ALP program is a village-focused program that enhances COIN efforts by enabling rural areas with limited or no ANSF presence to provide for their own local security.

The ALP program is a complement to the VSO program. Although not all VSO sites have ALP programs, all current ALP sites are part of an existing VSO. The U.S. Government supports the ALP through ASFF funding to the Ministry of Interior and through training and technical assistance. The program is overseen by the Afghan Government and jointly executed by U.S. and Afghan Special Forces.

District ALP sites fall under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior and thus are under the authority of the given district’s chief of police, who oversees both the ALP site training and validation process in addition to the formal ALP member screening process. ALP members are nominated by a representative local *shura*, are vetted by the Afghan intelligence service, and are trained by and partnered with designated U.S. forces. Currently, the Afghan Government has a *tashkil* authority for 10,000 personnel for the ALP. As of March 31, 2011, there are 34 validated/operational districts, 29 districts pending validation, and 14 pending MoI approval for ALP elements.

Continued expansion and success of the ALP program faces several challenges. The Taliban and other insurgent groups have attempted to counter ALP growth and success with a campaign that includes targeted assassinations, night letters, intimidation, and kidnappings. There are also several areas where intra-tribal and inter-tribal tensions have prevented expansion of the ALP.

Even so, the impact of ALP on promoting local security and eroding insurgent influence is significant. Recognizing this, COMISAF, in December 2010, placed a conventional U.S. Army infantry battalion, 1-16 Infantry, under the operational control of Combined Forces Special Operations Command Center – Afghanistan to expand the ALP program rapidly. The increase of the ALP authorization from 10,000 to 30,000 is an integral part of the COIN campaign, complements the gains made by conventional ISAF and ANSF forces and will help facilitate irreversible transition.

ANP vs. Functioning Justice System: Detention Issues

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, pp. 83
CONVICTS IN PROVINCIAL PRISONS, AS OF JUNE 30, 2010


Notes: Numbers are averages. Minimum acceptable one-person space (5.5 m²) determined by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Source: AHRC, "The Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan," 6/27/2010, pp. 7-8.

Overcrowding of Prison Facilities

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, pp. 82-84
**Afghan Views of ANP: 2009 vs. 2010**

### Favorable Views of the ANP: Regional Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Year ago</th>
<th>Now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kabul</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central/Hazarjat</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### % Saying ANP Ensure Security in their Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Year ago</th>
<th>Now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kabul</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South central</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central/Hazarjat</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Presence of and Attitudes Towards the ANP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>ANP has strong presence</th>
<th>Confidence in ANP</th>
<th>Respect for ANP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### % Saying the ANP is Capable of Dealing with...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Year ago</th>
<th>Now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small crime</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized crime</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afghan Views of Police Activity: 2009 vs. 2010

Afghans divide in perceptions of primary police functions in their community – 32 percent say, the ANP is chiefly performing law-enforcement and crime fighting duties, 30 percent primarily see the ANP performing counter-insurgency duties and 31 percent say, the force is doing both equally. This has shifted since last year, when more (38 percent) said that police were engaged in law enforcement duties than in counter-insurgency obligations (24 percent). There is a perception that police increasingly have competing responsibilities related to counter insurgency, which conflicts with traditional law and order activities.

Counter insurgency responsibilities are higher in the South, where the fighting is centered. In the South West, for example, 59 percent say that the ANP primarily is working as a counter insurgency force, a jump of 15 points since last year. Only 22 percent in the South West say that the police are focused mainly on law-enforcement and crime fighting duties.

In a separate question asking to what extent the police are engaged in fighting insurgents, more than three-quarters of Afghans (76 percent) report that the ANP in their area are involved in fighting insurgents “a great deal” or “somewhat” (unchanged since last year). But a majority (55 percent) thinks that they should be spending even more time fighting insurgents. Only 10 percent think they should do this activity less.

Seven in 10 report that the ANP in their area are involved in investigating routine non-violent and violent crime; only 15 percent think that the police should spend less time investigating these routine crimes, with the rest about evenly split on whether they should spend more time or are spending the right amount.

Sixty-five percent also report that the ANP in their area are involved in fighting organized crime, the same as a year ago. Roughly 6 in 10 report that the police are involved in preventing inter-ethnic and inter-tribal violence (up 4 points since last year); fighting the narcotics trade (unchanged); eradicating poppy (down 4 points); and fighting corruption (up 5 points). For each of these activities, more than 4 in 10 say that the police should be spending more time on them, and fewer than 20 percent think that they should be spending less time.

