The Conflicting Maps and Metrics of the Iraq-Syria Conflict

Anthony H. Cordesman

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Photo: ALBERTO PIZZOLI/AFP/Getty Images
Introduction

Metrics are never a substitute for narratives or detailed analysis. They can, however, reveal broad patterns in the course of war, and key uncertainties in the nature of how a war is being analyzed and reported. The Burke Chair at CSIS has prepared a selective comparison of the key metrics available on the “wars” in Iraq and Syria that help to illustrate both the patterns in the conflict and some of the key uncertainties -- or “fog of war” -- that shape efforts to portray and to understand it.

It is important to note that this analysis only provides only a small selection of the maps, graphs, and other metrics on the war, and relies on unclassified material. It also is so selective that it is important to note that the sources chosen only provide a picture of the more credible efforts address the problem of how to describe the uncertainties in the data.

The BBC – drawing largely on the work if HIS Janes – and the Institute for the Study of War (http://www.understandingwar.org/) are particularly outstanding examples of efforts to provide such analytic rigor and address the inevitable limits to summary metrics. The United States government, NATO, IHS Janes and Stratfor have also made important contributions to such mapping and graphics and the New York Times, and Washington Post have provided consistently good attempts to provide reporting in graphic and map form.

At the same time, even the limited selection of comparative graphics and metrics
presented in this report show just how different given pictures of key patterns in the
fighting can be and the sharp limits to the way it is being portrayed and analyzed.

Any effort to compare the different maps and graphics included in this report
highlights just how different given versions are --, sometimes when they are drawn
from the same original source.

In many cases, reviewing the narrative reporting at the time a given graphic was
issued indicates that it did not track with the detailed combat reporting in the article
presenting it, and that any supporting numbers were generally point estimates when
they should have been a range of figures that reflected serious uncertainties. One critical problem throughout the following survey – and one that
the Institute for the Study of War does avoid in the detailed maps on its own web site
-- is to show large blocs of color or “blobs” where there is only empty desert or only
token levels of force are present. Most of the fighting is concentrated in populated
areas that are very small and in securing the lines of communication between them.

It is also clear from the maps and graphics drawn from official U.S. sources that the
material that is declassified and/or drawn from official sources is often designed to
“spin” its contents to favor the source or support official policy. This is particularly true
in the case of reporting showing territory lost or gained and related measures in
square kilometers. This is a war for population centers and measuring gains and
gains in empty areas is virtually meaningless.

Furthermore, much of the official data released by the U.S. Department of Defense are rarely updated, and often lags months behind media and think tank reporting based on background and press briefings, and maps and charts used in press briefings are not included in the transcripts provided on DoD web sites.

There is a clear need to provide both better transparency and more accurate ways of reporting on the “war” against ISIS. This can only be done by providing better official reporting, mapping the actual nature of combat rather than showing large blobs of territory.

Better efforts are need to providing data and graphics that link the air and land battles, and that link combat to its impact on civilians and casualties and in ways that show the impact of current battles and developments. There has also been a virtual cutoff in efforts to summarize and map the patterns in “terrorist” or asymmetric attacks that are not related to major battles, although it is clear from the START and other data bases that these patterns of violence have a major impact in both Iraq and Syria.

This need for better transparency is equally clear from the unclassified material available on the Afghan conflict. See *The Afghan War: Reshaping American Strategy and Finding Ways to Win*[https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghan-war-reshaping-american-strategy-and-finding-ways-win].
Historical Background and Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions
Sykes-Picot 1916

Turkish Claims 1920

MENA: Degree of Colonization

Fig. 2: Degree of Colonization

- Full independence
- Full colonization or mandate status
- Nominal independence
- Major anti-colonial revolts
- Partial colonization or protectorate status

MENA: Levels of Post WWII Regime Change

MENA: Cold War Alignments

Population Density: Syria and Iraq

Source: Adapted from University of Texas, [www.lib.utexas.edu](http://www.lib.utexas.edu)
The Civil Side: Demographics

- Iraq grew 4.5 times between 1950 and 2016. Syria grew 4.9 times

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area (Sq. Km.)</th>
<th>Density (Persons Per Sq. Km.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3,495,000</td>
<td>183,630</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7,397,736</td>
<td>183,630</td>
<td>40.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>16,514,089</td>
<td>183,630</td>
<td>89.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>17,185,170</td>
<td>183,630</td>
<td>93.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>24,537,876</td>
<td>183,630</td>
<td>133.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>31,225,740</td>
<td>183,630</td>
<td>170.0</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area (Sq. Km.)</th>
<th>Density (Persons Per Sq. Km.)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5,163,443</td>
<td>437,367</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>11,117,804</td>
<td>437,367</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>23,128,328</td>
<td>437,367</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>38,146,025</td>
<td>437,367</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>47,656,612</td>
<td>437,367</td>
<td>109.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>76,519,418</td>
<td>437,367</td>
<td>175.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Sectarian Divisions in MENA

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/sunni-shiite-map-middle-east-iran-saudi-arabia.html?_r=0
Iraq and Syria Sunni Dominated Areas: 2017

The Broader “Kurdish Problem”

The Broader Kurdish Issue: 2017

Estimated number of Kurds (per country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>14.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>8.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18% of Turkish population
15% of Iraqi population
10% of Iranian population
9% of Syrian population

Source: CIA

KRG Zone of Control: Pre-ISIS

The Civil Side: Massive Demographic Pressure

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in Millions</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>105.5</td>
<td>137.6</td>
<td>184.7</td>
<td>252.5</td>
<td>310.4</td>
<td>376.9</td>
<td>420.1</td>
<td>520.7</td>
<td>581.3</td>
<td>635.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- MENA Growth in 1950-2010 was 4.5 times.
  - Egypt grew 4.5 times between 1950 and 2016.
  - Iraq grew 7.4 times
  - Libya grew 6.8 times
  - Syria grew 4.9 times
  - Yemen grew 5.7 times

- Projected MENA Growth in 2010-2015 is 59%.

http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
The Civil Side: Demographics by Country

Demographic Pressure in Gulf Countries: 1950-2050 (in Thousands)

Population (in Thousands)

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>1,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5,163</td>
<td>7,971</td>
<td>11,118</td>
<td>15,694</td>
<td>19,658</td>
<td>27,538</td>
<td>37,056</td>
<td>47,657</td>
<td>59,262</td>
<td>70,923</td>
<td>76,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>1,733</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>2,257</td>
<td>2,789</td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>3,482</td>
<td>3,751</td>
<td>3,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>2,697</td>
<td>3,287</td>
<td>3,981</td>
<td>4,601</td>
<td>5,147</td>
<td>5,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>1,959</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>2,574</td>
<td>2,548</td>
<td>2,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3,860</td>
<td>5,327</td>
<td>7,208</td>
<td>13,330</td>
<td>18,755</td>
<td>23,642</td>
<td>27,752</td>
<td>31,877</td>
<td>35,614</td>
<td>38,781</td>
<td>40,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>2,458</td>
<td>4,087</td>
<td>5,780</td>
<td>7,063</td>
<td>7,773</td>
<td>8,024</td>
<td>8,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>4,777</td>
<td>6,510</td>
<td>7,934</td>
<td>10,540</td>
<td>14,832</td>
<td>20,003</td>
<td>26,737</td>
<td>32,822</td>
<td>38,437</td>
<td>43,709</td>
<td>46,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>16,357</td>
<td>25,040</td>
<td>33,467</td>
<td>48,619</td>
<td>64,217</td>
<td>72,283</td>
<td>81,824</td>
<td>90,481</td>
<td>95,772</td>
<td>99,181</td>
<td>100,045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
The Civil Side: Youth Bulge

(Percentage of Native Population Below 25)

An extremely young population and massive numbers of young men and women desperate for careers, jobs, marriage, a home, and a family. The CIA estimates that an extraordinary 36.7% of Iraq's population is 0-14 years of age, and 19.6% is 15-24 years of age, and Iraq is nearly 70% urbanized. Its economy, politics, and social tensions will be under acute population pressure for at least another two decades.

The Civil Side: Governance

Failed governance leads to violence and extremism, or civil conflict. Authoritarianism and repression do not suppress them, simply bottle them up until they explode.

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
The Civil Side: Corruption

Corruption breeds anger and extremism: See Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan

Iraq and Syria: The Changing Zones of Influence and Control
Key Metrics for Suicide and Vehicle Bombings

Five countries that experienced the most suicide and vehicle bombings, 1970 – 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Suicide Bombings</th>
<th>Vehicle Bombings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>Percent of Global Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Five perpetrator groups responsible for most suicide and vehicle bombings, 1970 - 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
<th>Suicide Bombings</th>
<th>Vehicle Bombings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>Percent of Global Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Erin Miller and Michael Distler, Mass Casualty Explosives Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, START Background Report, University of Maryland, June 2017,
Terrorism Casualties: Iran, Iraq, Syria by Country: 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Iraq-Syria: ISIS Areas of Control: 9/2013 vs. 10/2017

DoD: Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of March 2015

Note: Our judgment as to which group has dominant influence over a particular city is based on a body of unclassified sources that we deem reliable.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August.

ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 20-25 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where they once could.

These areas translate into approximately 11,000-13,500 square kilometers (4,100-5,200 square miles). However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could be higher or lower depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

With the exception of its withdrawal from ‘Ayn al ‘Arab and Tall Hamis, ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged.

Source: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_Iraq/ReducedOperatingAreas0315.pdf
DoD: Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of April 2015

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August 2014. ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once could.

These areas translate into approximately 13,000 to 17,000 square kilometers (or 5,000 to 6,500 square miles).

However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could increase or decrease depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged, with its gains in As Suwayda’, Damascus Countryside, and Homs Provinces offset by losses in Halab and Al Hasakah Province.

BBC Map of ISIS Zones of Control, January 2015

ISIS Bombings and Assassinations in 2015

ISIS: January 2016

Iraq and Syria: ISIL's Areas of Influence, August 2014 Through April 2016

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL’s) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq and northern Syria have been pushed back since August 2014. Compared to its peak of territorial influence in Iraq and Syria in August 2014, ISIL probably can no longer operate openly in approximately 30 to 35 percent of populated areas, although the group is able to conduct attacks in many areas where it has ceded control. During April 2016, Iraqi forces captured territory from ISIL in Hit and west of Makhmur. In Syria, ISIL lost territory to Syrian regime-backed forces in central Homs Province and opposition forces in Dar’a Province. The map depicts ISIL’s net territorial losses, which translate into approximately 25,000 to 26,000 square kilometers, or about 45 percent of the territory it had dominated in Iraq as of August 2014. ISIL also has lost a net of 9,000 to 9,200 square kilometers, or about 20 percent of the territory it had dominated in Syria as of August 2014. ISIL probably has a presence and freedom of movement in much of the unpopulated areas depicted on the map, but we cannot determine if it is the dominant actor. Our estimates are subject to change because of the dynamic nature of the conflict.


Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Areas of Influence, August 2014 Through November 2016

The frontlines of the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in much of northern and central Iraq and northern Syria have been pushed back since August 2014. Compared to its peak territorial influence, ISIL probably can no longer operate openly in approximately 46 percent of populated areas it once controlled, although the group is able to conduct attacks in many areas it does not dominate. During November 2016, ISIL lost additional territory to Iraqi forces in Ninawa Governorate. In Syria, ISIL continued to lose territory in November to proregime, Turkish-assisted opposition, and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in Halab Province, mainly near Al Bab, and in Ar Raqqah Province.

The map depicts ISIL’s areas of influence, including its net territorial losses—32,500 to 34,500 square kilometers, or about 61 percent of the territory it had dominated in Iraq and 12,500 to 13,500 square kilometers, or about 28 percent of the territory it dominated in Syria—since August 2014. ISIL probably has a presence and freedom of movement in much of the unpopulated areas depicted on the map, but we cannot determine its level of influence in these areas. Our estimates are subject to change because of the dynamic nature of the conflict.

Source: OSD(PA), 12,2106
ISW Map of ISIS Zones of Control, August 19, 2016

CONTROL ZONE: An area where ISIS exerts physical/psychological pressure to assure that individuals/groups respond as directed.

ATTACK ZONE: An area where ISIS conducts offensive maneuvers.

SUPPORT ZONE: An area free of significant action against ISIS and which permits logistics and administrative support of ISIS’s forces.

BBC Map of ISIS Zones of Control, September 2016

‘Islamic State’ territory has dropped by 16% since Jan 2016

ISW Map of ISIS Zones of Control, October 17, 2016

ISIS Advances and Losses:
September 2013 to October 2016

Northern Iraq and Syria: October 26, 2016

Reports of additional Turkish troop and weaponry deployments along the Iraqi border to protect against crossing Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militias.

All eyes are on the operation that began on Oct. 16 to retake the largest city in Iraq still held by the Islamic State.

An estimated 2,000 Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite militias have redeployed from Syria to areas around Mosul and Hawija.

The Islamic State, while driven out of central Iraq, continues to target Shiite populations with suicide attacks in the Baghdad area.

The uneasy mix of forces battling the Islamic State

BBC Map of Zones of Control, October 31, 2016

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor (31 Oct 2016)
ISIS Areas of Control – December 2016

Syria: Northeast Zones of Control: April 2017

DoD Map of Iraq and Syria Zones of Control: May, 2017

January 2016

Syria: Key battles against ISIS still to be Fought: July 2017

Raqqa: July 24, 2017

Syria: Omran Estimate of Zones of control and Influence - I
August 15, 2017

Source: Information Unit at Omran Center, 15.8.17
iu@omrandirasat.org
ISIS: August 31, 2017

NYT/IHS Map of Iraq and Syria Zones of Control:
September 6, 2017

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/world/middleeast/islamic-state-reconstruction.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r=0
ISIS Territorial Losses: 5 January to October 9, 2017


Source: IHS Conflict Monitor
WP/IHS/ISW Map of Iraq and Syria Zones of Control: October 19, 2017

Iraq-Syria Zones of Control: October 2016


Source: IHS Conflict Monitor (18 October 2017)
ISIS Loss of Control in Iraq and Syria 2015-2017

How much territory IS has lost since January 2015

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor

Clock Tower
Roundabout, Raqqa,
February 20, 2014

BBC: Zones of Control, March 23, 2018

How much territory IS has lost since January 2015

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor

• Exact numbers of casualties from the conflict with IS are not available.

• The UN says at least 3,298 civilians were killed in acts of violence in Iraq in 2017, fewer than the 2016 total of 6,878 - although the true figure is likely to be higher as the organisation has been unable to verify some reports of casualties in the Mosul area.

• According to Iraq Body Count, the total number of civilian deaths in Iraq since 2014 stood at 67,376 up to the end of December 2017. The annual number of casualties has decreased slightly each year since 2014, from a high of 20,218 in that year to 13,187 last year.

• The UN no longer keeps track of casualty figures in Syria due to the inaccessibility of many areas and the conflicting reports from the various parties to the war there.

• The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based monitoring group, reported in December 2017 that it had documented the deaths of more than 346,600 people, including 103,490 civilians, since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad began March 2011. But it noted that the figure did not include 56,900 people who were missing and presumed dead.

Conflict Dynamics in Iraq

The initial maps in the section on Iraq -- in pages 62-67 -- again illustrate just how important it is to consider population density and sect and ethnicity, although they are based on uncertain data and long predate the impact of the fighting since 2011. They show very clearly that the fighting to date has occurred largely in sparsely populated areas and – unlike Syria – has had limited national impact.

The maps and data in pages 67-71 highlight the gains the Iraqi Kurds have made in non-Kurdish areas – a potential source of future tension and conflict. Other maps highlight the ethnic problems in Western Iraq, and particularly around Mosul.

The satellite images (pages 67-71) show the problems infighting in what are largely desert cities with serious internal barriers and empty surrounding areas that are very difficult to secure. These cities make natural fortresses for the use of civilian hostages, suicide attacks, booby-traps, and urban warfare.

At the same time, the data on Iraq forces -- pages 72-76 -- show the lasting impact of the U.S. defeat of Saddam’s forces in 2003 and just how fragmented, ethnic, and sectarian Iraq’s forces really are.

The charts on casualties (pages 77-79) are extremely uncertain, as is recognized by Iraq Body Count – which generated much of the data shown in the graphs. A range of estimates from different sources is also shown.

There is no way to credibly estimate the injured, refugee, IDP, and economic impact of the fighting – all of which has far more lasting impact than the number of dead. The final tables (pages 80-81) do, however, attempt to analyze the human cost of the war in general terms.
START Country Profile Data 2016 - Iraq

By a wide margin, the highest numbers of total attacks, deaths, and people injured took place in Iraq. In 2016 there were more than twice as many terrorist attacks in Iraq as the next highest-ranked country, Afghanistan.

- The average lethality of attacks in Iraq was 3.4 deaths per attack, 42% higher than the global average (2.4 deaths per attack).
- Perpetrator deaths in Iraq increased 79% between 2015 and 2016, comprising 25% of total deaths in Iraq, and accounting for more than one-third of the increase in total deaths in Iraq between 2015 and 2016.
- The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) remained the primary perpetrator of terrorist attacks in Iraq in 2016. For 66% of attacks in Iraq, source materials did not attribute responsibility to a particular perpetrator organization; however, ISIS was identified as the perpetrator in 94% of the remaining attacks for which a perpetrator organization was named. An additional 5% of attacks were carried out by Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq. The number of attacks ISIS carried out in Iraq increased from 775 in 2015 to 932 in 2016 (+23%).
- The total number of deaths due to terrorist attacks in Iraq increased 40% in 2016, due in large part to an increase in highly lethal attacks. Twelve of the 20 deadliest individual attacks in 2016 took place in Iraq, compared to two in 2015 and four in 2014. Each of these attacks resulted in more than 80 total deaths. The deadliest attack in Iraq in 2016 took place in July when an ISIS suicide attacker detonated explosives at a shopping center in the Karada neighborhood of Baghdad, killing at least 380 and wounding 200 others.
- In 2016, terrorism in Iraq continued to be marked by extremely deadly coordinated attacks. On 78 occasions during the year, there were more than 10 attacks on a single day within a particular country. Of these, more than two-thirds (71%) took place in Iraq. Likewise, there were 85 occasions in 2016 when more than 50 people were killed in terrorist attacks on one day in a particular country. More than half (55%) of these highly lethal days occurred in Iraq and involved up to 57 attacks on a single day.
- Extensive campaigns of non-lethal violence also took place in Iraq in 2016. For example, the leader of the Dawr District Council reported to the media that ISIS detonated explosives at more than 100 houses in the district over the course of a week in September. No casualties were reported, but dozens of families were forced to relocate.
START Country Profile Data 2016 – Iraq - II

- More than 2,400 attacks – the vast majority of all attacks in Iraq (86%) in 2016 – were classified as bombings/explosions. An additional 6% were armed assaults, 4% were kidnappings, 2% were facility attacks, and 2% were assassinations. Overall, 9% of all attacks were suicide attacks. These trends are generally very consistent with patterns of tactics in 2015, with the exception of declining numbers of assassinations (48 in 2016 compared to 73 in 2015), and increasing numbers of facility attacks (50 in 2016 compared to eight in 2015).

- The percentage of attacks involving people kidnapped or taken hostage in Iraq (5%) remained stable in 2016. Like in 2015 and 2014, the prevalence of attacks involving people kidnapped or taken hostage in Iraq was half that of the global percentage (10%) in 2016.

- However, following sharp increases in the total number of people kidnapped or held hostage in Iraq in 2013, 2014, and 2015, this number more than doubled in 2016, to include more than 8,500 people. Once again, this increase was largely due to a relatively small number of attacks that involved extremely high numbers of victims. Specifically, in 2014, there was one attack involving more than 200 people kidnapped or taken hostage, in 2015 there were two such attacks, and in 2016 there were six, including one attack in which 1,500 people were abducted, and one attack in which 3,000 people were abducted.

- In 2016 the most common types of targets in Iraq were private citizens and property (55%), businesses (15%), and police (7%). While the number of attacks overall in Iraq increased in 2016, the number of attacks against the following types of targets decreased, compared to 2015: police (-22%), non-diplomatic government (-13%), military (-51%), transportation (-34%), and educational institutions (-32%).

- The geographic distribution of terrorist attacks in Iraq shifted somewhat in 2016. Fewer attacks took place in Baghdad governorate (33%, compared to 41% in 2015). In contrast, more attacks took place in al Anbar governorate (22%, compared to 16% in 2015) and Nineveh governorate (9%, compared to 4% in 2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Force Ratio</th>
<th>Force Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Force Ratio</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Manpower Reserve Manpower</td>
<td>424,000</td>
<td>513,000</td>
<td>4:5</td>
<td>64,000-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>19:10</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>7:5</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIFVs</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>8:5</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCs</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>4:1</td>
<td>2,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed Artillery</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>9:10</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Propelled Artillery</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1:2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>1:5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Helicopters</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>6:5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major SAM Launchers</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraqi
Ethnic and
Sectarian
Divisions in late
2009

Sectarian Challenges
Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other

Ethnic Challenges
Iraq: Arab 75-82%, Kurdish 13-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%

Tribal Challenges
Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Iraq: Key Forces

Iraqi government

Iraqi Armed Forces

Iraqi Army, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Police
Iraqi Police Service National Police Supporting Forces Facilities Protection Service

Ba'athists

Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order; Fedayeen Saddam; General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries Al-Awda; General Command of the Armed Forces; Resistance and Liberation in Iraq; Popular Army; New Return; Patriotic Front; Political Media Organ of the Ba'ath; Party Popular Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq; Al-Abud Network

Shia Islamic militias

Mahdi Army; Abu Deraa's Mahdi Army faction; Badr Organization; Sheibani Network; Soldiers of Heaven; Special Groups (Iraq); Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq; Promised Day Brigade; Kata'ib Hezbollah

Sunni Islamic militias

Awakening groups, 1920 Revolution Brigade, Jaish al-Rashideen, Islamic Army in Iraq, Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance, Hamas of Iraq

Kurdish militias (PUK-Talibani/KDP-Barzani)

Peshmerga Kurdistan Workers' Party Kurdistan Freedom Falcons Party of Free Life of Kurdistan

Christian militias

Qaraqosh Protection Committee, Nineveh Plain Protection Units, Dwekh Nawsha, Syriac Military Council, Kataib Rouh, Allah Issa Ibn Miriam

Yazidi militias

Sinjar Alliance: Sinjar Resistance Units, Êzîdxan Protection Force, Êzîdxan Women's Units Insurgents

Nationalist Salafis

Mujahideen Army, Mujahideen Battalions of the Salafi Group of Iraq, Islamic Salafist Boy Scout Battalions, Mohammad’s Army

Salafi Jihadist

Key Iraqi Insurgent Groups: 7.2014

Iraq: Ten Years of Sunni Terrorist Attacks: 2004-2013

**2004-05** The group emerges as “Al Qaeda in Iraq” following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Its goal is to provoke a civil war.

**2006-07** The group’s February 2006 bombing of one of Iraq’s most revered Shiite shrines ignites sectarian violence across the country. After merging with several other Sunni insurgent groups, it changes its name to the Islamic State of Iraq.

**2008-10** ISIS claims responsibility for more than 200 attacks, many in densely populated areas around Baghdad.

**2011-12** The group is relatively quiet for most of 2011, but re-emerges after American troops withdraw from Iraq.

**2013** Seeing new opportunities for growth, ISIS enters Syria’s civil war and changes its name to reflect a new aim of establishing an Islamic religious state spanning Iraq and Syria. Its success in Syria bleeds over the border to Iraq.

