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Can Afghan Forces Be Effective in Transition?

*Afghanistan and the Uncertain Metrics of
Progress : Part Five*

Anthony H. Cordesman

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Photo: Paula Bronstein/Getty Images

Emeritus Chair
In Strategy

The Seven Part Analysis of the War

The Burke Chair has prepared a seven-part analytic overview of unclassified metrics, and of their current content relates to the challenges in policy, plans, resources, and management of the war that now shape the prospects of victory. It should be stressed that such an analysis is only a way of flagging key trends and developments within the limits imposed by using unclassified official reporting. Moreover, metrics are not a substitute for the kind of narrative that is critical to understand the complexity of this war, and put numbers, charts, and maps in context. This is a case where facing the real-world complexity of the conflict is essential to winning it.

An overview of the strengths and weakness of unclassified metrics does, however, provide considerable insight into what is known about the war, and the many areas where meaningful reporting is lacking and the reporting available is deceptive and misleading. This is particularly true in the case of the metrics and narratives available on the ANSF, which represent the one area where the US, ISAF, and other sources have not sharply reduced the amount of unclassified data since mid-2010.

Part Five: Hold and Build, and the Challenge of Development

This report highlights the progress and challenges in creating the Afghan national security forces necessary to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents and allow a transition in which Afghanistan assumes responsibility for most military, internal security and police action.

The metrics in this section portray major progress in proving adequate funding for the Afghan National Security Forces, (ANSF) and in creating an effective training base and operation to support the creation of forces necessary to do the job. These improvement increasingly affect force quality as well as force quantity – although the increase in numbers still outpaces the improvements in quality.

At the same time, Afghan force development is moving at a pace that will require large numbers of trainers and partners, and substantial US and other outside funding and support well beyond 2014, and it is not yet clear whether the ANSF can really transition to a self-supporting force until after 2020.. There are key shortfalls in foreign trainers and in partners for the police. Efforts to crease fully balance forces with adequate leadership command structures, and logistics/sustainability are just being put in place, Equipment and infrastructure are still being developed. Above all, it is too early to judge how well ANSF units will

perform without ISAF aid

Shaping Transition: Creating an Effective ANSF and Laying the Groundwork for Transition

The key factor shaping the pace of current progress is the lack of resources through 2009. The charts on aid spending at the start of this report show that no serious effort was made to fund the creation of the ANSF until FY2007, that these funding streams were erratic in FY2008, and funding of the scale of effort required did not begin until FY2010 – nearly a decade after the war began. This gross strategic negligence was compounded by a failure to provide even minimally adequate numbers of trainers until CY2010, and a matching failure to provide adequate basic equipment and facilities.

The responsibility for these failures lies largely with the US and occurred at the highest level of US national security decision-making in spite of warning and requests from at least one US Ambassador and senior commander.

A matching failure may still be coming. A political emphasis on getting enough Afghan forces for “transition” in 2011-2014 tends to force an emphasis on numbers, rather than force quality and creating a force that can retain the manpower it needs and operate as a balance forces without major US and ISAF support. Moreover, this form of transition omits the fact that the US and NATO must fund the ANSF indefinitely into the future and well beyond 2020. More broadly there are growing pressure to cut funding aid to the ANSF. This risks becoming a “worst of both worlds” approach to creating and funding a lasting ANSF capability.

Shaping Transition: Racing Towards Larger Forces

The creation of effective Afghan forces is critical to providing security and the “clear and hold” phase of the war on a national level. It is equally critical to allowing “build” to provide stability, prompt justice, governance, and a functioning economy, as well as some form of transition where Afghan forces replace US and ISAF forces.

The charts in this section show impressive progress in setting force goals large enough to do the job and in creating larger force numbers. They also, however, show how rushed some aspects of basic training process is, how critical it is to have highly qualified Afghan and foreign trainers, and that a force expansion this large depends on partner units to provide the experience and mentoring necessary to make up for so rushed a training process.

More detailed NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) data also show that attrition is still a problem in spite of recent pay increases – in part because forces are overcommitted and have not previously had proper opportunity for leave and recovery/follow-on training. This is now being corrected.

The full impact of such pressures only become apparent after regular training is completed. They make it absolutely essential to objectively measure quality and retention once units are in the field, and make the results transparent so they can be used to plan a workable and enduring transition.

Shaping Transition: A Crisis in Trainer Numbers and Quality and No Meaningful Data on Partners

NTM-A has created what seems to be solid training base for creating the kind of Afghan National Army needed for transition. There also is a steady increase in the number of Afghan training Afghans and Afghan combat elements that can operate with minimal outside support. As its data show, however, it is badly short of the foreign trainers it needs to succeed. Moreover, some estimates count pledged trainers as if they were there, and it is clear from the NTM-A figures that getting the right trainer quality will increasingly be more critical than simply increasing trainer numbers.

NTM-A does report ongoing progress, but some of this progress is in the number of pledged trainers, rather than trainers actually on the scene. It still seems to be short over 30% of critical trainers and over 50% of trainers overall – even if ISAF military with little prior training experience are counted as trainers. Moreover, time is critical as long as either 2010 or 2014 are treated as any form of deadline.

The data on these areas for the regular armed forces is not matched by similar detailed reporting on trainers for the various elements of the police forces.

Moreover, NTM-A is not responsible for partnering, and counting the quality of partners and partnering efforts. This is a critical omission in the metrics available on the ANSF.

Shaping Transition: The Afghan National Army (ANA): Much Better Data on Numbers than Quality and Endurance

Recent reports show a steady growth in the size of the Afghan Army and Air Force, and in many key qualitative aspects of formal

training. The critical problem is that there is no matching mix of transparent, credible metrics and narratives on the quality and effectiveness of any element of Afghan forces once they leave formal training and enter the field, and no meaningful data on the quality of the partnering they need to succeed.

The effectiveness measures that are reported on the ANA measure formal training and equipment resources and not performance in the field. Uncertain loyalties, ties to power brokers, retention and attrition problems, corruption are not addressed. A new rating system is supposed to have been developed, but its value and realism is not yet clear, and there are reports that provinces are being rate – sometimes favorably – on the basis of grossly inadequate coverage of a few districts.

The current and projected real world capability to support the new strategy and support transition is not rated or analyzed in objective terms. Even so, the ratings that are provided in the latest Department of Defense semiannual report (November 2010)

Shaping Transition: The Afghan National Police (ANP): Numbers that Disguise Major Problems in Quality, Ties to Power Brokers and Corruption

Once again, NTM-A provides data that shows the steady growth of the police force, and real progress in creating more effective training system. Some manpower data do, however, lump together the different elements of the police force do -- like the data on the ANA – highlight some of the problems in retention. The data do not, break out progress by element of the police, or spotlight the failure to expand the Afghan National Civil Order Police to anything like the needed goal. ISAF indicates this critical paramilitary element of the police needs to be over four times its current strength.

Far more realism is needed in measuring police force quality – particularly because corruption and ties to powerbrokers crippled the effectiveness of much of the police. Moreover, current rating systems do nothing to link the analysis of the police effort to the presence and effectiveness of the rest of the justice system and the presence of effective governance. The end result is that current effectiveness ratings that are virtually meaningless if the police are to play a key role in “hold, build, and transition” and free the Afghan Army to perform its military mission.

The ANP also present more of a challenge than the ANP. ISAF initially tried to create a police force based on German models that were hopelessly underresourced and did not meet Afghan needs and values. This failure was followed by an equaled

underresourced effort by the US State Department that largely ignored the fact that insurgent influence now required a police that could deal with guerrilla warfare. A third transfer of effort then occurred to the US Department of Defense, which began to set more realistic goals for paramilitary and self-defense capability, but was never properly resourced and effectively increase the burden on the ISAF and US military training effort. The police training and expansion effort remained decoupled from a rule of law effort that focused narrowly on creating a new formal justice system at the top. This allowed the Taliban and local power brokers to become the de facto system for local justices. Courts and jails were often lacking or unable to operate.

All of these problems are now being corrected. The rule of law effort is being changed to emphasize putting the informal justice system to the formal system by giving GIRoA a role in validating decisions made by the informal justice system. There is also far more emphasis on creating an effective justice system at the local level through cooperation between the Afghan Local Police, ANP, village and local Shuras, and District officials.

The Afghan Local Police effort is closely tied to aid efforts in governance and development, as well as linked to the ANP, the MoI, and potential career opportunities for ALP personnel to join the ANP. Unlike the Sons of Iraq, the effort is managed through the MoI, and not funded directly by ISAF.

Moreover, steps are being taken to end the lack of effective local governance in many Districts and Sub-Districts – an improvement which is an essential element in winning support for police and a justice system. The past lack of such a presence in many areas has meant all three elements of an effective justice system have not been actively present in much of the country – compounding the problems created by corruption, power brokers, and ethnic, sectarian, and tribal friction..

Shaping Transition Looking Towards the Future of the ANSF

This progress is still uncertain and much depends on whether the US and its allies will have the strategic patience to continue to fund and support the effort to 2014 and for many years afterwards. Better metrics and analysis are still needed to rate the creation and effectiveness of police forces – and that address problems like ties to power brokers, insurgents, and local factions, and the level of corruption, the problem of extortion and the abuse of power.


Most important, there is a need to provide clearly defined transition goals for the ANSF, and unclassified reporting does not post-2014 force goals for ANSF development. Moreover, planning is needed to identify the number of trainers and supporting forces that must remain after 2014, and the budget needed to support the ANSF after 2015.

Shaping Transition

Creating an Effective ANSF and Laying the Groundwork for Transition


Afghan Force Goals vs. Afghan Violence: 2004-2010

Number of average daily attacks per month




Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Giving Iraqi Security Forces Priority Over Afghan Forces through FY2007




Source: Adapted by Jordan D' Amato from data provided by Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Congressional Research Services (RL33110). Updated, 16 July 2010.


Erratic Funding Until Half of All US Aid Goes to ANSF



ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA
By Sub-Activity Group,
FY 2005–June 30, 2010 (\$ BILLIONS)



ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP
By Sub-Activity Group,
FY 2005–June 30, 2010 (\$ BILLIONS)



As of June 30, 2010, nearly \$25.23 billion had been appropriated to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) for building the ANSF- almost 49.0% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. DoD reported that of this amount, more than \$21.83 billion had been obligated, of which nearly \$20.79 billion had been disbursed.⁶ Figure 3.4 displays the amounts made available for the ASFF by fiscal year. DoD reported that cumulative obligations as of June 30, 2010, increased by more than \$1.56 billion over cumulative obligations as of March 31, 2010. Cumulative disbursements as of June 30, 2010, increased by nearly \$2.37 billion over cumulative disbursements as of March 31, 2010.

As of June 30, 2010, DoD had disbursed nearly \$20.79 billion for ANSF initiatives. Of this amount, nearly \$13.62 billion was disbursed for the ANA and nearly \$7.08 billion for the ANP; the remaining \$0.09 billion was directed to related activities.¹⁰ As shown in Figure 3.6, of the funds disbursed for the ANA, the largest portion -- nearly \$6.25 billion -- supported Equipment and Transportation. Of the funds disbursed for the ANP, the largest portion -- nearly \$1.94 billion -- also supported Equipment and Transportation.

Only Properly Fund Balanced Force Development Beginning in FY2010




Figure 11. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Budget from Fiscal Year 2005 to Fiscal Year 2011.





Figure 12. Infrastructure Program for 305K Afghan National Security Force.

Political Challenge Raised by Rising Cost of US Military Operations and ANSF Development

(In Current \$US Billions)



Source: CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook, Fiscal Years 2011-2021, January 2011, p. 77, and Department of Defense FY2011 and FY2012 defense budget summaries.

State and DoD Funding of ANA Training: 2002-2011


Dollars in millions											
Agency	Fiscal years										Total ^a
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011 request	
DOD	\$2.0	\$165.0	\$283.2	\$1,317.5	\$766.1	\$4,883.1	\$1,786.2	\$4,073.6	\$5,604.1	\$7,532.9	\$26,413.6
State	\$74.7	\$191.6	\$434.4	\$413.3	\$1.0	\$1.2	\$1.7	\$1.4	\$1.5	\$1.5	\$1,122.2
Total	\$76.7	\$356.6	\$717.5	\$1,730.8	\$767.1	\$4,884.3	\$1,787.9	\$4,075.0	\$5,605.6	\$7,534.4	\$27,535.7

In addition to funding allocated for ANA development, DOD has donated about \$30 million in excess defense articles to the ANA since fiscal year 2003. Items donated include trucks and personnel carriers. These figures do not include certain operational costs, such as the personnel costs for U.S. service members assigned to the ANA development mission. Totals may not add due to rounding. Funding includes detainee operations. Totals include funding from a variety of DOD and State sources. Figures for fiscal years 2002 through 2006 consist of funding appropriated into several different accounts, while those for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 consist solely of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and International Military Training and Education funds.

