ISIS and “Failed State Wars”: The Planning and Analytic Challenge

Anthony H. Cordesman

Last Updated: March 10, 2016

Photo: ALBERTO PIZZOLI/AFP/Getty Images
Not a War Against ISIS (Daesh) Islamic State

- Both Syria and Iraq have long been “failed states” in terms of politics governance, economic development, demographic pressures, and security.
- ISIS is product of two sets of civil wars, growing out of Sunni and Al Qaida hostility to U.S. invasion of Iraq.
- Rise after 2011 a product of major upheavals growing out of both internal problems and failed secularism.
- Syria is divided into four fighting ISIS, Kurdish, Arab-Islamist, and pro-Assad factions.
- Iraq is divided in Sunni, Kurdish, Iraqi government and Shiite factions on the edge of civil conflict and with growing violence after 2010.
- “Youth bulge” in very young populations creates further stress.
- U.S. invasion of Iraq compound impact of Saddam’s blood coup in 1979, Iran-Iraq War, invasion of Kuwait, U.S. led invasion in 2003, fighting from 2004-2013 all have a legacy – as does Assad’s father suppression of Moslem Brotherhood.
- Defeating or degrading ISIS with still leave violent Islamist extremists.
- Impact of 250,000+ dead, 500,000+ injured, 4+ million refugees, 7+ million internally displaced persons, 50%+ cut in GDP
Estimates of Iraq’s GDP per capita are uncertain at best, but the CIA puts it at $14,400. This compares with figures of $143,400 for Qatar, $71,000 for Kuwait, $64,500 for the UAE, and $52,500 for Saudi Arabia. Iran – at $17,100 – is the only Gulf oil exporting state whose per capita income comes close to Iraq, and Iran, too, after years of crippling international sanctions, is anything but a wealthy country.
Government Effectiveness and Failed Secularism

The higher the ranking, the better the country

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be.

Gulf Demographic Pressure: 1950-2050
(In Millions)

31,020,000 in 1950
168,920,000 in 2010 (X 5.4)
264,390,000 in 2050 (X 8.5)

The Four Threats That Drive Serious Terrorism and Insurgency (In Order of Priority)

• 1. **Host Country Government and Security Forces**: Authoritarianism, failure to cope with internal divisions, poor governance and corruption, failed economy development and equity, population pressure and youth bulge, repression and violence by internal security forces, traditional and corrupt military.

• 2. **The Overt “Threat”**: Moderate and peaceful beginnings shift to extreme and violent movements that feed on the civil-military divisions and failures of the host country governments.

• 3. **The U.S. Threat to the U.S.**: Relearn counterinsurgency yet again. Separate military (tactical) and civil (project-oriented development) efforts. Threat oriented and downplay Host Country problems. No meaningful overall civil-military plan or net assessment. Rapid rotations with limited expertise. Cycle of denial, flood resources, rush to generate Host country forces, then leave too soon. “Take note” of lessons, then ignore.

• 4. **Other Nations: Allied, Neutral, Hostile**: Allied limits to engagement, national caveats, demands; neutral interference for competing national interests, hostile action because anti-U.S., support overt threat, opposing national interests.
Key Challenges to USG Efforts

1. Spin, lack of objective analysis and transparency, compartmentation.
2. Focus on hostile forces rather than overall security situation.
3. Lack of meaningful integrated civil-military planning
4. Poor accounting and conditionality, lack of measures of effectiveness.
5. Military reverts to focus on tactical success, short-term civil buy offs.
6. Civil side pursues illusions of progress, reverts to project aid that often ignores security and fighting.
7. High rotation rates, new policies: Every year is the first year.
8. Erratic swings in funding. Emphasis on budget execution rather than effectiveness
The Uncertain State of Progress

• UN Human development data reflect progress, but also serious limits to that progress, and input data are very uncertain.

• World Bank estimates poverty increasing.

• Security remains a key problem.

• Far too much US, NGO, and other reporting accepts “best case” estimates and polls without validating data or methodology.

• Data on Progress in life expectancy, education, medical services raise major questions about quality of data.

• Critical near term challenges in revenues, job creation, electric power, agriculture, and roads.

• No major near-term development options before 2020.

• More than a decade of war has gone on with no meaningful estimates of the effectiveness of aid and only suspect accounting.

• Military and aid spending has often been driving factors in increase in corruption and distorting economy to dependence on outside spending.
Failed Governance

• Karzai heritage of corruption, power brokering, indifference to security issues, alienation of U.S.
• Nominal democracy which is often really government by power broker.
• U.S. heritage of unworkable constitution, election process, dysfunctional legislature without real local representation and fiscal powers.
• Over-centralized with provincial and district officials not elected, police chiefs not local, often corrupt or incompetent, and no funds of their own.
• Deeply divided and sometimes corrupt security services, including police and border police.
• Near paralysis over ethnic divisions and Ghani vs. Abdullah since June 14, 2014 election.
• Failure at election reform is pushing Ghani and Abdullah towards new election deadline, expiration of power sharing agreement.
• Corrupt ministries, some times incapable of planning and executing budgets, no measures of effectiveness and few real world data.
• Tokyo reforms in economy and governance in limbo.
• Ghani development plan not approved or funded.
• Dependent indefinitely on outside aid.
• Civil service centered in “Kabulstan,” not country.
Corruption

• Karzai heritage of corruption, power brokering, indifference to security issues, alienation of U.S.
• Nominal democracy which is often really government by power broker.
• U.S. heritage of unworkable constitution, election process, dysfunctional legislature without real local representation and fiscal powers.
• Over-centralized with provincial and district officials not elected, police chiefs not local, often corrupt or incompetent, and no funds of their own.
• Deeply divided and sometimes corrupt security services, including police and border police.
• Near paralysis over ethnic divisions and Ghani vs. Abdullah since June 14, 2014 election.
• Failure at election reform is pushing Ghani and Abdullah towards new election deadline, expiration of power sharing agreement.
• Corrupt ministries, some times incapable of planning and executing budgets, no measures of effectiveness and few real world data.
• Tokyo reforms in economy and governance in limbo.
• Ghani development plan not approved or funded.
• Dependent indefinitely on outside aid.
• Civil service centered in “Kabulstan,” not country.
Budget Execution Has Been a Major Problem