Iraq 2011-2016
15,620 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>3,748</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>8,005</td>
<td>8,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>13,873</td>
<td>13,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: Islamic State, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
IEP Estimate of Iraq as of 2015

Source: Adapted from Institute for Economics and Peace. Global terrorism Index 2016,
https://www.google.com/search?q=institute+for+economics+and+peace+global+terrorism+index&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8, p. 23
Liberating Desert Cities: Ramadi

375,000 before war

55,000-100,000 left during attacks

Liberating Desert Cities:
Fallujah

276,000 in 2011

??? in 2015

Source:
The “Kurdish Problem:” April 7, 2015

The image part with relationship ID rId2 was not found in the file.
The Kurdish Problem in Iraq After KRG Gains in fighting with ISIS in 2014-2015

Source: https://www.google.com/search?q=Map+of+Kurdish+Zone+in+Iraq&tbm=isch&imgil=wyCRcvHsINaCaM%253A%253B3CrqUIiw100KM%253Bhttps%252F%252Fcommons.wikimedia.org%252Fwiki%252FAtlas_of_Iraqi_Kurdistan&source=iu&pf=m&fir=wyCRcvHsINaCaM%253A%252C3CrqUIiw100rKM%252C&_biw=1358&_bih=995&usg=__dgkzFcIYx195k1yOUQwnkW3AK4c%3D&ved=0CCkQyjdqFQoTCMbNyuptnsgCFYGMLaodWW0G8g&ei=vOILVsb_BYGZ0gT2pmQDw#imgrc=wyCRcvHsINaCaM%253A&usg=__dgkzFcIYx195k1yOUQwnkW3AK4c%3D
Iraq:
Kurdish Areas:
16.2.16

Source: http://dayan.org/file/18233/download?token=gERXD3ip
ISW
Estimate
As of
July 14, 2016

Battle for Mosul Area – January 20, 2016

Downtown Mosul – July 2016

Mosul: Displaced Persons – 18.10.16-24.1.2017

People fleeing the Mosul crisis

Source: International Organization for Migration. Note: Drops in numbers reflect families returning home and verification of data

Fighting in Mosul Area – October-December 2016

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor, territory assessed as credible on 8 Dec

ISW
Estimate of Zones of Control in Iraq: 6.17

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15cb15d4cccd637c, accessed 8.24.17
Iraq: Post Mosul Ethic and Sectarian Divisions: 2017

ISW: Iraq and Iran Compel Kurdish Withdrawal from Kirkuk

Source: ISW, 16.10.17; https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15f37260cdd22fd0

A collapse of the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga under joint pressure from Iraq and Iran shortly after the Kurdish independence referendum on September 25, 2017 empowers Iran and could destabilize northern Iraq rather than unify the county. Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew from disputed areas across northern Iraq on October 16th and 17th, 2017. A combined force of Iraqi Security Forces and Iranian proxies gathered south of Kirkuk starting on October 13th in order to compel Iraq Kurdistan to relinquish control of the oil-rich city. The combined ISF-proxy force moved in to secure the city as well as nearby military bases and oil-fields on October 16th after the Peshmerga abandoned their positions. Peshmerga forces also withdrew from areas in Ninewa, Salah al Din, and Diyala Provinces. The Iraqi Government and Iran likely signaled their intent to use military force to compel the Peshmerga withdrawals in those provinces, if necessary. The Kurdish retreat is a win for both the central Iraqi government and Iran, whose proxies have secured new key terrain and consolidated control over previously contested cities. Iran has downplayed the role of its proxies in order to legitimize them as instruments of the Iraqi state. Western media coverage and statements from US officials have assisted Iran with this deception by denying the role of Iran’s proxies in Kirkuk. Kurdish populations now under the control of the Iraqi government and Iran’s proxies may drive an insurgency, however. Civil unrest against Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies began in Kirkuk and Khanakir on October 18th. Prime minister Abadi reportedly ordered a handover of security in Kirkuk to local police, and early reports indicate Iraqi forces and Iran’s proxies may have drawn back from Khanakir in northern Diyala. It is unclear whether these withdrawals will pacify the Kurdish population.
Iraq:
Kurdish Areas:
16.2.16

Source: http://dayan.org/file/18233/download?token=gERXD3ip

Radically different estimates exist, largely for the period 2003-2011, ranging from 109,132 to 1,033,000, with 176,382 injuries, including 99,163 civilians to 250,000 civilians injured

Iraq Civilian Death Estimates: 2011-2016

Iraq – 251,000 Violent Deaths Including Combatants, 2003–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iraq Body Count 2003-2013</th>
<th>132,764</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq War Logs new 'Civilian' and comparable 'Host Nation' remaining 2004-2009 - central estimate</td>
<td>10,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq War Logs ‘Host Nation’ combatant 2004-2009 - central estimate</td>
<td>5,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq War Logs ‘Enemy’ (minus IBC overlaps) 2004-2009 - central estimate</td>
<td>20,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi combatants killed March-May 2003</td>
<td>4,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents killed June-December 2003</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents killed May 2004</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents &amp; Iraqi soldiers killed March 2009</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents &amp; Iraqi soldiers killed 2010-2013</td>
<td>3,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL IRAQI</strong></td>
<td><strong>179,240</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US &amp; Coalition military killed 2003–2013</td>
<td>4,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US &amp; Coalition foreign contractors killed 2003–2013</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>184,512</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This total refers to deaths reported by news media, Iraqi ministries or NGOs, with additional estimates of deaths documented in the Iraq War Logs released by WikiLeaks in October 2010. The table below provides a detailed breakdown of victim categories and sources used across different periods. Since their release IBC has been integrating civilian casualty information contained in the War Logs, which cover the period from 2004 through 2009. To date this has added 4652-4819 previously unrecorded civilian deaths to the IBC database, representing roughly one third of the number we estimate will ultimately be derived from the Logs.1 The War Logs also contain detailed records of combatant deaths during 2004-2009. Based on our earlier analysis we are able to estimate the total number of deaths in all categories that the Logs are likely to contain. In combination with other data for 2003 and 2010-2013, this has allowed IBC to provide a running total of violent deaths among all victim categories, civilian or combatant. As of 31 December 2013, this combination of data provides the following totals.

Source: Iraq Body Count, [https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/](https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/)

18,802 civilians killed and 36,245 wounded
(UN figures, January 2014 – October 2015)[97]
37,497 civilians killed
(Iraq body count figures, January 2014 – February 2016)[98]

Total deaths: 53,361–72,056
(as of February 2016)

Numbers since February 2015, include Peshmerga killed and wounded, and do not include ISF killed and wounded in the Al Anbar Governorate

The Nation-Building Nightmare in Iraq: October 2016

- Population 37 million (CIA)
- People of concern rose from 1.4 million in 2013 to 4.7 million in 2015. May reach over 7 million after a successful campaign in Mosul. (OCHA, UNHCR)
- 10.0 million in need in August 2016; 7.3 million targets for humanitarian assistance. (OCHA)
- Number of IDPs was at least 3.3 million in August 2016. Some 277,000 refugees outside Iraq. (OCHA)
- 72% urbanized and counting under hyperurbanized conditions with major slums, added ethnic and sectarian pressure, limited job growth, and sharply inadequate infrastructure and security. (CIA)
- Iraq's largely state-run economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides more than 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings. (CIA)
- Falling global oil prices resulted in declining export revenues: Iraq government and KRG effectively bankrupt.
- Budget deficit equal to 15.4% of GDP in 2015. (CIA)
- Declining per capita income. $15,500 (2015 est.) (CIA)
- 25-30% of population below poverty line. (CIA)
- 16-23% direct unemployment; no estimate for indirect/disguised (CIA)
The Battle for Mosul
Setting the Stage

Mosul
Approximate pre-Islamic State populations:
2 million

Tikrit
150,000

Ramadi
350,000

Fallujah
300,000

Battling the Islamic State in Iraq

Mosul
Fell to ISIS
June 10, 2014
Battle began
Oct. 16, 2016

Tikrit
Retaken
March 31, 2015

Ramadi
May 17, 2015
Dec. 27, 2015

Fallujah
Jan. 3, 2014
June 26, 2016

Liberating Desert Cities: Mosul

1.8-2.0 million before war

664,000 in 2015?

2,000-4,500 ISIS Fighters

Iraqi Forces, Pesh Merga, Sunni PMFs, Shi’ite PMFs?

Source:
UNHCR Estimate of Human Impact of Fight for Mosul: 15.10.2016

UNHCR Iraq Representative

"Isis [IS] know where the routes out of the city are and they will kill people escaping," Mr Geddo says.

“There is only a narrow route which is safe to travel through. If too many people try to use them there will be bottlenecks, which are always dangerous. They are easy to attack."

Mr Geddo hopes the Iraqi army will be successful in keeping people in their homes, but says such a plan will be difficult to enforce. For this reason, the UNHCR and its partners are preparing for the worst.

"If [the situation in the city] is arranged in a proper way - everything will be controlled by the Iraqi army - people will not be allowed to flee Mosul," he says.

"If the outflow is uncontrolled there will be chaos and desperation."

'A million people displaced'

An estimated 3.3 million people - equivalent to almost 10% of the population of Iraq - have been uprooted by fighting since the start of 2014. Those currently fleeing Mosul and its surrounding areas join about half-a-million people who fled the city in June 2014.

There are no firm figures on how many people remain in Mosul, but there were more than two million when IS took the city more than two years ago.

Mr Geddo estimates the population could now be “anywhere between 1.2 and 1.5m people”.

As a result, the UN believes up to one million people could be displaced by the forthcoming military action, and some 700,000 of those, they believe, will need shelter.

It warns it could be one of the largest man-made displacement crises of recent times.

With current funding levels, the UNHCR says it is able to provide accommodation for 20,000 families - or 120,000 people.

Other groups working alongside the agency estimate they can help a further 50,000 families.

Emergency camps

"We will have five new permanent camps up by the end of October and hope to provide 20 more emergency camps closer to the theatre of conflict," says Mr Geddo.

Due to protection concerns, the locations of these emergency camps cannot currently be revealed.
BBC Map of Mosul IDP Camps: 15.10.2016

NYT Map of Mosul IDP Camps: 18.10.2016

Mosul: NYT Map of Greater Mosul Area

WP: Burning Oilfield at Qayyarah

Mosul: Daesh Daily Map of Greater Mosul Area

Source: NYT, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/157d741f29f461c9, 18.10.16
Mosul: BBC Battle Map
October 17, 2016

An estimated 3,500 to 5,000 IS fighters are dug into Mosul, while tens of thousands of forces have massed to recapture Iraq’s 2nd city.
Mosul: ISW Battle Map
October 17, 2016

Source: Institute for Study of War,
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/157def84a5ea4e55, 20.10.16
Mosul: BBC Battle Map October 18, 2016


Source: ISW/Stratfor - gains and losses are approximate, as at 17 October 2016
Mosul: ISW Battle Map
October 17-19, 2016

Source: Institute for Study of War,
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/157def84a5ea4e55, 20.10.16
Mosul:
BBC Battle Map
October 19, 2016 - I

Source: BBC,
Mosul: BBC Battle Map
October 19, 2016 - II

Source: BBC,

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor, gains assessed as credible on 19 Oct
Mosul: WP Battle Map
October 19, 2016


Sources: IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor, maps4news.com/HERE
Mosul: BBC Map of ISIS Losses: October 18-20, 2016 –

Mosul: NYT Battle Map October 19-20, 2016

Source: Mosul Eye

Mosul: WP Battle Map October 20, 2016


Sources: IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor, maps4news.com/HERE
Mosul: BBC Battle Map October 20, 2016 -

Mosul: LiveLeak Battle Map October 20, 2016

Source: LiveUA ISIS Map, 20.10.16
Mosul: BBC Images October 20, 2016

Source: Stratfor, AllSource Analysis, Digital Globe

Artillery and airstrikes hit IS defences

Source: Stratfor, AllSource Analysis, Digital Globe
Mosul:
BBC Battle Map
October 21, 2016 -

Source: BBC,
23.10.16
Mosul: BBC Battle Map
October 24, 2016 -

Mosul: BBC Battle Map

October 31, 2016

Mosul: BBC Battle Map October 31, 2016

Mosul: IDPs 18.10.16-1.11.16

People fleeing the Mosul crisis

Source: International Organization for Migration. Note: Drop on 20 Oct due to families returning home after initial displacement

Mosul: South Front Battle Map October 17, 2016 - II
Mosul: Bashiqa Battle Map October 23, 2016

Source: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/157fc9ee2a952d0823.10.16
Mosul: Bashiqa Battle Map
October 23, 2016

Source: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/157fc9ee2a952d0823.10.16
Islamic State counter-attacks

Islamic State expanded its attacks on Monday against Iraqi army and Kurdish forces to relieve pressure on its militants confronting an offensive on Mosul, its last major urban stronghold. The militants have conducted a series of counter-attacks on far flung targets across Iraq since last week.

Source: Institute for the Study of War.
C. Inton, 24/10/2016
le_carabinier: Mosul Campaign Map October 26, 2016

Source: https://twitter.com/LCarabinier/status/791387911568646145.
Mosul: ISW Battle Map October 22-24, 2016

Source: Institute for Study of War, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/157f911b3f73869
ISW: ISIS Defense Map
October 26, 2016

Source: Institute for Study of War,
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15808786f26479ef
Mosul: BBC Battle Map October 10-28
Mosul: ISW Battle Map
October 29-31, 2016

Source: Institute for Study of War, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/1581e7853e2c5d72
Mosul: BBC Battle Map October 29-31, 2016- I
Mosul: BBC Battle Map
October 29-31, 2016 - II

Source: BBC
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37843431,
Mosul:
BBC Battle Map
October 31, 2016

Source: BBC
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37702442,
Mosul: Western Approaches in Detail

Source: BBC
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37702442,
Heavy fighting was reported from the neighborhood of Karama on Tuesday.
2 Iraqi forces first entered the city through the industrial Gogjali neighborhood.
3 Islamic State militants are attacking Iraqi security forces in Bazwaia, a village that was retaken on Monday.
4 Iraqi Shiite militias have begun an offensive from the Qayyarah military base to take Tal Afar.
5 If the Islamic State loses control of Tal Afar, its connection to Raqqa in Syria will be severed.
6 Turkish advisers and about 3,000 Turkish-backed forces are based out of Zaylkan.
Mosul: Washington Post Battle Map October 17-November 1, 2016

Sources: IHS Jane's Conflict Monitor, maps4news.com/HERE

Mosul: BBC Battle Map
November 2, 2016

Source: BBC
• Exact numbers of casualties from the conflict with IS are not available.

• The UN says at least 3,298 civilians were killed in acts of violence in Iraq in 2017, fewer than the 2016 total of 6,878 - although the true figure is likely to be higher as the organisation has been unable to verify some reports of casualties in the Mosul area.

• According to Iraq Body Count, the total number of civilian deaths in Iraq since 2014 stood at 67,376 up to the end of December 2017. The annual number of casualties has decreased slightly each year since 2014, from a high of 20,218 in that year to 13,187 last year.

• The UN no longer keeps track of casualty figures in Syria due to the inaccessibility of many areas and the conflicting reports from the various parties to the war there.

• The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based monitoring group, reported in December 2017 that it had documented the deaths of more than 346,600 people, including 103,490 civilians, since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad began March 2011. But it noted that the figure did not include 56,900 people who were missing and presumed dead.
Mosul: LiveUA Battle Map November 1, 2016

Updates from Mosul Map 11.02.2016

- Turkish tanks massing near Turkish-Iraqi border in Silopi
- Iraqi troops advance south toward Tall Kayyf
- IS militants attack along Erbil-Mosul road
- ISOF enter Mosul from the East
- PM Abadi visits recently liberated Shura, a stronghold of the original Al Qaeda in Iraq
- PMF intended target is Tal Afar
- PMF close in on Mosul-Raqqa road
- US-backed Iraqi units close in on Hammam al-Ali, site of IS executions
- PMF seize some 40 villages in Nineveh

Source: Adapted from LiveUA Map base, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15828791337d457c?projector=1
Syria: The Metrics of War
Conflict Dynamics in Syria

The maps and graphs in the section on conflict dynamics in Syria reinforce many of the points raised in earlier sections, but they also show that Syria presents far more current problems than Iraq.

Syria is far more fragmented at the popular and military levels than Iraq. The constant changes in the size and alignments of given factions make it impossible to develop a reliable list, but pages 83-92 reflect a nightmare in terms of divided groups supporting Assad, the Arab rebels, the Kurds, and ISIS. Far too much media and analytic reporting only shows the name of the major group, and does not reflect the reality that the most effective Arab rebel forces have ideologies and goals similar to ISIS and had ties to Al Qaida.

Similarly the Syrian Kurds – the most effective fighters against ISI and the faction closest tied to the U.S. – has many ties to the PKK and Iraqi Kurds and increasingly has confronted Turkish opposition to their efforts to expand their influence and create a broad enclave along the Syrian-Turkish border.

The maps of ethnic and sectarian zones in Syria along with the population density data in pages 93-101 show why the main fight for Syria has little to do with ISIS, and the role of other violent Islamist extremist groups like Al Nusra or Jabhat Fateh al Sham.

The nature and geography of the fight between the Russian-backed Assad regime and the Arab rebels, and the critical nature of the struggle for a major population center like Aleppo is shown in “blob” form in pages 101-109. Some 70-75% of Syria’s population is in the more heavily populated West. Once again, most maps fail to reflect the deep differences between Arab rebel forces. Page
108 does, however, provide one of the few map estimates of the scale of damage to buildings and infrastructure.

The “Kurdish issue” in Syria and the growing Turkish and Kurdish confrontation in northern Syria is illustrated in pages 110-124.

The casualty data for Syria in pages 125-128 is even more uncertain than the data for Iraq, but the totals are clearly far higher for the period from 2011 onwards. The vast majority are also clearly inflicted by the Assad regime. Similarly, the charts in pages 129-130 show just how serious the resulting short and long-term term humanitarian crisis have become –although no clear way exists for estimating recovery times and cost, and no clear plans exist to take such action.
Syria: Key Forces

- ISIS (30,000-60,000?)
- Assad Government
  - Regular Forces
    - Army, Air Force, Police, Security services, Air Force Intelligence
    - Local militias and “Alawite warlords”
- Iran
  - Volunteers, Al Quds Force, IRG, MOIS/Vevak
- Hezbollah
- Russia: Special Forces, Army, Air Force, Navy

- Arab Rebel: 40+ changing factions (BBC: “as many as 1,000 armed opposition groups in Syria, commanding an estimated 100,000 fighters”)
  - Islamist extremist: Jabhat al-Nusra changes to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Conquest of Syria Front) in early August, 2016
  - Uncertain (“Moderate): Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Revolutionaries Front, Soldiers of al-Aqsa, Knights of Justice Brigade, the Islamic Movement of the Free Men of the Levant, the Supporters of the Religion Front
- Kurdish Forces (YPG+)
- U.S.: Special Forces
- European?
- Saudi-UAE-Qatari-Kuwaiti?
Estimate of ISIS Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: As of 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Fighters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5,000[57]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,719[62]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,000[63]</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>~600[64]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>600[65]</td>
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<td>Iraqi Kurdistan</td>
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<td>514[67]</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>440</td>
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<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>India</td>
<td>23[87][88][89]</td>
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<td>Qatar</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>6–8[94]</td>
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<td>Maldives</td>
<td>7[90]</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3[95]</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2[96]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2[97]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2[98]</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1[99]</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As of September 29, 2015, the CIA estimated that 30,000 foreign fighters had joined ISIS.[60] As of October 2015, 21% came from Europe, 50% from the Middle East or North Africa, and 29% from elsewhere.

List does not include nationals of Iraq and Syria (except for nationals of Iraqi Kurdistan).
Estimate of Pro-Assad Forces in Syria As of 8/2016

Syrian government forces

- Syrian Armed Forces
  - Syrian Arab Army
  - Republican Guard
  - Syrian Marines
  - 4th Armoured Division
  - Special Forces Command

- Syrian Arab Air Force
- Syrian Arab Navy
- National Defence Force

Allied armed groups:

- Ba'ath Brigades
- As-Sajda
- Syrian Social Nationalist Party
- Amal Movement
- Arab Nationalist Guard
- Syrian Resistance
- Jaysh al-Muwahhidoun
- Forces of Abu Ibrahim
- Sootom
- PFLP-GC
- Liwa Al-Quds
- Palestine Liberation Army
- Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas
- Liwa Fatemiya
- Liwa Za'aneh
- Faylaj Wa'ad al-Sadiq
- Fatah al-Intifada
- Popular Mobilization Forces
  - Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada
  - Basij Organization
  - Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq
  - Kataeb Hezbollah

Peace Companies
- DHKP-C
- Houthis
- Jaysh al-Wafaa
- Liwa Dhu al-Figer
- Dareh al-Sahel
- Dareh al-Areen
- Al-Hosn
- Dareh al-Watan
- al-Berri clan
- Ta'y tribe militias
- al-Jitish tribe militias
- Al-Shaitat tribe militias
- Far right volunteers
- Slavonic Corps (2013)

Hezbollah

Iran

- Iranian Armed Forces
- Revolutionary Guards
  - Quds Force
  - Basij

Army Ground Forces
- 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade

Estimate of Pro-Assad Forces in Syria As of 9/2016

**Syrian government forces**
- Syrian Armed Forces
  - Syrian Arab Army
  - Republican Guard
  - Syrian Marines
  - 4th Armoured Division
  - Special Forces Command
    - Tiger Forces
    - Suqur al-Sahara
    - 14th Special Forces Division
    - 15th Special Forces Division
  - Syrian Arab Air Force
  - Syrian Arab Navy
  - National Defence Force

**Allied armed groups:**
- Bar'ath Brigades
- al-Malikiya
- Syrian Social Nationalist Party
- Amal Movement
- Arab Nationalist Guard
- Syrian Resistance
- Jaysh al-Muwahhidin
- Forces of Abu Ibrahim
- Soooro
- PFLP-GC
- Liwa Al-Quds
- Palestine Liberation Army
- Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas
- Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham
- Liwa Fatemiyoun
- Liwa Zaimiyoun
- Faylaq Waad al-Sadiq

**Popular Mobilization Forces**
- Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada
- Badr Organization
- Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq
- Kata'a'ib Hezbollah
- Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba
- Peace Companies

**DHKP-C**
- Houthis
- Jaysh al-Watlas
- Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar
- Dareh al-Sahel
- Dareh al-Areen
- al-Haqq
- Dareh al-Watlan
- al-Berri clan
- Tayy tribe militias
- al-Jihesh tribe militias
- al-Shatail tribe militias
- Far right volunteers
- Slavonic Corps (2013)

**Hezbollah**
- Iran

**Armament support:**
- Russia
- Iran
- North Korea
- Iraq
- Belarus

**Russian Armed Forces**
- Russian Armed Forces
  - Russian Air Force
  - Russian Navy
  - Russian General Staff
    - Special Operations Command
      - GRU
      - Spetsnaz GRU

**Others:**
- Clan
- Tribes

**Iranian Armed Forces**
- Revolutionary Guards
  - Quds Force
  - Basij
- Army Ground Forces
  - 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade

**Source:** Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_armed_groups_in_the_Syrian_Civil_War, Accessed 9.30.16
Estimate of Arab Rebel Forces in Syria As of 9/2016

