



Demographic Change in the Greater Levant: A Case Study by Country *Egypt, Israel and Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.*

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It is hard for anyone who has not traveled extensively in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) over a period of decades to realize just how much each nation in the region has changed in terms of basic demographics. There has been a massive increase in population in every MENA country since the end of World War II and the colonial period, and the nations in the Greater Levant are no exception.

It should be stressed that there are no fully reliable figures for population growth, and estimates of the past, current, and projected population for each MENA country often vary by source. Many MENA countries have never had a fully credible census, and reliable broad estimates of population trends only became available in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The data for the period 1950 to 2021 seem accurate enough, however, to measure the massive overall rate of population increase in each country with reasonable accuracy, and that the projections of continuing major near-term trends in population increases through 2050 have a high probability of being correct.

The near-term estimates by the UN and World Bank show that all MENA countries experienced massive increases in population through 2021 and that the resulting pressures on their economies, governance, and social stability must have been a key factor affecting their stability. They also seem accurate enough to show that if today's demographic forces dominate future population growth, there is a near certainty that population pressure will present steadily growing problems through at least 2050. The same is true of the other demographic data and estimates the authors could find.¹

At the same time, one needs to be careful about trying to look too far into the future. The projections of population growth beyond 2021 do become steadily more uncertain with time and estimates of medium to long-term growth should be parametric to reflect this. This is why the total population growth estimates in this analysis have been limited to the period from 2021 to 2050.

To put these uncertainties into perspective, the UN's median projection of Iraq's population in 2050 is a rise to somewhere around 37 million. The US Census Bureau International Data Base (IDB) point estimates project a total of 33.4 million.² These uncertainties then rise sharply with time. The UN projects a median estimate of Syria's population in 2100 at around 43 million but *shows a range for the 95% prediction interval of some 27 million to 69 million*. The US Census Bureau International Data Base (IDB) point estimates for 2100 projects a point estimate of 39.7 million and does not reflect the same massive range of uncertainty.³

Population Growth, Security, and Stability

Population growth is far more likely to be a challenge that the nations of the Greater Levant need to do far more to meet than rise to levels that become some kind of Malthusian nightmare. It is not, however, a challenge that MENA nations can afford to ignore. There has been surprisingly little attention to the impacts of this growth in recent years in estimates of MENA country stability and security. If anything, the potential impact of massive population growth was of far greater concern in the 1950s to 1970s than it is today. This not only true of the level of concern over its impact on economic development planning, but of its impact on political analyses of internal stability.

Today, many studies on MENA country stability and security focus almost exclusively on the current political and economic situation and ignore the impact of past and future population growth

on the need for economic growth, particularly for added jobs, social services, infrastructure, and effective governance. They also ignore the extent to which such growth has already encouraged unrest, political violence, and civil conflict.

Most studies ignore the extent to which population growth has put major strains on governance, has led to far more interaction between different sectarian, ethnic, and tribal groups, and has transformed the internal stability of every state in the MENA region. Most notably, it has led to massive increases in urbanization and participation in the market economy, and, so far, it has done so in spite of internal conflicts, war, economic crises, and all of the other pressures that have shaped a troubled region.

There has also been limited attention to the extent that population growth has changed the culture and values of the populations involved. While many elements of traditional culture and social practices remain, every country in the region has been forced to adapt to a very different economic structure, need for literacy and modern education, and contact with outside values.

At the same time, the projections of population growth by sources like the World Bank and UN do not seem to assess the impact of population growth on problems in development, job creation, and urban services. They also do not address key limits on growth like the adequacy of water supplies or the impact of climate change and the growing concern of some experts that many MENA states will come under serious pressure for climate migration by 2050.⁴

Population growth is only one force for change in a region that is one of the most volatile regions in the world, but the graphs presented in this analysis show just how sharp it has been in the past and how likely it is to be a major force for at least the next two decades. At a minimum, economic development must be tied to estimates of population growth, governments need to plan for the future and not simply for the present, and high-risk areas like water and climate change need to be examined in the light of population growth. It also is all too clear that no country in the region can live in the past in religious or political terms. The tensions that divide populations today are shaped in part by forces that are constantly growing, and there is no way to return to the past or even cope by trying to live as if further change was not inevitable.

The Greater Levant as a Case Study

This analysis is part of a three-volume series of graphic estimates of the trends in population growth that covers all of the MENA region. This volume provides a country-by-country portrait of the population trends in the Greater Levant – including Egypt, Israel, Palestinian areas, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

A snapshot of current CIA estimates of population-related data is provided for each country, and then graphs that show the trends in total population and several other key trends shaped by population growth. Additional graphs show the trends in growth for ages 15 to 24 years - the key age group affecting the need for new and different jobs. They also show the trends for ages 65 and above which will soon lead to massive increases in the dependency ratios and need for income and aid to adults outside of the work force. And they show the trends in urbanization and limits, or decline, in agricultural and self-sufficient workers.

The graphs cover the period of 1950 to 2021 – with UN projections to 2050 and 2100. They collectively illustrate the importance of addressing demographic trends, and the dangers inherent in analyses of politics, governance, development, and security issues which are effectively a snapshot of the present.

The Impact of Massive Population Growth

At the same time, there are limits to the trend data that are now available. Projections beyond 2030-2050 are inherently uncertain, and cannot anticipate changes in governance, social structures and family size, and a host of other factors. The parametric data for total population in the original UN estimates covered 2021-2100. They seem to represent the state of the art in such long-term estimates. However, the projections beyond 2050 are so uncertain that the UN graphs for total population have been edited to focus on periods from 2021 to 2050 where population momentum does most to reduce such uncertainty, while the other UN graphs do project to 2100 – illustrating just how uncertain the data become.

It should be stressed that while some CIA data are provided, the authors concluded that there are insufficient data to show the trends in how population increases have affected the tensions between ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other sources of friction between factions, that have resulted from changes in location and their economic and political role because of population size.