- From fiscal years 2002 through 2010, DOD and State allocated about \$20 billion¹⁰ in support of the ANA. DOD and State have requested an additional \$7.5 billion in fiscal year 2011
- Of the approximately \$20 billion in U.S. funding allocated to date, about \$17.9 billion, or nearly 90 percent, has come from the DOD-managed Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.
- Since its creation in fiscal year 2005, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund has supported a variety of activities related to ANA development in the following four categories:
 - equipment and transportation, including procurement of weapons, vehicles, and communications items;¹¹
 - infrastructure projects, such as construction of garrisons, depots, and training facilities;
 - training and operation, such as establishment of training institutions and hiring of contractors to provide specialized training; and
 - sustainment, including salary payments and maintenance of vehicles and facilities.
- Of the \$17.9 billion in Afghanistan Security Forces Fund monies allocated to date, the largest portion—about \$7.0 billion, or 39 percent—has been directed toward equipment purchases.

The Rising Cost of ANSF Development

(In Current \$US Billions)



The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) directly supports funding to grow, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. For FY 2010, Congress appropriated \$9.2B for the ASFF, which is available through the end of FY2011. As of March 31, 2011, CSTC-A had obligated 85 percent of this amount. In addition, NATO contributions into the ASFF totaled \$100M. In February 2011, President Obama requested \$12.8B in the FY2012 budget to continue to equip and sustain the ANSF. These funds are essential to the building, training, equipping, and fielding of the security forces. ASFF funds are allocated for the ANA, ANP, and related activities, and then are further broken down into infrastructure, equipment, training, and sustainment. As the ANSF grow, NTM-A/CSTC-A will focus its attention on investment accounts (infrastructure and equipment). Going forward, though, operation accounts (training and sustainment) will become increasingly more important. As part of the transparency effort associated with these funds, the Government Accountability Office, DoD Inspector General, and the SIGAR currently have 20 audits ongoing that are in various states of completion.

- Source: CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook, Fiscal Years 2011-2021, January 2011, p. 77, and Department of Defense FY2011 and FY2012 defense budget summaries; . Source: DoD, "Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan; US Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces, Section 1203 Report, April 2011, p. 41.

ANSF Trust Fund Activity 2010

NATO Trust Fund Balances		
	Euro Balance	US Balance
CY10 Starting Balance	7.88 €	\$10.3M
Donations Received CY11	0.00 €	\$0.0M
Accrued Interest on NATO Account	0.00 €	\$0.5M
Less Project Transfers CY11	0.00 €	\$0.0M
Remaining Fund Balance	7.88 €	\$10.3M

NATO Sustainment Fund Balances		
	Euro Balance	US Balance
CY10 Starting Balance	101.97€	\$134.1M
Donations Received CY11	25.85 €	\$33.8M
Less Project Transfers CY11	22.06 €	\$ 29.6M
Remaining Fund Balance	105.76€	\$138.3M


The international community also provides funding for the ANSF. In September 2009, the North Atlantic Council agreed to expand the NATO ANA Trust Fund beyond the limitations of ANA development to include funding for sustainment costs. Several nations have provided significant contributions to the NATO ANA Sustainment Trust Fund, totaling approximately \$312M. Funds are transferred from the NATO ANA Sustainment Trust Fund to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund for execution. As of March 31, 2011, \$0.1B has been transferred from NATO into the ASFF.

Funding for police salaries, as well as other police development programs is supported by the United Nations Development Program, which oversees the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA). From 2002-2010, the international community donated approximately \$1.74B to LOTFA – \$620M was contributed by the United States. The United States is currently working with NATO to expand the NATO ANA Sustainment Trust Fund to also include donations for police and for ANSF literacy programs.

Afghan Inability to Fund the ANSF and Other Costs

The Afghan government budgeted about \$290 million in solar year 138934 for the ANA— nearly one-fifth of the nation's projected total revenues of \$1.5 billion for the year, and an increase of about 17 percent from the approximately \$250 million budgeted for the ANA the prior year. By comparison, however, annual U.S. funding for ANA sustainment has exceeded \$650 million every year since fiscal year 2007 and rose to \$1.9 billion in fiscal year 2010

U.S. dollars in billions



Sources: GAO analysis of Afghan Ministry of Finance and Afghan National Development Strategy data.

Note: Revenues and expenditures shown for 2008-09 and 2009-10 are actual figures. Data shown for 2010-11 are budget figures, and data shown for 2011-12 and 2012-13 are projections.

DOD officials stated that they had not reviewed NTM-A/CSTC-A's analysis and did not consider the resulting estimates to be official DOD figures on future sustainment costs. However, these officials said that they were unaware of any analysis DOD had conducted of how much ANA sustainment will cost. Similarly, while NATO documentation states that the amount of funding needed to sustain 171,600 ANA personnel is under analysis, an official at the U.S. Mission to NATO confirmed that no such analysis had been completed as of August 2010. To date, the United States has been the major contributor of sustainment funds for the ANA, with more than \$5 billion allocated since 2005. Officials at NTM-A/CSTC-A asserted that regardless of how much ANA sustainment costs, the total each year will be considerably less than the cost of maintaining a large U.S. and coalition troop presence in Afghanistan.

DOD budget documentation indicates that, beyond the \$7.5 billion requested in fiscal year 2011, no additional funding is needed to support the ANA's growth to 171,600.

According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, once the ANA reaches its current end goal, which has an October 2011 target date, the focus of funding efforts will turn to sustainment activities, such as salary payments and equipment replacement. However, as of August 2010, neither DOD nor NATO had completed an analysis of how much future funding will be needed to sustain the ANA. Prior GAO work has also found that DOD has not adequately analyzed future funding needed to sustain the ANSF.³¹ Furthermore, although DOD has produced a series of congressionally mandated reports since 2008 on the U.S. plan for sustaining the ANSF, these documents have not included estimates of the ANA's future sustainment costs.

While NTM-A/CSTC-A provided us with estimates indicating that sustainment of 171,600 ANA forces would cost between \$4.2 billion and \$4.5 billion annually from fiscal years 2012 through 2014.

Affordable or Unaffordable ANSF?

PROJECTED ANSF EXPENDITURES, 2008/09–2023/24				
	2008/09 ^a	2013/14	2018/19	2023/24
Expenditures by Security Force (\$ BILLIONS)				
ANA ^b	\$3.2	\$3.8	\$5.0	\$6.5
ANP ^c	\$1.5	\$1.7	\$2.1	\$2.7
Total	\$4.7	\$5.5	\$7.1	\$9.2
Expenditures Relative to Revenues (PERCENT)				
ANSF Expenditures as a Share of Projected GIRoA Domestic Revenues				
	449%	270%	195%	154%

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Includes operating and investment expenditures.


a. Estimated actual.

b. World Bank Manpower Level Assumptions: ANA strength increases to 240,000 by 2012/13; ANP strength increases to 160,000 by 2013/14. These differ from the troop levels agreed to at the January 2010 London Conference, which were 171,000 for the ANA and 134,000 for the ANP by October 2011.

c. Macroeconomic assumptions: Afghanistan's long-term GDP growth rate averages 6% annually; inflation decreases to 3% in 2012/13 and beyond; GIRoA domestic revenue rises to 13% of GDP by 2008/09.

Sources: World Bank/DfID, "Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Security Sector," pp. 23-24; DoD, "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," 4/2010, pp. 104, 115.

ESTIMATED DOMESTIC REVENUE COLLECTION, 2006/07–2009/10 (AF BILLIONS, \$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Figures are preliminary estimates. Af \$5 = \$1.

a. Projected figure, as of 4/10/2010.


Sources: Ministry of Finance; Da Afghanistan Bank.

Shaping Transition

**Perceptions of the ANSF Are
Mixed**


Perceptions of Security By District and in Travel

How is the security situation in your mantaqa?



"Good" – Mar 2011

0%~10%	
10%~20%	
20%~30%	
30%~40%	
40%~50%	
50%~60%	
60%~70%	
70%~	




How safe do you feel traveling outside your mantaqa during the day?



"Mostly/Completely Safe" – Mar 2011

0%~10%	
10%~20%	
20%~30%	
30%~40%	
40%~50%	
50%~60%	
60%~70%	
70%~	




Perceptions of Who is Winning

Who is winning the war: NATO and the Afghan government or the Taliban?

In nine of the fourteen research areas, more interviewees think NATO and Afghan Government forces are winning the war, as opposed to the Taliban insurgency.


Only in the districts of Panjwayi and Maiwand (both in Kandahar province), and the district of Garmsir in Helmand province, do more interviewees think the Taliban is winning the war. High numbers of respondents in southern Afghanistan either do not know or have no answer, while very few do not know or do not answer in northern Afghanistan.

Source: ICoS, Afghanistan Transition: The Death of Bin Laden and Local Dynamics, May 2011



Perceptions of Who is Causing Casualties

Who kills more civilians?



The majority of Afghan men interviewed in southern Afghanistan (69%) blame foreign forces for most civilian deaths, while 12% think that Afghan security forces kill more civilians than the Taliban. Only 10% of respondents think that the Taliban are responsible for a larger percentage of civilian deaths. This is contrary to UN assessments, which attribute 75% of civilian deaths to the insurgents and only 16% to both the international and Afghan forces.

Source: ICoS, Afghanistan Transition: The Death of Bin Laden and Local Dynamics, May 2011

The Bin Laden Effect


ICoS conducted interviews with 600 Afghan men in six districts starting on May 3rd 2011, the day after Osama bin Laden's death. Interviewees were asked if they had heard the news of Bin Laden's death; whether it was good or bad news; whether it meant al Qaeda was finished; and what it meant for the Taliban's fight in Afghanistan.

Sixty-eight percent of men interviewed said the death of Osama bin Laden is good news. High levels of respondents who do not think that Bin Laden's death is good news are found in Kabul University, where 36% said it was bad news, and Marjah, where 71% said it was bad news.

Opinions of interviewees on the effect of his death on the future of al Qaeda are mixed. When asked if Osama bin Laden's death means al Qaeda is finished, responses were split around 40%/40%, with the remainder having no answer. However, in Lashkar Gah and Marjah, higher numbers of interviewees do not believe his death means the end of al Qaeda. Fifty percent of respondents in Lashkar Gah, and 59% in Marjah, think Bin Laden's death does not mean the end of al Qaeda.

Overall, almost 50% of interviewees believe Bin Laden's death will hurt the Taliban, with the remainder split between 'it will help them', 'no effect' or no answer. The interviewees with the strongest belief that his death will help the Taliban are found in Lashkar Gah and Kandahar City, where about 25% of interviewees take that view. Small proportions of respondents in all areas actually think his death will actually help the insurgents.


Does Bin Laden's death affect the Taliban and their fight in Afghanistan?



Source: ICoS, Afghanistan Transition: The Death of Bin Laden and Local Dynamics, May 2011


Perceptions of Who Brings Security and Whether ANA Will Win

Who most brings security to your area?




"ANP" – Mar 2011

0%~10%	
10%~20%	
20%~30%	
30%~40%	
40%~50%	
50%~60%	
60%~70%	
70%~	




Do you think the ANA will be able to defeat the insurgents in the next few years?




"Most likely/certainly defeat" – Mar 2011

0%~10%	
10%~20%	
20%~30%	
30%~40%	
40%~50%	
50%~60%	
60%~70%	
70%~	



ABC Polling Shows that ANSF Development is Perceived as the One Positive Trend in US and ISAF Action




Some views of the U.S. and NATO performance are less negative. In the best rating, 53 percent say Western forces are doing better at training the Afghan Army and police. However far fewer see improvement at other key tasks – providing security (36 percent better, but 32 percent worse), providing reconstruction and development assistance (32 percent better, but 30 percent worse) and supporting local authorities (28-28 percent better/worse).

In another question, majorities think foreign forces are making at least some progress toward goals such as training Afghan forces to take over security (where a broad 84 percent see progress), strengthening Afghanistan’s government (69 percent) and preventing al Qaeda from re-establishing itself in Afghanistan (66 percent). Afghans rate US/NATO troops as the least successful in reducing corruption – but still a slight majority sees progress here.

In each of these, though, far fewer – no more than three in 10 – see “a great deal” of progress. For example, just 19 and 20 percent, respectively, see a great deal of progress in preventing a Taliban takeover or an al Qaeda resurgence – the chief aim of ISAF efforts.


ICoS Polling is Less Favorable - I

Do you think that Afghan army:




Helmand and Kandahar

Do you think that Afghan police:




Helmand and Kandahar

Is the Afghan army effective or not effective?



Helmand and Kandahar


Is the Afghan police effective or not effective?



Helmand and Kandahar

ICoS Polling is Less Favorable - II

Are the Afghan security forces able to provide security in areas from which the foreign forces are withdrawing?



Helmand and Kandahar

Are the Afghan security forces able to provide security in areas from which the foreign forces are withdrawing?			
	Able	Unable	No answer / Don't know
Garmsir	61%	16%	23%
Marjah	38%	54%	8%
Nawa	36%	47%	17%
Lashkar Gah	23%	73%	4%
Sangin	34%	51%	15%
Helmand	38%	48%	14%
Kandahar City	21%	76%	3%
Panjwai	34%	65%	1%
Zhari	22%	78%	0%
Kandahar	24%	74%	2%
Total	31%	61%	8%

Is it a good or bad thing that the foreign forces are starting to leave?			
	Good	Bad	No answer / Don't know
Garmsir	42%	44%	14%
Marjah	51%	40%	9%
Nawa	32%	48%	20%
Lashkar Gah	37%	56%	7%
Sangin	21%	70%	9%
Helmand	37%	51%	12%
Kandahar City	42%	54%	4%
Panjwai	82%	17%	1%
Zhari	79%	20%	1%
Kandahar	61%	37%	2%
Total	49%	44%	7%



If yes, why do you think they are leaving?			
	Helmand	Kandahar	Total
No answer / Don't know	99%	37%	68%
They are taking many casualties	1%	40%	20%
The war is too expensive	0%	8%	4%
Leaving of their own choice	0%	5%	3%
Their mandate/mission is over	0%	4%	2%
Other	0%	4%	2%
They have been beaten by the Taliban	0%	2%	1%

Uncertain Faith in Afghan Army & Police?


