Iran, Iraq, and the Challenges to US Policy

Anthony H. Cordesman

Last Updated: July 2008
American Credibility
Arab Public Opinion on the US

Generally speaking, is your attitude towards the United States:

- Very favorable
  - 2006: 4%
  - 2008: 4%

- Somewhat favorable
  - 2006: 8%
  - 2008: 11%

- Somewhat unfavorable
  - 2006: 21%
  - 2008: 19%

- Very unfavorable
  - 2006: 57%
  - 2008: 64%

Source: Shibley Telhami, 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll Poll Survey of the Survey of the Anwar Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International) International) Conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Survey conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE UAE
Which TWO of the following factors do you believe are most important in driving American policy in the Middle East?

- Promoting democracy: 4%
- Spreading human rights: 4%
- Promoting peace and stability: 6%
- Fighting terrorism: 7%
- Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons: 12%
- Preserving regional and global dominance: 30%
- Weakening the Muslim World: 33%
- Protecting Israel: 47%
- Controlling oil: 50%

Source: Shibley Telhami, 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll Survey of the Survey of the Anwar Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International) International) Conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Survey conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE UAE
Steps to Improve View of US

What TWO steps by the US would improve your views of the US most?

- Providing more economic assistance to the region
  - W/Egypt, 13%
  - W/O Egypt, 15%

- Pushing even more to spread democracy in the Middle East
  - W/Egypt, 13%
  - W/O Egypt, 13%

- Stopping economic and military aid to Israel
  - W/Egypt, 28%
  - W/O Egypt, 26%

- Brokering a Comprehensive Middle East Peace with Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 border and establishing a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital
  - W/Egypt, 50%
  - W/O Egypt, 56%

- Withdrawal of US forces from the Arabian Peninsula
  - W/Egypt, 46%
  - W/O Egypt, 41%

- Withdrawal of US forces from Iraq
  - W/Egypt, 44%
  - W/O Egypt, 43%

Source: Shibley Telhami, 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll Survey of the Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International) International) Conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Survey conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE UAE
Oil, Energy, and Import Dependence
World Energy Use: 1980-2030

Gulf Energy as Percent of World in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crude Oil Reserves</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas Reserves</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Production Capacity</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Production</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess Oil Production Capacity</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IEO 2007
World Dependence on Gulf Proven Conventional Oil Reserves


percent

History

Projections

Reference

Low Price

High Growth

Low Growth

High Price

None
US IEA Estimate of Future Oil Prices


Figure 90. Net import share of U.S. liquid fuels consumption, 1990-2030 (percent)

Figure 86. Total U.S. unconventional crude oil production, 2006-2030 (thousand barrels per day)
Vulnerability of Gulf Oil Fields

Iranian Conventional Military Threats
The GCC Threat to the GCC

- Vast lead in military spending and arms imports
- Support from US, Britain, France
- But,
- Poor Mission Focus with Limited Coordination
- Lack of Integration, Standardization
- Problems in Large-Scale Exercises and Training; Military Realism
- Problems in Jointness – including security services, police, and intelligence – and combined arms.
- Lack of Balanced Force Development: Manpower Quality and Sustainability
Comparative Military Manpower Trends
## Comparative Military Manpower in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Defense</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Army</th>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>152,000</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20,000</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>12,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008*
Comparative Iran vs GCC Spending: 1997-2007

1977: 4,996
1998: 6,165
1999: 6,060
2000: 7,972
2001: 2,232
2002: 3,189
2003: 3,189
2004*: 3,720
2005: 6,590
2006: 6,759
2007: 7,310

GCC Total:
1997: 33,659
1998: 34,655
1999: 30,979
2000: 34,357
2001: 37,559
2002: 35,112
2003: 35,322
2004*: 28,678
2005: 40,452
2006: 50,676
2007: 52,142

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008

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## Comparative Military Spending: 1988-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>GCC Total</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
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<td>3,614</td>
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<td>3,401</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>19,878</td>
<td>3,976</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>1,488</td>
<td>34,357</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>3,933</td>
<td>2,232</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>23,386</td>
<td>3,189</td>
<td>529</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,232</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>37,559</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>3,614</td>
<td>2,551</td>
<td>1,807</td>
<td>26,256</td>
<td>2,976</td>
<td>570</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>35,322</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>23,599</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>28,678</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>2,232</td>
<td>20,515</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>940</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>40,452</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>2,764</td>
<td>2,327</td>
<td>27,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>50,676</td>
<td>498</td>
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<td>30,810</td>
<td>9,888</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>52,142</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>4,002</td>
<td>3,410</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34,020</td>
<td>10,292</td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008*
Comparative New Arms Orders: 1988-2007

(\text{in US Current Million})