Free Syrian Army-affiliated rebel groups
- Southern Front
- al-Rahman Legion
- Syrian Turkmen Brigades
- Sultan Murad Division
- Levant Front[93]
- Authenticity and Development Front
  - Free Idlib Army[94]
    - 13th Division[92]
    - Mountain Hawks Brigade[62][64]
    - Northern Division[65][66]
  - Army of Mujahedeen
    - Jaysh al-Nasr[97]
    - Jaish al-Tahrir
    - 101st Infantry Division
    - 19th Division[61][65](until 2016)
    - al-Moutasem Brigade[92][72]
    - Hamza Division[71]
    - Northern Thunder Special Forces Brigade[72][73]
    - First Division of Aleppo[74]
  - Victory Brigades
    - Jaish al-Izzah[75]
    - 1st Infantry Division
    - 1st Coastal Division
    - Ahmad al-Abdo Martyrs Forces
    - Liberation Brigade faction[76]
    - New Syrian Army
    - Ghosts of the Desert[77]
    - Jaysh Usud al-Shariyaa
    - Liwa Ahrar Shariyaa
    - Fastaqim Kama Umirt
- Central Division[78]
- Ahrar al-Sham Brigade[79]
- 93rd Regiment[80]
- Firqat al Amin al Uweis Haalab[81]
- Martyr Badr Yastunun Brigade[82]
- Army of Conquerors[83][84]
- Kurdish Revolutionary Brigade[85][86]
- Ahrar al-Hasaka[87]
- Thuwar al-Jazira al-Suriyya[88]
- Saraya al-Qadisiyya[89]
- Division 90[90]
- Brigade 93[91]
- Brigade 91[90]
- al-Jabha al-Suriyya al-Tahrir[93]
- al-Habib al-Mustata Brigade[94][95]
- Liwa al-Adiyar[96][97]
- Secret Tasks Brigade[98]
- Deterring the Oppressors Brigades[98][100][101]
- Homs Liberation Movement[102][103]
- Ahrar al-Shariyya[104][105]
- Jaysh al-Janoub[106]
- Alwiya al-Junoub[107][108]
- Army of Free Tribes[108][110]
- al-Fajr al-Awal[111]

Armament support:
- Qatar[112][113]
- Saudi Arabia[114][115]
- Turkey
- United States[114][115]
- France[116]
- Libya (until 2014)[117]

Current and former al-Qaeda affiliates
- Jabhat Fateh al-Sham
  - Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar
  - Khurasan group
  - Muntasar Bileh Brigade[118]
  - Jaish Muhammad[119]
  - Katbat al Tawhid wal Jihadi[120]
  - Jabhat Ansar al-Din[121]
  - Harakat Sham al-Islam
  - Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya
  - Ajnad al-Kavkaz[122][123]
  - Junud al-Makhd[124]
  - Ghuraba al-Sham[125]
  - Fajr al-Ummah[150]
  - Fatah al-Islam[125][151][152]
  - Caucasus Empire[150]
  - Muhajirin wa-Ansar Alliance[154]
  - Junud al-Aqsa
  - Liwa al-Umma
  - Liwa al-Haqq
  - Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan[155]
  - Turkistan Islamic Party[156]
  - Imam Bukhari Jamaat
  - Ansar al-Islam splinter faction[157]

Non-FSA-affiliated rebel groups
- Ahrar al-Sham
  - Jaysh al-Islam
  - Sham Legion[112]
  - Harakat Nou al-Din al-Zenki
  - Ansar al-Sham
  - Jaish Ansar al-Islam
  - Jaysh al-Sunnah
  - Ashida’s Mujahideen Brigade[113]
  - Suqor al-Sham Brigade
  - Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union[114]
  - Criterion Brigades
    - al-Salwa Islamic Battalions[115][116][117][118][119][120]
    - al-Fatah Brigade[117]
    - Abna al-Sham[121][122]
    - Saraya al-Mujahideen[124]
    - al-Murasalat Brigade[125]

Allied armed groups:
- Grey Wolves[126][127][128]
- Muslim Brotherhood
- Muslim Brotherhood of Syria[129]
  - Shields of the Revolution Council
  - Hama[130][131][132]: (2012-2013)
  - Free Syrian Army[132][133][134]

Joint operations rooms[135]
- Army of Conquest
- Fatah Halab[136][137]
- Northern Homs Countryside Operations Room[138][139]
- Jaish al-Fustat[140]
- Damascus Operations Room[137]

Military councils:
- Syrian Revolutionary Command Council

**Source**: [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_armed_groups_in_the_Syrian_Civil_War), Accessed 9.30.16
Estimate of Arab Rebel Forces in Syria as of 8/2016

### Syrian opposition

- Southern Front
  - Ahrar al-Sham
  - Jaysh al-Islam
  - al-Rahman Legion
  - Ahrad al-Sham Islamic Union
- Sham Legion
- Syrian Turkmen Brigades
- Levant Front
- Authenticity and Development Front
- Army of Mujahdeen
- Jaysh al-Nasr
  - Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki
  - Fastagim Kama Ummat
- Jaish al-Tabrir
- Northern Division
- 101st Infantry Division
- Mountain Hawks Brigade
- 13th Division
- 16th Division
- al-Moutsanem Brigade
- Victory Brigades
- Jaish al-Izzah
- Ansar al-Sham
- 1st Infantry Brigade
- 1st Coastal Division

### Allied armed groups:

- Ahrar al-Sharqiya
- al-Murabitun Brigade
- al-Fatah Brigade
- Free Alawite Brigade

- Muslim Brotherhood
  - Muslim Brotherhood of Syria
  - Shields of the Revolution Council
  - Hamas (2012-2013)

### Joint operations rooms:

- Army of Conquest
- Unified Military Command of Eastern Ghouta
- Damascus Operations Room
- Fatah Halab
- Mare' Operations Room
- Hawar Kilis Operations Room
- Northern Homs Countryside Operations Room
- Jaish al-Haramun
- Jaish Al-Fusta

---

**Estimate of Syrian Democratic and Rojava Forces in Syria As of 9/2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free Syrian Army-affiliated rebel groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Rahman Legion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syrian Turkmen Brigades</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Sultan Murad Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Levant Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Authenticity and Development Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Free Idlib Army</td>
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<td>• 13th Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mountain Hawks Brigade</td>
</tr>
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<td>• Northern Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Army of Mujahedeen</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Jaysh al-Naqd</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Jaish al-Tahir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 101st Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 18th Division (until 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• al-Moutasem Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hamza Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Northern Thunder Special Forces Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>• First Division of Aleppo</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Victory Brigades</td>
</tr>
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<td>• Jaish al-Izzah</td>
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<td>• 1st Infantry Brigade</td>
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<td>• 1st Coastal Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ahmad al-Abdo Martyrs Forces</td>
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<td>• Liberation Brigade faction</td>
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<td>• New Syrian Army</td>
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<td>• Ghosts of the Desert</td>
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<td>• Jaysh Usud al-Sharqiyya</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Liwa Ahrar Suriyya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fastaqim Kama Umiri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Central Division                        |
| • Al-Norcat Brigades                    |
| • 83rd Regiment                         |
| • Firqat al Amiyun al Uwais Halab       |
| • Martyr Badr Yastunur Brigade           |
| • Army of Conquerors                    |
| • Kurdish Revolutionary Brigade         |
| • Ajnad al-Hassak                        |
| • Thwarr al-Jazira al-Suriya            |
| • Saraya al-Qadiisyya                   |
| • Division 90                          |
| • Brigade 93                           |
| • Brigade 51                            |
| • al-Jabha al-Suriyya il-Tahrin         |
| • al-Habbi al-Mustata Brigade           |
| • Liwa al-Adyay                         |
| • Secret Tasks Brigade                  |
| • Deterring the Oppressors Brigades     |
| • Homs Liberation Movement             |
| • Ahmar al-Sharqiyya                   |
| • Jaysh al-Janoub                      |
| • Alwiyaat al-Janub                    |
| • Army of Free Tribes                   |
| • al-Fajil al-Awall                    |

**Armanent support:**
- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- Turkey
- United States
- France
- Libya (until 2014)

**Joint operations rooms:**
- Army of Conquest
- Fatah Halab
- Northern Homs Countryside Operations Room
- Jaish al-Fustan
- Damascus Operations Room

**Military councils:**
- Syrian Revolutionary Command Council

**Current and former al-Qaeda affiliates**
- Jabhat Fateh al-Sham
- Jaish al-Mujahideen wal-Ansar
- Khorasan group
- Muntasar Bilal Brigade
- Jaish Muhammad
- Katibat al Towhid wal Jihadd
- Jaish Anser al-Din
- Harakat Sham al-Islam
- Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya
- Aqnad al-Kavakz
- Junud al-Makhd
- Ghuraba al-Sham
- Fajr al-Ummah
- Caucasus Empire
- Muhajirin wa-Ansar Alliance
- Junud al-Aqsa
- Liwa al-Umma
- Liwa al-Haqiq
- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
- Turkistan Islamic Party
- Imam Bukhari Jamaat
- Ansar al-Islam splinter faction

**Allied armed groups:**
- Grey Wolves
- Muslim Brotherhood
- Muslim Brotherhood of Syria
- Shields of the Revolution Council
- Syrian Free Army 2012
- Syrian Army

**Alleged support:**
- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- Turkey

Estimate of Kurdish (Roja) and Allied Forces in Syria As of 8/2016

Syrian Democratic Forces

- People's Protection Units (YPG)
- Women's Protection Units (YPJ)
- Shammar tribe militias
- Al-Sapaid tribe militias
- Euphrates Volcano
- Army of Revolutionaries
  - Northern Sun Battalion
  - Jabbat al-Akrad
- Seliq Brigade
- Liwa Thayyar al-Bagga
- Jaish al-Salam
- Furat Jarabuls
- New Syrian Forces
- Liwa 99 Musas
- Brigade Groups of Al-Jazira
- Al-Shaitat tribe militias
- Syriac Military Council (MFS)
  - Betanahir Women Protection Forces
- Manbij Turkmens Brigade

Other military units

- Self-Defence Forces (HXP)
- Civilian Defense Force (HPC)
- Anti Terror Units (YAT)
- Autonomous Protection Force

Allied armed groups:

- Al-Nukhbat Brigade
- Kurdistan Workers' Party
  - People's Defence Forces
  - Free Women's Units
- International Freedom Battalion
  - MLKP
  - TKP/ML TIKKO
  - United Freedom Forces
- TKP-Kivrik
- Yekiti Party
- Al-Bagdada
- Sharabiyya tribe militias
- Zubair tribe militias
- Sinjar Resistance Units

Military councils:

- Peshmerga
- Manbij Military Council

Estimate of Syrian Kurdish and Affiliated Arab Forces as of 9/2016

Military councils:
- Manbij Military Council
- al-Bab Military Council
- Jarabulus Military Council

Armament support:
- Iraqi Kurdistan
- Kurdistan Democratic Party
- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
- France
- United States
- Russia
- Syria

Other military units:
- Anti-Terror Units (YAT)
- Autonomous Protection Force

Allied armed groups:
- Kurdistan Workers' Party
- People's Defence Forces
- Free Women's Units
- International Freedom Battalion
- MLKP
- TKP/ML TIKKO
- United Freedom Forces
- MLSBP-DC
- Revolutionary Communist Party
- Türkevi Devrim Partisi
- Sosyal İstinye
- Proteteryasın Devrimi Kuruluş Örgütü
- Reconstrucción Comunista
- TKEPL
- Devrim Mermi Karargahı
- Bob Crow Brigade
- RUIS
- TKP-Kivircik
- Yekîti Party
- Sinjar Resistance Units

The Syrian Ethnic Nightmare – Pre 2011

Source: Gulf 2000,
https://www.google.com/search?q=Population+density+map+Iraq+and+syria&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjE0bWy2LnOAhX8BQMKHVR-01Y0Qписание=0ahUKEwjE0bWy2LnOAhX8BQMKHVR-01Y0Q
Syrian Population Density – Pre 2011

Source: STRATFOR, https://www.google.com/search?q=Population+density+map+syria&tbm=isch&imgil=q-lXqYU6ivLyiM%253A%253BpgypWCSYKZUDWM%253Bhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.reddit.com%25252Fcomments%25252F4lui2q%25252Foc_mapping_the_war_on_isis_in_syria_and_iraq%25252F&source=iu&pf=m&fir=q-lXqYU6ivLyiM%253A%253BpgypWCSYKZUDWM%253B&usg=__1ZG6hcQNsywnHJ9S8H5dqUrvl%3D&biw=1307&bih=912&ved=0ahUKEwjC--uuP2rnAhXE4iYKHTQgCxAQFgeQICoA&ei=OJ2sV8L-DMTFwwGEwK_IAQ#imgrc=q-lXqYU6ivLyiM%253A.
Syrian Road System
ISW Estimate of Zones of Control
August 5, 2016

Source: ISW: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1567acf901f4168a.
Zones of Control in Syria: 18 July 2016

Zones of Al Nusra or Jabhat Fateh al-Sham “the Front for the Conquest of the Levant.”

Activity in Syria:

18 July 2016

Source: WINEP, July 29, 2016, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/156388e63cfd3279
Zones of Al Nusra or Jabhat Fateh al-Sham "the Front for the Conquest of the Levant."

Activity in Syria: 18 July 2016

Source: WINEP, July 29, 2016, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/156388e63cfd3279

12-18 August 2016
ISW Estimate as of October 11, 2016

12-18 August 2016

ISW Estimate as of October 11, 2016

In late August, 10,000 displaced persons were evacuated from the besieged town of Douma, Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus Province to Idlib Province as part of a evacuation agreement agreed past two months.


Fighting for Aleppo: July 2016 -- in City
Alepomo: August 2016

Province has 4,868,000 (2011 Est.), almost 23% of the total population of Syria.

City had 2,500,000+

July 28
Pro-government forces take an area in the north and effectively encircle the opposition and cut much of the city off from supplies.

Aug. 6
An opposition force dominated by Islamist terrorist fighters lifted the blockade by retaking territory in the southwest.


Sources: Institute for the Study of War, IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor, OpenStreetMap, ESA LARIS KARKLIS/THE WASHINGTON POST
Syria: WINEP Estimate of Southern Front: October 2016

Aleppo: August 2016

Battle of Aleppo
August 6, 2016

Map Legend
- Insurgent control
- Contested area
- Loyalist attacks
- Insurgent attacks

https://twitter.com/PetoLucem/status/758628977892290560/photo/1?ref_src=twsr%5Etwf
275,000 people in rebel-held eastern Aleppo completely cut off from food, water and medicine, and has severely limited aid deliveries to 1.5 million people in government-held western Aleppo.
Aleppo: Bombing Impact

Devastation: The Aleppo neighbourhood of Jabal Babro was largely flattened by a government bombing raid on February 18 this year.

Contrast: Tariq al-Bab was a densely populated area before it was targeted by a regime air strike on February 22.

BBC Estimate of Aleppo Front: October 3, 2016

NYT/IHS Estimate of Zones of Control in Aleppo: 17.10.2016

NYT/IHS Estimate of Zones of Control in Aleppo: 17.10.2016

Lt. Gen. Sergei Rudskoi of the Russian military’s General Staff speaks to the media, with a map of the area around Aleppo seen in the background, at the Russian Defense Ministry’s headquarters in Moscow, Russia, Monday, Oct. 17, 2016. Rudskoi was quoted by Russian news agencies as saying Monday that Russian and Syrian forces will halt their fighting from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Oct. 20 in order to allow civilians and rebels safe passage out of the city as well as for the evacuation of the sick and wounded. (Pavel Golovkin/Associated Press)

By Associated Press October 18 at 5:39 PM
Some of the most densely populated areas have been hit.

NYT/IHS
Estimate
Aleppo:
17.10.
2016


Rebels launch battle to break Aleppo Siege 2.0
October 28, 2016

KEY
- Regime control
- Kurdish control
- ISIS control
- Opposition control
- Opposition Gains 10/28
- Opposition Shelling (approximate)
- Ongoing Attack
- Supply Line
- Severed Supply Line

Source: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/1581042e8a087f6d
Liberating Desert Cities: Raqqa

Population 1,000,000 Before War;

Now 250,000


Syria: Zones of Influence – January 26, 2017

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Source: IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor as of Jan 3.
Syria: Zones of Influence – January 26, 2017

Source: Institute for the Study of War
Syria: Areas of Influence – CRS-IHS Estimate: April 2017

Source: CRS using area of influence data from IHS Conflict Monitor, last revised April 4, 2017. All areas of influence approximate and subject to change. Other sources include UN OCHA, Esri and social media reports.
Syria: Areas of Influence Around Raqqa – CRS-IHS Estimate: April 2017

Areas of Influence or Presence
As of April 4, 2017. All areas approximate and subject to change.

Source: Areas of influence based on April 4, 2017, data from IHS Conflict Monitor, and adapted by CRS based on media accounts.

Humud, Blanchard, Niktin, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, CRS RL 33487, April 26, 2017
Syria: Areas of Influence Around Syria-Turkish Border – CRS-IHS Estimate:

Source: Areas of influence based on data from IHS Conflict Monitor, and adapted by CRS based on media accounts. Other sources include UN OCHA and Esri.

Humud, Blanchard, Niktin, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, CRS RL 33487, April 26, 2017
Zones of Control in Syria: April and July 2017

Syria areas of control

AS OF APRIL 3, 2017

AS OF JULY 6, 2017

Sources: Institute for the Study of War

Staff, 07/08/2017

Syria

Zones of Control: July 2017

Source: Washington Post

Syria De-escalation Zones: August, 2017

De-escalation zones agreed by Russia, Turkey and Iran

Omran: Battle of Deir ez-Zor & Raqqah "September-October 2017" - I

Source: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15f2f8894e1b2609 , October 16, 2017
Omran: Map of Control and Influence: Syria "17 October 2017" - II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial Areas</th>
<th>Gain</th>
<th>Lost</th>
<th>Territorial Areas</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oppostion Forces and Others</td>
<td>27,623 km²</td>
<td>%14.9</td>
<td>80 km²</td>
<td>5935 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPG Forces And Others</td>
<td>40,819 km²</td>
<td>%32</td>
<td>1600 km²</td>
<td>42,419 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Regime And Others</td>
<td>90,089 km²</td>
<td>%49</td>
<td>8874 km²</td>
<td>98,913 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>24,069 km²</td>
<td>%14.1</td>
<td>185 km²</td>
<td>4674 km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 September 2017 Control Break Down:

- 10.4% - 4.5%
- 19.4% - 2.5%
- 34.2% - 2.7%
- 7.4% - 4.4%

15 October 2017 Control Break Down:

- 7.4% - 4.4%
- 20.3% - 2.5%
- 35.5% - 2.7%
- 35.5% - 15.2%

Note: Occupied territories by Israel is 1,800 km² - Error Ratio (%2 - %1)

Source: Omran https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15f2a46e0270c51d Ocrtober 19, 2017
Omran: Map of Control and Influence: Syria "17 October 2017"- I

Source: Omran https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15f2a46e0270c51d October 19, 2017
Shifting boundaries

Jane's analyses the political and military factors that will challenge the existing borders of the Middle East.
IS loses control of Raqqa

3 July

11 Sep

16 Oct

Syrian Kurdish forces

Islamic State group

Source: IHS Markit
Clock Tower Roundabout, Raqqa, February 20, 2014
Syria: ISW Estimate of Areas of Control as of December 12, 2017

Syria: Zones of Conflict as of June 25, 2018

Karen DeYoung, Liz Sly and Zakaria Zakaria, Cease-fire in southwestern Syria nears collapse as U.S. and Russia trade blame, Washington Post, June 28, 2018
Syria: Zones of Conflict as of May 29, 2018

Syria Situation Report, ISW's Syria Team and Syria Direct, ISW, June 1, 2018, https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Sg3iyL6XWfy/WxHxFGlEfBI/AAAAAAAAYJ-4/BA2jEULcaGsY-A-n7jK-hNY-O2xTnEydACLcBGAs/s1600/Syria%2BSituation%2BReport%2B-%2BMay%2BActivity.png
Syria Refugees: As of July 6, 2017

More than 5 million Syrians have fled abroad to escape the fighting in Syria, according to the UN. Most have ended up in neighbouring Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.

Syrians have taken refuge in neighbouring countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkey | Lebanon | Jordan | Iraq | Egypt

Source: UNCHR, 6 Jul 2017

About 950,000 Syrians have applied for asylum in Europe since April 2011, according to UN figures.

The UN estimates there are more than 3 million Iraqis who have been forced to leave their homes to escape the conflict with IS and are displaced within the country.

The battle for control of Mosul led to more than 920,000 people fleeing their homes for nearby refugee camps or relatives’ homes.
Terrorist Incidents in Syria 2011-2016
1,800 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
IEP Estimate of Terrorism in Syria as of 2015

Syria Casualty Estimates: 2011-2016

Estimates of deaths in the Syrian Civil War, per opposition activist groups, vary between 301,781[1] and 470,000.[2] On 23 April 2016, the United Nations and Arab League Envoy to Syria put out an estimate of 400,000 that had died in the war.[3]

UNICEF reported that over 500 children had been killed by early February 2012.[4][5] Another 400 children were reportedly arrested and tortured in Syrian prisons.[6][7] Both claims have been contested by the Syrian government.[8] Additionally, over 600 detainees and political prisoners died under torture.[9] The United Nations stated that by the end of April 2014, 8,803 children had been killed,[10] while the Oxford Research Group said that a total of 11,420 children died in the conflict by late November 2013.[11] By mid-September 2016, the opposition activist group Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported the number of children killed in the conflict had risen to 15,099, while at the same time 10,018 women were also killed.[1]

The number of fatalities in the conflict, according to the Syrian opposition website Syrian Martyrs, is 151,888, updated to 30 April 2016.[12] The number includes 35,859 rebels but does not include members of the government security forces or pro-government foreign combatants who have died.[13] The Syrian Martyrs number of civilian deaths is significantly higher than the ones presented by other organizations, including the UN, one reason being they record deaths even when no name is given for the reportedly killed individual.[14]

Other estimates range from 292,815 to 470,000. All of the following totals include civilians, rebels and government forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Time period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Syrian_Civil_War
Syria Casualty Estimates: 2011-2016

The following figures were all compiled by the SOHR which is considered an authoritative source on the matter.[24] The figures are only for documented deaths, while the SOHR estimates another 120,500 undocumented deaths had occurred.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Pro-government forces</th>
<th>Anti-government forces</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Grand Total (inc.unidentified)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>52,290 killed</td>
<td>29,083 killed</td>
<td>46,266 killed</td>
<td>121,639 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>(2013: 30,220) killed</td>
<td>(2013: 18,812) killed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25,160 killed</td>
<td>32,726 killed</td>
<td>17,790 killed</td>
<td>75,676 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>17,686 killed</td>
<td>24,010 killed</td>
<td>13,249 killed</td>
<td>55,145 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2016</td>
<td>1,599 killed</td>
<td>1,687 killed</td>
<td>1,345 killed</td>
<td>4,631 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2016</td>
<td>1,442 killed</td>
<td>2,209 killed</td>
<td>1,109 killed</td>
<td>4,760 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>827 killed</td>
<td>1,232 killed</td>
<td>588 killed</td>
<td>2,647 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2016</td>
<td>990 killed</td>
<td>1,263 killed</td>
<td>859 killed</td>
<td>3,072 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>1,318 killed</td>
<td>2,668 killed</td>
<td>917 killed</td>
<td>4,903 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>1,435 killed</td>
<td>2,139 killed</td>
<td>1,208 killed</td>
<td>4,782 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2016</td>
<td>1,291 killed</td>
<td>1,882 killed</td>
<td>1,590 killed</td>
<td>4,763 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2016</td>
<td>1,311 killed</td>
<td>1,845 killed</td>
<td>1,289 killed</td>
<td>4,445 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2016</td>
<td>987 killed</td>
<td>1,302 killed</td>
<td>1,228 killed</td>
<td>3,417 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative 2016</td>
<td>11,200 killed</td>
<td>16,228 killed</td>
<td>10,133 killed</td>
<td>37,961 killed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Syrian_Civil_War
Syria Casualty Estimates: 2011-2013

Deaths per week during the Syrian civil war

Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/Deaths_per_week_during_the_syrian_civil_war_%28October_2013%29.png

The real Refugee Crisis

Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe:

June 2016

The real Refugee Crisis

Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe:

February 2018

The Nation-Building Nightmare in Syria: September 2016

• Population down from 22-24 million to 17.1 million, median age 23.8

• Estimates of dead range from some 270,000 to 470,000

• UNHCR estimates in July 2016 that Syria had 4.8 million refugees out the country – roughly 22% of its prewar population -- and 6.5 million people – over one-third of its present population -- displaced away from their homes and jobs inside Syria.

