The Islamic State, Iraq, and Syria: Metrics

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Last Updated: 2017
Sykes-Picot 1916

Turkish Claims 1920

MENA: Degree of Colonization

MENA: Cold War Alignments

The Edge of Repression and Impact of Failed States

Country status of selected Arab countries (January 2016)

- **Democracy**
- **Autocracy/restricted democracy**
- **Full autocracy**
- **Failed state/civil war**
- **Non Arab**

Sources: UN; *The Economist*

Population at onset of Arab spring
2011 estimate, m

A: ISRAEL
B: PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
C: BAHRAIN
D: QATAR

Sectarian Divisions in MENA

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/sunni-shiite-map-middle-east-iran-saudi-arabia.html?_r=0
Iraq and Syria Sunni Dominated Areas: 2017

Iraq: Ten Years of Sunni Terrorist Attacks: 2004-2013

Attacks That Could Be Attributed to ISIS

2004 - 51 attacks
2005 - 58 attacks
2006 - 5 attacks
2007 - 56 attacks
2008 - 62 attacks
2009 - 78 attacks
2010 - 66 attacks
2011 - 34 attacks
2012 - 603 attacks
2013 - 419 attacks

2004-05 The group emerges as “Al Qaeda in Iraq” following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, its goal is to provoke a civil war.
2006-07 The group’s February 2006 bombing of one of Iraq’s most revered Shiite shrines ignites sectarian violence across the country. After merging with several other Sunni insurgent groups, it changes its name to the Islamic State of Iraq.
2008-10 I.S.I. claims responsibility for more than 200 attacks, many in densely-populated areas around Baghdad.
2011-12 The group is relatively quiet for most of 2011, but re-emerges after American troops withdraw from Iraq.
2013 Seeing new opportunities for growth, I.S.I. enters Syria’s civil war and changes its name to reflect a new aim of establishing an Islamic religious state spanning Iraq and Syria. Its success in Syria bleeds over the border to Iraq.

The Broader “Kurdish Problem”

The Broader Kurdish Issue: 2017

Estimated number of Kurds (per country)

TURKEY 14.3 million
18% of Turkish population

IRAQ 5.6 million
15% of Iraqi population

IRAN 8.2 million
10% of Iranian population

SYRIA 1.5 million
9% of Syrian population

Source: CIA

Population Density, Hyper-Urbanization and Water

Egypt = 43% Urbanization  
Iran = 73% Urbanization  
Iraq = 70% Urbanization  
Jordan = 84% Urbanization  
Saudi Arabia = 83% Urbanization  
Syria = 58% Urbanization

Source: Strafor, https://www.google.com/search?q=population+density+map+of+Levant&tbm=isch&imgil=q-lXqYu6ivLyiM%253A%25252C%252528%252528%252520%25252F%25252Fwww.stratfor.com%25252Fimage%25252Fpopulation-density-greater-levantine&source=iu&pf=m&fir=q-lXqYu6ivLyiM%253A%2528%2528%2528%252520%25252Fwww%2525252Estratfor%2525252Ecom%25252Fimage%2525252Fpopulation-density-greater-levantine%252529%2529%2529%2529&usg=__Cxn3aZK1_dZz1qKovl8VFkTJkDU%3D&ved=0ahUKEwjg2NjEkd7KAhUGlR4KHcXSB2lQyjcIKA&ei=r0ezVqDFIIaqesWln5AG#imgrc=q-lXqYu6ivLyiM%3A&usg=__Cxn3aZK1_dZz1qKovl8VFkTJkDU%3D; and OCHA, http://reliefweb.int/map/iraq/iraq-relative-population-density-23-july-2014
Hyper Urbanization: 1950-2030

Most Heavily Muslim States Are Partners in the Fight Against Extremism

Most MENA States Are Critical Strategic Partners and Keys to Containing and Defeating Extremism

(MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA REGION)

Source: UNICEF.
START Estimate of Attacks In/or near U.S. Combat in 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
Iraq-Syria: ISIS Areas of Control: 9/2013 vs. 10/2017