- Operating expenditures:
  - Increased during the first six months of 2013, as more spending moved on-budget. Yet execution rates remain low, particularly for the development budget.
  - Increased to Afs 82.1 billion in the first six months in 2013, compared to Afs 75.4 billion over the same period in 2012.
- Development expenditures declined to Afs 23.7 billion in the first half of 2013, compared to Afs 27 billion in the first half of 2012.
- Low budget execution continues to be a problem in Afghanistan, particularly affecting development expenditures in 2013.
- Budget execution was only 36.4% of the operating budget and 17% of the development budget in the first half of 2013, compared to 50% and 24%, respectively, in the first half of 2012.
- Among ministries with development budgets of more than $50 million, only three (ministries of health, finance, and rural development) have executed more than 20% through the first half of 2013.

Economic Challenges

• Massive current dependence on outside war spending and aid

• “New Silk Road” is dead, and “Ring Road” is uncertain; mineral wealth is no miracle solution to economic challenges. Very little real growth other than aid and military spending driven – cyclical impact of rainfall.

• Still at war and highly aid dependent. Major barriers remain to “doing business.”

• Unclear who will plan and manage aid and revenues in government. No clear structure for managing aid, revenue flows, outside plans and focus.

• The goal of 50% Afghan control ignores the roll back of aid/NGO presence; government ability to use and manage is insufficient.

• Tokyo reforms in limbo. New reform plans not tied to clear plans for execution.

• Failure of UNAMA, uncertain role of World Bank and outside help in development planning, post-Transition economic stability.

• Key problems in transport, agriculture, power sector. Rising poverty, acute population pressure, uncertain employment level

• Service sector was dependent on flow of outside money. may leave, export capital, collapse.

• Major barriers to private development

• At least some risk of major recession and collapse of the market-driven sector.
The Economist Threat to Counterinsurgency Economics

1. The economic factors that divided and sometimes shattered a nation are largely ignored.

2. The specific economic forces driving given factions, areas, and terrorist-insurgency threats are not measured or taken into account. (Sects, ethnic groups, regional tensions, conflict/war zones, IDP-refugee impacts, etc.)

3. Reliance on classic national wide metrics for developed nations at peace: GDP, GDP per capita, Inflation, debt, Balance of Payments, etc..

4. Fail to address major uncertainties, limits to data.

5. Focus on classic nation-wide development as if war and causes of war did not exist, and need to reconstruct and construct basic services and functions did not exist.

6. Economic aid becomes project aid without valid national analysis and plans. Fails to alter dominant military focus on fighting, conflict termination, departure, (possibly short-term stability) and not national stability.

7. Largely ignore demographic pressures, youth needs, corruption costs and impacts, critical problems in governance and budget planning and execution.

8. Live in “now”, rather than economic history, examine best-case, not real futures.


10. Focus on getting money and spending, not auditing use of money and measuring effectiveness.
Nine Major Challenges that are not War Related

• Past reporting on GDP growth has been dishonest in that it took figures shaped by the agriculture sector, and gains determined by peak rainfall, and implied these were the result of development and aid.

• Transition and cuts in military and aid spending may have a critical impact on both the service and industries sector during transition. The lack of a comparable estimate of the impact of the narcotics sector is analytically absurd.

• In spite of these problems, there seems to have been real progress in human development in spite of gross exaggeration of improvement in medical services, and in students actually in school versus expected years of schooling.

• This still, however, has left Afghanistan far behind other poor Asian state like Bangladesh and Nepal.

• Transition will make the major barriers to doing business in Afghanistan – which ranks only 164th out of 189 countries – far more serious.

• There are no credible estimates of just how dependent Afghanistan has been on outside military spending and aid, but the World Bank and CIA warn that Afghan imports were 17 time exports in 2012.
Poverty vs. Economic Pressure

- Poverty data are national, dated, based on extremely uncertain inputs, and often do not reflect real world level of poverty and economic stress.
- No data to help locate key districts under stress.
- Acute pressure to leave for cities creates urban slums and pockets of poverty for which no clear data exist.
- Data are not precise but population pressure clearly increasing work force faster than real jobs are being created; major impact on disguised unemployment -- particularly for younger Afghans.
- No meaningful data on income distribution, but corruption, power brokering, misuse of aid have create acute problems, visible signs of elite benefiting at people’s expense.
- Lack of security, narco-trafficking, power brokers all add to economic stress.
- Little security for educated, technically competent. Strong reasons to become corrupt or leave.
The Uncertain Structure of Security

• Data on Afghan Surge show had little or no lasting impact.

• NATO/ISAF stopped most meaningful reporting on security trends after fiasco in which misestimated Enemy Initiated Attacks, had to admit no favorable trend existed even for largely meaningless metrics.

• After McChrystal left, reverted to only counting data national on tactical trends with no meaningful net assessments of insurgent vs. government influence and control.

• No maps or assessments of insurgent control or influence versus limited data for worst areas of tactical encounters.

• No maps or assessments of areas of effective government control and support and areas where government is not present or lacks support.

• Shift from direct clashes to high profile and political attacks makes it impossible to assess situation using past metrics, but HPAs sharply up.

• UN casualty data and State Department START data on terrorism highly negative.