As sources like the CIA *World Factbook* make clear, estimates of even the current divisions within a given nation's population are often uncertain, but there is no doubt that population pressure has affected the divisions within many populations in cases like Iraq and Yemen, and will continue to do so in the future.

More broadly, far too much of the data on projected economic growth, and the impact of critical factors like water supplies and climate change is analyzed by region, rather than by country, and without any clear assumptions of estimates of the impact of population growth. In practice, however, the nations in the entire MENA region, and in the three subregions used in this analysis are so different that regional and subregion averages and trend data are largely meaningless. They bury so many important differences between countries in the resulting average that they are largely useless in estimating real world outcomes on a national basis.

There also has been comparatively little effort to fully and accurately analyze the impact of past and projected population growth on real-world levels of poverty and the equity of income distribution, educational opportunities even at the regional and subregional levels by country. The same is true of differences in job opportunities, health care, representation in government, and how well development funding and aid are shared.

In many cases, national reporting in these areas is erratic, limited, and lacks a statistical base founded on an adequate census or polling effort. In at least some cases, the data seem to be more political than real – claiming progress or a lack of problems – when the real trends are very different.

Some analyses focus on economic growth as if trends like the growth in percent of GDP and total national income per capita, could properly address these issues. Other analyses treat metrics like per capita income and poverty as if population growth and urbanization were not making fundamental changes how the growth of the population interacts with shifts in foreign labor, refugees, and the internally displaced.

It should be noted that the UN graphs that display parametric projections beyond 2021 portray significant ranges of uncertainty and differences in the future levels of population pressure involved by country. They also ignore the pressures to reduce the use of fossil fuels to limit the impact of climate change – a source of major uncertainty in estimating the future ability of petroleum exporting states to deal with population growth. However, the UN projections for most

countries are certainly accurate enough to warn that the pressures caused by the need to deal with young populations will continue to present major problems in most countries through at least 2030, and warn that they could cause serious political unrest indefinitely into the future

Youth at Ages 15-24 and the Demand for Labor versus Aging Over 65 years and Massive Increases in Dependence on Others or the State for Income

The graphs showing the trends in ages 15-24 show that population growth has often led to total populations that are very young, and ones where the number of young men and women trying to enter the labor force have sharply increased the demand for advanced education and market-driven jobs. In many countries, this demand has sharply exceeded supply, and the UN's Arab Development Reports are only one of the many sources highlighting the shortfalls in youth employment and the resulting anger.

At the same time, the graphs for the growth in population in the population that is aged 65 and above show the effect of improved medical services and life spans and that they will lead to major - and sometimes massive - increases in the population over 65. Most of this population will not expect to work beyond this age. The graphs show that this is already creating a problem in several countries, but the growing burden of dependency could reach the crisis level after 2030-2040 if several nations do not expand their level of economic development and income, and create suitable social policy.

Shifting from Agriculture to a Market Driven System

The last set of graphs for each country shows that population pressure has combined with fundamental changes in the global economy to make nation-wide shifts away from nearly self-sufficient agriculture to petroleum and service industries, and done so with only a limited increase in manufacturing output.

With some exceptions, studies by the UN's Arab Human Development Reports, Arab Barometer, and other polls and sources show that job creation has not met growing needs, that most nations have lagged in providing adequate levels of development, and that the quality of governance has not kept up with the radically changing patterns in national needs - while work by Transparency International and the World Bank show that the end result has been growing corruption and a decline in governance - and sometimes help push nations to the near breakdown of national political structures and even civil war.

This is not the case for some of the wealthiest petroleum exporting states, notably Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. They have developed both their petroleum sectors and other aspects of their economies, and both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have major economic development and modernization plans, although Saudi Arabia's efforts include a large number of major showpiece programs of dubious potential cost-effectiveness.

"Oil wealth," however, is relative. Bahrain's reserves are very limited, and it is dependent on Saudi support. Iran has mismanaged its economy, and Iraq has largely squandered its petroleum wealth on massive state sector efforts, war, and political upheavals ever since 1980. Oman's reserves are limited compared to its population growth, and Yemen's massive population growth and instability have sharply limited its development and the benefits it could draw from its relatively small petroleum export income.

Governments Have Often Failed to Meet the Needs of their Peoples

Finally, the impact of population growth is shaped largely by the quality of governance and its development efforts. Regional and national public opinion polls highlight the extent to which the population of many states - including virtually every low-income state that permits public polling - feels that government is failing them to some degree – often to the point where affording basic foodstuffs is a serious problem. The Arab Barometer, and an Arab Human Development Report entitled *Citizenship 360° in the Arab Region*, are just a few of the examples of such polling.⁵

There is no way to know how the extent to which the problems most MENA governments are now having with their own people. And popular unrest, and demonstrations, are driven by population growth. Population pressure is only one factor among many. At the same time, various UN Arab Development Reports warned long before the “Arab Spring” that population pressure and the need for jobs was creating growing instability, and it is all too clear from the trends involved that there are few reasons to believe most MENA governments are prepared to meet the challenges of further population increases and changes in the demographic and urban character of their countries.

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Egypt

Like Algeria, Egypt is more an army with a country than a country with an army. Egypt has, however, managed to absorb a massive level of population increase more effectively than many other MENA states in spite of limited agricultural modernization and moderate industrialization by regional standards. It has done so by reliance on the Nile and a limited arable area plus tourism, taking advantage of what has been a relative stable major source of water, although one that now faces uncertainty because of Ethiopian damming of the Nile. Its population has grown, however, to over 100 million – which may well be higher than can be supported with growth to a fully developed state - and is projected to rise to around 150 million by 2050.

Egypt does have an ambitious National Structural Reform Program (NSRP) (FY2021/2022–FY2023/2024). However, job creation and personal incomes have already been serious sources of unrest since 2011, and the beginning of the Arab spring, and currency stability, inflation, and dependence on IMF loans are already serious issues. Poverty rates, investment in human development, and the quality of education and health care already are issues, as is the cost of supporting a rising population of over 65 years of age. Climate change presents a near to mid-term challenge.