• 13.5 million need protection. 12.1 million people in need of humanitarian aid, including 5.7 million children. 11.5 million lack of access to health care and scarcity of medicine have led to a catastrophic health situation. Poor food availability and quality and successive cuts in subsidies on bread have exacerbated nutritional deprivation. An estimated 25 percent of schools were not operational by 2014.

• No reliable summary of how badly the economy has suffered since 2011, but the CIA estimates that Syria’s GDP shrunk from an already very low $97.5 billion in 2012 to $55.8 billion in 2014, and per capita income was only $5,100 in 2010 – before the fighting began. This drop, instead of growth, ranked Syria as 219th of the world’s nations. Unemployment reached 57.7% in 2014, and 82.5% of the population lived below the poverty line by then – putting Syria at a rank of 202nd, and at the near bottom of the world’s nations.

• OCHA estimates that Syria's development situation has regressed almost by four decades. Four out of five Syrians now live in poverty. Since the crisis began in 2011, life expectancy among Syrians has dropped by more than 20 years, while school attendance has dropped over 50 per cent, with more than 2 million children now out of school. Syria has also seen reversals in all 12 Millennium Development Goal indicators. The Syrian economy has contracted by an estimated 40 per cent since 2011, leading to the majority of Syrians losing their livelihoods.

• Turkey hosts over 2.7 million registered Syrians. In Lebanon, more than a million registered Syrians live in over 1,700 communities and locations across the country, often sharing small basic lodgings with other refugee families in overcrowded conditions. In Jordan, over 600,000 men, women and children are currently trapped in exile. Iraq has also seen a growing number of Syrians arriving, hosting nearly 25,000, while in Egypt UNHCR.

• In 2009, 94 per cent of Syrian children attended primary and lower secondary education, by June 2016 only 60 per cent of children were in school in Syria, leaving 2.1 million children and adolescents without access to education in Syria. In neighboring countries, over 4.8 million Syrian refugees are registered with UNHCR, and 35 per cent are of school-age. In Turkey, only 39 per cent of school-age refugee children and adolescents were enrolled in primary and secondary education, 40 per cent in Lebanon, and 70 per cent in Jordan. This means that nearly 900,000 more Syrian school-age refugee children and adolescents are not in school.
### IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Syria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>5,496</td>
<td>7,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>7,230</td>
<td>6,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>3,258</td>
<td>3,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: Islamic State, Jabhat Fath al Sham, Qiwaat Suriyya al Dimogratiiyya (QSD)

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
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• Exact numbers of casualties from the conflict with IS are not available.

• The UN says at least 3,298 civilians were killed in acts of violence in Iraq in 2017, fewer than the 2016 total of 6,878 - although the true figure is likely to be higher as the organisation has been unable to verify some reports of casualties in the Mosul area.

• According to Iraq Body Count, the total number of civilian deaths in Iraq since 2014 stood at 67,376 up to the end of December 2017. The annual number of casualties has decreased slightly each year since 2014, from a high of 20,218 in that year to 13,187 last year.

• The UN no longer keeps track of casualty figures in Syria due to the inaccessibility of many areas and the conflicting reports from the various parties to the war there.

• The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based monitoring group, reported in December 2017 that it had documented the deaths of more than 346,600 people, including 103,490 civilians, since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad began March 2011. But it noted that the figure did not include 56,900 people who were missing and presumed dead.

Conflict Dynamics involving Kurds and Turks in North
Kurdish Expansion in Syria

Kobani has been the focal point of the U.S.-Kurdish battle with ISIS. American airstrikes have hit more than 1,000 targets there, almost half of all their strikes in Syria, helping the Kurds push back ISIS in the north.

Washington Institute for Near East Policy https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js/k=gmail.main.en.R9ZlbKBqeHM.O/m=m_i,t/am=OotHBjD_7_3BuUYBQFf6SlV573---VR22Ou_e_78PICKvAv9v9v8A_g_2oi0U/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9BDJG387znTIU-sJuuWL5oPBhgA, August 25, 2016.
Kurdish Population in Northern Syria

Washington Institute for Near East Policy
https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js/k=gmail.main.en.R9ZlbKBqeHM.O/m=m_i,t/am=OotHBJD_7_3BuYBQff6SIVS73---VR22OUe_78PscKvAy9v9v8A_g_2ol0U/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9BDjJG387znTLU-sjjuuWL5oPBhaA, August 25, 2016.
Kurdish (PYD) Expansion in Northern Syria

PYD Expansion in Northern Syria

Amnesty International visited 14 towns and villages in the Kurdish controlled areas of northern Syria. In ten of these villages, they found the local population had either had their homes demolished or faced either forced displacement as a group or targeted displacement.

**Abuse:**
- Village demolished
- Forced displacement
- Targeted displacement

Irrigated Land in Northern Syria

Euphrates Valley Irrigation Project
Battle of Manbij


Population = 100,000

Battles of Manbij and Hasakah: Kurds Moving towards Arab Rebel Areas and Sensitive Turkish Areas

Source: https://www.google.com/maps/@36.5795694,37.7277141,8z, 22.8.16,
Battle of Manbij

ISIS use of Human Shields

Source: BBC, 22.8.16, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/156afc3d473552bd
Turks as of October 1, 2016
Estimate of Zones of Influence in Northern Iraq: 3.10.2016

The U.S. and Allied Side of the War
U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq and Syria: September 2016

• No totals including allies and air component in Iraq/Syria or neighboring states

• Public figures only include over PCS, not covert or TDY.

• Iraq total rose from 170 in June 2014 to 4,087 PCS in May 2016. Became 4,400+ in September 2016.

• U.S. Army and Marines provide HIMARS fire support, AH-1Z/AH-64 missions, forward combat support for key defensive and offensive action, Wasp amphibious ship.

• Statements provide support to battalion level in Iraq do not seem correct.

• Syria total generally does not include related personnel that cross border in Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey.

• President added 250 Special Forces to Syria in April 2006. Now over 300.
Years after Iraq withdrawal, U.S. troop level rises

The first 170 of an initial contingent of 275 troops arrived in June 2014. Since then, the Defense Department has authorized additional troops, bringing the official level to 4,087, though the total number is likely higher because of undisclosed operations.

4,087 troops authorized as of April 16
4,400+ as of August 2016
5,000+ as of September 2016
5,262 PCS, 6,000 w/TDY, as of October 2016

Sources: Brookings Iraq Index, Defense Department

Land Precision Strike: HIMARS

The HIMARS carries six rockets or one MGM-140 ATACMS missile on the U.S. Army's new Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) five-ton truck, and can launch the entire Multiple Launch Rocket System Family of Munitions (MFOM). HIMARS is interchangeable with the MLRS M270A1, carrying half the rocket load.

The Extended Range MLRS Rocket (ER-MLRS) is a derivative of the M26 with a longer motor and only 518 grenades. This improves the range to more than 45 km (28 miles).

The M30 GLMRS rocket uses a guidance system with an IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) and a GPS receiver, and has four small additional control fins in the nose. To make full use of the much improved accuracy of the weapon over long distances, only 404 M85 DPICM bomblets are carried for a range of more than 60 km (37 miles). Minimum effective range for the GMLRS is about 10 km (6 miles).

The XM31 is a variant of the M30 with a 90 kg (200 lb.) unitary high-explosive warhead. The XM31 is a variant of the M30 with a 90 kg (200 lb.) unitary high-explosive warhead. In January 2006, the U.S. Army announced that the majority of (possibly all?) future purchases of tactical MLRS rockets will be M31s with unitary warhead.

In November 2015, the United States Army revealed they had deployed the HIMARS to Iraq, firing at least 400 rockets at the Islamic State since the beginning of summer.[8] HIMARS detachments were sent to Al Asad Airbase and Al-Taqaddum Air Base in Anbar province. On 4 March 2016, Army HIMARS systems fired rockets into Syria in support of Syrian rebels fighting ISIL for the first time, with the launchers based in neighboring Jordan.[9] On April 26, 2016, it was announced that the U.S. would be deploying the HIMARS in Turkey near the border with Syria as part of the battle with ISIL.[11]
Attack Helicopters

AH-64

AH-Z
U.S. Campaign Goals: August 2016

NEXT PLAYS IN THE COUNTER-ISIL CAMPAIGN

Stabilize Iraq’s Anbar Province
Generate Iraqi Security Forces to envelop Mosul
Identify and develop more local forces in Syria that will isolate and pressure Raqqah
Provide more firepower, sustainment and logistical support to our partners to enable them to collapse ISIL’s control over Mosul and Raqqah

U.S Military and Contractor Personnel in Iraq: FY2007-FY2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S. Armed Forces</th>
<th>Total Contractors</th>
<th>U.S. Nationals Contractors</th>
<th>Foreign and Host Country Nationals Contractors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>64,253</td>
<td>18,393</td>
<td>45,860</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q3 FY2011</td>
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<td>62,689</td>
<td>18,900</td>
<td>43,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4 FY2011</td>
<td>44,755</td>
<td>52,637</td>
<td>16,054</td>
<td>36,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 FY2012</td>
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<td>23,896*</td>
<td>11,237</td>
<td>12,649</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q2 FY2012</td>
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<td>10,967*</td>
<td>3,260</td>
<td>7,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 FY2012</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7,336*</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td>4,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4 FY2012</td>
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<td>9,000*</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td>6,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 FY2013</td>
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<td>8,449*</td>
<td>2,356</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q2 FY2013</td>
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<td>7,735*</td>
<td>1,898</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q4 FY2013</td>
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<td>6,624*</td>
<td>1,626</td>
<td>4,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 FY2014</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3,234*</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>2,414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DOD ceased publicly reporting numbers of DOD contractor personnel working in Iraq in December 2013, following the conclusion of the U.S. combat mission in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn), and the subsequent drawdown of DOD contractor personnel levels in Iraq. In late 2014, in response in part to developing operations in the region, DOD reinitiated reporting broad estimates of DOD contractor personnel deployed in Iraq in support of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). As the number of DOD contractor personnel in Iraq increased over the first six months of 2015, DOD resumed reporting exact numbers and primary mission categories of OIR contractor personnel in June 2015.

As of the fourth quarter of FY2016, there were 2,992 DOD contractor personnel in Iraq, compared to a force management level authorizing the presence of up to 4,087 U.S. troops in Iraq, primarily deployed as part of a U.S.-led coalition advise-and-assist mission in support of the Government of Iraq.13 Contract personnel would thus represent approximately 42% of the total estimated DOD personnel presence in-country. Approximately 61% of DOD’s 2,992 reported individual contractors were U.S. citizens, approximately 25% were third-country nationals; and roughly 14% were local/host-country nationals.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>—</td>
<td>3,234*</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>2,414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No Data on Contractors Released by CENTCOM from Q2 FY2014-Q4 FY2014*

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# U.S Contract Obligations in Iraq: FY2012-FY2017

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>$14,685.56</td>
<td>$17,987.49</td>
<td>$10,580.81</td>
<td>$7,878.74</td>
<td>$5,222.69</td>
<td>$617.71</td>
<td>$537.31</td>
<td>$77.62</td>
<td>$249.39</td>
<td>$684.88</td>
<td>$58,763.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
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<td>$1,333.27</td>
<td>$2,190.98</td>
<td>$609.37</td>
<td>$526.26</td>
<td>$338.40</td>
<td>$883.97</td>
<td>$212.81</td>
<td>$351.41</td>
<td>$680.63</td>
<td>$8,459.93</td>
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<td>Kuwait</td>
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<td>$4,934.01</td>
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<td>$5,050.40</td>
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<td>$2,612.30</td>
<td>$1,793.66</td>
<td>$2,004.14</td>
<td>$1,779.60</td>
<td>$38,044.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>$323.46</td>
<td>$469.24</td>
<td>$886.45</td>
<td>$351.45</td>
<td>$840.67</td>
<td>$870.86</td>
<td>$432.20</td>
<td>$175.28</td>
<td>$324.56</td>
<td>$241.64</td>
<td>$5,230.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$210.60</td>
<td>$375.76</td>
<td>$989.33</td>
<td>$806.44</td>
<td>$309.49</td>
<td>$570.03</td>
<td>$964.00</td>
<td>$1,255.52</td>
<td>$2,093.57</td>
<td>$1,018.00</td>
<td>$10,621.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<td>$193.21</td>
<td>$311.79</td>
<td>$143.24</td>
<td>$185.94</td>
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<td>$184.99</td>
<td>$203.56</td>
<td>$242.26</td>
<td>$2,516.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
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<td>$1,326.57</td>
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<td>$1,060.54</td>
<td>$1,467.74</td>
<td>$2,281.36</td>
<td>$1,757.70</td>
<td>$1,306.55</td>
<td>$1,422.39</td>
<td>$15,124.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>$94.29</td>
<td>$107.54</td>
<td>$85.31</td>
<td>$125.88</td>
<td>$142.16</td>
<td>$214.68</td>
<td>$228.80</td>
<td>$106.60</td>
<td>$124.73</td>
<td>$123.02</td>
<td>$1,473.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>$83.85</td>
<td>$92.30</td>
<td>$14.81</td>
<td>$13.77</td>
<td>$40.01</td>
<td>$54.17</td>
<td>$177.08</td>
<td>$168.23</td>
<td>$203.89</td>
<td>$186.71</td>
<td>$1,232.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Iraq Theater | $21,607.05 | $26,819.41 | $21,186.57 | $17,641.43 | $12,311.23 | $7,032.23 | $8,036.25 | $5,732.41 | $6,842.88 | $6,379.14 | $141,248.13 |
Train and Equip Funding in Iraq and Syria

Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) ($0.6 billion): Formally consolidates and increases the funding requests for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and the Syria Train and Equip Fund (STEF), creating a new appropriation to provide support to the military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq's and the VSO forces' operations against ISIS.

In addition to the pending FY 2017 request of $880 million for ITEF and STEF efforts, the request for additional FY 2017 appropriations includes an additional $626 million above the original FY 2017 request for ITEF and STEF to accelerate the Department’s train-and-equip efforts in Iraq and Syria as partners fight to retake the cities of Mosul and Raqqah.

- An additional $446.4 million is requested to provide continued maintenance and sustainment support to the ISF as they fight to retake the city of Mosul. These funds will address critical requirements generated by the protracted operations to seize Mosul and the higher-than-anticipated battle losses and operational costs that diverted funding and material intended for the post-Mosul reset and follow-on operations. These funds will also address support for future counter-ISIS operations in Iraq.

- An additional $180.0 million is requested to sustain the momentum of SAC and VSO forces as they fight to retake the city of Raqqah. These funds will address critical weapons, training, ammunition, and equipment requirements necessary to outfit the 16,000 supplementary partner forces from the SAC. These funds will also provide support for future counter-ISIS operations in Syria.
### Revisions to OCO Funding by Category in FY2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations/Force Protection</td>
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<td>+2.8</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>In-Theater Support</td>
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<td>+1.3</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
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<td>+0.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)</td>
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<td>Equipment Reset and Readiness</td>
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<td>-0.5</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Classified Programs</td>
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<td>Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF)</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>+&lt;0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
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<td><strong>+5.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>-5.8</strong></td>
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<td><strong>58.6</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015 Compliance</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.1</td>
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<td><strong>5.1</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>58.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>+5.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>-5.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>+5.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>63.7</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*C TCEF is a new account and includes the original request of $830 million for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and $260 million for the Syria Train and Equip Fund (STEF), plus an additional request of $448.4 million for ITEF related requirements and $100 million for STEF related requirements in this request for additional appropriations.*
Cost of U.S. Iraqi Train and Assist Efforts: FY2016-FY2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Summary (Dollars in Millions)</th>
<th>FY 2017 Request</th>
<th>FY 2017 Change</th>
<th>FY 2017 Revised Request</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQUIPPING ADDITIONAL SECURITY FORCES (Hold Forces)</td>
<td>170.406</td>
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<td>170.406</td>
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<tr>
<td>RESUPPLY COMBAT OPERATIONS</td>
<td>323.969</td>
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<td>323.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAINTENANCE AND SUSTAINMENT</td>
<td>71.600</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>71.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITE IMPROVEMENTS, MAINTENANCE AND SUSTAINMENT</td>
<td>64.025</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>64.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT TO THE KURDISH PESHRMA</td>
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<td>289.500</td>
<td>289.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>630.000</strong></td>
<td><strong>289.500</strong></td>
<td><strong>919.500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The United States Government (USG) strategy to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh, directed the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) to conduct a campaign to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIL/Daesh. The focus of DoD’s efforts is to work with and through the Government of Iraq (GoI) to build key security force capabilities, help professionalize its security forces, and promote longer term stability of the country and the region. Because the U.S. does not have direct operational control over these forces, the campaign is progressing at a pace that is driven by the GoI. This creates a more fluid and less predictable future that makes projecting funding requirements extremely challenging. For identification of the funding required, crucial assumptions must be made, and for FY 2017, these key assumptions are:

1. In FY 2017, the costs for equipping and training existing and new Iraqi units will decline, but the logistics requirements for supporting ongoing operations, including resupply and replacement of combat losses, will increase as compared to previous fiscal year justifications.
2. Iraqi security forces will be involved in continuing major operations to isolate, clear, hold, and stabilize territory currently occupied by ISIL, to include major population centers such as Mosul.
3. Using the operations in Ramadi and elsewhere in Anbar as a reference, it is expected that Mosul clearing operations will be slow; there will be a significant need for ammunition, anti-armor weapons, and counter-IED equipment; and the Iraqi forces will lose a significant amount of equipment to combat losses. (As an example, Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) has seen over 200 HMMWVs destroyed in Ramadi operations between August and November 2015.)
4. The effectiveness of hold forces made up of federal police, local police/security forces, and border police/security will be critical to holding liberated territory and improving security for the population and achieving U.S. objectives. Budget estimate assumes procurement of equipment to supply 20,000 of this hold force.
5. Current Building Partner Capacity (BPC) sites will continue to operate while new sites will be established as Iraqi security forces (ISF) moves north to and through Mosul.
6. The Iraqi economy will continue to be weak and their government will find it difficult to fund counter-ISIL/Daesh operations. U.S. and coalition support will continue to be important in paying for costs associated with the current crisis to achieve U.S. objectives.
7. Strong U.S. and coalition support, particularly highly visible support such as training and equipping, will be necessary for ISF to maintain sufficient combat power to accomplish assigned and future missions.
As of 4:59 p.m. EST June 1, the U.S. and coalition have conducted a total of 12,685 strikes (8,661 Iraq / 4,024 Syria).

U.S. has conducted 9,663 strikes in Iraq and Syria (5,876 Iraq / 3,787 Syria)

Rest of Coalition has conducted 3,022 strikes in Iraq and Syria (2,785 Iraq / 237 Syria)

The countries that have participated in the strikes include:

In Iraq: (1) Australia, (2) Belgium, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, and (8) UK


As of Apr. 16, U.S. and partner nation aircraft have flown an estimated 91,821 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria.

As of 8:28 a.m. EST October 20, 2016, the U.S. and coalition have conducted a total of 15,803 strikes (10,205 Iraq / 5,598 Syria).

U.S. has conducted 12,236 strikes in Iraq and Syria (6,920 Iraq / 5,316 Syria)

Rest of Coalition has conducted 3,567 strikes in Iraq and Syria (3,285 Iraq / 282 Syria)

The countries that have participated in the strikes include:

In Iraq: (1) Australia, (2) Belgium, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, and (8) UK


As of September, 2016, U.S. and partner nation aircraft have flown an estimated 116,391 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria.

Source: http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-ResolveOctober 24, 2016:
US-led coalition strikes: **IRAQ**: 9,601, **SYRIA**: 5,054

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor, 19 Sep 2016

IHS/BBC Map Coalition Air Strikes, September 6, 2016

IHS/BBC Map Coalition Air Strikes, September 6, 2016


# Targets Damaged/Destroyed as of May 31, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV’s</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging Areas</td>
<td>1,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>6,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions</td>
<td>7,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
<td>1,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Targets</td>
<td>8,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,374</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may fluctuate based on battle damage assessments

Current as of 31 May 2016

Source: CENTCOM CCCI

Source: [http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve](http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve)
### Targets Damaged/Destroyed as of September 26, 2016

**OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV’s</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging Areas</td>
<td>2,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>7,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions</td>
<td>8,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
<td>2,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Targets</td>
<td>10,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>31,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may fluctuate based on battle damage assessments
Current as of 26 September 2016

Source: CENTCOM CCCI
Coalition
Airstrikes as of October 2016

As of 5:12 a.m. EST October 25, 2016, the U.S. and coalition have conducted a total of 15,861 strikes (10,245 Iraq / 5,616 Syria).

U.S. has conducted 12,278 strikes in Iraq and Syria (6,947 Iraq / 5,331 Syria)
Rest of Coalition has conducted 3,583 strikes in Iraq and Syria (3,298 Iraq / 285 Syria)

The countries that have participated in the strikes include:
In Iraq: (1) Australia, (2) Belgium, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, and (8) UK

As of September, 2016, U.S. and partner nation aircraft have flown an estimated 116,391 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria.

Source: Laris Karklis, Aaron Steckelberg and Tim Meko, The uneasy mix of forces battling the Islamic State
IHS/BBC Map Coalition Airstrikes, as of October 31, 2016

US-led coalition strikes: IRAQ: 10,043, SYRIA: 5,493


Figure showing Coalition strikes in Iraq and Syria from 2014 to 2016.

- Iraq: 10,043 strikes
- Syria: 5,493 strikes

Source: BBC, September 30, 2016

No Meaningful Agreement on ISIS Body Counts

Micah Zenko (@MicahZenko) senior fellow with the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations chronology of Body Counts:

• It should be no surprise then that President Barack Obama’s administration has been using body counts in the ongoing war against the Islamic State. In January 2015, just 16 days after Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby asserted in a press conference that he wasn’t “getting into an issue of body counts…. It’s simply not a relevant figure,” U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Stuart Jones, unprompted, told an Al Arabiya interviewer that “the airstrikes have now killed more than 6,000 ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq.”

• Since that first estimate, the administration has steadily released other figures on combatant deaths. What’s less clear is how well those chosen data points line up with one another.

• On March 3, 2015, Army Gen. Lloyd Austin, then-commander of Centcom, told the House Armed Services Committee that the U.S. military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria had killed 8,500 enemy fighters.

• Three months later, that number increased. On June 1, 2015, Air Force Gen. Herbert J. “Hawk” Carlisle, the chief of Air Combat Command, informed reporters at an Air Force Association breakfast: “We’ve taken about 13,000 enemy fighters off the battlefield since the September-October time frame.”