• No reason for insurgents to engage NATO/ISAF or ANSF on unfavorable terms before combat NATO/ISAF forces are gone.
Critical Challenges to ANSF

- Expansion rushed in erratic bursts from 2005 onwards with erratic funding and supply of advisors until CY2010-CTY2011.
- Heavy reliance on police and Afghan Local Police for paramilitary functions they are not trained and armed to perform.
- Efforts to end combat role by end-2014 cut advisors and advisor role in combat units far below the levels needed. Seriously degraded chances of success.
- Election crisis weakened corrupt and already inadequate Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior.
- Meaningful unclassified reporting on Army and Police readiness at unit level has halted. Supposedly for security reasons but evidently because data would strongly argue against plans to cut number of advisors and phase them out by end-2016.
- Strong indications the U.S. is repeating the kind of politicized reporting on ANSF that disguised the problems in the ARVN before the collapse of Vietnam.
- Media reporting strongly indicates serious losses in security in many districts, and rising threat to some urban areas.
A Failed Transition Plan

- Took U.S. and allies until 2008 to admit how serious the resurgence of the Taliban and other insurgents really was. Delay partly result of focus on Iraq. Partly focus on tactical encounters, rather than rise of insurgent influence.

- Transition was then shaped by Presidential decision to end U.S. combat involvement at end 2014 regardless of conditions in the field and combat readiness of the ANSF.

- Plans to cut advisors in 2015 and eliminate them by end-2016 were never conditions-based and are now being reexamined, but will not compensate for fact have already removed advisors from combat units.

- Have increase role of U.S. air support and joint U.S.-Afghan special forces units, but these forces are too small to tip the balance.

- Plans to make Afghan Air Force effective proving steadily more questionable within what seem to be impossible deadlines.

- No real plan for Resolute Support Mission. At present is all spin waiting on hard decisions about extending to 2017 and beyond.

- Only real positive signs are possible leadership struggles in Taliban.
Paying the Necessary Price in Aid

• Long U.S. and allied history of cutting aid funds too soon.

• Aid flow has been extremely erratic, lacked central planning and effective financial control and measures of effectiveness in the field.

• SIGAR reporting does not reflect any major current improvements in U.S., allied, or Afghan planning, management, fiscal control at civil or military levels.

• Afghan dependence on future aid far higher than planned, seems likely to grow, and will extend beyond 2020.

• No progress in Tokyo reforms Afghan government had pledged in return for aid.
Meeting the Analytic and Policy Challenge
The Broadening Threat
ISIS Area of Operation

**Major events:**
- ◈ Attacks directed by/linked to ISIS
- ○ Attacks inspired by ISIS
- ○ Arrests of suspected ISIS militants or supporters

Major ISIS Attacks and Arrests: 10.14 to 8.15

**Iranian Influence**

**Lebanon** Hezbollah is considered Iran’s proxy in Lebanon. It follows Iranian leadership and acts in Iran’s interest.

**Syria** Iran is a strong ally of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria and is active in Syrian command structures and on the ground through proxies, including Hezbollah.

**Iraq** Iran has directed military offensives against ISIS in Iraq and provided arms and training to Iraq’s Shiite militias.

**Bahrain** Saudi Arabia and its allies accuse Iran of backing opposition from the Shiite majority against the Sunni monarchy.

**Yemen** Tehran has provided money and possibly arms to the Houthi movement, but does not seem to exert a strong influence over the group as it does with Hezbollah.

The Refugee, IDP, and Humanitarian Impact
Massive Impact of Syria and Iraq Conflicts

By June 2015, the number of refugees in Syria alone had risen to 3.98 million, and the number of IDPs was 7.6 to 7.8 million = 11.6 to 11.8 million out of a population of 18 million.

Growing Lasting Impact on Other States

In 2014, just 126,800 refugees were able to return to their home countries, the lowest number for 31 years.

Regional Strategic Partnerships and Alliances
Key Islamic Partners Affecting MENA Security

Bahrain (Base 5th fleet in the Gulf),

Egypt (Critical staging point for US air movements and access to the Suez Canal),

Jordan (ally deeply involved in the fight against ISIS),

Kuwait (provides air bases and land warfare facilities),

Lebanon (US aid plays a key role in its fight against extremism),

Morocco (key strategic position in North Africa and the entry to the Mediterranean),

Oman (ally and faces Iran across the straight of Hormuz),

Qatar (locate main U.S. airbase in the Gulf, and member of the coalition against ISIS),

Saudi Arabia (main partner in Gulf security, plays a critical role in the fight against terrorism, Turkey (which is a long-standing NATO ally),

UAE (key military partner to U.S. air and naval forces, is also fighting ISIS, provides bases US allies like Britain and France).
Saudi, UAE, GCC Influence

Countries Fighting ISIL in Iraq

Rise of ISIL and Areas of Occupation in both Iraq and Syria
Islamic State setbacks

Dissent, defections and reversals on the battlefield are steadily eroding the Islamic State's aura of invincibility in Syria and Iraq, suggesting that the group is starting to fray from within as its many enemies step up their offensives on multiple fronts.

A gun battle erupted last week between Syrian fighters and foreigners in Abu Kamal after the Syrians refused an order by a Kuwaiti commander to travel to Iraq to reinforce the front lines in Tikrit.

In Ramadi, fighting erupted between a group of mostly Chechens and local Iraqi supporters of the Islamic State who felt they were being abandoned when the foreigners decided to head back to Syria.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August 2014. ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once could.

These areas translate into approximately 13,000 to 17,000 square kilometers (or 5,000 to 6,500 square miles).

However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could increase or decrease depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged, with its gains in As Suwayda’, Damascus Countryside, and Homs Provinces offset by losses in Halab and Al Hasakah Province.
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August.

ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 20-25 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where they once could.

These areas translate into approximately 11,000-13,500 square kilometers (4,100-5,200 square miles). However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could be higher or lower depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

With the exception of its withdrawal from ‘Ayn al ‘Arab and Tall Hamis, ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged.
IS areas of influence

- Dominant as of April 2015
- Territorial losses since August 2014

Key locations - dominant group

- IS
- Syrian Kurds
- Contested city
- Iraqi government
- Syrian government
- Iraqi Kurdish security forces

Source: US Department of Defense. Tikrit was retaken from IS in April 2015

The Islamic State takes in more than $1 million per day in extortion and taxation. Salaries of Iraqi government employees are taxed up to 50 percent, adding up to at least $300 million last year; companies may have their contracts and revenue taxed up to 20 percent. As other revenue streams have stalled, like banks and oil, the Islamic State has adjusted these rates to make taxation a larger portion of its income.

