
Anthony H. Cordesman

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Photo: Paula Bronstein/Getty Images
The Afghan-Pakistan War: An Introduction

NATO/ISAF, the US government, and UN have provided important unclassified data on the rising intensity of the conflict, but coverage has often been limited and some data are contradictory. Other material has been provided by the UN, or by private organizations like Senlis -- whose results are generally more negative than those of the US and NATO/ISAF.

This paper provides a comparison of such data in graphic and map form. No one source can be said to be reliable and no one set of trends is definitive. The only way to track the trends in the war is to look at different sources and metrics.

The reader should also be aware that there are particularly sharp differences in estimates of Taliban and other insurgent influence depending on whether that influence is measures in terms of clashes, poll, presence, or risk to NATO/ISAF, and UN/NGO personnel. This is clearly reflected in the maps in showing the rise of violence, high risk areas, and areas of Taliban influence.

The data are further limited by the fact that NATO/ISAF, the US and other sources do not cover the Pakistani side of the fighting. This ignores one of the most critical aspects of the conflict.
The Rising Intensity of Conflict:

2001-2007
Total Security Incidents in Afghanistan: 2005-2008


Average Annual Monthly Incidents

• The security situation in Afghanistan is assessed by most analysts as having deteriorated at a constant rate through 2007. Statistics show that although the numbers of incidents are higher than comparable periods in 2006, they show the same seasonal pattern.

• The nature of the incidents has however changed considerably since last year, with high numbers of armed clashes in the field giving way to a combination of armed clashes and asymmetric attacks countrywide.

• The Afghan National Police (ANP) has become a primary target of insurgents and intimidation of all kinds has increased against the civilian population, especially those perceived to be in support of the government, international military forces as well as the humanitarian and development community.

• …the more significant change in 2007 is the shift from large-scale armed clashes in the field to asymmetric or terror-style attacks. The former do still take place and as air support is often used, casualty figures are still high. On average however these clashes are fewer and smaller than in 2006.

• Possible reasons include the high numbers of Taliban fighters killed during summer 2007 including many mid-level and senior commanders. Another reason must be the realization that these types of attacks are futile against a modern conventionally equipped military force supported by a wide range of air assets. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has also been improving throughout 2007
Trend in Number of Attacks in Peak Month: 2005-2007

Adapted from DoD report on Stability and Security in Afghanistan, June 2008,

Attacks Targeting Non-Combatants

Adapted from US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism. April 30, 2008, and www.nctc.gov
--17 more attacks were thwarted in 1996 and 68 in 2007

--40 humanitarian workers killed and 89 abducted in 2007 in 130 attacks.

--40+ food convoys attacked

80 killed and 90 wounded in attack on 17 February 2008; 35 killed and 28 injured in attack the next day

Trend in Afghan IEDs and Roadside Bombs: 2002-2007

Incidents by Year

Only 10 SAM firings to date, but HN-5s appear in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>IEDs &amp; Roadside Bombs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>2,258</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,276</td>
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The Rising Intensity of Conflict:

2007-2008
The lack of any systematic reporting on the intensity of the war is particularly striking for 2008. It is clear from US background briefings that the level of conflict continues to intensify, but the data provided are national and do not show where the fighting is becoming most serious.

The Secretary General of the UN and the US Director of National Intelligence have provided some useful summary judgments. (pp. 32-33)

The UN, NATO/ISAF governments, and the Afghan government do not, however, provide reliable breakouts of Afghan casualties, no reliable central chronology, no detailed description of NATO/ISAF or Afghan Army and police activity and outcomes. No meaningful maps are provided of either the pattern of conflict, or the shifts in Taliban influence. Once again, activity in Afghanistan is decoupled from activity in Pakistan.

The closest thing to useful summary reporting on the location of the fighting, and trends by area and region, is provided by Senlis (pp. 35-41). It is important to note that NATO sources and the Afghan government dispute much of the detail in these maps, but that background briefings tend to support them. One key difference is that background briefings by intelligence experts tend to describe much of the Taliban presence in terms of support areas for the fighting, while Senlis describes them as areas of Taliban influence.
NATO and member government reporting focuses almost exclusively on the fighting and kinetic developments. The Taliban, however, is not fighting the same war as NATO/ISAF. It is seeking to expand its political and economic influence, not to defeat NATO/ISAF and Afghan forces in open battle.

The Taliban and other Islamist fighters are also fighting a war of political attrition in an effort to outlast NATO/ISAF presence, force out given countries and NGOs, and push the Afghan people into a belief they must deal with the Taliban. Polls by ABC and TFT indicate that the Taliban and other Islamist fighters are having growing success in achieving these objectives.

This does not mean that the Taliban or other factions control most areas. It does often mean that they are present more often that NATO/ISAF or Afghan government forces, can pressure of threaten local leaders, can control part of the drug trade, and recruit and pay young fighters – in a country with 40-60% youth unemployment or underemployment. The Senlis maps on pages 38-43 of the briefing may not be fully accurate, but they illustrate the point quite well.
Rising Attacks in the South and East

Security incidents in 2007*

*Includes events initiated by coalition forces or by insurgents. Also included are the discovery, turn-in and unexplained detonation of ordnance.

Rise in Violent Incidents Per Month: July-September 2008
(UN Estimate)

Number of Security Incidents By Month, January 2003 to June 2008

### IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2008

#### IED Incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sep-06</th>
<th>Sep-07</th>
<th>Sep-08</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>286</td>
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</table>

#### Found/Cleared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
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<th>Sep-08</th>
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<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>132</td>
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</table>

#### Ineffective IED Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ineffective IED Attacks</th>
<th>Sep-06</th>
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<td>70</td>
<td>105</td>
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#### Effective Attacks

<table>
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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| 37 |
|    |

| 61 |
|    |

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Rise in Afghan Violence: 2007 vs. 2008

Insurgent attacks and civilian casualties in the first quarter of 2008 versus the first quarter of 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Insurgent Attacks</th>
<th>Civilian Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Mar 2007</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Mar 2008</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Suicide Bombs: 2001 - First Six Months of 2008

The Rising Intensity of Conflict:

2008
Key Trends: 2008-2009 - I


- The number of attacks in the peak month in each year rose from 400 in 2005 to 800 in 2006 and 1,000 in 2007, and reach 1,000 in September 2008. Attacks causing at least one death rose from 366 in 2005 to 695 in 2006 and 892 in 2007, and the number killed, injured, or kidnapped rose from 1540 in 2005 to 3,557 in 2006 and 4,672 in 2007. Peak monthly US casualties (killed and wounded) rose from less than 20 from 2002-2003 to the mid-30s in 2004, 70 in 2005 and 2006, and 130 in 2007.

- These figures rose by roughly third between 2007 and 2008. As the NATO/ISAF figures attached to this analysis show. During 2008, there was a 33% increase in kinetic events or military clashes, a 27% increase in indirect fire attacks, and a 67% increase in surface to air fire. The number of IED attacks – the most serious source of casualties, rose by 26% to 27%. There was a 119% increase in the number of attacks on Government of Afghanistan personnel, and 50% rise in kidnapings and assassinations. The number of suicide attacks dropped by 5%, but their lethality and skill increased and so did estimates of the number of suicide bombers in training. The number of NATO/ISAF deaths rose by 35% and civilian deaths rose by 40-46%.

- The situation deteriorated further in late 2008 and early 2009, in part because the weather permitted more Jihadist movement. Clashes and attacks in the first two months of 2009 were twice the numbers as during the same period in 2008. They surged by 131% in the Eastern province of Kunar relative to the same month in 2008, highlighting the growth of the threat in the east as well as in the south. This situation continued to deteriorate in March. US forces reported that "kinetic activity" in eastern Afghanistan increased by 68 percent this year compared to the same 80-or-so-day span last year. In the two provinces bordering Pakistan's Waziristan provinces, violence involving Western troops is up 90 percent, and attacks rose by 130% in the area across from the Mohmand and Bajaur tribal areas -- where the Pakistani military claimed the Taliban had "lost".

- US and UN intelligence maps that were issued or leaked during 2005 to 2007, and more recent NATO/ISAF maps issued in January 2009, do show the size of the high risk-areas inside Afghanistan have increased by 30% to 50% every year since 2005. Kabul is scarcely under siege, but it has turned from a city where NATO/ISAF and aid personnel could wander as tourists to one so filled with violence that the US and foreign compounds have become the equivalent of a “Green Zone.” There has been a particularly serious increase in violence in the Afghan-Pakistan border area. There were 431 insurgent attacks in the Khyber border area during January-November 2007, and 625 during the same period in 2008 – an increase of 45%.

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These data understate the scale of the problem since they do not count all the Afghan on Afghan violence that does not attack government officials and forces, and kidnappings, night letters, and Taliban attacks on Afghan civilians have spread to cover nearly half of the country. The UN rates nearly half the country as unsafe for movement by aid workers not supported by troops, and security has deteriorated sharply in Kabul, particularly in the last year. The level of violence, incidents, and casualties continues to rise, as does the frequency and intensity of combat. A new threat has also developed to US and NATO/ISAF lines of supply, as well as imports from Pakistan, during 2008. This is critical because at least 60% of all supplies come from ports in Pakistan across the border in the Khyber and FATA areas.

While detailed NATO/ISAF and US maps that show the growth of Taliban, Hekmatyar, and Haqqani areas of influence are classified, it is clear from unclassified briefings that these insurgent groups continue to expand their influence at the local level. Although they are controversial, estimates by the International council on Security and Development (formerly the Senlis Council) indicate that the

“The Taliban now holds a permanent presence in 72% of Afghanistan, up from 54% a year ago. Taliban forces have advanced from their southern heartlands, where they are now the de facto governing power in a number of towns and villages, to Afghanistan’s western and north-western provinces, as well as provinces north of Kabul. Within a year, the Taliban's permanent presence in the country has increased by a startling 18%. Three out of the four main highways into Kabul are now compromised by Taliban activity. The capital city has plummeted to minimum levels of control, with the Taliban and other criminal elements infiltrating the city at will.”

The increase in their geographic spread illustrates that the Taliban’s political, military and economic strategies are now more successful than the West’s in Afghanistan. Confident in their expansion beyond the rural south, the Taliban is at the gates of the capital and infiltrating the city at will. Of the four doors leading out of Kabul, three are now compromised by Taliban activity. The roads to the west, towards the Afghan National Ring Road through Wardak to Kandahar have become unsafe for Afghan or international travel by the time travelers reach the entrance to Wardak province, which is about thirty minutes from the city limits.

The road south to Logar is no longer safe for Afghan or international travel. The road east to Jalalabad is not safe for Afghan or international travel once travelers reach the Sarobi Junction which is about an hour outside of the city. Of the two roads leaving the city to the north only one – the road towards the Panjshir valley, Salang tunnel and Mazar – is considered safe for Afghan and international travel. The second road towards the north that leads to the Bagram Air Base is frequently used by foreign and military convoys and subject to insurgent attacks.