Taliban fighters are reported to be reassuring Afghan police and army units at remote checkpoints that they will not be attacked, provided that they give information on foreigners in the region, convoys travelling through, and so on. This allows the Taliban to gain all of the benefits of gathering intelligence on the roads without having to risk their own safety in doing so. This is less of a danger inside Lashkar Gah and Kandahar City, where Afghan security forces have more ability and will to resist an attack by the insurgents. However in rural areas and on remote roads, some under-resourced Afghan police and army units which do not have the confidence or willingness to stand up to Taliban attacks provide information, rather than risk being killed or abducted by Taliban fighters. This does not imply political support for the insurgency – it is simply a practical response to the exposed positions of the Afghan security forces.

Supporting this assessment, ICOS field research in October 2010 indicated that many ordinary Afghans do not have faith in their security forces. Only 52% of 1,000 Afghan men interviewed in Kandahar and Helmand believed the Afghan army was effective and just 38% thought so about the police. Particularly concerning for the current military dynamics is the fact that 61% of interviewees in October 2010 thought that Afghan security forces would be unable to provide security in areas from which NATO-ISAF was withdrawing.

Source: ICoS, Afghanistan Transition Dangers of a Summer Drawdown, February 2011




Underlining the fears about duplicity and complicity, 81% believed that Afghan police were helping or joining the insurgency, and 69% thought the same of the army.



Source: ICOS field research October 2010.


Perceptions of Corruption and Quality of Life

Do you believe that corruption in the Government affects your daily life?



"Yes" – Mar 2011

0%~10%	
10%~20%	
20%~30%	
30%~40%	
40%~50%	
50%~60%	
60%~70%	
70%~	




How satisfied are you with your current quality of your life?



"Somewhat/Very Satisfied" – Mar 2011

0%~10%	
10%~20%	
20%~30%	
30%~40%	
40%~50%	
50%~60%	
60%~70%	
70%~	



Afghan Perceptions of Corruption

22. Is it your opinion that corruption among government officials or the police has increased over the last year or so, decreased, or has it remained about the same?

	Increased	Decreased	Same	No opinion
11/13/10	37	33	29	2
12/23/09	42	30	24	4
1/12/09	50	22	21	7

23. Beyond any corruption occurring in your local area, what is your view of the level of corruption [ITEM] - is that a big problem, a moderate problem, a small problem or not a problem?

11/13/10 - Summary table

	----Big/Moderate----			-----Small/No problem-----			No opin.
	NET	Big	Moderate	NET	Small	Not a problem	
a. Within the government of this province	93	61	31	7	6	1	1
b. At the national level within the government in Kabul	88	65	22	11	9	2	2

Trend:

a. Within the government of this province

	----Big/Moderate----			-----Small/No problem-----			No opin.
	NET	Big	Moderate	NET	Small	Not a problem	
11/13/10	93	61	31	7	6	1	1
12/23/09	90	64	26	8	6	2	2

b. At the national level within the government in Kabul

	----Big/Moderate----			-----Small/No problem-----			No opin.
	NET	Big	Moderate	NET	Small	Not a problem	
11/13/10	88	65	22	11	9	2	2
12/23/09	83	64	19	11	9	2	5

Afghan Experience with Corruption

12. Has it ever happened to you personally that a representative of (ITEM) has asked for money or other payment in exchange for favorable treatment in the performance of his official duties?

11/13/10 - Summary table

	Yes	No	No opinion
a. Afghan National Police	21	78	1
b. Afghan National Army	7	92	1
c. The provincial government	27	72	1

13. (IF YES) The last time this happened, did you regard this as corruption or did you see it as acceptable behavior in this case?

11/13/10 - Summary table

	Corruption	Acceptable	No opinion
a. Afghan National Police	75	22	3
b. Afghan National Army	55	40	5
c. The provincial government	78	17	5

12/13 NET:


11/13/10 - Summary table

	---Asked for money/payment---				
	NET	Corruption	Acceptable	No	No opinion
a. Afghan National Police	21	16	5	79	1
b. Afghan National Army	7	4	3	93	*
c. The provincial government	27	21	5	73	1


Shaping Transition

Racing Towards Larger Forces

ANSF Historical and Planned Growth in 6/10



- Growth accelerating
- Challenged by attrition and retention



Promising Growth, Challenges Remain

- Growth on track for 2010;
 - ANCOP attrition enduring concern
 - Entering historical summer lull
- ANA quality improving, however;
 - Leader development lagging
 - Officer & NCO shortages persist
- Keys to arresting ANP attrition:
 - Recruit-Train-Assign Model
 - Pay-Partner-Predictable Cycle
 - Leader Development & Literacy
- Ministerial capacity improving – projecting self sustaining in 2012


ANSF and US Security Priorities: July 2010

Priority	ANDS Target	Current Target	Status	ANDS Completion Date
Alghan National Army	80,000 troops (plus 6,600 in training)	134,000 troops (by 10/2010) 171,600 troops (by 10/2011)	129,885 troops (as of 6/20/2010)	End of 2010
Alghan National Police	82,180 police officers	109,000 police officers (by October 2010) 134,000 police officers (by 10/2011)	105,873 police officers (as of 6/20/2010)	End of 2010
Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups	All illegal armed groups disbanded in all provinces		98 of 140 DIAG-targeted districts declared compliant	March 20, 2011
Removing Unexploded Ordnance	Land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance reduced by 70%		UN: Land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance reduced by 47%	End of 2010
	90% of all known areas contaminated by mines or explosive remnants of war cleared		DoS: 665 million square meters of contaminated land remain	2012
	All emplaced anti-personnel mines cleared			2013

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Priorities were originally based on Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) targets.

Sources: GfRtoA, "Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Executive Summary," 6/2008, p. 6; NTMA/CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010; UNDP, "Afghanistan's New Beginning Programme: DIAG First Facts," 7/3/2010; UN, "Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan Newsletter: May 2010," 5/2010, p. 4; DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 6/30/2010.

ANSF Development Plan: 2009-2011 as of 10/2010



Source: NTM-A, *Year in Review, November 2009 to November 2010*, p. 8

NTM-A Goals for 2011

Accelerate Progress:


- Train Afghan Trainers
- Accelerate Leader Development
- Build Literacy and “Vocational Skills”
- Inculcate an ethos of Stewardship
- Develop Enduring Institutions, Systems, and Enablers

Challenges:


- Attrition: Army –2.68% (Jan 11); Police –1.8% (Jan 11); ANSF Goal = 1.4%
- Leadership Shortfalls:
- Officers (v. Auth): Army –82.3%; Police –82.3%
- Non-Commissioned Officers (v. Auth): Army –85.4%; Police –73.7%
- Literacy: ~ 58K in training; ~ 61K completed some training (1st to 3rd Grade)

But, No Clear End State or Transition Goal as of 2/2011


Afghan National Army



Afghan National Police




ANSF Manpower Growth



During the reporting period, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continued to make significant progress, increasing in quantity, quality, and operational capacity. They have exceeded their growth goals due to increased recruiting and improved retention, and remain on schedule to meet their October 2011 goals of 171,600 and 134,000, respectively. As of March 2011, the Afghan National Army (ANA) force levels reached 159,363 soldiers – 4,375 ahead of the goal of 154,998. The Afghan National Police (ANP) also exceeded its growth goals, reaching 125,589 police – 3,589 ahead of its goal of 122,000. Notably, both the ANA and the ANP continue to reach and exceed growth benchmarks despite recent attrition rates above target levels.

Marked increases in the size of the ANSF have been paralleled by significant quality improvements, as U.S. and coalition forces in key terrain districts continue to live, train and operate shoulder-to-shoulder with the ANA and ANP. Currently, 96 percent of ANA and 83 percent of ANP units in key terrain districts are partnered with ISAF units, and 95 percent of all operations are conducted with partnered forces. In fact, in the major operations west of Kandahar in late 2010, Afghan forces comprised nearly 60 percent of the overall force.

ANSF Growth





As of 7 May 2011

Source: US Experts

Shaping Transition


Continuing Problems in Foreign Trainer Numbers and Quality

Training Transition Forces




But, Critical Shortfalls Exist in Trainer Numbers

NTM-A Institutional Trainer Sourcing Progress





And, in Key Trainer Skills



ANA Instructor & Training Team Shortfalls: 1/2011

Even Counting Pledged Instructors Who Are Not There



While the United States has deployed additional forces to temporarily alleviate the shortage in instructors for the ANA, these efforts do not fully address the ANA's instructor shortage. NTM-A/CSTC-A documentation notes that, due to the presence of additional U.S. personnel, the ANA's average instructor-to-trainee ratio in basic training improved from about 1 instructor for every 79 trainees as of November 2009 to approximately 1 instructor for every 24 trainees as of November 2010—a key factor, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A, in improved marksmanship qualification rates among ANA trainees. (Fig. 11 shows one such U.S. soldier providing marksmanship training to ANA recruits.) However, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A, while U.S. forces on temporary deployment have improved the quality of ANA basic training, these personnel were not intended to provide instruction in the advanced skills that the ANA must acquire by the time it grows to 171,600.²⁷ Similarly, a November 2010 NTM-A/CSTC-A document noted a particularly serious shortage in the number of instructors needed to teach the ANA specialized skills and stated that unless critical instructor positions are filled between December 2010 and July 2011, the ability of the ANA to develop skills it needs to start assuming lead responsibility for Afghanistan's security may be delayed.

The ANA is also facing shortfalls in coalition training teams needed to develop the skills of new army units once they are fielded. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, field-based training of the ANA is vital given that army forces completing unit training have limited capability. For example, NTM-A/CSTC-A data indicate that of the first 12 new ANA units fielded since the adoption of the new capability assessment system, 11 were assessed as either dependent on coalition forces for success or ineffective. Given the generally low level of capability that ANA units have upon completing unit training, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials stated that they expect newly formed units to receive substantial training in the field from training teams and partner units. However, shortages exist in the number of training teams available to assist in ANA development. NTM-A/CSTC-A documentation specifies that a total of 205 training teams are needed to complete fielding of a 171,600-person ANA by October 2011. However, as of September 2010, the total number of training teams fielded or pledged by coalition nations was 164—41 fewer than the number needed. According to IJC, given the serious challenges that the ANA faces, the ability of army units to develop greater capability will be delayed if they lack training teams to provide field-based training.

ANA Instructor & Training Shortfalls: 3/2011

Following the November 2010 Lisbon Summit and associated NATO Global Force Generation Conference, troop-contributing nations confirmed pledges for 104 additional institutional trainers, decreasing the trainer shortfall to 770. NATO subsequently released CJSOR v10.1 to capture adjustments in trainer requirements, containing a total requirement of 2,778 institutional trainers. However, shortfalls still exist. The current shortfall in institutional trainers is 740, with 1,371 deployed trainers in-place and 667 confirmed pledges..

CJSOR Trainer Status (Version 10.1)

Requirement	In-Place	Pledged	Shortfall
2,778	1,371	667	740

Of the remaining 740 unfilled institutional trainer positions, the figure below summarizes the departments that are affected by the shortage. While NTM-A/CSTC-A has made great progress in training the ANSF, the continued shortage of required trainers will delay both institutional transition and professionalization of the ANSF.

The United States currently sources 1,166 non-CJSOR trainer positions. In order to temporarily address the NATO CJSOR shortfall, and fill the U.S.-sourced, non-CJSOR requirements as quickly as possible, the United States deployed entire units. The United States also provides an additional 963 personnel to provide skills not found in the deployed units. This brings the total U.S. sourcing to 2,129.

NTM-A/CSTC-A CJSOR (Version 10.1) Summary

667 Short of 2778 Required		
Department	Percent Sources	Trainers Short
Police	67%	288
Medical	38%	89
Log	24%	30
Air Force	71%	64
Army	82%	269

Continuing NTM-A Warnings About Trainers: 24/4/11

“We passed a significant milestone this week - we are now at 50% of our authorized number of Coalition trainers, the highest we've been since NTM-A was activated in November 2009.

However, the lack of the other 50% of Coalition trainers/advisors with key skills (critical gaps, in medical, logistics and engineers) threatens to slow progress in ANSF development at the time when we need to be accelerating.

We continue to make significant progress growing the fielded forces, yet the development of their supporting logistics system is lagging.

The absence of these skilled trainers and advisors is slowing the development of functional sustainment systems - at echelon above Corps, Army and Police supply depots and training centers--and the indigenous capacity necessary to effectively manage them.