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Iran & Iraq & Bahrain & Kuwait & Oman & Qatar & Saudi Arabia & UAE & Yemen \\
\hline
03-06 & 2200 & 2100 & 300 & 1400 & 1200 & 100 & 12400 & 3700 & 800 \\
00-03 & 500 & 200 & 400 & 2200 & 1200 & 0 & 3400 & 8100 & 600 \\
96-99 & 1,700 & 0 & 600 & 900 & 300 & 800 & 6000 & 7600 & 700 \\
92-95 & 1,200 & 0 & 200 & 6200 & 600 & 2000 & 22300 & 4800 & 500 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\text{0 = Data less than $50 million or nil. All data rounded to the nearest $100 million.}


Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008
Land Force Threats

- Iranian Threat to Kuwait and Iraq
- Iranian permissive amphibious/ferry operation.
- Iranian dominance of Iraq; Invited In to Replace US?
- Spillover of Iraqi Sunni -Shi’ite power struggles.
- Yemeni incursion into Saudi Arabia or Oman
  
  But

- Low near-term probability.
- High risk of US and allied intervention.
- Limited threat power projection and sustainability.
- Unclear strategic goal.
Comparative Modern Tank Strength

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008
Comparative Armored Vehicle Strength

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008
Comparative Artillery Strength

![Graph showing the comparative artillery strength of various countries.]

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008
### Keeping a Decisive US Qualitative Edge in US Forces and Arms Transfers to the Gulf ($10.5B in FY087 & FY09)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Ground Capabilities</th>
<th>Joint Maritime Capabilities</th>
<th>Joint Air Capabilities</th>
<th>Space-based Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Future Combat Systems:</td>
<td>CVN 21 Carrier Replacement</td>
<td>16 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ground and air systems</td>
<td>1 Virginia Class Submarine</td>
<td>20 F-22A Raptors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119 Stryker Vehicles</td>
<td>1 DDG-1000 Destroyer</td>
<td>36 V-22 Ospreys</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,249 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles</td>
<td>2 Littoral Combat Ships</td>
<td>23 F/A-18 Hornets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,061 Heavy Tactical Vehicles</td>
<td>2 T-AKE Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ships</td>
<td>22 E/A-18G Growlers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,187 Medium Tactical Vehicles</td>
<td>CVN Refueling Complex Overhaul</td>
<td>16 CH-47 Chinooks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 M1A1 Abrams Tank Upgrades</td>
<td>Basic Research +$0.3B in FY 2009 (+$1.4B FY09-FY13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Weapons Demilitarization</td>
<td>2 Joint High Speed Vessels</td>
<td>VH-71 Helicopter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 T-AKE Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ships</td>
<td>KC-X Aerial Refueling Tanker</td>
<td>2 Space Based Infrared Systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVN Refueling Complex Overhaul</td>
<td>59 Predators, Reapers and Warriors</td>
<td>4 Expendable Launch Vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Joint High Speed Vessels</td>
<td>2 T-AKE Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ships</td>
<td>GPS Satellite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Mobile User Objective System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transformational Satellite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wideband Global SATCOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Increase Ground Capabilities

**Army**
- Active: 42 Brigade Combat Teams (482.4K Soldiers)
- 12/12 Months Home Station / Months Deployed

**Marine Corps**
- Active: 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Forces (175K Marines)
- 7/7 Months Home Station / Months Deployed

**Brigade Combat Teams**
- Active: 48 Brigade Combat Teams (547.4K Soldiers)
- 24/12 Months Home Station / Months Deployed

**Bar Chart**
- FY 2007: +40K Active Army
- FY 2008: +3K Active Army, +11K Active Marine Corps, +2K Previous Additions
- FY 2009: +7K Active Army, +3K Active Marine Corps
- FY 2010: +7K Active Army, +5K Active Marine Corps
- FY 2011: +7K Active Army, +5K Active Marine Corps, +3K Active Marine Corps
- FY 2012: +1K Active Army, +65K Active Marines, +27K Active Marine Corps

Source: FY 2009 DoD Budget Request; FY 2008 Budget; FY 2007 Supplemental

Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Air/Missile Threats

- Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack.
- Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate kills.
- Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War”
- Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.
- Strikes again tankers or naval targets.
- Attacks on US-allied facilities

But
- Low near-term probability.
- High risk of US and allied intervention.
- Limited threat: power projection and sustainability.
- Unclear strategic goal.
Comparative Combat Air Strength

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008
Comparative High Quality Fighter/Attack

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008
Naval Threats

- Iranian effort to “close the Gulf.”
- Iranian permissive amphibious/ferry operation.
- Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War”
- Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.
- “Deep strike” with air or submarines in Gulf of Oman or Indian Ocean.
- Attacks on US facilities

But

- Low near-term probability.
- High risk of US and allied intervention.
- Limited threat power projection and sustainability.
- Unclear strategic goal.
Comparative Major Naval Combat Ships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Missile Combat</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Major Other Combat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missile Patrol</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008
Asymmetric Warfare and “Wars of Intimidation”
Most Likely Foreign Threats Are Not Formal Conflicts

• Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian efforts at proliferation)
• Use of irregular forces and asymmetric attacks.
• Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements or exploiting internal sectarian, ethnic, tribal, dynastic, regional tensions.
• Arms transfers, training in host country, use of covert elements like Quds force.
• Harassment and attrition through low level attacks, clashes, incidents.
• Limited, demonstrative attacks to increase risk, intimidation.
• Strike at critical node or infrastructure.
Some Tangible Examples

- Iranian tanker war with Iraq
- Oil spills and floating mines in Gulf.
- Libyan “stealth” mining of Red Sea.
- Use of Quds force in Iraq.
- “Incidents” in pilgrimage in Makkah.
- Support of Shi’ite groups in Bahrain.
- Missile and space tests (future nuclear test?).
- Naval guards seizure of British boat, confrontation with US Navy, exercises in Gulf.
- Development of limited “close the Gulf” capability.
- Flow of illegals and smuggling across Yemeni border.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

• 125,000+, drawing on 1,000,000 Basij.
• Key is 20,000 Naval Guards, including 5,000 marines.
  • Armed with HY-3 CSS-C-3 Seersucker (6-12 launchers, 100 missiles, 95-100 km), and 10 Houdong missile patrol boats with C-802s (120 km), and 40+ Boghammers with ATGMs, recoilless rifles, machine guns.
  • Large-scale mine warfare capability using small craft and commercial boats.
  • Based at Bandar e-Abbas, Khorramshar, Larak, Abu Musa, Al Farsiyah, Halul, Sirri.
• IRGC air branch reported to fly UAVs and UCAVs, and control Iran’s strategic missile force.
  • 1 Shahab SRBM Bde (300-500-700 km) with 12-18 launchers, 1 Shahab 3 IRBM Btn (1,200-1,280 km) with 6 launchers and 4 missiles each.
“Closing the Gulf”

• 3 Kilo (Type 877) and unknown number of midget (Qadr-SS-3) submarines; smart torpedoes, (anti-ship missiles?) and smart mine capability.
• Use of 5 minelayers, amphibious ships, small craft, commercial boats.
• Attacks on tankers, shipping, offshore facilities by naval guards.
• Raids with 8 P-3MP/P-3F Orion MPA and combat aircraft with anti-ship missiles: (C-801K (8-42 km), CSS-N-4, and others).
• Free-floating mines, smart and dumb mines, oil spills.
• Land-based, long-range anti-ship missiles based on land, islands (Seersucker HY-2, CSS-C-3), and ships (CSS-N-4, and others). Sunburn?
• IRGC raids on key export facility(ties).
The Gulf
Gulf Oil Fields
Hormuz: Breaking the Bottle at the Neck

- 280 km long, 50 km wide at narrowest point.
- Traffic lane 9.6 km wide, including two 3.2 km wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a 3.2 km wide separation median
- Antiship missiles now have ranges up to 150 km.
- Smart mines, guided/smart torpedoes,
- Floating mines, small boat raids, harassment.
- Covert as well as overt sensors.
Strait of Hormuz-Imagery
Abu Musa, Tumbs, Hormuz: Factoids

• 34 miles (55 KM) wide at narrowest part.

• Channels consist of 2-mile (3.2 km) navigable channels for inbound and outbound traffic, separated by 2-mile wide buffer zone.

• 40% of all globally traded oil supply.

• 75%-plus of Japan’s oil/

• 13.4 MMBD of crude through Strait in May 2007

• Additional 2 MMBD of products and over 31 million tons of LNG.

• 90% of all Gulf exports go through Strait.

• EIA predicts exports will double to 30-34 MMBD by 2020

• Gulf will export 40% of world’s LNG by 2015.
Planning for Asymmetric Warfare

• Deterrence and conflict prevention as critical as defense.

• Again, need integrated GCC force planning and war planning efforts.

• Must show GCC will act together. Cannot divide or exploit weakest link.

  - Exercise realistic “red-blue” war games to determine common options and requirements.

• Follow-up with realistic CPXs and FTXs.

• Emphasize joint warfare approaches that tie in paramilitary and security forces.

• Demonstrate have exercised a retaliatory capability.

• Show can work effectively with US, UK, France.

• Strike at critical node or infrastructure.
Iranian Missiles and Proliferation
Nuclear Uncertainty

- Must plan to deal with possible Iranian force with unknown weapons characteristics, delivery systems, basing, and timelines.
  - Technology base now exists, enrichment to fissile levels is only limiting factor.
- Already a key factor in Iranian capability to conduct “wars of intimidation.”
- Clear Iran proceeding with extensive ballistic missile program regardless of whether it pursues the nuclear option.
- Cannot predict timeframe for nuclear threat. Worst case is 2009, but could well be 2015.
- Chemical and biological options as well.
Confusion Over the US NIE

