The “War” Against ISIS

Anthony H. Cordesman

Last Updated: August 11, 2016
Meeting Key Policy Challenges
Keeping ISIS in Perspective

• If one looks at the most recent START statistics on terrorism in the State Department annual report on terrorism, and only considers the top five threats, three are clearly Islamist extremist: ISIS (in Syria and Iraq), the Taliban, and Boko Harum.

• There are more than 40 Islamist extremist groups listed in the START database, but if one looks only at these top three, ISIS was responsible for only 37% of the attacks and 38% of the deaths.

• There is no clear way to assess the role of ISIS role in terms of all Islamist extremist attacks, but if one looks at the total numbers of attacks in the countries with the highest rates of terrorism in the MENA region (Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria), ISIS was responsible for 29% of the attacks in 2015, and 56% of the deaths.

• Islamic extremism also does dominate terrorism in the world, but ISIS was only responsible for for 9% of the attacks in the entire world in 2015, and 21% of the deaths.

• Depriving ISIS of control over population centers and sanctuary to raise funds and train fighters, and breaking it up as key organization, matters. Defeating it in any practical sense, however, will not begin to deal with the lasting threat.

Not Really a War Against ISIS (ISIL, Daesh, Islamic State)

- Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen have long been “failed states” in terms of politics governance, economic development, demographic pressures, and security.
- Libya torn apart into two warring “governments,” many local factions, Islamists, and regional and ethnic differences.
- ISIS “Caliphate” is product of two sets of civil wars, growing out of Sunni and Al Qaida hostility to U.S. invasion of Iraq.
  - Rise after 2011 a product of major upheavals growing out of both internal problems and failed secularism.
  - Syria is divided into four main fighting factions: ISIS, Kurdish, Arab-Islamist, and pro-Assad factions. Impact of 250,000+ dead, 500,000+ injured, 4+ million refugees, 7+ million internally displaced persons, 60%+ cut in GDP
  - Iraq is divided in Sunni, Kurdish, Iraqi government and Shiite factions on the edge of civil conflict and with growing violence after 2010.
  - “Youth bulge” in very young populations creates further stress.
  - U.S. invasion of Iraq compound impact of Saddam’s blood coup in 1979, Iran-Iraq War, invasion of Kuwait, U.S. led invasion in 2003, fighting from 2004-2013 all have a legacy – as does Assad’s father suppression of Moslem Brotherhood.
  - Defeating or degrading ISIS with still leave violent Islamist extremists.
- Yemen scene of constant fighting and civil struggles since British leave Aden. Now is Houthi vs. Sana government struggle Massive population pressure, serious water and arable land issues, drug economy. Sunni vs. Shi’ite and north-south tensions. Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula, not ISIS, is dominant Sunni Islamist extremist faction.
Key Failures in USG Efforts

1. Policy level comes to focus on spin, lack of objective analysis and transparency, compartmentation. Congress goes for partisan and member advantage.

2. Denial of complexity, net for net assessment. Focus on hostile forces rather than overall security situation.

3. Lack of meaningful integrated civil-military planning

4. Poor accounting and conditionality, lack of measures of effectiveness, focus on past waste rather than future needs and effectiveness.

5. Military reverts to focus on tactical success, short-term civil buy offs.

6. Focus on force generation rather than combat effectiveness. Rush in too late, leave too early; don’t provide combat advisors, erratic programs and funding, lack of conditionality

7. Civil side pursues illusions of progress, tries to reform everything, then reverts to project aid that often ignores security and fighting.

8. We lie when we say we’ll focus on letting them do it their way, helping them evolve their civil and security systems on their terms.

9. Efforts at improving fiscal management, counter corruption, rule of law, police reform reflect our goals and culture, do more harm than good

10. High rotation rates, new policies: Every year is the first year. Fail to develop and retain core expertise in economic planning, state politics, governance reform, and security reform.

11. Erratic swings in funding. Emphasis on budget execution rather than effectiveness

12. We “take note of lessons” after the crisis, fail to learn from the past.
The Uncertain State of “Progress”

- Years of war have now gone on since 2011 with no meaningful estimates of impact and the effectiveness of aid and only suspect accounting.
- Rising GDP in petro-economics may disguise deep structural problems, impact of population growth, income distribution problems. Etc.
- Poverty estimates often fail to address rising costs, impact of urbanization, etc.
- Security remains a key problem that often is not taken into account in economic and human development estimates.
- Rising sectarian, ethnic, tribal, regional and other internal divisions often ignored.
- Unemployment data ignore productivity, disguised unemployment, career opportunities.
- Data on progress in life expectancy, education, medical services raise major questions about quality of data.
- Critical near term challenges in revenues, job creation, electric power, agriculture, and roads.
- Estimate of future opportunities for progress often ignore reality that states at war need time to recover. No major near-term development options until.
- Military and aid spending have often been driving factors behind increase in corruption and distorting economy to increase dependence on outside spending.
Setting the Stage: The Rising U.S. Level of Effort
As of 4:59 p.m. EST July 27, the U.S. and coalition have conducted a total of 14,093 strikes (9,411 Iraq / 4,682 Syria).

U.S. has 10,826 strikes in Iraq and Syria (6,393 Iraq / 4,433 Syria)

Rest of Coalition has 3,267 strikes in Iraq and Syria (3,018 Iraq / 249 Syria)

The countries that have participated in the strikes include:
In Iraq: (1) Australia, (2) Belgium, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, and (8) UK
In Syria: (1) Australia, (2) Bahrain, (3) Canada, (4) France, (5) Jordan, (6) The Netherlands, (7) Saudi Arabia, (8) Turkey (9) UAE and (10) UK

As of Apr. 16, U.S. and partner nation aircraft have flown an estimated 105,695 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria.

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As of July 15, 2016, the total cost of operations related to ISIL since kinetic operations started on August 8, 2014, is $8.4 billion and the average daily cost is $11.9 million for 708 days of operations.
The US-led coalition has launched more than 7,000 air strikes against IS targets in Iraq since August 2014. The UK launched its first air strikes on the group in Iraq the following month. Other nations taking part include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, and the Netherlands. In Syria, the US-led air campaign began in September 2014. Since then, more than 3,400 strikes have been carried out by coalition forces, which include Australia, Bahrain, Canada, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the UK.
# Targets Damaged/Destroyed as of May 31, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWVs</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging Areas</td>
<td>1,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>6,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions</td>
<td>7,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
<td>1,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Targets</td>
<td>8,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,374</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may fluctuate based on battle damage assessments
Current as of 31 May 2016

Source: CENTCOM CCCI

Source: [http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve](http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve)
## High-value ISIL Fighters Killed by Coalition Strikes in 12/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date Killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rawand Dilsher Taher</td>
<td>external operations; handled money and equipment</td>
<td>Raqqah, Syria</td>
<td>12/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalil Ahmed Ali al-Wais (AKA Abu Wadhah)</td>
<td>“Emir” of Kirkuk province</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>12/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Anas</td>
<td>IED cell leader</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>12/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunis Khalash (AKA Abu Jawdat)</td>
<td>Deputy Financial Emir</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>12/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mithaq Najim</td>
<td>Deputy “Emir” of Kirkuk province; trained FTFs</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>12/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siful Haque Sujan</td>
<td>computer systems engineer; external operations; educated in the U.K.; hacker; specialized in anti-surveillance technology and weapons development</td>
<td>Raqqah, Syria</td>
<td>12/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akram Muhammad Sa’ad Faris (AKA Akram Aabu)</td>
<td>commander/executioner</td>
<td>Tellafar, Iraq</td>
<td>12/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charaffe al-Mouadan</td>
<td>external operations; Paris attacks cell leader</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>12/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Kader Hakim</td>
<td>external operations; forgery specialist; veteran fighter; linked to Paris attacks network</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>12/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tashin al-Hayali</td>
<td>external operations</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>12/27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cost of U.S. Air Operations as of July 15, 2016

As of July 15, 2016, the total cost of operations related to ISIL since kinetic operations started on August 8, 2014, is $8.4 billion and the average daily cost is $11.9 million for 708 days of operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily Cost ($M)</th>
<th>Average Daily Cost</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Expense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$4.8</td>
<td>$5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$2.4</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$3.0</td>
<td>$3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$1.4</td>
<td>$1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$1.9</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$2.5</td>
<td>$6.9</td>
<td>$7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Category</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$1.4</td>
<td>$1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support</td>
<td>$0.6</td>
<td>$1.5</td>
<td>$1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.8</td>
<td>$4.8</td>
<td>$5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Pay</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$2.4</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve, 6.8.16.
Years after Iraq withdrawal, U.S. troop level rises

The first 170 of an initial contingent of 275 troops arrived in June 2014. Since then, the Defense Department has authorized additional troops, bringing the official level to 4,087, though the total number is likely higher because of undisclosed operations.