ISIS Loss of Control in Iraq and Syria 2015-2017

ISIS Territorial Losses: 5 January to October 9, 2017

BBC Map of Iraq and Syria Zones of Control: July 17, 2017

Syria: Areas of Control: April 3 vs. August 30, 2017

Source: Institute for the Study of War
Staff, 17/09/2017

NYT/IHS Map of Iraq and Syria Zones of Control: September 6, 2017

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/world/middleeast/islamic-state-reconstruction.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r=0
WP/IHS/ISW Map of Iraq and Syria Zones of Control: October 19, 2017

Iraq-Syria Zones of Control: October 2016

BBC: Zones of Control, October 18, 2017

Omran: Map of Control and Influence: Syria "17 October 2017" - I

Source: Omran https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15f2a46e0270c51d October 19, 2017
**Omran: Map of Control and Influence: Syria "17 October 2017" - II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territoria Areas</th>
<th>Gain</th>
<th>Lost</th>
<th>Territoria Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opp &amp; Others</td>
<td>27,623 km²</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>5935 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPG</td>
<td>40,819 km²</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>1600 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Regime</td>
<td>90,089 km²</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>8874 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>24,069 km²</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>185 km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Occupied territories by Israel is 1,800 km² - Error Ratio (%2 - %1)

**15 September 2017 Control Break Down**

- Opp & Others: 10.4%
- YPG: 4.5%
- Syrian Regime: 19.4%
- Others: 34.2%

**15 October 2017 Control Break Down**

- Opp & Others: 19.4%
- YPG: 2.5%
- Syrian Regime: 34.2%
- Others: 32.7%

Source: Omran https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15f2a46e0270c51d Ocrtober 19, 2017
October 9, Syrian Democratic Forces reportedly continued their advance in the eastern Deir-Ez-Zor governorate, capturing Mweileh town in Sur subdistrict, located north of Sur city.

October 10, Syrian Regime offensive is largely dependent on Russian aerial coverage; the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that 150 daily Russian airstrikes had targeted ISIS bases in Mayadin city.

October 15, SDF spokesperson announced that all willing combatants have evacuated the city; however, the likely destination of potential ISIS-affiliated evacuees is currently unknown. Furthermore, the SDF-led ‘Wrath of Euphrates’ operation against ISIS has led to SDF control over most neighborhoods in Ar-Raqqa city amidst heavy aerial support by the U.S.-led coalition, resulting in a high rate of civilian displacement.

October 15, Syrian Regime forces and Allied Militias, supported by Russian aerial and ground forces, continued their advance south of Deir-Ez-Zor city, Syrian Regime forces, advanced into Al Mayadin city, Al Mayadin subdistrict, located 43.8 km south of Deir-Ez-Zor city.

October 17, About 400 Islamic State (ISIS) members, including foreign fighters, have in recent weeks surrendered to U.S. backed forces in ISIS former Syrian stronghold Raqqa; inside source confirmed that the ISIS Syrian fighters were transferred to "Ayn Issa" Camp, while the foreign fighters were transferred to "Suluk" Military headquarter.

October 18, Syrian Democratic Forces reportedly captured the several villages from ISIS, 7 KM eastern side of Deir-Ez-Zor City.