- Not say Iran was not moving towards nuclear weapons.
  - Did say evidence that halted formal efforts at weapons development in 2003. (When US “victories” in Iraq and Afghanistan seemed to threaten Iran,
  - Made it clear that Iran was pursuing enrichment technology that was the relevant barrier to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Since NIE was issued, new evidence has surfaced of weapons development efforts beyond initial “laptop” and “Green Salt” disclosures.
- Iran has also been discovered to have completed development of a new, far more advanced centrifuge.
- Iran has announced two new long-range missiles, and a “space” program that can be adapted to missile development.
DNI’s March 2008 Summary - I

Over the past year we have gained new insights into Tehran’s activities related to nuclear weapons and the Community recently published a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on this area. I want to be very clear in addressing the Iranian nuclear capability. First, there are three parts to an effective nuclear weapons capability:

1. Production of fissile material
2. Effective means for weapon delivery
3. Design and weaponization of the warhead itself

We assess in our recent NIE on this subject that the design and weaponization were halted along with covert military uranium conversion and enrichment-related activities. Declared uranium enrichment efforts will enable the production of fissile material to continue. This is the most difficult challenge of nuclear production. Iran’s efforts to perfect ballistic missiles that can reach North Africa and Europe also continue.

We remain concerned about Iran’s intentions and assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We have high confidence that Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons until fall 2003. Also, Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons. Iran continues its efforts to develop uranium enrichment technology which can be used both for power reactor fuel and for producing nuclear weapons. And, as noted, Iran continues deeply to develop missile capabilities capable of delivering nuclear weapons and to develop intercontinental missiles.

We also assess with high confidence that after fall 2003 Iran has conducted research and development of high-confidence military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.

We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, the halt to nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities, as well as covert military uranium conversion and enrichment activities, for at least several years. Because of intelligence gaps, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that all such activities were halted. We assess with moderate confidence that Tehran had not restarted these efforts as of mid-2007 but since they comprised an unclassified effort that Iran attempted to hide, we do not know if these activities have been restarted.

We judge with high confidence that the activities were directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously secret nuclear work. This indicates that Iran may be more susceptible to influence on the issue than we judged previously.

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DNI’s March 2008 Summary - II

We do not have sufficient intelligence information to judge confidently that Iran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapon design and weaponization activities indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt to restart those activities. We with moderate confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons and continue to significantly expand and diversify that capability. We continue to assess with moderate confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon. We continue to assess with moderate high confidence that Iran probably has imported or has created a weaponusable fissile material but still with moderate high confidence it has not obtained a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad or has created the future a nuclear weapon or can develop a weapon. Barring the acquisition Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce a certain amount of fissile material indigenously which we judge with high confidence it has not done.

Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006 despite the 2003 halt in its nuclear weapon design and weaponization activities. Iran made significant progress in 2005 in installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate high confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them.

- We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2016, but that is very unlikely.

- We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2012-2015 timeframe. INR judges Iran unlikely to achieve this capability before 2015 because of foreseen technical and programmatic problems. All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.
We know that Tehran had a chemical warfare program prior to 1997, when it defected elements of its program. We assess that Tehran maintains dual use facilities intended to produce CW agents in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive appropriations. We assess Iran maintains a capability to weaponize CW agents in a variety of delivery systems. We assess that Iran has previously conducted CW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for biological warfare.

Extract from J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee,” 27 February 2008.
Arab Public Opinion on Whether Iran Has A Nuclear Program

Do you believe that:

- Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons
  - W/Egypt, 39%
  - W/O Egypt, 46%

- Iran is merely conducting research for peaceful purposes
  - W/Egypt, 38%
  - W/O Egypt, 52%

Source: Shibley Telhami, 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll Survey of the Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International) Conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE.
Arab Public Opinion on Impact of Iran’s Nuclear Program

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, which of the following is closest to your view:

- **It will use them against Arab states**
  - W/Egypt, 8%
  - W/O Egypt, 11%

- **It will use them against Israel**
  - W/Egypt, 31%
  - W/O Egypt, 32%

- **It will not use them, but they will help Iran increase its influence regionally and globally**
  - W/Egypt, 45%
  - W/O Egypt, 44%

Source: Shibley Telhami, 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll Survey of the Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International) Conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE
Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002
Vehicle Entrance Ramp (before burial)

Admin/engineering office area

Bunkered underground production halls

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image

20 SEP 02
Vehicle Entrance Ramp (after burial)

- Bunkered underground Centrifuge cascade halls
- New security wall
- Dummy building concealing tunnel entrance ramp
- Admin/engineering office area
- Helicopter pads