Source: Brookings Iraq Index, Defense Department

KEVIN UHRMACHER/THE WASHINGTON POST
Land Precision Strike: HIMARS

The HIMARS carries six rockets or one MGM-140 ATACMS missile on the U.S. Army's new Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) five-ton truck, and can launch the entire Multiple Launch Rocket System Family of Munitions (MFOM). HIMARS is interchangeable with the MLRS M270A1, carrying half the rocket load.

The Extended Range MLRS Rocket (ER-MLRS) is a derivative of the M26 with a longer motor and only 518 grenades. This improves the range to more than 45 km (28 miles).

The M30 GLMRS rocket uses a guidance system with an IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) and a GPS receiver, and has four small additional control fins in the nose. To make full use of the much improved accuracy of the weapon over long distances, only 404 M85 DPICM bomblets are carried for a range of more than 60 km (37 miles). Minimum effective range for the GMLRS is about 10 km (6 miles).

The XM31 is a variant of the M30 with a 90 kg (200 lb) unitary high-explosive warhead. The XM31 is a variant of the M30 with a 90 kg (200 lb) unitary high-explosive warhead. In January 2006, the U.S. Army announced that the majority of (possibly all?) future purchases of tactical MLRS rockets will be M31s with unitary warhead.

In November 2015, the United States Army revealed they had deployed the HIMARS to Iraq, firing at least 400 rockets at the Islamic State since the beginning of summer. Himars detachments were sent to Al Asad Airbase and Al-Taqaddum Air Base in Anbar province. On 4 March 2016, Army HIMARS systems fired rockets into Syria in support of Syrian rebels fighting ISIL for the first time, with the launchers based in neighboring Jordan. On April 26, 2016, it was announced that the U.S. would be deploying the HIMARS in Turkey near the border with Syria as part of the battle with ISIL.
U.S. Campaign Goals: August 2016

NEXT PLAYS IN THE COUNTER-ISIL CAMPAIGN

Stabilize Iraq's Anbar Province

Generate Iraqi Security Forces to envelop Mosul

Identify and develop more local forces in Syria that will isolate and pressure Raqqah

Provide more firepower, sustainment and logistical support to our partners to enable them to collapse ISIL's control over Mosul and Raqqah

The Rise and Decline (?) of ISIS: Comparative Views
U.S. Command View of Progress Against ISIS August - 2016

Progress Against ISIS

Our strikes have enabled the liberation of more than 25,000 total square kilometers from Daesh. That's nearly half of what the enemy once controlled in Iraq and 20 percent of what they once controlled in Syria.

...we've dropped more than 30,000 munitions on the enemy with approximately two-thirds of those in Iraq and about one-third in Syria. Our artillery has conducted more than 700 fire missions.

And although it's not a measure of success and it’s difficult to confirm, we estimate that over the past 11 months we've killed about 25,000 enemy fighters. When you add that to the 20,000 estimated killed prior to our arrival, that's 45,000 enemy taken off the battlefield.

...the number of (ISIS) fighters on the front line has diminished. They've diminished not only in quantity, but also in quality. We don't see them operating nearly as effectively as they have in the past, which makes them even easier targets for us so as a result they're attrition has accelerated here of late. You know, we had this big engagement of this big convoy that tried to escape from Fallujah and they kind of made themselves easy targets for us. I don't think they would have made that mistake a year or two ago.

So, I think that the -- overall, the flow of foreign fighters has been reduced as well. And that contributes to the decline in the effectiveness of the enemy on the battlefield.

QUESTION: Do you still believe that ISIS fighting capacity is still in the neighborhood of 30,000, as we've been hearing for, you know, the last year or so?

GEN. MACFARLAND: Well, here's the thing. They can grab a bunch of people minding their own business off the street, throw them in the back of a pickup truck, and drop them off at a checkpoint with some AKs and say, "defend this checkpoint." And they've done that. We've seen them do that in places.

So, how many of those people are there against their will? How many of them are trained? How many can you really call a fighter? We know that they've taken a lot of their administrative folks and pushed them out to the front lines. They're not really supposed to be there. It's not their number one function within the so-called caliphate. So, they are able to make good some of their losses.

We've also conducted more than 200 strikes against oil and natural gas activities of the enemy, destroying more than 640 of their tanker trucks but more importantly a number of critical facilities such as gas oil separation plan critical nodes, which reduce their oil revenue stream by perhaps 50 percent.

We've also hit more than 25 bulk cash sites, destroying at least a half a billion dollars. And we vigorously attacked enemy leadership, command and control and weapons manufacturing capability....in our estimate, Daesh is earning $300 million a month from illicit oil activities. That should have been approximately $30 million a month and we estimate that the reduction from Tidal Wave II operations cuts their revenues by a half to approximately $15 million a month. Since September 2014, CJTF has conducted 303 strikes against oil and gas related facilities. Since the start of Operation Tidal Wave II, we've conducted 193 of those strikes. The last was on the Fourth of July against six oil wellheads.

We're going to try to get Mosul back as fast as we can. It's one million people living under an oppression rule under terrible conditions and we're going to push to get it back as fast as possible.

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1567a11dccc3b667
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Estimated Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Iraq and Syria</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish claims</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian military estimate</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihadist claim</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA estimate in 2014</td>
<td>20,000–31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA estimate in 2016</td>
<td>20,000–25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outside Iraq and Syria</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Egypt</td>
<td>1,000–2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Libya</td>
<td>5,000–10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Algeria</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Jordan</td>
<td>4,200+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Turkey</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Afghanistan</td>
<td>3000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Yemen (1,000–4,000)</td>
<td>~1,000–1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Europe (7,000–10,000)</td>
<td>4,000–10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In West Africa</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,600–258,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wikipedia, ptress, interviews
Islamic State setbacks

Dissent, defections and reversals on the battlefield are steadily eroding the Islamic State’s aura of invincibility in Syria and Iraq, suggesting that the group is starting to fray from within as its many enemies step up their offensives on multiple fronts.

A gun battle erupted last week between Syrian fighters and foreigners in Abu Kamal after the Syrians refused an order by a Kuwaiti commander to travel to Iraq to reinforce the front lines in Tikrit.

In Ramadi, fighting erupted between a group of mostly Chechens and local Iraqi supporters of the Islamic State who felt they were being abandoned when the foreigners decided to head back to Syria.
DoD: Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of March 2015

Note: Our judgment as to which group has dominant influence over a particular city is based on a body of unclassified sources that we deem reliable.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August.

ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 20-25 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where they once could.

These areas translate into approximately 11,000-13,500 square kilometers (4,100-5,200 square miles). However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could be higher or lower depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

With the exception of its withdrawal from ‘Ayn al ‘Arab and Tall Hamis, ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged.
DoD: Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of April 2015

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August 2014. ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once could.

These areas translate into approximately 13,000 to 17,000 square kilometers (or 5,000 to 6,500 square miles).

However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could increase or decrease depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged, with its gains in As Suwayda’, Damascus Countryside, and Homs Provinces offset by losses in Halab and Al Hasakah Province.

The Islamic State has lost 14 percent of the territory it held in January, according to an analysis by IHS, a defense research firm. Airstrikes and ground offensives have forced the group to withdraw from some areas, but it has also made new gains.
ISIS Gains and Losses in Southern Syria in 2015
A mix of Iraqi government forces and Shiite militias pushed the terrorist group out of Tikrit, in April, and Islamic State fighters are currently surrounded in Ramadi.

After months of trying to regain control of Ramadi, Iraqi security forces were finally able to surround it in early December. But government forces have yet to enter the city center, where urban combat is expected to stretch for months.
ISIS Grip on Raqqa and Mosul at End-2015


ISIS Bombings and Assassinations in 2015

ISW Estimate of Zones of Control: February 9, 2016

CONTROL ZONE: An area where ISIS exerts physical/psychological pressure to assure that individuals/groups respond as directed.

ATTACK ZONE: An area where ISIS conducts offensive maneuvers.

SUPPORT ZONE: An area free of significant action against ISIS and which permits logistics and administrative support of ISIS’s forces.

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/maps/1528fb7753f1b5ec,
Between 1 Jan and 15 December 2015, the Islamic State lost control of 14 per cent of its territory. New analysis indicates that in the last 3 months, the Islamic State has lost a further 8 per cent of its territory. In 2016, major losses in the north-east extend south towards Raqqa and Deir al-Zour as the mixed-sectarian Kurdish and Sunni Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) advance under the cover of US and Russian airstrikes. The Syrian government has also made gains in the West, now stands just 5km outside the ancient city of Palmyra, which was overrun by the jihadists in mid-2015.

