Shaping the War in Afghanistan: The Situation in the Spring of 2010

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With the Assistance of Nicholas B. Greenough

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Photo: Paula Bronstein/Getty Images
Where We Stand and How We Got There
“The insurgency is confident “…Winning a War of Political Attrition by Reducing International Support

**Most Likely**

- **Goal:** Maintain pressure, enable ISAF withdrawal, population centric approach

- **Operations:**
  - Contest ISAF presence, create opportunity for ISAF withdrawal of forces
  - Steadily increase violence, sustain high profile attacks in urban areas
  - Contest ISAF / GIRoA in north and west
  - Consolidate influence in areas they dominate, accommodate ISAF supporters who shift sides

- **Impact:**
  - ISAF/ANSF able to secure population centers
  - Reduced international support for Afghanistan
  - Growing popular apathy toward GIRoA
  - Reduced support for ANSF
  - Ethnic fissures exacerbated, but militia remain focused on the insurgency

**Most Dangerous**

- **Goal:** Increase pressure, seek to destroy ISAF, punish population

- **Operations:**
  - More aggressively contest ISAF, inflict casualties if forces withdraw
  - Significantly increase high profile attacks in urban areas
  - Foster ethnic rivalries in north and west
  - Impose TB Sharia in areas they dominate, punish ISAF supporters

- **Impact:**
  - Reduced security in population centers
  - Significant loss of international support
  - Open popular frustration with GIRoA
  - Popular enmity toward ANSF
  - Open fighting between ethnic groups, drawing in regional benefactors

...looking toward post-ISAF Afghanistan.

“Time is Running Out....”

- The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces.

**Kinetic Events by Geography**

- Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.
- Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.
- The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09).

**Kinetic Events by Week and Type**

- PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 12 NOV):
  - Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
  - Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
  - 39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
The insurgency in Afghanistan has expanded geographically.

The Insurgency had momentum in much of the South and East.
The Afghan Insurgency at End-2009

We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
• Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
• Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
• AQ provides facilitation, training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 15 DEC):
Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)
Where the Fighting Is: 2009

Afghanistan Security Incidents
January – October 2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data.
71% of initiated security incidents occurred in 10% of total districts.
Casualties at End-2009

In 2009, the number of civilian casualties was the highest since 2001, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA recorded 2,412 deaths in 2009, a 14% increase from the 2,118 deaths recorded in 2008. Of all civilian deaths reported by UNAMA in 2009, 67% were attributed to anti-government elements and 25% to pro-government forces. The remaining 8% could not be attributed to either category because some civilians were killed in cross-fire or when unexploded ordnance detonates.
Insurgent Influence & Capability by District: 2009

- **RED**: Insurgents are effective, strong capability and influence among populace (95 Total)
- **Orange**: Insurgents have demonstrated capability (97 Total)
- **Yellow**: Insurgents have limited capability (162 Total)
- **White**: Not able to assess (45 Total)

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data through 30 Sep 09.
Going South & Aiding the Taliban: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends in Afghanistan 2002-2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2002-2009 UNODC
Area under Poppy Cultivation (ha) and Potential Production of Opium (mt) 2001-2008
Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2009 UNODC
Security Incidents from Poppy Eradication

Source: SIGAR, January 2010, p. 119
How IEDs Became the “Stingers” of this Afghan War
IED Attacks: 2007-2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
Steadily Increasing Size of Charges

- Percentage of IEDs with charge weights over 25 lbs has dramatically increased
- Trend of increasing charge size is an effort by INS to provide a low-cost method of attempting to defeat friendly force armor technology
- The IED is the weapon of choice for the Taliban (akin to the surface to air missile system for the mujahideen)

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009

<table>
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<th>Sep-07</th>
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<td>Ineffective IED Attacks</td>
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IED Attacks with Coalition Force Casualties

IED's Turned In

IEDs Found and Cleared

Ineffective IED Attacks

2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009

JIEDDO J9 – 10 OCT 09
Source: IDA Scrubbed SigActs (CIDNE)
This slide shows the 5 provinces with the most IED activity during March 2010, which accounted for 80% of the IED activity in Afghanistan.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
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Lack of ISAF and Aid Donor Unity of Effort is Another Key “Threat”
Deteriorating Afghan Support for ISAF

- 36.2% negative: 14.7% had a very low opinion of ISAF; 18.8% had a bad opinion.
- 29.3% of Afghans had a very good or good opinion of ISAF; down from 39.5% in 2008.
- 34.4% had a neutral opinion.

ISAF Regional Commands

RC-North

RC-West

RC-Capital

RC-East

RC-South

The Need for Unity of Effort: ISAF in a “Nationwide” War

Source: NATO/ISAF: [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html), as of April 2010
No Room for Caveats: National Commitments in April 2010
46 Troop Contributing Nations ISAF Total Strength: approx 102,500

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<th>Nation</th>
<th>Troop</th>
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<th>Source: NATO/ISAF: <a href="http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html">http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html</a>, as of April 2010</th>
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The Problem of “Stand Aside” Forces: ISAF Troops in Afghanistan by Level of Engagement: April 10, 2010

- US Fully Committed: 61% (62,415)
- Allied Fully Committed: 16% (16,515)
- Allied Caveat & Stand Aside: 23% (23,724)

4,715 of 16,515 fully committed allied forces leave in 2011
just 38 percent rate the work of the United States in Afghanistan positively – up 6 points in the past year, but far below its peak, 68 percent, in 2005. (NATO’s ratings are as low, and flat.) Fifty-one percent have a favorable view of the United States overall – vastly below its high point, 83 percent, in 2005. And U.S. favorability drops to 35 percent in the East and 29 percent in the South (vs. 59 percent in the rest of the country) – again, plummeting where the United States is most actively engaged in combat.

While its performance is rated poorly, most Afghans nonetheless see a need for the United States’ presence in Afghanistan – a view probably informed by very broad rejection of the likely alternative, the Taliban. As noted, more than two-thirds of Afghans support the presence of U.S. forces in their country, slightly up from last year although still below its peak. (Most Afghans last year opposed a troop increase in the abstract; the shift from those views to support for Obama’s surge is mirrored in U.S. public opinion as well.)
UN Estimates that NATO/ISAF is Responsible for Far Smaller Percent of Civilian Deaths

Source: UN and NATO/ISAF as reported by ABC News, 11.1.2010.
But Perceptions Differ on Air Strikes and Where Offensives Have Not Brought Lasting Security

There clearly are many other remaining challenges for Afghanistan and its Western allies alike. In addition to their weak overall ratings and the issue of civilian casualties, 40 percent say U.S. or NATO forces have a strong presence in their area – up 6 points from a year ago, but well below its peak. And just under half, 48 percent, are confident in the ability of these Western forces to provide security and stability – again up a bit, but far below its level in 2006, 67 percent.