• Then, on July 29, 2015, USA Today cited military intelligence estimates, which were confirmed by coalition officials, that “15,000 militants [have been] killed in a U.S.-led airstrike campaign.”

• On Oct. 12, 2015, an anonymous “senior military officer” told USA Today: “The U.S.-led bombing campaign has killed an estimated 20,000 Islamic State fighters.” The following day, Army Col. Steve Warren, the spokesman for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), told a reporter about that same figure: “We try to stay away from body counts, generally speaking. I’m not going to argue with those numbers that you just cited.”

• The next month, on Nov. 30, 2015, anonymous military officials again told USA Today that “the campaign has killed 23,000 Islamic State fighters.”

• On Jan. 6, Warren, who earlier declared his avoidance of body counts, told reporters in prepared remarks: “In December, we estimate approximately 2,500 enemy fighters were killed in coalition airstrikes across Iraq and Syria,” bringing the total to 25,500.

• On April 12, the New York Times reported that American airstrikes had killed 25,000 Islamic State fighters, according to unnamed Pentagon officials. CNN’s Jim Sciutto had a slightly higher number from officials, at 26,000.

• Finally, on Aug. 10, Army Lt. Gen. Sean MacFarland, the commander of the Combined Joint Task Force-OIR, claimed that “over the past 11 months we’ve killed about 25,000 enemy fighters…. That’s 45,000 enemies taken off the battlefield.”

Source: Foreign Policy, August 19, 2016
## Air strikes and ISIS Leaders

### High-value ISIL Fighters Killed by Coalition Strikes in 12/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date Killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rawand Dilsher Taher</td>
<td>external operations; handled money and equipment</td>
<td>Raqqah, Syria</td>
<td>12/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalil Ahmed Ali al-Wais</td>
<td>“Emir” of Kirkuk province</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>12/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AKA Abu Wadhah)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Anas</td>
<td>IED cell leader</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>12/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunis Khalash</td>
<td>Deputy Financial Emir</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>12/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AKA Abu Jawdat)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mithaq Najim</td>
<td>Deputy “Emir” of Kirkuk province; trained FTFs</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>12/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siful Haque Sujan</td>
<td>computer systems engineer, external operations, educated in the U.K.; hacker; specialized in anti-surveillance technology and weapons development</td>
<td>Raqqah, Syria</td>
<td>12/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akram Muhammad Sa’ad Faris</td>
<td>commander/executioner</td>
<td>Tellafar, Iraq</td>
<td>12/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AKA Akram Aabu)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charaffe al-Mouadan</td>
<td>external operations; Paris attacks cell leader</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>12/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Kader Hakim</td>
<td>external operations; forgery specialist; veteran fighter; linked to Paris attacks network</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>12/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tashin al-Hayali</td>
<td>external operations</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>12/27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sources:
Cost of U.S. Air Operations as of August 31, 2016

As of August 31, 2016, the total cost of operations related to ISIL since kinetic operations started on August 8, 2014, is $9.3 billion and the average daily cost is $12.3 million for 755 days of operations.


#### Average Daily Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Expense (# of Days)</strong></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$4.5</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$2.2</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$2.8</td>
<td>$4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$9.5</td>
<td>$12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$1.3</td>
<td>$2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$1.9</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
<td>$1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$2.5</td>
<td>$6.5</td>
<td>$7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$9.5</td>
<td>$12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Category</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$1.3</td>
<td>$2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support</td>
<td>$0.6</td>
<td>$1.4</td>
<td>$2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.8</td>
<td>$4.5</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Pay</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$2.2</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$9.5</td>
<td>$12.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Extrapolated Total Cost ($M):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Expense</th>
<th>Total Cost (8 Aug 2014 - 31 Aug 2016)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3,842</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$23</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$2,055</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$3,385</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$9,304</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$1,556</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$1,091</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$5,874</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$783</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$9,304</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Category</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td>$1,669</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support</td>
<td>$1,603</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>$54</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3,865</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Pay</td>
<td>$58</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$2,055</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$9,304</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers may not add due to rounding

The February Airpower Summary showcases the Air Coalition’s uptick in weapons employment against ISIS strongholds, releasing the second most ordnance in a single month behind January’s milestone of operations. For Operation Inherent Resolve, the Coalition continues to pressure ISIS on multiple fronts, executing overlapping operations to destroy ISIS in Mosul and Raqqah – the terrorist organization’s self-proclaimed capitals. In Iraq, Coalition air forces continue to work by, with and through Iraqi Security Forces on the ground as they continue their liberation of West Mosul. The enemy has been preparing for this battle for some time and they’ve done an extensive amount of work to dig and build barriers to complicate the Iraqi advance. Coalition airpower can redirect the enemy’s advances or retreats, thus giving ground forces a tactical advantage. Additionally, we continue to impede their logistical and financial support, reduce their fielded force, and demolish enemy weapons caches and fighting positions. In Syria, we continue supporting partner forces on the ground to work toward liberating Raqqah.

As of May 10, 2017, the U.S. and coalition had conducted a total of 21,267 strikes (12,619 Iraq / 8,648 Syria). The U.S. has conducted 16,902 strikes in Iraq and Syria (8,646 Iraq / 8,256 Syria).

The rest of the coalition has conducted 4,365 strikes in Iraq and Syria (3,973 Iraq / 392 Syria).

The countries that have participated in the strikes include:

In Iraq: (1) Australia, (2) Belgium, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, and (8) UK

Between Aug. 8, 2014, and May 8, 2017, U.S. and partner-nation aircraft have flown 152,208 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria.

As of March 31, 2017, the total cost of operations related to ISIL since kinetic operations started on August 8, 2014, was $12.5 billion and the average daily cost was $13 million for 967 days of operations.

Total OCO Funding in FY2017: $63.7B of $613.3B (10.4%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
<td>7,551,332</td>
<td>+415,506</td>
<td>+2,589,273</td>
<td>10,556,111</td>
<td>-446,283</td>
<td>10,109,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>646,706</td>
<td>+99,800</td>
<td>+212,535</td>
<td>959,041</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>959,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>162,419</td>
<td>+3,000</td>
<td>+66,571</td>
<td>231,990</td>
<td>-3,000</td>
<td>228,990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>-5,000</td>
<td>-10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Housing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolving and Management Funds</td>
<td>93,800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>93,800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>93,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Defense-Wide</td>
<td>8,459,257</td>
<td>+518,306</td>
<td>+2,686,379</td>
<td>11,845,942</td>
<td>-454,283</td>
<td>11,391,659</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total OCO                              | 58,797,551                   | +5,775,000            | +5,080,132                                  | 69,652,683                     | -5,947,000                | 63,705,683                         |

| Total Base + OCO                       | 583,428,118                  | +5,775,000            | -30,000,000                                 | 619,203,118                    | -5,947,000                | 613,256,118                        |

---

1. For the Military Construction Bill appropriations, the President's Budget Request reflects the amounts enacted in Division A of P.L. 114-223, the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017 (September 29, 2016).


3. The enacted Military Construction Bill amounts exclude a base-budget, prior-year rescission of $307,662 thousand.
OCO Funding: FY2008-FY2017
(in $US billions)

1/ Data are for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Operation NEW DAWN (OND), OIR, follow-on Iraq activities, and related missions. The FY 2017 request for additional appropriations includes $2.0 billion for OIR.
2/ Afghanistan data are for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), OFS, and related missions. The FY 2017 request for additional appropriations includes $1.1 billion for OFS.
3/ The FY 2016 enacted and the original FY 2017 Request were at the OCO levels in the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015.
4/ The FY 2017 OCO amendment included $20 million for Operation ODYSSEY LIGHTNING (OLL) in Libya.

US Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria: Original Plan

Thousands

- Invasion peak: JUL 2003
- Surge peaks: SEP 2007
- Surge announces: JAN 2007
- Surge end: JUL 2008
- Drawdown begins: MAR 2009
- Surge peaks: MAY 2011
- Surge announces: DEC 2009
- Additional deployments announced: FEB 2009
- OIF end: SEP 2010
- OND end: DEC 2011

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.19.

Notes: Reflects U.S. troops in-country; excludes troops providing in-theater support or conducting counter-terror operations outside the region. Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, CRS RL33110, December 8, 2014, p.9.
## OCO Military Personnel: FY2015-FY2017
(as of February 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>FY2015 Actual</th>
<th>FY2016 Actual</th>
<th>FY2017 Projected (Original Request)</th>
<th>FY2017 Projected (Amended Request)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (OFS)</td>
<td>10,012</td>
<td>9,737</td>
<td>6,217</td>
<td>8,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (OIR)</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td>5,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-theater Support</td>
<td>55,958</td>
<td>55,831</td>
<td>58,593</td>
<td>58,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. and other locations</td>
<td>16,020</td>
<td>15,991</td>
<td>13,085</td>
<td>13,085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request, Overseas Contingency Operations and DOD Overview: Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Amendment FY2017 (figure 2).

**Notes:** In-theater support includes Afghanistan, Iraq, Horn of Africa, and the European Reassurance Initiative (including approximately 10,500 afloat forces).

Williams & Epstein, *Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017* p.25.
U.S. Uniformed Military and Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan
Q4 FY2007-Q1 FY2016

U.S. Uniformed Military and Contractor Personnel in Iraq
Q4 FY2007-Q1 FY2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation/Agency</th>
<th align="right">01&amp;02</th>
<th align="right">03</th>
<th align="right">04</th>
<th align="right">05</th>
<th align="right">06</th>
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<th align="right">08</th>
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<th align="right">10</th>
<th align="right">11</th>
<th align="right">12</th>
<th align="right">13</th>
<th align="right">14</th>
<th align="right">15 Req.a</th>
<th align="right">FY01-14</th>
<th align="right">FY01-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan War or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)</strong></td>
<td align="right"></td>
<td align="right"></td>
<td align="right"></td>
<td align="right"></td>
<td align="right"></td>
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<td align="right"></td>
<td align="right"></td>
<td align="right"></td>
<td align="right"></td>
</tr>
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Reflects June 2014 amended DOD request, excludes OIR. Totals may not add due to rounding.
**US Estimated War Funding by Agency, FY2001-FY2015 Request**

In Billions of Dollars of Budget Authority

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<tr>
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<th>FY01 &amp; FY02</th>
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<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
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<td>$0</td>
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<td>$100</td>
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<td>$74</td>
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</table>

Cumulative Enacted*:

- **Total**: $1,609
- **DOD**: $1,499
- **State/USAID**: $93
- **VA Medical**: $18

* Cumulative enacted (FY01-FY14). ** Amounts less than $500 million.

FY2015 reflects June 2014 amended request rather than initial placeholder request of $79.4 billion for DOD. Excludes $5.5 billion requested for OIR in FY2015.

### US Estimated War Funding by Agency, FY2001-FY2015 Request

In Billions of Dollars of Budget Authority

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<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
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<th>FY13</th>
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</table>

* Cumulative enacted (FY01-FY14).  ** Amounts less than $200 million.

Reflects June 2014 amended DOD request, excludes OIR. Totals may not add due to rounding.

Small Forces Lead to Diseconomies of Scale

In Iraq and in Afghanistan

Sources: CRS calculated average strength from DOD’s monthly “Boots on the Ground” reports, and operational costs from DOD’s Cost of War reports. Operational costs include war-designated military personnel and operation and maintenance obligations excluding funds to train Afghan and Iraq security forces, coalition support and other flexible funds set up to meet special war needs; investment costs include war-designated procurement, RDT&E and military construction from DOD’s monthly Cost of War reports.

As of July 2016, DOD had obligated a total of $1.4 trillion for emergency or OCO/GWOT requirements for these named operations.

Afghanistan
- OEF -$592.8 billion
- OFS -$60.9 billion

Iraq
- OIF/OND -$732.1 billion
- OIR -$10.7 billion

Enhanced U.S. Security/Noble Eagle
- ONE -$27.5 billion

DoD and DoS OCO Funding: FY2012-FY2017
Q4 FY2007-Q1 FY2016

DoD and DoS OCO Funding: FY2012-FY2017
Q4 FY2007-Q1 FY2016

Funding for Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Enduring vs. OCO - I

dollars in billions

Williams & Epstein, Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status, CRS R44519, February 7, 2017 p.25.
## Funding for Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Enduring vs. OCO - II

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<tr>
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<th>FY2015 Request</th>
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**Source:** Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations Summary Tables (see Table 1 in each of FY2015, FY2016, and FY2017 documents).

**Note:** In FY2016 and FY2017 Summary Tables, “State Operations and Related Accounts” are referred to as “Diplomatic Engagement and Related Accounts.”

### Funding for Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: Enduring vs. OCO - II

dollars in billions

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2015 Request</th>
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<td>$1.9</td>
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<td>$1.7</td>
<td>$8.5</td>
<td>$3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Organizations</td>
<td>$4.0</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$4.5</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$2.1</td>
<td>$1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Operations Total</td>
<td>$27.9</td>
<td>$3.9</td>
<td>$30.6</td>
<td>$5.2</td>
<td>$26.1</td>
<td>$9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Economic Assistance</td>
<td>$16.5</td>
<td>$2.8</td>
<td>$17.9</td>
<td>$3.8</td>
<td>$15.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Security Assistance</td>
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<td>$1.0</td>
<td>$7.3</td>
<td>$1.3</td>
<td>$6.2</td>
<td>$1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations Summary Tables (see Table 1 in each of FY2015, FY2016, and FY2017 documents).

**Note:** In FY2016 and FY2017 Summary Tables, “State Operations and Related Accounts” are referred to as “Diplomatic Engagement and Related Accounts.”

---

Iraq and Syria – US Coalition Airstrikes as of May 31, 2017

## Cost of Coalition Operations: 8-8 2014 to 6-30-2017

### Average Daily Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily Cost ($M)</th>
<th>8 Aug - 19 Sep 2014 (Ops in Iraq; Pre-Syria, 43 days)</th>
<th>20 Sep 2014 - 30 June 2017 (Ops in Syria and Iraq, 1015 days)</th>
<th>Average Daily Cost (8 Aug 2014 - 30 June 2017, 1058 days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BY EXPENSE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$3.2</td>
<td>$3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$13.9</td>
<td>$13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BY SERVICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
<td>$2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$1.9</td>
<td>$1.6</td>
<td>$1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$2.5</td>
<td>$8.6</td>
<td>$8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$13.9</td>
<td>$13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extrapolated Total Cost ($M):</th>
<th>Total Cost (8 Aug 2014 - 30 June 2017, 1058 days)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BY EXPENSE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$5,356</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$23</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$3,230</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$5,747</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>$14,356</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BY SERVICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$2,782</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$1,742</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$8,800</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$1,031</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>$14,356</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted by the author from [https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/15f0a524a24d099e](https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/15f0a524a24d099e)
### Cost of Coalition Operations: 8-8 2014 to 6-30-2017

#### Average Daily Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily Cost ($M)</th>
<th>8 Aug - 19 Sep 2014 (Ops in Iraq; Pre-Syria, 43 days)</th>
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<th>Average Daily Cost (8 Aug 2014 - 30 June 2017, 1058 days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BY EXPENSE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$3.2</td>
<td>$3.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$13.9</td>
<td>$13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BY SERVICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$13.9</td>
<td>$13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BY CATEGORY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$2.6</td>
<td>$2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support</td>
<td>$0.6</td>
<td>$2.8</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.8</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Pay</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$3.2</td>
<td>$3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$13.9</td>
<td>$13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Total Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extrapolated Total Cost ($M):</th>
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<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$1,031</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$14,356</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BY CATEGORY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td>$2,634</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support</td>
<td>$2,875</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>$79</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
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<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Pay</td>
<td>$159</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$3,230</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$14,356</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iraq and Syria – US Coalition Airstrikes as of July 17, 2017

### OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

#### Close Air Support/Escort/Interdiction*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Sorties with at least one weapon release</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6,591</td>
<td>2,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>21,116</td>
<td>9,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>21,181</td>
<td>11,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>14,780</td>
<td>9,088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Number of Weapons Released

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>6,292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>2,145</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td>2,758</td>
<td>2,380</td>
<td>2,694</td>
<td>3,242</td>
<td>3,145</td>
<td>28,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>2,052</td>
<td>2,582</td>
<td>2,341</td>
<td>3,160</td>
<td>2,439</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td>2,427</td>
<td>3,038</td>
<td>2,709</td>
<td>2,943</td>
<td>30,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>3,439</td>
<td>3,878</td>
<td>3,274</td>
<td>4,374</td>
<td>4,848</td>
<td>4,313</td>
<td>5,075</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36,351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistics provided includes numbers of sorties (not strikes) and munitions expended by aircraft under CFACC control.

#### Additional Key Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties</td>
<td>2,373</td>
<td>9,514</td>
<td>12,270</td>
<td>11,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift and Airdrop Sorties</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>6,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)*</td>
<td>14,555</td>
<td>78,500</td>
<td>72,800</td>
<td>50,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Passengers*</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>47,200</td>
<td>46,900</td>
<td>53,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)</td>
<td>1,417,900</td>
<td>111,200</td>
<td>822,171</td>
<td>380,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker Sorties</td>
<td>4,859</td>
<td>14,737</td>
<td>13,064</td>
<td>10,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Refuelings</td>
<td>28,956</td>
<td>84,381</td>
<td>80,912</td>
<td>52,578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Iraq only
Operation Inherent Resolve – destroying ISIS in Iraq and Syria

Coalition airpower continued its annihilation of ISIS, releasing more than 3,550 weapons, a 30 percent decrease from the record high set in August. September also marked a key milestone for the Coalition, surpassing 100,000 weapons employed since OIR began in August 2014. During the month of September, Coalition airstrikes successfully eliminated five high-value ISIS targets.

On Sept. 4, Coalition aircraft killed Al-Shami as he rode a motorcycle near Mayadin, Syria. Al-Shami led ISIS’ efforts to procure explosives and build bombs for external terrorist acts. The same engagement also resulted in the destruction of the bomb-making lab Al-Shami was en route to. On the same day, Junaid ur Rehman, a senior ISIS drone pilot trainer and engineer, was killed by a precision airstrike south of Mayadin in the village of Al-Asharah, Syria. On Sept. 12 and 13 respectively, three individuals tied to ISIS’ unmanned aerial surveillance network were targeted and killed, including Abu Mawad Al-Tunisi, Sajid Farooq Babar and Abu Salman. The removal of these high value ISIS members disrupts and degrades ISIS’ warfighting capabilities on the battlefield.

As Syrian regime forces advanced on Deir ez-Zor city, the convergence of regime and Coalition partner ground forces in this area called for increased awareness and de-confliction so as to avoid strategic miscalculations in the air or on the ground. As a result, Coalition and Russian military officials, including Coalition air planners from the Combined Air Operations Center, met face-to-face to adjust and expand de-confliction measures. The discussions emphasized the need to share operational graphics and locations to ensure the prevention of accidental targeting or other possible frictions that would distract from the defeat of ISIS. Non-kinetic effects continue to play a critical role in our efforts to defeat ISIS. During the month of September, the Coalition airdropped more than four million leaflets in Iraq and Syria. These leaflets were instrumental in countering ISIS propaganda, informing civilians of Coalition efforts to liberate them from ISIS, and mitigating civilian casualties by telling them how to avoid being hurt by airstrikes and how to safely evacuate. According to Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve, these measures were effective. With the support of Coalition airpower, ISIS continues to face defeat in Raqqa. The SDF have now cleared more than 75 percent of the entire city. Additionally, the SDF also commenced clearance operations against ISIS in the Khabur River Valley, northwest of Deir ez-Zor. Finally, Coalition aircraft continue to support the Government of Iraq as they continue to defeat ISIS and liberate the few remaining holdouts in Iraq. More than 42,000 square kilometers have been cleared and more than 4 million people are now free from ISIS control.
Coalition Air Campaign: September 2014-August 16, 2017 - II

US-led coalition strikes: **IRAQ: 12,468, SYRIA: 11,205**

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor, 16 Aug 2017

The US-led coalition has conducted more than 12,766 air strikes against IS targets in Iraq since August 2014. Most attacks have been carried out by US aircraft, but those from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands and the UK have also taken part.

In Syria, the air campaign began in September 2014. Since then, about 12,850 strikes have been carried out by coalition forces, which include Australia, Bahrain, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the UK.

The number of strikes each month rose steadily in Iraq up to a peak in January 2016 and then began to fall as the number of strikes in Syria increased dramatically, reaching a high of just over 1,500 in September 2017.

Russia is not part of the coalition, but its jets began air strikes against what it called “terrorists” in Syria in September 2015.

Most attacks have been carried out by US aircraft, but those from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands and the UK have also taken part.

In Syria, the air campaign began in September 2014. Since then, about 11,200 strikes have been carried out by coalition forces, which include Australia, Bahrain, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the UK.

The number of strikes each month rose steadily in Iraq up to a peak in January 2016 and then began to fall as the number of strikes in Syria increased dramatically, reaching a high of 880 in June 2017.
## Coalition Airpower: 2012 to 9-30-2017

### Operation Freedom’s Sentinel/Resolute Support Mission

#### Close Air Support*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Sorties with at least one weapon release</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>28,760</td>
<td>1,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>21,900</td>
<td>1,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>12,978</td>
<td>1,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5,774</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5,162</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3,307</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Number of Weapons Released

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>4,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>2,365</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>947</td>
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<td>2016</td>
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<td>115</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>2,238</td>
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*Statistics provided includes numbers of sorties (not strikes) and munitions expended by aircraft under CFACC control.

#### Combined Data (minus OIR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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<td>Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties</td>
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<td>477</td>
<td>84</td>
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Source: AFCENT (CAOC) Public Affairs – afcent.pa@afcent.af.mil.
Coalition Airpower: 2012 to 11-30-2017

Combined Forces Air Component Commander 2012-2017 Airpower Statistics

**Operation Inherent Resolve**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Close Air Support/escort/Interdiction</th>
<th>Number of Weapons Released</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>Sorties with at least one release</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6,591</td>
<td>2,003</td>
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<td>2015</td>
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<td>21,181</td>
<td>11,825</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>18,008</td>
<td>9,746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistics provided includes numbers of sorties (not strikes) and munitions expended by aircraft under CFACC control.*
The US-led coalition has conducted more than 13,200 air strikes against IS targets in Iraq since August 2014. Most attacks have been carried out by US aircraft, but those from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands and the UK have also taken part.

In Syria, the air campaign began in September 2014. Since then, almost 14,000 strikes have been carried out by coalition forces, which include Australia, Bahrain, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the UK.

The number of strikes each month rose steadily in Iraq up to a peak in January 2016 and then began to fall as the number of strikes in Syria increased dramatically, reaching a high of just over 1,400 in August 2017.

Russia is not part of the coalition, but its jets began air strikes against what it called "terrorists" in Syria in September 2015.

Coalition Air Campaign: November 20, 2017

Coalition strikes

- Iraq: 13,214
- Syria: 13,998

*Figures are up to 20 November 2017

Source: US Central Command
The US-led coalition has conducted more than 13,200 air strikes against IS targets in Iraq since August 2014. Most attacks have been carried out by US aircraft, but those from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands and the UK have also taken part. By the end of 2017, 74 countries were said to have joined the US-led coalition fighting IS in Iraq and Syria.

In Syria, the air campaign began in September 2014. Since then, more than 14,200 strikes have been carried out by coalition forces, which include Australia, Bahrain, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the UK. The number of strikes each month rose steadily in Iraq up to a peak in January 2016 and then began to fall as the number of strikes in Syria increased dramatically, reaching a high of just over 1,400 in August 2017.