Iraq and Syria: ISIL's Areas of Influence, August 2014 Through April 2016

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL's) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq and northern Syria have been pushed back since August 2014. Compared to its peak of territorial influence in Iraq and Syria in August 2014, ISIL probably can no longer operate openly in approximately 30 to 35 percent of populated areas, although the group is able to conduct attacks in many areas where it has ceded control. During April 2016, Iraqi forces captured territory from ISIL in Hit and west of Makhmur. In Syria, ISIL lost territory to Syrian regime-backed forces in central Homs Province and opposition forces in Dar'a Province. The map depicts ISIL's net territorial losses, which translate into approximately 25,000 to 26,000 square kilometers, or about 45 percent of the territory it had dominated in Iraq as of August 2014. ISIL also has lost a net of 9,000 to 9,200 square kilometers, or about 20 percent of the territory it had dominated in Syria as of August 2014. ISIL probably has a presence and freedom of movement in much of the unpopulated areas depicted on the map, but we cannot determine if it is the dominant actor. Our estimates are subject to change because of the dynamic nature of the conflict.


Source: [http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve](http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve)
ISIS Sanctuary Map: July 1, 2016

BBC Map of Zones of Control, August 1, 2016

Conflict Dynamics in Iraq
Iraq Population Density (UN OCHA) 7/2014

Iraqi Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions in late 2009

Sectarian Challenges
Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other

Ethnic Challenges
Iraq: Arab 75-82%, Kurdish 13-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%

Tribal Challenges
Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Iraq Energy Infrastructure

Source: EIA, [https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ](https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ), April 28, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq (1000)</td>
<td>Iran (1000)</td>
<td>Force Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Manpower</td>
<td>424,000</td>
<td>513,000</td>
<td>4:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Manpower</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>19:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>7:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIFVs</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>8:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCs</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>4:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed Artillery</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>9:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Propelled Artillery</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>1:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>11:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Helicopters</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>6:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major SAM Launchers</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>11:10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraq: Key Forces

Iraqi government

Iraqi Armed Forces

Iraqi Army, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Police
Iraqi Police Service National Police Supporting Forces Facilities Protection Service

Ba'athists

Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order; Fedayeen Saddam; General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries Al-Awda; General Command of the Armed Forces; Resistance and Liberation in Iraq; Popular Army; New Return; Patriotic Front; Political Media Organ of the Ba'ath; Party Popular Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq; Al-Abud Network

Shia Islamic militias

Mahdi Army; Abu Deraa's Mahdi Army faction; Badr Organization; Sheibani Network; Soldiers of Heaven; Special Groups (Iraq); Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq; Promised Day Brigade; Kata'ib Hezbollah

Sunni Islamic militias

Awakening groups, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaish al-Rashideen, Islamic Army in Iraq, Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance, Hamas of Iraq

Kurdish militias

Peshmerga Kurdistan Workers' Party Kurdistan Freedom Falcons Party of Free Life of Kurdistan

Christian militias

Qaraqosh Protection Committee, Nineveh Plain Protection Units, Dwekh Nawsha, Syriac Military Council, Kataib Rouh, Allah Issa Ibn Miriam

Yazidi militias

Sinjar Alliance: Sinjar Resistance Units, Êzîdxan Protection Force, Êzîdxan Women's Units Insurgents

Nationalist Salafis

Mujahideen Army, Mujahideen Battalions of the Salafi Group of Iraq, Islamic Salafist Boy Scout Battalions, Mohammad's Army

Salafi Jihadist

### Iraq: Key Forces

#### Iraqi government
- Security forces
- Private militias
- Iran
- Quds Force
- Syria (airstrikes, limited involvement)

**CJTF-OIR:** [16]

**Military aid:** [show]

#### Iraqi Security Forces
- 600,000 (300,000 Army and 300,000 Police)
- Awakening Council militias - 30,000
- Contractors ~7,000
- US Forces 3,550
- Canadian Forces 600

#### Popular Mobilization Forces
- Asa‘ib Ahl al-Haq
- Peace Companies
- Kata’ib Hezbollah
- Mukhtar Army
- Badr Brigades
- Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada
- Kata’ib al-Imam Ali
- Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces

**Supported by:**
- Iran
- Hezbollah

#### Iraqi Kurdistan
- Peshmerga
- Rojava
- YPG
- YPJ
- PKK
- HPG
- YJA-STAR
- PJAK
- YRK
- HPJ
- Sinjar Alliance
- YBŞ
- YJÊ
- HPS

#### Iraqi security forces and militias:
- 11,426 killed and 11,601 wounded

**Assyrian forces**
- MFS
- NPU
- QPC
- Dwekh Nawsha

**CJTF-OIR:** [16]

**Military aid:** [show]

**Iraqi Kurdistan**
- Peshmerga

**Military Council of Anbar’s Revolutionaries**
- Anbar Tribal Council
- 1920 Revolution Brigade
- Rashidin Army
- Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance
- Iraqi Hamas

**ISIL**
- Military of ISIL
- Ansar al-Islam (merged with ISIL)

**Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance**
- Islamic Army in Iraq
- Mujahideen Army
- Ansar al-Sunnah (majority joined IS)
- Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance
- Iraqi Hamas

**Ba’ath Party Loyalists**
- Naqshbandi Army
- SCJL
- MCI
- Free Iraqi Army

**Ba’ath Party Loyalists**
- Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order: 5,000+
- Islamic Army in Iraq: 10,400 (2007)
- SCJL: 10,000+
- MCIR: 75,000
- Free Iraqi Army: 2,500

**Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant:**
- 30,000–100,000 fighters

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NYT, Washington Post, Wikipedia, IISS
U.S. Command View of Progress with Iraqi Forces:
August 2016

Iraqi Security Forces

Individually, we’ve trained more than 13,500 members of the Iraqi security forces including over 4,000 Iraqi Army soldiers, 1,500 counter terrorism service soldiers, 6,000 Peshmerga, almost 1,000 Federal police and 300 border guards.

These Iraqi security forces have liberated almost a quarter of a million civilians in Iraq. We also stepped up our emphasis on police training and recruiting travel forces, adding 5,000 trained local police and over 20,000 tribal fighters enrolled.

The ISF proved that they can conduct complex and decisive operations. To seize the operationally important airfield of Qayyarah West, for example, the Iraqi army conducted an attack by the largest Iraqi armored force since 1990, although this time the M1 tanks and the coalition were on their side. The ISF also conducted the first opposed bridging operation by any Arab army since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, for which the Kurds provided important cooperation and support.

But the turning point in Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq was the liberation of Ramadi, just as it was a turning point in 2006 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Here, the Iraqi counterterrorism service and Iraqi army, with our support, won a hard-fought victory. In the process, they broke the back of enemy resistance in Anbar province by inflicting massive casualties, cutting off Fallujah, dealing a huge blow to enemy morale, and proving to themselves that they were better than Daesh.

Ramadi also taught us important lessons about how to train and equip the ISF for urban combat, which will pay dividends as we prepare for the battle of Mosul.

We’ve shifted away from counterinsurgency towards combined arms maneuver training, teaching the Iraqis how to integrate infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, aviation and other combat multipliers to achieve an overwhelming advantage at the right place and time on the battlefield.

These Iraqi security forces have liberated almost a quarter of a million civilians in Iraq. We also stepped up our emphasis on police training and recruiting travel forces, adding 5,000 trained local police and over 20,000 tribal fighters enrolled.
Iraq Control of Terrain Map: July 14, 2016

Liberating Desert Cities: Ramadi

Liberating Desert Cities: Falluja

Liberating Desert Cities: Mosul

The Nation-Building Nightmare in Iraq: July 2016

- Population 37 million
- People of concern rose from 1.4 million in 2013 to 4.7 million in 2015. May reach over 7 million after a successful campaign in Mosul.
- Number of IDPs rose to 4.4 million in 2015. Some 277,000 refugees outside Iraq
- 72% Urbanized and counting.
- Iraq's largely state-run economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides more than 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings
- Falling global oil prices resulted in declining export revenues: Iraq government and KRG effectively bankrupt.
- Budget deficit equal to 15.4% of GDP in 2015.
- Declining per capita income. $15,500 (2015 est.)
- 25-30% of population below poverty line.
- 16-23% unemployment
Conflict Dynamics in Syria
### Estimate of ISIS Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: As of 8/2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5,000[67]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,719[62]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,000[63]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>~600[64]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>600[65]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>85–600[66]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>514[67]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>440</td>
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<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>360[66]</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
<td>350[69]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>300[70]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>100–300[71]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>250–300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>250[72][73]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>200–250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>100–200[74]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>200[75][76]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>200[77]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>100–150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>100–150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>140[78]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>100–130[79]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>50–100[81]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>23[87][88][89]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of September 29, 2015, the CIA estimated that 30,000 foreign fighters had joined ISIS.[60] As of October 2015, 21% came from Europe, 50% from the Middle East or North Africa, and 29% from elsewhere.

List does not include nationals of Iraq and Syria (except for nationals of Iraqi Kurdistan).