Important Note: As of the end of September, nearly 708,000 individuals are reported to still remain in ISIS-held communities in Deir-Ez-Zor governorate. This includes approximately 120,000 individuals in ISIS-held northern Deir-Ez-Zor governorate between Tabni, Tabni subdistrict, Deir-Ez-Zor City and the Euphrates River; 68,000 individuals in the ISIS-controlled western Deir-Ez-Zor governorate from Khasham in Khasham subdistrict to Markada across Khabour River; 120,000 in southern Deir-Ez-Zor governorate from Hajin to Abukamal; and nearly 400,000 individuals in the central Deir-Ez-Zor governorate.
Russia renewed its violent, indiscriminate air campaign against civilians in Western Syria in order to coerce groups opposed to the Bashar al-Assad regime to accept a ceasefire or ‘de-escalation zone’ in Idlib Province. Russia shifted its air campaign to target rebel-held terrain in Idlib and Hama Provinces following an offensive launched by Hay`at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – the successor of Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Fatah al-Sham – in Northern Hama Province on September 19. The Russian Ministry of Defense launched an immediate disinformation operation to present this shift in its air campaign as a legitimate series of strikes against extremist groups attempting to disrupt a ‘de-escalation zone’ in Idlib Province brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran on September 15. Russia nonetheless mounted a systematic campaign of airstrikes against civilian infrastructure – including hospitals, schools, power stations, and mosques – as well as former U.S.-backed rebel groups unaffiliated with HTS or al Qaeda. The strikes marked a return to the widespread punitive air campaigns Russia previously directed against opposition-held terrain across Western Syria. Russia also employed advanced weapons systems to further inflict violence against Idlib Province under the guise of counter-terrorism operations. The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Permanent Mediterranean Task Force launched Kalibr cruise missiles targeting Ma`ar`at al-Numan in Southern Idlib Province on September 22. Russia Tu-95MS ‘Bear’ strategic bombers later launched Kh-101 cruise missiles targeting the outskirts of Idlib City on September 26. Russia’s deliberate use of violence against civilians precludes any legitimate, Russian-enforced ‘de-escalation’ zone in Idlib Province.

Russia also leveraged its ongoing air campaign to co-opt Turkey away from the U.S. and NATO in order to further set conditions for the planned ‘de-escalation zone’ in Idlib. Russia concentrated its airstrikes in areas of Western Idlib Province along the Syrian-Turkish Border from September 25 - 30. The Russian Air Force likely sought to interdict the movement of HTS and opposition forces ahead of a Turkish Armed Force (TSK) deployment into Idlib by targeting rebel-held areas connecting Western Aleppo Province to the Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing on the Syrian-Turkish Border as well as key supply routes around Idlib City. Turkish President Recep Erdogan subsequently announced the start of cross-border operations to implement the Idlib ‘de-escalation zone’ on October 7. Erdogan stated that Russia would support his intervention. The TSK began deployments to observation positions in Northern Idlib Province near the majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton on October 12 following earlier reconnaissance missions. Russia likely perceives an opportunity to exploit widening diplomatic fissures between the U.S. and Turkey. Russia could thus attempt to use the ‘de-escalation zone’ to compel Turkey into deeper – albeit temporary – cooperation with Russia in Northwestern Syria at the expense of the United States.

The graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

ISA: Russian Retargeting of Civilians: Post Al Qaida Hama Offensive - II

ISW: Iraq and Iran Compel Kurdish Withdrawal from Kirkuk

Source: ISW, 16.10.17; https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15f37260cdd22fd0

A collapse of the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga under joint pressure from Iraq and Iran shortly after the Kurdish independence referendum on September 25, 2017 empowers Iran and could destabilize northern Iraq rather than unify the country. Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew from disputed areas across northern Iraq on October 16th and 17th, 2017. A combined force of Iraqi Security Forces and Iranian proxies gathered south of Kirkuk starting on October 13th in order to compel Iraq Kurdistan to relinquish control of the oil-rich city. The combined ISF-proxy force moved in to secure the city as well as nearby military bases and oil fields on October 16th after the Peshmerga abandoned their positions. Peshmerga forces also withdrew from areas in Nineveh, Salah al Din, and Diyala Provinces. The Iraqi Government and Iran likely signaled their intent to use military force to compel the Peshmerga withdrawals in those provinces, if necessary. The Kurdish retreat is a win for both the central Iraqi government and Iran, whose proxies have seized new key terrain and consolidated control over previously contested cities. Iran has downplayed the role of its proxies in order to legitimize them as instruments of the Iraqi state. Western media coverage and statements from US officials have assisted Iran with this deception by denying the role of Iran’s proxies in Kirkuk. Kurdish populations now under the control of the Iraqi government and Iran’s proxies may drive an insurgency, however. Civil unrest against Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies began in Kirkuk and Khanaqin on October 18th. Prime minister Abadi reportedly ordered a handover of security in Kirkuk to local police, and early reports indicate Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies may have drawn back from Khanaqin in northern Diyala. It is unclear whether these withdrawals will pacify the Kurdish population.
ISIS Revenues: 2014-2016

*2015 kidnapping figure is unknown

Note: Amounts shown are upper estimates. Other income comes from the sale of antiquities and foreign donations, but is not thought to be significant.