Strikingly, just 42 percent in the South and East support the presence of U.S. forces in their area, compared with 78 percent in the rest of the country. Positive ratings of the U.S. performance dive to 16 percent in the South and 28 percent in the East, vs. 45 percent in the rest of the country. And just 26 percent in these two regions are confident in the ability of U.S. and NATO forces to provide security, compared with 56 percent elsewhere.

More generally, support for the presence of U.S. and NATO forces is 18 points higher among people who rate their local security positively, 26 points higher where reports of violence are lower and also 26 points higher where there’s no coalition bombing reported. Similarly, where the presence of U.S. and NATO forces is seen as strong, 67 percent report confidence in the ability of these forces to provide security, 73 percent rate their performance positively and fewer blame Kabul or the West for the country’s violence.

...more Afghans also say the United States and NATO are doing worse, not better, in avoiding civilian casualties, by 43-24 percent. This may reflect dismay over widely publicized individual incidents, such as the bombing of a pair of hijacked fuel tankers in September that killed scores of civilians in Kunduz province. It’s another measure the allies want to move their way if their basic support is to rise.

Civilian Casualties Remain a Critical Problem Although Insurgents Account for 80%: 10/09 to 3/10

Killed

Wounded

A Population-Centric Strategy in Response: “Shape, clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer”

“ISAF, in partnership with GIRoA, conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations, enables an expanded and effective ANSF and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable stability.”
Addressing Six Centers of Gravity

- Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

- Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

- Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

- Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

- Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.

- Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan as A Host Country

• Can influence, but not transform.

• Cannot win as an “occupier:” credible, ongoing transfer to host country leadership and full sovereignty critical.

• Need host country forces to become the face of operations as quickly as possible.

• Tactical gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.

• Must deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values.

• Governance, and government services, are critical, and are most critical at the local and regional level.

• Must find options to deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.
Defining the Concept of Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer

• **Shape**: Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.

• **Clear**: Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;

• **Hold**: Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,

• **Build**: Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.

• **Transfer**: Shift responsibility and activity to Afghan government, ANSF, and Afghan people.
COMISAF Intent

**Purpose**
- Assist GIROA in defeating the insurgency
- Protect the Afghan population and separate insurgent influence
- Gain popular support for the government
- Allow sustainable progress and promote legitimacy
- Prevent the return of transnational terrorists and eliminate potential safe havens

**Method**
- Conduct the operation in three stages: A) Gain the Initiative; B) Achieve Strategic Consolidation; and C) Sustain Security.
- Gain the initiative and stop insurgent momentum in the next 12-18 months
- Establish closer cooperation with the International Community
- Achieve improved integration and CIV-MIL operational cohesion

**Endstate**
- Insurgency defeated to within GIROA’s capacity
- Legitimate governance extends to local levels
- Socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people
- GIROA, with ISAF support, is capable of assuming the lead for security
Campaign Design

Lines of Operation

- **PROTECT** the Population
  - Partner with ANSF to secure population centers
  - Tailor force packages with mentor teams
  - Isolate INS from population
  - Reduce INS intimidation, coercion, persuasion
  - Disrupt INS C2, operations and sustainment

- **ENABLE** Afghan National Security Forces
  - Recruit and train ANSF for COIN operations
  - Build sustainable capacity and capability in ANSF
  - Professionalize the force thru reform/accountability

- **NEUTRALIZE** Malign Influence
  - Identify corruption; assist GiRoA with detainee system
  - Disrupt foreign sponsorship/support to INS in AFG
  - Prevent narco-state; deny narco-profit/reducing foreign fighter networks disrupted, development project extortion reduced and majority of population views GiRoA as legitimate.

- **SUPPORT** Extension of Governance
  - Increase GiRoA institutional capacity; enhance RoL
  - Enhance Provincial Reconstruction Teams
  - Support formal and informal sub-national structures

- **SUPPORT** Socio-economic Development
  - Establish infrastructure and transportation networks
  - Increase employment opportunities/alternative livelihoods
  - Establish education programs
  - Solicit Donors/establish Afghan Development Zones

Operational Objectives


- Accelerate ANA growth to 134,000 by Fall 2010. BPT raise new target ceiling of 240,000 for ANA. BPT raise target strength of ANP to 160,000. Increase mentors, trainers, partners, funding and giRoA participation.

- Malign actors are marginalized, illegitimate governance denied, narcotic profiteering reduced, foreign fighter networks disrupted, development project extortion reduced and majority of population views GiRoA as legitimate.

- Ministries and sub-national governance partnered with civil surge; Afghan reconciliation policy established; local governance mechanisms allow for reintegration; RoL and legitimate, responsive, and accountable governance extended to the population.

- GiRoA revenue collection and resource distribution mechanisms enhanced; infrastructure and road networks bolster licit economy and increase employment; incentive structures increase stability in local communities.

MEANS

- GiRoA and ANSF
- NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations, UNAMA, Partners
- Funding: International Community, Donors, UN, NATO, EU

Phase 3 ends when the insurgency is defeated and no longer able to threaten the survival of GiRoA. Afghanistan is stabilized, legitimate governance extends to local levels, socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people, and GiRoA, with ISAF in support, is capable of assuming the lead for the provision of security.
Campaign Strategy

Protect the Population.
- Prioritize effort in high-density population areas where insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Reduce civilian casualties.

Enable Afghan National Security Forces.
- Accelerate and expand indigenous security force capacity and capability. Partner at every echelon.

Neutralize malign influence.
- Identify and report corruption; forge responsible and accountable governance.

Support extension of governance.
- Gain active support of the population by empowering legitimate sub-national leaders with effective population security measures.

Support socio-economic development.
- Gain active support of the population by creating security conditions that provide space for community-based development opportunities. Connect econ corridors.
Population Density of Afghanistan

Source: globalsecurity.org
Resilient and Complex Insurgency

Kinetic Events

2006: 957
2009: 2968

Taliban operational emphasis:
- Increase murder and intimidation campaign
- Increase targeting of GI RoA officials
- Increase IEDs; reduce freedom of movement
- Reposition beyond ANSF/ISAF areas
Struggle for the Population

Most Threatened Population Areas

Prevent GIROA development and influence
Limit population ability to choose

Elements of Insurgent Influence
- Shadow governance
- Population intimidated and/or coerced
- Insurgents have Freedom of Movement
- Friendly Freedom of Movement limited
- Infrastructure development disrupted
- Economic capacity truncated

Essential Security Influence

Create time and space
Enable population opportunity to choose

Elements of Security Influence
- National thru local governance improved
- Security in key population centers
- Security connected between regions
- Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
- Major infrastructure projects ongoing
- Economic corridor sustainable

ISAF, May 2010
People have to believe that the future under GIROA will be better.