Estimate of Pro-Assad Forces in Syria As of 8/2016

**Syrian government forces**
- Syrian Armed Forces
  - Syrian Arab Army
    - Republican Guard
  - Syrian Marines
  - 4th Armoured Division
  - Special Forces Command
    - Tiger Forces
    - Sagur al-Sahara
    - 14th Special Forces Division
    - 15th Special Forces Division
- Syrian Arab Air Force
- Syrian Arab Navy
- National Defence Force

**Allied armed groups:**
- Ba’ath Brigades
- As-Sa’ida
- Syrian Social Nationalist Party
- Amal Movement
- Arab Nationalist Guard
- Syrian Resistance
- Jaysh al-Muwahhiddeen
- Forces of Abu Ibrahim
- Sootom
- PFLP-GC
- Liwa Al-Quds
- Palestine Liberation Army
- Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas
- Liwa Fatemiyoun
- Liwa Zainebiyoun
- Faylak Wa’ad al-Saddiq
- Fatah al-Intifada
- Popular Mobilization Forces
  - Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada
  - Basij
  - Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
  - Kata’ib Hezbollah

**Peace Companies**
- DHKP-C
- Houthi
- Jaysh al-Wafa
- Liwa Dhu al-Figan
- Dar al-Sahel
- Dar al-Areq
- Al-Hosn
- Dar al-Watan
- al-Berri clan
- Tayy tribe militias
- al-Jilesh tribe militias
- Al-Shaitat tribe militias
- Far right volunteers
- Slavonic Corps (2013)

**Iran**
- Revolutionary Guards
  - Quds Force
  - Basij
- Army Ground Forces
  - 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade

**Hezbollah**

**Source:** Wikipedia, [Military activity of ISIL](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_activity_of_ISIL), and [Foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_activity_of_ISIL#Foreign_fighters_in_Iraq_and_Syria), Accessed 9.8.16
Syrian Forces: U.S. Command View of Progress
August -2016

Syrian Security Forces

Across the border, we have supported our various partnered forces in the North, the Northwest and Southeast Syria. While the forces on the Marea line have indeed held against Daesh advances, they’ve even made some progress south of the Turkish border.

The Syrian Democratic forces have made significant progress elsewhere. The SDF pushed the enemy out of the towns of (inaudible), Shaddadi, Hasakah and Tishreen and soon will finish the fight in the important city of Manbij, which will set the stage for the eventual attack to seize Raqqa and that will mark the beginning of the end for Daesh in Syria.

During these operations, coalition aircraft have conducted about 50,000 sorties against Daesh in the past year.
## Estimate of Arab Rebel Forces in Syria as of 8/2016

### Syrian opposition
- Southern Front
  - Abrar al-Sham
  - Jaysh al-Islam
  - al-Rahman Legion
  - Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union

- Sham Legion
- Syrian Turkmen Brigades
- Levant Front
- Authenticity and Development Front
- Army of Mujahideen
- Jaysh al-Nasr
- Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki
- Fastagim Kama Ummit
- Jaish al-Tafarik
- Northern Division
- 101st Infantry Division
- Mountain Hawks Brigade
- 13th Division
- 16th Division
- al-Moutasem Brigade
- Victory Brigades
- Jaish al-Izzah
- Ansar al-Sham
- 1st Infantry Brigade
- 1st Coastal Division

### New Syrian Army
- Jaysh Usad al-Sharo'a
- Criterion Brigades
- Jabhat Ansar al-Islam
- Liwa Ahrar Souriya
- Jaysh al-Sunna
- Central Division
- Atofeqat Brigades
- 93rd Regiment
- Firqat al Amr al Uwlaa Halab
- Martyr Baar Yastum Brigade
- Army of Conquerers

### Kurdish Revolutionary Brigade
- Division 99
- Brigade 93
- Brigade 51
- Hamza Division
- Al-Jabba al-Suriyya lil-Tafarik
- Al-Habib al-Mustafa Brigade
- Liwa Al-Adiyat
- Secret Tasks Brigade
- Deterring the Oppressors Brigades
- Homs Liberation Movement
- Jaysh al-Janoob
- Alwiyat al-Jonub
- Army of Free Tribes
- Al-Fawja al-Awal
- Al-Safwa Islamic Battalions
- Abina al-Sham

### Allied armed groups:
- Grey Wolves
- Muslim Brotherhood
- Muslim Brotherhood of Syria
- Shields of the Revolution Council
- Hamas (2012-2013)

### Joint operations rooms:
- Army of Conquest
- Unified Military Command of Eastern Ghouta
- Damascus Operations Room
- Fatah Halab
- Mare' Operations Room
- Hawar Kilis Operations Room
- Northern Homs Countryside Operations Room
- Jaish al-Haramoun
- Jaish Al-Fastaq
Estimate of Kurdish (Roja) and Allied Forces in Syria As of 8/2016
The Syrian Ethnic Nightmare – Pre 2011

Source: Gulf 2000,
https://www.google.com/search?q=Population+density+map+iraq+and+syria&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjE0bWy2LnnWiXosbAKHgl8CEkQAhIDECAo&biw=1307&bih=912&imgrc=pl5o89pRKnk_hM%3A%3Bpl5o89pRKnk_hM%3A%3BpR-qt8Hln4MuM%3A&imgrefc=pl5o89pRKnk_hM%3A

58
Syrian Population Density – Pre 2011

Source: STRATFOR, https://www.google.com/search?q=Population+density+map+syria&tbm=isch&imgil=q-lXqU6iLyW%253A%25252CpgypWCSYKZUDWM%25252Bhttps%2525253A%2525252FS%2525252FWwww.reddit.com%2525252FR%2525252FMapPorn%2525252Fcomments%2525252F4lui2q%2525252Foc_mapping_the_war_on_isis_in_syria_and_iraq%25252Fsource=iu&pf=m&fir=q-lXqU6iLyW%253A%25252CpgypWCSYKZUDWM%25252C%25252C_&usg=__1ZG6hcQNsywnHJ9S8H5dqOUrvI%3D&biw=1307&bih=912&ved=0ahUKEwjC-uuP2rnOAhXE4YKHQTgCkCyjclKw&ei=OJ2sV8L-DMTFmwGEwKIAQ#imgrc=q-lXqU6iLyW%253A.
Kurdish Expansion in Syria

Kobani has been the focal point of the U.S.-Kurdish battle with ISIS. American airstrikes have hit more than 1,000 targets there, almost half of all their strikes in Syria, helping the Kurds push back ISIS in the north.

Syrian Kurds and Tensions with Syrian Arabs

Amnesty International visited 14 towns and villages in the Kurdish controlled areas of northern Syria. In ten of these villages, they found the local population had either had their homes demolished or faced either forced displacement as a group or targeted displacement.

**Abuse:**
- Village demolished
- Forced displacement
- Targeted displacement

Villages were visited in July and August 2015

Source: Amnesty International; control area provided by Janes

Fighting in Syria: January-June, 2016

1 July 9: Opposition groups start anti-regime offensive in Southern Syria. Several opposition groups within the Free Syrian Army (FSA) affiliated Southern Front launched the Battle of ‘Idlib Idlib’ targeting pro-regime positions in Daraa Province. The statement follows increased pressure from prominent activists and religious officials calling for a renewal of military operations in response to recent gains by pro-regime forces in the Eastern and Western Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus.

2 July 12: Regime advances in Daraya. Pro-regime forces advanced into several districts of the opposition stronghold of Daraya in the Western Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus. Daraya has been under siege since 2012 and serves as a major symbol of opposition resistance to the regime.

3 July 9 – 12: Regime extends nationwide ‘regime of calms’ for Eid al-Fitr. The Syrian Arab Army extended a three-day nationwide ‘regime of calms’ that first began on July 6 in honor of Eid al Fitr. The two unilateral declarations extended the truce until July 15. Local activists nonetheless reported that clashes, shelling, and airstrikes continued across the country, particularly in Damascus and Aleppo City.

4 July 9: Regime forces seize key town near Damascus. Regime forces seized the town of Qamishli in the Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus following twelve days of clashes with NDF military group. Qamishli served as a waypoint for supplies entering Eastern Ghouta from Qamishlo Mountains.

5 July 10: IS detonates SVST in opposition headquarters in Duma. It detonated an SVST in a headquarters of Salah al-Deen and the town of Duma in the Eastern Qamishlo Mountains, killing at least six opposition fighters.

6 July 9 – 13: Pro-regime forces close main supply routes into Aleppo City. On July 9, pro-regime forces established full control over the Castello Road - the last major supply route into opposition-held districts of Aleppo City. Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliates Jabhat al-Nusra and other groups in the Jordan Al-Talaa Operations Room mounted several failed attempts to reopen the Castello Road but withdrew in the face of heavy air and artillery strikes. Meanwhile, the Fatal Halab Operations Room launched an offensive against regime positions in the Old City of Aleppo on July 11 but failed to secure any meaningful gains.

7 July 9 – 11: Syrian Democratic Forces clear 45% of Manbij. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have cleared up to one-quarter of Manbij in Northern Aleppo Province after advancing to the city center. Manbij served as a key transport hub between the Syrian-Turkish border and Raqqa City. The SDF completed the encirclement of Manbij on June 30.