We continue to maximize contractors where we can but at a significant financial cost. Only by filling our critical shortfalls with the right grades and skills from the coalition can we properly develop a professional, sustainable and enduring logistics system for the ANSF.

These trainers and advisors are also central to our anti-corruption efforts and providing the necessary safeguards and oversight to ensure stewardship of our investment.”

Shaping Transition

The Need for Further Improvement at the MoD and Top Command Levels

MoD Capability Milestone Level: 3/2011

MoD Overall Rating CM2B	Current CM
Support to Operations	3
AMoD Intel Policy	2B
Office of the Surgeon General	4
AMoD Reserve Affairs	3
AMoD Disaster Response	3
Construction & Property Mngt Div	3
Personnel Management	2B
AMoD Personnel	2B
AMoD Education	3
Gender Integration	0
National Logistics	2B
AMoD AT&L	2B
Acquisition Agency	2A
Hor. Int. & Str. Mngt	2B
Minister of Defense	2A
1st Deputy Minister of Defense	3
Accountability & Transparency	4
AMoD Strategy & Policy	2A
MoD Legal	3
MoD Public Affairs	2A
MoD IG	2B
MoD Finance	2A
MoD Parliamentary Affairs	3
Strategic Communication	4

GS Overall Rating CM2B	Current CM
Support to Operations	2B
GS G2	3
GSG3 Operations	2B
GS G3 Force Management	3
GSG6 Communications	2B
Comm Spt Unit	1B
Ground Force Command	0
Afghan Air Force	0
ASOC	0
Personnel Management	2B
GS G1	2B
ANAREC	2A
Religious & Cultural Affairs	2B
National Logistics	2B
GS G4	2B
Logistics Command	2B
Hor. Int. & Str. Mngt	2B
Chief of the General Staff	3
Vice Chief of the General Staff	2A
GS Legal	2B
GS IG	2B
GS Finance	2A

In May 2009, all of the assessed departments within MoD and the General Staff were rated as requiring significant coalition assistance to accomplish their missions (CM-3) except for two (Inspector General and Budget & Finance) rated as requiring some coalition assistance to accomplish their missions (CM-2B); and one (Reserve Affairs) rated as existing but unable to accomplish its mission (CM-4). As of the end of the CM reporting period in January 2011, three departments were rated CM-4, four were new and not assessed, eleven had achieved a CM-3 rating, nineteen had achieved a CM-2B rating, eight had achieved a CM-2A rating, and one had achieved a CM-1B rating (the CM-1B rating is pending final Commander NTM-A transition decision approval)

Capability Milestone Rating System

	CM-4: The department or institution exists but cannot accomplish its mission.
	CM-3: Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.
	CM-2B: Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.
	CM-2A: Department or institution capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered.
	CM-1B: Department or institution capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only.
	CM-1A: Department or institution capable of autonomous operations.

Shaping Transition


The Afghan National Army: Progress in Quantity

ANA Missions & Status in 2/2011


Army ANA Mission: The Afghan National Army is responsible for protecting Afghanistan's territorial integrity, upholding and protecting the Constitution, defending national and Islamic values, and establishing a favorable environment for public welfare and progress.(Afghan National Military Strategy, dated 15 February, 2010)

- **Strength:** 152 K (as of 29 JAN 2011); Approved Growth 171.6K by NOV 11
- **Growth** of ~ 55K since NOV 09
- **Structure:**
 - 6 Corps
 - 1 Capitol Division (Kabul)
 - 1 Special Operating Forces (SOF) Command
 - 1 Ground Forces Command HQ
- **Air Force:** 57 Aircraft (as of 15 FEB 2011)(10) C-27; (35) Mi-17; (9) Mi-35; (3) AN-32
- **11 of 12 Branch Schools Open**
 - ~ 24K Soldiers in Training per day on average
 - ~ 7K Soldiers complete training per month on average
 - ~ 137 Concurrent Courses at 27 Separate Training Sites (see map)
 - ~ \$6.8B Planned Infrastructure Development for > 300 Units
- **Fielded since Nov '09:** 71,616 Weapons; 11,536 Vehicles; 22,721 Communications Assets

ANA Growth: 10/2009 to 10/2010



ANA Growth 1/2010-12/2010




Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.

From January to October 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A data show that the ANA met or exceeded its recruitment target in all but 2 months, with recruitment averaging over 6,500 soldiers per month. This was more than twice the average monthly recruitment figure of approximately 3,000 reported for the preceding 10 months. Overall, the total number of personnel recruited between January and October 2010 exceeded the total recruitment target for those months by over 6,000.

In addition, NTM-A/CSTC-A reports that retention of ANA personnel who have fulfilled their contracts has generally continued to meet the monthly target of 60 to 70 percent. A typical ANA contract lasts for 3 years. At the end of a contract, ANA personnel are given the opportunity to reenlist. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, between January and October 2010, the ANA met its overall retention target in 7 out of 10 months.


ANA Growth: 3/2010 to 3/2011




Maintaining an appropriate ethnic balance in the ANA remains a priority for the MoD, especially with southern Pashtuns. The MoD Southern Recruiting Delegation returned from the southern provinces (i.e., Daykundi, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan, Zabul) in October 2010 and stationed representatives from the Recruiting Command and Provincial Councils in each southern province to identify and recruit eligible candidates. In March 2011, 201 southern Pashtuns were recruited – a slight decrease from the 211 that were recruited in February, and just over 80 percent of the goal. NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to monitor southern Pashtun recruitment data to determine appropriate goals, measure progress, and assess the impact of the initiative.

In October 2010, the ANA exceeded its goal of 134,000 personnel by 10,638 and is ahead of its goal to meet its 171,600 objective by the end of October 2011. However, during the past 12 months, 70 percent of those eligible either re-enlisted at the end of their term of service or rejoined having previously left the ANA. Although recruiting and retention are continuing at a strong pace, attrition is a concern. If the levels of attrition seen throughout the last five months continue, there is a significant risk to projected ANA growth. Recent studies show that the core causes of attrition in the ANA are poor leadership and accountability, separation from family, denial of leave or poor leave management, high operational tempo, and ineffective deterrence against AWOL.

ANA Laydown April 2011




ANA Laydown January 2008




ANA Developments

ANA TRAINING GRADUATES BY UNIT ASSIGNMENT



Source: NTMA/CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.


ANA TRAINING GRADUATES BY SCHOOL



a. At the Consolidated Fielding Center, units form, equip, and conduct initial collective training.
b. Bridmal Academy is for NCOs.

Source: NTMA/CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.

ANA WEAPONS FIELDIED



Note: These weapons were transferred to ANA forces from 4/1/2010 to 6/23/2010.

Source: NTMA/CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.

ANA RADIOS AND VEHICLES FIELDIED

Vehicles	
Light and medium tactical vehicles	484
Up-armored HMMWVs ^a	163

Radios	
VHF radios ^b	661
HF radios ^c	241

a. Up-armored HMMWVs include M1151, M1152, and M1152 ambulance models.

b. Very High Frequency (VHF) radios include various configurations of the PRC-1077 and HH7700 radio systems.

c. High Frequency (HF) radios include various configurations of the RT-7000 and PRC-1099 radio systems.

Source: NTMA/CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.

ANA Pay Reform 11/2009

	Monthly rates before pay reform	Monthly rates after pay reform	Increase in monthly salary	Percentage increase in salary
Officer rank				
General	\$900	\$945	\$45	5
Lieutenant general	800	845	45	6
Major general	700	745	45	6
Brigadier general	600	645	45	8
Colonel	450	495	45	10
Lieutenant colonel	400	445	45	11
Major	350	395	45	13
Captain	270	345	75	28
First lieutenant	230	295	65	28
Second lieutenant	210	275	65	31
Enlisted rank				
Sergeant major	230	275	45	20
Master sergeant	190	255	65	34
Sergeant first class	165	235	70	42
Staff sergeant	150	210	60	40
Sergeant	135	180	45	33
Soldier	120	165	45	38

Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.

Note: The pay figures above are for personnel with less than 3 years of service at their current ranks. ANA personnel receive a longevity-based pay increase every 3 years served at rank.

Cost Per Afghan Solider

**Total cost for ANA
soldier with M16**

Armor=\$1,431

M16=\$976

Clothing=\$422

Equipment =\$166

Total = \$2,995

Body armor = \$1,431

Kevlar Helmet

**Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) and Small Arms
Protective Insert (SAPI) plates**

Equipment = \$166

Canteen Duffel bag Elbow pads

Entrenching tool

First aid kit

Knee pads

Poncho

Rucksack and frame

Sleeping bag

Sleeping mat

Other

Weapon = \$976 M16 rifle

Clothing = \$422

Berets

Cold weather gear

Field jacket and liner

Mechanic coveralls

Physical training clothing Belts Undergarments

Uniform

Wet weather set

Boots (steel toed, combat, and cold weather)

Other



Army, Navy, US Marine Corps, and Air Force Annual Operational Costs Per Troop in Afghanistan and Iraq FY2005-FY2011


Request in thousands of dollars per troop per year

Operation	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY2010 Amended Request in BA, 2-1-10	FY2011 Request, 2-1-10	FY05-FY09 Average
AFGHANISTAN								
Average Strength ^a	18,129	20,424	23,154	30,103	42,117	84,000	102,000	26,785
Military Personnel	189	115	149	166	172	97	92	158
Operation and Maintenance	293	328	417	462	335	569	603	367
Afghanistan Operational Costs^b	483	442	566	628	507	667	694	525
IRAQ^a								
Average Strength ^a	142,574	117,640	145,066	156,534	141,155	100,000	43,000	140,594
Military Personnel	81	121	93	87	78	87	135	92
Operation and Maintenance	272	389	417	418	354	382	668	370
Iraq Operational Costs^b	352	509	510	505	433	469	802	462
COMPARING AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ OPERATIONAL COSTS								
Afghanistan less. Iraq Operational Costs	130	-67	56	123	74	198	-108	63
% Difference	27%	-15%	10%	20%	15%	30%	-16%	12%
AVERAGE OPERATIONAL COSTS FOR BOTH WAR WARS								
Average Strength for Both Wars ^a	160,703	138,064	168,219	186,636	183,272	184,000	145,000	167,379
Average Operational Cost for Both Wars^b	367	499	518	525	450	559	726	472

a. Reflects average for each fiscal year of monthly troop levels reported by DOD. b. Operational costs include appropriations for military personnel and Operation and Maintenance excluding training of Afghan and Iraq security forces.

Source: Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, CRS, RL33110, March 29, 2011.


Cost Per Afghan Battalion







Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; GAO (photo).

Note: M16 rifle costs are included in both figure 3 and figure 4.

Army Training Sites







ANA Training Comparison: 2009-2010





Developing the systems and institutions to professionalize and grow the force

ANA Literacy Training Program: 2009-2010



Literacy training Rapid start Monumental task Key to professionalization of the ANA

ANA Ethnicity



Armored Vehicle Developments

- **Afghan & US Partnership**: The US Government has announced the donation of up to 490 Armored Security Vehicles worth \$600M for the Afghan Army. The donation includes support equipment, spare parts, and training support.
- **Armored Vehicles**: Provides the ANA with armor capability in 9 variants: Armored Personnel Carriers with gunner protection and turret, as well as command & control, mortar, ambulance, engineering, maintenance, and reconnaissance variations.
- **Proven Capability**: This is an improved version of the M1117 vehicle that the US Army already uses. The vehicles will be produced in Louisiana by Textron Marine and Land Systems. M1117 has been in US military inventories since Sept 2000.
 - **Sustainable and Reliable**: Has 70% commonality with US Army ensuring an enduring long term relationship and a proven record of sustainability and reliability
 - **Improvements for Afghanistan**: Enhanced Survivability provides protection from IEDs, equivalent to MRAP/MATV
 - **Seven Quick Reaction Forces**: These vehicles will provide the Afghan Army with a force that can rapidly respond to threats anywhere in the country or along the border
- **Delivery**: Delivery of the first vehicle is scheduled for Nov 2011. Complete delivery is estimated for December 2012.



Armored Capability for the Afghan Army

Shaping Transition

**The Afghan National Army: Some
Progress in Quality and Endurance
but Still A Long Way to Go**

Progress and Focus Areas (as of 17 May 11)

Progress:

- **Public Perception**
 - All Volunteers
 - Retention & Pride of Service
- **Capable Security Ministries**
 - Budgeting and Execution
 - Strategic Planning & Policy Development
- **Professionalization**
 - Literacy
 - Leader Development
 - Vocational Training
- **Training Institutions**
 - Afghan Trainers
 - Standardized Courses

Focus Areas:

- **Accountability**
- **Transparency**
- **Logistics Network**



***Significant progress ...
... challenges remain***


Where the ANSF Are Today

100% mandatory literacy training

Living wage and incentive pay

11/12 vocational schools opened

Trained leaders increased by 500%




95% weapon qualification rate

NATO Weapons, high quality equipment


Afghan-made uniform items

Greater retention

Significant Progress in Quality



ANA Monthly Attrition Rates



Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.

