Aiming for a Quasi-alliance

Building a More Robust Japan-Philippines Security Partnership

AUTHOR
Kojiro Tonosaki
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Introduction

As Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan has frequently stated, “Ukraine may be East Asia tomorrow.”1 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sent shockwaves around the world, causing a rethinking of security, not only in the United States and Europe but also in East Asia. In particular, security in the Taiwan Strait is now frequently discussed in the media, and countries are considering the potential implications of the war in Ukraine for regional security. This includes the Philippines, which is vulnerable to external threats and aiming to modernize its military by the end of 2027. Japan has developed a close relationship with the Philippines and supported capacity building to help Manila manage an increasingly complex security environment, including concerns about a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait.

Among Japan’s relationships with Southeast Asian countries, its relationship with the Philippines is particularly close. The Fukuda Doctrine, which later became the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was announced by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in Manila in August 1977 and focused mainly on economic cooperation. However, security cooperation between the two countries has also developed in recent years. More recently, Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, introduced by former prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2016, accelerated these trends.3

The rapid development of defense cooperation between Japan and the Philippines is due to a shared sense of urgency after China actively pursued maritime expansion in the 2010s. A collision between two Chinese patrol vessels and a Philippine survey vessel at Reed Bank in March 2011 and a standoff at Scarborough Reef in 2012 shocked the Benigno Aquino III administration and caused it to seek defense cooperation with Japan and Australia in addition to its only ally, the United States. Meanwhile, Chinese coercion around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea began straining Japan-China
relations in 2009 and prompted Japan to network more closely with countries around the region to counter Chinese assertiveness throughout the First Island Chain. In a veiled reference to China, Japan’s first national security strategy, unveiled in 2013, states that Japan will strengthen diplomatic and security cooperation with ASEAN countries, which prefer to resolve the South China Sea issue according to the rule of law rather than by force. Thus, defense cooperation between Japan and the Philippines has progressed in countering China’s maritime expansion in the region.

Capacity building for Southeast Asian nations, including the Philippines, is critical to addressing the challenges posed by Chinese assertiveness. As David B. Shear, former assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, noted with regard to U.S. force posture in the region, “In Northeast Asia we have a clear forward line of defense, numerous forward deployed forces, and strong, capable allies. It’s just the opposite in Southeast Asia, where we have a more ambiguous line defense, many fewer forces, and far less capable allies.” Japan has embraced this cause and is working to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Philippines. This paper examines recent developments in defense cooperation between Japan and the Philippines, reviews the security policies of the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations, and proposes measures to strengthen the security partnership between the two countries.
The security partnership between Japan and the Philippines has grown closer in recent years, as evidenced by Japan’s decision in August 2020 to transfer air surveillance radar systems to the Philippines. In June 2021, Japanese minister of defense Nobuo Kishi and Philippine secretary of national defense Delfin Lorenzana held a video teleconference in which they agreed to: (1) strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or any act that would increase tensions, (2) continue to promote bilateral defense cooperation and exchange, and (3) maintain and strengthen the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept.

Japan and the Philippines have long had active economic relations and cultural exchanges, but the two countries have made remarkable progress in defense cooperation since the 2010s. In contrast, the relationship between the United States and the Philippines, both treaty allies, has appeared relatively distant in recent years. In February 2020, President Rodrigo Duterte’s entourage was refused entry visas by the United States due to human rights violations, and the Philippines unilaterally notified the United States that it was breaking the Visiting Forces Agreement governing the U.S. military presence in the country. In July 2021, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin visited the Philippines, and the Visiting Forces Agreement was kept in place, but the relationship between the two countries is still in the process of repair. In August 2021, in an address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Defense Minister Lorenzana stressed that “U.S. support for the modernization of the Philippine Armed Forces would make the Philippines a more reliable ally and would be beneficial to the United States.” However, it is difficult to determine whether concrete progress has been made in security cooperation between the United States and the Philippines.
Japan-Philippines Security Partnership before Aquino

Until the 2010s, the bilateral relationship between Japan and the Philippines was particularly pronounced on the economic front. Figure 1 summarizes the trends of the Philippines’ major trading partners and shows that while China’s advance in 2020 was remarkable, Japan’s presence has been significant since the 1990s. Figure 2 shows the number of foreign visits of Philippine presidents to select major countries, which reveals emphasis on relations with Japan. Japan also has historically been the largest provider of official development assistance (ODA) to the Philippines.

Figure 1: Major Trading Countries of the Philippines

Japan-Philippines security cooperation started to develop from the early 2000s. During the summit meeting between Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine president Gloria Arroyo held on September 15, 2001, immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the two leaders agreed to elevate their relationship to a higher partnership level, including discussions on bilateral, regional, and global security. In addition, they affirmed the need to hold an annual political dialogue on security. Also, in December 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Arroyo met in Manila to discuss a wide range of security issues and signed the "Philippines-Japan Joint Statement on the Partnership of Two Neighboring Countries in Proximity for Comprehensive Cooperation." The statement pledged that the two countries would promote policy dialogue on security, maritime and consular issues and strengthen joint efforts to prevent and combat human trafficking.