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image

21 JUL 04
Effective Concealment

- Buried Centrifuge Cascade Halls
- Dummy Bldg Located Over Vehicle Entrance Ramp
# How Much is Enough?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fissile Material</th>
<th>Simple gun-type weapon</th>
<th>Simple implosion weapon</th>
<th>Sophisticated implosion weapon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)</td>
<td>90110 lbs/4050 kg</td>
<td>33 lbs/15 kg</td>
<td>2026 lbs/912 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Grade Plutonium</td>
<td>14 lbs/6 kg</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.59 lbs/24 kg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extract from the unclassified estimates in Union of Concerned Scientists, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet,” April 2004 and work by Abdullah Toucan
## Stages of Development of Iran’s Missiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Progenitor Missiles</th>
<th>Propellant</th>
<th>Range (Km)</th>
<th>Payload (Kg)</th>
<th>IOC (Year)</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mushak-120</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CSS-8, SA-2</td>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mushak-160</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CSS-8, SA-2</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mushak-200</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Soviet SSN-4, N Korean SCUD B</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>987-1,000</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>250-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Soviet SSN-4, N Korean SCUD C</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>750-989</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>200-450 (these are very high estimates)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab-3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N Korea Nodong-1</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>760-1,158</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>25-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab-4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N Korea Taep’o-dong-1</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,040-1,500</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghadr 101</td>
<td>multi</td>
<td>Pakistan Shaheen-1</td>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghadr 110</td>
<td>multi</td>
<td>Pakistan Shaheen-2</td>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>China M-18</td>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>760-1,158</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kh-55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Soviet AS-15 Kent, Ukraine</td>
<td>jet engine</td>
<td>2,900-3,000</td>
<td>200kgt nuclear</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N Korea Taep’o-dong-2</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>390-1,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab-6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N Korea Taep’o-dong-2</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>270-1,220</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from [Iran Special Weapons Guide](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/Iran/missile.htm), Global Security.org, available at: [http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/Iran/missile.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/Iran/missile.htm)
# Iranian Missile Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variant</th>
<th>Shahab-3</th>
<th>No Dong</th>
<th>Shahab-4</th>
<th>Variant</th>
<th>IRIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payload</td>
<td>~1,000</td>
<td>700-1000</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>~1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iranian Ballistic Missiles

**Source:**

**IRAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Missile Delivery System</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSS-8</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUD B</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Libya; North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUD C</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Missile Delivery System</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>Potential Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Dong</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taepo Dong 1</td>
<td>More than 1,500</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taepo Dong 2</td>
<td>4,000–6,000</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Should Iran receive long range missiles from North Korea, or develop its own, it could threaten a much wider area.
Strike on Iran?

- Timelines: Acquisition, Deployment, Modernization?
- Targeting intelligence?
- Dispersal, hardening, concealment?
- Hardening vs. Attack lethality
- SEAD: Penetration? Suppression? Kill?
- Range, payload, refuel, recovery
- Restrike? Penetration corridor enforcement?
- LOW? LUA? Covert?
Post-Strike on Iran/ Parallel Iranian Options

• IR-2, R-3, R-3 “cooled,”  *
• Folded centrifuge
• Concealed heavy reactor
• LWR cannibalization
• LWR download
• Dirty weapons
• Basic biological
• Genetic engineered weapons
Key Force Posture Decisions

- **US and/or Israel**
  - *Prevent, preempt*, contain, deter, retaliate, mutual assured destruction.

- **Iran and Israel:**
  - In reserve (secure storage), launch on warning (LOW), launch under attack (LOA), ride out and retaliate
  - Continuous alert, dispersal
  - Point, wide area defense goals

- **Israel:**
  - Basing mode: sea basing, sheltered missiles.
  - Limited strike, existential national, multinational survivable.

- **US:**
  - Level of defensive aid.
  - Ambiguous response
  - Clear deployment of nuclear response capability.
  - Extended deterrence. Assured retaliation.

- **Gulf:**
  - Passive (wait out), defensive, or go nuclear.
  - Ballistic, cruise missile, air defense.
  - Seek extended deterrence from US
Key Force Posture Decisions - II

• **Syria:**
  - Link or decouple from Iran.
  - Passive (tacit threat) or active (clear, combat ready deployment).

• **Non-State Actor:**
  - Tacit or covert capability.
  - Proven capability.
  - Deployment mode: Hidden, dispersed, pre-emplaced
Iran’s Hypothetical Forces

- Less than 50 nuclear weapons, most fission, possibly some boosted. 30 Nuclear warheads, 20 bombs.
  - Most 20-30 Kt, some 100 KT
- 100 Shahab 3 and 3 ER on mobile TELs. 60 TELs.
- Su-24, F-14 convert, and Su-37 strike aircraft.
- Reverse engineered KH-55 cruise missiles.
- Mustard and persistent nerve gas, stable bombs, bombs and warheads with cluster munitions.
- Limited satellite targeting and damage assessment capability.
- Limited ballistic missile point defense capability with SA-300/SA-400
- Meaningful civil defense? No.
Israel’s Hypothetical Forces