Finally, 58 percent report that the ANP in their area are involved with preventing violence against women in their area. Thirty-six percent of Afghans think that the police should spend more time on this activity; 20 percent say less time.
Afghan Views of Police Quality: 2009 vs. 2010

Most Afghans, 82 percent, think that the police in their area understand the law, albeit with room for improvement; just 30 percent think that they understand it “very” well. Still, only 4 percent say that the police don’t understand the law well at all. It’s crucial: As reported, a sense that the police understand the law is the strongest single predictor of views of the ANP as effective.

Three-quarters also think that the police in their area understand what their duties are, 70 percent think that their local police are well-trained, 65 percent think that they are well-equipped, and 63 percent think that they are able to perform their duties without assistance from international forces.

However, less than a third say that the police are “very” well-trained, “very” well-equipped, or “very” well-prepared to take over duties from international forces, showing that further improvements are needed.

In terms of salaries, a majority (63 percent) of Afghans think that the police should be paid more than the teachers, which is similar to a question asked last year in which 66 percent also said that the police should be paid more. Furthermore, more Afghans think that the police should be paid more than the doctors, ANA members and other government workers than those who think that they should be paid less (doctors by 44-34 percent; ANA by 36-27 percent; government workers by 44-25). The issue of payment too, is important – three-quarters of Afghans think that if the police in their area were better paid by the government, there would be less corruption within the ranks.

In a separate question about police capability, 9 out of 10 Afghans see ANP officers in their area as capable of coping with small crime (44 percent “very” capable), stable since last year. Fewer but still two-thirds think that officers in their area are capable of coping with big, organized crime, also unchanged since last year – but only 21 percent say that their local police are “very” capable of dealing with this sort of crime, down 5 points. Sixty-two percent think that their local police are capable of coping with the insurgency, up 5 points since last year; but just 22 percent see the police as “very” capable in this area.
Afghan Trust in ANP: 2009 vs. 2010

Who would you turn to first to report the following crimes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>ANP</th>
<th>District/provincial government</th>
<th>Elders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thefts</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic accidents</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault/threat</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual offences</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against women</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons For Not Reporting Crime to the ANP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Non-victim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It was not serious</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of trust</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn’t know where to report it</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danger or fear of retaliation</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of evidence</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bias in favor of the other party</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of Afghans Who Report Being the Victim of...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Victim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traffic accidents</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft/robbery/burglary</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land ownership/rights/offences</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assaults/threats</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANP Corruption Remains Critical, But Must Be Kept in Context

A majority of Afghans – 65 percent – define payment in exchange for favorable treatment as corruption. But nearly 3 in 10 think that whether this constitutes corruption depends on the situation, and 6 percent see it as acceptable behavior. This ambiguity may complicate efforts to attack the problem.

Regardless of its acceptability to some Afghans in some circumstances, perceptions of corruption are widespread. Eighty-five percent think, there is corruption among government employees in Afghanistan. Fewer see corruption in the ANP – but still 60 percent report corruption (“a lot of” 22 percent, or “some” 38 percent) among the police. Substantially fewer think there is corruption among ANA members, 42 percent; or among teachers in Afghanistan, 40 percent.

Despite the many positive indicators, many Afghans see substantial room for improvement by the police. In terms of direct corruption, 16 percent say, they or someone in their family have been asked by a police officer for money or a gift to avoid an arrest or fine; 12 percent say, they have been asked for money or a gift in order to receive police protection for their business or home; and 13 percent say, they have been asked for a bribe for some other reason. Twenty-six percent say, they or someone in their family have experienced at least one of these. In the South West, reports of bribes rise dramatically, with at least 40 percent reporting that they have been asked for each of the types of bribes measured.

Afghans have the lowest confidence in their local police’s ability to deal with corruption. Fifty-five percent rate them as either “somewhat” or “very” capable of dealing with this issue. Far fewer call their police “very” capable in this domain compared to last year, just 17 percent, and down 7 points since last year.

In a separate question that asked respondents to choose whether the ANP are mainly honest or corrupt, more than three-quarters of Afghans said that the ANP were “entirely” or “mostly” honest; however just 21 percent took the top rating, “entirely honest.” (Far fewer, 3 percent, said, they were “entirely corrupt.”) Combined with the previous result, this suggests that Afghans see corruption within the force as significant, but perhaps more limited to a circumscribed set of bad actors, rather than endemic.

In the most positive note on this issue, only 8 percent of Afghans say, the ANP have become more corrupt in the last year, while more than three times as many say, they have become more honest. The rest see no change.