Japan has also strengthened ties with the Philippines through diplomatic engagement with ASEAN leaders in many international forums, including the Japan-ASEAN Summit (established in 1977), the Japan-ASEAN Forum (established in 1977), the International Conference on the Future of Asia (established in 1995), ASEAN Plus Three (established in 1997), and the East Asia Summit (established in 2005). In addition, the ASEAN Regional Forum (established in 1994) and, more recently, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (established in 2010), where ministers in charge of foreign affairs and defense participate in ASEAN-related meetings to discuss regional security issues, naturally led to an increase in high-level bilateral exchanges between Japan and the Philippines. Prior to 2012, Tokyo and Manila did not pursue formal agreements on defense cooperation. However, in the face of China’s aggressive behavior in the South and East China Seas, Japan and the Philippines were forced to change this thinking.
**Evolving the Japan-Philippines Security Partnership during Aquino**

The March 2011 collision between two Chinese patrol boats and a Philippine survey ship on the Reed Bank and the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff gave the Aquino administration a great sense of urgency and prompted it to seek military assistance from Japan and Australia in addition to assistance from its only ally, the United States. At the same time, Japan had its own reasons for approaching the Philippines.

Relations between Japan and China have been strained since a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese coast guard vessel in the East China Sea in 2010, which was followed by a persistent campaign of Chinese coercion to support its sovereignty claims over the Senkaku Islands, which Japan rejects. Soon after returning to power at the end of 2012, Prime Minister Abe declared, “The islands are Japan’s inherent territory, and we own it, we have effective control over it, and there is no room for negotiation,” and he refused to acknowledge the existence of a dispute over the Senkaku Islands. China responded by increasing the number and frequency of its civilian vessel deployments. Abe then signaled his tough stance on Chinese coercion to support its maritime sovereignty claims in the South China Sea by noting in the country’s first National Security Strategy (released in 2013) that Japan would enhance diplomatic and security cooperation with ASEAN countries that prefer settling South China Sea disputes not by force but by following the rule of law. Thus, in response to China’s maritime aggression, defense cooperation between Japan and the Philippines, which faces similar challenges in the Scarborough Shoal, started to gain momentum.

In July 2012, Japanese minister of defense Satoshi Morimoto and Philippine minister of defense Voltaire Gazmin signed the Japan-Philippines Defense Cooperation Intention Statement, including plans to conduct a wide range of exchanges among defense officials and explore defense cooperation in areas such as capacity building. A few days after this meeting, Philippine foreign secretary Albert del Rosario announced that Japan would provide 10 40-meter-class vessels to the Philippine coast guard (PCG) by the end of the year as part of Japan’s ODA to the Philippines.

In June 2013, Japanese defense minister Itsunori Onodera and defense secretary Gazmin welcomed the deepening of the “strategic partnership” between Japan and the Philippines in the field of defense, especially in the maritime area, and confirmed that steady progress had been made, including mutual visits between Japan’s chief of the maritime staff and the commander of the Philippine navy; consultations between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Philippine naval staff; expansion of the JMSDF fleet’s port calls to the Philippines; and implementation of the Pacific Partnership defense exchange in 2012. The two ministers also focused on extending security cooperation between the two countries to the aviation sector, which was emphasized during the visit of the chief of staff of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force to the Philippines. At the same meeting, Secretary Gazmin proposed allowing the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) access to bases in the Philippines. Japan also conducted humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in the Philippines, which was severely damaged by Typhoon Haiyan in mid-November 2013. Japan dispatched three JMSDF destroyers (the transport ship Osumi, the large destroyer Ise, and the supply ship Towada), three CH-47 transport helicopters, three UH-1 transport helicopters, two KC-767 air tankers, seven C-130
transport aircraft, one U-4 support aircraft, and a maximum of about 1,180 personnel to conduct medical and epidemic prevention activities, rescue operations, and the transport of relief supplies.\textsuperscript{20}

In December 2013, President Aquino and Prime Minister Abe also exchanged views on the regional and international situation, including issues surrounding the South China Sea and China’s establishment of an air defense identification zone, and confirmed that they would work even more closely together to address regional and international challenges as the regional security environment becomes increasingly severe.\textsuperscript{21} After the meeting, Japanese foreign minister Fumio Kishida and Philippine foreign minister del Rosario signed a letter regarding the “provision of patrol boats to the Philippine Coast Guard.”\textsuperscript{22} In June 2014, Abe and Aquino met again and exchanged views on the role of the United States in the region. Prime Minister Abe welcomed the recently agreed Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the Philippines and the United States, as it would contribute to regional peace and stability by strengthening U.S. presence in the region, including improving disaster response capabilities.\textsuperscript{23}

During his official visit to Japan in June 2015, President Aquino held in-depth discussions with Prime Minister Abe on regional peace and stability.\textsuperscript{24} The two leaders issued two documents, a joint declaration on “A Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and Goals for Peace, Security and Growth in the Region and Beyond” and an accompanying action plan. The joint declaration stated that the relationship between the two countries reflects common ideals and goals to ensure regional peace and stability and referenced Chinese behavior by expressing serious concerns about unilateral actions to change the status quo in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{25} In the action plan, the two governments committed to promoting security cooperation in various areas, including intelligence protection, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime security, the provision of defense equipment, technical cooperation, and capacity-building support.\textsuperscript{26} The two leaders also welcomed the signing of a contract for the construction and acquisition of 10 patrol vessels and expressed their intention to continue and accelerate talks on strengthening maritime domain awareness (MDA).\textsuperscript{27}