Source: ICSR

Syria Refugees: As of July 6, 2017

More than 5 million Syrians have fled abroad to escape the fighting in Syria, according to the UN. Most have ended up in neighbouring Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.

Syrians have taken refuge in neighbouring countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNCHR, 6 Jul 2017

About 950,000 Syrians have applied for asylum in Europe since April 2011, according to UN figures.

The UN estimates there are more than 3 million Iraqis who have been forced to leave their homes to escape the conflict with IS and are displaced within the country.

The battle for control of Mosul led to more than 920,000 people fleeing their homes for nearby refugee camps or relatives’ homes.
ISW
Estimate of Zones of Control in Iraq: 6.17

Source: ISW,
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15cb15d4cccd637c, accessed 8.24.17
Iraq: Post Mosul Ethic and Sectarian Divisions: 2017

ISIS in Syria, July 10, 2017

Source: Janes by IHS Markit as of July 10

THE WASHINGTON POST
Syria

Zones of Control: July 2017

Source: Washington Post
Coast of Coalition Operations: 8-8 2014 to 6-30-2017

### Average Daily Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily Cost ($M)</th>
<th>8 Aug - 19 Sep 2014 (Ops in Iraq; Pre-Syria, 43 days)</th>
<th>20 Sep 2014 - 30 June 2017 (Ops in Syria and Iraq, 1015 days)</th>
<th>Average Daily Cost (8 Aug 2014 - 30 June 2017, 1058 days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BY EXPENSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$3.2</td>
<td>$3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$13.9</td>
<td>$13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BY SERVICE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
<td>$2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$1.9</td>
<td>$1.6</td>
<td>$1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$2.5</td>
<td>$8.6</td>
<td>$8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$13.9</td>
<td>$13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extrapolated Total Cost ($M):</th>
<th>Total Cost (8 Aug 2014 - 30 June 2017, 1058 days)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BY EXPENSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$5,356</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$23</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$3,230</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$5,747</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$14,356</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BY SERVICE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$2,782</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$1,742</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$8,800</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$1,031</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$14,356</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted by the author from [https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/15f0a524a24d099e](https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/15f0a524a24d099e).
# Coalition Airpower: 8-8-2014 to 9-30-2017 - I

## OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

### Close Air Support/Escort/Interdiction*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,591</td>
<td>21,116</td>
<td>21,181</td>
<td>14,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorties with at least one weapon release</td>
<td>2,003</td>
<td>9,912</td>
<td>11,825</td>
<td>9,088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Number of Weapons Released

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>6,292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>2,145</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td>2,758</td>
<td>2,380</td>
<td>2,694</td>
<td>3,242</td>
<td>3,145</td>
<td>28,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>2,052</td>
<td>2,582</td>
<td>2,341</td>
<td>3,160</td>
<td>2,439</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td>2,427</td>
<td>3,038</td>
<td>2,709</td>
<td>2,943</td>
<td>30,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>3,439</td>
<td>3,878</td>
<td>3,274</td>
<td>4,374</td>
<td>4,848</td>
<td>4,313</td>
<td>5,075</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36,351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistics provided includes numbers of sorties (not strikes) and munitions expended by aircraft under CFACC control.

## Additional Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties</td>
<td>2,373</td>
<td>9,514</td>
<td>12,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift and Airdrop Sorties</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)*</td>
<td>14,555</td>
<td>78,500</td>
<td>72,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Passengers*</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>47,200</td>
<td>46,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)</td>
<td>1,417,900</td>
<td>111,200</td>
<td>822,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker Sorties</td>
<td>4,859</td>
<td>14,737</td>
<td>13,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Refuelings</td>
<td>28,956</td>
<td>84,381</td>
<td>80,912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Iraq only
**Operation Inherent Resolve – destroying ISIS in Iraq and Syria** Coalition airpower continued its annihilation of ISIS, releasing more than 3,550 weapons, a 30 percent decrease from the record high set in August. September also marked a key milestone for the Coalition, surpassing 100,000 weapons employed since OIR began in August 2014. During the month of September, Coalition airstrikes successfully eliminated five high-value ISIS targets.