Oil revenue has fallen to about $2 million per week, but the group is not dependent on oil income. Much of the production is used for its own fuel. Past oil sales show that the Islamic State was already selling oil at deep discounts that fluctuated among local markets — for instance, selling oil for less in Kirkuk than in Mosul.

The largest expenditure is salaries, which is estimated to be between $3 million and $10 million every month. The Islamic State also invests in police-state institutions, such as committees, media, courts, and market regulation, but provides relatively few services.

The group avoids investment in infrastructure because it can be an easy target for attacks, and the territory it holds can change quickly. The group minimizes costs by looting military equipment, appropriating land and infrastructure, and paying relatively low salaries. The group also limits its vulnerability by shifting operations, transitioning between expanding its territory and fueling terrorist activity. The Islamic State’s loss of ground in Tikrit last month, for example, has not stopped it from launching attacks in other parts of Iraq and Syria and taking the Iraqi city of Ramadi this weekend.

Syria and Iraq Air Campaign
Air Campaign: Sorties Flown by Location, as of September 15, 2015

Source:
Air Campaign: Sorties Flown in Iraq and Syria, as of September 17, 2015

Air strikes in Iraq and Syria

- Iraq: 4,122
- Syria: 2,362

Figures are up to 17 September 2015

Source: US Central Command

Air Strikes in Syria by Country as of September 20, 2015

## Operation Inherent Resolve

### Targets Damaged/Destroyed*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV's</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging Areas</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>3,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions</td>
<td>2,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Targets</td>
<td>3,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,684</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may fluctuate based on battle damage assessments
Current as of 7 August 2015

Source: CENTCOM CCCI
## Coalition Air Effort in Iraq and Syria as of 31 August 2015

### Operation Inherent Resolve

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close Air Support/Escort/Interdiction</td>
<td>6,981</td>
<td>15,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorties with at least one weapon release</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>4,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift and Airdrop Sorties</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>6,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)*</td>
<td>14,555</td>
<td>50,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Passengers*</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>29,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)</td>
<td>1,417,900</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker Sorties</td>
<td>4,828</td>
<td>10,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Refuelings</td>
<td>28,956</td>
<td>62,737</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Weapons Released</th>
<th>Less Activity</th>
<th>More Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>1,756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Iraq only

---

- Some figures may have changed due to data re-calculation and re-verification

Comparative Air Strikes in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan as of 31 August 2015

There were more U.S.-coalition airstrikes in Syria and Iraq in the past year than during more than five years of the Afghan war.

From January 2010 to Aug. 31, 2015, there have been 20,237 weapons released over Afghanistan, according to U.S. military data.

From August 2014 to August 2015, there have been 22,478 weapons released over Syria and Iraq, mostly by U.S. aircraft.

Every month this year, the airstrikes have far exceeded that of any month of the Afghan war since January 2010.

According to the U.S. military, as of mid-August, fighting the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq has cost U.S. taxpayers $3.7 billion, an average of $9.9 million a day, since the air war began last year.

Of course, the U.S. war in Afghanistan has been winding down, which explains the decrease in airstrikes.

Source: Sudarsan Raghavan, Chart: How much more the U.S. has bombed the Islamic State than the Taliban
Foreign Volunteers

(No reliable estimates exist, and most are dated and only include ISIS. U.S. estimates as of September 2015 put total for ISIS at a nominal 30,000)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-islamic-state-is-fraying-from-within/2015/03/08/0003a2e0-c276-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html

TOTAL: 21,632
Foreign Fighters are Negligible Part of Population Base: 5/2015

Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq

- Tunisia: 272
- Saudi Arabia: 86
- Russia: 10
- Jordan: 189
- Morocco: 45
- France: 18
- Lebanon: 155
- Germany: 8
- UK: 10
- Libya: 97
- Turkey: 7
- Pakistan: 2
- Uzbekistan: 17

Note: Upper estimates used. Countries with fewer than 500 fighters not included
Source: ICSR, CIA World Factbook
NYT Estimate of Foreign Fighters: 5/2015

North Africa and Middle East
The largest share of foreign fighters counted in the study came from Tunisia, a country with one of the more stable post-Arab Spring governments. Saudi Arabia's share is also large, but recent government crackdowns have stanch the flow of fighters.

Former Soviet States
Decades of officially sanctioned religious persecution, ethnic conflicts and Islamic radicalization are key reasons for the flow of fighters from post-Soviet states, according to Peter Neumann, director of the I.C.S.R. Many fighters have combat experience from decades of war in the Caucasus.

Western Europe
The war in Syria has drawn young Europeans, many of whom have used cheap flights to Turkey as a route to Syria. Mr. Neumann noted that some small European countries like Belgium produce a remarkable number of fighters in relation to their population.

Other regions
American law enforcement officials have focused not only on monitoring social media networks more aggressively, but also on educating state and local authorities about ways to identify potential travelers.

MENA: 7,500-10,000
FSU: 1,300-2,000
W. Europe: 2,260-2,460
Other: 1,730
Total: 12,790 – 16,190

Sources: Country of origin data from Peter Neumann, King's College London; the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence

### Number of nationals fighting for ISIL

**Note**: List does not include nationals of Iraq and Syria (except for nationals of Iraqi Kurdistan).

**Note**: According to jihadist ideologues, 90% of its fighters in Iraq are Iraqi and 70% of its fighters in Syria are Syrian.[19]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nationals Fighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saudi Arabia</strong></td>
<td>7,000[54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
<td>2,400--5,000[51][54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td>2,400[55]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
<td>1,500[56]--2,000[57]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td>1,500[56][58]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>500-1,500[50][60]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>1,200[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>600[56]--1,000[50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td>900[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Libya</strong></td>
<td>600[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>500--600[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td>360[55]--600[61]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi Kurdistan</strong></td>
<td>85-600[62]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td>514[63]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>500[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uzbekistan</strong></td>
<td>500[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
<td>440[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkmenistan</strong></td>
<td>360[56][64]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td>330[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>China</strong></td>
<td>300[56][65]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Azerbaijan</strong></td>
<td>100-300[66]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia</strong></td>
<td>250[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kazakhstan</strong></td>
<td>250[58]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands</strong></td>
<td>200--250[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kyrgyzstan</strong></td>
<td>100[56]--200[67]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria</strong></td>
<td>200[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kosovo</strong></td>
<td>200[68][69]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines</strong></td>
<td>200[70]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tajikistan</strong></td>
<td>190[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>150--180[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austria</strong></td>
<td>100--150[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td>100--150[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Africa</strong></td>
<td>140[71]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yemen</strong></td>
<td>110[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>100[56]--130[72]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
<td>100[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>100[49][56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Georgia</strong></td>
<td>50--100[73]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td>50--100[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td>90[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>80[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Palestine</strong></td>
<td>70--80[74]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kuwait</strong></td>
<td>70[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Somalia</strong></td>
<td>70[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finland</strong></td>
<td>50--70[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia</strong></td>
<td>50--70[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td>60[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>50[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iran</strong></td>
<td>50[75]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>50[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel</strong></td>
<td>40--50[76]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Switzerland</strong></td>
<td>40[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Zealand</strong></td>
<td>6[56]--40[77]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>30[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malaysia</strong></td>
<td>20-30[78]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>India</strong></td>
<td>18--20[79][80]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qatar</strong></td>
<td>15[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Arab Emirates</strong></td>
<td>15[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bahrain</strong></td>
<td>12[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portugal</strong></td>
<td>12[81]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macedonia</strong></td>
<td>12[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td>9[82]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td>6--6[83]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maldives</strong></td>
<td>7[14]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croatia</strong></td>
<td>7[84]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Singapore</strong></td>
<td>2[85]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ghana</strong></td>
<td>2[86]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Korea</strong></td>
<td>1[87]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latvia</strong></td>
<td>1[58]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
<td>1[89]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wikipedia Estimate of Groups affiliated to ISIS/ISIL: 9/2015

- **Algeria**: Wilayat Algeria formed from Jund al-Khilafah after it pledged allegiance to ISIL. Wilayat Barqa formed from the Shura Council of Islamic Youth
- **Libya**: Some militants formerly associated with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya also pledged allegiance to ISIL
- **Egypt**: Wilayat Sinai formed from the majority of the membership of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis
- **Yemen**: Wilayat Sanaa formed from a faction of Ansar al-Sharia who pledged allegiance to ISIL
- **Pakistan and Afghanistan**: Wilayat Khorasan formed from the allegiance of militants from groups based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, including Jundallah, Tehreek-e-Khilafat, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and dissident commanders formerly associated with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.
- **Northeastern Nigeria, Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon**: Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya formed from Boko Haram pledging allegiance to ISIL.
- **Chechnya and Dagestan**: Wilayat Qawqaz formed from dissident militants of the Caucasus Emirate in Chechnya and Dagestan who switched their allegiance to ISIL.
- **Palestinian**: Militants of the group Army of the Islamic State (Palestinian Territories) pledged allegiance to ISIL
- **Philippines, Malaysia**: Militants of the group Abu Sayyaf pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Saudi Arabia**: Unidentified militants in Saudi Arabia – designated as provinces of ISIL.
- **Jordan**: Militants of the group Sons of the Call for Tawhid and Jihad (Jordan) pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Lebanon**: Militants of the group Free Sunnis of Baalbek Brigade pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Maldives**: The group Islamic State of the Maldives pledged allegiance to ISIL in July 2014.

Iraq
Demographic Pressures on Iraq

Iraq Total Population (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (millions)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate (percent)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Annual Births (millions)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Iraq

The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country’s percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

The Myth of Iraqi Oil Wealth

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that, excluding Iran, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) earned about $730 billion in net oil export revenues (unadjusted for inflation) in 2014. This represents an 11% decline from the $824 billion earned in 2013, largely because of the decline in average annual crude oil prices, and to a lesser extent from decreases in the amount of OPEC net oil exports. This was the lowest earnings for the group since 2010.

For 2015, EIA projects that OPEC net oil export revenues (excluding Iran) could fall further to about $380 billion in 2015 (unadjusted for inflation) as a result of the much lower annual crude oil prices expected in 2015, a 48% drop from 2014.

For Iraq – assuming no military problems, this means a drop from $87 billion in 2014 to $45.2 billion.

On a per capita basis, OPEC (excluding Iran) net oil export earnings are expected to decline by half from about $2,186 in 2014 to $1,114 in 2015. OPEC net oil export revenues in 2015 are based on projections of global oil prices and OPEC production levels from EIA’s March 2015 ShortTerm Energy Outlook (STEO).

Iraq’s per capita oil income in 2014 was $2,682, compared to $7,900 for Saudi Arabia, $25,362 for Kuwait, and $36,013 for Qatar. If EIA is right, it will drop to $1,368 in 2015.

EIA does estimate that OPEC revenues will rebound to $515 billion in 2016, with the expected rebound in crude oil prices. (+36%)
This data is based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports.

Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

Source: Iraq Body Count: https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/

143,334 – 162,577 Further analysis may add 10,000 civilian deaths.

These data are based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports.

Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

Source: Iraq Body Count: [https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/](https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/)
Baghdad, 1 August 2015 – According to casualty figures released today by UNAMI, a total number of 1,332 Iraqis were killed (including civilians, civilian police and casualty figures in Anbar) and another 2,108 were injured in acts of terrorism, violence and armed conflict in July*.

The number of civilians killed is 844 (including 27 civilian police and casualty figures in Anbar), and the number of civilians injured is 1,616 (including 38 civilian police and casualty figures in Anbar).

A further 488 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (including Peshmerga, SWAT and militias fighting alongside the Iraqi Army / Not including casualties from Anbar Operations) were killed and 492 were injured.