**Deepening the Japan-Philippines Security Partnership during the Duterte Administration**

The security partnership between Japan and the Philippines, promoted under the Aquino administration, was intended to counter China’s advances in the South China Sea. However, Philippine foreign policy under President Duterte took a different direction. Duterte prioritized economic engagement with China, downplayed territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea and the challenges posed by Chinese coercion, and seemed to distance the Philippines from the United States, as evidenced by his declared intent to nullify the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States. Despite apparent tensions in Philippine-U.S. security relations, the two countries confirmed in 2019 that the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty will be invoked in the event of an attack on the Philippines in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the Philippines was one of the first ASEAN countries to announce its support for the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership announced in 2020.\textsuperscript{28} These Philippine actions are understandable given the Philippines’ strategic location along the First Island Chain and the importance of cooperation with the United States and other regional players to counter Chinese assertiveness across the region.
During this complicated period in U.S.-Philippines relations, Japan facilitated regular consultations with the Duterte administration to strengthen security ties. In September 2016, Prime Minister Abe held his first summit meeting with President Duterte in Laos. The two leaders agreed to cooperate in the field of maritime security by transferring a JMSDF training aircraft (TC-90) to the Philippine navy and continuing to promote security and defense cooperation by improving the MDA capabilities of the Philippines, supporting pilot training, strengthening the maintenance infrastructure of the Philippine navy, and delivering the first 40-meter-class large patrol boat to the Philippines. During a visit to Japan in October of the same year, President Duterte witnessed the signing of a letter regarding the lease of five JSDF TC-90 maritime reconnaissance aircraft to the Philippines to monitor Chinese activities in the South China Sea and a document to strengthen the PCG by granting the construction of two ships. President Duterte also referenced the prospect of military exercises between the Philippines and Japan in the future.

In January 2017, Prime Minister Abe paid a two-day official visit to Manila for a summit meeting with Duterte, stating that Japan would further enhance the maritime capabilities of the Philippines through the provision of patrol vessels and training and that the JSDF would participate in that year’s joint U.S.-Philippines Balikatan exercise. President Duterte thanked Japan for its assistance in enhancing capabilities in the field of maritime security and counterterrorism, particularly the provision of patrol vessels and small speed boats and the loan of the TC-90. One U.S. analyst observed that Abe’s visit reflected “Tokyo’s ambition to keep up with growing Chinese influence in the geopolitically strategic Southeast Asian country by ensuring steady flows of aid and investment.”

By March 2018, Japan had completed the delivery of all five TC-90s to the Philippine navy, which are expected to boost its capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; humanitarian assistance; disaster relief; and maritime air surveillance. Additionally, Japan completed the delivery of 10 multi-role capable vessels to the PCG in August 2018. These vessels are used for search and rescue, marine environmental protection, pollution control, humanitarian and disaster relief, and enforcement of maritime laws. In June 2018, the Japan Ministry of Defense announced that it had decided to transfer parts and other items from UH-1 multi-purpose helicopters retired from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to the Philippines at no cost. The free transfer of UH-1 parts to the Philippines was the second military equipment transfer to the Philippines since May 2016, when the free transfer of used Japanese patrol aircraft, ships, and other JSDF equipment became possible.

It should be noted that the momentum for strengthening Japan-Philippines defense cooperation was not lost during the Covid-19 pandemic, even though face-to-face personnel exchanges were temporarily suspended. In August 2020, the Japan Ministry of Defense announced that a contract had been signed between Mitsubishi Electric and the Philippine Department of National Defense regarding air surveillance radars. In July 2021, the first air-to-air bilateral training was conducted between the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the Philippine air force at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, and in June 2022, General Izutsu Shunji, chief of staff of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, and Lieutenant General Connor Anthony D. Canlas Sr., commanding general of the Philippine air force, were present in the second joint training. During his stay in the Philippines, General Izutsu stated “both nations, the Philippines and Japan, are engaging in increasing surveillance capability (and have) interest in engaging in the space situation awareness.” He also mentioned the possibility of cooperation on air surveillance radars, in terms of software to control the radars, as well as operational training for the Philippine air force.

As demonstrated by the preceding chapter, security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines increased dramatically in both quantity and quality in the 2010s, especially during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s tenure. Japan’s deepening of defense cooperation with the Philippines is aimed at enhancing the presence of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in Southeast Asia and improving deterrence in the region as a whole by supporting defense capacity building. Japan should seek to further strengthen its security partnerships, particularly interoperability. In order to consider how best to build a more robust security partnership between Japan and the Philippines, it is important to understand the evolution of Philippine defense policy in response to drastic changes in the regional security environment since the 2010s, when China became more assertive with respect to its maritime sovereignty claims.

When Benigno Aquino took office in June 2010, he promised to eradicate poverty and combat corruption and announced a policy to promote stable economic development and peaceful conflict resolution with domestic rebel groups. The content of this inaugural speech clearly shows that the initial threat perception of the Philippines at that time was directed toward domestic threats such as the rebels in Mindanao. The island of Mindanao, located in the south of the Philippines, has long been a predominantly Muslim area, but many Christians settled there under immigration policies dating back to the colonial era. The region has long been beset by conflicts as a result. Aquino pursued peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and in 2014, the government of the Philippines signed the Bangsamoro Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the MILF. However, Aquino’s perceptions of the regional security environment shifted after a Philippine oil exploration vessel was intercepted by a Chinese ship near Reed Bank in March 2011 and after a standoff between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal that lasted about two months, starting in April 2012.
President Aquino took the two incidents as an opportunity to review the military posture of the country, which had been focused on domestic governance, and began a full-scale modernization effort to make the military more capable of defending the region against external threats. Under a long-term plan, the Aquino administration slowly but steadily built a defense posture capable of dealing with maritime and air threats, despite tight finances, by acquiring two major pieces of equipment: two U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters for the Philippine navy and 12 South Korean FA-50 fighter planes for the Philippine air force. In response to China’s violations of Philippine sovereignty, Aquino developed a new defense strategy with four pillars: (1) formulating the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act; (2) building maritime domain awareness; (3) rebuilding air defense posture; and (4) seeking cooperation with other countries.