Looking toward the future, the World Bank analysis of water use in the MENA region shows that Egypt - where irrigated agriculture is a fundamental component of the economy - has the largest volume of reuse of agricultural drainage water in the region.⁶ Despite having the lowest water stress in the region, growing socioeconomic challenges will grow its surface water stress in the future. At the same time, the Bank's studies of the impact of climate change raise serious questions about the growing environmental challenges Egypt may face between 2022 and 2050, and its ability to support its existing population in the eastern and western portions of the Nile Delta, including Alexandria.⁷ Some estimates indicate a potential need for major population migration outside of the country.


Snapshot of Key Factoids from the CIA Factbook (accessed August 2022)

- ◁ **Population distribution:** approximately 95% of the population lives within 20 km of the Nile River and its delta; vast areas of the country remain sparsely populated or uninhabited
- ◁ **Foreign population:** NA
- ◁ **Ethnic groups:** Egyptian 99.7%, other 0.3% (2006 est.)
- ◁ **Sectarian groups:** Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 90%, Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox, other Christians include Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, and Anglican) 10%
- ◁ **Dependency ratios:** total dependency ratio: 64.6 youth dependency ratio: 55.8 elderly dependency ratio: 8.8
- ◁ **Median Age:** 24.1 years
- ◁ **Population growth rate:** 1.68% (2022 est.)
- ◁ **Literacy:** 71.2%
- ◁ **School life expectancy: (primary to tertiary):** 14 years
- ◁ **Urbanization:** 43% of total population (2022)

- ◁ **Urbanization Growth Rate:** 1.9% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)
- ◁ **GDP per capita:** \$12,000 (2020 est.)
- ◁ **GDP Composition:** agriculture: 11.7% (2017 est.) industry: 34.3% (2017 est.) services: 54% (2017 est.)
- ◁ **Labor force by Occupation (2004):** agriculture: 25.8% industry: 25.1% services: 49.1% (2015 est.)
- ◁ **Overall Unemployment Rate:** 7.86% (2019 est.)
- ◁ **Unemployment Youth ages 15-24:** total: 19.2% male: 12.2% female: 49.3% (2019 est.)


Total Population Estimates for Egypt (In Millions)

World Bank



Source: World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2021&locations=EG&start=1960&view=chart>


UN 1950 to 2100:




Source: UN, <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/TOT/818>.

Egypt: Warning Signs: Entry to Labor Force Age and Seniors 65 and Over

UN: Population Age 15-24




UN: Age 65 and Over



Source: UN, <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/65plus/818>

Egypt: Shifts from Rural to Urban Market-Driven Population



Source: UN Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects <https://population.un.org/wup/Country-Profiles/>

Israel

Israel has developed the most modern economy and most advanced military forces in the MENA region. It has a high level of governance, a functioning democracy, and its Jewish population has a moderate to high income by global standards. It is the only high technology economy in the MENA region, and it is now exploiting major offshore gas fields and is a gas exporter to Jordan and Egypt. The growth of the Jewish population remains moderate by MENA standards, but still presents challenges for the future.

The CIA *World Factbook* notes that.

...low labor force participation among minority populations, low workforce productivity, high costs for housing and consumer staples, and a lack of competition, remain a concern for many Israelis (...). Israel's income inequality and poverty rates are among the highest of OECD countries, and there is a broad perception among the public that a small number of "tycoons" have a cartel-like grip over the major parts of the economy."

...Israel's progressive, globally competitive, knowledge-based technology sector employs only about 8% of the workforce, with the rest mostly employed in manufacturing and services - sectors which face downward wage pressures from global competition. Expenditures on educational institutions remain low compared to most other OECD countries with similar GDP per capita.

Looking further into the future, the World Bank analysis of water use in the MENA region shows that Israel is a global leader in water productivity but will experience significant increases in surface water stress driven by climate change.⁸


Snapshot of Key Factoids from the CIA Factbook (accessed August 2022)

- < **Population distribution:** population concentrated in and around Tel-Aviv, as well as around the Sea of Galilee; the south remains sparsely populated with the exception of the shore of the Gulf of Aqaba
- < **Foreign population:** NA
- < **Ethnic groups:** Jewish 74% (of which Israel-born 78.7%, Europe/America/Oceania-born 14.8%, Africa-born 4.2%, Asia-born 2.3%), Arab 21.1%, other 4.9% (2020 est.)
- < **Sectarian groups:** Jewish 74%, Muslim 18%, Christian 1.9%, Druze 1.6%, other 4.5% (2020 est.)
- < **Dependency ratios:** total dependency ratio: 67.3 youth dependency ratio: 46.6 elderly dependency ratio: 20.8
- < **Median Age:** 30.4 years
- < **Population growth rate:** 1.44% (2022 est.)
- < **Literacy:** 97.8%
- < **School life expectancy: (primary to tertiary):** 16 years
- < **Urbanization:** 92.8% of total population (2022)
- < **Urbanization Growth Rate:** 1.51% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)
- < **GDP per capita:** \$38,300 (2020 est.)
- < **GDP Composition:** agriculture: 2.4% (2017 est.) industry: 26.5% (2017 est.) services: 69.5% (2017 est.)

- ◁ **Labor force by Occupation (2004):** agriculture: 1.1% industry: 17.3% services: 81.6% (2015 est.)
- ◁ **Overall Unemployment Rate:** 4.4% (2020 est.)
- ◁ **Unemployment Youth ages 15-24:** total: 7.9% male: 7.6% female: 8.2% (2020 est.)

Israel: Total Population Growth Estimates (In Millions)

World Bank




Source:

World

Bank,

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2021&locations=IL&start=1960&view=chart>


UN 1950 to 2050:




Source: UN, <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/TOT/376>.