8 July 9: IED allegedly kills senior PKK leader near Qamishlo. Unidentified militants detonated an IED near Qamishlo, in Rasakah Province, allegedly killing senior Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) commander Fehran Huseyin and eight of his bodyguards. The blast was claimed by a little-known opposition group called Fist of Tur Hanan. The PKK denied the claims as propaganda spread by Turkey.

9 July 11: ISIS claims downing of regime warplane near Deir ez-Zor City. ISIS claimed to shoot down a Syrian MiG-21 ‘Fishbed’ fighter jet near the Deir ez-Zor Military Airport. The plane had reportedly been returning to the Hama Military Airport after sorties against IS. On the same day, IS also claimed to down a regime Mi-8 ‘Hip’ helicopter in the Eastern Qamishlo Mountains near Damascus.

10 July 9 – 12: Islamic State shoots down Russian attack helicopter east of Palmyra. IS downed a Russian Mi-24 ‘Hind-E’ attack helicopter in the eastern outskirts of Palmyra, killing both pilots. Russia announced a “battle of revenge” in response to the downing. On July 12, Russian Air Forces sortied six Tu-22M3 Backfire strategic bombers from an unidentified airfield in Russia targeting alleged IS training camps and ammunition warehouses in the towns of Sukhna and Azaz east of Palmyra.

1 August 1 - 2: Opposition downs Russian helicopter in Idlib Province. An unidentified opposition group downed a Russian Mi-24 Hind transport helicopter near Baraghin in Idlib Province, killing all the military personnel on board in the smallest single incident for Russia since its direct intervention into the Syrian Civil War in September 2015. The next day, pro-regime helicopters dropped barrel bombs allegedly containing chlorine gas on Syrian villages, injuring at least thirty-three individuals. The Russian Ministry of Defense denied all claims of the use of chemical weapons by pro-regime forces.

2 July 31: ISW Deputy Special Envoy visits Damascus. ISW Deputy Special Envoy for Syria, J. D. Armour, held talks with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem in Damascus ahead of talks between the regime and opposition scheduled to be held in Astana on August 1.

3 August 1: Northern Homs Operations Room launches operation in support of Aleppo City. Jabhat Fatah al-Sham — the successor of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jund al-Aqsa and other opposition groups in the Northern Homs Operations Room launched an offensive centered “Today is Your Day, Aleppo!” in support of an ongoing opposition attack on regime-held Aleppo City. Opposition groups seized several checkpoints in Southern Homs Province.

4 July 31 - August 2: Opposition shatters regime deal in Homs Province. At least one unidentified opposition group seized control over a regime checkpoint in the village of Busayra in Homs Province, reportedly as part of a surprising attack on regime-held territories in the province.

5 July 21 - August 5: Jaish al-Fatah announces “Battle to Break the Siege of Aleppo City.” Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, and other members of the Astana Homs operations room announced the “Battle to Break the Siege of Aleppo City” in coordination with local factions in the Homs Homs Operations Room. Opposition groups seized a number of key regime positions in the southwestern outskirts of Aleppo City, seizing the opposition within two kilometers of lifting the siege of the city. Heavy clashes remain ongoing.

6 July 28: Russia announces four new humanitarian corridors in Aleppo City. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced the creation of four new humanitarian corridors for civilians to evacuate opposition-held districts of Aleppo City. Russia claimed that nearly two hundred civilians have departed Eastern Aleppo City since pro-regime forces completed the encirclement of the city on July 26.

7 July 28 - August 5: Syrian Democratic Forces claim rapid advances in Manbij. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces—a coalition of the Kurdish YPG and allied opposition groups—claimed to control over 90% of Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province on July 31 following rapid advances against ISIS. ISIS reportedly only holds the Manbij military base and parts of the eastern districts of the town.

8 August 2: Islamic State militants capture a Syrian on their behalf in Deir ez-Zor Province. ISIS reportedly liberated several villages in Deir ez-Zor Province in preparation for an offensive against US-backed pro-regime forces in Deir ez-Zor Province. Local sources reported continued clashes in the northern districts of the city as well as the outskirts of the Deir ez-Zor Military Airfield.

9 August 2: A government delivery of humanitarian aid to a rebel-held area. The World Food Program announced the delivery of 50,000 metric tons of humanitarian aid by cruise to the heavily besieged pro-government areas. The aid is intended to relieve the situation in rebel-held areas.

10 August 3: Opposition group announces split with U.S.-backed Syrian National Army. Green, pro-island rebel group Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, announced it would split with the U.S.-backed Syrian National Army, citing the group’s continued obstruction of its demands. The statement noted that Jabhat Fateh al-Sham will continue its campaign against the regime and ISIS in the Eastern Province. The Syrian National Army is a participant in the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Coalition Against Chemical Weapons” program.

Source: ISW, http://

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**Areas of Control**

- Pre-Regime Forces
- Jabhat Fatah al-Sham
- The Islamic State
- Opposition Forces
- Pro-Regime
- U.S. / Coalition
- Mixed Control

**Airstrikes**

- **Pro-Regime**
- **Opposition Forces**

*Control of territory as of 22 July 2016.*
1 August 3-5: Prison riot erupts in Suwayda City. Hundreds of prisoners reportedly rioted in the Suwayda Central Prison on August 3, seizing control over sections of the prison. Regime forces later recaptured the prison using live ammunition, killing at least eight detainees and wounding dozens of others. The prison riot came amidst street protests in Suwayda City and Shabba following the deaths of several civilians in incidents involving pro-regime militiamen. The regime cut internet services in Suwayda Province in response to the unrest.

2 August 8-10: Clashes intensify in Eastern Ghouta. Prominent Shi'ite group Jaysh al-Islam announced the operation 'Thawra al-Raqqa' on August 8 in order to counter recent advances by pro-regime forces near the al-Sultan Airbase in the Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces seized the majority of the nearby village of Hush al-Nuri following heavy clashes with opposition forces.

3 August 3: Israel allegedly strikes Hezbollah near Damascus. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) reportedly conducted an airstrike against a convoy of four tracks from Hezbollah near Ma'artha north of Damascus, Israel refused to comment on the alleged strike.

4 August 7-10: Pro-regime forces advance in Latakia Province. Pro-regime forces seized the town of Kinsabah in Northern Latakia Province following clashes with opposition forces including the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room. Intense clashes remain ongoing as opposition forces attempt to recapture the town.

5 August 5: Journalist reportedly escapes from Al-Qaeda in Latakia Province. U.S. journalist Lindsey Snell reportedly escaped from a prison run by Jabhat al-Sham, the successor of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra in Northern Latakia Province. Snell had allegedly been held by the group for at least ten days. Snell reportedly crossed the border into Hayat Province in Southern Turkey amidst conflicting reports that she had been either detained by authorities for an illegal border crossing or turned over to the U.S. in Incirlik Airbase.

6 August 6: Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room breaks the siege of Aleppo City. The Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room, a coalition that includes Jabhat al-Sham and the Fatah Halab Operations Room seized the Ramoush Artillery College and the neighboring Ramoush Industrial District on the southern outskirts of Aleppo City, lifting the siege on opposition-held districts of the city. The Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room subsequently released a statement highlighting its intention to seize the entirety of Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces have mounted a series of counterattacks against opposition forces after receiving reinforcements from across the country, including an elite unit from Lebanese Hezbollah, several thousand Iranian-backed Iraqi and Afghan Shi'a fighters from Iraq, and nearly two thousand Republican Guard soldiers from Homs Province in Southern Syria.

7 August 10: Russia announces daily three-hour ceasefire in Aleppo City. The Russian Defense Ministry announced the start of a daily three-hour ceasefire between the hours of 10:00am and 1:00pm in order to permit the delivery of humanitarian aid along the regime-held Castello Road in Northern Aleppo City. The announcement comes after calls from the UN for the implementation of a weekly forty-eight hour humanitarian ceasefire in the city.

8 August 8: Syrian Democratic Forces claim to control nearly all of Manbij. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) claimed to control over ninety percent of Manbij following clashes with the Islamic State. The SDF stated that the estimated several hundred IS militants remaining in the city are confined to the Manbij City Center. The fight for Manbij, which began in June 2016, has reportedly displaced at least 70,000 civilians while killing at least four hundred civilians and one-thousand combatants on both sides.

9 August 5: Denmark begins airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria. Denmark conducted its first airstrike against the Islamic State in Syria as part of Operation Inherent Resolve. Four F-16 fighter jets from the Royal Danish Air Force Conducted strikes in Al-Raqqa City, targeting command-and-control centers and weapons depots. Denmark has been conducting airstrikes against IS in Iraq since October 2014.

10 August 7: U.S.-backed New Syrian Army repels attack by Islamic State. The U.S.-backed New Syrian Army claimed to repel an attack by IS on their base near the Al-Tanf Border Crossing that included an SVBIED. The New Syrian Army is a participant in the U.S. Department of Defense 'train-and-equip' program for vetted opposition groups.
Zones of Control in Syria: 18 July 2016

Zones of Al Nusra or Jabhat Fateh al-Sham “the Front for the Conquest of the Levant.”