By blocking the doors to the city in this way, the Taliban insurgents are closing a noose around the city and establishing bases close to the city from which to launch attacks inside it. Using these bases, the Taliban and insurgent attacks in Kabul have increased dramatically – including kidnapping of Afghans and foreigners, various bomb attacks and assassinations. This dynamic has created a fertile environment for criminal activity. The links between the Taliban and criminals are increasing and the lines between the various violent actors becoming blurred. All of these Taliban successes are forcing the Afghan government and the West to the negotiating table.
The Taliban are now dictating terms in Afghanistan, both politically and militarily. At the national level, talk of reconciliation and power sharing between undefined moderate elements of the Taliban movement and elected government officials is commonplace. At a local level, the Taliban is maneuvering skillfully to fill the governance void, frequently offering a mellower version of localized leadership than characterized their last stint in
NATO/ISAF Security Summary 2008

2008

- 24% Afghans perceive improvement, 19% perceive worsening (Sep 08 poll)
- 70% of kinetic events continue to occur in 10% of the districts
- 33% increase in Kinetic Events
- IED events up 27%...single largest cause of casualties
- 119% more attacks on GIRoA
- 5% less Suicide Attacks
- 50% more Kidnappings/Assassinations

ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 35%
Civilian Deaths: up 40% - 46%*

Building Host Nation Capacity:
ANA: 13 more Kandak BNs formed
46 Kandaks capable of BN Ops

ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD
13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs fielded

Source: NATO – ISAF “Metrics Brief 2007-2008”
Insurgent Initiated Attacks: 2007-2008

• Two distinct insurgencies operate in Afghanistan: a Kandahari-based Taliban in the South and a more complex, adaptive insurgency in the East.

• There has been a 37 percent increase in attacks along Afghanistan major highway -- the Ring Road -- from 2007 to 2008.

• Direct fire incidents increased 40 percent.

• Indirect fire incidents increased 27 percent.

• IED incidents, including discovered IEDs and suicide bombings, increased 26 percent.

• Surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) increased 67 percent.

• INS attacks up 33% in 2008
  ➢ Direct Fire up 40%
  ➢ Indirect Fire up 27%
  ➢ IEDs up 26%
  ➢ Surface to Air Fire up 67%
NATO/ISAF IED Events in 2008

- 27% increase in IED events / 29% increase in casualties
- 24% increase in discoveries* (by volume)
  - 2007 / 2008 discoveries* = 35% of all IED events
- 21% increase in civilian turn-ins

Source: NATO – ISAF “Metrics Brief 2007-2008”
Status in 2009:

2008
Enemy Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan: May 2003 to March 2009

Number of average daily attacks per month

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.

enemy initiated attacks in afghanistan
may 2003 to march 2009

number of average daily attacks per month

source: gao analysis of department of defense data.
NATO/ISAF: Key Trends: 1st Quarter 2009 -I

- Revised U.S. Strategy and Additional Resources (27 Mar 09)
  - 17,700 additional troops and 4,000 additional trainers
  - Several hundred civilians for capacity building in governance and economic development

- Increased commitment from the international community
  - The Afghanistan “Big Tent” Conference at the Hague (31 Mar 09): over 70 nations agreed on 4 broad objectives and pledged additional resources
  - NATO Summit (4 Apr 09): 13 NATO nations and 9 non-NATO nations have pledged nearly 5,000 additional troops
    - Six nations (two more pending) have pledged Election Support Forces
    - 17 nations (5 new) have pledged at least 18 Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) & several Police Mentor Teams (PMTs)
    - Other pledges include additional medical teams, helicopters, and cargo & fighter aircraft
  - At least 23 nations have pledged a total of over $350M (for various support funds including the Election Support Fund, the ANA Trust Fund, the Helo Fund, Reconstruction Fund, and others)*
  - At least two nations are considering removal or revision of national caveats (Italy and Norway)

- Completed voter registration for Aug 09 Presidential & Provincial Council elections
  - Over 4.5 million new registrants (in addition to nearly 11 million registered in 2004)
  - Approximately 39% of new registrants were female
  - Not a single major security incident

- Reopened 81 schools for over 50,000 students in Helmand, Kandahar, & Uruzgan
  - Announced by Ministry of Education (MoE) on 26 March
    - This is an addition to the approximately 170 schools reopened before the end of 2008
    - MoE expects to continue reopening schools at about 120 per quarter
  - Effort was led by MoE with the support of tribal elders, local councils, and religious scholars

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009
• Enhanced support for Counter-Narcotic (CN) efforts and greater effects
  – Received new authorities from SACEUR (4 Feb 09) to provide support to GIROA-led CN efforts
  – Increased eradication year to date relative to the same period last year (+158%)
  – Denied the insurgency at least $1.6M from interdiction efforts
    • Drug and pre-cursor chemical seizures and post-interdiction destructions are up 86%
    • 18 deliberate CN operations conducted through 31 Mar (compared to 14 during same period in ’08)
    • 27 nexus targets captured and 9 killed to-date this year
      – 4 of the 9 killed assessed to be senior members of a leading narcotic network
      – Last year to-date only 5 had been captured

• Initiated pilot program for Afghan Public Protection Force
  – Provides enhanced security and extends legitimate governance of GIROA to designated districts in key provinces to improve stability and strengthen community development
  – Afghan-led and Afghan-decided initiative that relies on increased community responsibility for security
  – Graduated first class (240+ students) on 26 Mar 09 and now operational in Jalrez District in Wardak Province
  – Second class (200+ vetted students) to begin by end of April (Nerkh District)

• Increased success with High Value Targets on the Joint Prioritized Effects List
  – 27 targets have been killed or captured to-date this year
  – 13% increase relative to the same period last year

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009
Improved security in many areas despite overall increase in violence

- Violence over the winter months of 2008-2009 has increased due to:
  - Milder winter
  - Continued freedom of action for insurgents from sanctuaries across the border
  - Deliberate increase in operational tempo by ANSF and ISAF

- New forces introduced in 2008/2009 in Kapisa, Wardak, Logar Provinces and Garmsar District

- Slight improvements in public perception of security (as of Mar ’09 survey)
  - 35% of Afghans say security is better now than it was 6 months ago (last quarter 28%)
    - Kabul 40% (last quarter 29%); Logar 26% (last quarter 8%); Wardak 20% (last quarter 13%); Kapisa 49% (last quarter 30%)
  - 13% say security is worse than it was 6 months ago (last quarter 17%)
    - Kabul 8% (last quarter 9%); Logar 19% (last quarter 28%); Wardak 28% (last quarter 37%); Kapisa 8% (last quarter 15%)

- Attacks are down significantly within the city and province of Kabul
  - Insurgent initiated attacks in Kabul province were down 10% (Aug 08 – Mar 09 relative to Aug 07 – Mar 08)
  - Insurgent initiated attacks in Kabul City were down 29% (Aug 08 – Mar 09 relative to Aug 07 – Mar 08)
  - ANA and ANP deaths were down 73% in the province (2007 to 2008)
  - Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility began in August 2008

- Starting to see results in other areas
  - Insurgent initiated attacks down 39% in Kapisa Province (Jan-Mar 09 relative to Jan-Mar 08)
  - Insurgent initiated attacks down 19% in Garmsar District (Jan-Mar 09 relative to Jan-Mar 08)

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009
40% of Afghans say country headed in right direction, 38% say headed in wrong direction*

For Jan and Feb 09, 80% of kinetic events occurred in 11% of the districts

Feb09 vs. Previous 3 Months’ Average (i.e. Nov08-Jan09)
INS Initiated Attacks: +12%
IED Events: -15% (57% of all casualties since Jan 07)
Attacks on GIRoA: -37%
Suicide Attacks: +3%
Kidnappings/Assassinations: +20%
ISAF Deaths: +21%
ANSF Deaths: -27%
Civilian Deaths: +9%

Building Host Nation Capacity:**
ANA: 77 total Kandak BNs formed
47 Kandaks capable of BN Ops

ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD
13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs fielded

* Source: ABC News / BBC / ARD Poll conducted 30 Dec 08 – 12 Jan 09 and published on 9 Feb 09.
** Source: CSTC-A.
Comparing Feb 09 to the previous three month period (Nov 08 – Jan 09), insurgent attacks are up 12% overall:

- Direct Fire attacks are up 54%
- Indirect Fire attacks are down 32%
- IEDs are down 15%
- Surface to Air Fire is down 50%

Mild weather, increased troop strength, and an offensive spirit resulted in significantly more kinetic events this winter.

Insurgents shifting tactics toward softer targets.

Source: NATO JOISS Database
IED Events (Found and Detonated)

- Comparing Feb 09 to the previous three month period (Nov 08 – Jan 09):
  - Total IED events were down 15%
  - Total casualties from IED events were down 26% (for ISAF, IED casualties down 45%)
- For the 3-month period ending Feb 09 relative to the same period ending Feb 08, discoveries (IED finds by ISAF / ANSF plus turn-ins by local nationals) were up 66%
- Since January 2007, discoveries account for 52% of all IED events

Source: NATO JOIIS Database
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Most Likely Outcome of War

Perception of an improving security climate has increased two quarters in a row – 86% of Afghans believe security is the same or better in their mantaq.

Is security in your mantaq better, the same or worse than it was 6 months ago?

**Kabul**
- Sep 08: 31% Better, 56% The Same, 10% Worse
- Dec 08: 29% Better, 60% The Same, 9% Worse
- Mar 09: 40% Better, 51% The Same, 8% Worse

**Nationwide**
- Sep 08: 24% Better, 56% The Same, 19% Worse
- Dec 08: 28% Better, 54% The Same, 17% Worse
- Mar 09: 35% Better, 51% The Same, 13% Worse

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll:
Afghan Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009

Civilians hurt by (Net 38%)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009-2</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snipers</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kidnappings</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coalition bombs</td>
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<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition forces</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA/ANP</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among other violence, a quarter report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area in the past year; three in 10, kidnappings for ransom. Thirty-eight percent report civilian casualties in the past year, attributed about equally either to U.S./NATO/ISAF or to anti-government forces, and somewhat less so to Afghan government forces. Given these and their many other challenges, the number of Afghans who expect their lives to improve in the year ahead has dropped from a peak of 67 percent in 2005 to 51 percent today. And just under half, 47 percent, expect a better life for their children, hardly a ringing endorsement of the country’s prospects. The resurgence of the Taliban is a key element of the public alarm: Fifty-eight percent of Afghans see the Taliban as the biggest danger to the country, measured against local warlords, drug traffickers or the U.S. or Afghan governments. And 43 percent say the Taliban have grown stronger in the past year, well more than the 24 percent who think the movement has weakened.


### ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Trend in Experience with Taliban Violence: 2006-2009/2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Night Letters</th>
<th>Bombings</th>
<th>Killings</th>
<th>Arson</th>
<th>Fighting Gov't/Foreign Troops</th>
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<td><strong>2006</strong></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>45%</td>
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<td><strong>2007</strong></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>42%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2009-2</strong></td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>33%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Positive Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09


SECURITY SUMMARY

- 33% increase in security incidents
- 70% of security incidents continue to occur in 10% of the districts
- IED events up 27%: largest cause of casualties

- 37% increase in ISAF force strength
- 28% increase in ANSF force strength
- 31% increase in offensive operations

Civilian Casualties: up 40% - 56%
ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 37%
ANSF Deaths: up 6%
- ANPs suffer 3x more casualties than ANA/ISAF
- 124% more attacks on GIRoA
- 50% more kidnappings/assassinations

- ANA: 13 more Kandak/Battalion formed
  46 Kandaks capable of Battalion Ops
- ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD
  13 of 20 ANCOP Battalions fielded

As of: 3 Jan 09
The Cost in Blood:
Trends in Casualties
Total Casualties: Iraq vs. Afghanistan
Through January 3, 2009

*Non-hostile deaths includes: Accident, Illness, self-inflicted, undetermined, and pending.
### MONTHLY CASUALTIES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: 2008

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January</th>
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Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan: First Six Months of 2007 versus 2008 (Killed)

UN Estimate, reported by AP, June 29, 2008
NATO/ISAF Civilian Deaths in 2008

- Up 46% according to ISAF (JOIIS/NATO) database
- Up 40% according to UNAMA database
- INS cause 80% of civilian casualties*

*according to ISAF report procedures / investigations
Civilian Deaths

- Comparing Feb 09 to the previous three month period (Nov 08 – Jan 09), civilian deaths are down 9%
- Since Jan 07, insurgents have caused 79% of civilian deaths

Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell Formed in CJOC
Standardizes process to investigate incidents of reported civilian casualties

Source: CJOC, CIVCAS Cell
ANA, ANP, ISAF Military Deaths

- Overall Trend up 12%
  - ISAF/OEF: up 35%
  - ANA: up 16%
  - ANP: up 9%

- ANP - over 60% of total since Jan 2007
Military Deaths*

- Comparing Feb 09 to the previous 3 month period (Nov 08 – Jan 09):
  - Total military deaths are down 21%
  - ANSF deaths are down 29% (though ANA deaths are up 21%)
  - ISAF deaths are up 21%

*Attributed to insurgent initiated attacks (direct fire, indirect fire, IEDs, and surface-to-air fire)

Source: NATO JOIIS Database
The Shifting Nature of the Threat
The Shifting Nature of the Threat and Afghan Attitudes Towards the Taliban and Other Threat Elements

There are no reliable estimates of the trends in the strength of full and part time cadres for the four main threat groups: Taliban, Taliban in Pakistan, Haqqani Network (HQN), Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddun (HiG), and Al Qa’ida. All, however, seem to have grown and found at least partial sanctuaries since 2001, and especially since 2003.

The intelligence community has not declassified maps of the areas influenced or dominated by such groups since late 2006 (p. 55). US experts have, however, noted that the Taliban has split between a more traditional Afghan Taliban under Omar in the south and a more splintered Taliban with closer links to Al Qa’ida, the HiG, and HQN in the east and Pakistan.

The US Director of National Intelligence and has also warned that threat activity continues to grow and outpace the development of Afghan forces, and US experts indicate that the Taliban has clear regional goals for expanding its influence and presence throughout Afghanistan in 2008.

As for public attitudes, Afghans do not support terrorism, and are largely negative towards the Taliban – although more supportive of Al Qa’ida. They are, however, sufficiently concerned over the course of the war to advocate negotiations between the government and Taliban and a limited majority favor a coalition government. Afghans are also more supportive of the Taliban in the Pashtun south.
Afghan Insurgent Groups

- Three major groups in East and South.
- Forces in East (Western Pakistan):
  - Taliban (5,000-10,000 permanent Tier One fighters; unknown number of part-time Tier Two fighters).
  - Haqqani Network (HQN),
  - and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG)
- Al Qa’ida provides major support to insurgents in western border area of Pakistan
- Omar Leads classic Taliban hierarchy in South
- FATA area (“Waziristan”) and Baluchistan are major sanctuaries in Pakistani border area.
- Pakistani government has ceded control of some areas.
- Part of ISI supports insurgent groups.
- Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan -- including Pakistani Taliban -- and foreign volunteers


ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Experience with Taliban Violence by Province: 2009/2

Enemy Elements By Area of Influence 2005-2007

TB presence or influence =
HiG presence or influence =
AQAM presence or influence =
HQN presence or influence =
High Criminal presence =
(Anti-Gov Element presence or influence =
(population centers excluded)
Growing Differences Between Insurgent Organizations

**TBSL in the south:** Over 2007, the Taliban leadership in the south has been weakened as a result of the capture or kill of senior Taliban leaders. While the insurgency in the south remains Taliban-led, the once overarching influence of the Taliban over the insurgency in the east is diminishing. The insurgency in the east has become a conglomerate of disparate insurgent groups, operating independently from the once prevailing influence of the Taliban senior leadership in the south.

**Insurgent leadership in the east:** The insurgency within the FATA and RC East significantly evolved over 2007; it is no longer a traditional rigid structure, operating in a top-to-bottom order, and more importantly, no longer a Taliban-dominant insurgent network. Interacting networks including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat Mohammad-e drive the concept of the insurgency in the east.
Threat Outlook

• Potential for two distinct insurgencies: A Kandahari-based Taliban in the South and an interconnected insurgency in the East.

• The insurgency in the east will likely continue to operate as a distributed network, with less influence from the Taliban leadership and increasing influence from Al-Qaida.

• In the East, the insurgency is expected to increase its offensive operations within the FATA against the Pakistan Military as well as within the settled areas of Pakistan to destabilize the country.

• With gains made in 2007, insurgent elements in Pakistan will use the winter months to reconstitute, reequip, and emerge in 2008 as a stronger and more viable threat to GIRoA, ISAF, and the GoP.

• Pakistan’s growing civil unrest, political turmoil, and security concerns focused on India will continue to divert security resources from the FATA.
Adapting Insurgency in the FATA and Afghanistan

• Insurgency within the FATA and RC East has significantly evolved over 2007; it is no longer a traditional rigid structure, operating in a top to bottom order, and more importantly, no longer a Taliban-dominant insurgent network.

• Interacting networks including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat Mohammad-e drive the concept of the insurgency in Afghanistan.

• The interactions that occur between differing networks are governed by a set of internal rules, a basic ideology, which in turn generate state the entire insurgency.

• Over 2007, the Taliban leadership in the south has been weakened as a result of the capture or kill of senior Taliban leaders.

• While the insurgency in the south remains Taliban-led, the once overarching influence of the Taliban over the insurgency in the east is diminishing.

• The insurgency in the east has become a conglomerate of disparate insurgent groups, operating independently from the once prevailing influence of the Taliban senior leadership in the south.
**Insurgency Objectives**

**RC-North: Destabilize** - Increased asymmetric attacks aimed at destabilizing the region

**RC-West: Expand** - Aggressive insurgent expansion designed to further develop support areas

**RC-East: Sustain** - Enemy sustains current level of operations in the east through increased use of asymmetric tactics

**RC-South: Control** - Enemy attempts to consolidate gains IOT control the south by isolating Kandahar

**Factors for a decrease in Significant Acts for 2008 compared to the same time-period in 2007:**

- Waziristan fighting and POLMIL instability in Pakistan
- Successes against key HVTs and networks
- Winter weather
- Sustained ISAF operations due to no winter RIP/TOA
- Increased use of OPSEC by insurgents
- Insurgent training
Insurgency’s Objectives in Afghanistan

- **Regional Command North:** To destabilize the northern provinces in order to undermine security and discredit GIRoA in a region considered stable.

- **Regional Command West:** To expand established insurgent support areas in the western provinces in order to destabilize the western provinces and facilitate the movement of personnel, weapons, and ammunition to insurgents in the south.

- **Regional Command South:** To retain control of historical insurgent operational and support areas in order to isolate Kandahar from the influence of the central government in Kabul and restrict ISAF freedom of movement along HWY 1.

- **Regional Command East:** To sustain operations within the eastern provinces with increasing use of asymmetric tactics as the insurgency becomes more interconnected among disparate insurgent groups and increasingly influenced by Al-Qaida tactics.
Expanding Zones of Violence and Taliban Activity
Extreme Risk/Hostile Environment classification (pink... now makes up about one third of the surface area of the country.

Main areas... affected, i.e. areas where the deteriorating security situation has been assessed as an Extreme Risk/Hostile Environment thereby causing less accessibility to programs, are:

- The southern and extreme northern parts of Helmand Province, most of Kandahar Province, a portion of northern Nimroz Province and most of Zabul and Uruzgan Provinces.
- The rest of Paktika Province not previously colored pink.
- The “Tora Bora” area of southern Nangahar Province.
- The extreme northern area of Nuristan Province.

Medium Risk/Unstable Environments added include parts of Farah, Badghis and Faryab Provinces.

Low Risk/Permissive Environments (i.e. improved) include parts of Maydan Wardak, Badakshan (northern tip), Takhar and Baghlan Provinces.

These improved areas are insignificant when seen against the large areas which deteriorated. It is also possible that some of these “improved” areas may soon revert back to previous assessments.
### Enemy Activity Snap-shot (Weeks 1 – 52 for 2005 & 2006)

01 January – 31 December (2005 & 2006)

#### Activity for Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Attacks</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Fire *</td>
<td>1558</td>
<td>4542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Fire</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>1511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEDs</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>1677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Method of Attack

- **Direct Fire**: Includes SAFIRE events
- **Indirect Fire**
- **IEDs**
- **No. of Incidents**
  - 0
  - 1 – 15
  - 16 – 30
  - 31 – 45
  - 46 +

**Note**: Does not include land mine strikes

*Direct Fire includes SAFIRE events*
UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones:

2005 versus 2007
Shift in Location of Violence: 2007 vs. 2008
Rise in Percent in the first quarter of 2008 versus the first quarter of 2007

Central Area includes Kabul, Wardak, Logar & Parwan
Western Area is centered around Herat

Areas where the accessibility deteriorated between May 2006 and May 2007.

Areas where the accessibility improved between May 2006 and May 2007.
Senlis Estimate of Rise in Fatal Attacks in 2007

Insurgent activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2007)

Legend:
- Area with light Taliban presence
- Area with substantial Taliban presence
- Area with permanent Taliban presence
- Border between Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Insurgent attack resulting in death in 2007

The Limits of Governance: “Government” vs. Taliban control in the South (Senlis estimate, November 2007)
Kinetic Activity in Afghanistan by Province
1 Jan 07 - 8 Mar 08

(14 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan are not included as they experienced less than 20 attacks during this time period)
UN ACCESSIBILITY MAP
SECURITY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT ARE COMPLEMENTARY

Secure areas
Main effort on development

Critical areas
Main effort on governance/outreach

Insecure areas
Main effort on security
The Taliban are far from achieving popular support -- across a range of measures the group still is shunned by large majorities of Afghans. But 22 percent say it has at least some support in their area, and this soars to 57 percent in the Southwest overall, including 64 percent in its home base, Kandahar. That's up sharply from 44 percent in the Southwest last year, and up from 41 percent in Kandahar. There's also evidence the Taliban have made some progress rebranding themselves. Twenty-four percent of Afghans say it's their impression the Taliban “have changed and become more moderate” -- far from a majority, but one in four. And that view spikes in some provinces -- most notably, to 58 percent in Wardak and 53 percent in Nangarhar, bordering Kabul to the west and east, respectively. People who see the Taliban as more moderate are 20 points more likely to favor negotiating with the movement, and less supportive of the U.S. and NATO/ISAF presence in Afghanistan.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Weaker</th>
<th>Stronger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: At Least Some Support for the Taliban: 2007 versus 2009/2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2007 (%)</th>
<th>2009-2 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghans Saying At Least Some Support for Taliban: 2009/2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Bombings</th>
<th>Killings</th>
<th>Fighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanghar</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Taliban More Moderate?: 2009/2

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Should The Government Negotiate with the Taliban?

2009-2

NATO/ISAF Events Map in 2008

Change in Kinetic Event Density
1 Jan - 28 Dec 07 and 08

- Decreased events in select areas
  - Kabul: City 47%; Province 15%
  - ANSF deaths down 61%
  - Garmsir: 43%

- 31% more kinetic events in '08 - same areas
- Increased event levels due to:
  - More ISAF / ANSF operating in more areas
  - Increased asymmetric methods
  - Continued sanctuary in PAK

*Density range / calibration differs from province to district in order to show differences
Taliban Presence in November 2008

"Between the AGE\(^*\) and the Government, who has more influence in your area?"