Israel: Warning Signs: Entry to Labor Force Age and Seniors 65 and Over

UN: Population Age 15-24




UN: Age 65 and Over




Source: UN, <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/65plus/376>.


Israel: Shifts from Rural to Urban Market-Driven Population




Note: Urban and rural population in the current country or area as a percentage of the total population, 1950 to 2050.



Note: Proportion of urban population in the current country as compared to its subregion and region. The proportion is expressed as a percentage of the total population, 1950 to 2050.



Note: Urban and rural population in the current country.



Note: Urban population by size class of urban settlement and number of cities, 1990, 2018 and 2030. The grey area is a residual category that includes all urban settlements with a population of less than 300,000 inhabitants.

Source: UN Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects <https://population.un.org/wup/Country-Profiles/>

West Bank and Gaza

Israel is unique, however, is having four separate areas of minority Arab population operating and living under different rules and security constraints: Jerusalem, the rest of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. The data on the separate mix of Jews and Arabs in the first three areas is uncertain, but total growth for each population in Israel proper is projected to be similar in the charts developed by the U.S. Census Bureau in this section (The UN and World Bank do not provide projections).

There are no current indications that a two-country solution to peace will be found to separate Jews and Palestinians, and tensions between Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem and within Israel remains high and is likely to increase as a result of population growth, Israeli security procedures, real estate policies and treatment of holy places, and Palestinian threats and violence.

The Palestinian Authority has not been a functional democracy since 2006, when Hamas won the election in Gaza and then seized all PA military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. The Palestinian Authority is dysfunctional and has done little to help develop the West Bank. It now administers the major Palestinian population centers and areas immediately surrounding them and the CIA reports that, “roughly 60% of the West Bank remains under full Israeli civil and military control, impeding movement of people and goods through the territory.” Israeli politics increasingly debate the annexation of the areas under Israeli control, and Palestinians in these areas and Jerusalem face increasing pressure to leave.

Economic growth in West Bank is limited and unemployment – especially youth unemployment – is high. Corruption in the Palestinian Authority is high, and the CIA notes that,

Longstanding Israeli restrictions on imports, exports, and movement of goods and people continue to disrupt labor, trade flows, the territory’s industrial capacity, and constrain private sector development. The PA’s budget benefited from an effort to improve tax collection, coupled with lower spending in 2017, but the PA for the foreseeable future will continue to rely heavily on donor aid for its budgetary needs and infrastructure development.

As the following charts show, Gaza is not only a constant source of violence between Israel and Hamas, but a demographic disaster – an area with no resources or water to support massive population growth, with the possible except of natural gas resources – now claimed by Israel. Both Israel and Egypt enforce tight border controls and the border with Israel has been the repeated source of fighting and air and rocket attacks.

The CIA *World Factbook* notes that,

Since April 2017, the Palestinian Authority has reduced payments for electricity supplied to Gaza and cut salaries for its employees there, exacerbating poor economic conditions. Since 2014, Egypt’s crackdown on the Gaza Strip’s extensive tunnel-based smuggling network has exacerbated fuel, construction material, and consumer goods shortages in the territory. Donor support for reconstruction following the 51-day conflict in 2014 between Israel and HAMAS and other Gaza-based militant groups has fallen short of post-conflict needs.

UN reporting has been accused of being biased in favor of the Palestinians and does not reflect the number of Palestinian terrorist attacks and violent actions, or Hamas’ attacks on Israel. However, the UN web page on Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory lists the following “facts and figures” for the West Bank and Gaza:


- ◀ **Territory: Gaza Strip (365 km²) and the West Bank (approximately 5,655 km²), including East Jerusalem.** (Source: OCHA: *Humanitarian Atlas Occupied Palestinian Territory 2019*)

- ◁ **Percentage of the West Bank off-limits for Palestinian use: 61%...** (Source: UN OCHA Area C, 2021)
- ◁ **West Bank separation wall: Total planned length: 712 km; 65.3% is complete, of which 85 % runs inside the West Bank.** (Source: UN OCHA, Barrier Update 2021)
- ◁ **The Palestinian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: 4.8 million (1.9 million in Gaza, 2.9 million in the West Bank).** (Sources: UN OCHA Humanitarian Atlas Occupied Palestinian Territory 2019)
- ◁ **Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA: 5.6 million (1.4 million in Gaza, 858 thousand in the West Bank, 2.2 million in Jordan, 476 thousand in Lebanon, and 562 thousand in Syria) as of December 2019.** (Source: UNRWA in Figures)
- ◁ **Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem: approximately 630 thousand in 150 settlements established in the West Bank since 1967 and 34 : " õ q wó settlements erected without official Israeli authorization. * U q w t e g u < " õ T g r on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People: Developments in the Economy of the Occupied R c n g u v k p k c p " V g t t k v q t { ö " C w i " 4 2 4 2 = " W P " Q E J C " õ Q e e w Needs Overview 4 2 4 3 ö " F g e " 4 2 4 2 +**
- ◁ **Israeli roadblocks and checkpoints obstructing Palestinian movement in the West Bank: 593, most of them aimed to protect Israeli settlers. * U q w t e g < " W P " Q E J C " õ Q e e w r k g V g t t k v q t { " * q R v + " J w o c p k v c t k c p " P g g f u " Q x g t x k g y " 4 2**
- ◁ **Conflict-related deaths 2011-2021: 3,572 Palestinians, 198 Israelis; including 806 Palestinian children and 14 Israeli children.** (Sources: UN OCHA Special Focus, OCHA Online Protection of Civilians Database)
- ◁ **Per capita GDP Occupied Palestinian Territory: US\$ 3,463.3, 2019.** (Sources: World Bank R w d n k e c v k q p u " õ R c n g u v k p k c p " V g t t k v q t k g u ö " Q e v " 4 2 4 US\$ 43,592 in Israel.
- ◁ **Poverty rate Occupied Palestinian Territory: 36% in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and 64% in Gaza; 2021 est. * U q w t e g < " W P " Q E J C " õ Q e e w r k g f " R * q R v + " J w o c p k v c t k c p " P g g f u " Q x g t x k g y " 4 2 4 3 ö " F g e " 4 2**
- ◁ **Water: Palestinian per capita access to water consumption in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is below the internationally recommended level of 100 liters per capita. Israel controls 85% of Palestinian water sources. * U q w t e g < " õ T g r q t v " q p " W P E V C F " R c n g u v k p k c p " R g q r n g < " F g x g n q r o g p v u " k p " v j g " G e q p q c 2020)**
- ◁ **Food Security: 2 million Palestinians are considered food insecure, including 0.6 million in the West Bank and 1.4 million in Gaza; 2021 est.** (Source: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2021)