NTM-A/CSTC-A data indicate that, as of October 2010, the ANA consisted of 144,638 personnel. NTM-A/CSTC-A has also reported that the ANA lost over 4,000 personnel in October 2010 due to attrition. Furthermore, NTM-A/CSTC-A data show that nearly 300 ANA personnel whose contracts ended in October 2010 decided not to reenlist. In sum, approximately 4,300 personnel were dropped from the ANA payroll in October 2010 either because of attrition or nonreenlistment. NTM-A/CSTC-A reports that the ANA recruited almost 8,000 new personnel in October 2010. However, the first 4,300 of these new recruits did not count toward net growth of the force, since they were needed to offset the loss of approximately 4,300 personnel due to attrition and nonreenlistment. Consequently, out of the roughly 8,000 recruits from July 2010, 3,700—less than half—counted toward net growth.

GAO, AFGHANISTAN SECURITY Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined, GAO 11-66, January 2011.

According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, a high attrition rate is the primary challenge the ANA faces in meeting its present goal of growing the force to 171,600 personnel by October 2011. For instance, in the 12-month period from November 2009 to October 2010, the ANA lost over 30,000 soldiers due to attrition. This means that, in addition to the recruits needed to grow the force, the ANA also had to recruit 30,000 soldiers to fill these vacant slots. NTM-A/CSTC-A plans have accounted for the need to achieve this additional recruiting, noting that in order to grow from the July 2010 force size of just over 134,000 to the 171,600 goal—an increase of about 37,000—the ANA will need to recruit and train over 86,000 personnel. Additionally, absenteeism remains a challenge to fielding an ANA force as planned. Specifically, IJC data indicate that the number of ANA present for duty continues to fall below the number of ANA assigned to units. In September 2010, for example, IJC reported that, across the ANA, only 69 percent of soldiers were present for duty. In some units, such as the 215th Corps in southwestern Afghanistan, the ratio of present for duty was even lower. An analysis of data provided by IJC indicates that, from January to September 2010, on average, over a quarter of the ANA was absent during any given month.

ANA NCO Shortfalls

ANA unit	Number of NCO positions	Number of NCO positions unfilled	Percentage of NCO positions unfilled
111th Capital Division	2,016	756	38
201st Corps	5,654	1,376	24
203rd Corps	5,449	1,666	31
205th Corps	6,219	1,806	29
207th Corps	2,488	569	23
209th Corps	3,134	798	25
215th Corps	4,345	1,222	28
Special Operations Forces Division	2,570	220	9
Total	31,875	8,413	26

Despite some progress, the ANA is continuing to face shortfalls in non-commissioned officers (NCO) needed to provide leadership to ANA units in the field. As of October 2010, about one-quarter of NCO positions in ANA combat units were unfilled. This represents an improvement since our last report,²⁴ when we found that, between November 2007 and February 2008, the proportion of unfilled NCO positions ranged as high as 50 percent. In spite of this improvement, NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that it considers the ongoing shortfall of NCOs to be a major challenge, noting that development of leaders is essential to improving ANA capability.

ANA Major Equipment Shortfalls at End-2010

Item	Number authorized	Number on hand	Percentage of authorized on hand
Weapons			
D-30 howitzer	210	99	47
SPG-9 recoilless gun	750	254	34
Vehicles			
Variable reach rough terrain forklift	238	117	49
M916 tractor	124	56	45
M870 trailer	131	52	40
M1151 Humvee	2,108	829	39
Motorcycle	300	110	37
Fire truck	50	10	20


Item	Number authorized	Number on hand	Percentage of authorized on hand
Maintenance van	219	13	6
Fuel trailer	97	5	5
Warehouse forklift	180	4	2
Communications equipment			
Programming kit	650	308	47
Very high-frequency handheld radio	31,209	14,767	47
High-frequency base station	1,497	685	46
Very high-frequency vehicle-mounted radio	13,055	4,440	34
Tactical telephone	14,749	2,089	14
Protective equipment			
Kevlar helmet	144,638	40,803	28

As of November 2010, the ANA had less than half of the authorized equipment amount on hand for 17 of 48 equipment items (35 percent). This is a slight improvement since the GAO 2008 report, when it found that there were 21 of 55 equipment items (38 percent) for which army units had less than half of the required amount on hand.²⁹ Additionally, as of November 2010, the ANA had an average of about 72 percent of the authorized amount on hand per equipment item, as compared with an average of about 60 percent on hand per equipment item at the time of our last report. This improvement notwithstanding, shortages remain in weapons, vehicles, communications items, and protective equipment.

Although the ANA's equipping levels have slightly improved, IJC documentation indicates that not all pieces of equipment that the ANA has on hand are considered ready to be used in operations. According to IJC, while factors such as enemy action and normal wear and tear can lead to equipment being deemed unserviceable, an additional factor is that the ANA continues to lack responsibility for its equipment. In addition, a senior NTM-A/CSTC-A official stated that the ANA's nascent logistics system gives it limited ability to maintain or repair the equipment it receives. Similarly, IJC and SIGAR30 have both identified the ANA's weak logistics system as a significant challenge to development of capable army units. Consequently, although IJC and NTM-A/CSTC-A are working to institute programs to address these challenges, concerns exist about the extent to which the ANA will properly maintain the equipment items it receives.

Afghan Ratings of ANA Are High, but Not Rising: 2009 vs. 2010

Favorable Views of Afghan Institutions




Afghans rate most national institutions favorably, and some of these ratings have improved since last year. Eighty-three percent report a favorable opinion of the central government, up 9 points. Eight in 10 have a favorable opinion of the ANA and 74 percent report a favorable view of the district government, both basically unchanged. While fewer, 57 percent, have a favorable opinion of the courts in Afghanistan, this is up by 10 points.

Overall, 76 percent say, the central government has a strong presence in their area, 73 percent say, the district government has a strong presence, 67 percent say, the ANA has a strong presence, and 54 percent say, the courts have a strong presence in their area. These compare with 80 percent who say, the police have a strong local presence. As noted, presence of the police is one of the two strongest independent factors in viewing the ANP favorably.

As with the ANP, favorable ratings of Afghan institutions are lower in the South West than in other regions. Only 71 percent in the South West view the central government positively, and 69 percent rate the ANA positively – 12 and 11 points lower than the national averages. In addition, fewer than half rate the district government or the courts positively, down by 18 points and 10 points respectively, from last year.


ANA Effectiveness – 11/2010




*Ratings are made with the RDL system.

ANA Capability in the Field as of 4/2011

Afghan Uniformed Police: Districts and Precincts



Army Kandaks Assessment



Commander's Unit Assessment Tool Ratings



As of 14 Apr 11

Next ANSF assessment available on 2 June 2011

UNCLASSIFIED

32

ANA Readiness Ratings

Rating definition level	Description
Independent	Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition forces.
Effective with advisors	Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations within their own battle space and maintaining regional security with limited guidance from training team only. Partnered unit assistance is no longer needed.
Effective with assistance	Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations and maintaining regional security with limited assistance from partnered unit.
Dependent on coalition forces for success	Unit capability is dependent on partnered unit presence/assistance to execute and sustain operations and maintain regional security.
Ineffective	Unit is not capable of executing or sustaining operations even with partnered unit presence/assistance.

ANA Readiness Ratings 2/2011

Figure 16: Afghan National Army Rating Definition Levels (February 2011)

Rating Definition Level (RDL)	Corps HQ	DIV HQ	BDE HQ	Unit Types			Total Kandak Equivalents	Total Units and HQs
				Kandak	GSU	Coy		
Independent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Effective with Advisors	1	1	7	44	8	0	52	61
Effective with Assistance	5	0	13	57	7	3	64	85
Developing	0	0	3	23	4	0	27	30
Established	0	0	0	1	2	2	3	5
Not Assessed	0	0	0	9	2	6	11	17
TOTAL	6	1	23	134	23	11	157	198

GSU=General Support Unit. Kandaks plus GSUs equals Total Kandak Equivalents.
 Kandaks include all warfighting kandaks, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Commando Kandaks.
 Source: IJC AAG - CUAT
 Date: 23 February 2011

From September 2010 through February 2011, the number of fielded ANA *kandaks* and *kandak* equivalents grew from 136 to 157, an increase of 15 percent over the reporting period. The ANA also improved in quality. The number of *kandak*-equivalent formations rated as “Effective with Advisors,” the second highest rating, grew from 32 to 52 during this period, and those rated as “Effective with Assistance” rose from 39 to 64, increases of 63 percent and 64 percent, respectively. Through the end of this reporting period, 74 percent of ANA *kandaks* were rated as effective with assistance or better, up from 52 percent during the previous reporting period. Moreover, from September 2010 to February 2011, the total number of *kandaks*, headquarters, and general support units rated as “Effective with Advisors” rose from 42 to 61; and those rated as “Effective with Assistance” rose from 49 to 85. Currently, no units have been validated as “Independent.”

During the major floods in Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan last summer, the AAF flew 400 missions and transported over 188 tons of supplies. During the 2010 parliamentary elections, it recorded 225 flight hours and transported over 67,000 kgs of supplies to remote locations. It also rescued survivors of the Salang Pass avalanche, supported search and recovery operations following an airliner crash, and delivered generators and supplies to schools. In January, the AAF flew the first training sorties at Shindand Air Base in Herat Province, the new home for AAF training. The ANA took a lead role in security efforts in and around Kabul during the January inauguration of Afghanistan’s new parliament. Despite being an obvious target for insurgent attack – and numerous schedule changes to which the ANA had to react – the events proceeded without incident.

Key challenges still remain. Not all ANA units and leaders are sufficiently mature, experienced, or professional – qualities that take time and discipline to develop. As well, the ANA’s ability to sustain itself and to improve its combat enablers requires focus and effort. There can be no doubt, however, that the force is indeed growing in quality, quantity, and capacity. With continued persistence on the part of ISAF and its Afghan partners, the ANA will continue to progress.

Source: DoD, “Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan; US Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces, Section 1203 Report, April 2011, p. 38.

During the first quarter of 2011, Commander IJC assessed that the ANA overall continues to show steady improvement in the field. ANA units are conducting more independent operations, are becoming increasingly proficient, and are gaining the trust of the people. Recently, they have shown noticeable improvement in their AWOL and Present for Duty rates. Increases in the number of personnel available for duty have positively impacted operational effectiveness. Units are beginning to implement their own measures to limit AWOL soldiers, such as personnel tracking. Coalition and ANA forces control much more territory than they did a year ago, and ANA units (and their ANP counterparts) have been a significant contributor to the combined team success.

Nonetheless, key challenges remain. ANA units are still too dependent on coalition forces for operations, and specifically logistical support. The ANA lacks a sufficient number of personnel trained in the specialized skill sets of intelligence, maintenance, and medical support. A lack of literacy is a particular limitation to personnel assigned to these specialized-skill areas. In some cases, a lack of understanding by Afghan commanders of how best to utilize personnel trained in these specialized skills sets leads them to divert them to infantry duties. ISAF continues to work with the Afghans to address these concerns by providing additional specialized training and literacy education.


Operational effectiveness of individual ANSF units is assessed through the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). The CUAT collects both quantitative data and a qualitative assessment of a unit's operations, personnel, leadership, maintenance, supply, equipment readiness and accountability, and other aspects of its functioning. Each area receives a rating, known as a Rating Definition Level (RDL), and the unit receives an overall rating for its operational effectiveness. The RDL range currently includes Not Assessed, Established, Developing, Effective with Assistance, Effective with Advisors, and Independent. 17 Units are evaluated by their partners/mentors every six weeks. Typically, unpartnered units are not assessed; however, on occasion, a Regional Command may choose to send an assessment team to an unpartnered ANSF unit to complete an assessment.

"Independent" denotes a unit that is capable of the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from Coalition Forces. "Effective with Advisors" means that the partnered coalition unit does not exceed a limited guidance role. Units that are "Effective with Assistance" are those that are capable of executing operations and providing regional security with varied partnered unit assistance. A "Developing" unit is one whose capability is dependent on partnered unit presence and assistance. Finally, an "Established" unit is one which is not capable of executing or sustaining operations even with partnered assistance.

Units are evaluated by their partners/mentors every six weeks. Typically, unpartnered units are not assessed; however, on occasion, a Regional Command may choose to send an assessment team to an unpartnered ANSF unit to complete an assessment.

Regional Support Commands & Partnering

RSCs engage with IJC & ANSF senior leaders to identify and support operational requirements



ANA Partnering 3/2011

Figure 15: Afghan National Army Partnering Status (March 2011)

Regional Command	Embedded		Partnered		Mentored		Uncovered		Total Partnered		Total Reported	
	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ	Kandaks	HQ
RC Capital	4	0	7	2	4	1	3	0	15	3	18	3
RC East	12	5	34	4	2	0	0	0	48	9	48	9
RC West	0	0	6	4	7	0	2	0	13	4	15	4
RC North	1	0	10	3	3	0	1	1	14	3	15	4
RC Southwest	14	3	2	1	2	0	0	0	18	4	18	4
RC South	4	0	18	4	4	1	0	0	26	5	26	5
Commando	9	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	10	1	10	1
Total	44	9	78	18	22	2	6	1	144	29	150	30
Grand Totals									173		180	

Source: IJC CUOPS Security Partnering
Date: 8 March 2011

In March 2011, 225 out of 268 (83 percent) priority ANP units across Afghanistan were partnered (Figure 14); and 173 out of 180 (96 percent) ANA units were partnered (Figure 15). Moreover, ANSF and ISAF partnered units are also increasingly conducting operations together. From April 2010 to March 2011, the number of major operations that were partnered rose from 54 percent to 95 percent across all the regional commands..