- Detectable increase in confidence of GIROA
  - Improved access to basic services
  - Improved Rule of Law
  - Better access to education
  - More opportunities for legitimate employment
  - Belief that corruption is being addressed
- Growing security and confidence in ANSF
  - People feel safer
  - ANSF trusted; leadership viewed as responsive
- Greater freedom of movement
- GIROA viewed as empowering ANSF
Uncertain Afghan Perceptions of Security

- Although widespread insurgent influence remains, a high percentage (84%) of Afghans feel that security is either good or fair in their mantaq (area).
- Additionally, 44% of respondents rated security as good.
- However, a decline in Afghan perceptions toward ISAF has been evident over the last quarter.
- In December 2009, the perception of ISAF improved from the post-election lows of September 2009.
- However, in March 2010, perceptions dropped again. The very good rating has reached its lowest point since polling began in September 2008.
- 29% of Afghans had a very good or good opinion of ISAF with an additional 34% reporting a neutral rating.
Critical Impact of Civilian Casualties

Civilian Casualties, whether ISAF or Insurgent are responsible, increases violence.

- When ISAF is responsible for civilian casualties kinetic activities increase by 25-65% for 5 months
- When Insurgents are responsible for attacks kinetic activities increase 10 and 25% for 3 months
<table>
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<th>Gain the Initiative</th>
<th>Build ANSF Capacity</th>
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<td>Population-centric counterinsurgency campaign</td>
<td><strong>Gain the Initiative</strong>&lt;br&gt;Restore confidence and build momentum toward Afghans determining their own future</td>
<td><strong>Build ANSF Capacity</strong>&lt;br&gt;Accelerate development and improve effectiveness through embedded partnering</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Gain the Initiative</td>
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<td>• Grow and Develop ANSF</td>
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<td>• Enable Improved Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Improve Unity of Effort and Command</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009 – Set the Conditions</strong>&lt;br&gt;Assessment - Debate</td>
<td><strong>2010 – Shift in Momentum</strong>&lt;br&gt;Decision - Resources</td>
<td><strong>Integrate civil, military and International Community efforts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Build capacity and confidence in all levels of GIRoA</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shape: Refocusing the ISAF and Afghan Government Response to Focus on 46? 80? 121? Key Districts
Shape

In the Shape phase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics and the tribes relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and the economic status of a given area.

• Develop mix of US, NATO/ISAF, and host country deployments needed to create conditions where the force can credibly clear the insurgents.

• Limit insurgent ability to reinforce and disperse.
Priorities for Shaping Operations in Afghanistan

• Combined IJC and Afghan Government planning teams identified 80 districts as key terrain.

• Key terrain is defined in military terms as those areas that afford a marked advantage to whichever party controls them, are those districts where the bulk of the population is concentrated, and that contain centers of economic productivity, key infrastructure, and key commerce routes connecting such areas to each other and to the outside world.

• These districts roughly follow the line of Highways 1, 4, and 7 through the most densely populated portions of the country.

• Supplementing the 80 Key Terrain districts are an additional 41 districts identified as areas of interest. In general these are districts that for a variety of reasons exert influence on Key Terrain districts to a degree that renders it necessary to focus information collection and operational resources upon them to support operations in the Key Terrain districts.

• Focus on these 121 districts does not imply that what happens in the rest of the country is unimportant, but it does indicate that the focus of the IJC operations is concentrated in those areas that have been identified by combined Afghan and ISAF planning efforts as the most critical to success. Operational assessment necessarily focuses upon these areas.

• Population sympathizes with the Afghan government in 24% (29 of 121) districts.

• ISAF is working closely with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to coordinate and synchronize governance and development in the 48 focus districts prioritized for 2010.
Terrain vs. Population Afghanistan
Violence is sharply above the seasonal average for the previous year an 87% increase from February 2009 to March 2010 - partly due to mild winter, and partly due to operations in Helmand and preparation for operations in Kandahar.
IED Events Continue to Rise: 10/09 to 3/10

- IED attacks and associated casualties decreased compared to the last reporting period but were still high compared to the same period of the previous year. IEDs continue to cause the most civilian and military casualties.

- IED events increased markedly in 2009. The overall number of events was two times higher in December 2009 compared to 2008. This increase led to an increase in the total number of casualties by 55%, with a 123% increase in international partner casualties.

- January to March 2010 saw a 16% increase in IED use, mainly caused by central Helmand operations where insurgents prepared an IED-based defense.

Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts

Key Terrain Districts (80)
Area of Interest Districts (41)
Unfinished Road
Trends in Key Districts: 12/09 vs. 4/10

Support for Afghan Government

Comparative Security

### Criteria for Assessing Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color Code</th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Full Authority</td>
<td>Sustainable Development</td>
<td>Secure Environment</td>
<td>Population supports Afghan Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>Dependent Growth</td>
<td>Occasional Threats</td>
<td>Population sympathizes with Afghan Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimal Growth</td>
<td>Frequent Threats</td>
<td>Population Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gray</td>
<td>Dysfunctional</td>
<td>Stalled Growth</td>
<td>Dangerous Environment</td>
<td>Population sympathizes with Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Nonexistent</td>
<td>Population at Risk</td>
<td>Insecure Environment</td>
<td>Population Supports Insurgency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

District Assessment Model


Population actively supporting Govt and Security Forces: Green
Population sympathizing with Govt and Security Forces: Blue
Population neutral/on the fence: Yellow
Population sympathizing with Insurgents: Blue
Population actively supporting Insurgency: Red

*An area outside the key terrain, activity tracked but not formally assessed: Afghan efforts with international assistance are likely to be successful in these areas; or areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment.
Defining Key Districts

• **Key Terrain:**
  – The combination of a concentrated population and physical infrastructure that the control of, and support from, provides a marked advantage to either the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) or the insurgents, to include:
    • Population centers
    • Commerce routes
    • Production areas
    – Border crossing points

• **Area of Interest:**
  – The 41 Area of Interest Districts represent a second tier of districts representing combination of a concentrated population and physical infrastructure that the control of, and support from, provides a marked advantage to either the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) or the insurgents.
  – Operationally, these are districts where deliberate comprehensive Governance, Development, and Security activities are not planned but where they are occurring or are planned to occur, such as districts which correspond to national and sub-national efforts to develop Government, Development and Security, includingFocused District Development (FDD) process, District Delivery, District Support Teams (DSTs), and districts of concern for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). These districts are generally adjacent to Key Terrain Districts or have a direct influence on activities in the key terrain.