West Bank and Gaza: Total Population Growth Estimates


Note: the following graphs are close estimates from various sources. An authoritative census study on their demographics was unavailable at the time of this report.

West Bank and Gaza, World Bank



<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=1990&locations=PS&start=1990&view=bar>


Growth of Palestine: Populations of Israel and Palestinian Territories between 1960 and 2020 in millions




Sources: Adapted from Statista, <https://www.statista.com/chart/20645/palestine-and-israel-population-growth/>.
References UN Data.

Gaza: Total Population Growth Estimates and Palestinian age Distribution

Total Population of West Bank



Total Population of Gaza



Sources:

United States Census Bureau, International Database https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/#/country?COUNTRY_YEAR=2022&COUNTRY_YR_ANIM=2022&FIPS_SINGLE=WE, and GA

Jordan

Jordan faces serious population pressures relative to its resources and the impact of climate change, and has become hyper-urbanized with limited agricultural reform, but is relatively well governed and has actively pursued modernization and development, including the development of an effective Reform Matrix and 2021-2023 Economic Priorities Program. Its population has grown, however, to the limits of what Jordan's resources can easily support and population growth and the impact of climate change will present growing problems in the near term.

The World Bank summarized Jordan's development prospects as follows in its May 2022 *Overview*:

Jordan has begun its recovery from the COVID-19 shock — real GDP grew by 2.2% in 2021 following a 1.6% contraction in 2020. However, the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated Jordan's jobs challenge: Unemployment stood at 23.3% in Q4-2021, youth unemployment reached nearly 50% and the women's labor force participation rate is 14%, one of the lowest in the world. At end-2021, Jordan's public and publicly guaranteed gross debt stood at 113.8% of GDP (and debt net of SSIF debt holdings at 92% of GDP) respectively. High unemployment rates, widening external imbalances, elevated debt levels and weak investment highlight sizable challenges to a robust recovery.

Jordan faces several climate-related hazards including significant temperature increases, precipitation decreases and increased incidents of drought. Jordan is heavily dependent on fossil-fuel imports, with limited natural resources. It is among the most water-poor countries in the world. Jordan's fiscal situation demands that it finds private sector solutions to climate challenges and that it incentivizes these solutions from a climate lens as part of its development model.

Even prior to the COVID-19 crisis, Jordan's economy had been struggling with persistently sluggish growth dynamics and structural challenges. Between 2016 and 2019, real GDP growth averaged about 2%, insufficient to create enough jobs for Jordan's young labor force. Part of this weak growth performance traces back to multiple external shocks Jordan has experienced in the past decade, including regional conflicts and the influx of nearly 1.3 million Syrian refugees (representing almost 13% of the total population). Sitting at the center of a volatile region, Jordan continues to play a role as an anchor for regional stability and for the global public goods it provides by hosting refugees and promoting cross-border regional cooperation and trade.

The CIA World Factbook noted that,

Since the onset of the civil war in Syria and resulting refugee crisis, one of Jordan's most pressing socioeconomic challenges has been managing the influx of approximately 660,000 UN-registered refugees, more than 80% of whom live in Jordan's urban areas. Jordan's own official census estimated the refugee number at 1.3 million Syrians as of early 2016.

Jordan is nearly completely dependent on imported energy—mostly natural gas—and energy consistently makes up 25-30% of Jordan's imports. In August 2016, Jordan and the IMF agreed to a \$723 million Extended Fund Facility that aims to build on the three-year, \$2.1 billion IMF program that ended in August 2015 with the goal of helping Jordan correct budgetary and balance of payments imbalances.

Looking further into the future, the World Bank analysis of water use in the MENA region shows that Jordan is the fourth most water-scarce country in the world, and economic development and demographic growth linked to the recent influx of refugees have added further strain on the very limited water supply of the country.⁹ At the same time, the Bank's studies of the impact of climate change raise serious questions about the growing environmental challenges Jordan may face between 2022 and 2050, and its ability to support its existing population in addition to the its growing number of refugees.¹⁰ Some estimates indicate that it is considered highly vulnerable to


climate change, which is projected to continue making the country warmer, drier, and subject to more extreme events, including droughts and floods.

Snapshot of Key Factoids from the CIA Factbook (accessed August 2022)

- ◁ **Population distribution:** population heavily concentrated in the west, and particularly the northwest, in and around the capital of Amman; a sizeable, but smaller population is located in the southwest along the shore of the Gulf of Aqaba
- ◁ **Foreign population:** NA
- ◁ **Ethnic groups:** Jordanian 69.3%, Syrian 13.3%, Palestinian 6.7%, Egyptian 6.7%, Iraqi 1.4%, other 2.6% (includes Armenian, Circassian) (2015 est.)
- ◁ **Sectarian groups:** Muslim 97.1% (official; predominantly Sunni), Christian 2.1% (majority Greek Orthodox, but some Greek and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Protestant denominations), Buddhist 0.4%, Hindu 0.1%, Jewish <0.1%, folk <0.1%, other <0.1%, unaffiliated <0.1% (2020 est.)
- ◁ **Dependency ratios:** total dependency ratio: 58.2 youth dependency ratio: 52 elderly dependency ratio: 6.3
- ◁ **Median Age:** 23.5 years
- ◁ **Population growth rate:** 0.81% (2022 est.)
- ◁ **Literacy:** 98.2%
- ◁ **School life expectancy: (primary to tertiary):** 11 years
- ◁ **Urbanization:** 91.8% of total population (2022)
- ◁ **Urbanization Growth Rate:** 0.98% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)
- ◁ **GDP per capita:** \$9,800 (2020 est.)
- ◁ **GDP Composition:** agriculture: 4.5% (2017 est.) industry: 28.8% (2017 est.) services: 66.6% (2017 est.)
- ◁ **Labor force by Occupation (2004):** agriculture: 2% industry: 20% services: 78% (2013 est.)
- ◁ **Overall Unemployment Rate:** 19.1% (2019 est.)
- ◁ **Unemployment Youth ages 15-24:** total: 37.3% male: 34.8% female: 49.4% (2019 est.)