AGE\(^*\) Influence

Source: MRA, ANQAR 1.0, Nov 08

UNCLASS // REL USA ISAF NATO
Insurgency vs. GIRoA Influence

“Between the Anti-Government Elements (AGE)* and the Government, who has more influence in your area?”

* Word used in Dari & Pashto to encompass all AGEs

Source: MRA, ANQAR 2.0, Dec 08

Day Kundi not sampled due to extremely poor security & high risk
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Experience with Taliban Violence by Province: 2009/2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Bombings (%)</th>
<th>Killings (%)</th>
<th>Fighting (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanghar</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Violence in Kabul in 2008

Taliban Activity in Kabul in 2008

AFGHANS TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY IN KABUL

- 31% of Kabul residents believed security has improved from June to Dec 2008. Only 10% thought security has deteriorated (ANQAR\(^1\)).
- Recorded incidents / reported crime reduced after the transfer of responsibility.
- ANSF casualties in Kabul dropped 61% in 2008.

\(^1\)Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Report

![Phase 1 - Kabul City - 31 Aug 08](chart1)

![Phase 2 - Northern Districts 31 Oct 08](chart2)

![Phase 3 - Southern Districts 31 Dec 08](chart3)
One War in Two Countries:

Afghanistan versus “Pashtunistan”
One War in Two Countries: Afghanistan versus “Pashtunistan”

It is clear that the war would have a radically different character if Pashtun and Baluchi areas in Pakistan did not act as de facto sanctuaries and support areas for the Taliban, HiG, and HQN. (p. 70-78) US experts estimate that the areas under such influence in Pakistan grew significantly in 2006 and 2007.

Pakistan also provides an important sanctuary for Al Qa’ida, which has steadily closer links to the Taliban in eastern Afghanistan and to the Hi, and HQN. (pp. 78-82). As a result, all of these movements are having a destabilizing impact on Pakistan and creating steadily greater instability in both the largely Pashtun Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in the East and the Baluchi areas in the south.

Pakistani public opinion does not favor the government carrying out a major campaign to deal with these threats or any form of US or NATO intervention. It is also deeply divided on the impact of Al Qa’ida, the Taliban, and local Jihadis and relatively hostile to the Bush Administration.
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Ratings of Neighboring Countries 2009/2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking Beyond the Borders

- **Fight against Taliban and Other Islamist extremists in Afghanistan.**

- **Fighting against Taliban and other Islamist extremists in Eastern Pakistan (Waziristan and Tribal Agencies).**

- **Greater Pashtun and Ethnic/Sectarian struggles.**

- **Al Qa’ida, Bin Laden and Neo-Salafi extremist Elements; sanctuary in Pakistan.**

- **Broader instability in Pakistan; Islamist struggle for control.**

- **Outside interests and influence: Iran, Russia, China, Central Asia, Narco-trafficking**
Major Ethnic Divisions
Ethnic & Linguistic Diversity
Percent of Population and Language Speakers

80% Sunni, 19%

Source: CIA World Factbook 2007
42% Pashtun

8-10% Pashtun

Source: http://fata.gov.pk/_theme/images/fata_map_big.jpg
Al Qa’ida’s Role in Pakistan

- Major recovery and sanctuary in Pakistan.
- Supports, but does not control Taliban.
- Source of funding and foreign volunteers.
- Significant ideological force.
- May help coordinate Taliban and other insurgents groups.
- Narcotics source of financing.
Major AQAM Areas of Influence

TB presence or influence =
HiG presence or influence =
AQAM presence or influence =
HQN presence or influence =
High Criminal presence =
Anti-Gov Element presence or influence =
(population centers excluded)
Senlis, “Stumbling into Chaos, Afghanistan on the Brink, November 2007, p. 8.”
Insurgency in the FATA

• 2007-2009 Insurgent Gains / Pakistan Military’s Operation AL-MIZAN losses:
  • 2007-2009 has seen an unprecedented number of offensive actions taken by insurgent elements against the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and security forces within the FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).
  • To date, Pakistani security forces have been unsuccessful in mitigating insurgent presence, have sustained record losses, and have raised serious questions on the Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) and Frontier Corps’s capacity and capability to conduct effective military operations in the FATA and the NWFP against militants and extremists.

• Pakistani Security Force Reorganization within the FATA/NWFP:
  • GoP plans to reduce PAKMIL presence within the FATA and increase reliance on the less capable Frontier Corps. Under the plan, PAKMIL assumes a greater role in the border security mission while the Frontier Corps will have greater focus on security and stability missions within the general populace of FATA/NWFP.
  • This has the potential to allow for further insurgent gains in the FATA and the NWFP and embolden a stronger more viable insurgency.

• Spread of “Talibanization” within the FATA and the NWFP:
  • Due to the GoP’s failed policies and security initiatives within the FATA, insurgent elements have been able to expand their influence in the settled areas of NWFP and further solidify greater portions of the FATA as insurgent safe-havens.
Cross Border Raids from Pakistan to Eastern Afghanistan: First Six Months of 2007 vs. 2008

Overall Attacks Up 40% Over Same Period in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Jun 07</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Jun 08</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 vs. 08</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Insurgency’s Strategic Objectives in Pakistan

• **Defend the Federally Administered Tribal Area:** To retain sanctuary, enabling the insurgency’s ability to reconstitute fighters, plan and stage operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and internationally.

• **Destabilize the Government of Pakistan:** To prevent the Government of Pakistan from focusing effective military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Area.

• **Defeat the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF):** To remove GIRoA, force an ISAF withdrawal, and return the Taliban to power.
Pakistan’s Internal Concerns

**Political / Civil Climate**
- Pakistan contends with political turmoil following Bhutto’s assassination

**Pakistan Military and Frontier Corps**
- PAKMIL and Frontier Corps (FC) realignment ongoing; concern is effectiveness of FC in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)

**Federally Administered Tribal Area**
- 2007 has seen an unprecedented number of offensive actions taken by insurgent elements against the Government of Pakistan (GoP). To date, Pakistani security forces have been unsuccessful in mitigating insurgent presence, have sustained record losses, and have raised serious questions on the Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) and Frontier Corps’s capacity and capability to conduct effective military operations in the FATA.

- Due to the GoP’s failed policies and security initiatives within the FATA, insurgent elements have been able to expand their influence in the settled areas of NWFP and further solidify greater portions of the FATA as safe-havens.
Developments in NATO/ISAF and US Forces
Among other violence, a quarter report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area in the past year; three in 10, kidnappings for ransom. Thirty-eight percent report civilian casualties in the past year, attributed about equally either to U.S./NATO/ISAF or to anti-government forces, and somewhat less so to Afghan government forces. Given these and their many other challenges, the number of Afghans who expect their lives to improve in the year ahead has dropped from a peak of 67 percent in 2005 to 51 percent today. And just under half, 47 percent, expect a better life for their children, hardly a ringing endorsement of the country’s prospects. The resurgence of the Taliban is a key element of the public alarm: Fifty-eight percent of Afghans see the Taliban as the biggest danger to the country, measured against local warlords, drug traffickers or the U.S. or Afghan governments. And 43 percent say the Taliban have grown stronger in the past year, well more than the 24 percent who think the movement has weakened.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Traffickers</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Commander</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Government</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

more Afghans now blame the country’s strife on the United States and its allies than on the Taliban. Thirty-six percent mostly blame U.S., Afghan or NATO forces or the U.S. or Afghan governments for the violence that has occurred, up by 10 points from 2007. Fewer, 27 percent, now mainly blame the Taliban, down by 9 points.

Afghanistan’s central and provincial governments have a stronger presence and greater public confidence than Western forces – but they, too, have suffered. In 2005, still celebrating the Taliban’s ouster in November 2001, 83 percent of Afghans approved of the work of President Karzai and 80 percent approved of the national government overall. Today those have slid to 52 and 49 percent respectively.

Crucially, the Kabul government and its Western allies do better where they are seen as having a strong presence and as being effective in providing security, as well as in areas where reported conflict is lower. Where security is weaker or these groups have less presence, their ratings decline sharply. For example, among people who say the central government, the provincial government or Western forces have a strong local presence, 58, 57 and 46 percent, respectively, approve of their performance. Where the presence of these entities is seen as weak, however, their respective approval ratings drop to just 31, 22 and 25 percent.

Among people who report bombing or shelling by U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces in their area, support for the presence of U.S. forces drops to 46 percent, vs. 70 percent among those who report no such activity. There’s a similar pattern in support for retribution against U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces. While 25 percent of all Afghans now say violence against such forces can be justified, that jumps to 44 percent among those who report air strikes or shelling in their area. It’s a similar 45 percent in the South and East, where the fighting has been most intense. By contrast, support for attacks on Western forces drops to 18 percent where no bombing or shelling has occurred, and to 15 percent in the provinces where conflict has been lowest, roughly the northern half of the country. All told, one in six Afghans report coalition bombardment in their area within the past year, but with huge variation; it soars to nearly half in the Southwest and nearly four in 10 in the East.

Increase in ISAF troop levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Troop Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug-03</td>
<td>5581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug-04</td>
<td>8065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-05</td>
<td>9685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-06</td>
<td>19597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-06</td>
<td>31267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-08</td>
<td>47332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-09</td>
<td>56420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# NATO/ISAF Forces: January 2007

### Key Facts:
- **Commander:** General (UK) D. J. RICHARDS
- **Current HQ:** HQ ISAF IX (UK lead) from 4 May 2006
- **37 Troop Contributing Nations**
- **ISAF Total Strength:** Approx 33,250 (Includes National Contingent Commands)
- **Remaining US Contingent:** Approx 8000 (Operation Enduring Freedom)
- **ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass)** 650,000 km²
- **25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)**

### Regional Command Capital:
- **(Approx Strength 4700)**
  - HQ ISAF in Kabul (UK)
  - HQ RC(C) in Kabul (FR)
  - KAIA (BU)

### Regional Command South:
- **(Approx Strength 11,500)**
  - HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NL)
  - Forward Support Base KAF
  - PRT KANDAHAR (CA)
  - PRT LASHKAR-GAH (UK, DA, ES)
  - PRT TARIN KOWT (NL,AUS)
  - PRT QALAT (US,RO)

### Regional Command West:
- **(Approx Strength 1900)**
  - HQ RC(W) in HERAT (IT)
  - Forward Support Base HERAT (SP)
  - PRT HERAT (IT)
  - PRT FARAH (US)
  - PRT QALA-E-NAW (SP)
  - PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LI)

### Regional Command North:
- **(Approx Strength 3000)**
  - HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (GE)
  - Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (GE)
  - PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
  - PRT FEYZABAD (GE)
  - PRT KONDUZ (GE)
  - PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HU)
  - PRT MEYmana (NO)

### Regional Command East:
- **(Approx Strength 10,500)**
  - HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM (US)
  - Forward Support Base BAGRAM (US)
  - PRT SHARANA (US)
  - PRT KHOST (US)
  - PRT METHER LAM (US)
  - PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
  - PRT PANJSHIR (US)
  - PRT JALALABAD (US)
  - PRT GARDEZ (US)