On Sept. 4, Coalition aircraft killed Al-Shami as he rode a motorcycle near Mayadin, Syria. Al-Shami led ISIS’ efforts to procure explosives and build bombs for external terrorist acts. The same engagement also resulted in the destruction of the bomb-making lab Al-Shami was en route to. On the same day, Junaid ur Rehman, a senior ISIS drone pilot trainer and engineer, was killed by a precision airstrike south of Mayadin in the village of Al-Asharah, Syria. On Sept. 12 and 13 respectively, three individuals tied to ISIS’ unmanned aerial surveillance network were targeted and killed, including Abu Mawad Al-Tunisi, Sajid Farooq Babar and Abu Salman. The removal of these high value ISIS members disrupts and degrades ISIS’ warfighting capabilities on the battlefield.

As Syrian regime forces advanced on Deir ez-Zor city, the convergence of regime and Coalition partner ground forces in this area called for increased awareness and de-confliction so as to avoid strategic miscalculations in the air or on the ground. As a result, Coalition and Russian military officials, including Coalition air planners from the Combined Air Operations Center, met face-to-face to adjust and expand de-confliction measures. The discussions emphasized the need to share operational graphics and locations to ensure the prevention of accidental targeting or other possible frictions that would distract from the defeat of ISIS. Non-kinetic effects continue to play a critical role in our efforts to defeat ISIS. During the month of September, the Coalition airdropped more than four million leaflets in Iraq and Syria. These leaflets were instrumental in countering ISIS propaganda, informing civilians of Coalition efforts to liberate them from ISIS, and mitigating civilian casualties by telling them how to avoid being hurt by airstrikes and how to safely evacuate. According to Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve, these measures were effective. With the support of Coalition airpower, ISIS continues to face defeat in Raqqa. The SDF have now cleared more than 75 percent of the entire city. Additionally, the SDF also commenced clearance operations against ISIS in the Khabur River Valley, northwest of Deir ez-Zor. Finally, Coalition aircraft continue to support the Government of Iraq as they continue to defeat ISIS and liberate the few remaining holdouts in Iraq. More than 42,000 square kilometers have been cleared and more than 4 million people are now free from ISIS control.
Coalition Air Campaign: September 2014-August 16, 2017 - II

US-led coalition strikes: IRAQ: 12,468, SYRIA: 11,205


The US-led coalition has conducted more than 12,766 air strikes against IS targets in Iraq since August 2014. Most attacks have been carried out by US aircraft, but those from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands and the UK have also taken part.

In Syria, the air campaign began in September 2014. Since then, about 12,850 strikes have been carried out by coalition forces, which include Australia, Bahrain, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the UK.

The number of strikes each month rose steadily in Iraq up to a peak in January 2016 and then began to fall as the number of strikes in Syria increased dramatically, reaching a high of just over 1,500 in September 2017.

Russia is not part of the coalition, but its jets began air strikes against what it called "terrorists" in Syria in September 2015.

Most attacks have been carried out by US aircraft, but those from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands and the UK have also taken part.

In Syria, the air campaign began in September 2014. Since then, about 11,200 strikes have been carried out by coalition forces, which include Australia, Bahrain, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the UK.

The number of strikes each month rose steadily in Iraq up to a peak in January 2016 and then began to fall as the number of strikes in Syria increased dramatically, reaching a high of 880 in June 2017.