Russia is not part of the coalition, but its jets began air strikes against what it called "terrorists" in Syria in September 2015.

Coalition Air Strikes as of January 8, 2018

Coalition strikes

- Iraq 13,260
- Syria 14,236

*Figures are up to 8 January 2018

Source: US Central Command

Coalition Air Strikes as of March 23, 2018

US-led coalition strikes: **IRAQ: 13,315**  **SYRIA: 14,660**

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor, 23 Mar 2018
Coalition Air Strikes as of March 23, 2018

Coalition strikes

- Iraq 13,315
- Syria 14,660

*Figures are up to 26 March 2018

Source: US Central Command
The Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah Side of the War
The Russian Build Up: 10/2015 - II


Russian sea and air assets move into Syria

The Russian Defense Ministry last month announced the deployment of ships from its Black Sea Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to carry out military drills. Included were:

1 **Cruiser** (Moskva)

1 **Destroyer** (Smetlivy)

2 **Frigates** (Pytlivy and Ladny)

Russia has deployed a variety of military aircraft to Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia, including:

4 **Su-34** Fullback fighter-bombers

12 **Su-24** Fencer attack aircraft

12 **Su-25** Frogfoot close-air-support aircraft

Other aircraft at the airport in Latakia:

4 **Su-30** Flanker multi-role fighters

12+ **Mi-24** Hind attack helicopters

Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Pentagon
Russian Facilities in Syria: 9/2015

Russia’s introduction of the S-400 Triumph weapons system in Syria near Latakia, confirmed by CJTF-OIR officials on December 2, poses additional risk to U.S. and coalition forces in the airspace over the battlefield in Syria. The S-400 is a mobile surface-to-air defense missile system with long-range strike capability of about 400 kilometers. See Figure 4 for key cities and airspace positions in full range of the missiles. In December, CJTF-OIR reported that Russia’s SA-17 air-defense radar system is located in Aleppo, but its location was not influencing coalition airstrikes. CJTF-OIR officials repeatedly denied that the deployment of these advanced systems had any effect on the U.S. air mission.

DoD reported that, over a 27-day span during December 5–31, the coalition conducted 172 airstrikes in Syria (6.37 per day). The month prior, during November 7–27, it conducted 185 strikes (8.01 per day).
On 03 OCT the Russian military deployed the S-300 (NATO reporting name: SA-23) air defense system to the Syrian naval base in Tartus. Russian forces already operate the S-400 (NATO reporting name SA-21 Growler) long-range air defense system, which has a claimed range of 400km, as well as the S-200 (SA-5 Gammon), in Syria. Russia also operates a number of short-range air defense systems, including the Pantsir-S1 and Buk missile systems, as well as the naval version of the S-300 a Slava-class guided missile cruiser in the Mediterranean. In addition to the IADS, Syrian forces operate the Bastion coastal defense system out of Tartus.

Now that the Russian IADS in Syria is deployed and presumably fully functional, it changes the regional security situation in two ways. First, it confirms that the ongoing Russian deployment of disparate missile systems to Syria over the past year always intended to culminate in a fully functional IADS, rather than individual missile systems in different locations. SAM systems in the S-300 family (including the S-400) are designed to be both forwards and backwards compatible, which means that their component parts - command and control modules, search and fire control radars, missile launchers and missiles - may be used in different combinations.

Second, this deployable and road mobile IADS solely aims to threaten US and coalition aircraft and deter further involvement or escalation of coalition operations. The only purpose of this IADS is to pressure US and coalition policy makers to cede the majority of Syrian airspace to Russian and Syrian aircraft in order to continue their campaign of targeting civilian populations for destruction or depopulation, as evidenced by recent Russian threats to shoot down U.S. coalition aircraft. This expeditionary, modular, and mobile Russian IADS is a significant upgrade over the legacy Syrian IADS. The component parts of the Syrian IADS were largely fixed, difficult if not impossible to move, and highly dependent on centralized command and control as well as external long range radar cuing.
Russian Air Defenses in Syria: WP Map of 6.10.16

Source: Institute for the Study of War, IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor as of Oct. 6
THE WASHINGTON POST
High Confidence Locations of Russian and Coalition Air Strikes

Air Campaign: New Patterns in Air Strikes December 3 to February 23rd


UK, Russian and US-led strikes in Syria

**US-led coalition air strikes**

- UK: 3 Feb-23 Feb 2016, 3 Dec 2015-2 Feb 2016
- Other coalition forces: 4 Feb-23 Feb 2016, 30 Sept 2015-3 Feb 2016

**Russian air & cruise missile strikes**

- 26 Jan-16 Feb 2016, 30 Sep 2015-25 Jan 2016

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US military, UK MoD, French Defence Ministry. Locations may have multiple strikes.

Kirlogan stated that the operation targeted both 18 and the syr

something about the map and areas of control.

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/156c2e29103a8a70
Russian Expansion of Activity: August 2016

- Tu-22M3 bombers and Su-34 attack fighters fly out of Iran (8.19)
- Targets were hit in Aleppo, Idlib and Deir al-Zour provinces. Local groups said 27 civilians had died.
- Two ships from Black Sea Fleet --Zelyony Dol and Serpukhov -- fired three Kaliber cruise missiles from off the coast of Syria in the eastern Mediterranean (19.8)
- Talks stall on all levels from humanitarian to settlement.
- Syrian fighters bomb U.S. supported Kurdish forces (?) (8.19)
- Saleh says he and Houthi may invite Russians to aid them in Yemen (?) (8.21)

August 13: Iran reportedly appoints new National Defense Forces head in Suwayda Province. Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Ibrai Shyshani reportedly appointed Saleh Jarbou as the new commander of the National Defense Forces in Suwayda Province following a meeting at the Iranian Embassy in Damascus. If confirmed, the appointment illustrates the growing degree of control held by Iran over the security apparatus of the regime, particularly its networks of pro-regime paramilitaries.

August 16: Military Operation Center in Jordan allegedly orders Southern Front to refrain from anti-regime operations. The covert U.S.-backed Military Operations Center (MOC) based in Amman, Jordan, allegedly demanded that the Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated Southern Front refrain from launching an offensive against the regime-held town of Sheikh Musleim in Daraa Province, according to local activists. The MOC offered to provide monthly salaries to opposition fighters in return for the deal. Pro-regime forces supported by Russian airstrikes seized Sheikh Musleim from the opposition in January 2016.

August 16: Senior Chinese official meets with Syrian Minister of Defense in Damascus. Director of the Office for International Military Cooperation of China’s Central Military Commission Guan Youfei met Syrian Minister of Defense Fahd Jassim al-Freij and an unidentified Russian general in Damascus, according to Chinese state-run media. Guan stated that China is “willing to keep strengthening” bilateral military cooperation with Syria. An anonymous Chinese official stated that China agreed to provide humanitarian aid to Syria as well as consider the deployment of trainers to the Syrian Arab Army.

August 14: Islamic State detonates SVVEST at key opposition-held border crossing in Idlib Province. The Islamic State detonated an SVVEST near a bus transporting opposition fighters near the Atmeh Border Crossing in Idlib Province, killing over thirty opposition fighters and wounding at least fifty others. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the attack also killed at least two soldiers in the Turkish Armed Forces.

August 14: Pro-regime forces repel opposition offensive on Aleppo City. Jabhat Fatah al-Sham - the successor of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra - and other members of the Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room and Fatah Halab Operations Room launched a two-pronged offensive targeting the concom factory and other positions on the outskirts of Aleppo City. Opposition forces secured initial gains before being forced to retreat by heavy airstrikes.

August 14-15: Opposition groups form Al-Bab Military Council. Seven local opposition groups announced the formation of the Al-Bab Military Council with the goal of seizing the SDF-held town of Al-Bab in Aleppo Province. The Al-Bab Local Council later denounced the groups for their alleged links to the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a coalition with heavy participation of the Syrian Kurdish YPG.

August 17: Opposition claims to seize key border town from Islamic State. The U.S.-backed Hawar Kilis Operations Room announced its full control over the key border town of Al-Rai in Northern Aleppo Province following three days of heavy clashes with the Turkish Armed Forces reportedly providing cross-border artillery support to the offensive. Al-Rai serves as a key transit route for smuggling fighters and supplies across the Syrian-Turkish border.

August 12: Syrian Democratic Forces seize full control of Manbij. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a coalition consisting of the Syrian Kurdish YPG and allied opposition groups – seized full control over Manbij after clearing the Islamic State from the last remaining districts of the city center. A large number of remaining IS fighters withdrew towards the north in a convoy containing several hundred civilians. Operations to clear the city of sleeper cells and explosives remain ongoing. The campaign began on May 31.

August 17-18: Regime warplanes target Syrian Kurds in Al-Hasakah City. Regime warplanes conducted airstrikes on at least six locations held by the Syrian Kurdish YPG near Al-Hasakah City amid ongoing clashes between pro-regime National Defense Forces (NDF) militia and Syrian Kurdish Asayish internal security forces.

August 16-18: Russia conducts first airstrikes from Western Iran. Russia launched airstrikes from the Shahid Nojeh Airbase in Hamadan Province in Western Iran following the conclusion of a basing agreement. Russia sortied Tu-22 M3 ‘Backfire’ strategic bombers and Su-34 ‘Fullback’ fighter-bombers from the base, claiming to conduct airstrikes against alleged Islamic State targets in Deir e-Zor Province as well as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham targets in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces.
ISW Estimate of Russian air Strikes at Time of Failed Ceasefire: September 12-19, 2016

Source: ISW, Genevieve Casagrande, Syria Analyst and the ISW Syria Team, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/1574e8a532c9826e?projector=1.
ISW Estimate as of October 11, 2016

12-18 August 2016
ISW Estimate as of October 11, 2016

**1 October 10:** Turkish-Backed Opposition Forces

**Syrian Democratic Forces in Northern Aleppo Province:**
Turkey in Operation Euphrates Shield seized the town of Dabiq in Northern Aleppo Province. The fall of Dabiq represented a symbolic ideological significance as the alleged site of a future apocalyptic battle against the Islamic State (IS). The US-led coalition conducted airstrikes targeting IS forces following the group’s seizure of the town.

**2 October 11:** UNICEF and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) team from Idlib to support the country’s northwestern region.

**3 October 12:** Turkey launches Operation Euphrates Shield in northwestern Syria.

**4 October 13:** Russian forces in Syria.

**5 October 14:** Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria.

**6 October 15:** Syrian government forces in eastern Ghouta.

**7 October 16:** Turkish forces in Syria.

**8 October 17:** Russian airstrikes in Latakia.

**9 October 18:** Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria.

**10 October 19:** Russian airstrikes in Hama.

**11 October 20:** Russian forces in Syria.

**12 October 21:** Turkish-Backed forces in northern Syria.

**13 October 22:** Syrian government forces in eastern Ghouta.

**14 October 23:** Russian forces in Syria.

**15 October 24:** Turkish-Backed forces in northern Syria.

**16 October 25:** Syrian government forces in eastern Ghouta.

**17 October 26:** Turkish-Backed forces in northern Syria.

**18 October 27:** Russian forces in Syria.

**19 October 28:** Turkish-Backed forces in northern Syria.

**20 October 29:** Syrian government forces in eastern Ghouta.

**21 October 30:** Turkish-Backed forces in northern Syria.

**22 October 31:** Russian forces in Syria.

**23 October 32:** Turkish-Backed forces in northern Syria.

**24 October 33:** Syrian government forces in eastern Ghouta.

**25 October 34:** Turkish-Backed forces in northern Syria.

**26 October 35:** Russian forces in Syria.

**27 October 36:** Turkish-Backed forces in northern Syria.

**28 October 37:** Syrian government forces in eastern Ghouta.

**29 October 38:** Turkish-Backed forces in northern Syria.

**30 October 39:** Russian forces in Syria.

**31 October 40:** Turkish-Backed forces in northern Syria.

Russia renewed its violent, indiscriminate air campaign against civilians in Western Syria in order to coerce groups opposed to the Bashar al-Assad regime to accept a ceasefire or ‘de-escalation zone’ in Idlib Province. Russia shifted its air campaign to target rebel-held terrain in Idlib and Hama Provinces following an offensive launched by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – the successor of Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Fatah al-Sham – in Northern Hama Province on September 19. The Russian Ministry of Defense launched an immediate disinformation operation to present this shift in its air campaign as a legitimate series of strikes against extremist groups attempting to disrupt a ‘de-escalation zone’ in Idlib Province brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran on September 15. Russia nonetheless mounted a systematic campaign of airstrikes against civilian infrastructure – including hospitals, schools, power stations, and mosques – as well as former U.S.-backed rebel groups unaffiliated with HTS or al Qaeda. The strikes marked a return to the widespread punitive air campaigns Russia previously directed against opposition-held terrain across Western Syria. Russia also employed advanced weapons systems to further inflict violence against Idlib Province under the guise of counter-terrorism operations. The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Permanent Mediterranean Task Force launched Kalibr cruise missiles targeting Ma’arat al-Numan in Southern Idlib Province on September 22. Russia Tu-95MS ‘Bear’ strategic bombers later launched Kh-101 cruise missiles targeting the outskirts of Idlib City on September 26. Russia’s deliberate use of violence against civilians precludes any legitimate, Russian-enforced ‘de-escalation’ zone in Idlib Province.

Russia also leveraged its ongoing air campaign to co-opt Turkey away from the U.S. and NATO in order to further set conditions for the planned ‘de-escalation zone’ in Idlib. Russia concentrated its airstrikes in areas of Western Idlib Province along the Syrian-Turkish Border from September 25 - 30. The Russian Air Force likely sought to interdict the movement of HTS and opposition forces ahead of a Turkish Armed Force (TSK) deployment into Idlib by targeting rebel-held areas connecting Western Aleppo Province to the Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing on the Syrian-Turkish Border as well as key supply routes around Idlib City. Turkish President Recep Erdogan subsequently announced the start of cross-border operations to implement the Idlib ‘de-escalation zone’ on October 7. Erdogan stated that Russia would support his intervention. The TSK began deployments to observation positions in Northern Idlib Province near the majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton on October 12 following earlier reconnaissance missions. Russia likely perceives an opportunity to exploit widening diplomatic fissures between the U.S. and Turkey. Russia could thus attempt to use the ‘de-escalation zone’ to compel Turkey into deeper – albeit temporary – cooperation with Russia in Northwestern Syria at the expense of the United States.

The graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

ISA: Russian Retargeting of Civilians: Post Al Qaida Hama Offensive - II

Foreign Fighters
Rough Estimate of Total ISIS Fighters in Syria and Iraq: As of 8/2016

In Iraq and Syria
- 200,000 (Kurdish claims)
- 70,000 Russian military estimate
- 100,000 (Jihadist claim)
- 20,000–31,000 (CIA estimate in 2014)
- 20,000–25,000 (CIA estimate in 2016)

Outside Iraq and Syria
- 1,000–2,000 (In Egypt)
- 5,000–10,000 (In Libya)
- 30 (In Algeria)
- 4,200+ (In Jordan)
- 3,000 (In Turkey)
- 3,000+ (In Afghanistan)
- ~1,000 (in Yemen) 1,000–
- 4,000 (In Europe) 7,000–
- 10,000 (In West Africa)

Estimated total:
52,600–258,000
Yes, we have noticed a reduction in the flow of foreign fighters. We think at its heyday last year, that it was upward of 2,000 a month that were coming into Syria then moving into Iraq. We think that the flow is now down somewhere around between 200 and 500. I've seen different estimates on that.

That was prior to Manbij, so I don't know that we have a kind of a new estimate based on what we're seeing in the fight in Manbij. If we can get that area completely under control, I would anticipate that to go down, but we'll have to kind of re-look at those numbers when that happens.

We're also looking at the flow into and around both Syria and Iraq. So it's not just where they're coming in but where are they staying? Where are they being supported? How do they get from point A to point B? You know, we certainly don't see the long convoys of white trucks moving across the desert where fighters are moving in and out, and moving from Mosul to Raqqah unimpeded, as we saw a year and half ago in this fight.

Now, the facilitation -- the flow of foreign fighters is done -- a few guys hide in the back of truck, people walking across the desert. You don't see the massive amounts of -- of movement. It's certainly been whittled down in its size.

Where that's important tactically is if somebody is in Raqqah and they're trying to get reinforcements to Mosul, they can do it either through a slow -- through a slow method -- they were having to send foreign fighters or just fighters -- not just foreign fighters, but fighters. If you were trying to send fighters from Raqqah to Mosul, you would end up sending them through the Abu Kamal and Al Qaim area.

That's why that fight is important because that's going to help slow down the flow of foreign fighters to that one high-speed avenue of approach from Iraq to Syria and back. And so we're interdicting those lines as well.

You know, you're never going to seal a border. Certainly the border wasn't sealed prior to all of this and it's going to be tough to do that. We're training, you know, the border security forces to assist with that, at the same time we're training the Iraqi police.
FTFs continue to reach ISIL-controlled territory, although it remains impossible to accurately assess their number, origins, affiliations, or identities. These FTFs continue to travel undetected through the relatively small portion of the Turkey-Syria border still controlled by ISIL (about 98 km). Ongoing diplomatic efforts seek to work with Turkey to increase security of that border, and the U.S.-led coalition is active on a variety of fronts to prevent, detect, and deter such individuals from joining ISIL. Along with interagency colleagues this quarter, DoS has signed two agreements to share information on known or suspected terrorists. DoS also worked with DHS this quarter to improve visa screening by implementing enhanced questionnaires on persons applying for visa-free travel through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program. The additional questions are intended to help U.S. security agencies in screening potential FTFs who may seek to exploit the Visa Waiver Program.

**FTF Origins and Force Strength**

As reported in Lead IG’s September 2015 OIR report, the House Committee on Homeland Security estimated that approximately 25,000 FTFs had traveled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIL, as of last September (about 5,000 of them Tunisian nationals). A somewhat more recent report, published in December by the New York-based consultancy The Soufan Group draws on data compiled by the UN and other sources to place the number of FTFs slightly higher, at between 27,000 and 31,000. The Soufan Group noted that the profile of the approximately 150 U.S. citizens who have successfully traveled to Iraq and Syria is diverse, with no predominant geographical region or ethnicity.

The Soufan Group also concluded the following:

- **FTFs from Russia and Central Asia** have increased an estimated 300% since June 2014.
- **Regionally**, Saudi Arabia (2,500), Turkey (2,100), and Jordan (2,000) are estimated to have produced the most FTFs.
- **Personal-recruitment pitches** made by ISIL members or sympathizers are often just as compelling as social-media appeals, especially in extremist hotbeds, such as the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia and Arab-immigrant enclaves in France and Belgium. The French government estimated that, as of October, 1,700 FTFs had traveled from France to fight for ISIL.
- **The western Balkans** are increasingly serving as a transit hub for FTFs seeking to join ISIL in Iraq and Syria. In November, the New America Foundation released a report on 474 FTFs from 25 Western countries (defined as select countries in Europe and North America, as well as Australia and New Zealand). Of the 474 FTFs included in the study, 83 were U.S. citizens.
December 2013 to August 2014

TOTAL: 21,632

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-islamic-state-is-fraying-from-within/2015/03/08/0003a2e0-c276-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html
Uncertain Foreign Fighter Numbers: 2014 to 2015 - I

The majority of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from neighbouring Middle Eastern and North African states, as well as Turkey. Tunisia has the greatest number of departing foreign fighters of any country in the world.

http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 46.
Uncertain Foreign Fighter Numbers: 2014 to 2015 - II

Among countries where Muslims are not in the majority, Russia and Western Europe have the highest numbers of fighters known to have travelled to Iraq and Syria.


**NOTE:** Estimates represent the best available figure for the number of fighters who have ever left the country to join any armed group, including but not limited to ISIL. These figures do not reflect those who may have been arrested, been killed or have returned to their country of origin. See Annex D for more data sources.
Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria: 2013 to 2015

The majority of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from the Middle East and North Africa. Western countries include Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia.

The total number of foreign fighters believed to have joined armed groups in Iraq and Syria more than doubled from December 2013 to October 2015. Figures are cumulative totals. Numbers are estimates only based on IEP calculations from a variety of sources.

The US Central Intelligence Agency believes IS may have up to 31,000 fighters in the region, many of whom are foreign recruits. Figures from the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and the New York-based Soufan Group show an estimated 20,000 fighters from almost 80 countries have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with extremist groups. The figures suggest that while about a quarter of the foreign fighters are from the West, the majority are from nearby Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Morocco.
Foreign Fighters are Negligible Part of Population Base: 5/2015

Note: Upper estimates used. Countries with fewer than 500 fighters not included
Source: ICSR, CIA World Factbook

27,000 foreign jihadists made the trip from 86 countries, more than half of them from the Middle East and North Africa. Tunisians make up the majority of foreign recruits.
Where Islamic State foreign fighters come from

Foreign fighters per 1 million people

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Source: The Count of Emmejihad/Guy Van Vlierden

THE WASHINGTON POST

The US Central Intelligence Agency believes IS may have up to 31,000 fighters in the region, many of whom are foreign recruits.

Figures from the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and the New York-based Soufan Group show an estimated 20,000 fighters from almost 80 countries have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with extremist groups.

The figures suggest that while about a quarter of the foreign fighters are from the West, the majority are from nearby Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Morocco.

Note: Upper estimates used. Countries with fewer than 500 fighters not included.

Source: ICSR, CIA World Factbook

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### Wikipedia Estimate of ISIS Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: As of 8/2016

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As of September 29, 2015, the CIA estimated that 30,000 foreign fighters had joined ISIS.[60] As of October 2015, 21% came from Europe, 50% from the Middle East or North Africa, and 29% from elsewhere.

List does not include nationals of Iraq and Syria (except for nationals of Iraqi Kurdistan).

Primary operating areas of Sunni extremist groups in 2017

Source: US Office of the Director of National Intelligence
BBC Estimate of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria:
Soufan Group: October 2017

Nationalities of IS foreign fighters

- Russia
- Saudi Arabia
- Jordan
- Tunisia
- France
- Morocco
- Turkey
- Uzbekistan
- Germany
- UK

*Most numbers are approximate and are dated between Mar 2016 and Aug 2017. In the case of Uzbekistan there is no data for returned fighters.

Source: The Soufan Group (Oct 2017)
ISIS and Al Qaida

ISIS’s attacks are growing faster than attacks by other terrorist organizations. From 2013–2014 the number of attacks by ISIS increased 233 percent from 373 to 1,241.

*al-Qaeda in Iraq in considered to be ISIS’s predecessor

Source: Meghan Keneally, JAN DIEHM, ABC News, Sobering Chart Shows ISIS Is the Terror Group With Most Mass Killings Since 2000
In 2015 there were 28 countries that had ISIL affiliations, whereas 12 countries had al-Qa’ida affiliates.

In three years ISIL and affiliated groups have killed nearly 30,000 from terrorism. That is a similar number to what al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups have killed over the last eight years.

ISIL, Al Qaida, Al Nusra Attacks by Country: 2010-2015

Syria: 533 Incidents

Yemen: 893 Incidents

Iraq: 2,896 Incidents

Saudi Arabia: 10 Incidents

Perpetrators: (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Al-Nusra Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)); All incidents regardless of doubt.

Source: START,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
Types of targets of terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 - 2016

Source: Erin Miller and Michael Distler, Mass Casualty Explosives Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, START Background Report, University of Maryland, June 2017.
ISIL is a much more deadly terrorist group than any of its precursor groups. Precursors to ISIL are the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI).