### National Contingent Commands:
- **(Approx Strength 1650)**

### Key Facts:
- **Commander:** General (USA) Dan K. MCNEILL
- **Current HQ:** HQ ISAF X (USA lead) from 4 FEB 2007
- **39 Troop Contributing Nations**
- **ISAF Total Strength:** approx 41 700 (Includes National Support Elements)
- **Remaining USA Contingent:** approx 7 000 (Operation Enduring Freedom)
- **ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass):** 650,000 km²
- **25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)**

### Regional Command Capital: (approx strength 3 300)
- HQ ISAF in Kabul (Composite)
- HQ RC(C) in Kabul (ITA)
- KAIA (BGR)

### Regional Command South: (approx strength 11 700)
- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (GBR)
- Forward Support Base KAF
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHIKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

### Regional Command West: (approx strength 2 500)
- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NAW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

### Regional Command North: (approx strength 3 400)
- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMAMA (NOR)

### Regional Command East: (approx strength 14 300)
- HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM (USA)
- Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT SHARANA (USA)
- PRT KHOS (USA)
- PRT METHHER LAM (USA)
- PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
- PRT PANJSHIR (USA)
- PRT JALALABAD (USA)

### National Support Elements (approx strength 6500)

**Key Facts:**
- **Commander:** General (USA) David D. McKiernan
- 41 Troop Contributing Nations
- ISAF Total Strength: approx 51,350
- ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km²
- 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

**Regional Command Capital:** (aprx strength 5,850)
- HQ ISAF in Kabul (Composite)
- HQ RC(C) in Kabul (FRA)
- KAIA (HUN)

**Regional Command South:** (aprx strength 18,160)
- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NLD) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
- Forward Support Base Kandahar (multinational)
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

**Regional Command West:** (aprx strength 2,990)
- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

**Regional Command North:** (aprx strength 4,690)
- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

**Regional Command East:** (aprx strength 19,660)
- HQ RC(E) in Bagram
- Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT LOGAR (CZE)
- PRT SHARANA (USA)
- PRT KHOSHT (USA)
- PRT METHAN LAM (USA)
- PRT BAMYAN (NZE)
- PRT PANJSHIR (USA)
- PRT JALALABAD (USA)
- PRT GHAZNI (USA)
- PRT ASADABAD (USA)
- PRT BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT NURISTAN (USA)
- PRT WARDAK (TUR)
- PRT GARDEZ (USA)

**Note on numbers:** Totals are approximations and actual numbers change daily. Number of troops will never be exact and should be taken as summaries.

Key Facts:
- Commander: General (USA) David D. McKiernan
- 42 Troop Contributing Nations
- ISAF Total Strength: approx 58,390
- ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km²
- 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Note on numbers: Totals are approximations and actual numbers change daily. Number of troops will never be exact and should be taken as indicatives.

Regional Command Capital: (aprx ISAF strength 5,830)
- HQ ISAF in Kabul (Composite)
- HQ RC(C) in Kabul (FRA)
- KAIA (POL)

Regional Command South: (aprx ISAF strength 22,830)
- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NLD) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
- Forward Support Base Kandahar (multinational)
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

Regional Command West: (aprx ISAF strength 2,940)
- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

Regional Command North: (aprx ISAF strength 4,730)
- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

Regional Command East: (aprx ISAF strength 22,060)
- HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM
- Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT LOGAR (CZE)
- PRT SHARANA (USA)
- PRT KHOST (USA)
- PRT METHER LAM (USA)
- PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
- PRT PANJSHIR (USA)
- PRT JALALABAD (USA)
- PRT GHAZNI (POL,USA)
- PRT ASADABAD (USA)
- PRT BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT NURISTAN (USA)
- PRT WARDAK (TUR)
- PRT GARDEZ (USA)

**Troop Contributing Nations (TCN):** The ISAF mission consists of the following 42 nations (the troop numbers are based on broad contribution and do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2780</td>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1770</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>3465</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>150</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2830</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2350</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (rounded)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

US/NATO/ISAF/ Killed by Year: 2001-2008

NATO/ISAF Military Deaths in 2008

- Overall Trend **up 12%**
  - ISAF/OEF: up 35%
  - ANA: up 16%
  - ANP: up 9%

- ANP - over 60% of total since Jan 2007
Total NATO/ISAF/OEF Killed
Through January, 2009

760 coalition deaths
1,472 US wounded

Source: [http://www.icasualties.org/oef/default.aspx](http://www.icasualties.org/oef/default.aspx)
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; February 9, 2009

US Strategies and Plans for Iraq and Afghanistan

**Iraq**
- **Country's strategy**: International Compact for Iraq
- **U.S. strategies and plans**:
  - President Obama outlined a new U.S. strategy in Feb. 2009

**Afghanistan**
- **Country's strategy**: Afghanistan National Development Strategy
- **U.S. strategies and plans**:
  - DOD report under the Bush Administration described "a comprehensive [U.S.] strategy" for Afghanistan
  - President Obama announced plans in Feb. 2009 to develop a new comprehensive strategy

**Interagency operational plans**
- Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)/U.S. Embassy 2009 Joint Campaign Plan
- None identified

**Sector level plans**
- Examples
  - Security forces development plan
  - Integrated energy plan has not been completed
  - Ministry capacity building plan has not been developed
- Examples
  - Counternarcotics strategy
  - Security forces development plans are not detailed and coordinated
  - USAID plan for 2005-2010 is being updated

*Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and USAID data.*
Total US Casualties: Patterns in Total KIA and WIA in Iraq and Afghanistan Wars from 2001-2008

Total US Casualties
By Month, 2001-2008

Note: Killed in action includes died of wounds, Accidents includes other deaths

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division
Scale and Impact of NATO Air Strikes
Munitions Dropped in Afghanistan versus Iraq: First Six Months of 2008 (Bombs and Missiles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Afghan: June Only)</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rising Use of Fixed Wing Airpower: 2006-2008
(Human rights Watch Estimate)

Wing Airpower and Civilian Casualties: 2006-2008
(Human rights Watch Estimate)

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with US/NATO/ISAF Air Attacks in Past Year: 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2009-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: US/NATO/ISAF Air Strikes: Acceptability & Blame

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghans Who Feel Attacks on Coalition Forces are Justified : 2-2009

Developments in Afghan Army (ANA) and Police (ANP) Forces

Public Confidence and Local Support

ABC News/BBC/ARD poll

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces
Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014
(Authorized Personnel)

(Trained and Assigned Personnel)

Trained and assigned ANSF stand at 145,000 and will reach the current objective of 216,000 by the beginning of 2014.

In November 2008, the ANA stood at 79,068 (including 5,420 absent without leave- AWOL), composed of 78 kandaks (battalions) and five Commando (CDO) kandaks.

In summer 2008, the GIRoA sought agreement to further increase the ANA from 80,000 to 122,000 soldiers with an additional 12,000 trainee, transient, hospitalized, and student (TTHS) account (for a total authorized end strength of 134,000). On September 10th 2008, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved.

The GIRoA will reach its objective of 134,000 ANA personnel by the beginning of 2014.

The 134,000 force structure calls for 20 brigades, a new division headquarters in the capital, Corps-level artillery, engineer and Quick Reaction Force assets, as well as an increase in institutional support.

As of November 2008, the ANA had seven battalions and one brigade and one corps headquarters rated at Capability Milestone (CM)1: capable of operating independently.

Twenty-nine battalions/squadrons, six brigade headquarters, and three corps headquarters were reported at the CM2 level: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support.

Twenty-five battalions/squadrons, four brigade headquarters, one corps headquarters, and the ANAAC headquarters were reported at the CM3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces.

Six battalions/squadrons and one brigade headquarters are reported at CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. Finally, there are eighteen battalions/squadrons and two brigade headquarters that are still not formed or reporting.

Currently, two of the five corps can field nearly all of their subordinate units and join their international partners in some of the most contentious areas of RC East and South.

Table 4 - ANA Unit CM levels, December 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CM1</th>
<th>CM2</th>
<th>CM3</th>
<th>CM4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANA Size and Capability in 2008

- ANA Increasingly Conducting and Leading Operations (62% of total)
- ANA Air Corps have over tripled monthly troop and cargo capacity since Feb 08
  - Feb 08: 3,000 passengers / 10 tons of cargo
  - Nov 08: 10,000 passengers / 50 tons of cargo

Source: NATO – ISAF “Metrics Brief 2007-2008”
In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of April 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 82,780 personnel. This represents 62% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by the end of 2011.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Now, over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA.
ANA PROGRESS FROM JAN 08 TO DEC 08

Battalion / Kandak Level Capabilities

Key Points:

ANA fielding: From Jan 08 to Dec 08, 13 new Battalions were fielded (Include Infantry, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Commando Bns)

ANA manning: ANA personnel assigned to ANA land combat forces increased from 31,342 in Jan08 to 44,051 in Dec08
ANA total personnel assigned increased from 49,452 in Jan08 to 67,263 in Dec08

ANA capabilities:
- 21 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 1, being able to plan and execute operations at Battalion level with no external support for organic functions
- 23 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 2, being able to plan and execute operations at Battalion level with external support
- 22 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 3, being able to plan and execute operations at Coy level with external support
- 2 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 4, fielded but not capable to plan and lead operations
- ANA led operations increased from 49% in Jan08 to 62% in Dec08
The ANSF responded quickly and decisively to attacks at the Ministries of Justice, Education, and Foreign Affairs.

- ANSF efforts demonstrate both increased capacity within the ANA, ANP and NDS, and also increased coordination between the forces.
- The quick and independent response and actions on the scenes are further indication that the Afghans are capable of lead security responsibility in Kabul (assumed in 2008).
- The ANSF swiftly rescued hostages and thwarted further attacks on the Independent Election Commission and other possible targets.
- Security was restored in Kabul within three hours in a well coordinated and proportionate response.
- Ten insurgents attacked; four had suicide vests (of which two detonated); seven insurgents were killed and two detained. Friendly casualties: 19 killed, 52 wounded.

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009
Shortages in US and NATO Afghan Army Trainers: 2007-2013

The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police with responsibilities that include criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs.

The roles of the various police services span a wide spectrum of policing, law enforcement, and security functions. The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of 82,000 personnel that is capable of operating countrywide. At the end of November 2008 there were 75,954 assigned ANP personnel.