Baghdad was the worst affected Governorate with 1,091 civilian casualties (335 killed, 756 injured). Diyala suffered 170 killed and 284 injured, Salahadin 64 killed and 74 injured, Ninewa 101 killed and 28 injured, and Kirkuk 26 killed and 11 injured.

According to information obtained by UNAMI from the Health Directorate in Anbar, the Governorate suffered a total of 600 civilian casualties (147 killed and 453 injured).

“Since last summer’s onslaught by terrorists of the so-called ISIL, Iraq has been living through one of the most difficult phases in its modern history”, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG), Mr. Jan Kubis said. “Resolute action about Daesh and its ideology, equality and cooperation of all Iraqi components as true patriots in these efforts is needed to put an end to this tragic situation. The human cost of the conflict and the suffering of the people is enormous and profoundly worrying”, the SRSG underscored.

CAVEATS: In general, UNAMI has been hindered in effectively verifying casualties in conflict areas. Figures for casualties from Anbar Governorate are provided by the Health Directorate and are noted below. Casualty figures obtained from the Anbar Health Directorate might not fully reflect the real number of casualties in those areas due to the increased volatility of the situation on the ground and the disruption of services. In some cases, UNAMI could only partially verify certain incidents. UNAMI has also received, without being able to verify, reports of large numbers of casualties along with unknown numbers of persons who have died from secondary effects of violence after having fled their homes due to exposure to the elements, lack of water, food, medicines and health care. For these reasons, the figures reported have to be considered as the absolute minimum.
Iraq Population Density (UN OCHA) 7/2014

Zones of Control in Iraq

ISW Estimate

September 11, 2015

Fall of Ramadi and Approaches to Baghdad

Sources: Institute for the Study of War (ISIS area of influence); International Crisis Group.
Fighting in Ramadi
South Yemen was a separate country until 1990. The northwest, an area historically called Yemen, is mostly Shiite. The southeast, known as Hadramawt, is home to a mostly Sunni population. "Yemen and the Hadramawt have seldom been part of the same political entity in the past and have maintained separate identities for a long time," said Michael Izady, a historian and cultural geographer who has mapped ethnicity and religion for Columbia University.

The “Kurdish Problem:” April 7, 2015

The Kurdish Problem in Iraq before KRG Gains in fighting with ISIS in 2013-2015
The Kurdish Problem in Iraq After KRG Gains in fighting with ISIS in 2014-2015

Source: https://www.google.com/search?q=Map+of+Kurdish+Zone+in+Iraq&tbm=isch&imgil=wyCRcvHsINaCaM%253A%253B3CrqUUiw100RM%253Bhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Fcommons.wikimedia.org%25252Fwiki%25252FAtlas_of_Iraqi_Kurdistan&source=i&pf=m&fir=wyCRcvHsINaCaM%253A%253B3CrqUiw1OOrKM%253B_&_biw=1358&bih=995&usg=__dgkzFcIYx195k1yOUQwnkW3AK4c%3D&ved=0CCkQyjdqFQoTCMbNyuPtnsgCFYGMIAdW0G8g&ei=vOjlgfCcXkYG2Qb73m9gA
#imgrc=wyCRcvHsINaCaM%3A&usg=__dgkzFcIYx195k1yOUQwnkW3AK4c%3D

- Autonomous Region as recognized in 2005 by Iraq
- Aras under Kurdish control
- Autonomous Region according to the 1970 manifest
- Areas claimed by the Kurdish government
Has become an area of Kurdish as well as Kurdish-Arab tension. Commander of the Yezidi Sinjar Protection Forces Haydar Qassem Sheshou was arrested on April 5th, 2015, by a special police force affiliated with Barzani and KDP under the pretext of being linked to the Popular Mobilization militias. These groups were accused of committing violent operations in areas liberated from ISIS, which prompted the PUK Central Council to condemn the arrest and hint that the Democratic Party wanted to hand Sinjar over to ISIS.

Is an area of critical energy value: EIA estimates 17% of Iraq oil reserves are in the north of Iraq, near Kirkuk, Mosul, and Khanaqin. Control over rights to reserves is a source of controversy between the ethnic Kurds and other groups in the area. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that the Iraqi Kurdistan Region contained 4 billion barrels of proved reserves. KRG's estimate is much higher because it is a resource estimate that includes unproved resources. The KRG recently increased its oil resource estimate from 45 billion barrels to 60 billion barrels although this has not been independently verified and this number likely includes at least some resources in disputed areas—especially Kirkuk.

After skirmishes between ISIL and KRG forces around the Kirkuk and Bai Hassan fields, the KRG took over operations at the Avana Dome, a part of the Kirkuk field, and Bai Hassan in July 2014. Shortly after, KRG restarted commercial production at those fields, which allowed the KRG to increase oil flows through its newly built pipeline that connects to Ceyhan (see Table 2). Meanwhile, Iraq’s Northern Oil Company continued to produce about 120,000 bbl/d from the Kirkuk's Baba Dome, of which 30,000 bbl/d was sent to the Kirkuk refinery. The remainder of the oil production was reinjected into oil fields associated with natural gas to keep natural gas production flowing for power generation.

A December 2014 deal reached between Baghdad and the KRG has allowed Kirkuk crude to be transported via the KRG pipeline to Ceyhan, providing Baghdad with a commercial outlet for its northern production (see section on Issues between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad). Fighting around Kirkuk city continues to take place, making nearby fields vulnerable to supply disruption.

Source: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, "Kurdistan in Iraq: An escalating conflict," September 2nd, 2015, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#inbox/14f8dd839ca07ee1, and http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ.
Energy Vulnerability in Iraq

http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ
Iraq’s Long History of Export Instability

Iraq's total petroleum and other liquids production and consumption

- Gulf War (1990-91)
- Iraq war begins in 2003
- Net exports
- Production
- Consumption

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ
Iraq Still Had World’s Second Largest Increase in Supply in 2014

Despite some supply disruptions and security threats, Iraq was the second-leading contributor to global oil supply growth in 2014, behind only the United States. Iraq accounted for almost 60% of production growth among the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), although this growth was more than offset by production declines in other OPEC countries. Iraq’s crude oil production, which averaged almost 3.4 million barrels per day (bb/d) in 2014, was 330,000 bb/d above 2013 levels, despite the heightened security threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and disrupted production in northern Iraq.