There are three descriptive terms used to describe the various types of partnering and mentorship. “Embedded partnering” is the most intensive form of partnering, where the ANA or ANP share the same battle space with their ISAF partners and live on the same installation. Embedded partnering results in a unified, combined force with Afghans often in the lead; builds trusting relationships quickly based on shared risks and responsibilities; capitalizes on the combined team’s strengths and offsets each other’s weaknesses; and allows the population to see coalition forces as supporting (not leading) ANSF. Embedded partnering is arguably the most effective training approach; however, it requires a greater number of ISAF troops to support and is typically leveraged for Afghan units that require additional training assistance. Ideally, as Afghan units become more capable, independent, and effective, the intensity of partnering relationships is not as critical, and the same objectives can be achieved through regular partnering or mentoring.

“Partnering” describes a specific form of combined operations. Specifically, a “partnered” unit describes an assigned relationship between an ISAF unit and an ANSF unit where both share the same battle space but do not live together. The ISAF partner unit shares the goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF unit, but also works together with the ANSF to defeat the insurgency. The ISAF partner unit shares comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, and intelligence with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership includes an active mentoring role and primary oversight responsibility. Proximity enables partnered units to establish a deeper personal and working relationship that allows them to plan, train, and coordinate operations, and to support one another in accomplishing assigned tasks.

“Mentoring” refers to an assigned relationship between an Afghan unit and an ISAF advisory team – typically called an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) for ANA units and a Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (POMLT) for ANP units. The ISAF partner unit shares no operations guidance, strategy, information or intelligence with its ANSF counterpart. Still, while not as focused as partnering or embedded partnering, the mentoring relationship is still extremely valuable. It is normally applied for Afghan units that, while capable, still require advanced professional development and advice in the field, as well as enabler support. Each POMLT and OMLT is normally deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum of six months. POMLTs are typically composed of 15-20 personnel and OMLTs are typically composed of 11-28 personnel (depending on the type and function of the partnered ANA unit).

Shaping Transition

**The Afghan Air Force: Progress
but Years of Help are Needed**

AAF Plans & Status as of 3/2011

In June 2010, President Karzai redesignated the Afghan National Army Air Corps as the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Although the name change does not currently make the AAF independent from the ANA, the move affirms Afghan intent to eventually return the air force to its former independent status.

The AAF's long-term development strategy envisions an air force that can support the needs of the ANSF and the Afghan Government by 2016 – capable of Presidential airlift, air mobility, rotary and fixed-wing close air support, casualty evacuation, and aerial reconnaissance. The AAF also plans to be able to sustain its capacity through indigenous training institutions, including a complete education and training infrastructure. The air fleet will consist of a mix of Russian and Western airframes. Afghan airmen will operate in accordance with NATO procedures, and will be able to support the Afghan Government effectively by employing all of the instruments of COIN airpower. This plan is ambitious and belies a continuing tension between aspirations and affordability.


In January 2011, the AAF had 56 of its planned fleet of 146 aircraft, including 35 Mi-17 helicopters, nine Mi-35 attack helicopters, nine C-27 airlifters, and three An-32 airlifters. The AAF fleet reflects the Afghan Government's COIN airpower priorities. The Mi-17 is an effective rotary-wing airframe due to its durable structure and lift capacity at high altitude. The Mi-35 provides an indigenous, albeit limited, close air support capability for the ANSF. The C-27 is the AAF's first modern, all-weather-capable aircraft.

In conjunction with the AAF, NTM-A/CSTC-A has planned and requested funding for a comprehensive aircraft acquisition and modernization plan. By 2016, the Mi-17 fleet will grow to 56. Discussions are under way to extend the service life of the Mi-35, which will allow this airframe to remain in the AAF inventory through 2016. Finally, key acquisitions include:

- Replacement of the AAF's Antonov An-32 by the 20 C-27A aircraft, a turboprop, fixed wing airlifter. Nine C-27A's are currently on-hand, and 11 will be delivered by 2012.
- Procurement of six initial flight training rotary wing aircraft with expected delivery by October 2011.
- Procurement of up to 32 "Cessna-like" fixed-wing aircraft for initial flight and basic fixed-wing screening with expected delivery beginning in October 2011 and completion by FY2013.
- Potential procurement of up to 20 aircraft for fixed-wing close air support.


Assembling an experienced, professional AAF, including an instructor cadre that can provide pilot and technical training, is the focus of NTM-A/CSTC-A's "Airmen Build" line of operation. By the end of March 2011, AAF manning should reach 4,728 Airmen – an increase of 630 airmen over the December 2010 strength. The Afghans and NTM-A/CSTC-A continue to research opportunities to bolster both the AAF NCO and Officer Corps in an effort to develop the force in both quantity and quality as it grows to the proposed 2011 end strength of 8,017 personnel (March 2012). Attrition stands near 1.4 percent per month, which is an acceptable level to maintain professional and technical skills. Factors limiting growth include education levels, English language requirements, and pilot training – factors that also limit the AAF's ability to produce personnel who are able to perform the technically advanced specialties required for aircraft maintenance and airfield support.

Afghan Air Force Progress



Steady progress...challenges with pilot training, English language, technical skills, and aircraft acquisition lead times

Air Strength & Training and Operations Sites



Mi-17 Force

Afghan & US Partnership: The US Government will donate 21 Mi-17 v5 helicopters worth \$365M.

- **Adding to the Fleet:** The 21 Mi-17s will complement the current fleet (35) expanding tactical mobility
- **Spare Parts and Sustainment:** Additionally, the U.S. is donating spare parts, ground support equipment, tools, weaponry (guns and rocket pods), and maintenance manuals building a lasting relationship of support

Versatile Helicopter Fleet: The modern Mi-17v5 aircraft is well suited for the rugged Afghan environment.

- **Most Modern and New:** These new helicopters are the most modern version of the Mi-17 aircraft available and are part of a reliable, and well-established aircraft line.
- **Enhanced Capabilities:** The helicopters provide a broad spectrum of capabilities including: Tactical airlift, air-to-ground fire suppression, air assault, troop movement, Presidential airlift, and Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) missions.

National Capabilities: First of the 21 aircraft deliveries will be late 2011 with all 21 complete by 2012.

- **Locations:** This fleet will support operations throughout the country from seven airfield locations in Kabul, Shindand, Kandahar, Mez-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, and Gardez.

Key to an Enduring Afghan Air Force



Cessna Light Aircraft Force

Afghan & US Partnership: The US Government announced a donation of 32 Cessna Light Lift Aircraft (\$88.5M)

- Supporting Afghan Forces: The training aircraft will be based at Shindand Flying Training Center and the remaining aircraft will be stationed at airfields throughout Afghanistan
- Sustainable: The USG is also providing maintenance support, training devices, spare parts, support equipment, tools, & manuals
- US Air Force: The USAF has options to purchase 15 C-208's as part of its Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA) program



Cessna 182T

Six Cessna 182T (C-182) Initial Trainers: Will assess student pilot aptitude to progress through pilot training and to teach basic flying

- Deliveries: Start in February 2012 and completed by January 2013
- Cost: The individual cost of the C-182 is \$524K per aircraft



Cessna 208B

Twenty Six Cessna 208B (C-208) Light Airlift: Will meet the light airlift needs of the Afghan Air Force

- The C-208: A 10-seat single engine plane to carry passengers or cargo
- Deliveries: Start in August 2011 and completed by September 2013
- Cost: The individual cost of the C-208 is \$2.2M per aircraft

Enabling Afghan Transition and Deepening Afghan/US Partnership

Shaping Transition

The Need for Further Improvement at the MoI Level

MoI Capability Milestone Level: 3/2011

Department	Current CM
Chief of Staff/Special Staff	
Public Affairs	2A
Inspector General	3
Anti-Corruption	2B
Legal Affairs/LEGAD	3
Intelligence	3
DM of Admin & Support	
Personnel Mgmt	2B
Logistics	3
Finance & Budget	3
Facilities & Installation	4
Surgeon Medical	2B
Info, Comms & Tech	3
Training Mgmt	3
Acquisition & Procurement	3

Department	Current CM
DM of Counter Narcotics	
Counter Narcotics	3
DM of Strategy and Policy	
Strategic Planning	2B
Policy Development	2A
Force Management	3
DM of Security	
Afghan Uniform Police	3
Afghan Border Police	2B
GDPSU	3
Anti-Crime	2B
ANCOP-(G)	3
Operations Planning	2A
Force Readiness	3
APPF	N/A
ALP	N/A

Overall, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is assessed as requiring significant coalition assistance to accomplish its mission, resulting in a rating of CM-3; the MoI achieved this status in 2009. During the reporting period, the majority of departments remained static in CM ratings, while some improved and some regressed.

With the retirement of the Parliamentary Affairs Department, and the addition of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) departments, there are now 26 ministerial development plans. The March 2011 Ministerial Development Review Board rated 14 departments as CM-3, six as CM-2B, three as CM-2A (Public Affairs, Policy Development, and Operations Planning), and one as CM-4 (Facilities).. The ALP and APPF remain unassessed. Finally, the Review Board approved the addition of a Civil Service Ministry Development Plan.

Since his appointment in June 2010, Minister of Interior Bismillah Kahn Mohammadi has taken proactive measures to attack corruption, introduce efficiencies, improve security, increase accountability and transparency, eliminate waste, and decentralize and delegate authority to trustworthy leaders. He championed both the Inherent Law for Officers and NCOs and the ANSF Retirement Act, which were published as law in March 2011. Introduction of retirement regulations and their enforcement led to the retirement of 57 general officers, and replacement of over 30 top ministerial and provincial leaders including three of four deputy ministers and the chief of staff. He has also introduced and promoted core values, a system of discipline and rewards, mandatory basic education, and a robust literacy program. All of these efforts have had a significant positive impact on the professional development and progress of the MoI.

Shaping Transition

**The Afghan National Police: Rising
Numbers but Continuing Problems
in Quality, Ties to Power Brokers,
and Corruption**

Afghan Police By Branch: 4/2011

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE

The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) continues to be the premiere police force in Afghanistan and has improved substantively since the last reporting cycle. ANCOP is meeting its growth objectives through increased recruiting, reduced attrition, and a predictable deployment schedule. The March 2011 total strength for ANCOP exceeds 9,348 personnel, including students in training. Officer and NCO development increased with attendance at commander and staff courses, logistics and specialty training, and literacy training at all levels. Increased unit leadership capabilities, a dedicated training cycle prior to deployments, and command emphasis on quality of life improvements are largely responsible for ANCOP progress.

AFGHAN BORDER POLICE

As of March 2011, the ABP end strength was 19,865. ABP is on track to meet all growth objectives for officers and ABP patrolman, but remains short of non-commissioned officer objectives (3.3K of 4K assigned). NTM-A/CSTC-A is considering options to reallocate training space to close this gap. ABP attrition has consistently remained below 2.5 percent per month over the last 12 months, and was at a 12-month low of 1.5 percent in March 2011.

High attrition continues to challenge the Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Civil Order Police, which experienced attrition rates of 1.5 percent and 2.9 percent respectively in March 2011. It is noteworthy that the ANCOP rate decreased modestly from a high of 6.5 percent in February 2010. The MoI is taking measures to implement policies to address the contributing

AFGHAN UNIFORM POLICE

As of March 2011, the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) end strength is 66,927. AUP is on track to meet all growth objectives for officers and AUP patrolman, and is capable of achieving 98 percent of its 2011 NCO objectives under current training fill rates. NTM-A/CSTC-A and MOI continue to push the recruiting base to ensure all available training seats are used. AUP attrition remains the lowest of all police pillars at 0.7 percent in March 2011. It has averaged 1.1 percent attrition since October 2009, which is below the attrition objective of 1.4 percent.

ANP Missions & Status in 2/2011

Police ANP Mission: The Afghan National Police is primarily responsible for maintaining civil order and law enforcement. The police will work with the people to actively combat crime and disorder (including terrorism and illegal armed activity); prevent the cultivation, production and smuggling of narcotics; and fight corruption. The police will ensure the sovereignty of the State and protect its borders. (Afghan National Police Strategy, dated December, 2010)

- **Strength: 118.8K (as of 08 FEB 2011); Approved Growth 134K by NOV 11**
- **Growth of ~ 24K since NOV 09**
- **Structure: (4) Main Pillars, (2) Sub Pillars**
- **59 Concurrent Courses at 37 Separate Training Sites (see map)**
 - ~ 8.5K Police in Training per day on average
 - ~ 4.1K Police complete training per month on average
 - ~ \$4.5B Planned Infrastructure Development for > 700 Units
- **Fielded since Nov ,,09: 17,728 Weapons; 6,790 Vehicles; 76,208 Communications Assets**

Pillars of ANP Development

Main Pillars:


- ***Afghan Uniform (Civilian) Police (AUP)***—(~ 62K as of 14 FEB 2011):(7) ANP Regional Zones, (34) Provinces, Traffic Police, and Fire and Rescue Department
- ***Afghan National Civil Order Police (Gendarmerie) (ANCOP)***—(~ 7.9K as of 14 FEB 2011): COIN with military support; nationally deployable; (4) Brigades; (21) Battalions (Kandaks)
- ***Afghan Border Police (ABP)***—(~ 19K as of 14 FEB 2011): Border Security Zone (up to 50Km into Afghanistan); Border Posts; Customs Operations
- ***Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP)***—(~6K as of 18 FEB 2011): Investigative and Police Intelligence capacities

Sub Pillars:

- ***Afghan Public Protection Force***—protect key infrastructure, facilities, construction projects and personnel; assumes responsibilities from Private Security Companies (PSC) across Afghanistan
- ***Afghan Local Police***—secure local communities; temporary capability; no arrest or investigative authority; cannot use in offensive operations; “neighborhood watch with guns”

Funding the ANP: International Contributions to LOFTA


Since 2002, the international community has contributed about \$1.5 billion to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which is administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to fund recurrent ANP costs — primarily salaries, allowances, and benefits. The following chart shows funding through September 30, 2010:



Source: SIGAR analysis of UNDP’s quarterly and annual LOTFA reports.