**Formulating the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act**

As early as July 2010, Aquino had ordered a comprehensive review of the defense system and announced his intention to push for the modernization of the air force for territorial defense. However, in response to the two incidents mentioned above and with external threats in mind, he embarked on a full-scale effort to modernize the military. In December 2012, six months after the impasse at the Scarborough Shoal, he signed Republic Act No. 10349. The act revised Republic Act No. 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act, which expired in December 2011 without any significant pieces of equipment acquired for the military. The revised act extended the military modernization program to December 2027. The first phase of the plan under this act was from 2013 to 2017, the second phase is from 2018 to 2022, and the third phase will be from 2023 to 2027. The total funding amount for the first five years is at least 75 billion Philippine pesos ($1.5 billion). Under this long-term plan, the Aquino administration was able to acquire big-ticket assets, such as two former U.S. Coast Guard cutters for the Philippine navy and 12 South Korean FA-50 fighter jets for the Philippine air force.

**Building Maritime Domain Awareness**

For the Philippines, a country with 7,641 islands and a coastline longer than that of the United States, the importance of establishing maritime domain awareness (MDA) has long been a necessity. MDA is defined as “the effective understanding of any activity associated with the maritime environment that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment.” The Philippine coastal monitoring system was originally based on a human intelligence network, which lacked the means to verify, confirm, or establish patterns of reported sightings and prevented timely and effective monitoring. In 2009, at the end of the Arroyo administration, Republic Act No. 9993 was passed, separating the coast guard from the navy. In September 2011, a little more than a year after taking office, the Aquino administration organized the National Coast Watch System by Executive Order No. 57. The objectives of these two movements were to enhance maritime situational awareness from Philippine territorial waters, including the South China Sea, to its exclusive economic zone. The Aquino administration decided that the mainstay of the National Coast Watch System would be the coast guard and established the headquarters of the National Coastal Watch Center in the coast guard headquarters compound.
Rebuilding Air Defense Posture

The Philippine air force retired all of its mainstay F-5 fighter jets in 2005. From then until the arrival of the first FA-50 fighter jets from South Korea in 2015, the Philippines did not operate fighter jets, and the Aquino administration had to rebuild its air defense posture from scratch. In addition, based on available public information, the radar coverage of the air force at the time was probably limited.\textsuperscript{56} For this reason, the Philippines had to urgently introduce fighter jets and air surveillance radar systems to reestablish the Philippines’ air defense posture. In 2014, following the modernization act passed at the end of 2012, the Philippine air force developed a long-term blueprint for rebuilding the Philippines’ air defense posture, known as “Flight Plan 2028.”\textsuperscript{57} In the same year, a contract was signed with South Korea for the introduction of FA-50 fighter jets, with flight training conducted in parallel in South Korea. In addition, the government decided at the end of 2014 to introduce three sets of air surveillance radar systems from Israel.

Seeking Cooperation with Other Countries

Despite the formulation of the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act at the end of 2012, budgetary constraints and a lack of human resources to operate the equipment limited the Philippines’ efforts to develop the naval and air force capabilities necessary for territorial defense. Therefore, it was natural for the Philippines to compensate for those limitations by seeking defense cooperation with the United States, its ally, and Australia.

However, the security relationship between the Philippines and the United States after the Cold War was not stable. In September 1991, the Philippine Senate refused to renew the Philippines-U.S. Military Base Agreement, the legal basis for stationing U.S. troops in the Philippines, which resulted in the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country and the loss of the U.S. military presence in the region. But the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in 1994 caused the Philippines to reaffirm the importance of the U.S. presence, leading to the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1999.

After 2000, security cooperation between the United States and the Philippines began in earnest as part of the war on terrorism, especially operations against the Abu Sayyaf. Unlike groups such as the MILF, which aimed to gain independence from the government, Abu Sayyaf was increasingly associated with al Qaeda, which was committed to global jihad, and Jemaah Islamiyah, which aimed to create an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. In January 2002, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, and until the end of the operation in 2014, an average of 500 to 600 U.S. special forces personnel were stationed in the Philippines annually.

Changes in U.S. diplomacy in the early 2010s were also a factor that allowed the Aquino administration to deepen security cooperation with Washington. In 2011, the Obama administration announced a “rebalancing policy” to allocate more military and economic resources to the Asia-Pacific region. In response, the Aquino administration deepened security cooperation with the United States. Then, in 2014, the two countries signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which institutionalized the bilateral alliance by allowing the United States to rotate troops into the Philippines for extended periods of time and to build and operate both U.S. and Philippine military facilities at bases in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{58}
The Aquino administration also deepened security ties with Australia. The two countries had already signed a Status of Forces Agreement in 2007 similar to the Visiting Forces Agreement signed by the United States and the Philippines. The agreement allowed Australian troops to stay in the Philippines, guaranteed their legal status, and facilitated joint Australia-Philippines counterinsurgency training. But the Philippine Senate did not ratify the agreement until 2012, likely in response to China’s increased assertiveness. In 2013, the Australian government’s White Paper on Defence devoted an entire chapter to international defense engagement and proposed greater involvement in Southeast Asia. As a result, security cooperation between Australia and the Philippines has deepened partly because of Australia’s proactive stance on regional diplomacy.
Rodrigo Duterte was inaugurated as the 16th president of the Philippines in June 2016 and had gained popularity during the campaign for his blunt statements on policy matters. His approach to foreign policy upon taking office also attracted attention. Duterte announced that he would take a tough stance on drug eradication, stating in his policy speech, "We will not stop until the last drug lord, the last financier and the last pusher have surrendered or been put behind bars. Or below the ground if they so wish." He did not get along well with the United States after President Obama called for an end to human rights abuses related to the drug war. Duterte distanced himself from the United States and also played down a ruling by an international tribunal that dismissed China’s claims to much of the South China Sea, a case which had been brought to the Permanent Court of International Justice by the Aquino administration. And Duterte asked former president Fidel V. Ramos to make an unofficial visit to China to start informal bilateral talks, in stark contrast to Aquino’s firm stance against China.