• **White Areas:**
  – An area outside the key terrain, activity tracked but not formally assessed: Afghan efforts with international assistance are likely to be successful in these areas
  – Areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment.
Overall District Assessments

In All of Afghanistan

In 80 Key Districts

Activity trends in key terrain are consistent with overall activity levels.
ISAF Concept of Operations: April 2010

Shape:

Looking at Helmand, Kandahar, and the East
Central Helmand Update

- Progress is slow, but steady
- Violence and intimidation
- Limited GIRoA capacity limiting governance and development
- Population tentative, but responding positively

GIRoA gaining credibility and earning legitimacy is a slow process.
Kandahar in Context

- 2nd largest city (~850,000)
- Pashtun Heartland
- Taliban spiritual home
- Strategic / trading crossroads
- Historic / symbolic significance
- AQ historic link – Taliban era

- Dominant Pashtun Influence
Focus on Kandahar

Why Kandahar?
Why is it planned this way?
Terrain vs. Population: Kandahar
Key Challenges

- Economic disparity between elites and populace
- Extreme patronage network
- Monopolization of contracts
- Criminality and illicit economy dominates
- Frequent land disputes
- Distorted commodity value-chains
- Inadequate Infrastructure
Governance is a Main Effort

- Commitment from the Afghan government
  Reinforce key CIVMIL partnerships with GIRoA at all levels

- GIRoA capacity to deliver services
  Channel International Community resources through GIRoA ministries

- Contracting and corruption
  Scrutinize new contracts and broaden range of beneficiaries

- Ability to mitigate malign powerbrokers
  Strengthen legitimate political bodies; reduce informal influences
Tribes, Power Brokers, and Fragmentation

Struggles for power and influence both leverage and exacerbate tribal rivalries

Major Tribes and Subtribes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Durani</th>
<th>Panipai</th>
<th>Ghilzai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popalzai</td>
<td>Noorzai</td>
<td>Baluch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barakzai/Mohammedzai</td>
<td>Altai</td>
<td>Hotak (Ghilzai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alikozai</td>
<td>Alikozai</td>
<td>Khantee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achakzai</td>
<td>Ishaqzai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community Rivalries & Disputes

Durani (internal feud)

Popalzai (internal feud)

Noorzai vs. Achakzai

Mohamand vs. Popalzai

Alikozai vs. Popalzai

Durrani vs. Ghilzai

Alikozai vs. Popalzai

Alikozai vs. Alikzizai

Noorzai vs. Alikzizai

Struggle for power and influence both leverage and exacerbate tribal rivalries.
Setting a Realistic Campaign Timeline

Change will not be visible day to day; will emerge over months

Illustrative

GIROA CAPACITY

Discernable Change (Internal)

US Force Closure

Kandahar City

Arghandab

Zhari Panjwa’i

Daman

May 2010

Jul 2010

Sep 2010

Nov 2010

Governance and Development

Security force levels

District Delivery Program

ISAF, May 2010
Afghan Popular Trust in the Afghan Government in RC East: April 2010

Largest deployment of PAKMIL forces on the western border of Pakistan in the nation’s history, with over 130,000 PAKMIL deployed to the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). More than 100,000 PAKMIL troops were moved from the eastern border with India.
Clear: Creating the New Security Capabilities Needed to Provide Lasting Security
In the clear phase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow.

Carefully coordinated international forces and host country security forces eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.

ISAF will focus on 80 of 364 districts in 2010. Has not identified the districts, but are key population centers.
In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of mid September 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 93,980 personnel. This represents 70% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by October 2010.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA and the ANA leads 62% of joint operations.

ANA and ANP Casualties: 2007-2009

ANA

From September 21 to December 27, 2009, there were 238 ANA casualties, according to IJC: 173 soldiers wounded in action and 65 killed in action. The number of ANA casualties decreased by 46% from the preceding quarter. The greatest number of casualties occurred in Helmand.

ANP

From September 21 to December 27, 2009, there were 258 ANP casualties, according to IJC: 155 personnel wounded in action and 103 killed in action. Total ANP casualties decreased by 52% from the preceding quarter. Casualties were concentrated in the southern provinces. The greatest number of casualties occurred in Helmand.

From October 1 to December 31, 2009, the ANA fielded 1,791 radios, 980 vehicles, and 15,097 weapons), according to CSTC-A. The only weapons that the ANA procured this quarter were 12,305 M16A4 rifles. The largest difference in equipment fielded was the number of weapons, which was more than seven times as many as last quarter. The ANP fielded 309 radios, 520 vehicles, and 1,257 weapons, according to CSTC-A. The only ANP procurements this quarter were 1,515 AK-47 assault rifles and 395 light tactical vehicles.
Continuing Crisis in NTM-A Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Short</th>
<th>Percent Filled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO Staff</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>*44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Trainers</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>*23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Personnel</td>
<td>2,570</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>*95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>*5,209</td>
<td>*3,111</td>
<td>*2,098</td>
<td>*60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not include POMLETs, another critical shortfall. Other personnel does include 419 US Army personnel temporarily assigned to perform trainer duties.

ISAF, As of May 8, 2010
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE:
- Attrition remains an issue
- Highest combat casualties
- Current strength ~104.5K

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE:
- Recruiting success must be maintained
- Highest combat casualties
- Current strength ~119K

ANSF Near Term Growth

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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>*170,591</td>
<td>*195,800</td>
<td>*191,969</td>
<td>*220,100</td>
<td>*223,847</td>
<td>*243,000</td>
<td>*243,000</td>
<td>*305,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>81,020</td>
<td>96,800</td>
<td>94,958</td>
<td>103,600</td>
<td>104,459</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>134,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>89,571</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>97,011</td>
<td>116,500</td>
<td>119,388</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>171,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ISAF, May 2010.
The Afghan National Army is Growing In Strength

A Changing ANA

ISAF, May 2010.