Activity in Syria:

18 July 2016

Source: WINEP, Jul 29, 2016, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/156388e63cfd3279
Allepo: Bombing Impact

Devastation: The Aleppo neighbourhood of Jabal Babro was largely flattened by a government bombing raid on February 18 this year.

Contrast: Tariq al-Bab was a densely populated area before it was targeted by a regime air strike on February 22.

Encirclement of Allepo: July 2016

Fighting for control in Aleppo, Syria

**July 28**
Pro-government forces take an area in the north and effectively encircle the opposition and cut much of the city off from supplies.

**Aug. 6**
An opposition force dominated by Islamist terrorist fighters lifted the blockade by retaking territory in the southwest.

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor, OpenStreetMap, ESA LARIS KARKLIS/THE WASHINGTON POST
Liberating Desert Cities: Raqqa

Source:
The Nation-Building Nightmare in Syria: July 2016

• Population down from 22-24 million to 17.1 million, median age 23.8
• Estimates of dead range from some 270,000 to 470,000
• UNHCR estimates in July 2016 that Syria had 4.8 million refugees out the country – roughly 22% of its prewar population -- and 8.7 million people – over half of its present population -- displaced away from their homes and jobs inside Syria.
• More than 12.2 million people are in need of humanitarian aid, including 5.6 million children. Lack of access to health care and scarcity of medicine have led to a catastrophic health situation. Poor food availability and quality and successive cuts in subsidies on bread have exacerbated nutritional deprivation. An estimated 25 percent of schools were not operational by 2014.
• No reliable summary of how badly the economy has suffered since 2011, but the CIA estimates that Syria’s GDP shrank from an already very low $97.5 billion in 2012 to $55.8 billion in 2014, and per capita income was only $5,100 in 2010 – before the fighting began. This drop, instead of growth, ranked Syria as 219th of the world’s nations.
• Unemployment reached 57.7% in 2014, and 82.5% of the population lived below the poverty line by then – putting Syria at a rank of 202nd, and at the near bottom of the world’s nations.
• Turkey hosts over 2.7 million registered Syrians. In Lebanon, more than a million registered Syrians live in over 1,700 communities and locations across the country, often sharing small basic lodgings with other refugee families in overcrowded conditions. In Jordan, over 600,000 men, women and children are currently trapped in exile. Iraq has also seen a growing number of Syrians arriving, hosting nearly 25,000, while in Egypt UNHCR
Status of Syrian Crisis: OCHA March 2016

- **13.5M** People in need of humanitarian assistance
- **4.8M** People who fled the country
- **6.6M** People internally displaced by violence

Data source: OCHA (as of Mar 2016).

Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe: June 2016

Air Strikes and the Russian Role in Syria
Russian sea and air assets move into Syria

The Russian Defense Ministry last month announced the deployment of ships from its Black Sea Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to carry out military drills. Included were:

1 Cruiser (Moskva)

1 Destroyer (Smetlivy)

2 Frigates (Pytlivy and Ladny)

Russia has deployed a variety of military aircraft to Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia, including:

4 Su-34 Fullback fighter-bombers

12 Su-24 Fencer attack aircraft

12 Su-25 Frogfoot close-air-support aircraft

Other aircraft at the airport in Latakia:

4 Su-30 Flanker multi-role fighters

12+ Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters

Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Pentagon

Russian Facilities in Syria: 9/2015

Maximum S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage

Putin ordered S-400 missiles to Syria after Turkish F-16 aircraft shot down a Russian Su-24 on November 24, 2015.

Nominal Maximum range of 428 kilometers

Estimates of maximum real world range differ: 250 to 400 kilometers

Syria: Russian airstrikes focus on other Rebel Forces: September 30 - October 30, 2015

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=30f86d1605&view=pt&g=map&qs=true&search=query&th=150c1d4650dc1ce8&siml=150c1d4650dc1ce8; 1.11.2015
High Confidence Locations of Russian and Coalition Air Strikes

Facts on the Ground
When Putin Announced Withdrawals

Russian aircraft flew more than 9,000 sorties
Destroyed 209 oil production and transfer facilities
Helped Syrian government troops to retake 400 settlements
Helped Damascus to regain control over more than 10,000 sq km (3,860 sq miles) of territory

Source: Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, quoted by Russian media

Air Campaign: New Patterns in Air Strikes
December 3 to February 23rd

Source:

UK, Russian and US-led strikes in Syria

US-led coalition air strikes
- UK
  - 3 Feb - 23 Feb 2016
  - 3 Dec 2015 - 2 Feb 2016
- Other coalition forces
  - 4 Feb - 23 Feb 2016
  - 30 Sept 2015 - 3 Feb 2016

Russian air & cruise missile strikes
- 26 Jan - 16 Feb 2016
- 30 Sep 2015 - 25 Jan 2016

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US military, UK MoD, French Defence Ministry. Locations may have multiple strikes
ISIS in Libya: The Key Players

Government of National Accord (GNA) faction –West:
• Misratan militia forces
• Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG)

House of Representatives faction –East \
• Libyan National Army
• Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
  • ISIS Wilayat Tarabulus (operating in Sirte)
  • ISIS Wilayat Barqa (operating in Benghazi)

Ansar al Sharia and related Islamist coalitions
• Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC; operating in Benghazi)
• Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB; operating from Ajdabiya)
• Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (MSCD)
Libya: Population Density

Libya: Tribal and Ethnic Mess

From January to October 2015, Libya’s crude oil production averaged slightly more than 400,000 barrels per day (b/d), significantly below the 1.65 million b/d that Libya produced in 2010.

Libya’s economy is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon production. Oil and natural gas accounted for nearly 96% of total government revenue and 98% of export revenue in 2012. Roughly 79% of Libya’s export revenue came from crude oil exports, which brought in about $4 billion per month (or about $48 billion total for the year) of net revenues in 2012.

Libya’s net oil export revenues totaled $9 billion in 2014 as a result of the drop in oil export volumes. During the 2011 civil war, the drop in oil and natural gas production led to an economic collapse, and real gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 62% for the year. Libya’s GDP growth rebounded in 2012, reflecting the relative stability of oil production, but it contracted by almost 14% in 2013 and by 24% in 2014.

Libya’s dry natural gas production grew substantially from 194 billion cubic feet (Bcf) in 2003 to 594 Bcf in 2010. Most other natural gas output in Libya is produced by the NOC and its Sirte Oil Company. As with oil, Libya’s natural gas production was almost entirely shut in for sustained periods in 2011. Dry natural gas production averaged 277 Bcf in 2011, more than a 50% drop from the previous year. Natural gas production soon recovered to an average of 431 Bcf in 2012 and stayed relatively unchanged in 2013 and 2014.

EIA: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=LBY
Libya: Key Forces

**Council of Deputies**
(Tobruk-based) (until 2016)[1][2]
- Libyan National Army[3][4]
- Zintani brigades[5]
- Warshefana[5]

Supported by:
- Egypt[6][7]
- United Arab Emirates[6]
- France[8][9][10]
- United States[11][12]
- United Kingdom[13]

**Government of National Accord**
(since 2016)
- Presidential Guard [21]
- Misrata Brigades [22]
- Sabratha Military Council/Sabratha Revolutionary Brigades [23]
- Petroleum Facilities Guard [24][25]
- Libyan Navy[26]
- Tuareg militias[27]
- Toubou militias[28]
- al-Bunyan al-Marsoos[29]

Supported by:
- United States[30]
- United Nations[30]

**Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries**
- Ansar al-Sharia
- Libya Shield 1
- February 17th Martyrs Brigade
- Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade

**Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna**
- Ansar al-Sharia (Derna)
- Abu Salim Martyrs

Supported by:
- United States[30]
- United Nations[30]

**Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant**
(since 2015)[34]
- Wilayat Barqa[35][36]
- Wilayat Tripolitania[37]
- Wilayat Fezzan[37]
ISIS Role in Libya: January 2015

Where the Islamic State Is Active in Libya

Episodes of violence by ISIS or its affiliates in 2015

ISIS controls more than 150 miles of coastline around Surt

Source: New York Times,
ISIS’s Campaign in Libya: January 4-February 19, 2016

1) ISIS began an offensive to take over the oil fields east of Sirte on January 4.

2) ISIS launched a spectacular attack on Misrata security forces on January 7, likely to set conditions to take over key transportation routes between western and central Libya.

3) Unidentified aircraft repeatedly struck ISIS positions near Sirte throughout January and February.

4) Suspected ISIS militants extended the oil fields offensive eastward on January 10.

5) ISIS seized the village of al Buerat with little opposition on January 31.

6) ISIS strengthened defenses around Sirte beginning on February 11.

7) U.S. aircraft struck a Tunisian ISIS leader near Sabratha on February 19.