During the election period in April 2016, Duterte criticized Aquino’s acquisition of FA-50 fighter jets as a waste of money because they were inadequate to deter China, could not be used to fight insurgents, and could at best only be used for ceremonial flights. This appeared to place the Philippine military’s modernization program in jeopardy. However, a close look at security policy up to the end of 2021 shows no evidence that the Duterte administration significantly altered Aquino-era policies. Rather, there appears to have been a certain degree of continuity under the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act. From this perspective, the security policy of the Duterte administration will be reviewed in four areas: (1) continuing implementation of the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act; (2) enhancing maritime situational awareness; (3) enhancing air defense posture; and (4) deepening security cooperation with countries other than the United States.
Continuing Implementation of the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act

It was initially believed that President Duterte’s security policy would prioritize domestic security to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. Lieutenant General Ricardo Visaya, incoming chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), confirmed, “Duterte wants night fighting capabilities, so we will prioritize this.” However, immediately after Duterte’s inauguration, Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana declared, “Territorial defense is one of the priorities of the Duterte administration. It is very important as we need to protect our territories against encroachment by other parties.” He also noted that the 15-year modernization program of the AFP would continue as scheduled, a sign that the Duterte administration would not abandon the modernization plan enacted by the previous administration.

The Philippine National Defense Strategy published in November 2018 clarified that the Department of National Defense would sustain its effort to improve territorial defense capabilities through continued implementation of the AFP Capability Upgrade Program and the AFP Modernization Program. It is evident that the security policy of the Duterte administration, which in the early years of the administration was thought to be focused on fighting insurgents, did not deviate much from that of the Aquino administration and ensured a certain degree of continuity and consistency thanks to the Revised National Armed Forces Modernization Act. Toward the end of his administration, Duterte strongly promoted the modernization of the AFP, so much so that an active-duty general assessed that “the AFP has always been grateful for the direction and support of the Commander-in-Chief [President Duterte] in continuously improving its capabilities.”

Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness

In March 2021, the Philippine government discovered a Chinese “fishing fleet” consisting of 220 vessels around Julian Felipe Reef in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone. Defense Minister Lorenzana said, “We call on the Chinese to stop this incursion and immediately recall these boats violating our maritime rights and encroaching into our sovereign territory.” Further calls for action ensued on social media, with Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin protesting on Twitter. Images released by the Philippine coast guard (PCG) in April 2021 showed six Chinese-registered vessels around the reef and the PCG patrolling the area by boat. In September 2021, when asked about Julian Felipe Reef, Vice Admiral Leopoldo Laroya, the PCG commander, stated, “At present, we have been maintaining a continuous patrol of the West Philippine Sea. As far as Chinese fishing vessels are concerned, we have been in contact with some of them, and after due warning given to them, they leave the area.”

Although it is difficult to determine whether the Chinese ships that had gathered on the reef were dispersed as a result of the PCG patrols, it is clear that Philippine maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities have improved to some extent, as evidenced by the protests of government officials and the PCG response to the incident outlined above. From 2013 to 2017, U.S. defense industry giant Raytheon was responsible for building the coastal surveillance system and designing the Philippines’ National Coastal Surveillance Center, with headquarters in Manila and two branches in Cebu in the central Philippines and on Palawan Island bordering the South China Sea. In addition, in 2016, at
the end of the Aquino administration, the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea, chaired by the president’s national security adviser, was established as an interagency organization between the Office of the President, the Department of National Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the AFP, and the PCG. The task force remained intact during the Duterte administration and furthered efforts to enhance MDA. Presidents Aquino and Duterte adopted different approaches to China, but that did not affect the activities of the PCG, as shown in Table 1. In particular, the PCG has added 15 patrol boats to its fleet over the 10-year period from 2011 to 2021, including 10 multi-role response vessels from Japan. In addition, since 2017, the country has conducted trilateral patrols in the Sulu and Celebes Seas with Indonesia and Malaysia.

Table 1: PCG Personnel and Equipment from Aquino to Duterte

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol boat river (PBR)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In January 2022, the Philippines announced its intention to introduce supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles from India to improve naval defense in the South China Sea. “As head of procuring entity (HOPE), I recently signed the Notice of Award for the Philippine Navy Shore-Based Anti-Ship Missile Acquisition Project,” Defense Secretary Lorenzana wrote in a Facebook post. Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, praised this decision as the “most strategic purchase the AFP has made in years.” On the other hand, a weakness is the lack of the “kill chain” between sensors and shooters for targeting moving maritime targets, which is required for robust technical and procedural capability. However, through training and expected future cooperation with partner countries, the AFP will strengthen its deterrent capabilities over time.