Iraq crude oil production, 2012-14

ISIL attacks in northern Iraq in early June 2014 reduced northern Iraqi production and refinery operations (not including the Iraqi Kurdistan Region). These attacks did not affect southern production and exports, which accounted for 65% of Iraq’s total crude oil exports in 2014. ISIL did not significantly affect production in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq, although fighting came very close to fields produced under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—the Khurmala Dome and Shahian. Some oil companies were forced to abandon exploration projects, which could delay future development.

Iraq’s crude oil production fell to its lowest monthly levels for the year during July and August following the start of the ISIL offensive. From August to December, Iraq’s production grew by almost 600,000 bb/d, reflecting increased output from fields in southern Iraq and in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region following infrastructure expansions and a partial recovery in northern Kirkuk production. In December, Iraq’s crude oil production reached 3.75 million bb/d, the highest amount on record.

Source:
http://www.eia.gov/todayinke nergy/detail.cfm?id=19911
Rise of Iraqi Terrorism: 1970-2013

**Rise of Iraqi Terrorism: 1970-2013**

**NUMBER OF FAMILIES BY GOVERNORATE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>97,394</td>
<td>584,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babylon</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>9,748</td>
<td>58,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>89,772</td>
<td>538,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>10,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahuk</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>71,009</td>
<td>426,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>20,869</td>
<td>125,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>47,544</td>
<td>285,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>12,117</td>
<td>72,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>1,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>14,078</td>
<td>84,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineawa</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>32,974</td>
<td>197,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadissiya</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>3,999</td>
<td>23,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah al-Din</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>24,961</td>
<td>149,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>27,374</td>
<td>164,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thi-Qar</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>9,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>5,509</td>
<td>33,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,331</strong></td>
<td><strong>528,601</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,171,606</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **High concentration**
- **Low concentration**

**Sources**
Thematic data: IOM/DTM as of 2015/08/04
Administrative data: OCHA COC
This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

**IOM’s DTM**
IOM’s DTM aims to monitor displacement and provide accurate data on the IDP population in Iraq. Data are collected through IOM’s Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RART), composed of 140 staff deployed throughout the entire Iraqi territory. Data is gathered using an extensive network of over 1,300 key informants.

From the start of January 2014 through 30 June 2015, the DTM identified 3,171,606 internally displaced individuals (528,601 families).

**Baghdad governorate**
- Hosts the second largest IDP population (17% or 538,632 individuals). The majority of this population is originally from Anbar governorate (55%), while a smaller portion (7%) are originally from Baghdad governorate. IDPs were displaced mainly before June 2014 (18%), September 2014-March 2015 (31%) and after April 2015 (28%). The vast majority (91%) is housed in private settings.
- Anbar governorate hosts the largest IDP population (18% or 584,364 individuals) and reports a very high rate of intra-governorate displacement; 97% of IDPs are originally from the same governorate. These IDPs were displaced mainly before June 2014 (44%) and after April 2015 (38%). The majority is housed in private settings (81%), out of which 72% in host families and 9% in rented houses, while a smaller portion (19%) is in critical shelters.
- Finally, Anbar governorate hosts 12% of the total returnees (39,558 individuals).

**Kirkuk governorate**
- Hosts the fourth largest displaced population (13% or 399,660 individuals). IDPs in Kirkuk are mainly from Salah al-Din (36%), Anbar (10%) and from within Kirkuk (19%). They were displaced mainly in June-July 2014 (29%) and September 2014-March 2015 (27%). The majority of IDPs (55%) are in rented houses, critical shelters (14%) and camps (2%). Furthermore, Kirkuk hosts 2% of the total returnees population (4,548 individuals).
Fighting in Syria
### Demographic Pressures on Syria

**Syria Total Population (in millions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (millions)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate (percent)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Annual Births (millions)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Syria

Income Group, Region, or Country: Syrian Arab Republic

Voice and Accountability

Political Stability and Absence of

Government Effectiveness

Regulatory Quality

Rule of Law

Control of Corruption

The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

The Pre-War Ethnic Sectarian Nightmare in the Levant

Energy Vulnerability in Syria

http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=SYR
Rough Estimate of Current Areas of Control - I

Zones of Control in Syria

ISW Estimate

September 2, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/ISW/14fd9c79b69ce51
Military Situation on the Syrian-Turkish Border: September 14, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War.
The Russian Build Up: 9/2015

• Expanding Russian port facilities in naval base at Tartus and expanding an airfield south of Latakia into an air base.
• New construction at the Assad International Airport in Latakia, and soon after, satellite imagery confirmed the presence of Russian T-90 tanks, artillery and large transport aircraft at the airfield.
• Deploy 3-4 Su-30 (Su-27?) fighters, 12 Su-24 strike fighters, 12 Su-10 close support fighters, and Pchela-1T UAVs.
• Deploy 14 helicopters — Mi-24 Hind gunships and Mi-17 Hip transport helicopters
• Start air strikes on 30.9.15.
• Providing R-166-0.5 (ultra) high-frequency signals (HF/VHF) vehicles with jam-resistant voice and data communications which have been seen driving through Syria
• An unknown number of new artillery weapons, reportedly 152mm systems.
• Deploying six or more T-90 main battle tanks, 35 or more new BTR-82A/B wheeled AFVs with 30mm cannon turrets, and an unknown number of Russian Humvee equivalent
• Deploying prefabricated housing for up to 2,000.
• Deploying at least two unit sets of SA-22 land-based air defense systems.
• Possibly deploying 200 marines and housing for as many as 1,500 personnel at the airfield near the Assad family’s ancestral home.
Russian Facilities in Syria: 9/2015

Buffer Zone Guesstimate

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, Hurriyet Daily News

THE WASHINGTON POST
In about a week, a coalition of Kurdish militias and Syrian rebels seized two strategic towns controlled by the Islamic State near the border with Turkey. The latest advance led to the capture of Ain Issa, a town that is only 30 miles from the Islamic State’s stronghold, Raqqa.