- 7 Corps to 9
- 14 Bde HQ to 22
- 50 Inf Btn to 81
- 44 Inf Co to 72
- 13 CS Btn to 21
- 15 CSS Btn to 22
- 6 Cdo Btn to 9
- 2 SF Btn to 4
- 2 Air Wing to 3
So is the Afghan National Police (ANP)

A Changing ANP

- 4 ANCOP Patrol Btms to 30. Plus 10 new Urban Btms
- 2 Regional AUP HQ to 7
- 52 ABP Cos become 34 Btms
- Increase in Afghan Anti-Crime Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabler</th>
<th>11/10 Goal</th>
<th>11/11 Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>*109,000</td>
<td>*134,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>10,139</td>
<td>18,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>62,297</td>
<td>73,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>22,734</td>
<td>23,397</td>
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<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>5,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enablers</td>
<td>11,725</td>
<td>12,374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ISAF, May 2010.
The Insurgency Reaches a Crisis: 2005-2009

Rising Pace of Kinetic Events

- Insurgency is loosely organized, increasingly effective...but growing more cohesive
- Insurgent strength is enabled by GIRoA weakness
- International support for development has not met population’s expectations
- Security force capacity has lagged behind a growing insurgency
- Perceived insurgent success will draw foreign fighters

In COIN, catch up ball does not work

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
ANSF Force Goals for Beginning of Transfer in October 2011

- ANSF Growth and Development
  - ANP: 134k, delivered at CM-2, balanced against operational requirements
  - ANA: 171.6k, delivered at CM-2, balanced against operational requirements
    - ANAAC: 5.7k end strength, operating at CM-2, integrated C2 system, balanced against operational requirements; CM-1 by 2016
  - ANSF medical system at CM-3, with growth to CM-1 by 2020
  - Systems: Enduring Afghan operated and sustained systems (Capability in terms of DOTMLPF, objective proficiency and other applicable measures)
    - Education & Training at CM-2; Logistics at CM-2; C4I at CM-2; Personnel at CM-2
- Recruiting and Training Commands
  - ANAREC at CM-2
  - ANPREC at CM-2
  - ANATC at CM-2
  - ANPTC at CM-2
- Infrastructure
  - ANA at CM2: 75% in Permanent Facilities
  - 25% in Temporary Facilities (for no more than one winter)
  - ANP at CM2: 60% in Permanent Facilities
  - 40% in Temporary Facilities
MoD & MoI Goals for Beginning of Transfer in October 2011

GIRoA
– ONSC coordinating cross-ministerial issues
– MoD at CM-1
– MoI at CM-1

Leader Development
– Annual attrition goals achieved: ANA 14%, ANP 16%
– NCO and Officer positions filled to at least 85%
– Recruiting systems are established to sustain ANSF force levels and enable future growth if required
– ANA/ANP have achieved 70% approval ratings

Information Engagement
– Ministries and ANSF IE at CM-2
– Ministries and ANSF IE plan present and effective with objectives met
Afghan National Army Trained and Assigned January 2007- November 2008
US ETT Personnel Required and Assigned
August 2007-2013

ISAF OMLTs
June 2007-2013

Fielded
Required

ANA Recruiting, Retention, and Ethnic Balance are Improving

In late May 2009, the MoD reported that the ANA end-strength was 89,521 and as of late March 2010, ANA end-strength had grown to 112,779, which is slightly above its March 2010 goal of 112,700.

• Recruiting within the ANA has largely exceeded goals between October 2009 and March 2010, and in several months the ANA recruited more personnel than they could train.

• Retention within the ANA (defined as the ability to re-contract ANSF personnel) has also been strong as the ANA exceeded its goal of 60% retention for each of the past six months.

• Attrition (defined as the unplanned loss of ANSF personnel), still remains a problem as the ANA has failed to meet desired goals over the last six months.

• Absent without leave (AWOL) personnel remain a significant contributor to attrition rates, with the percentages growing over the past year from six percent in May 2009 to a high of 12% in November 2009. For the last twelve months, AWOL has averaged nine percent.

• NTM-A and the MoD anticipate pay raises, instituted in December 2009, and other initiatives to provide better equipment (including up-armored vehicles and crew-served weapons), will improve attrition rates.
Afghan National Police Trained and Assigned
January 2007-November 2008

PMTs, US Personnel Required and Assigned
June 2007 – November 2008

By December 2009, the ANP achieved their 2009 growth objective of an additional 14,800 police; however, there were insufficient numbers of police to achieve security for the August 20, 2009 election.

The JCMB agreed to immediately increase the end-strength of ANP in Kabul and ten high-threat districts by 14,800 personnel prior to the election. The MoI was able to recruit only 9,800 prior to the election and failed to ensure they all completed basic training on time. Due to the compressed time period available to train these police, 6,900 attended three weeks of the eight-week training program prior to the election and 2,900 received no training. After the election, a plan was implemented to ensure these police completed the entire eight-week program with the first class in September 2009. They are projected to be complete by July 2010.

In January 2010, the JCMB, the international community, and the U.S. Government agreed to the Afghan proposal to grow the ANP to 109,000 by October 2010 and 134,000 by October 2011.
Hold:
Establishing Government, a Rule of Law, and a Broader Definition of Security
Hold

In the hold phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIRoA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul.

International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return.

*Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population.*

Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.
Winning Popular Support is As Much a Challenge as the Threat

Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010

In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives—a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).

Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading in the right direction, 59% of Afghans responded “yes” This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.
“...the latest poll by ABC News, the BBC and ARD German TV finds that sharply more Afghans now see the Taliban as the main source of their country’s strife, while many fewer blame the United States or its allies – significant progress in a central aim of the new commander of U.S. and NATO forces, Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

Another, basic change is larger still: After steep declines in recent years there’s been a 30-point advance in views that the country is headed in the right direction; 70 percent now say so, the most since 2005. Afghans’ expectations that their own lives will be better a year from now have jumped by 20 points, to 71 percent, a new high. And there’s been a 14-point rise in expectations that the next generation will have a better life, to 61 percent.

Many challenges remain. Complaints about official corruption are higher than ever. Views of the United States and NATO’s performance remain poor, with six in 10 rating their work negatively. And accounts of local violence have held steady, with many Afghans still blaming allied forces for civilian casualties. All these raise the question of whether the overall improvements can hold as Hamid Karzai’s honeymoon fades and the fighting continues."

...There’s also a continued sense that, whatever the problems, living conditions are better now than they were under the Taliban – 70 percent say so. Two-thirds also say the rights of women have improved; six in 10 report greater freedom to express political views.

But fewer than half report better economic opportunities or security from crime and violence than in the Taliban days, underscoring these continued challenges.