Enhancing Air Defense Posture

In September 2021, two FA-50PH fighter jets of the Philippine air force scrambled against an unidentified aircraft that had violated its airspace. In military aviation parlance, “scramble” refers to the immediate deployment of fighter aircraft to intercept an unknown or hostile aircraft. “The Philippine Air Defense Control Center (PADCC), through its radars, detected an unidentified inbound aircraft in the Philippine Air Defense Identification Zone (PADIZ), approximately 120 nautical miles
northwest of Bolinao, Pangasinan,” Philippine air force (PAF) spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Maynard Mariano said in a statement. "In the past decades, aircraft flying without clearance would willfully violate the Philippine airspace knowing that they will not be challenged. Today, our airspace is being closely monitored jointly by the PAF and the CAAP [Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines],” he said. However, since there are no reports of similar scrambles since that incident, it is difficult to assess the air defense posture of the Philippines. But since the first 2 of the 12 FA-50 fighter jets from South Korea were acquired in 2015, this capability has steadily strengthened.

Just as the construction of the MDA progressed under the Duterte administration, the restructuring of the air defense posture, which was initially feared because of Duterte’s statement that “fighter jets are a waste of money,” also advanced without major impediments. The acquisition plan for Israeli-made air defense radars established under the Aquino administration appears to have been executed, with radars installed in the Gozar Air Station near Mindoro Island, the Paredes Air Station located in the northern part of Luzon, and Mt. Salakot located in Palawan. In addition, a Japanese radar manufactured by Mitsubishi Electric will be installed in the near future, although the timing is unknown, and steady progress is being made in building a Philippine Air Defense Identification Zone.

Deepening Security Cooperation with Countries other than the United States

Although the 2018 Philippine National Defense Strategy defines the United States as “the only treaty ally of the Philippines,” bilateral security cooperation did not progress under the Duterte administration and arguably regressed compared to the Aquino administration. During his first visit to China, Duterte said, “I announce my separation from the United States,” and his foreign policy was dubbed “Duterte’s Dalliance with China.” Duterte’s approach did not change after the transition to the Trump administration in the United States. Although Duterte expressed thanks to Trump for the support of U.S. special forces during the battle for Marawi against Islamic State militants in 2017, the regular U.S.-Philippines military exercise known as Balikatan was scaled back to about 5,500 participants from more than 10,000 the previous year, and the emphasis of the exercise was shifted from military training to disaster response. Duterte’s decision to renounce the Visiting Forces Agreement also weakened momentum for bilateral security cooperation, and Japan and Australia tried to fill the void during this period.

While relations with the United States soured under the Duterte administration, the security partnership between the Philippines and Australia deepened through counterterrorism operations and joint exercises under Balikatan. During the Marawi City siege in 2017, Australia sent Orion aircraft to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions and sent military personnel to advise and support counterinsurgency operations. In addition, in October 2017, after the operation, the Philippines and Australia signed a security agreement on capacity building and counterterrorism. This enabled the Philippine navy to conduct capacity-building activities through Royal Australian Navy port visits. When Australian naval vessels visited the Philippines in November 2017, the two navies conducted a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise in Subic Bay for demonstration purposes while President Duterte was onboard the Australian vessel HMAS Adelaide, and he expressed his appreciation for their cooperation against terrorism.
period, Professor Renato Cruz De Castro of De La Salle University said it was “the best way for the Philippines to avoid succumbing headlong to China’s interests.” De Castro has further argued that the two middle powers of Japan and Australia played an important role in the modernization of the Philippine military.
The Philippines was not prepared to adequately defend against external threats when China began to pursue maritime expansion in the 2010s. Both Aquino and Duterte emphasized the need for infrastructure development in the Philippines while recognizing budgetary constraints regarding the acquisition, maintenance, and improvement of defense equipment. As the Philippines continues to develop its maritime security and air power capabilities, it will need not only hardware in the form of defense equipment but also education, training, and communication networks that are critical to the success of any military modernization project. Japan has actively supported the Philippines by promoting defense exchanges and capacity building, but in order to take the Japan-Philippines security relationship to the next level, it will be necessary to conclude agreements that facilitate information sharing and joint training. Japan can also play an important role in encouraging security cooperation between the Philippines and the United States while sustaining its own efforts to enhance the capacity of the Philippine air force to strengthen preparedness and deterrence in an increasingly complex regional security environment.

In this context, the security partnership between Japan and the Philippines could be strengthened through several actions:

1. **Hold regular foreign and defense ministerial meetings.**

In April 2022, the first foreign and defense ministerial meeting (2+2) between Japan and the Philippines was held. The joint statement issued by the two countries declares that they will consider concluding a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) for facilitating reciprocal visits and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) for exchanging goods and services. The two governments also agreed to meet on a regular basis to align their strategic perspectives on developments in the region.
Convening the 2+2 regularly is essential for the development of a strong bilateral security relationship and networking with other countries in the region. Australia was the first country other than the United States with which Japan established a 2+2 framework, and the number of such engagements with other countries has grown, as shown in Table 2. While Japan does not necessarily maintain strong security relationships with all the countries it has engaged under the 2+2 framework, regular meetings are a prerequisite for building strong security partnerships.

Table 2: Japan’s 2+2 Meetings (Excluding the United States)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2+2 Partner Country</th>
<th>First Meeting</th>
<th>Total Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The history of the U.S.-Japan 2+2 shows that since the first meeting in September 1960, it has functioned as an important consultative body to consider a variety of issues related to consultations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and bilateral cooperation in the security field. Just as former U.S. secretary of state James Baker proposed in 1990 to upgrade the U.S.-Japan 2+2 to its current ministerial level, it is a natural step to encourage consultations between Japan and the Philippines above the vice-ministerial-level meetings between the foreign and defense authorities of Japan and the Philippines that have already taken place nine times. The Japan-Australia security relationship has developed remarkably in recent years, with the signing of a Japan-Australia RAA in January 2022 to facilitate joint training and the Australian Department of Defence announcing in April 2022 that an Australian KC-30A aerial refueling aircraft had successfully tested aerial refueling on a Japanese F-2 fighter jet. Additionally, both countries coordinate closely with the United States under the Trilateral Security Dialogue. The three countries should coordinate their respective approaches to defense cooperation with the Philippines and make effective use of each country’s limited resources to enhance the role of the Philippines as a regional defense partner. Japan reflects the outcome of those discussions in the agenda for the Japan-Philippines 2+2 to establish and implement common strategic objectives for defense cooperation in the region.