Rise in Terrorism in Syria

Syria – Terrorist Incidents

Syria - Fatalities

A recent survey of 1,365 Syrians from all 14 governorates of the country found some surprising attitudes.

Consider this: A fifth of those interviewed said the Islamic State -- the brutal Islamist group known for its beheadings, that rules over large swaths of Syria and Iraq -- is a positive influence on the country.

And 82 percent said that they believe the Islamic State was created by the United States and its allies.

The Syria survey was conducted by ORB International, a U.K.-based market research firm, from June 10 to July 2. The poll has a margin of error of +/-3 percentage points.

The majority of Syrians interviewed said they believe that the situation is worsening, and only 21 percent said they preferred their life today than when Syria was fully controlled by Bashar al-Assad's regime.

Nearly half of Syrians surveyed said they opposed U.S.-coalition airstrikes, and nearly 80 percent said that the war has gotten worse because of the influx of foreign fighters.

Yet there is also sense of hope: The majority of Syrians surveyed said a diplomatic solution was possible to end the war, and that Syrians can set aside their difference and live side by side again.
Syria: The Lights Go Out in Aleppo: 3/2012-12/2014

Comparative Casualty per Month Estimate: 2011-2013

The opposition Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that least 82,000 people have been killed after two years of civil war in Syria. The number of casualties documented by opposition activist groups vary.

CASUALTIES BY MONTH
From select activist groups

- Violations Documentation Centre
- Syrian Shuhada
- Syrian Network for Human Rights

(Jan. - May 2013 data are Reuters calculations based on available casualty reports)

Source: Reuters,
https://www.google.com/search?q=trend+graphs+for+Syrian+casualties&tbm=isch&imgil=YGlffJlki6As0M%253A%253Baacmvbd6LOjVI%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F%25252F6storiesfromthe7continents.blogspot.com%25252F2013_06_01_archive.html&source=iu&pf=m&fir=YGlffJlki6As0M%253A%253Baacmvbd6LOjVI%252C&biw=1491&bih=976&ved=0CDAQyjdBqQoTCMeij89jigMcFUtsjgodOTALSg&ei=XQL8VYeBNevmuQS54KQ0BA&usg=__twkWLalmgNnRKrmq_WnWQeP81oP%3D#imgrc=Zmg7tLcF3wov0OM%3A&usg=__twkWLalmgNnRKrmq_WnWQeP81oP%3D

- First shipments of arms from Qatar, according to The New York Times
- 'Significantly more and better weapons' start to be sent in by Gulf states and US, according to The Washington Post.
- CIA begging to 'limit supplies of weapons . . . reaching rebel forces', according to The Times.
- Gulf states and U.S. begin to 'sharply increase their military aid to Syria's opposition fighters', according to The New York Times.
Syrian Refugee and IDB Crisis: March 1, 2015

Total Syrian refugees
3 824 641

Total IDPs in Syria
7 600 000

1 622 839
Syrian refugees in Turkey

1 175 171
Syrian refugees in Lebanon

7 600 000
IDPs in Syria

242 468
Syrian refugees in Iraq

623 447
Syrian refugees in Jordan

136 661
Syrian refugees in Egypt

24 055
Syrian refugees in North Africa

Copyright, European Union, 2015. Map created by EC-JRC. The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the European Union.

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ECDM_20150229_Syria_IDPs.pdf
Syria: UNICEF Gap - 55% Funded: June 2015:

People in Need

- 12.2 million inside Syria, including 5.6 million children
- 4 million refugees, including 2.1 million children

Syrian Children in Need

UNICEF Funding Requirements for SRP and 3RP in 2015

- $903 million (US$)

2015 UNICEF Results

Water

- In Syria, UNICEF is providing water treatment supplies that treat enough water to serve over 16.55 million people on a regular basis. UNICEF also provides targeted support to water systems:
  - Syria: 135% of target 3.5 million
- In neighboring countries, 1,017,022 people have been provided with access to drinking and domestic water:
  - Iraq: 79% Target 123,948
  - Lebanon: 48% Target 592,614
  - Jordan: 35% Target 1,840,000

Child Protection

- There are over 820,000 children targeted for psychosocial support services in 2015, to date 447,138 children have benefited from these services:
  - Syria: 56% Target 385,000
  - Jordan: 57% Target 203,264
  - Lebanon: 44% Target 140,000
  - Turkey: 51% Target 50,000
  - Iraq: 62% Target 39,044
  - Egypt: 54% Target 11,000

Education

- In Syria, UNICEF supported access to formal education for 13,017 students through school rehabilitation, pre-fabricated classrooms and school bursaries.
  - Syria: 3% Target 365,500
- In neighboring countries, 344,186 refugee children have been supported to enroll in formal education:
  - Turkey: 55% Target 180,000
  - Jordan: 100% Target 87,150
  - Lebanon: 130% Target 130,000
  - Iraq: 90% Target 24,782
  - Egypt: 91% Target 14,500

Note: Education results remain pending the new school year from September.

Health

- 5,051,986 children vaccinated against polio as of June 2015.
- There are over 20 million children targeted with polio vaccination in 2015, mainly through campaigns**.
- Three campaigns have been conducted in Syria reaching 2,989,659 children under five with immunization and 2,062,327 children have been immunized between Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Nine campaigns have been conducted in the sub-region so far this year.

**Campaigns include NID and SNID.
Registered Syrian Refugees as of August 31, 2015

Registered refugees: **4,088,078**

- **Turkey**: 1,938,000
- **Lebanon**: 1,113,941
- **Jordan**: 629,245
- **Iraq**: 249,463
- **Egypt**: 132,375
- **N Africa**: 24,055

Source: UNHCR, Reliefweb (figures up to 31 August 2015)