ANP are Limited by a Failed Justice System and Lack of Rule of Law

Notably, Afghans by more than a 20-point margin think that corruption in their area is more an issue among the courts that enforce justice (57 percent) than it is among the police force (36 percent). Also, by 55-39 percent, more say, the police are doing their jobs and it is the fault of the courts that more criminals are not brought to justice, than vice versa. Given the shared role of the police and the courts in the criminal justice system, these results suggest that efforts to strengthen the rule of law sector would be well-served by a complimentary focus on the court system, together with the performance of the ANP.

Regional differences come into play, particularly in the South West. There, respondents divide evenly on whether they think corruption is a bigger problem among the ANP in their area (49 percent) or the courts (50 percent). Moreover, the South West is the only region where people are more apt to believe that the courts are doing their job and it is the fault of the police that more criminals are not brought to justice (59 percent) than the reverse (41 percent).

…Overall, 76 percent say, the central government has a strong presence in their area, 73 percent say, the district government has a strong presence, 67 percent say, the ANA has a strong presence, and 54 percent say, the courts have a strong presence in their area. These compare with 80 percent who say, the police have a strong local presence. As noted, presence of the police is one of the two strongest independent factors in viewing the ANP favorable.
Shaping Transition

Progress with the Afghan Local Police
Afghan Perceptions of Potential Advantage of Local Police/ALP Presence

Access to police and to other public facilities in Afghanistan is up across the board, a reflection of the reconstruction efforts being brought to bear.

Just more than half of Afghans (52 percent) now are within a half-hour of a police station, a jump of 11 points since last year. And while last year 28 percent of Afghans lived more than an hour from a police station, that number has now dropped to just 18 percent. Proximity to police independently predicts favorability ratings of the ANP, but not its effectiveness or confidence scores.

...Fewer than one in five Afghans say, local watch groups supported by the police have been established in their area, but where they have been created these groups had shown success: Among those who have such a group locally, 61 percent say, it has improved security. Far fewer, 28 percent, say that it has had no impact, or say that it has made security worse (9 percent).

More broadly, in the country as a whole, 51 percent think that police-supported local watch groups would help improve security in their area. While this is unchanged since last year, there are regional differences. The perception that watch groups are helpful for security has dropped in the South West, West and North, by 10, 11 and 7 points, respectively. This has been offset, however, by a 20-point jump in the Central/Hazarjat region.

Also, only 8 percent now think that these groups would make security worse, a drop of 10 points, and one that has occurred in almost every region. And in another positive note, among those who think watch groups could improve security, 80 percent say, they would be willing to become a member of this type of group, unchanged since last year.
Afghan Local Police Status

As of 19 May 11

More than 6,000 Official ALP Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Color</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>GIRoA-Validated/Operational</td>
<td>green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Tashkil signed, pending validation</td>
<td>yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Pending MOI Approval</td>
<td>red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Total Operational/Emerging Sites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Experts
Shaping Transition

Progress with the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
ANCOP Unit Strengths: SY1390

1st Bde Overall: 97%
HQ Kabul 99%
SSB Kabul 94%
1st BN Kabul 97%
2nd BN Kabul 103%
3rd BN Baghlan 97%
4th BN (47co) Laghman 98%
5th BN (47co) Jalalabad 95%
6th BN Konduz 99%
7th BN (4 co) Wardak 93%
8th BN MeS 100%

4th Bde Overall: 93%
HQ Gardez 93%
SSB Gardez 95%
1st BN Gardez 94%
2nd BN Ghazni 94%
3rd BN Sharana 76%
4th BN Gardez 102%

Continued ANCOP growth (+775); Executing 4th Company Thickening.
ANCOP NCO Summary: SY1390

Attrition Goals:
- 1st QTR FY11: 50% Achieved: 43.0%
- 2nd QTR FY11: 35% Achieved: 35.8%
- 3rd QTR FY11: 30%
- 4th QTR FY11: 22%

Projected to field 6th Brigade (NCOs) by February 2012
Shaping Transition

Looking Towards the Future of the ANSF
Setting a Realistic Campaign Timeline: Success Requires a Sustained Effort Long Beyond 2011 or 2014

- Proof that new strategy and tactics work is possible by mid-2011
- Major transition to ANSF should not begin until force is ready -- probably late 2012 at earliest.
- Slow phase down of US troops must be conditions based.
- Foreign aid and continued funding of most ANSF costs probably needed well beyond 2015.