ISIS is executing a sophisticated, multi-front campaign against Libya’s oil facilities, demonstrating the organization’s growing capability abroad. President Obama reportedly ruled out significant military intervention against the group as of February 18. The administration opted to continue intermittent strikes against ISIS leaders in Libya instead, such as the strike on an ISIS leader in western Libya on February 19. This surgical approach is unlikely to defeat the group, which maintains more than 5,000 fighters and is reinforced by leadership sent from Iraq and Syria. Libyan ground forces are also unlikely to expel ISIS from its areas of control. ISIS’s safe haven in Libya will allow it to survive even if it is defeated in Iraq and Syria. ISIS will use its Libyan base to exacerbate regional disorder and likely to attack Europe.

By Claire Coyne, Emily Estelle, and Harleen Gambhir
With support from Charles Gohn and Sarah Crockett

Islamist militia bloc backing the General National Congress (GNC), a legislative authority based in Tripoli, and a tribal-secularist militia bloc backing the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). The coalitions have each cooperated alternately with secular and religious groups when necessary to achieve their own interests.
ISIS in Libya – June 11-20, 2016

AEI, http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/Map1_1200.gif
ISIS in Libya – June 11-20, 2016

AEI, http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/Map1_1200.gif
ISIS in Libya – June 21-30, 2016

AEI, http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/Map1_1200.gif
ISIS in Libya – July 1-10

AEI, http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/Map1_1200.gif
ISIS in Libya – July 20-21

AEI, http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/Map1_1200.gif
ISIS in Libya – July 21 – August 1

AEI, http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/Map1_1200.gif
Fighting into Sirte on the Ground

[Map of Sirte showing locations such as IS HQ, Hospital, ‘Re-education’ centre, Public punishments, Residential area, and Crucifixions.]

https://www.google.com/search?q=Sirte,+Libya+satellite+photo&tbm=isch&imgil=QemGbl6Ly1hTVM%253A%253BW5tSk6OXivghZM%253Bhtp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.123rf.com%25252Fphoto_44241898_sirte-map-satellite-view-libya-isis.html&source=iu&pf=m&fir=QemGbl6Ly1hTVM%253A%253CW5tSk6OXivghZM%252C&usg=__oCzh0Ar0ggsINosK-2-dZfFb78%3D&biw=1368&bih=878&ved=0ahUKEwio7bDz6qrOAhlUBkxx4KHVPBDoStqAChQIw&ei=i9GkV-j7M4GmetOCs9gO#imgrc=TRvNIEFybOsEM%3A
The Nation-Building Challenge in Libya: July 2016

- Population 6.4 million; Median age 28
- Youth unemployment 48.7%; overall unemployment 30% (?)
- 79.7% urbanized
- GDP drops from $130.2B in 2013 to $92.6B in 2015
- Per capita income drops from $20,800 in 2013 to $14,600 in 2015
- 33% below poverty line in 2014.
- As of 2015, 434,869 IDPs, 471,653 people of concern.
- Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, struggled during 2015 as the country plunged into civil war and world oil prices dropped to seven-year lows.
- In early 2015, armed conflict between rival forces for control of the country’s largest oil terminals caused a decline in Libyan crude oil production, which never recovered to more than one-third of the average pre-Revolution highs of 1.6 million barrels per day.
- The Central Bank of Libya continued to pay government salaries to a majority of the Libyan workforce and to fund subsidies for fuel and food, resulting in an estimated budget deficit of about 49% of GDP.
- Libya’s economic transition away from QADHAFI’s notionally socialist model has completely stalled
- Libya’s leaders have hindered economic development by failing to use its financial resources to invest in national infrastructure. The country suffers from widespread power outages in its largest cities, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing, have all declined as the civil war has caused more people to become internally displaced, further straining local resources.
- Extremists affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attacked Libyan oilfields in the first half of 2015; ISIL has a presence in many cities across Libya including near oil infrastructure, threatening future government revenues from oil and gas.
BACK UP SLIDES
Wider Areas of ISIS (ISIL, Daesh, Islamic State) Control, Operation, and Affiliation
ISIS “Provinces”

Regional Strategic Partnerships and Alliances
Key Islamic Partners Affecting MENA Security

Bahrain (Base 5th fleet in the Gulf),

Egypt (Critical staging point for US air movements and access to the Suez Canal),

Jordan (ally deeply involved in the fight against ISIS),

Kuwait (provides air bases and land warfare facilities),

Lebanon (US aid plays a key role in its fight against extremism),

Morocco (key strategic position in North Africa and the entry to the Mediterranean),

Oman (ally and faces Iran across the straight of Hormuz),

Qatar (locate main U.S. airbase in the Gulf, and member of the coalition against ISIS),

Saudi Arabia (main partner in Gulf security, plays a critical role in the fight against terrorism,)

Turkey (which is a long-standing NATO ally)

UAE (key military partner to U.S. air and naval forces, is also fighting ISIS, provides bases US allies like Britain and France).
Conflicting Threat and Allied Interests
(Other nations too have vital security interests)

- Iran: Expanding regional influence, role in Syria and Iraq, Challenge to U.S.
- Russia: Ukraine, basing, regional influence, support of Assad, U.S. is destabilizing region, Putin’s desire to reassert Russia.
- Lebanon: Hezbollah, Shi’ite Alignments, ties to Iran, refugees.
- Iraq: Shiite-dominated government with deep sectarian and ethnic tensions, distrust of reliance on U.S.
- Kurds: Wide mix of factions and interests in Syria, Iraq, Turkey (Iran?), refugees
- Israel: Focus on Palestinians, Iran and nuclear, own security.
- Turkey: Erdogan’s ambitions, Kurdish issue(s), focus on Assad, higher tolerance of Islamist movements, own security, refugees.
- Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait: Focus on Assad in Syria matches focus on ISIS, support Sunni Arabs in Iraq, Iran in Gulf a primary threat, uncertain trust in U.S.
- Bahrain: Focus on tensions with own Shi’ites (Base 5th fleet in the Gulf)
- Egypt: Internal struggles, uncertain trust in U.S., Sinai unrest.
- Jordan: Major internal security concerns, border threats, uncertain trust in U.S., Palestinian issue, refugees.
- Europe: Ukraine, refugees, no common interest in region, focus on domestic needs, limit defense spending and military efforts.
Key Sectarian and Ethnic Divisions Shaping Regional Tensions and Vulnerability to Extremism
Key Divisions by Islamic Sect

Key Shi’ite Areas in the Middle East

Shi’ite Population density is very different from geographic
There are about three Shiites for every five Sunnis in the
Middle East.

Iran and Iraq have mixed populations, but Shi’ite-
dominated governments. All other Arab states and Turkey
have Sunni-led governments.

Iran is home to about eight million Sunnis who make up
about 11 percent of the population.

Most of the Shiites are in Iran, but they are also the
majority in countries like Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Iraq, and
are a significant political and military force in Lebanon and
Syria.

Iraq is Muslim (official) 99% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian 0.8%, Hindu <.1, Buddhist <.1, Jewish <.1,
folk religion <.1, unaffiliated .1, other <.1

Syria’s population is Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni
74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13% -- Alawites are not
Shi’ites and have very different beliefs), Christian (includes
Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian) 10% (includes Orthodox,
Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%, Jewish (few remaining
in Damascus and Aleppo)

Bahrain’s total population is Muslim 70.3%, Christian
14.5%, Hindu 9.8%, Buddhist 2.5%, Jewish 0.6%, folk
religion <.1, unaffiliated 1.9%, other 0.2% (2010 est.) The
native population is 60-70% Shi’ite.

Shiites are a significant minority in Saudi Arabia, making up 15% to 25% of residents. Conservative Wahhabi practices are followed by some 15% of Saudi Arab’s
population as well as most native Qataris. The majority of Saudis and other Gulf Sunnis practice less conservative forms of Islam.

Yemen is Muslim 99.1% (official; virtually all are citizens, an estimated 65% are Sunni and 35% are Shia), other 0.9% (includes Jewish, Baha’i, Hindu, and
Christian; many are refugees or temporary foreign residents) (2010 est.)

Turkey is some 99%, largely Sunni but with some scattered Shi’ites and other Islamic sects. Its ethnic structure is Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 18%, other minorities
7-12% (2008 est.).

Pakistan is Muslim (official) 96.4% (Sunni 85-90%, Shia 10-15%), other (includes Christian and Hindu) 3.6% (2010 est.). Afghanistan is Muslim 99.7% (Sunni 84.7
- 89.7%, Shia 10 - 15%), other 0.3% (2009 est.)
Iran mixes Azeri, Kurd, Lur, Baloch, Arab, Turkmen and Turkic tribes but the CIA does not estimate percentages.

Iraq is Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5%.

Syria is Arab 90.3%, Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7%.