# Coalition Airpower: 2012 to 9-30-2017

## Operation Freedom’s Sentinel/Resolute Support Mission

### Close Air Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Sorties with at least one weapon release</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>28,760</td>
<td>1,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>21,900</td>
<td>1,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>12,978</td>
<td>1,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5,774</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5,162</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3,307</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Number of Weapons Released

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>4,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>2,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>3,238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistics provided includes numbers of sorties (not strikes) and munitions expended by aircraft under CFACC control.*

### Combined Data (minus OIR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties</td>
<td>34,937</td>
<td>31,049</td>
<td>32,999</td>
<td>21,634</td>
<td>19,681</td>
<td>14,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Sorties</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>17,040</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>8,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)</td>
<td>265,000</td>
<td>201,000</td>
<td>158,400</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>69,200</td>
<td>63,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Passengers</td>
<td>749,000</td>
<td>506,000</td>
<td>202,700</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>111,100</td>
<td>91,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)</td>
<td>41,952,000</td>
<td>10,883,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker Sorties</td>
<td>16,007</td>
<td>12,319</td>
<td>9,085</td>
<td>5,323</td>
<td>4,910</td>
<td>4,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Refuelings</td>
<td>67,020</td>
<td>53,266</td>
<td>46,793</td>
<td>26,162</td>
<td>18,137</td>
<td>12,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Evacuation Sorties</td>
<td>2,171</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saves</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assists</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AFCENT (CAOC) Public Affairs – afcent.pa@afcent.af.mil
Operation Freedom’s Sentinel & Resolute Support Mission – advising Afghan Air Forces & countering terrorism

In August, the 555th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, the Triple Nickel, surpassed 555 bombs dropped and have now employed more than 600 weapons against ISIS-Khorasan and Taliban targets. August heralded the arrival of additional F-16s to bolster the ability to conduct kinetic strikes and over watch of friendly ground forces. The 774th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron conducted the first combat airdrop in Afghanistan in more than two years. The airdrop resupplied coalition ground forces and minimized risk to aircraft by avoiding the need to land at dangerous airfields.

Additionally, the 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron exercised with an Army Combat Aviation Brigade at Bagram and familiarized their Pararescue Airmen with the CH-47 Chinook helicopter. The training enhanced interoperability and educated 83rd ERQS Airmen on army tactics and techniques. Lastly, the Afghan Air Force expanded their airdrop capabilities by conducting their first operational night drop on Aug. 22 using their C-208s.

The AAF also held a targeting exercise, or TTX, to introduce senior Afghan leadership to the concept and benefits of a targeting validation board. The TTX was well received and a successful first step toward establishment of a formal targeting board.

September marked a record high month for weapons employed in Afghanistan since 2012, with 751 munitions being delivered against Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan targets; a 50 percent jump from August. This increase can be attributed to the President’s strategy to more proactively target extremist groups that threaten the stability and security of the Afghan people. Additionally, the recent addition of six F-16s at Bagram Air Base, coupled with more B-52 missions dedicated to Afghanistan, offer the additional strike capacity needed to target these groups.

As part of this strategy, a key milestone was achieved in the effort to modernize and build up Afghanistan’s nascent airpower capabilities, with the U.S. Air Force C-17 enabled delivery of the first two Afghan Air Force UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters on Sept. 18, at Kandahar Air Field. The UH-60s are the first of 159 that will be delivered to the AAF under the Aviation Transition and Modernization program, a $6.8 billion, five-year effort to modernize and increase the AAF fleet. This fleet of UH-60s, as well as other strike and mobility aircraft, will provide firepower and mobility to enable the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces to bring a decisive advantage to the fight against anti-government forces.
Afghanistan: Major Attacks: May 2016-Mid August 2017

The New York Times | Source: Institute for the Study of War

ISW Estimate of Areas of Risk in Afghanistan: 11.23.16-3.15.17

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map+/151a7e717269d3cb
Long War Journal: Estimates of Afghan Taliban Controlled and Contested Districts: March 1, 2017

https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=10Qz0dzwDWPj6bkyfWN6qoLhhaaU&ll=33.73028742596195%2C59.147801487657716&z=6
Taliban Claims of Its Percent of Control

Yemen – Cholera - II
August, 2017

Yemen – Cholera - III
August, 2017

Sewage systems failed during the rainy season, sparking the current cholera crisis.