- al-Baghdadi becomes leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq
- al-Baghdadi calls for 100 attacks in retaliation for the death of Usama bin Ladin
- ISIL formed and moves into Syria
- International airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria
- Invaded Raqqa
- al-Qa’ida severs ties
- Yazidis flee to the mountains
- Returned to Iraq, invaded Mosul

All Al Qaida and Islamic State Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016

5,887 Incidents
- 9.8% of largely Islamic regions
- 8.3% of world

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=20029&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max= All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: (Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida Kurdish Battalions (AQKB); Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Islamic State in Bangladesh; Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL))
All Elements Labeled as Al Qaida Causing Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016

1,505 Incidents

- 2.1% of World Total
- 2.5% of Largely Islamic Region Total

Source: START database. All incidents regardless of doubt. Includes Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida Kurdistan Battalions (AQKB); Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al-Qaqa Brigade.

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

All incidents regardless of doubt.
ISIS
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was responsible for more attacks and deaths than any other perpetrator group in 2016. In particular, ISIS carried out 20% more terrorist attacks in Iraq, and caused 69% more total deaths in Iraq, compared to 2015. Beyond Iraq and Syria, ISIS and perpetrator groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS carried out attacks in more than 20 different countries. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of the ISIS affiliates were located in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.

Of the attacks for which perpetrator information was reported in 2016, 19% were carried out by ISIS. (Note: Attacks attributed to ISIS in the Statistical Annex dataset exclude those attributed to specific declared branches of ISIS such as those operating in Egypt, Libya, and West Africa. They also do not include attacks carried out by unaffiliated individuals who might have been inspired by ISIS.) Additionally, 13% of attacks in 2016 were carried out by the Taliban.

ISIS (+17%) and al-Shabaab (+47%) carried out more terrorist attacks in 2016 than they did in 2015. However, while al-Shabaab’s lethality decreased (11% fewer total deaths in 2016), the total number of deaths caused by ISIS increased 48% and the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage by ISIS increased 75% in 2016, compared to 2015.

While ISIS was responsible for 19% fewer terrorist attacks in Syria (122 in 2016 compared to 150 in 2015), the number of attacks carried out by ISIS in Iraq increased by 20% (932 in 2016 compared to 775 in 2015). The lethality of these attacks increased 69% (7,338 total deaths in 2016, compared to 4,341 in 2015).

Furthermore, the geographic reach of attacks by ISIS and its affiliates continued to grow in 2016. The number of attacks attributed to ISIS outside of Iraq and Syria increased 80%, from 44 in 2015 to 79 in 2016. This does not include attacks attributed to other organizations that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of these ISIS affiliates were located in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.
For more than a decade, the organization now known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or simply the Islamic State, has carried out deadly terrorist attacks. Beginning as a small network led by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the first terrorist attack attributed to this group was the assassination of American diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan in October 2002. Since then, the group initially known as Tawhid and Jihad (Jama'at al-Tawhid w'al-Jihad (the Party of Monotheism and Jihad)) has undergone a complex evolution, including name changes, leadership changes, and shifts in allegiance to other Salafi-jihadist organizations, most notably al-Qaida. In addition, the reach of ISIL’s violence surpasses its own membership, to include attacks carried out by other groups and individuals who have pledged allegiance to ISIL regardless of whether or not formal ties exist.

This complexity makes it difficult to comprehensively and systematically place into context the violence of one of the most active and deadly terrorist organizations in recent history. For the purpose of this report, we have classified the terrorist attacks in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into four ISIL-related perpetrator categories:

- ISIL Predecessor: attacks by organizations that were part of the ISIL lineage prior to adoption of the ISIL name in 2013
- ISIL: attacks by operatives of the “core” of the organization, based in and primarily active in Iraq and Syria
- ISIL Affiliate: attacks by organizations that have declared allegiance to ISIL
- ISIL-Inspired: attacks by individuals who have indicated that they were motivated by allegiance to ISIL
- ISIL-Related: any of the above

This report presents data that illustrate the dynamics of ISIL-related terrorism over time and place, from 2002 to 2015. In particular, we investigate trends in the number of attacks and deaths caused by ISIL-related terrorism over time, the geographic spread of ISIL-related terrorism, and patterns of tactics, targets, and lethality of ISIL-related terrorism.

Source: START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report, https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/ _/js/k=gmail.main.en_sXDiEpUnPe0.O/m=m_i,t/am=nhGPDGD-3_uDc5ODgK70kQrz3n--fSo7dnmH - 8DROI4P_N_h_A_8FetlUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdJPOUaW LXcEmXR9Kgg0GbqzX_ow, and https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a99.
Between October 2002 and April 2013, ISIL predecessors (primarily known as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)) carried out attacks almost exclusively in Iraq (95%). An additional 5 percent of attacks carried out by the perpetrator organizations that would become ISIL took place in Syria beginning in December 2011.

Initially sources attributed responsibility for the attacks in Syria to AQI, and in 2012 al-Nusra Front began claiming responsibility for attacks in Syria. In addition, four attacks were carried out in Jordan—one in 2002 (by Tawhid and Jihad) and three in 2005 (by AQI). Two men reportedly linked to AQI carried out an attack in the United Kingdom in 2007.

In April 2013, ISI leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced the expansion of ISI to include al-Nusra Front in Syria. Although al-Nusra Front’s leadership ultimately rejected this alliance, and al-Qaida leadership subsequently disowned ISIL.

- Between 2002 and 2015, more than 4,900 terrorist attacks were carried out by groups or organizations affiliated with ISIS.
- The attacks caused more than 33,000 deaths and 41,000 injuries (including perpetrator casualties), and involved more than 11,000 individuals held hostage or kidnapped.
- Excluding incidents where the perpetrator group was not identified, these attacks represented 13 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide, 26 percent of all deaths, 28 percent of all injuries, and 24 percent of all kidnap victims or hostages due to terrorism during the same time period.
- “Core” ISIL was responsible for the majority of attacks (58%), deaths (58%), and especially hostages (88%), compared to ISIL predecessor groups, ISIL-affiliated groups, and individuals inspired by ISIL. Attacks carried out by ISIL and ISIL predecessor groups each comprised 42 percent of all injuries caused in ISIL-related terrorist attacks.
- Although attacks carried out by individuals who claimed allegiance to ISIL have drawn considerable media attention in recent months, these perpetrators were responsible for less than 1 percent of all ISIL-related attacks and casualties between 2002 and 2015. In addition, attacks carried out by individuals inspired by ISIL were 74 percent less deadly on average than ISIL-related attacks in general (1.9 deaths per attack on average, compared to 7.3).

ISIL Predecessor: attacks by organizations that were part of the ISIL lineage prior to adoption of the ISIL name in 2013
ISIL: attacks by operatives of the “core” of the organization, based in and primarily active in Iraq and Syria
ISIL Affiliate: attacks by organizations that have declared allegiance to ISIL
ISIL-Inspired: attacks by individuals who have indicated that they were motivated by allegiance to ISIL
ISIL-Related: any of the above

Source: Adapted from START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002–2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/
Keeping in mind the potential impact of increasing access to media sources on which the GTD is based, we encourage readers to interpret trends over time with caution. For more information please see:

Source: Adapted from START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002–2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/
While approximately half (51%) of attacks carried out by perpetrators not linked to ISIL were lethal, three-quarters (75%) of ISIL-related attacks were deadly. The highest proportion of lethal attacks were those carried out by ISIL-inspired individuals, whose attacks resulted in at least one death 85 percent of the time. Note, however, that despite this relatively high prevalence of deadly attacks, the average lethality of attacks carried out by ISIL-inspired individuals between 2002 and 2015 was 1.9 deaths per attack. This is much more similar to the lethality of attacks by perpetrators not linked to ISIL (2.1 deaths per attack). In contrast, the average number of deaths per attack carried out by ISIL predecessor groups was 8.6, the average number of deaths caused by attacks carried out by ISIL “core” was 7.5, and attacks by ISIL affiliated groups caused 5.8 deaths per attack, on average.

None of the attacks by ISIL-inspired individuals were suicide attacks, compared to approximately 24 percent of attacks by ISIL predecessors, 19 percent of attacks by ISIL “core,” and 17 percent of attacks by ISIL affiliates. Nearly two-thirds (63%) of the weapons used in the ISIL-inspired attacks were firearms. Seven of these attacks involved “melee” weapons—knives or other sharp objects. Two involved explosives, and in one of these (the San Bernardino attack in the United States), the explosives failed to detonate. Two attacks involved vehicles used as weapons.

In addition to the prevalence of suicide attacks, ISIL-related terrorist attacks between 2002 and 2015 were also distinguished by the frequent taking of hostages and commission of multi-part events comprised of coordinated attacks. In approximately 12 percent of ISIL-related attacks, including those carried out by individuals inspired by ISIL, the assailants either kidnapped victims or held hostages at the site of the attack. This tactic was 50 percent more prevalent in ISIL-related attacks than in attacks that were not linked to ISIL.

Likewise, the prevalence of coordinated attacks was three times as high for ISIL-related attacks (39% of all attacks were part of a coordinated event) compared to attacks that were not carried out by ISIL-linked perpetrators (13%). In general, attacks that were part of a coordinated event were 22 percent deadlier, on average, than isolated attacks. However, with respect to ISIL-related attacks, those that were part of coordinated events were actually 38 percent less deadly, on average, compared to isolated attacks. This somewhat counter-intuitive finding stems from the fact that ISIL and its predecessors have carried out a number of exceptionally deadly isolated attacks, causing hundreds of casualties.

ISIL/ISIS/Daesh Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016

4,343 Incidents
• 6.1% of World Total
• 7.2% of MENA Total

Source: START,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
All incidents regardless of doubt.
Perpetrators: (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)) Rises to 4347 if include Islamic State of Iraq
Scope: Transnational
Orientation: Sunni Islamic
Objective: Revolutionary

A total of 4,236 attacks were claimed by, or attributed to, the Islamic State in open sources in 2016, underlining the group’s status as the most prolific non-state armed group worldwide. Despite ongoing heavy territorial pressure on the group in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, the recorded number of attacks increased by 28% from 2015, highlighting the extent of the group’s resistance and ongoing capabilities, as well as its transition to insurgent operations in recaptured areas and punitive operations. While Iraq and Syria accounted for 84% of Islamic State attacks worldwide, this was down from 92% in 2015, underlining the expanding presence of its affiliates, in addition to proliferating lone actors operating in the West.

Countries in which the group is active:
- Afghanistan
- Bangladesh
- Belgium
- Cameroon
- Chad
- Egypt
- France
- Germany
- India
- Indonesia
- Iraq
- Israel
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Malaysia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Pakistan
- Philippines
- Russian Federation
- Saudi Arabia
- Somalia
- Syria
- Tunisia
- Turkey
- United States
- Yemen
ISIS “Provinces”

ISIS Attacks vs. Deaths: 2002-2015

Source: Erin Miller, Sheehan Kane, William Kammerer, and Brian Wingenroth: Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002--2015; START, August 2016
In comparison to global patterns during the same time period, the weapons used by ISIL in terrorist attacks between 2013 and 2015 were disproportionately explosives rather than firearms and incendiaries.

Specifically, the vast majority (80%) of weapons used in ISIL’s attacks were explosives, compared to 58 percent of weapons used worldwide. An additional 16 percent of weapons used by ISIL were firearms, compared to 33 percent globally, and 2 percent involved “melee” weapons (usually sharp or blunt objects).

Only 1 percent of the weapons used in ISIL’s attacks were incendiaries, much lower than the usage of incendiary weapons in 6 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide.

Chemicals, vehicles as weapons, and sabotage equipment comprised less than 1 percent of the weapons used in attacks by ISIL between 2013 and 2015. Note, however, that recent reports indicate that ISIL’s use of chemical weapons became more common in 2016.9
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Chemicals, vehicles as weapons, and sabotage equipment comprised less than 1 percent of the weapons used in attacks by ISIL between 2013 and 2015.

Note, however, that recent reports indicate that ISIL’s use of chemical weapons became more common in 2016, quarters of all attacks carried out by ISIL.

Source: START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report, https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js=k.gmail.main.en.sXDiEpUnPe0.O/m=m_i/t/am=nhGPDGD-3_uDcSoDdKQrz3n--fS07drrnH--8DROIv4P_N_h_A_8FetLUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdJPOUaWLXcEmxR9KqgOGBqXN_ow and https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a9a.
ISIS Revenues: 2014-2016

*2015 kidnapping figure is unknown

Note: Amounts shown are upper estimates. Other income comes from the sale of antiquities and foreign donations, but is not thought to be significant.

Source: ICSR

BBC Graph of ISIS Revenue: 2014 vs. 2015

IHS Jane's Graph of ISIS Revenue: Summer 2015 vs. March 2016

Islamic State finances in Iraq and Syria

Oil and gas
-26%

Tax and confiscation
-23%

Other
-67%

Monthly revenue in summer 2015

$31m $39m $9m

Total: $79m

Overall: -29%

Monthly revenue in March 2016

$23m $30m $3m

Total: $56m

Financial Times Map of ISIS Oil Trade, February 2016

ISIS Affiliates
### ISIS Affiliates – 2014-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State</th>
<th>Jund al-Khilafah (Tunisia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>Jundallah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar Al-Khilafa (Philippines)</td>
<td>Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>Lahij Province of the Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)</td>
<td>Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barqa Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>Najd Province of the Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>Sanaa Province of the Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fezzan Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>Shabwah Province of the Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadramawt Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijaz Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>Sinai Province of the Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)</td>
<td>Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State in Bangladesh</td>
<td>Supporters of the Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaah Ansharat Daulah</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Khilafat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jund al-Khilafah (Algeria)</td>
<td>Tripoli Province of the Islamic State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: START, *Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report,* [https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js=k=gmail.main.en.sXDiEpUnPe0.O/m=m_i_t/am=nhGPDDO-3_u0cS0DgK70kQrz3n--f5o7drmH--8DROIv4P_N_h_A_8FetlUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdJPOUaWLXcEmxR9Kgg0Gbq2X_ow](https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js=k=gmail.main.en.sXDiEpUnPe0.O/m=m_i_t/am=nhGPDDO-3_u0cS0DgK70kQrz3n--f5o7drmH--8DROIv4P_N_h_A_8FetlUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdJPOUaWLXcEmxR9Kgg0Gbq2X_ow) and [https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a99](https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a99).
START Estimate of ISIS Affiliate Attacks in 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
### ISIS Role in Worldwide Attacks: 2002-2015

#### Attack Patterns of ISIL-Related and Non-ISIL-Related Terrorist Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>% Lethal</th>
<th>Total Deaths per Attack</th>
<th>% Suicide</th>
<th>% Hostages/Kidnapping</th>
<th>% Coordinated Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISIL-Related</td>
<td>4943</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL Predecessors</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>2858</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL-Affiliated</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL-Inspired</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ISIL-Related</td>
<td>78345</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>83288</strong></td>
<td><strong>52.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Erin Miller, Sheehan Kane, William Kammerer, and Brian Wingenroth: *Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002–2015; START, August 2016*
As new and established organizations began making declarations of allegiance to ISIL, the network expanded dramatically. In 2014, 11 ISIL-affiliated perpetrator groups carried out terrorist attacks in eight different countries, and in 2015 a total of 27 ISIL-affiliated groups carried out attacks in 20 different countries. The 10 most active ISIL affiliates are listed in the table below, along with information about their attack patterns. Note that for organizations that existed prior to pledging allegiance to ISIL, such as Boko Haram, the table includes only those attacks that they carried out as ISIL affiliates. Thus, the time periods included for each group are not directly comparable.

The ISIL affiliates responsible for the most terrorist attacks and deaths are certainly those that were the most well-established organizations prior to indicating their allegiance to ISIL, and/or had declared allegiance to ISIL the earliest. These include Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Sinai Province (formerly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) in Egypt, and BIFM in the Philippines. ISIL’s presence in Libya was precipitated by Libyan fighters returning from Iraq and Syria—militants who had organized as the Islamic Youth Shura Council, which splintered from Ansar al-Sharia.

Terrorist attacks by both ISIL and ISIL affiliates were characterized by a high proportion of perpetrator deaths—24 percent and 23 percent of total deaths, respectively—compared to attacks that were not linked to ISIL, in which 17 percent of all deaths were perpetrator deaths. The affiliates whose attacks resulted in the highest proportion of perpetrators among those killed were the Khorasan Chapter in Afghanistan and Pakistan (47% of those killed in attacks were perpetrators), BIFM (35%), the Sinai Province (27%), and Boko Haram (24%). More than one-fifth (22%) of the Boko Haram and Sinai Province assailants who were killed died in suicide attacks. Attacks in which especially large numbers of perpetrators were killed typically involved numerous assailants attacking a security target, or security forces responding to a major attack targeting civilians.

A key distinction of the attacks by ISIL-inspired perpetrators, all of which occurred in 2014 and 2015, is that they took place in locations where terrorist attacks were relatively rare compared to where ISIL and ISIL affiliates were typically active. Eight of the ISIL-inspired attacks took place in the United States, six in France, four in Australia, two in Denmark, two in Canada; the Gaza Strip, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines each experienced one ISIL-inspired attack.

Source: Adapted from START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002–2015; http://www.start.umd.edu/

Source: Adapted from START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002-2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/.

An interactive version of this map is available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/interactive/ISILmap.html
Between October 2002 and April 2013, ISIL predecessors (primarily known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)) carried out attacks almost exclusively in Iraq (95%). An additional 5 percent of attacks carried out by the perpetrator organizations that would become ISIL took place in Syria beginning in December 2011.

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Excluding incidents where the perpetrator group was not identified, these attacks represented 13 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide, 26 percent of all deaths, 28 percent of all injuries, and 24 percent of all kidnap victims or hostages due to terrorism during the same time period.

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Although attacks carried out by individuals who claimed allegiance to ISIL have drawn considerable media attention in recent months, these perpetrators were responsible for less than 1 percent of all ISIL-related attacks and casualties between 2002 and 2015. In addition, attacks carried out by individuals inspired by ISIL were 74 percent less deadly on average than ISIL-related attacks in general (1.9 deaths per attack on average, compared to 7.3).
Between 2013 and 2015, there were 32 occasions on which ISIL carried out more than 10 attacks in a single day, all in Iraq.

Furthermore, the number of cases in which ISIL attacks resulted in more than 100 deaths increased from six to 16 between 2013 and 2015. These attacks targeted private citizens (6 attacks), military (5), police (3), business (1), and government (1) targets.

The deadliest attacks attributed to ISIL took place in Iraq in June 2014, when assailants abducted more than 1,600 Iraqi Air Force recruits at Camp Speicher in Tikrit and ultimately killed most, if not all of them. In a separate attack earlier that month, ISIL operatives killed more than 600 Shia prisoners at Badush prison in Nineveh.
Deaths from ISIS-Related Terrorist Attacks, Worldwide, 2002-2015*

While approximately half (51%) of attacks carried out by perpetrators not linked to ISIL were lethal, three-quarters (75%) of ISIL-related attacks were deadly. The highest proportion of lethal attacks were those carried out by ISIL-inspired individuals, whose attacks resulted in at least one death 85 percent of the time. Note, however, that despite this relatively high prevalence of deadly attacks, the average lethality of attacks carried out by ISIL-inspired individuals between 2002 and 2015 was 1.9 deaths per attack. This is much more similar to the lethality of attacks by perpetrators not linked to ISIL (2.1 deaths per attack). In contrast, the average number of deaths per attack carried out by ISIL predecessor groups was 8.6, the average number of deaths caused by attacks carried out by ISIL “core” was 7.5, and attacks by ISIL affiliated groups caused 5.8 deaths per attack, on average.

Source: START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report, https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js/k=gmail.main.en.sXDiEpUnPe0.0/m=m_i/t/am=nhGPDGD-3_uDcS0DgK70kQrz3n--fSo7drmH--8DROIV4P_N_h_A_8FeltUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdJPOUaWLXcEmxR9Kgg0Gbq2X_ow and https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a99.
The most frequent targets of ISIL attacks between April 2013 and the end of 2015 were private citizens and property (39%). Perhaps most notably, attacks primarily targeting private citizens resulted in more than 6,100 people held hostage or kidnapped. Available sources indicate that approximately 1,200 of these victims were subsequently released. The remaining victims were either killed or their status is unknown.

Along with private citizens and property, military targets (21%) and police targets (14%) comprise nearly three-quarters of all attacks carried out by ISIL.

Source: START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report, https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js/k=gmail.main.en.sXTdEpUnPe0.O/m=m_i/t/am=nhGPDGD-3_uDcSODgK70kQrz3n--fSo7dmoN RaiJc-8dDROiV4P_N_h_A_8FetIUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdpiLOuWxEmxR9KggDGbq2X_ow and https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a99.
Preferred ISIS Attack Methods: 2000-2014 - II

https://www.google.com/search?q=Graphs+of+ISIS+Attacks&tbm=isch&imgil=bJ_2yql3oLmSmM%253A%253BzYt03MFSKMNN7aM%253Bhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Fosintjournal.wordpre
ss.com%25252F2014%25252F08%25252F21%25252Ffan-analysis-of-isis-quarterly-reports-kill-and-
conquer%25252Fsource=iu&pf=m&fir=bJ_2yql3oLmSmM%253A%253BzYt03MFSKMNN7aM%253B%25252C_%usg=__OJ0sBYgGF0w5QcG2TgHMOTwLE%3D&biw=1243&bih=972&ved=0ahUKEwjwx
7DxiOzNAhVLGD4KhdolBTcQyjKw&ei=RemDV7CRDMuww-AHakZ54Aw#imgrc=bJ_2yql3oLmSmM%3A
ISIS Terrorist Attacks: January – June 2014

The first attack carried out by an individual reportedly inspired by ISIL, though not directly linked to the organization, took place in April 2014 in the United States. In Seattle, an assailant shot and killed a civilian and later claimed he had done so in response to U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two months later, the same assailant carried out similar attacks in Seattle and West Orange, New Jersey before being apprehended, tried, and convicted. A total of 26 attacks, marked in yellow on the map above, were carried out in 2014 and 2015 by individuals inspired by ISIL. These attacks killed 50 people, including 13 perpetrators, and took place primarily in the United States (8 attacks), France (6), Australia (4), Denmark (2), and Canada (2).
From May 2013 through the end of the year, ISIL carried out an average of 46 attacks per month. In 2014, the frequency of attacks more than doubled to 106 attacks per month, and in 2015, ISIL carried out 102 terrorist attacks per month. Like attacks by its predecessors, ISIL’s terrorist attacks between 2013 and 2015 (shown in red on the map) were heavily concentrated in Iraq (86%) and Syria (12%). ISIL was also responsible for terrorist attacks in neighboring countries such as Lebanon (1%) and Turkey (1%), as well as in Bahrain, Belgium, Egypt, France, Israel, Jordan, Libya, and Somalia, each of which comprised less than 1 percent of ISIL’s terrorist attacks.

In mid-2014, increasing numbers of attacks were carried out by new and existing organizations that pledged allegiance to ISIL, described here as ISIL affiliates. Among the first of these organizations to declare allegiance to ISIL was the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM), active in the Philippines. In August 2014, BIFM spokesperson Abu Misry Mama stated “We have an alliance with the Islamic State and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.” Later that year, the Barqa Province of the Islamic State and the Tripoli Province of the Islamic State emerged in Libya, while Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt pledged allegiance to ISIL and became the Sinai Province of the Islamic State.