Turkey is Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 18%, other minorities 7-12% (2008 est.).
### Key Iraqi Insurgent Groups: 7.2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Name</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Active In:</th>
<th>ISIS relationship:</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naqshbandia Order/J.R.T.N.</strong></td>
<td>BAATHIST</td>
<td>Diyala, Salahuddin</td>
<td>Fighting</td>
<td>Established in 2007, the group’s reputed leader was a high-ranking deputy in Saddam Hussein’s regime. The group is believed to have initially assisted ISIS in its push south from Mosul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1920 Revolution Brigades</strong></td>
<td>BAATHIST</td>
<td>Diyala, Anbar</td>
<td>Fighting in some areas</td>
<td>Formed by disaffected Iraqi Army officers who were left without jobs after the Americans dissolved the military in 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islamic Army of Iraq</strong></td>
<td>SALAFIST</td>
<td>Diyala, Salahuddin, Anbar</td>
<td>Periodic fighting</td>
<td>ISIS has targeted family members of the leadership of this group, which has long had a presence in Diyala and has been involved in past sectarian battles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mujahedeen Army</strong></td>
<td>SALAFIST</td>
<td>Diyala, Salahuddin, Anbar</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>A nationalist Islamist group that advocates overthrowing the Iraqi government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khata’ib al-Mustapha</strong></td>
<td>SALAFIST</td>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>Islamic militants who fight against the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army of Muhammad</strong></td>
<td>SALAFIST</td>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>Islamic militants who fight against the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khata’ib Tawrat al-Ashreen</strong></td>
<td>ANTI-GOVERNMENT SUNNI TRIBE</td>
<td>Diyala, Salahuddin</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>Sunni tribes opposed to the Iraqi government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunna</strong></td>
<td>ISLAMIST JIHADIST</td>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>Fighting</td>
<td>An Al Qaeda-affiliated group that has led a number of deadly attacks in Iraq over the years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Kurdish Issue in Iraq
The “Kurdish Problem:” April 7, 2015
The Kurdish Problem in Iraq After KRG Gains in fighting with ISIS in 2014-2015
Iraq: Kurdish Areas: 16.2.16

Source: http://dayan.org/file/18233/download?token=gERXD3ip
The Nation-Building Nightmare in Yemen: July 2016

- Population 27 million; Median age 19
- 40% of children underweight before war.
- Youth unemployment 37%; overall unemployment 27%
- GDP drops from $105B in 2013 to $75.5 in 2015
- Per capita income drops from $3,900 in 2013 to $2,700 in 2015
- 54% below poverty line in 2014.
- As of 2015, 2.5 million IDPs, 267,000 refugees, 2.8 million people of concern.
- Ongoing war has halted Yemen’s exports, pressured the currency’s exchange rate, accelerated inflation, severely limited food and fuel imports, and caused widespread damage to infrastructure. At least 82% of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance.
- Rebel Huthi groups have interfered with Ministry of Finance and Central Bank operations and diverted funds for their own use. Yemen’s Central Bank reserves, which stood at $5.2 billion prior to the conflict, currently stand at $1.5 billion.
- The Central Bank is exposed to approximately $7 billion in overdraft, more than three times the legal limit, directly linked to the Houthis withdrawing $116 million on a monthly basis.
- The private sector is hemorrhaging, with almost all businesses making substantial layoffs.
- The Port of Hudaydah, which handles 60% of Yemen’s commercial traffic, was damaged in August 2015 as a result of the conflict and is only operating at 50% capacity.
- Access to food and other critical commodities such as medical equipment is limited across the country due to security issues on the ground.
- The Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen’s neediest, is no longer operational and has not made any disbursements since late 2014.
ISIS Financing
After the US-led coalition stepped up air strikes in October 2015, aimed at halting the oil extraction in IS-held areas, reports suggest production has fallen. According to the Center for the Analysis of Terrorism this is not only due to the air strikes, but also because IS does not have the technology to maintain aging equipment, and oil wells are becoming depleted.
Foreign Volunteers

(No reliable estimates exist, and most are dated and only include ISIS. U.S. estimates as of September 2015 put total for ISIS at a nominal 30,000)
U.S. Official Estimate Foreign Fighters

FTFs continue to reach ISIL-controlled territory, although it remains impossible to accurately assess their number, origins, affiliations, or identities. These FTFs continue to travel undetected through the relatively small portion of the Turkey-Syria border still controlled by ISIL (about 98 km). Ongoing diplomatic efforts seek to work with Turkey to increase security of that border, and the U.S.-led coalition is active on a variety of fronts to prevent, detect, and deter such individuals from joining ISIL.

Along with interagency colleagues this quarter, DoS has signed two agreements to share information on known or suspected terrorists. DoS also worked with DHS this quarter to improve visa screening by implementing enhanced questionnaires on persons applying for visa-free travel through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program. The additional questions are intended to help U.S. security agencies in screening potential FTFs who may seek to exploit the Visa Waiver Program.

FTF Origins and Force Strength

As reported in Lead IG’s September 2015 OIR report, the House Committee on Homeland Security estimated that approximately 25,000 FTFs had traveled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIL, as of last September (about 5,000 of them Tunisian nationals). A somewhat more recent report, published in December by the New York-based consultancy The Soufan Group draws on data compiled by the UN and other sources to place the number of FTFs slightly higher, at between 27,000 and 31,000. The Soufan Group noted that the profile of the approximately 150 U.S. citizens who have successfully traveled to Iraq and Syria is diverse, with no predominant geographical region or ethnicity.

The Soufan Group also concluded the following:

- FTFs from Russia and Central Asia have increased an estimated 300% since June 2014
- Regionally, Saudi Arabia (2,500), Turkey (2,100), and Jordan (2,000) are estimated to have produced the most FTFs.
- Personal-recruitment pitches made by ISIL members or sympathizers are often just as compelling as social-media appeals, especially in extremist hotbeds, such as the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia and Arab-immigrant enclaves in France and Belgium. The French government estimated that, as of October, 1,700 FTFs had traveled from France to fight for ISIL.
- The western Balkans are increasingly serving as a transit hub for FTFs seeking to join ISIL in Iraq and Syria. In November, the New America Foundation released a report on 474 FTFs from 25 Western countries (defined as select countries in Europe and North America, as well as Australia and New Zealand). Of the 474 FTFs included in the study, 83 were U.S. citizens.
TOTAL:

21,632
Foreign Fighters are Negligible Part of Population Base: 5/2015

Note: Upper estimates used. Countries with fewer than 500 fighters not included
Source: ICSR, CIA World Factbook
Where Islamic State foreign fighters come from

Foreign fighters per 1 million people

- Kosovo
- Maldives
- Bosnia
- Saudi Arabia
- Morocco
- **Belgium** 42
- Austria
- Denmark
- France
- Finland
- Russia
- Netherlands
- Georgia
- Germany
- Kazakhstan
- Norway
- Australia
- Ireland
- Serbia
- Algeria
- Indonesia
- Malaysia
- Italy

Source: The Count of Emmejihad/Guy Van Vlierden

Source:: Washington Post, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-vulnerable-is-the-united-states-to-a-brussels-like-attack/2016/03/22/3a848992-f03e-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-vulnerable-is-the-united-states-to-a-brussels-like-attack/2016/03/22/3a848992-f03e-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html)
Yes, we have noticed a reduction in the flow of foreign fighters. We think at its heyday last year, that it was upward of 2,000 a month that were coming into Syria then moving into Iraq. We think that the flow is now down somewhere around between 200 and 500. I've seen different estimates on that.

That was prior to Manbij, so I don't know that we have a kind of a new estimate based on what we're seeing in the fight in Manbij. If we can get that area completely under control, I would anticipate that to go down, but we'll have to kind of re-look at those numbers when that happens.

We're also looking at the flow into and around both Syria and Iraq. So it's not just where they're coming in but where are they staying? Where are they being supported? How do they get from point A to point B? You know, we certainly don't see the long convoys of white trucks moving across the desert where fighters are moving in and out, and moving from Mosul to Raqqah unimpeded, as we saw a year and half ago in this fight.

Now, the facilitation -- the flow of foreign fighters is done -- a few guys hide in the back of truck, people walking across the desert. You don't see the massive amounts of -- of movement. It's certainly been whittled down in its size.

Where that's important tactically is if somebody is in Raqqah and they're trying to get reinforcements to Mosul, they can do it either through a slow -- through a slow method -- they were having to send foreign fighters or just fighters -- not just foreign fighters, but fighters. If you were trying to send fighters from Raqqah to Mosul, you would end up sending them through the Abu Kamal and Al Qaim area.

That's why that fight is important because that's going to help slow down the flow of foreign fighters to that one high-speed avenue of approach from Iraq to Syria and back. And so we're interdicting those lines as well.

You know, you're never going to seal a border. Certainly the border wasn't sealed prior to all of this and it's going to be tough to do that. We're training, you know, the border security forces to assist with that, at the same time we're training the Iraqi police.

Source: Colonel Christopher Garver, Operation Inherent Resolve Spokesman; Captain Jeff Davis, Director, Defense Press Office