- 200+ boosted and fusion weapons.
  - Most 20-100 Kt variable yield, some 1 Megaton.
- 100 Jericho 1 and 2.
- 30 Jericho ER.
- JSF, F15I, F-16I with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, advanced conventional precision strike capability.
- 3 Dolphin submarines with nuclear armed SLCMs.
- High resolution satellite targeting and damage assessment capability.
- Moderate ballistic missile point and area defense capability with Arrow IV/V and Patriot PAC-3 TMD.
- Meaningful civil defense? CW only.
Why Yield Matters

(Seriousness of Effect in Kilometers as a Function of Yield)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>10KT</th>
<th>20 KT</th>
<th>50 KT</th>
<th>100 KT</th>
<th>500 KT</th>
<th>1 MT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fireball</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals Vaporize</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Psi</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Psi</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals Melt</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics Melt/Ignite</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood chars/Burns</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Degree Burns</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from the Royal United Services Institute, Nuclear Attack Civil Defense London, RUSI/Brassey’s, 1982, pp. 30-36
Israel: Blast coverage of 20KT Iranian Nuclear Weapon
The closer to ground a bomb is detonated, the more dust and debris is thrown into the air, and the more local fallout.

Impact with the ground severely limits the blast and radiation from a bomb. Ground bursts are not usually considered tactically advantageous, with the exception of hardened underground targets such as missile silos or command centers.

Population kills can be different. For a 1 MT explosion, lethal ellipses can reach 40-80 miles against unsheltered populations after 18 hours.

For a 1 MT explosion, lethal ellipses will reach 40-80 miles against unsheltered populations after 18 hours. Area of extreme lethality (3000 rads) can easily reach 20+ miles.

A dose of 5.3 Gy (Grays) to 8.3 Gy is considered lethal but not immediately incapacitating. Personnel will have their performance degraded within 2 to 3 hours, and will remain in this disabled state at least 2 days. However, at that point they will experience a recovery period and be effective at performing non-demanding tasks for about 6 days, after which they will relapse for about 4 weeks. At this time they will begin exhibiting symptoms of radiation poisoning of sufficient severity to render them totally ineffective. Death follows at approximately 6 weeks after exposure.

Delayed effects may appear months to years following exposure. Most effects involve tissues or organs. Include life shortening, carcinogenesis, cataract formation, chronic radiodermatitis, decreased fertility, and genetic mutations.
Israel:
Nominal
Worst
Case
20KT
Fall Out
Coverage
Iran:
Hugh Value
Population Centers
Tehran

- Iran: Total of 68.7 million.
  - Ethnicity: Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%
  - Religions: Muslim 98% (Shi'a 89%, Sunni 9%), other (includes Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i) 2%
- Tehran: Topographic basin with mountain reflector. Nearly ideal nuclear killing ground.
- Land area of 658 square kilometers (254 sq mi)
- Approximately 7.6 million people in city.
- 12.6 million in municipal area and greater metropolitan area, and 15 million in municipal area. Some 20% of Iran’s population.
- Tehran is a sprawling city at the foot of the Alborz mountain range with an immense network of highways unparalleled in western Asia.
- Hub of the country's railway network. The city has numerous cultural centers
- About 30% of Iran’s public-sector workforce and 45% of large industrial firms are located in Tehran. More than half of Iran's industry is based in Tehran.
- Tehran is the biggest and most important educational center of Iran. Nearly 50 major colleges and universities in Greater Tehran.
- Majority of residents are Persians who speak many different dialects of Persian corresponding to their hometown. (including Esfahani, Shirazi, Yazdi, Khuzestani, Semnani, Taleghani, Dari, Judeo-Persian, etc) The second largest linguistic group is that of the Azari.
Iran: Impact of One 1 MT Airburst
Iran:
Impact of
Four
1 MT
Airbursts
Tehran: The Fallout Problem

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fallout
Iran Nuclear, US Conventional

• Assume mature, dispersed Iranian force. Preemption limited option for US, but face launch on warning, launch under attack option.
• Iran cannot threaten US. Can threaten US bases in Gulf, Israel, Europe, GCC allies, Egypt, Jordan, oil export capabilities.
• SAD-like environment relying on proxy targets for maximum damage to US.
• Iranian side:
  • Limited strike designed to intimidate or show resolve, force issue without generating massive nuclear retaliation. Might focus on Arab target, rather than US or Israel, to try to limit retaliation.
  • *Reserve strike capability critical.*
  • *Lower fission yields, less accurate force* limit range of targeting, but can cover all US bases and mix of other targets.
  • Target to maximize casualties, clear attention to fall out, lasting effects.
  • Inflict 2,000,000 to 8,000,000 prompt to 21-day dead; long term death rate cannot be calculated.
  • Iranian recovery very possible.
• US side:
  • Some preemptive damage limitation possible.
  • Launch on confirmed warning from US satellites.
  • Massive reserve conventional and nuclear strike capability.
  • Stealth and precision strike capability give weapons of mass effectiveness (WME) capability.
  • Power, refineries, continuity of government, C4I assets.
  • EMP option would be “semi-nuclear” response.
CBRN Prompt (48-hour) Killing Effect in an Urban Environment
Q_{50} for Some Types of BW - Open-Air Deployment