Jordan: Total Population Growth Estimates In Millions

World Bank




Source:

World

Bank,

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2021&locations=JO&start=1960&view=chart>


UN 1950 to 2100:




Source: UN, <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/TOT/400>.

Jordan: Warning Signs: Entry to Labor Force Age and Seniors 65 and Over

UN: Population Age 15-24




UN: Age 65 and Over




Source: UN, <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/65plus/400>.


Jordan: Shifts from Rural to Urban Market-Driven Population




© 2018 United Nations, DESA, Population Division. Licensed under Creative Commons license CC BY 3.0 IGO.
Note: Urban and rural population in the current country or area as a percentage of the total population, 1950 to 2050.



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Note: Proportion of urban population in the current country or area as compared to its subregion and region. The proportion is expressed as a percentage of the total population, 1950 to 2050.



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Note: Urban and rural population in the current country.



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Note: Urban population by size class of urban settlement and number of cities, 1990, 2018 and 2030. The grey area is a residual category that includes all urban settlements with a population of less than 300,000 inhabitants.

Source: UN Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects <https://population.un.org/wup/Country-Profiles/>

Lebanon

The data on Lebanon's population in the following charts show major differences between the UN and World Bank, but both graphs show levels of growth that Lebanon cannot effectively absorb. The graph on youth from 15-24 years of age shows a decline in youth demand for jobs that seems to imply significant migration out of the country. The rise in age 65 and over numbers will present a significant economic challenge.

Lebanon has gone from civil war to a sectarian kleptocracy divided between Sunni, Shi'ite, and Christian that has virtually collapsed, leaving its economy in near chaos. Its government has been relatively effective in the past but now lacks effective enough leadership to function properly, although its military remains relatively well organized and force for stability. At the same time, the Hezbollah has emerged as a major military force equipped with large numbers of missiles and rickets and with close ties to Iran and Syria –raising new issues regarding possible conflicts with Israel.

The CIA *World Factbook Book* notes that,

Lebanon has experienced periods of political turmoil interspersed with prosperity built on its historical position as a regional center for finance and trade, although that status has significantly diminished since the beginning of Lebanon's economic crisis in 2019, which includes simultaneous currency, debt, and banking crises. The country's 1975-90 civil war, which resulted in an estimated 120,000 fatalities, was followed by years of social and political instability. Sectarianism is a key element of Lebanese political life.

The CIA also notes that,

Pledges of economic and financial reforms made at separate international donor conferences during the 2000s have mostly gone unfulfilled, including those made during the Paris III Donor Conference in 2007, following the July 2006 war. The "CEDRE" investment event hosted by France in April 2018 again rallied the international community to assist Lebanon with concessional financing and some grants for capital infrastructure improvements, conditioned upon long-delayed structural economic reforms in fiscal management, electricity tariffs, and transparent public procurement, among many others.

... The Syria conflict cut off one of Lebanon's major markets and a transport corridor through the Levant. The influx of nearly one million registered and an estimated 300,000 unregistered Syrian refugees has increased social tensions and heightened competition for low-skill jobs and public services. Lebanon continues to face several long-term structural weaknesses that predate the Syria crisis, notably, weak infrastructure, poor service delivery, institutionalized corruption, and bureaucratic over-regulation.

Chronic fiscal deficits have increased Lebanon's debt-to-GDP ratio, the third highest in the world; most of the debt is held internally by Lebanese banks. These factors combined to slow economic growth to the 1-2% range in 2011-17, after four years of averaging 8% growth. Weak economic growth limits tax revenues, while the largest government expenditures remain debt servicing, salaries for government workers, and transfers to the electricity sector. These limitations constrain other government spending, limiting its ability to invest in necessary infrastructure


Looking further into the future, the World Bank analysis of water use in the MENA region shows that Lebanon is already on the threshold of water scarcity, with surface water largely exploited and groundwater already in overdraft, and, similarly to Jordan, has a sizable refugee population that is increasing.¹¹ At the same time, the Bank's studies of the impact of climate change raise serious questions about the growing environmental challenges Lebanon may face between 2022 and 2050, and its ability to support its existing population pressures.¹² Some estimates indicate also a potential brain drain and out migration as its economic crisis worsens.