2. Establish a formal agreement or de facto framework for information sharing.

Japan and the Philippines should conclude an information security agreement or an equivalent de facto framework for information sharing to enhance their capacity to jointly assess regional security.
dynamics. Such an agreement is the foundation (“infrastructure”) of security cooperation and is essential if Japan-Philippines defense cooperation is to deepen in the future.\textsuperscript{94} Such an agreement would also enable the two countries to share information on defense equipment and military operations and would facilitate defense equipment exports and joint training.\textsuperscript{95} Since Japan first signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with the United States in 2007, it has added eight other GSOMIA partners in the following order: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), France, Australia, the United Kingdom, India, Italy, South Korea, and Germany.

In July 2020, the Sankei Shimbun reported that the government of Japan was considering sharing information with the Philippines on air defense radar exports. According to the article, several Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) officials stated that “information on the Bashi Strait is becoming indispensable for Japan’s defense.”\textsuperscript{96} Since 2016, China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force has conspicuously dispatched aircraft to the Pacific Ocean through the Miyako Strait between Miyako Island and Okinawa as well as the Bashi Strait between Luzon Island in the Philippines and Taiwan. Experts have suggested that if Japan and the Philippines can share information on the locations of Chinese military aircraft, it will be possible to facilitate countermeasures against China’s attempts to project air power beyond the First Island Chain.\textsuperscript{97}

When sharing sensitive information, it is essential to introduce strict penalties in case of leakage. The government of Japan enacted the Specially Designated Secrets Act in December 2013 and will have to initiate in-depth discussions with the Philippines on how the country can introduce similar measures. If that process takes time, both governments should consider establishing a de facto information-sharing framework, to the extent possible under domestic laws, until the agreement is concluded and aim to effectively enhance the situational awareness capacity of the Philippines as soon as possible. Although the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness is a multilateral initiative, it is a good example of a de facto framework because it allows unclassified information sharing by using existing technologies and institutions without concluding a de jure specific security protection agreement.\textsuperscript{98}

Of course, the mere existence of such agreements does not automatically facilitate bilateral security cooperation. For example, the Moon Jae-in administration of South Korea announced in 2019 its intention to abrogate the GSOMIA with Japan, but under pressure from the United States, the notification was suspended just before it expired. The Moon administration took the position that the GSOMIA could be abrogated at any time, depending on South Korea’s decision.\textsuperscript{99} However, NBC News points out that during the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States provided Ukraine with real-time intelligence such as geospatial data, intercepted communications, and targeting information.\textsuperscript{100} Establishing such a framework for sharing classified information in peacetime rather than in wartime will greatly improve regional deterrence and capabilities to cope with urgent situations.

3. Conclude a Reciprocal Access Agreement.

Institutional arrangements such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) Japan recently concluded with Australia are needed to facilitate joint training and exercises between the JSDF and Philippine armed forces (AFP). In June 2015, President Aquino expressed interest in signing a similar Visiting Forces Agreement with Japan and suggested that both governments recognize the need for such a framework.\textsuperscript{101} Professor Ken Jimbo of Keio University said, “The role of the SDF under the Indo-Pacific
Initiative should be expanded,” and “to this end, it is necessary to conclude the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with India, the Philippines, and Singapore.”

The Philippines has a Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States and a Status of Forces Agreement with Australia. The April 2022 Japan-Philippines 2+2 joint statement noted that Japan and the Philippines should start

... to consider frameworks to facilitate reciprocal visits as well as reciprocal provision of supplies and services in order to further enhance and facilitate cooperation such as exercises between Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Going forward, the Japanese side will proceed with deliberations, including on the possibilities of concluding a reciprocal access agreement and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.

Currently, the government of Japan is initiating or considering negotiations with the United Kingdom and France regarding RAAs, similar to its agreements with Australia, in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. However, it took about seven and a half years to conclude the Japan-Australia RAA due to concerns such as Japan’s use of the death penalty. Therefore, it may be difficult for a Japan-Philippines RAA to be signed soon, but such a de jure framework will be necessary to make training and exercises between the Philippines and Japan smoother, which will deepen the Japan-Philippines security partnership.

4. Promote further transfer of defense equipment.

Japan should promote more exports of defense equipment to improve interoperability between the JSDF and AFP. As noted above, radars made by Mitsubishi Electric Corporation will be transferred from Japan to the Philippines. Since the easing of Japan’s Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment in 2014, Japan tried to secure agreements to export submarines to Australia and surveillance radars to Thailand but failed in both cases. However, there have already been several successful cases between Japan and the Philippines, such as the provision of TC-90s and UH-1 parts. There are also reports that the Japan Air Self-Defense Force is considering human resource development projects with the Philippines connected to radar exports. Packaging defense equipment exports with training initiatives would serve as a foundation for deepening Japan-Philippines defense cooperation.

Japan’s Medium Term Defense Program states: “The government as a whole will promote the appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.” Based on Japan’s policy, Japan’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) launched a feasibility study for the overseas transfer of defense equipment in April 2020 as a “new initiative for promoting equipment transfer” (Figure 3). In this new initiative, a contract is signed with a trading company at the start of the survey, the public and private sectors collaborate in the process of narrowing down the scope of equipment to be covered, and the project concept is eventually materialized through discussions between the public and private sectors. Initially, surveys will be conducted in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, and it is hoped that these efforts will be carried out in the Philippines as well.