Readiness of Afghan Police Units: Current and Projected by Readiness Category: 2008-2013

(District AUP and Specialized Unit CM levels, February-December 2008, with Projections for 2009-2013)

Table 6 - CM levels for ANP Units, December 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CM1</th>
<th>CM2</th>
<th>CM3</th>
<th>CM4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Impact of Afghan Police Reform: Casualties and Pay

Figure 17 Local Afghan Casualties, Pre- and Post-FDD by District, November 2008*


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>Pre-Pay Reform</th>
<th>Pay Reform</th>
<th>ANP/ANA Pay Parity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>O-9</td>
<td>$107</td>
<td>$750</td>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>O-8</td>
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<td>BG</td>
<td>O-7</td>
<td>$95</td>
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<td>COL</td>
<td>O-6</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>$88</td>
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<td>$380</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>$83</td>
<td>$300</td>
<td>$330</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>$78</td>
<td>$250</td>
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<td>2nd SGT</td>
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<td>$140</td>
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<td>3rd SGT</td>
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<td>$145</td>
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<td>1st PTRLMN</td>
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<td>$70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd PTRLMN</td>
<td></td>
<td>$70</td>
<td>$70</td>
<td>$100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Figure 17: Local Afghan Casualties, Pre- and Post-FDD by District, November 2008.
Shortfall in Police Mentoring Teams: 2008

(U.S. Personnel Required and Assigned, June 2007 -November 2008)

NATO/ISAF: Afghan Public Protection Program

AP3 Overview
- District community councils select local protection forces
- Special Forces “train the trainers”
- ANSF train the Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF); Ministry of Interior provides oversight
- Amplified by Wardak Governor’s information and media campaign
- Deployment of APPF is coordinated between the ANP and the District community council

Key Takeaway: AP3 is a pilot community engagement program that relies on civil participation to enhance local security, deny insurgent support, and extend government legitimacy to the district level

APPF – Jalrez District
243 pax / 47 villages
- 46% Tajik
- 38% Pashtun
- 16% Hazara

Wardak Province, Jalrez District AP3 Pilot Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>IDLG Select APPF</th>
<th>ANA District Security Ops</th>
<th>APPF Deployment</th>
<th>Development Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ph 0: Prepare</td>
<td>Dec 08</td>
<td>Jan 09</td>
<td>Feb 09</td>
<td>Mar 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph 1: Shape</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph 2: Clear</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph 3: Hold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph 4: Build</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009
Counternarcotics or Aid and Comfort to the Enemy?
• In the country as a whole, 63 percent of Afghans call raising opium poppy “unacceptable in all cases.”
• But in the six top-producing provinces that dives to 31 percent – and in Helmand, source of two-thirds of Afghanistan’s opium poppy, to just 12 percent.
• Instead, 66 percent in the top-producing provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Nimroz and Zabul in the Southwest, and Farah in the West), call it acceptable to cultivate the crop. That peaks at 88 percent in Helmand.
• Most who say it’s acceptable say that’s the case only if there’s no other way to earn a living, suggesting openness to alternatives. But the high prices for opium poppy may make alternatives a hard sell.
• Another challenge: Even nationally, few Afghans, just 13 percent, support spraying pesticides as a way to eradicate the crop.

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; February 9, 2009
The Rising Opium Threat in the South

Cultivation Year

- 2006
- 2007
- 2008

Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Counternarcotics Pushes Growth South

Market Saturation Does Limit Growth

Decline in Farm Gate Price

But, Far Too Little To Matter

UN estimate production down 6% in 2008, but farm gate prices down 19-22%

Drug Seizures and Eradication: 2003-2008

NATO/ISAF: Counternarcotics - 1Q 2009 - I

Eradication As of 28 Mar:
- 1,383 hectares Governor Led Eradications (GLE)
- Centrally Directed Eradications are up 269% year to date (YTD) and well exceed the 2008 total
- Combined with GLE, total eradication are up 158% year to date relative to last year

Interdiction: Summary Comparison of 2008 to 2009 year-to-date of Key Seizures

Year-to-Date, Denied the insurgency:
$US 1.6 Million
(Farm Gate Value)

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009
ISAF / NATO Authorities

- Received updated guidance from SACEUR (4 Feb 09)
  - Narcotic facilities / facilitators legitimate targets if intelligence links to insurgency
  - Poppy eradication not an ISAF task (GIROA leads)
  - Example ISAF tasks: share information, provide logistics, enhanced operational support (i.e. cordon, post-interdiction destruction)
- ISAF conducting complementary operations and providing specific support to GIROA-led CN-Interdiction activity (Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force & Narcotics Interdiction Unit)

USA Authorities

- Assist in post interdiction destruction by air assets
- OEF ROE allow targeting of uncleared labs
- Direct support to Afghan CN forces

United Kingdom Authorities

- Support to Afghan CN forces
- Assist in post interdiction destruction
- No ordinance dropping on uncleared labs

Denmark / Estonia

- Will support ISAF CN efforts
- Unofficial commitments from Canada and Lithuania

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009
Afghan Governance: Going in the Right Direction? Corruption?


Do you believe the Government is going in the right direction or wrong direction?

- **Wrong Direction**: 30% (Dec 08), 25% (Mar 09)
- **Same Place, Not Going**: 19% (Dec 08), 19% (Mar 09)
- **Right Direction**: 50% (Dec 08), 43% (Mar 09)
- **Refused / Don't Know**: 8% (Dec 08), 7% (Mar 09)

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009

Afghan Economics and Conditions of Life
While 62 percent of Afghans rate their overall living conditions positively, that’s declined steadily from 83 percent in 2005.

There has been significant progress in some areas.

- Seventy-two percent of Afghans say schools have been rebuilt or reopened in their area in the past five years (up 7 points from 2007); 53 percent, mosques; 47 percent, roads (up 12 points); 45 percent, health clinics (up 8 points); and 44 percent, police stations.

- While fewer than half, 42 percent, say they have good roads, bridges and other infrastructure in their area, that’s up sharply from 24 percent in 2005.

- Seventy-seven percent rate their local schools positively; 65 percent say they have clean water, up 12 points compared with 2007 and a new high.

- And 73 percent support the presence of foreign aid organizations in Afghanistan.

In other areas,

- barely over half rate their access to medical care positively.

Fifty-nine percent have no formal education. Forty-eight percent cannot read.

- Just under half positively rate their protection from the Taliban and other armed groups.

- While 61 percent say they can move about safely, that’s down 10 points from 2007, and leaves four in 10 without such freedom of movement. And beyond food and fuel, in terms of prices overall, 58 percent report difficulty being able to afford things they want and need.

- (Only) 51 percent, say foreign aid groups are making progress in providing a better life for Afghans. And fewer still, 30 percent of Afghans, say foreign development aid has benefited them personally. There’s also concern about its future: Nearly three-quarters are worried about the impact of the global financial crisis on aid to their country.

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; February 9, 2009
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; February 9, 2009

Afghan Economic Realities

• More than half report incomes less than the equivalent of $100 a month; 93 percent, under $300.

• Fifty-nine percent have no formal education. Forty-eight percent cannot read.

• The affordability of food is worsening: Sixty-three percent of Afghans say they cannot afford to buy all or even some but not all of the food they need, up 9 points from late 2007. And while 63 percent report adequate availability of food (regardless of affordability), that’s down from 82 percent in 2006.

• Fuel prices, likewise, are a major problem; 68 percent say they can’t afford the fuel they need for cooking or heat, a serious issue in the cold Afghan winter.

• Just 29 percent say there’s a good supply of jobs or economic opportunities in their area.

• And the number who characterize their economic opportunities as “very bad” has doubled since 2006 -- from 17 percent then to 33 percent now, one in three Afghans.

• Electricity supply is steadily the single biggest complaint, along with economic opportunity and prices.

• Fifty-five percent have no electricity whatsoever in their homes; just one in 20 has power all day.

• Another poorly rated area is support for agriculture, such as the availability of seed, fertilizer and farm equipment, a central concern in a country that’s three-quarters rural, with food prices so problematic.

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces;, February 9, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Ability to Afford Food: 2007 vs. 2009-2

Afghan Agriculture: Output By Crop and Value of Exports

Figure 21 – Major Agricultural Products, Afghanistan, 2000/2001-2008/2009 (1,000 metric tons)

Figure 22 – Value of Exported Afghan Agricultural Produce, 2001-2007

Major issues related to healthcare assessment arise from the lack of a basic acceptable standard of “healthcare.” Many Afghans deem simple items such as vaccination as “healthcare.”

% with access to a clinic or Hospital

- Overall: 62%
- Center: 75%
- Periphery: 56%

Source: MRA, ANDP 6, July 2008
How would you rate the quality of the healthcare available in your area?"
Access to schools for both girls and boys varies across the country and is tightly linked to security. Degree of access to girls schools is also an ethno-geographic factor.

**Access to Boys Schools**

- Overall: 62%
- Center: 75%
- Periphery: 56%

**Access to Girls Schools**

- Overall: 61%
- Center: 84%
- Periphery: 51%

**% with access to girls schools by ethnic group**

- Pashtun: 44%
- Tajik: 73%
- Uzbek: 74%
- Hazara: 72%

Source: ANDP 6, July 2008

Uruzgon not sampled due to extremely poor security & high risk Population approx. 300k; 1% of the Afghanistan's population
Education Map in 2009

“How safe are the children when they go to school or study in school?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Very Unsafe</th>
<th>A Little Unsafe</th>
<th>Mostly Safe</th>
<th>A Little Safe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Are 6-14 years old boys/girls in your household going to school or madrassa?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Access to Schools (Boys)

Access to Schools (Girls)

Day Kundi not sampled due to poor security & high risk

Source: MRA, ANQAR 2.0, Dec 08
NATO/ISAF Ring Road Map in 2008

154 kilometers constructed in 2008

75% of RING Road and 44% of International Links Completed

Completed
To be complete by Mar 09 (benchmark)
To be complete by Mar 10
To be complete after Mar 10
Unknown

Source: USAID 30 Nov 08
Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the provision of roads?

- Don’t Know / NA
- Very dissatisfied
- Somewhat dissatisfied
- Neither
- Somewhat satisfied
- Very satisfied

Nationwide Results

- 11.7%
- 18.1%
- 15.2%
- 27.9%
- 26.5%

Events Density (400km²)

- No events
- Low
- Medium
- Significant
- High

Comparing Feb 09 to the previous 3 months (Nov 08 – Jan 09), attacks on convoys are down 53%.

Source: ANQAR 2.0, Dec 08

Transportation Infrastructure

570 km of regional highways were constructed or rehabilitated with asphalt in 2008.

Source: USAID, 28 Feb 09
“Hold and Build:”
Aid and PRTs
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Reconstruction: Rebuilt or Reopened in Past Five Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinics</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Stations</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Funding of the Afghan National Development Strategy by Budget Year

(US Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008/09</th>
<th>2009/10</th>
<th>2010/11</th>
<th>2011/12</th>
<th>2012/13</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total funding</strong></td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>6,064</td>
<td>6,165</td>
<td>6,009</td>
<td>5,819</td>
<td>31,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic revenue</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>6,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total donor assistance</strong></td>
<td>6,513</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>4,814</td>
<td>4,398</td>
<td>3,908</td>
<td>24,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditures</strong></td>
<td>7,903</td>
<td>9,286</td>
<td>10,236</td>
<td>11,038</td>
<td>11,637</td>
<td>50,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total shortfall</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>3,222</td>
<td>4,071</td>
<td>5,029</td>
<td>5,818</td>
<td>18,643</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NATO/ISAF PRTs and RCs
(April 2009)

NATO/ISAF: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/index.html
# DoD Aid to Afghanistan: 2002-2008

($US Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>FY2004</th>
<th>FY2005</th>
<th>FY2006*</th>
<th>FY2007*</th>
<th>FY2008*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Air Mobility (OCONUS)</td>
<td>12,800</td>
<td>72,833</td>
<td>27,866</td>
<td>56,829</td>
<td>38,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Air Mobility (CONUS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,390</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>15,459</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Training</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>11,580</td>
<td>12,441</td>
<td>13,176</td>
<td>21,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Equipment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>2,796</td>
<td>15,036</td>
<td>4,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16,045</td>
<td>8,568</td>
<td>11,191</td>
<td>26,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Special Narcotics Force Enhancement</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>6,075</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Border Police - Facilities (BCPs)</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>6,587</td>
<td>16,127</td>
<td>5,449</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Border Police - Facilities (HQs)</td>
<td>6,420</td>
<td>42,684</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Border Police - Training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,911</td>
<td>7,350</td>
<td>41,460</td>
<td>28,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Border Police - Equipment</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>14,188</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>10,945</td>
<td>959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Highway Police Facilities</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN National Police Facilities</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td>2,103</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Police - Equipment</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,850</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Information Campaign for MOI</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>3,432</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Technology-MIP Efforts</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>7,382</td>
<td>12,564</td>
<td>70,976</td>
<td>43,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Technology-Non MIP Efforts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>9,030</td>
<td>38,670</td>
<td>13,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Program Support</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,228</td>
<td>9,202</td>
<td>11,794</td>
<td>9,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Dept Helicopter Lease</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>71,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>224,535</strong></td>
<td><strong>108,054</strong></td>
<td><strong>290,985</strong></td>
<td><strong>189,619</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes total Supplemental funding appropriated in that year.