Snapshot of Key Factoids from the CIA Factbook (accessed August 2022)

- ◁ **Population distribution:** the majority of the people live on or near the Mediterranean coast, and of these most live in and around the capital, Beirut; favorable growing conditions in the Bekaa Valley, on the southeastern side of the Lebanon Mountains, have attracted farmers and thus the area exhibits a smaller population density
- ◁ **Foreign population:** NA
- ◁ **Ethnic groups:** Arab 95%, Armenian 4%, other 1%
- ◁ **Sectarian groups:** Muslim 67.8% (31.9% Sunni, 31.2% Shia, smaller percentages of Alawites and Ismailis), Christian 32.4% (Maronite Catholics are the largest Christian group), Druze 4.5%, very small numbers of Jews, Baha'is, Buddhists, and Hindus (2020 est.)
- ◁ **Dependency ratios:** total dependency ratio: 48.4 youth dependency ratio: 37.2 elderly dependency ratio: 11.2
- ◁ **Median Age:** 33.7 years
- ◁ **Population growth rate:** 0.66% (2022 est.)
- ◁ **Literacy:** 95.1%
- ◁ **School life expectancy: (primary to tertiary):** 11 years
- ◁ **Urbanization:** 89.3% of total population (2022)
- ◁ **Urbanization Growth Rate:** -1.23% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)
- ◁ **GDP per capita:** \$11,600 (2020 est.)
- ◁ **GDP Composition:** agriculture: 3.9% (2017 est.) industry: 13.1% (2017 est.) services: 83% (2017 est.)
- ◁ **Labor force by Occupation (2004):** agriculture: 39% (2009 est.) industry: NA services: NA
- ◁ **Overall Unemployment Rate:** 9.7% (2007)
- ◁ **Unemployment Youth ages 15-24:** total: 23.4% male: 24.5% female: 21.4% (2019)

Lebanon: Total Population Growth Estimates (In Millions)

World Bank




Source:

World

Bank,

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2021&locations=LB&start=1960&view=chart>


UN 1950 to 2100:




Source: United Nations, <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/TOT/422>

Lebanon: Warning Signs: Entry to Labor Force Age and Seniors 65 and Over

UN: Population Age 15-24




UN: Age 65 and Over




Source: United Nations, <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/65plus/422>


Lebanon: Shifts from Rural to Urban Market-Driven Population




Note: Urban and rural population in the current country or area as a percentage of the total population, 1950 to 2050.



Note: Proportion of urban population in the current country as compared to its subregion and region. The proportion is expressed as a percentage of the total population, 1950 to 2050.



Note: Urban and rural population in the current country.



Note: Urban population by size class of urban settlement and number of cities, 1990, 2018 and 2030. The grey area is a residual category that includes all urban settlements with a population of less than 300,000 inhabitants.

Source: UN Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects <https://population.un.org/wup/Country-Profiles/>

Syria

Syria has experienced one of the most devastating civil wars in recent history, coupled to some of the most ruthless attack on the opponents of the Assad regime and their civilian dependents. This has led to massive refugee outflows, as well as internally displaced populations. This makes any conventional assessments and projections of population pressure difficult to impossible, although the UN estimate of the rise between 2020 and 2050 is one that is far beyond the capacity of present Syrian development efforts to support.

The Assad regime seems to have won the fighting, although two enclaves remain in Eastern Syria, and another major rebel enclave still exists in the northwest. Turkey now occupies some areas, and U.S. forces support the largely Kurdish enclave in the northeast.

The CIA *World Factbook* notes that,

According to a September 2021 UN estimate, the death toll resulting from the past 10 years of civil war is more than 350,000, although the UN acknowledges that this is the minimum number of verifiable deaths and is an undercount. According to a June 2022 UN estimate, the death toll resulting from the past 10 plus years of civil war is more than 306,000. As of early 2022, approximately 6.66 million Syrians were internally displaced and 14.6 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance across the country. An additional 5.6 million Syrians were registered refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and North Africa. The conflict in Syria remains one of the two largest displacement crises worldwide (the other is the invasion of Ukraine).

It also notes that,

Syria's economy has deeply deteriorated amid the ongoing conflict that began in 2011, declining by more than 70% from 2010 to 2017. The government has struggled to fully address the effects of international sanctions, widespread infrastructure damage, diminished domestic consumption and production, reduced subsidies, and high inflation, which have caused dwindling foreign exchange reserves, rising budget and trade deficits, a decreasing value of the Syrian pound, and falling household purchasing power. In 2017, some economic indicators began to stabilize, including the exchange rate and inflation, but economic activity remains depressed and its GDP almost certainly fell.

During 2017, the ongoing conflict and continued unrest and economic decline worsened the humanitarian crisis, necessitating high levels of international assistance, as more than 13 million people remain in need inside Syria, and the number of registered Syrian refugees increased from 4.8 million in 2016 to more than 5.4 million... the economy remains highly regulated. Long-run economic constraints include foreign trade barriers, declining oil production, high unemployment, rising budget deficits, increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, industrial contraction, water pollution, and widespread infrastructure damage.

The World Bank *Overview* for April 2021 notes that,

The social and economic impact of the conflict is also large—and growing. Socioeconomic conditions are deteriorating rapidly affected by a range of shocks, including the prolonged armed conflict, economic sanctions, COVID-19 pandemic, a severe drought, deepening economic crisis in neighboring Lebanon and Turkey and the economic consequences of the war in Ukraine and associated sanctions. The continued depreciation of the local currency has led to rampant inflation, worsening already high food insecurity and pushing more people into poverty. Conflict, displacement and the collapse of economic activities and social services have all contributed to the decline in welfare for Syria's inhabitants. Before the conflict, extreme poverty in Syria (\$1.90 2011 PPP per day) was virtually nonexistent. It is now affecting more than 50 percent of the population. Access to shelter, livelihood opportunities, health, education, water, and sanitation have all worsened dramatically since the onset of the conflict. With a severely degraded healthcare system following the decade-long war, COVID-19 has only exacerbated the pre-existing vulnerable situations...from 2011 to 2016, cumulative GDP losses were estimated at US\$226 billion, about four times the Syrian GDP in 2010. The second study also found that losses caused by the conflict's disruption of the economy exceeded those losses caused by physical destruction by a factor of 20.

the Syrian conflict broke down bilateral and transit trade routes, destabilized the region, and led to the largest displacement crisis since the Second World War. As a result, Syria's neighbors faced the combination of a decrease in economic activity, deterioration in labor markets, and increase in poverty that would have overwhelmed even the world's most advanced economies...a number of persistent structural weaknesses in the region, including low or deteriorating institutional resilience, reduced the effectiveness of the mitigation policies put into place to deal with the impact of the Syrian crisis. Short-termism in policymaking propagated the shocks caused by the Syrian conflict, leading to costly and ineffective services, lost economic opportunities, and underfunded programs. The report advocated a fundamental shift from short-term mitigation policies to a medium-term regional strategy that would address structural problems.