- Plague (liquid): 3.5-4.5 liter/sq.km
- Tularemia (dry): 3.0-4.0 kg/sq.km
- Anthrax (dry, old version): 15-20 kg/sq.km
- Anthrax (dry, new version): 4.5-5.0 kg/sq.km
- Anthrax (liquid): 5.0-5.5 liter/sq.km
- Brucellosis (dry): 3.5-4.5 kg/sq.km
- Glanders/Melioidosis (liquid): 4.5-5.5 liter/sq.km
- Smallpox (liquid): 3.5-4.0 liter/sq.km
- Marburg (dry): less than 1.0 kg/sq.km
New Types of Biological Weapons

- **Binary biological weapons** that use two safe to handle elements that can be assembled before use. This could be a virus and helper virus like Hepatitis D or a bacterial virulence plasmid like E. coli, plague, Anthrax, and dysentery.

- **Designer genes and life forms**, which could include synthetic genes and gene networks, synthetic viruses, and synthetic organisms. These weapons include DNA shuffling, synthetic forms of the flu – which killed more people in 1918 than died in all of World War I and which still kills about 30,000 Americans a year – and synthetic microorganisms.

- **"Gene therapy" weapons** that use transforming viruses or similar DNA vectors carrying Trojan horse genes (retrovirus, adenovirus, poxvirus, HSV-1). Such weapons can produce single individual (somatic cell) or inheritable (germline) changes. It can also remove immunities and wound healing capabilities.

- **Stealth viruses** can be transforming or conditionally inducible. They exploit the fact that humans normally carry a substantial viral load, and examples are the herpes virus, cytomegalovirus, Epstein-Barr, and SV40 contamination which are normally dormant or limited in infect but can be transformed into far more lethal diseases. They can be introduced over years and then used to blackmail a population.

- **Host-swapping diseases**: Viral parasites normally have narrow host ranges and develop an evolutionary equilibrium with their hosts. Disruption of this equilibrium normally produces no results, but it can be extremely lethal. Natural examples include AIDS, Hantavirus, Marburg, and Ebola. Tailoring the disruption for attack purposes can produce weapons that are extremely lethal and for which there is no treatment. A tailored disease like AIDS could combine serious initial lethality with crippling long-term effects lasting decades.

- **Designer diseases** involve using molecular biology to create the disease first and then constructing a pathogen to produce it. It could eliminate immunity, target normally dormant genes, or instruct cells to commit suicide. Apoptosis is programmed cell death, and specific apoptosis can be used to kill any mix of cells.
Soviet RBK-type Cluster Bomb for CBR Weapons

Source: Ken Alibeck
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Non-State Actor CBR(N?)

- **Independent, Proxy, False Flag, or Trigger Force?**
- **Access likely to be more critical in determining capability than ability to create own weapons, but highly lethal BW and genetic weapons may be becoming “off the shelf” option.**
- **Many of same twists as covert State Actor attacks:**
  - Bypasses defenses.
  - Plausible deniability?
  - Exploits special vulnerability of “one bomb” states.
  - Psychological and political impacts as important as direct killing effects.
  - False flag and proxy options clear.
  - Buying time may limit risk of retaliation.
  - Allows to exploit “slow kill” nature of biological strikes. Achieve “line source” effects
  - Covert forces in place can restrike or escalate.
- **Unclear Non-State Actors are deterrable by any form of retaliation.**

Source: Ken Alibeck
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State Actor Covert Bioterrorism, Suitcase Nuclear

- Bypasses defenses.
- Plausible deniability?
- Exploits special vulnerability of “one bomb” states.
- Psychological and political impacts as important as direct killing effects.
- False flag and proxy options clear.
- Buying time may limit risk of retaliation.
- Allows to exploit “slow kill” nature of biological strikes. Achieve “line source” effects
- Covert forces in place can restrike or escalate.
- Target potentially faces major weakening of conventional capabilities without ability to counter-escalate.
Possible Terrorist/Covert/Irregular Deployment of Biological Weapons

• Use of infected vectors (mosquitoes, fleas, lice, etc.)
• Contamination of food and water supplies
• Contamination of various articles (letters, books, surfaces, etc.)
• Use of different aerosolizing devices and approaches to contaminate inner spaces of various buildings (line and point sources)
• Use of different aerosolizing devices and approaches for open-air dissemination (line and point sources)
• Inner- and outer-space explosive dissemination including suicide bombers
• Terrorist/Sabotage methods of infecting crops and livestock

Source: Ken Alibeck
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WME: “Weapons of Mass Effectiveness”

- Theoretical possibility, give precision long-range strike capability.
- Target mix varies with attacker’s motives.
- Broad possible target base in MENA area, varying sharply by country.
  - Desalination
  - Major power plants, nuclear power plants.
  - Water purification and distribution.
  - Refinery
  - High value, long-lead time oil, gas, and petrochemical facilities.
  - Ethnic and sectarian high value targets.
  - Leadership elite: Royal family, president, etc.
Dealing with Nuclear Uncertainty