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.


ANP Disbursements Through September 30, 2010




Source: UNDP's quarterly and annual LOTFA reports.

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

ANP Growth: 10/2008 to 11/2010



ANP Growth: 3/2010 to 3/2011



In late October 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A discovered a procedural discrepancy in the personnel accounting process for ANP resulting in some double-counting. As a result, the end-strength numbers for August-October 2010 were restated. NTM-A/CSTC-A subsequently sponsored an assessment team that validated current accounting processes and corrective actions. They validated both the ANP end-strength and the accuracy of the November and December 2010 strengths. As of March 31, 2011, the ANP reached an end-strength of 125,589, exceeding by 3,589 the expected March position of 122,000.

SIGAR Finds Critical Uncertainties as to Real ANP Strength: 4/2011

The Mol is automating its human resource records and developing personnel management systems to improve ANP accountability. However, the Mol cannot determine the actual number of personnel that work for ANP because it has been unable to reconcile personnel records or verify data in four different personnel systems and databases.

As of September 30, 2010, the number of ANP records in the different systems, databases, and processes ranged from 111,774 to 125,218.

The Mol's systems and databases contain basic ANP personnel, biometric, identification card, and registration information. However, these systems and databases are decentralized and the records and data in them are incomplete, unverified, and unreconciled.

Since 2002, UNDP has disbursed almost \$1.26 billion from LOTFA to fund ANP salaries and other costs. Although the Mol continues to make progress automating the payroll and payment processes, the Mol's payroll system currently provides little assurance that only those ANP personnel who work are paid and that LOTFA funds are only used to reimburse eligible ANP payroll and other costs. As of September 2010, about 21 percent of ANP were still paid by cash and neither Mol nor UNDP have verified payroll data and cannot confirm that only ANP who work have been paid.

UNDP, as the LOTFA administrator, has overall responsibility for oversight and monitoring of LOTFA funds and the reimbursement of eligible ANP costs. However, UNDP cannot confirm that LOTFA funds reimbursed only eligible ANP costs and its reports do not provide sufficient evidence that all audit findings are resolved; thus, additional procedures are needed to improve the oversight and monitoring of ANP payroll costs and LOTFA funds. Until these issues have been addressed, there is limited assurance that only ANP personnel who worked received pay and that LOTFA funds were used to reimburse only eligible ANP costs.

The Mol is developing personnel and payroll systems to support the ANP. Current efforts to account for, automate, and centralize all personnel and payroll data and records will further aid the sustainment of ANP. However, the Mol will continue to face challenges gathering personnel and payroll data, centralizing the data within a system, and integrating into other systems until long-standing issues with security, infrastructure, and coordination are addressed.

Table 1: Number of ANP Human Resource/Personnel Records as of September 2010

Source of ANP Human Resource/Personnel Data	No. of ANP Records
Manual Mol human resource records	111,774
Personnel identification card/registration database	125,218
PERSTAT report - Assigned ^a	120,504
Afghanistan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS)	113,225

Source: Mol Human Resources and Biometric Center.

Note: ^a Does not include more than 8,100 non-*tashkil* ANP that are reported by Mol Human Resources.


Table 2: Number of Registered ANP and Status of HRIS database as of September 2010

ANP Rank	Identification Card/ Registration Database	HRIS	Not Yet Included in HRIS
Officers	22,698	16,709	5,989
Sergeants	25,761	7,556	18,205
Patrolmen	76,759		76,759
Total	125,218	24,265	100,953

Source: Mol Registration ID Unit.


Note: Total includes 1,700 officers and sergeants in both databases but no longer on the force.

ANP Effectiveness 10/2010




ANP Capability in the Field as of 23/2/2011

Afghan Uniformed Police: Districts and Precincts



Army Kandaks Assessment



Commander's Unit Assessment Tool Ratings



As of 14 Apr 11

Next ANSF assessment available on 2 June 2011

UNCLASSIFIED

32

ANP Partnering 3/2011

Figure 14: Afghan National Police Partnering Status (March 2011)

ANP Priority Units	Embedded	Partnered	Mentored	Uncovered	Total Partnered ANP Units	Total Units in KTD
AUP District Units in KTD	25	65	14	12	104	116
AUP Precinct Units in KTD	13	30	21	24	64	88
ABP Kandaks	7	19	4	4	30	34
ANCOP Kandaks	4	3	9	3	16	19
Provincial Response Companies (PRC)	0	10	1	0	11	11
Grand Total	49	127	49	43	225	268

Source: ANA & ANP Fielded Force Effectiveness 1 MAR 2011
Date: 1 March 2011

In March 2011, 225 out of 268 (83 percent) priority ANP units across Afghanistan were partnered.

There are three descriptive terms used to describe the various types of partnering and mentorship. “Embedded partnering” is the most intensive form of partnering, where the ANA or ANP share the same battle space with their ISAF partners and live on the same installation. Embedded partnering results in a unified, combined force with Afghans often in the lead; builds trusting relationships quickly based on shared risks and responsibilities; capitalizes on the combined team’s strengths and offsets each other’s weaknesses; and allows the population to see coalition forces as supporting (not leading) ANSF. Embedded partnering is arguably the most effective training approach; however, it requires a greater number of ISAF troops to support and is typically leveraged for Afghan units that require additional training assistance. Ideally, as Afghan units become more capable, independent, and effective, the intensity of partnering relationships is not as critical, and the same objectives can be achieved through regular partnering or mentoring.

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“Mentoring” refers to an assigned relationship between an Afghan unit and an ISAF advisory team – typically called an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) for ANA units and a Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (POMLT) for ANP units. The ISAF partner unit shares no operations guidance, strategy, information or intelligence with its ANSF counterpart. Still, while not as focused as partnering or embedded partnering, the mentoring relationship is still extremely valuable. It is normally applied for Afghan units that, while capable, still require advanced professional development and advice in the field, as well as enabler support. Each POMLT and OMLT is normally deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum of six months. POMLTs are typically composed of 15-20 personnel and OMLTs are typically composed of 11-28 personnel (depending on the type and function of the partnered ANA unit).

ANP Readiness Ratings 2/2011

Figure 17: Afghanistan National Police Rating Definition Levels (February 2011)

Rating Definition Level (RDL)*	AUP	ABP	ANCOP	Total
Independent	0	0	0	0
Effective with Advisors	52	8	10	70
Effective with Assistance	65	14	0	79
Developing	33	6	6	45
Established	1	2	0	3
Not Assessed	1	4	1	6
TOTAL	152	34	17	203

* Includes AUP field units (no HQs) in Key Terrain Districts, all ANCOP and all ABP.

Source: IJC AAG - CUAT

Date: 23 February 2011

The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and the Afghan Border Police (ABP). Generally, the AUP train and perform traditional community policing functions. In contrast, ANCOP undergo more intense training, are better armed, are deployable around the country, and have a paramilitary capability that makes them uniquely well-suited for COIN operations. Finally, ABP perform border control and customs functions.





The number of assessed AUP units has increased. Of the priority AUP field units assessed (those that are not headquarters), 52 of 152 were rated as “Effective with Advisors”; and 65 were rated as “Effective with Assistance” (Figure 17). During the most recent CUAT cycle, there was only one unassessed partnered unit because it was new. The overall trend in effectiveness for ANCOP *kandaks* is improving with fewer unassessed units and more units rated “Effective with Advisors.” The number of units with this rating has increased from three to ten since September 2010 (Figure 17). Moreover, this year over 20 additional ANCOP units will thicken as personnel now in the training pipeline join their assigned units.

The trends are also positive within the ABP, with more units reporting via the CUAT. Eight out of 34 ABP *kandaks* are currently rated as “Effective with Advisors”; and 14 are rated as “Effective with Assistance.” There are currently four unassessed ABP units from RC-South. Partners should join these units in summer 2011.

Police Training Centers




ANP Training Comparison: 2009-2010



Developing the systems and institutions to professionalize and grow the force


ANP Developments

ANP TRAINING GRADUATES BY PROGRAM



Source: NTMA/CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.

ANP WEAPONS FIELDIED



Note: These weapons were transferred to ANP forces from 4/1/2010 to 6/23/2010.
Source: NTMA/CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.

ANP RADIOS AND VEHICLES FIELDIED

Vehicles

Light and medium tactical vehicles	988
Up-armored HMMWV ^a	818

Radios

VHF radios ^b	1,531
HF radios ^c	119




a. Up-armored HMMWVs include M1151, M1152, and M1152 ambulance models.

b. Very High Frequency (VHF) radios include various configurations of Motorola or ICOM radio systems.

c. High Frequency (HF) radios include various configurations of CODAN radio systems.

Source: NTMA/CSTCA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.

ANP Progress by Area



Infrastructure, equipment, local acquisition, contract management, funding, logistics, and maintenance are on track but challenges remain

Afghan Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police (3/21/2011)

Local security programs supporting the Afghan Government have been successful in protecting remote area populations, preventing their exploitation by the insurgency, and expanding government influence. These programs integrate bottom-up village and district defense systems, and serve as a complement to top-down, national-level ANSF development. U.S. Special Operations Forces launched the VSO initiative in early 2010, and in September 2010, the Ministry of Interior assumed control of the ALP initiative. The two programs are complementary, and the insurgency increasingly views them as a significant threat to their ability to influence the population.

VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

The VSO initiative is a bottom-up Afghan Ministry of Interior program that facilitates local security and development at the village level, connecting the local population to district governance. VSO is grounded in the tradition of rural Afghan villages providing for their own security, and focuses on Afghan communities with the will but not the means to resist the insurgency through grass-roots initiatives, especially in areas that have limited ANSF and ISAF presence.

The VSO model uses Afghan and ISAF personnel living in the community full-time to help improve security, governance, and development in more remote areas of Afghanistan. The VSO initiative follows a four-phase process: shape, hold, build, and transition. The shape phase begins with an assessment of the village and surrounding area and ends with the establishment of a U.S. special operations force VSO site within the village. This phase is characterized by the building of rapport, trust, and relationships. During the hold phase, VSO personnel focus on protecting the population and laying the foundation for follow-on development and governance efforts.


The build phase links villages to district and provincial governments through institutional arrangements, such as district and provincial *shuras* and carefully-designed and managed development projects using CERP funds and other resources. Finally, the transition phase expands the influence of village stability to other areas throughout the district, while transitioning responsibility for security, development, and governance to the Afghan Government.

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

President Karzai established the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program under the Afghan Ministry of Interior in August 2010. The program incorporated previous village-level defensive programs, e.g., the Community Defense and Local Defense Initiatives. The ALP program is a village-focused program that enhances COIN efforts by enabling rural areas with limited or no ANSF presence to provide for their own local security.

The ALP program is a complement to the VSO program. Although not all VSO sites have ALP programs, all current ALP sites are part of an existing VSO. The U.S. Government supports the ALP through ASFF funding to the Ministry of Interior and through training and technical assistance. The program is overseen by the Afghan Government and jointly executed by U.S. and Afghan Special Forces.

Afghan Local Police Sites (3/21/2011)




District ALP sites fall under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior and thus are under the authority of the given district's chief of police, who oversees both the ALP site training and validation process in addition to the formal ALP member screening process. ALP members are nominated by a representative local *shura*, are vetted by the Afghan intelligence service, and are trained by and partnered with designated U.S. forces. Currently, the Afghan Government has a *tashkil* authority for 10,000 personnel for the ALP. As of March 31, 2011, there are 34 validated/operational districts, 29 districts pending validation, and 14 pending MOI approval for ALP elements.

Continued expansion and success of the ALP program faces several challenges. The Taliban and other insurgent groups have attempted to counter ALP growth and success with a campaign that includes targeted assassinations, night letters, intimidation, and kidnappings. There are also several areas where intra-tribal and inter-tribal tensions have prevented expansion of the ALP.

Even so, the impact of ALP on promoting local security and eroding insurgent influence is significant. Recognizing this, COMISAF, in December 2010, placed a conventional U.S. Army infantry battalion, 1-16 Infantry, under the operational control of Combined Forces Special Operations Command Center – Afghanistan to expand the ALP program rapidly. The increase of the ALP authorization from 10,000 to 30,000 is an integral part of the COIN campaign, complements the gains made by conventional ISAF and ANSF forces and will help facilitate irreversible transition.