Looking further into the future, the World Bank analysis of water use in the MENA region shows that decades of poor water resources management and planning have led Syria to a water crisis characterized by surface water overabstraction and groundwater depletion.¹³ At the same time, the Bank's studies of the impact of climate change raise serious questions about the growing environmental challenges Syria may face between 2022 and 2050, with already more than 70 percent of total renewable water resources originated outside the country.¹⁴ Some estimates indicate that water shortages in the country may exceed 3.5 billion cubic meters by 2050.

(Note: approximately 22,900 Israeli settlers live in the Golan Heights (2018))


Snapshot of Key Factoids from the CIA Factbook (accessed August 2022) (note: Data are unusually uncertain)

- ◁ **Population distribution:** significant population density along the Mediterranean coast; larger concentrations found in the major cities of Damascus, Aleppo (the country's largest city), and Hims (Homs); more than half of the population lives in the coastal plain, the province of Halab, and the Euphrates River valley
- ◁ **Foreign population:** NA
- ◁ **Ethnic groups:** Arab ~50%, Alawite ~15%, Kurd ~10%, Levantine ~10%, other ~15% (includes Druze, Ismaili, Imami, Nusairi, Assyrian, Turkoman, Armenian)
- ◁ **Sectarian groups:** Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13%), Christian 10% (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%
- ◁ **Dependency ratios:** total dependency ratio: 55.4 youth dependency ratio: 47.8 elderly dependency ratio: 7.6
- ◁ **Median Age:** 23.5 years
- ◁ **Population growth rate:** 5.91% (2022 est.)
- ◁ **Literacy:** 86.4%
- ◁ **School life expectancy: (primary to tertiary):** 9 years
- ◁ **Urbanization:** 56.8% of total population (2022)
- ◁ **Urbanization Growth Rate:** 5.38% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)
- ◁ **GDP per capita:** \$2,900 (2015 est.)
- ◁ **GDP Composition:** agriculture: 20% (2017 est.) industry: 19.5% (2017 est.) services: 60.8% (2017 est.)

- ◁ **Labor force by Occupation (2004):** agriculture: 17% industry: 16% services: 67% (2008 est.)
- ◁ **Overall Unemployment Rate:** 50% (2017 est.)
- ◁ **Unemployment Youth ages 15-24:** total: 35.8% male: 26.6% female: 71.1% (2011 est.)


Syria: Total Population Growth Estimates (In Millions)

World Bank



Source: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2021&locations=LY&start=1960&view=chart> World Bank,


UN 1950 to 2100:




Source: UN <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/TOT/760>

Syria: Warning Signs: Entry to Labor Force Age and Seniors 65 and Over

UN: Population Age 15-24







UN: Age 65 and Over



Source: UN, <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/65plus/760>

Syria: Shifts from Rural to Urban Market-Driven Population



Source: UN Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects <https://population.un.org/wup/Country-Profiles/>

¹ The reader should be aware that international statistics vary sharply even when issued by the government of many countries for that country. This report draws on two major international organizations, but the U.S. Census Bureau provides its own country-by country projections through 2100 as part of its International Data Base as well as some statistical summary data that do not always agree with data provided by the State Department, Department of Defense, and CIA for the same country and some year. The reader can explore these databases at https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/#/country?COUNTRY_YEAR=2022&COUNTRY_YR_ANIM=2022&FIPS_SINGLE=AG.

² See the UN projection for Syria at <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/TOT/760>, and the U.S. Census Bureau International Database projection for Syria at https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/#/country?COUNTRY_YEAR=2022&COUNTRY_YR_ANIM=2022&FIPS_SINGLE=SY&menu=countryViz.

³ See the UN projection for Syria at <https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/TOT/760>, and the U.S. Census Bureau International Database projection for Syria at https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/#/country?COUNTRY_YEAR=2022&COUNTRY_YR_ANIM=2022&FIPS_SINGLE=SY&menu=countryViz.

⁴ Estimates of the impact of climate change are still very much in development but the World Bank has completed a very detailed pioneering study of such issues. See World Bank, *Groundswell Part II: Acting on Internal Climate Migration*, 2021, for a detailed modeling effort covering all of the countries in the MENA region, as well as water and agricultural issues and some aspects of governance, stability, and development. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/09/13/climate-change-could-force-216-million-people-to-migrate-within-their-own-countries-by-2050>. An earlier World Bank survey focusing on water issues provides additional background. See World Bank, *Beyond Scarcity: Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa*, MENA Development Report; Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/27659>.

⁵ For a more detailed analysis see Jamal, Pagliani, and Hsu; *Citizenship 360° in the Arab Region: Perceptions on Sustainable Development Across Countries, Income, and Gender*, UN Arab Development Report Research Paper, UN Development Program, 2020.

⁶ World Bank, *Beyond Scarcity: Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa*, World Bank Group, 2018.

⁷ World Bank, *Groundswell Part II: Acting on Internal Climate Migration*, 2021, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36248>

⁸ World Bank, *Beyond Scarcity: Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa*, World Bank Group, 2018..

⁹ World Bank, *Beyond Scarcity: Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa*, World Bank Group, 2018.

¹⁰ World Bank, *Groundswell Part II: Acting on Internal Climate Migration*, 2021, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36248>

¹¹ World Bank, *Beyond Scarcity: Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa*, World Bank Group, 2018.

¹² World Bank, *Groundswell Part II: Acting on Internal Climate Migration*, 2021, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36248>

¹³ World Bank, *Beyond Scarcity: Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa*, World Bank Group, 2018.

¹⁴ World Bank, *Groundswell Part II: Acting on Internal Climate Migration*, 2021, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36248>