Another result on security points the same way. In 2005, 72 percent of Afghans rated their personal security from crime and violence positively. A year ago that fell to 55 percent. Today it’s still at 55 percent – stabilized, at least, but still well below its best, or where millions of Afghans clearly want it to be.

Afghans’ better hopes for the future, as noted, could also reflect hopes that the renewed Western commitment will ultimately resolve their country’s strife. Moreover, in addition to the U.S./NATO efforts, this poll find a 12-point rise in confidence in local commanders and their militia to provide security – a result that may reflect efforts by some local militia, called arbakai, to oppose the Taliban.
Afghan’s Still Support Their Government and the ANSF, and the US/ISAF Rating Has Improved

Views of the United States and NATO’s performance remain poor, with six in 10 rating their work negatively. And accounts of local violence have held steady, with many Afghans still blaming allied forces for civilian casualties. All these raise the question of whether the overall improvements can hold as Hamid Karzai’s honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.

There also are significant regional differences. Support for U.S. and NATO efforts are sharply lower in the South and East, where the fighting is heaviest. Local support for the Taliban rises to 27 percent on its home turf, in the country’s Southwest, vs. 10 percent in the rest of the country. And views of the country’s direction are markedly less bright in some high-conflict areas, such as Helmand, heart of the opium poppy trade.

Critical from the U.S. perspective is that, despite poor views of its performance, 68 percent of Afghans continue to support the presence of U.S. forces in their country – and nearly as many, 61 percent, favor the coming surge of Western troops initiated by President Obama. But support for the surge drops to 42 percent in the South and East; support for the presence of U.S. forces also drops in these regions, and support for attacks on U.S. and NATO forces, while sharply down overall, remains much higher in the restive South. honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.

...Support for the planned increase in U.S. and NATO forces is accompanied by majority belief the United States will accomplish the goals set out by Obama – for example, training Afghan forces to take over security, strengthening the Kabul government, preventing the Taliban from retaking control, preventing al Qaeda from re-establishing a base of operation and reducing corruption. But fewer, ranging from 22 to 33 percent, are very confident these will happen.

The commitment expressed by the planned surge may be another factor bolstering public hopes. There are, in any case, other signs of improved views of the West: There’s been a 14-point gain from last year, to 83 percent, in the view among Afghans that it was right for the United States to invade and overthrow the Taliban just more than eight years ago. And the number of Afghans who say attacking Western forces can be justified has dropped sharply, from 25 percent a year ago to 8 percent, a new low. (It jumps to 22 percent in the South – but that’s half of what it was there a year ago.)

According to the UNODC, there is a strong correlation between insurgency and cultivation. The UNODC Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey indicates that almost 80% of villages with very poor security conditions grew poppy, while poppy grows in only 7% of villages unaffected by violence.

Counternarcotics Strategy is Changing to Emphasize a Focus on Traffickers

The U.S. CN Strategy is closely aligned with four Afghan national CN priorities as laid out in its National Drug Control Strategy:

- Disrupt the drug trade by targeting traffickers and their backers;
- Strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods;
- Reduce the demand for illicit drugs and treatment of problem users; and
- Develop state institutions at the central and provincial levels vital to delivery of Afghanistan’s CN strategy.

The U.S. Government continues to support the Afghan Government’s eight-pillar National Drug Control Strategy, which includes international and regional cooperation, institution building, demand reduction, public awareness, alternative livelihoods, interdiction, justice sector reform, and eradication.

Build:
Providing the Economic Dimension of Security and Effective and Popular Governance
In the build phase, the U.S., members of the international community, and Afghans take advantage of the security and stability established in the clear and hold phases to build the human capital, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to achieve a stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan.

The U.S. and other members of the international community provide advisory services and training to the leaders and lawmakers who govern the country. International trainers and mentors help build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

The Afghan citizens who will staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprise of the country receive aid, education, and training. The international community works to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.

Development and Build” are Equal Challenges:
About eighty percent of Afghanistan's population lives in rural areas. A significant proportion is poor and lacks adequate and secure sources of livelihoods. The situation has worsened as a result of the global food price crisis and recurring food shortages. The country's long-term stability and prosperity hinge on expanding the agricultural sector, improving natural resource management and increasing options for people in rural areas to make a living. The Government's long-term vision is to ensure the social and economic well-being of these communities, especially the poor and vulnerable among them.

Afghanistan's livelihood base of agriculture and natural resources has been depleted by a combination of factors including violent conflict; the absence of an enabling environment for the private sector; and poor management of natural resources, especially land. Frequent natural disasters are matched by limited and even declining capability to manage such disasters. Social cohesion and the sense of community have been undermined by mass displacement and migration, population growth and a lack of resources.
In 2009, WFP fed a total of approximately 9 million vulnerable Afghans. (30%+)

This included the provision of 51,370 metric tons of food assistance to nearly 1.4 million Afghans, including 325,400 people affected by localized emergencies such as the spring floods.

In close cooperation with UNHCR, it also assisted 118,800 internally displaced persons and 43,600 returnees.

Although the winter has been mild, humanitarian agencies had developed winter-preparedness plans as part of each regional humanitarian contingency plan. The World Food Programme (WFP) pre-positioned to remote areas some 28,760 metric tons of food to support 803,715 beneficiaries. This was complemented by non-food items distributed by UNHCR to more than 200,000 vulnerable displaced persons.

The new, more focused Humanitarian Action Plan for 2010 was launched in January. Although the Plan has yet to receive funding this year, it was well noted at the London Conference, and efforts are ongoing to engage a wide spectrum of donors active in Afghanistan.
World Food Programme Estimate of Afghan Needs

• 7.4 million people – nearly a third of the population – are unable to get enough food to live active, healthy lives. Another 8.5 million people, or 37 percent, are on the borderline of food insecurity.

• Around 400,000 people each year are seriously affected by natural disasters, such as droughts, floods, earthquakes or extreme weather conditions.

• While life expectancy has increased slightly to 44.5 years for men and 44 for women, many of the country’s health indicators are alarming. Along with a high infant mortality rate, Afghanistan suffers from one of the highest levels of maternal mortality in the world (1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births).

• More than half of children under the age of five are malnourished, and micronutrient deficiencies (particularly iodine and iron) are widespread. (39&% are underweight.)

• In 2008, Afghanistan was hit by both drought and globally high food prices, which saw the price of wheat and wheat products increase dramatically across the country. Despite prices beginning to fall in 2009, they remain higher than normal.