Rui Matsukawa, a member of Upper House of the Diet representing the Liberal Democratic Party, expressed her concern that the private sector in Japan is assuming all the risks involved in defense equipment contracts and said:
We will actively promote the overseas transfer of defense equipment as a defense policy. To this end, the government of Japan should take responsibility for establishing an adequate system centered on Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency. In addition, it is important to appropriately ease the strict application of the three principles of defense equipment transfer to the corners of the world.\textsuperscript{111}

She further insists that this point should be included in the National Security Strategy and other related documents to be revised later this year.\textsuperscript{112} She also suggests that “businesspeople working for trading companies should be hired as defense attachés in charge of equipment transfer for a limited period of time, and they should work in Japanese embassies in countries where there are likely to be prospects for development.”\textsuperscript{113} Overlapping with ATLA’s efforts, if the Japanese embassies in the Philippines, in addition to the above four countries, were to appoint such personnel, it could be a breakthrough in promoting the transfer of defense equipment.

Figure 3: Image Feasibility Study Launched by ATLA


5. Implement more proactive and strategic overseas development assistance.

Japan should utilize overseas development assistance (ODA) proactively and strategically to reduce the budgetary burden of defense purchases on the Philippines. Under the “Non-Project Grant Aid for Provision of Japanese Disaster Reduction Equipment” agreement signed in March 2015, Japan provided the “Life-Saving System” in October 2021 to the AFP, which includes the JSDF’s electro-hydraulic equipment, cutters, spreaders, electric pumps, acoustic probes, lighting equipment with generators, boats for use in situations such as tsunamis and guerrilla rains, life jackets, life-saving belts, and
other equipment and materials necessary for saving lives during disasters. In November 2021, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force conducted a briefing for the AFP on the handling of life-saving equipment to efficiently utilize the equipment during disaster response. Japan’s 2020 White Paper on Development Cooperation states that Japan will continue to leverage its various forms of support, including ODA, in its efforts to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The white paper also outlines a policy of working with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the European Union to help developing countries in various fields such as maritime safety and disaster management, in which ODA is playing an important role.

In May 2014, at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, Prime Minister Abe said that Japan would combine various options to support developing countries in the region, including strategic use of ODA (e.g., provision of patrol vessels, dispatch of experts), support for capacity building by the JSDF, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. In 2015, the government of Japan revised the ODA Charter and established the Development Cooperation Charter, which clearly states the philosophy that ODA can be used to support the military forces of other countries for “non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-relief purposes” and that “such cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis in light of their substantive relevance.” The capacity-building projects by the JSDF cover 15 countries mainly in Southeast Asia and are conducted annually for the AFP in a wide range of areas, as shown below in Table 3.

### Table 3: Japanese Capacity-Building Assistance to the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>First Meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>International aviation law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Ship maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Ship maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Ship maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Aviation medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition, as mentioned above, opportunities for defense equipment transfers between Japan and the Philippines are gradually increasing. Furthermore, if goods are provided to the Philippines
through ODA, education to become proficient in operations and maintenance will prove essential to help the Philippines improve its capabilities. One of the greatest advantages of ODA is that, in the case of grants, funds can be given without any obligation to repay. Even in the case of ODA loans, the repayment period is long and interest rates are as close to interest-free as possible. Through such schemes, development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare and disaster relief can be actively pursued, saving the limited budget of the Philippine government while contributing to improving the humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security capabilities of the AFP and Philippine coast guard.
Conclusion

In May 2022, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. won the presidential election in the Philippines. Like his recent predecessors, Marcos will need to define the relationship with the United States, a treaty ally, and develop a strategy to manage China, which continues to challenge the status quo in the maritime domain. According to a survey of ASEAN countries published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore in February 2022, 83.5 percent of Filipino respondents answered that they would choose the United States if the Philippines were forced to align with either the United States or China. This suggests an interest in furthering alliance ties with Washington, but in reality, for the Philippines and other countries in the region, this involves the maintenance of a delicate balancing act between the two great powers. It is also possible that Marcos could pursue outreach with China just as Duterte did at the onset of his administration.

Japan and the United States have introduced strategies to maintain regional stability and prosperity by realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and enhancing cooperation with Southeast Asian partners such as the Philippines is critically important to those efforts. Japan has a long history of engagement with the Philippines rooted in economic cooperation, but gradually expanding to include defense cooperation and capacity building is critical to managing an increasingly complex regional security environment marked by increased Chinese assertiveness in the maritime domain. Japan should further develop its security partnership with the Philippines to reflect its geopolitical importance and address its security vulnerabilities in coordination with the United States and other regional partners. Experts in Japan and the United States have addressed the importance of engagement with the Philippines in geostrategic terms but with less consideration of what exactly should be done. This paper details ways to sustain momentum for bilateral security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines as a step toward multilateral security cooperation with the
United States or Australia in the future. There should be no doubt that strengthening security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines, a process over 10 years in the making, will enhance deterrence in the region and contribute to the future development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.
About the Author

Kojiro Tonosaki is a former visiting fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington, D.C., from the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, Japan Ministry of Defense (July 2021–June 2022). He holds the rank of lieutenant colonel and is a transportation pilot. He is the author of, among other works, “Integrated Deterrence’ in the PH: Advice to prepare for the worst-case scenario,” “US-Asean relations: the important things are simple,” and “Brahmos in the Philippines and Quad Potential.”
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Kojiro Tonosaki

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