US Aid in Afghanistan By Fiscal Year: 2002-2009
($US Millions, Including Supplementals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line of Operation</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Afghan National Army</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>4,872</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Afghan National Police</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>2,525</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Other Security</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy/Governance</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dev/Hum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Reconstruction</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Alternative Livelihood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Rule of Law</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Humanitarian/Other</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Drug</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Interdiction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Eradication</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Alternative Livelihood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- Other CN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>947</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>2,491</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>3,668</td>
<td>10,268</td>
<td>6,095</td>
<td>2,922</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## US PRT Funding By Province in FY2008
($US, Including Supplementals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRT</th>
<th>FY2008 Non-CERP Funding</th>
<th>CERP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bagram</td>
<td>$11,087,025.00</td>
<td>$158,900.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>$5,446,417.00</td>
<td>$72,900.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktya</td>
<td>$2,993,000.00</td>
<td>$26,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>$32,306,067.00</td>
<td>$88,900.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khowst</td>
<td>$18,004,799.00</td>
<td>$41,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konar</td>
<td>$53,297,667.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>$72,687,950.00</td>
<td>$32,100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>$21,820,334.00</td>
<td>$107,300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuristan</td>
<td>$24,686,202.00</td>
<td>$5,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panjshir</td>
<td>$6,851,425.00</td>
<td>$22,200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalat</td>
<td>$2,263,000.00</td>
<td>$43,900.00</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$5,948,098.00</td>
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### Staffing of US PRTS: 2008

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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>13</strong></td>
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The Battle of Perceptions: Afghan Attitudes
The Shifting Nature of the Threat and Afghan Attitudes Towards the Taliban and Other Threat Elements

There are no reliable estimates of the trends in the strength of full and part time cadres for the four main threat groups: Taliban, Taliban in Pakistan, Haqqani Network (HQN), Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddun (HiG), and Al Qa‘ida. All, however, seem to have grown and found at least partial sanctuaries since 2001, and especially since 2003.

The intelligence community has not declassified maps of the areas influenced or dominated by such groups since late 2006 (p. 55). US experts have, however, noted that the Taliban has split between a more traditional Afghan Taliban under Omar in the south and a more splintered Taliban with closer links to Al Qa‘ida, the HiG, and HQN in the east and Pakistan.

The US Director of National Intelligence and has also warned that threat activity continues to grow and outpace the development of Afghan forces, and US experts indicate that the Taliban has clear regional goals for expanding its influence and presence throughout Afghanistan in 2008.

As for public attitudes, Afghans do not support terrorism, and are largely negative towards the Taliban – although more supportive of Al Qa‘ida. They are, however, sufficiently concerned over the course of the war to advocate negotiations between the government and Taliban and a limited majority favor a coalition government. Afghans are also more supportive of the Taliban in the Pashtun south.
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; February 9, 2009
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; February 9, 2009
Among other violence, a quarter report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area in the past year; three in 10, kidnappings for ransom. Thirty-eight percent report civilian casualties in the past year, attributed about equally either to U.S./NATO/ISAF or to anti-government forces, and somewhat less so to Afghan government forces. Given these and their many other challenges, the number of Afghans who expect their lives to improve in the year ahead has dropped from a peak of 67 percent in 2005 to 51 percent today. And just under half, 47 percent, expect a better life for their children, hardly a ringing endorsement of the country’s prospects. The resurgence of the Taliban is a key element of the public alarm: Fifty-eight percent of Afghans see the Taliban as the biggest danger to the country, measured against local warlords, drug traffickers or the U.S. or Afghan governments. And 43 percent say the Taliban have grown stronger in the past year, well more than the 24 percent who think the movement has weakened.

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; February 9, 2009
Afghan Views of Taliban -2007
ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Afghan Views of Taliban and Al Qa'ida - 2007

Environics Poll

Are Terrorist Tactics Justified? -2007

Environics Poll

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kidnapping</th>
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<th>Suicide Bombs</th>
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<tr>
<td>All the time</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only rarely</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>71%</td>
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<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
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Should Government Deal with Taliban? 2007

Environics Poll

- 74% for negotiations
- 53% for coalition government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negotiations</th>
<th>Coalition Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly support</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat support</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat oppose</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly oppose</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depends</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Afghan Views of Taliban - Nationwide - 2007
ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

- Plurality of Afghans, 42 percent, say the movement has gained strength in the past year, far surpassing the 24 percent who think it’s weakened.
- Just 13 percent of Afghans express a favorable opinion of the Taliban, essentially the same as last year.
- 10 percent say it has a strong presence in their area, although more, 25 percent, say it has at least some presence). Afghans prefer their current government to the Taliban by 84-4 percent. (It was 91-1 in 2005.)
- 36 percent of Afghans name the Taliban as the prime cause of violence, and an additional 22 percent cite Al Qa’ida or foreign jihadi fighters. Nineteen percent cite either U.S. or NATO forces or the U.S. government.
- Despite the Taliban’s very negative reputation – and partly linked to perceptions of its strength – 60 percent of Afghans say the Karzai government should negotiate a settlement in which Taliban leaders would be allowed to hold political office in exchange for laying down their arms.
- Support for a settlement is 16 points higher among those who think the Taliban has grown stronger rather than weaker; and it peaks, at 88 percent, in its home base, Kandahar.

Afghan Views of Taliban Activity - Nationwide - 2007
ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

Are you aware of any of the following activities by the Taliban in this area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No opi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. The delivery of night letters</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Bombings</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Killing individuals</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Burning schools/government buildings</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Fighting government or foreign troops</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. People giving food/money to Taliban</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• While Taliban activity continues, there have been reported declines in three areas – the burning of schools and government buildings (reported by 33 percent, vs. 45 percent last year), bombings (also now reported by 33 percent, compared with 43 percent) and individual killings (34 percent, vs. 42 percent).

• No meaningful change in the number of Afghans who report clashes between Taliban and government or foreign forces in their area, 42 percent
  • Broad regional differences. In the Southwest, more, 60 percent, report fighting between Taliban and government forces; so do 63 percent in the Northwest, vs. just 23 percent in the North.

• Sixty-nine percent of Afghans believe Pakistan, a past supporter of the Taliban, is allowing it to operate within Pakistani borders. Indeed just 19 percent of Afghans have a favorable opinion of Pakistan, almost as low as the Taliban itself (13 percent).

Afghan Views of Taliban - Southwest - 2007
ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll

• In 2006, 57 percent in the Southwest called the Taliban the country’s greatest threat; it’s 36 percent in 2007.
• Fifty percent in the Southwest say they strongly oppose the presence of the Taliban; down from 72 percent last year.
• 23-point increase in perceptions in this region that the Taliban has a strong local presence, and 29-point decline in perceptions of a strong presence by the Afghan police.
• Confidence in the ability of provincial governments in the Southwest to provide security is down by 20 points; confidence in the ability of the Taliban to provide security, while still much lower, is up by 19 points.
• 29-point drop in the number who say the Taliban has “no significant support at all” in the area.
• Very unfavorable views of the Taliban have fallen from 62 percent in 2006 to 44 percent in 2007.
• No change in views of the strength of U.S. or NATO forces in the region. But, huge 37-point drop in the number of people who report local support for NATO forces, as well as a 20-point drop in support for U.S. forces.
• In 2006, 78 percent in the Southwest called it a good thing for the United States to have overthrown the Taliban; 59 percent say so in 2007.
• Positive ratings of overall living conditions have worsened by 20 points in the Southwest.
• Favorable opinions of Osama bin Laden have increased from 1 percent in 2006 to 15 percent in 2007.


Southwest = Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul
Growing Differences Between Insurgent Organizations

**TBSL in the south:** Over 2007, the Taliban leadership in the south has been weakened as a result of the capture or kill of senior Taliban leaders. While the insurgency in the south remains Taliban-led, the once overarching influence of the Taliban over the insurgency in the east is diminishing. The insurgency in the east has become a conglomerate of disparate insurgent groups, operating independently from the once prevailing influence of the Taliban senior leadership in the south.

**Insurgent leadership in the east:** The insurgency within the FATA and RC East significantly evolved over 2007; it is no longer a traditional rigid structure, operating in a top-to-bottom order, and more importantly, no longer a Taliban-dominant insurgent network. Interacting networks including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat Mohammad-e drive the concept of the insurgency in the east.
The Taliban are far from achieving popular support—across a range of measures the group still is shunned by large majorities of Afghans. But 22 percent say it has at least some support in their area, and this soars to 57 percent in the Southwest overall, including 64 percent in its home base, Kandahar. That’s up sharply from 44 percent in the Southwest last year, and up from 41 percent in Kandahar. There’s also evidence the Taliban have made some progress rebranding themselves. Twenty-four percent of Afghans say it’s their impression the Taliban “have changed and become more moderate”—far from a majority, but one in four. And that view spikes in some provinces—most notably, to 58 percent in Wardak and 53 percent in Nangarhar, bordering Kabul to the west and east, respectively. People who see the Taliban as more moderate are 20 points more likely to favor negotiating with the movement, and less supportive of the U.S. and NATO/ISAF presence in Afghanistan.


ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Views of US-Led Ouster of the Taliban

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Experience with Taliban Violence by Province: 2009/2

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: At Least Some Support for the Taliban: 2007 versus 2009/2

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghans Saying At Least Some Support for Taliban: 2009/2

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Should The Government Negotiate with the Taliban?

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Most Likely Outcome of War

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009

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<th>Event</th>
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<th>2007</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snipers</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kidnappings</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coalition bombings</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition forces</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA/ANP</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civilians hurt by (Net 38%)


Among other violence, a quarter report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area in the past year; three in 10, kidnappings for ransom. Thirty-eight percent report civilian casualties in the past year, attributed about equally either to U.S./NATO/ISAF or to anti-government forces, and somewhat less so to Afghan government forces. Given these and their many other challenges, the number of Afghans who expect their lives to improve in the year ahead has dropped from a peak of 67 percent in 2005 to 51 percent today. And just under half, 47 percent, expect a better life for their children, hardly a ringing endorsement of the country’s prospects. The resurgence of the Taliban is a key element of the public alarm: Fifty-eight percent of Afghans see the Taliban as the biggest danger to the country, measured against local warlords, drug traffickers or the U.S. or Afghan governments. And 43 percent say the Taliban have grown stronger in the past year, well more than the 24 percent who think the movement has weakened.

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09


In the country as a whole, 63 percent of Afghans call raising opium poppy “unacceptable in all cases.”

But, in the six top-producing provinces that dives to 31 percent – and in Helmand, source of two-thirds of Afghanistan’s opium poppy, to just 12 percent.