ANP vs. Functioning Justice System: Detention Issues


DETAINEES IN DISTRICT DETENTION CENTERS, AS OF JUNE 30, 2010



Notes: Kabul does not have district detention centers; it has gender-specific provincial detention centers. As of 7/10/2010, the Kabul Female Prison and Detention Center held 143 women—104 convicts and 39 detainees. The Kabul Detention Center held 409 men, all detainees. An additional 55 male detainees were being held at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center.


Source: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.

INMATES IN SELECT PROVINCIAL PRISONS, AS OF JUNE 30, 2010 (PERCENT)




Overcrowding of Prison Facilities

CONVICTS IN PROVINCIAL PRISONS, AS OF JUNE 30, 2010




Source: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.




Notes: Numbers are averages. Minimum acceptable one-person space (5.5 m²) determined by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Source: AIHC, "The Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan," 6/27/2010, pp. 7-8.

Afghan Views of ANP: 2009 vs. 2010


Favorable Views of the ANP: Regional Change




% Saying ANP Ensure Security in their Area



Presence of and Attitudes Towards the ANP




% Saying the ANP is Capable of Dealing with...



Afghan Views of Police Activity: 2009 vs. 2010

What kind of task are the police in your area performing more often?




Afghans divide in perceptions of primary police functions in their community – 32 percent say, the ANP is chiefly performing law-enforcement and crime fighting duties, 30 percent primarily see the ANP performing counter-insurgency duties and 31 percent say, the force is doing both equally. This has shifted since last year, when more (38 percent) said that police were engaged in law enforcement duties than in counter-insurgency obligations (24 percent). There is a perception that police increasingly have competing responsibilities related to counter insurgency, which conflicts with traditional law and order activities.

Counter insurgency responsibilities are higher in the South, where the fighting is centered. In the South West, for example, 59 percent say that the ANP primarily is working as a counter insurgency force, a jump of 15 points since last year. Only 22 percent in the South West say that the police are focused mainly on law-enforcement and crime fighting duties.

In a separate question asking to what extent the police are engaged in fighting insurgents, more than three-quarters of Afghans (76 percent) report that the ANP in their area are involved in fighting insurgents “a great deal” or “somewhat” (unchanged since last year). But a majority (55 percent) thinks that they should be spending even more time fighting insurgents. Only 10 percent think they should do this activity less.

Police Activities In Your Area




Seven in 10 report that the ANP in their area are involved in investigating routine non-violent and violent crime; only 15 percent think that the police should spend less time investigating these routine crimes, with the rest about evenly split on whether they should spend more time or are spending the right amount.

Sixty-five percent also report that the ANP in their area are involved in fighting organized crime, the same as a year ago. Roughly 6 in 10 report that the police are involved in preventing inter-ethnic and inter-tribal violence (up 4 points since last year); fighting the narcotics trade (unchanged); eradicating poppy (down 4 points); and fighting corruption (up 5 points). For each of these activities, more than 4 in 10 say that the police should be spending more time on them, and fewer than 20 percent think that they should be spending less time.

Finally, 58 percent report that the ANP in their area are involved with preventing violence against women in their area. Thirty-six percent of Afghans think that the police should spend more time on this activity; 20 percent say less time.

Afghan Views of Police Quality: 2009 vs. 2010

% Saying the ANP is Capable of Dealing with...



In a separate question about police capability, 9 out of 10 Afghans see ANP officers in their area as capable of coping with small crime (44 percent “very” capable), stable since last year. Fewer but still two-thirds think that officers in their area are capable of coping with big, organized crime, also unchanged since last year – but only 21 percent say that their local police are “very” capable of dealing with this sort of crime, down 5 points. Sixty-two percent think that their local police are capable of coping with the insurgency, up 5 points since last year; but just 22 percent see the police as “very” capable in this area.

Most Afghans, 82 percent, think that the police in their area understand the law, albeit with room for improvement; just 30 percent think that they understand it “very” well. Still, only 4 percent say that the police don’t understand the law well at all. It’s crucial: As reported, a sense that the police understand the law is the strongest single predictor of views of the ANP as effective.


Three-quarters also think that the police in their area understand what their duties are, 70 percent think that their local police are well-trained, 65 percent think that they are well-equipped, and 63 percent think that they are able to perform their duties without assistance from international forces.

However, less than a third say that the police are “very” well-trained, “very” well-equipped, or “very” well-prepared to take over duties from international forces, showing that further improvements are needed.


In terms of salaries, a majority (63 percent) of Afghans think that the police should be paid more than the teachers, which is similar to a question asked last year in which 66 percent also said that the police should be paid more. Furthermore, more Afghans think that the police should be paid more than the doctors, ANA members and other government workers than those who think that they should be paid less (doctors by 44-34 percent; ANA by 36-27 percent; government workers by 44-25). The issue of payment too, is important – three-quarters of Afghans think that if the police in their area were better paid by the government, there would be less corruption within the ranks.

Afghan Trust in ANP : 2009 vs. 2010


Who would you turn to first to report the following crimes?



Reasons For Not Reporting Crime to the ANP




% of Afghans Who Report Being the Victim of...



	Victim	Non-victim
Favorable view of ANP	72%	81%
Confidence in ANP	62	72
Respect for ANP	63	75
ANP understand the law	74	84
ANP understand their duties	69	76
ANP properly trained	61	71
ANP can perform duties		
Without assistance	53	65
ANP are honest	68	79

ANP Corruption Remains Critical, But Must Be Kept in Context

% Reporting Corruption Among...



Afghans have the lowest confidence in their local police's ability to deal with corruption. Fifty-five percent rate them as either "somewhat" or "very" capable of dealing with this issue. Far fewer call their police "very" capable in this domain compared to last year, just 17 percent, and down 7 points since last year.

In a separate question that asked respondents to choose whether the ANP are mainly honest or corrupt, more than three-quarters of Afghans said that the ANP were "entirely" or "mostly" honest; however just 21 percent took the top rating, "entirely honest." (Far fewer, 3 percent, said, they were "entirely corrupt.") Combined with the previous result, this suggests that Afghans see corruption within the force as significant, but perhaps more limited to a circumscribed set of bad actors, rather than endemic.


In the most positive note on this issue, only 8 percent of Afghans say, the ANP have become more corrupt in the last year, while more than three times as many say, they have become more honest. The rest see no change.

A majority of Afghans – 65 percent – define payment in exchange for favorable treatment as corruption. But nearly 3 in 10 think that whether this constitutes corruption depends on the situation, and 6 percent see it as acceptable behavior. This ambiguity may complicate efforts to attack the problem.

Regardless of its acceptability to some Afghans in some circumstances, perceptions of corruption are widespread. Eighty-five percent think, there is corruption among government employees in Afghanistan. Fewer see corruption in the ANP – but still 60 percent report corruption ("a lot of" 22 percent, or "some" 38 percent) among the police. Substantially fewer think there is corruption among ANA members, 42 percent; or among teachers in Afghanistan, 40 percent.


Despite the many positive indicators, many Afghans see substantial room for improvement by the police. In terms of direct corruption, 16 percent say, they or someone in their family have been asked by a police officer for money or a gift to avoid an arrest or fine; 12 percent say, they have been asked for money or a gift in order to receive police protection for their business or home; and 13 percent say, they have been asked for a bribe for some other reason. Twenty-six percent say, they or someone in their family have experienced at least one of these. In the South West, reports of bribes rise dramatically, with at least 40 percent reporting that they have been asked for each of the types of bribes measured.

Perceptions of Change in Police Corruption



ANP are Limited by a Failed Justice System and Lack of Rule of Law

Favorable Views of Afghan Institutions



Notably, Afghans by more than a 20-point margin think that corruption in their area is more an issue among the courts that enforce justice (57 percent) than it is among the police force (36 percent). Also, by 55-39 percent, more say, the police are doing their jobs and it is the fault of the courts that more criminals are not brought to justice, than vice versa. Given the shared role of the police and the courts in the criminal justice system, these results suggest that efforts to strengthen the rule of law sector would be well-served by a complimentary focus on the court system, together with the performance of the ANP.

Regional differences come into play, particularly in the South West. There, respondents divide evenly on whether they think corruption is a bigger problem among the ANP in their area (49 percent) or the courts (50 percent). Moreover, the South West is the only region where people are more apt to believe that the courts are doing their job and it is the fault of the police that more criminals are not brought to justice (59 percent) than the reverse (41 percent).


...Overall, 76 percent say, the central government has a strong presence in their area, 73 percent say, the district government has a strong presence, 67 percent say, the ANA has a strong presence, and 54 percent say, the courts have a strong presence in their area. These compare with 80 percent who say, the police have a strong local presence. As noted, presence of the police is one of the two strongest independent factors in viewing the ANP favorable.

Shaping Transition

Progress with the Afghan Local Police

Afghan Perceptions of Potential Advantage of Local Police/ALP Presence

Proximity to a Police Station




Access to police and to other public facilities in Afghanistan is up across the board, a reflection of the reconstruction efforts being brought to bear.

Just more than half of Afghans (52 percent) now are within a half-hour of a police station, a jump of 11 points since last year. And while last year 28 percent of Afghans lived more than an hour from a police station, that number has now dropped to just 18 percent. Proximity to police independently predicts favorability ratings of the ANP, but not its effectiveness or confidence scores.

...Fewer than one in five Afghans say, local watch groups supported by the police have been established in their area, but where they have been created these groups had shown success: Among those who have such a group locally, 61 percent say, it has improved security. Far fewer, 28 percent, say that it has had no impact, or say that it has made security worse (9 percent).

Potential Impact of Local Watch Groups




More broadly, in the country as a whole, 51 percent think that police-supported local watch groups would help improve security in their area. While this is unchanged since last year, there are regional differences. The perception that watch groups are helpful for security has dropped in the South West, West and North, by 10, 11 and 7 points, respectively. This has been offset, however, by a 20-point jump in the Central/Hazarjat region.

Also, only 8 percent now think that these groups would make security worse, a drop of 10 points, and one that has occurred in almost every region. And in another positive note, among those who think watch groups could improve security, 80 percent say, they would be willing to become a member of this type of group, unchanged since last year.

Afghan Local Police Status

As of 19 May 11



Shaping Transition

Progress with the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

ANCOP Unit Strengths: SY1390


3rd Bde Overall: 97%		
HQ	Herat	97%
SSB	Herat	92%
1 st BN (4 co)	Herat	97%
2 nd BN	Herat	109%
3 rd BN	Herat	88%
4 th BN	Herat	96%

Attrition: 4.1%

Attrition Goals:		Achieved:	
1 st QTR FY11	<50%	43.0%	
2 ^d QTR FY11	<35%	35.8%	
3 rd QTR FY11	<30%		
4 th QTR FY11	<22%		

ANCOP HQ: 105%

1st Bde Overall: 97%			Attrition: 1.3%
HQ	Kabul	99%	
SSB	Kabul	94%	
1 st BN	Kabul	97%	
2 nd BN	Kabul	103%	
3 rd BN	Baghlan	97%	
4 th BN (4 co)	Laghman	98%	
5 th BN (4 co)	Jalalabad	95%	
6 th BN	Konduz	99%	
7 th BN (4 co)	Wardak	93%	
8 th BN	MeS	100%	



2nd Bde Overall: 85%		
HQ	Kandahar	79%
SSB:	Kandahar	76%
1 st BN	Kandahar	87%
2 nd BN	Kandahar	84%
3 rd BN	Kandahar	91%
4 th BN	Kandahar	85%
5 th BN (4 co)	Lashkar Gah	158%

Attrition: 0.0%

As of April 2011 PERSTAT	
SY 1390 Auth (5 Bdes):	13,678
Fielded Force:	10,123 (74%)
Training Base:	3,533
Officer - 65%	NCO - 75%
Overall Monthly Attrition:	1.3% (down from 2.9%)

4th Bde Overall: 93%			Attrition: 0.0%
HQ	Gardez	93%	
SSB	Gardez	95%	
1 st BN (4 co)	Gardez	94%	
2 nd BN	Ghazni	94%	
3 rd BN	Sharana	76%	
4 th BN	Gardez	102%	


1st Qtr, SY 1390 Growth Objective: (1-4 Bdes + 6 Coys) 10,318
Apr 2011 Perstat Strength: (1-4 Bdes + 6 Coys) 10,123 (98%)

**Continued ANCOP growth (+775);
 Executing 4th Company Thickening.**

Attrition	
< 1.4%	Green
> 1.4%	Red

Personnel	
> 85%	Green
70%-84%	Yellow
51%-69%	Orange
< 50%	Red

ANCOP NCO Summary: SY1390




Projected to field 6th Brigade (NCOs) by February 2012

Shaping Transition

Looking Towards the Future of the ANSF

Setting a Realistic Campaign Timeline: Success Requires a Sustained Effort Long Beyond 2011 or 2014



- Proof that new strategy and tactics work is possible by mid-2011
- Major transition to ANSF should not begin until force is ready -- probably late 2012 at earliest.
- Slow phase down of US troops must be conditions based.
- Foreign aid and continued funding of most ANSF costs probably needed well beyond 2015.