• Insecurity is a major and growing concern. Insurgent activity and military operations have affected food security in some regions, undermined reconstruction efforts and restricted humanitarian interventions.

• Environmental degradation a severe problem. War, uncontrolled grazing, pastureland encroachment, illegal logging and the loss of forest and grass cover have worsened drought conditions and reduced agricultural productivity.
Afghan Agriculture

- Climate: Arid to semiarid; cold winters and hot summers
- Terrain: Mostly rugged mountains; plains in north and southwest
- Arable Land: 12.13%
- Permanent Crops: 0.21%
- Other: 87.7% (2005)
- Total renewable water resources: 65 cubic kilometers (1997)
- Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):
  - total: 23.26 cu km/yr (2%/0%/98%)
  - per capita: 779 cu m/yr (2000)
- Food production: Opium, hashish, wheat, rice, barley, pulses, oilseeds, fruits, nuts, vegetables, sheep. (leather)
- Annual harvest: 4.8 million metric tones of cereals (estimated)
- Agricultural production (47.2% of GDP, WFP): 47.2 (31% CIA)
- 78.6% of active labor force is involved in agriculture, but unemployment is at least 35%
- 36% of population is below poverty line
- Annual per capita income is $800. (219th in the world)
Corruption is a Critical Issue

Internally, ...corruption is a very prominent threat to hopes for progress. Nearly all Afghans – 95 percent – now say official corruption is a problem in their area, up 23 points since 2007. Seventy-six percent say it’s a big problem; both are new highs.

Outside their immediate area, 90 percent see official corruption as a problem at the provincial level, and 83 percent call it a problem in the national government in Kabul – both vast numbers – with nearly two-thirds saying it’s a big problem at both these levels of government.

But, Governance is Less of a Problem in Afghan Eyes

Given the continued challenges, a fundamental question is what’s behind the improvements in Afghans’ attitudes about their country’s direction and leadership. The answer appears to be a variety of elements rather than one silver bullet.

As noted, relief in the election’s end is a strong factor; the promise of stability can be appealing, fears of civil unrest after the disputed election were not realized and Karzai’s endorsement by several of his leading opponents may have carried weight.

Karzai may also be experiencing a typical winner’s rally, often seen in U.S. elections; indeed, beyond presidential approval, Americans’ views of the United States’ direction improved after Obama’s election – in still-challenging times – just as they’ve now soared in Afghanistan. A question is to what extent support may fade (as has Obama’s), especially if Karzai’s campaign promises are unmet.

ELECTION – On the Afghan election itself, this poll finds majority suspicion of fraud in voting and vote counting alike – 56 and 60 percent, respectively, think these occurred. But far fewer (three in 10) see it as widespread fraud; 82 percent express confidence that “a system of freely voting for leaders” will work in Afghanistan; and 75 percent say they’re satisfied with the election.

Positive views of the election are a clear factor in Afghans’ brighter hopes for the future; among those who say they’re satisfied with the outcome, 78 percent say the country’s headed in the right direction; among those who are dissatisfied this dives to 45 percent.

Positive views of the country’s direction likewise are dramatically higher among people who are confident democracy can work in Afghanistan, as well as among those who rate Karzai’s performance positively. Those who suspect widespread fraud, on the other hand, are considerably less sanguine about the country’s direction overall.

Karzai, for his part, is not immune from the country’s geographical divisions. His performance rating drops to 40 percent in Helmand vs. 72 percent in the rest of the country. And underscoring the impact of development, his rating is 18 points higher in areas where people give a positive rating to the availability of jobs and economic opportunity.

Another result on elections may not be one that Western governments would prefer: Forty-three percent of Afghans say their preferred form of government is an Islamic state, rather than a democracy (32 percent) or strongman rule (23 percent). Support for an Islamic state spikes to 56 percent in the East, bordering Pakistan’s tribal areas. But elsewhere such views have changed; in Iraq, support for democracy ultimately soared after a series of successful elections.

Economic and development advances are additional factors. After long delay, there are positive reports of development in this impoverished country. Fifty-five percent of Afghans now say they have electricity, up 15 points since 2007. From its low in 2007, there’s been a 24-point gain in the number who rate their electrical supply positively – albeit just to 38 percent, indicating the continued need to develop power supply and delivery.

Fifty-six percent report new or rebuilt roads in their area in the past five years, up 21 points from 2007; the number who rate their local infrastructure positively has more than doubled since first measured in 2005. While access to medical care remains a problem, half report new or rebuilt health clinics, up 13 points from 2007. And, in a largely rural nation with heavy reliance on subsistence farming, positive ratings of support for agriculture – availability of seed, fertilizer and equipment – is up by 9 points in the past year, albeit just to 45 percent.

On the economy, while affordability of food and fuel remain significant problems, 45 percent of Afghans rate the national economy positively, up 12 points from a year ago. Fewer, 39 percent, rate their own financial situation positively, but that too is up, by 7 points. The availability of jobs and economic opportunities is still a challenge, rated positively by just four in 10, but that’s up by 11 points in the past year.

Part of the improvement in economic attitudes may reflect aspirations; the Karzai government has announced a plan to raise teachers’ salaries, encouraging some speculation that other public sector raises – army, police – may follow. Again, if they don’t, positive views could be at risk.

In one sign of consumer advances – small in the grand scheme, but potentially powerful in its personal impact – the number of Afghans who report having a cell phone in their household has essentially doubled since 2005, from 31 percent then to 60 percent now. There’s also a continued sense that, whatever the problems, living conditions are better now than they were under the Taliban – 70 percent say so. Two-thirds also say the rights of women have improved; six in 10 report greater freedom to express political views. But fewer than half report better economic opportunities or security from crime and violence than in the Taliban days, underscoring these continued challenges.

Conditions of Life

Poverty and Unemployment

Poverty Levels and Unemployment, September 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
<th>40 percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population below the poverty line</td>
<td>53 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Communications

Wireless phone subscriber and landlines, September 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wireless phone subscribers</th>
<th>6,536,830</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landlines</td>
<td>45,668 (2001: 15,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Energy

Installed Electrical Generation Capacity, September 2008

| Installed Electrical Capacity | 754MW (2001: 430MW) |
Conditions of Life (continued)

Transportation

Kilometers of road and percentage of the Ring Road complete, September 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roads Built (USAID only)</th>
<th>2,700km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Ring Road complete</td>
<td>73 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Health

Access to the Basic Package of Health Services, Trained Healthcare personnel, and Clinics constructed or rehabilitated, September 2008

| Percentage of population with access to the BPHS | 80 percent |
| USAID Trained health care workers | 10,600 |
| Clinics constructed/rehabilitated by USAID | 670 |

Education

Students enrolled in School, Percentage Female Students, and School Constructed or Rebuilt, September 2008

| Students enrolled in school | 6,000,000 |
| Percentage of female students | 33 percent |
| Schools constructed or rebuilt by USAID | 680 |
Population Growth: 1950-2020

No census since early 1970s.