Terrorist activity of ISIL affiliates increased dramatically in March 2015 the extremely violent Nigerian organization Boko Haram, announced “allegiance to the caliph.” Following this development, Boko Haram’s terrorist activity was a significant driver of the overall trend of violence carried out by ISIL affiliated groups. In 2015, each of these ISIL-affiliated groups—Boko Haram, Sinai Province, Tripoli Province, Barqa Province, and BIFM—ranked among the 20 most active perpetrator organizations worldwide in terms of number of attacks.

Source: START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report, https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js/k=gmail.main.en.sXDiEpUnPe0.D/m=m.i.t/ams=nhGPcGDG-3_uDc50DqK70kQrz3n--fSo7dwnH---8DROIV4P.N_h._8FetlUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdIPOUaW/0QxEmxR9Kgg0G5gqzLQw, and https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e09a99.
ISIS MENA and South Asia Fatalities: 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
Terrorism and U.S. Wars: Syria and Iraq
All Incidents in MENA and South Asia Regions: 2011-2016

51,321 Incidents

Years: (between 2011 and 2016), All incidents regardless of doubt.

Source: START,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
Incidents From Major Groups U.S. is Fighting in MENA and South Asia Regions: 2011-2016

Perpetrators: (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al-Shabaab; Badr Brigades; Haqqani Network; Houthi extremists (Ansar Allah); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Taliban; Taliban (Pakistan))

12,159 Incidents

Source: START, Years: (between 2011 and 2016), All incidents regardless of doubt.
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
The Broader Kurdish Issue: 2017

Incidents From Major Groups U.S. is Fighting in MENA and South Asia Regions: 2010-2015

Total of 9,482 between 2010 and end 2015; Includes Haqqani Network; Huthi Extremists; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Taliban; Taliban (Pakistan))

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
START Estimate of Attacks In/or near U.S. Combat in 2015
START Estimate of ISIS & Affiliate Attacks in Key U.S. Combat Areas 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
Key Trends in Terrorism: Worldwide and In Iraq and Afghanistan
Total fatalities in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and worldwide, 2000 – 2016

Source: Erin Miller and Michael Distler, Mass Casualty Explosives Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, START Background Report, University of Maryland, June 2017,
Types of targets of terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 - 2016

Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 1970-2016

170,350 incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Source: START Data Base,
Years: (between 1970 and 2016)
All incidents regardless of doubt.
Region: (North America; Central America & Caribbean; South America; East Asia; Southeast Asia; South Asia; Central Asia; Western Europe; Eastern Europe; Middle East & North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Australasia & Oceania)
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8

Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 1970-2016
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 1970-2016
(170,350 Incidents)

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 1970-2016
(170,350 Incidents)

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016

70,767 incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Number of Terrorist Attacks by Region Worldwide 2011-2016 (70,767 Incidents)

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016
(70,767 Incidents)

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Target Type Worldwide 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Attack Type Worldwide 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Weapons Type Worldwide 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Casualties Per Incident Worldwide 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Terrorist Attacks in Heavily Islamic Regions: 2011-2016

60,320 Incidents

- 85% of world total
- 7% caused by some element of ISIS

Source: START database,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Terrorism in the MENA Region: 2010-2016

27,580 Incidents

- Grow 2-3 times in 5 years
  if do not include insurgency:
- 46% of total for Islamic regions
- 4,343 or only 15.7% are attributed to ISIS/ISIL/Daesh

Source: START Data Base,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&region=10&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.
Levels and Patterns in Terrorism in 2016
START Significant Trends and Data - 2016

• The total number of terrorist attacks in 2016 decreased by 9% and total deaths due to terrorist attacks decreased by 13%, compared to 2015. This was largely due to fewer attacks and deaths in Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen. Twenty-six percent of all deaths in 2016 were perpetrator deaths, up from 24% in 2015.

• In several countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, and Turkey, terrorist attacks and total deaths increased in 2016.

• Although terrorist attacks took place in 104 countries in 2016, they were heavily concentrated geographically. Fifty-five percent of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines), and 75% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, and Pakistan).

• The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was responsible for more attacks and deaths than any other perpetrator group in 2016. In particular, ISIS carried out 20% more terrorist attacks in Iraq, and caused 69% more total deaths in Iraq, compared to 2015. Beyond Iraq and Syria, ISIS and perpetrator groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS carried out attacks in more than 20 different countries. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of the ISIS affiliates were located in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.

• The number of attacks in which victims were kidnapped or taken hostage continued to decline in 2016; however, the number of kidnapping victims and hostages continued to increase. Like in 2015, this was primarily due to a small number of attacks involving exceptionally large numbers of victims.

• In 2016, a total of 11,072 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide, resulting in more than 25,600 total deaths and more than 33,800 people injured. These casualty figures include more than 6,700 perpetrator deaths and 1,600 perpetrator injuries. In addition, more than 15,500 people were kidnapped or taken hostage.

• In past years (2012, 2013, and 2014), total attacks and casualties worldwide generally peaked in May or June, coinciding with the onset of spring “fighting season” in Afghanistan. In 2015, considerable decreases elsewhere obscured the influence of increasing terrorist attacks in Afghanistan on global statistics. However, in 2016 the peak in May was largely a result of a sharp increase in the number of terrorist attacks in Iraq (309 attacks). Unlike previous years, the number of attacks in Afghanistan showed little indication of seasonal influence, instead decreasing fairly steadily throughout the year.

• Of the 25,621 people killed in terrorist attacks in 2016, 6,755 (26%) were perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Perpetrators killed themselves intentionally in suicide attacks, unintentionally while attempting to carry out attacks, or were killed by security forces or victims responding to attacks. This is a 6% decrease in the number of perpetrator deaths, compared to 2015.

• Terrorist attacks took place in 104 countries in 2016; however, they were heavily concentrated geographically. Fifty-five percent of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines), and 75% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, and Pakistan).

• Several countries that have routinely experienced large numbers of terrorist attacks in recent years observed considerable decreases in total attacks in 2016, compared to 2015. These included Pakistan (-27%), Afghanistan (-22%), Nigeria (-21%), and Yemen (-21%), and to a lesser extent Syria (-6%) and the Philippines (-2%).

• In contrast, Iraq, which has experienced more terrorist attacks than any other country each year since 2013, saw a 23% increase in total attacks in 2016. Other top-ranked countries that experienced increases in total attacks in 2016 included Somalia (+49%), Turkey (+17%), and India (+16%).

• Overall, global patterns produced a net decrease of 9% in terrorist attacks worldwide between 2015 and 2016.

• Several countries that were not among those with the most attacks nonetheless saw considerable increases in 2016. These included Saudi Arabia (+129%, from 48 attacks in 2015 to 110 attacks in 2016).
• In Bangladesh, terrorist violence increased 296% between 2014 and 2015, coinciding specifically with the anniversary of disputed 2014 elections. Data for 2016 indicated that this was an isolated pattern, as Bangladesh saw a sharp decrease (-82%, from 461 attacks in 2015 to 85 attacks in 2016).

• The total number of people injured due to terrorist attacks worldwide declined 10% in 2016. However, this global statistic obscures a great deal of regional variation. For example, Yemen (-69%), Nigeria (-67%), and Afghanistan (-19%) saw large decreases in the number of people injured in 2016.

• By contrast, in Turkey (+176%), Somalia (+104%), Pakistan (+29%), India (+27%), and Iraq (+12%) there were large increases in the total number of people injured due to terrorist attacks in 2016.

• While worldwide attacks, the total number of deaths, and the total number of people injured decreased in 2016, the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage in terrorist attacks worldwide increased 26%.

• In 2016, there were three countries in which more than 1,000 people were kidnapped or taken hostage: Iraq (8,586; +114%); Afghanistan (1,673; +48%), and Syria (1,406; -5%).

• The sharp increase in Iraq – where the already high number of people kidnapped or taken hostage more than doubled in 2016 – was entirely the result of two particular events. In June 2016, Kata’ib Hizballah claimed responsibility for abducting 1,500 displaced civilians in Al-Anbar governorate. In August 2016, 3,000 displaced civilians were abducted in Kirkuk governorate in an attack attributed to ISIS. These two attacks involved more hostages than any other event in the Statistical Annex dataset. They are followed by the January 2013 attack during which 850 hostages were held by Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade in Algeria, and a third 2016 attack in December in Aleppo, Syria, in which Hizballah held 800 hostages.

• Several of the countries that experienced the most terrorism saw decreases in the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage in terrorist attacks in 2016. These included Turkey (-87%), Nigeria (-69%), India (-63%), and Yemen (-62%).
Attacks in 2016
12,384 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=31&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Attacks by Region in 2016

12,384 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Attacks by Region in 2016

12,384 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=31&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Target Type in 2016

12,384 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.

&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Attacks Type in 2016

12,384 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Weapons Type in 2016

12,384 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=31&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Ten countries with the most terrorist attacks, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2965</td>
<td>9764</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>13314</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>8586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>4561</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>5054</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>1673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1729</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>1832</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>2088</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>2656</td>
<td>9.16</td>
<td>1406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2282</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>11072</td>
<td>25621</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>33814</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>15543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes perpetrators

In 2016, a total of 11,072 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide, resulting in more than 25,600 total deaths and more than 33,800 people injured. These casualty figures include more than 6,700 perpetrator deaths and 1,600 perpetrator injuries. In addition, more than 15,500 people were kidnapped or taken hostage.

Attack Types in 2016

13,488 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=attack&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0&attack=2,1,3,7,4,5,6,8,9
## Targets of terrorist attacks worldwide, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Number of Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>4734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (General)</td>
<td>1016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists/Non-State Militia</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists &amp; Media</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (Diplomatic)</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Political Party</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airports &amp; Airlines</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food or Water Supply</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourists</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion Related</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualties Per Incident in 2016

12,384 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=31&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
NOTE: Killed and injured greatly exceed total, reasons are not clear.
Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Countries with Highest Death Rate in 2015

2015 saw Niger and Cameroon among the ten countries with the most deaths from terrorism for the first time.

Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria accounted for 72% of all terrorist deaths.

Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan had at least a 30% decline over 2014.

Afghanistan rose 18% from 4,507 to 5,312

ISIS, Boko Haram, and Taliban accounted for 55% of deaths in 2015.

ISIS killed 6,141 in 2015, or an average of 6.7 deaths per attack (62% of deaths in Iraq even with 37% unknown).

Boko Haram killed 5,478, some 75% in Nigeria. Average of 11 per attack.

Taliban killed 4,502, 18% above 2014, and average of 4 deaths per attack.

IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
IHS Jane’s 2015 Global Trends

IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
Key Perpetrators of Terrorism in 2016
Information about perpetrators was reported in source materials for 52% of terrorist attacks in 2016. A total of 334 groups and organizations were identified as perpetrators of terrorist attacks, compared to 288 in 2015. This includes approximately 100 groups and organizations that had not previously been identified as perpetrators in the Global Terrorism Database.

In 35% of the attacks for which there was information about perpetrator groups, an organization explicitly claimed responsibility. For the remaining attacks, source documents attributed responsibility to a particular group or groups based on reports from authorities or observers.

Of the attacks for which perpetrator information was reported in 2016, 19% were carried out by ISIS. (Note: Attacks attributed to ISIS in the Statistical Annex dataset exclude those attributed to specific declared branches of ISIS such as those operating in Egypt, Libya, and West Africa. They also do not include attacks carried out by unaffiliated individuals who might have been inspired by ISIS.) Additionally, 13% of attacks in 2016 were carried out by the Taliban.

ISIS (+17%) and al-Shabaab (+47%) carried out more terrorist attacks in 2016 than they did in 2015. However, while al-Shabaab’s lethality decreased (11% fewer total deaths in 2016), the total number of deaths caused by ISIS increased 48% and the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage by ISIS increased 75% in 2016, compared to 2015.

Terrorist violence by Maoist extremists in India remained fairly consistent between 2015 and 2016 with respect to the number of attacks, the number of deaths, and the number of people injured. However, the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage by Maoist extremists in India decreased 76%.

In contrast, the number of terrorist attacks carried out by the Taliban in 2016 decreased 23% compared to 2015, and the total number of deaths caused by the Taliban’s terrorist attacks decreased 20%. Likewise, the number of attacks carried out by Houthi extremists decreased 9%, and there was a dramatic decrease in the casualties caused by terrorist attacks attributed to Houthi extremists: total deaths declined 62%, total injuries declined 67%, and the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage declined 65% between 2015 and 2016.

Note, however, that terrorist attacks by Houthi extremists increased in Saudi Arabia in 2016. There were 56 attacks carried out by Houthi extremists in Saudi Arabia, compared to nine in 2015. The majority of these attacks (80%) involve explosive projectiles (e.g., rockets, mortars) fired at civilian and military targets.

While ISIS was responsible for 19% fewer terrorist attacks in Syria (122 in 2016 compared to 150 in 2015), the number of attacks carried out by ISIS in Iraq increased by 20% (932 in 2016 compared to 775 in 2015). The lethality of these attacks increased 69% (7,338 total deaths in 2016, compared to 4,341 in 2015).

Furthermore, the geographic reach of attacks by ISIS and its affiliates continued to grow in 2016. The number of attacks attributed to ISIS outside of Iraq and Syria increased 80%, from 44 in 2015 to 79 in 2016. This does not include attacks attributed to other organizations that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of these ISIS affiliates were located in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.

Five perpetrator groups with the most attacks worldwide, 2016

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)**</td>
<td>1133</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>9114</td>
<td>6178</td>
<td>7671</td>
<td>6608</td>
<td>8379</td>
<td>4805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>3615</td>
<td>4535</td>
<td>3572</td>
<td>4758</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maoists/Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houthi Extremists</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes perpetrators
** Excludes attacks attributed to branches of ISIS or ISIS-inspired individuals

Source: START Annex of Statistical Information, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 2017, p. 15
## IHS Jane’s Top 10 Perpetrators in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Attack Numbers</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State</td>
<td>4,236</td>
<td>Attacks increased 28% over 2015. 84% were in Syria and Iraq versus 92% in 2015, reflecting expansion of affiliates and &quot;lone wolf&quot; attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk Peoples Republic</td>
<td>3,417</td>
<td>Pro-Russian Separatist Group in Ukraine. Six-fold increase in attacks over 2015. Centered in Donetsk and Luhansk. 124 fatalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhansk Peoples Republic</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>Pro-Russian Separatist Group in Ukraine. More than twice the level of attacks in 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabat Fatah al Sham (Al Nusra)</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>Operates in Syria. Changed names after split (?) with Al Qaida in July 2016. 20% increase in attacks over 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar Allah</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>Houthi group in Yemen. Almost double attacks over 2015. 20% of attacks in Saudi. Used anti-ship missiles in Bab el Mandab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiwatt Suriyya al-Dimografatiyya (QSD)</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>The Syrian Democratic Forces are a U.S. backed coalition led by the Kurdish Yekineyen Parastina Gel which has separately carried out 110 attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>Taliban attacks rose by 15 in 2016. It has failed to take provincial capitals, but steadily expanded its influence in other areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>Operates in Somalia. A 64% increase in attacks in 2016. Many mass casualty attacks using vehicles in populated areas like Mogadishu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPHM)</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>5% increase in attacks in 2016 (14% overall increase in India). Largely focused on attacks on security forces,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016.
Impact of Key Terrorist Groups: 2014

Both Boko Haram and ISIL dramatically increased their deadliness from 2013 to 2014.

The five most deadly terrorist groups are also responsible for deaths not categorised as terrorism. ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group and was in conflicts which killed over 20,000 people in 2014.

Battle-Related Deaths by Terrorist Group

ISIL and the Taliban account for the majority of battle related deaths.

Source: UCDP Battle Related Deaths, IEP calculations

Increases and Decreases in Deaths by Country: 2014-2015

Iraq and Nigeria had the largest reductions in deaths from terrorism from 2014 to 2015, with both countries recording more than 2,500 fewer deaths last year.

Three countries had an increase of more than 800 deaths: Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan.

Niger had the largest increase in deaths from terrorism last year, due to increased activity by Boko Haram.

Source: Adapted from Institute for Economics and Peace. Global terrorism Index 2016,
Sources, Analytic Cautions and Challenges
Key Challenges and Problems
In the Metrics of Terrorism

• No agreed definition of terrorism of other how to define and measure any key metric.
• Reliance on media sources or unstated sources. Cancelation of NCTC and all official public reporting on trends and data.
• Radical differences in level of reporting by region, lack of credible data in Central and East Asia.
• No reporting on state terrorism, large scale killing of civilians in countries like Syria.
• Failure to report ranges in many key areas of large-scale uncertainty – particularly perpetrators and casualties.
• Failure to clearly distinguish between insurgency and terrorism.
• Labeling of asymmetric threats and enemies as terrorist, regardless of methods of attack.
• Failure to distinguish ethnicity, sect, tribe and other key data in patterns of terrorism in reporting.
• Constant changes in method of analysis and reporting, and unclear historical comparability of data shown.
• Lack of clear handling of hate crimes in collecting terrorism data.
• Focus on ideology and religion rather than full range of causes of terrorism.
Surveying Terrorism in 2016

This analysis provides a comparative overview of some of the leading open source different metrics for measuring the patterns in global and regional terrorism in 2016, how terrorism varies by region, and the relative impact of extremism.

It should be stressed that it relies on summary graphs, charts, and maps to explore a range of metrics that have many key limitations and problems, and where the caveats and definitions used by each source require a reader seeking to fully understand the trends presented in this report to examine the sources listed, read the description of how the data are collected, defined, and presented and the supporting narrative.

Drawing on the START Data Base and Other Sources

The report draws heavily on the START data base maintained by the University of Maryland and used by the State Department in its annual country reports on terrorism. (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) The START database is now the closest thing available to an official U.S. data base, and is the primary source of most U.S. media, research center, and academic estimates.
It also draws heavily on the summary public reporting of IHS Janes, the EU and Europol, and the work of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) and its *Global Terrorism Index 2016*. The IEP also makes use of START, but is a source of independent estimates and narrative analyses, and makes independent assessments of the impact of terrorism and its economics. ([https://www.google.com/search?q=institute+for+economics+and+peace+global+terrorism+index&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8.](https://www.google.com/search?q=institute+for+economics+and+peace+global+terrorism+index&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8.))

**Key Challenges and Problems In the Metrics of Terrorism**

Many of the broad trends presented in this study seem valid, and comparative views are presented where major differences exist between sources. However, no analysis can overcome the fact that the START data base and most open source reporting rely heavily on media reporting and have major gaps and uncertainties that are normally clearly recognized in their detailed description of their database and its supporting analyses.

Reporting varies sharply for given countries in a given region, but is particularly weak in the areas where many governments fail to allow accurate reporting on terrorism in their media. Useful as the START data base and other independent analyses are, relying on public reporting leaves major problems and gaps in the data available, particularly in East and Central Asia.
Broader Problems in the Data and Reporting

Moreover, cataloguing the trends, methods of analysis, and data from the wide range of sources used in this survey has revealed a much wider range of problems. It is clear there may be critical problems in the ways many analysts approach terrorism and counterterrorism:

• The definition of “terrorism” used in many sources is not clearly stated, and it is often politicized.

• Most sources do not show how they separate terrorism” from insurgency, internal conflicts, and low-intensity conflict. The rising level of such violence in the MENA and other regions is either treated as terrorism or not addressed.

• Sources vary in attempting to estimate uncertainty, and many do not fully explain their methodology and source of data.

• Reporting on state-sponsored terrorism is extremely erratic and is limited largely to criticism that focuses on a few hostile powers in ways that are highly politicized and lacking in detail. No effort is made to estimate state covert action or terrorism against given elements of its population, or the widespread use of military forces to kill and terrorize civilians by regime like the Assad regime in Syria.
• As a result, virtually all terrorism and extremism reporting focuses on non-state actors.

• Excessive repression in the name of counterterrorism -- and state activities that amount to de facto state terrorism -- are not reported as terrorism even when they clearly have such impacts. These problems in the counterterrorism activity of various states – some U.S. partners and allies – are only officially reported – if at all -- in the State Department annual human rights report and reports by various human rights NGOs.

• No clear source or method exists to estimate the impact of terrorism in creating refugees, internally displaced persons, lasting human and humanitarian impacts, collateral damage, and economic impacts.

• Casualty data are highly uncertain. Most sources only attempt to count casualties caused by non-state actors. They often confuse terrorism with insurgency and internal power struggles, and many sources only address killed, rather than injured or wounded.

• Incident counts and casualty data are also erratic, and the other impacts of extremism and terrorism such as intimidation, extortion, torture, and misuse of the justice system cannot be quantified and no reliable methodology exists for estimating areas of geographic influence.
• There is no reliable way to estimate the impact of terrorism in areas dominated or controlled by various groups of non-state actors, and once again, insurgent groups the U.S. sees as enemies are often labeled as “terrorists” regardless of the fact they are insurgents using forms of irregular warfare which are not “terrorism” per se and/or are reacting to abuses by the governments they are challenging.

• Most sources do not identify attackers, attacks, and targets by sect, ethnicity, and tribe. It is impossible to trace the patterns of violence that drive terrorism, and reporting often does not distinguish clear between terrorism and hate crimes.

• Perpetrator data are often very uncertain, and estimates vary sharply from source to source.

• Both the identification of the perpetrators and the level of affiliation with given terrorist groups are often uncertain, and many assessments do not attempt to deal explicitly with these uncertainties.

• Most sources have made major changes in their method of analysis and reporting overtime, and the historical comparability of data shown is often uncertain.
• Most data are global or nationwide. It is generally difficult to trace the patterns within given parts of what often are deeply divided countries or movements that cross national borders.

• The impact of key regional, ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and other internal conflicts may or may not be reported as terrorism and are not addressed by source, cause, or reasons for choosing given targets.

• No reliable data exist on foreign volunteers, on international flows of terrorist activity, and on the overall patterns in extremism.

• The actual date of many sources is not specified or unclear.

• Aside from chronologies – whose content differs sharply from source to source – reporting – the nature of how attacks are being selected for reporting and defined as terrorism is often unclear.

• Most sources seem to undercount countries where there is limited media reporting on any form of dissent. This lead to low figures for Central Asia and parts of East Asia, and suspiciously low totals for a large number of countries.

• Scattered small attacks on various ethnic groups, sects, tribes, and minorities often add up to major cumulative levels of violence and terrorism over time, but are not generally reported as terrorism unless some terrorist group claims
responsibility and are catalogued as hate crimes. The end result is often massively undercount the actual level of violence by Islamist extremists, sectarian and ethnic fighters, and tribal violence.

- There is no clear source of comparative data on the size, cost, nature, and comparative effectiveness of various counterterrorism efforts by country and international organization.

- Only limited snapshots exist of the factors that cause terrorism, insurgency, and internal violence. Key factors like population pressure, “youth bulges,” underemployment and unemployment, critical problems in governance, corruption, barriers to development, critical problems in income distribution.

- Cronyism and nepotism, repression and failed rule of law, internal discrimination, and alienation of key segments of the population, are rarely addressed except in human rights reporting.

- Comparative assessment of efforts to address the level of Islamic extremism in given countries and areas -- and to address the efforts to counter such extremism on a religious, ideological, and political basis – also are limited snapshots of part of the problems and efforts involved. Many are special interest efforts supporting a given proposed approach or solution.
Some broad measures of the cost-effectiveness of the U.S. counter terrorism effort – and its strength and weaknesses -- are provided by the Department of Homeland security, but these cover only a small part of part of the U.S. domestic effort, however, and do not cover overseas contingency operations. The basic focus of DHS effectiveness data is immigration and border/coastal security.