66 percent in the top-producing provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Nimroz and Zabul in the Southwest, and Farah in the West), call it acceptable to cultivate the crop. That peaks at 88 percent in Helmand.

Most who say it’s acceptable say that’s the case only if there’s no other way to earn a living, suggesting openness to alternatives. But the high prices for opium poppy may make alternatives a hard sell.

Another challenge: Even nationally, few Afghans, just 13 percent, support spraying pesticides as a way to eradicate the crop.

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009


- **US, ISAF, Afghan Gov**: 26% (2007) vs. 36% (2009-2)
- **Taliban**: 36% (2007) vs. 27% (2009-2)

Among people who report bombing or shelling by U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces in their area, support for the presence of U.S. forces drops to 46 percent, vs. 70 percent among those who report no such activity. There’s a similar pattern in support for retribution against U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces. While 25 percent of all Afghans now say violence against such forces can be justified, that jumps to 44 percent among those who report air strikes or shelling in their area. It’s a similar 45 percent in the South and East, where the fighting has been most intense. By contrast, support for attacks on Western forces drops to 18 percent where no bombing or shelling has occurred, and to 15 percent in the provinces where conflict has been lowest, roughly the northern half of the country. All told, one in six Afghans report coalition bombardment in their area within the past year, but with huge variation; it soars to nearly half in the Southwest and nearly four in 10 in the East.

...more Afghans now blame the country's strife on the United States and its allies than on the Taliban. Thirty-six percent mostly blame U.S., Afghan or NATO forces or the U.S. or Afghan governments for the violence that occurred, up by 10 points from 2007. Fewer, 27 percent, now mainly blame the Taliban, down by 9 points.

Afghanistan's central and provincial governments have a stronger presence and greater public confidence than Western forces -- but they, too, have suffered. In 2005, still celebrating the Taliban's ouster in November 2001, 83 percent of Afghans approved of the work of President Karzai and 80 percent approved of the national government overall. Today those have slid to 52 and 49 percent respectively.

Crucially, the Kabul government and its Western allies do better where they are seen as having a strong presence and as being effective in providing security, as well as in areas where reported conflict is lower. Where security is weaker or these groups have less presence, their ratings decline sharply. For example, among people who say the central government, the provincial government or Western forces have a strong local presence, 58, 57 and 46 percent, respectively, approve of their performance. Where the presence of these entities is seen as weak, however, their respective approval ratings drop to just 31, 22 and 25 percent.


The US/NATO/ISAF Threat to the US/NATO/ISAF

• In 2005, ... 83 percent of Afghans expressed a favorable opinion of the United States -- unheard of in a Muslim nation. Today just 47 percent still hold that view

• The number who say the United States has performed well in Afghanistan has been more than halved, from 68 percent in 2005 to 32 percent now. Ratings of NATO/ISAF forces are no better. Just 37 percent of Afghans now say most people in their area support Western forces; it was 67 percent in 2006. And 25 percent now say attacks on U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces can be justified, double the level, 13 percent, in 2006.

• Just 18 percent say the number of U.S. and NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan should be increased. Far more, 44 percent, want the opposite -- a decrease in the level of these forces. (ISAF stands for International Security Assistance Force, the U.N.-mandated, NATO-led multinational force in Afghanistan.)

• The failures to date to hold ground and provide effective security are powerful factors in Afghan public opinion. Far fewer than in past years say Western forces have a strong presence in their area (34 percent, down from 57 percent in 2006), or -- crucially -- see them as effective in providing security (42 percent, down from 67 percent).

• Amid widespread experience of warfare -- gun battles, bombings and air strikes among them -- the number of Afghans who rate their own security positively has dropped from 72 percent in 2005 to 55 percent today -- and it goes far lower in high-conflict provinces. In the country’s beleaguered Southwest (Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces) only 26 percent feel secure from crime and violence; in Helmand alone, just 14 percent feel safe.

• Civilian casualties in U.S. or NATO/ISAF air strikes are a key complaint. Seventy-seven percent of Afghans call such strikes unacceptable, saying the risk to civilians outweighs the value of these raids in fighting insurgents.

• And Western forces take more of the blame for such casualties, a public relations advantage for anti-government forces: Forty-one percent of Afghans chiefly blame U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces for poor targeting, vs. 28 percent who mainly blame the insurgents for concealing themselves among civilians.

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; February 9, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: US/NATO/ISAF Air Strikes: Acceptability & Blame

![Chart showing acceptability and blame for US/NATO/ISAF air strikes.]

Acceptable?

Blame When Civilians Harmed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>US/NATO/ISAF AF</th>
<th>Anti-Government Forces</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>27%</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Government Forces</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Among people who report bombing or shelling by U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces in their area, support for the presence of U.S. forces drops to 46 percent, vs. 70 percent among those who report no such activity. There’s a similar pattern in support for retribution against U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces. While 25 percent of all Afghans now say violence against such forces can be justified, that jumps to 44 percent among those who report air strikes or shelling in their area. It’s a similar 45 percent in the South and East, where the fighting has been most intense. By contrast, support for attacks on Western forces drops to 18 percent where no bombing or shelling has occurred, and to 15 percent in the provinces where conflict has been lowest, roughly the northern half of the country. All told, one in six Afghans report coalition bombardment in their area within the past year, but with huge variation; it soars to nearly half in the Southwest and nearly four in 10 in the East.

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with US/NATO/ISAF Air Attacks in Past Year: 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>3%</td>
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</table>

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghans Who Feel Attacks on Coalition Forces are Justified: 2-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nationwide</th>
<th>Coalition Bombing in Area</th>
<th>High-conflict Provinces</th>
<th>No Coalition Bombing in</th>
<th>Low-conflict Provinces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Ratings of Neighboring Countries 2009/2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>91%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008-12</th>
<th>2009-2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wrong Direction</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Place</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Direction</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perception of an improving security climate has increased two quarters in a row – 86% of Afghans believe security is the same or better in their mantaqa.

Is security in your mantaq better, the same or worse than it was 6 months ago?

**Kabul**
- Kabul Sep 08: 31% Better, 56% The Same, 10% Worse
- Kabul Dec 08: 29% Better, 60% The Same, 9% Worse
- Kabul Mar 09: 40% Better, 51% The Same, 8% Worse

**Nationwide**
- Nationwide Sep 08: 24% Better, 56% The Same, 19% Worse
- Nationwide Dec 08: 28% Better, 54% The Same, 17% Worse
- Nationwide Mar 09: 35% Better, 51% The Same, 13% Worse

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009
Do you believe the Government is going in the right direction or wrong direction?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Dec 08</th>
<th>Mar 09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wrong Direction</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Place, Not Going</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Direction</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused / Don't Know</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008-12</th>
<th>2009-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wrong Direction</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Place</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Direction</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nationwide 2007</th>
<th>Nationwide 2009-2</th>
<th>Herat</th>
<th>Kabul</th>
<th>Rest of Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem: NET</strong></td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Big Problem</strong></td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces, February 9, 2009

Positive Ratings of Local Conditions
ABC News/BBC/ARD poll

- Living conditions: 83%, 72%, 62%, 55%
- Security: 35%, 35%
- Jobs/Economy: 29%

Dates:
10/18/05, 10/19/06, 11/7/07, Now

Afghan Conditions of Life

• While 62 percent of Afghans rate their overall living conditions positively, that’s declined steadily from 83 percent in 2005.

• There has been significant progress in some areas.

  • Seventy-two percent of Afghans say schools have been rebuilt or reopened in their area in the past five years (up 7 points from 2007); 53 percent, mosques; 47 percent, roads (up 12 points); 45 percent, health clinics (up 8 points); and 44 percent, police stations.

  • While fewer than half, 42 percent, say they have good roads, bridges and other infrastructure in their area, that’s up sharply from 24 percent in 2005.

  • Seventy-seven percent rate their local schools positively; 65 percent say they have clean water, up 12 points compared with 2007 and a new high.

  • And 73 percent support the presence of foreign aid organizations in Afghanistan.

• In other areas,

  • barely over half rate their access to medical care positively. Fifty-nine percent have no formal education. Forty-eight percent cannot read.

  • Just under half positively rate their protection from the Taliban and other armed groups.

  • While 61 percent say they can move about safely, that’s down 10 points from 2007, and leaves four in 10 without such freedom of movement. And beyond food and fuel, in terms of prices overall, 58 percent report difficulty being able to afford things they want and need.

  • (Only) 51 percent, say foreign aid groups are making progress in providing a better life for Afghans. And fewer still, 30 percent of Afghans, say foreign development aid has benefited them personally. There’s also concern about its future: Nearly three-quarters are worried about the impact of the global financial crisis on aid to their country.

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces;, February 9, 2009
Afghan Economic Realities

• Fifty-five percent have no electricity whatsoever in their homes; just one in 20 has power all day.
• More than half report incomes less than the equivalent of $100 a month; 93 percent, under $300.
• Fifty-nine percent have no formal education. Forty-eight percent cannot read.
• The affordability of food is worsening: Sixty-three percent of Afghans say they cannot afford to buy all or even some but not all of the food they need, up 9 points from late 2007. And while 63 percent report adequate availability of food (regardless of affordability), that’s down from 82 percent in 2006.
• Fuel prices, likewise, are a major problem; 68 percent say they can’t afford the fuel they need for cooking or heat, a serious issue in the cold Afghan winter.
• Just 29 percent say there’s a good supply of jobs or economic opportunities in their area.
• And the number who characterize their economic opportunities as “very bad” has doubled since 2006 -- from 17 percent then to 33 percent now, one in three Afghans.

• Electricity supply is steadily the single biggest complaint, along with economic opportunity and prices.
• Another poorly rated area is support for agriculture, such as the availability of seed, fertilizer and farm equipment, a central concern in a country that’s three-quarters rural, with food prices so problematic.

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces;, February 9, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Ability to Afford Food: 2007 vs. 2009-2

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Reconstruction: Rebuilt or Reopened in Past Five Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinics</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Stations</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Battle of Perceptions:
Pakistani Attitudes
Pakistani Public Opinion and Support for the War: June 2008 Terror Free Tomorrow Poll

**Nationally:** 32.2% somewhat unfavorable to US; 41.6% very unfavorable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Pursuit of Taliban and Al Qaeda Inside Pakistan without working with the Pakistani Military</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Military working with the Pakistani Military to pursue Taliban and Al Qaeda Inside Pakistan</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pakistani military pursuing Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters inside Pakistan</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pakistani Public Opinion on the US and Al Qa’ida: September 2008

Global Scan Poll for PIPA and BBC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whose in Winning: US or Al Qa’ida?</th>
<th>Feelings About Al Qa’ida</th>
<th>Effect of War on Terror on Al Qa’ida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Qa’ida Winning</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Winning</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Winning</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qa’ida Stronger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Effect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qa’ida Weaker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BBC World Service Poll, September 28, 2008
The Battle of Perceptions:
US/NATO/ISAF Attitudes
US & European Public Opinion on the Afghan War: June 2008

Source: German Marshall Fund of the US: Transatlantic Trends, 2008, p. 14,
Percentage of Population Believing NATO is Still Essential

Source: German Marshall Fund of the US: Transatlantic Trends, 2008, p. 14,
Support for Options in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Europe 12</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Providing Security for Reconstruct.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating Narcotics Production</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisting with Training ANSF</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducting Combat Vs. Taliban</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
European Views of NATO and Afghanistan

Source: German Marshall Fund of the US: Transatlantic Trends, 2008, p. 14,