But,

Population has doubled since Soviet invasion

Nearly tripled from lowest period of refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Demographic Pyramid in 2010

## International Aid Pledges to Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount (£ in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>2,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Development Bank</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission (EC)</td>
<td>1,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Non-U.S. Pledges (including donors not listed)</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,800 (includes pledges at April 2009 NATO summit)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. October 2008 report. p. 140. This table lists donors pledging over $500 million total.*
A “Coalition of National Branding and the Uncoordinated:”
Mix of NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area

Key Facts:
- Commander: General (USA) Stanley A. McChrystal
- 43 Troop Contributing Nations
- ISAF Total Strength: approx 71,030
- ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km²
- 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Regional Command Capital: (aprox ISAF strength 6,130)
- HQ ISAF KABUL (COMPOSITE)
- HQ RC(C) KABUL (FRA)
- KAIA (ESP)

Regional Command South: (aprox ISAF strength 36,500)
- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NLD) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
- Forward Support Base KANDAHAR (multinational)
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

Regional Command West: (aprox ISAF strength 4,400)
- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

Regional Command North: (aprox ISAF strength 5,700)
- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

Regional Command East: (aprox ISAF strength 18,300)
- HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM
- Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT LOGAR (CZE)
- PRT SHARANA (USA)
- PRT KHOST (USA)
- PRT METHER LAM (USA)
- PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
- PRT PANJSHIR (USA)
- PRT JALALABAD (USA)
- PRT GHAZNI (POL,USA)
- PRT ASADABAD (USA)
- PRT BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT NURISTAN (USA)
- PRT WARDAK (TUR)
- PRT GARDEZ (USA)

US Funds Supporting Afghanistan Reconstruction Efforts ($Billions)

FUNDING SOURCES (TOTAL: $51.01)

- **ASFF**: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
  - $25.23
- **CERP**: Commander’s Emergency Response Program
  - $2.64
- **ESF**: Economic Support Fund
  - $9.74
- **INCLE**: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
  - $2.50
- **Other**: Other Funding
  - $10.90

AGENCIES

- **Department of Defense (DoD)**
  - $27.87
- **USAID**
  - $9.74
- **Department of State (DoS)**
  - $2.50
- **Distributed to Multiple Agencies**

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (ANDS)

Security | Governance | Development

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding.  
ESF Funds

Appropriations by Fiscal Year
($Billions)

Cumulative Comparison
($Billions)

Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) and amounts reported as provided by USAID for FY 2002–2009.

Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/21/2010.
CERP FUNDS

Appropriations by Fiscal Year ($Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appropriated</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$1.64</td>
<td>$1.61</td>
<td>$0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative Comparison ($Billions)

As of Sept 30, 2009:
- Appropriated: $1.64
- Obligated: $1.61
- Disbursed: $0.96

As of Dec 31, 2009:
- Appropriated: $1.65
- Obligated: $1.59
- Disbursed: $1.06

Projected: $2.64

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) and amounts reported as provided by DoD except as specified. Updated data from DoD resulted in a lower obligation figure than that reported as of 9/30/09.

The US Civilian “Surge” is Having an Impact

The United States leads 13 of 27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.
- U.S. civilians are posted to all 13 U.S.-led PRTs and to 13 of the 14 PRTs led by our international partners.
- U.S. civilians staff District Support Teams (DSTs) in 32 of ISAF’s 48 focus districts (18 in RC-East, 13 in RC-South, and one in RC-West).
- An additional eight DSTs are scheduled to come into operation in 2010.

Since January 2009, the number of U.S. civilians operating in Afghanistan has tripled. As of April 1, 2010, there are over 1,000 civilians in country.
- During this same time, U.S. civilian presence in the field outside Kabul, has more than quadrupled, from 67 to over 350.
- The majority of new civilian personnel were deployed to RC-South and RC-East. Embassy Kabul has requested an additional 20%-30% increase in civilian staff levels by the end of 2010.

Key initiatives are:
- Increasing significantly the number of civilian technical advisers in key line ministries in the provinces and district centers;
- Implementing a new civil-military agriculture redevelopment strategy to deprive the insurgency of new recruits and income from the narcotics trade;
- Expanding sub-national capacity building efforts through new civil-military initiatives, such as the District Development Working Groups and District Support Teams;
- Facilitating the re-emergence of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms while strengthening the formal justice system;
- Targeting drug traffickers and their networks, instead of targeting poor farmers through eradication;
- Supporting Afghan Government efforts to reintegrate Taliban who renounce al Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the constitutional system; and
- Designing a new communications strategy to counter al Qaeda and Taliban propaganda, while delivering media and other resources to the Afghans to enable them to shape their own political narrative.
Transfer: Conducting a Responsible Withdrawal?

Or, A Premature Cut and Run?
Transfer

No clear definition as yet, but “transfer” is to begin by mid 2011.

- Afghan government will remain dependent on US and outside financial aid indefinitely into the future -- probably through 2021 and beyond.
- US military advisors talk about doubling (and largely funding) the ANA and ANP, but Presidential approval is uncertain and force expansion is to be assessed annually.
- US military advisors call for real partnership with Afghan forces, but it is unclear if this can be implemented before 2011, must less fully prepare for transfer before 2014.
- No clear plan for increasing Afghan governance capacity or economic support and development.

Success requires the US to address all six centers of gravity in the war.

The US must have truly integrated civil military efforts.

And, there is Pakistan...
Realistic and Achievable Objectives

These include:

• Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

• Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

• Develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

• Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

• Restructure the UN, allied, NGO, and the international community efforts to actively address these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.
Execute and Resource an Integrated Civilian-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy

U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will execute two priority missions:

1) Securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al-Qaida and its allies in order to provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective government control; and

2) Training and partnering with the ANSF so that those forces are able to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow the United States and other international forces to decrease their role in combat operations.

Security operations are integrated with governance and economic development efforts led by civilian agencies. Security operations will separate the population from the insurgents and provide the space and time in which stabilization and reconstruction activities can take hold. Security operations will be coupled with a strategic communications campaign to counter the terror and misinformation campaigns of the insurgents.