- Decide proper mix of four basic military options:
  - Prevention/preemption,
  - Active and passive defense,
  - Acquiring own nuclear weapons, and/or
  - US extended deterrence.
- Can wait for diplomacy for time being, but need to start considering future options.
  - Ballistic and cruise missile defenses may be cost-effective simply to deal with conventional threat.
  - A number of systems offer both improved air and missile defense.
  - Need quietness with US containment options; extended deterrence.
  - Open support for IAEA and diplomatic options; key passive approach.
Iraqi Progress and Instability
The Iraq Challenge

• Success is an option, but half a decade of tasks remain:
  • Doubtful that can get rapid progress in conciliation, but slow conciliation better than division or civil war, and far easier to talk about abandoning Iraq than to do it if trigger a humanitarian disaster.
  • Consolidate progress in Iraq forces: Independent for internal security by 2012; create ability to defend against foreign threats by 2018.
  • Restructure police and criminal justice efforts, make local security real.
  • Build effective governance and services at national, provincial, and local level.
  • New focus on economic and aid dimensions; longer-term programs for petroleum, development, and aid.
  • Solve “federalism” and ethno-sectarian issues.
  • Contain or limit Iran, resolve Iraqi-Kurdish-Turkish issue, and reassure Sunni allies have not abandoned Iraqi Sunnis.

• If military succeeds, and conciliation happens, need to phase out US forces at rate that best achieves Iraqi and regional stability.

• If efforts fail, need phased cuts tied to clear political efforts, aid, and at least option of seeking to bloc civil war turning into military bloodbath. Extreme caution in intervening, but need to develop a Plan B flexible enough to react to events in Iraq.

• Need to talk to key allies and powers in region now. Reassure that will not leave Gulf, will aid them in dealing with Iran, and seeking some form of stability in Iraq. Need clear basing plans to handle exist and forces keep.
Anaconda Strategy vs. AQI

**Work with Source Countries**
- Border Ports of Entry Improvements
- Counter-Terrorist Force Ops
- Conventional Force Ops
- Iraqi Conventional & Special Force Ops
- Sons of Iraq

**Syria Engagement**
- Strategic Communications
- Interagency

**Kinetics**
- Counter Ethno-Sectarian Pressures
- Tribal Awakenings
- Detainee Ops

**Non-kinetics**
- Intel Fusion
- Intel, Surveillance and Recce Platforms
- Counterinsurgency in Detention Facilities
- Detainee Releases
- Jobs Programs Services
- Education
- Religious Engagement
- Internet

**AQI NEEDS**
- Weapons
- AQ Senior Leader Guidance
- Money
- Command and Control
- Ideology
- Popular Support
- Other Groups
- Safe Havens
- Ansar al Sunna

Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008
Key Surge Operations

Surge Forces
15 Jun 2007

Additional Combat Power
- 1 Division Headquarters
- 5 Brigade Combat Teams
- Marine Expeditionary Unit
- Combat Aviation Brigade
- 2 Marine Battalions

Operation Fardh al-Qanoon

Operation Phantom Thunder
- Al Anbar
  - Lake Thar Thar
  - Karma
  - Fallujah & Ramadi

- Divala
  - Basra
  - Tammieh/Kham Bani Had
  - Divala River Valley

Baghdad
- Adaminh District
- Maneuver District
- Rashid District
- West of Taj

Southern Baghdad Belts
- Arab Labour Area
- Salman Pak Area
- Euphrates River SW of Baghdad

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Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends

Source: MNF-I SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of June 1, 2008. Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) attacks.

Civilian Deaths

Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008
Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions
Real World Ethno-Sectarian Population Parameters?

Three sources:

- CIA World Factbook, unsourced;
- Average ABC News polls ‘07-‘08, N=6,652 via 1,386 points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CIA WFB</th>
<th>LoC</th>
<th>ABC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shiites</td>
<td>60-65%</td>
<td>60-65%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Arabs</td>
<td>12-22*</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>15-20</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Muslims</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Extrapolated

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths
January 2006 – May 2008

Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments CIOC Trends Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of June 1, 2008.

Ethno-Sectarian Violence

Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths

Neighborhood Sect Legend
- 75% Shi'a
- 75% Sunni
- 51% Shi'a / 25% Sunni
- 51% Sunni / 25% Shi'a
- Unknown
- Mixed - No majority

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Average Number of Daily Attacks in Iraq for Selected Provinces, August 2005 through Early May 2008

Note: Each data point represents the average number of daily attacks for the specified period of time, as reported in DOD’s quarterly reports to Congress.


Average Daily Attacks by Province
July 2007 – November 2007

These four provinces have approximately 42% of the population but account for 80% of attacks.
Attacks in Baghdad Province have decreased approximately 53% since last reporting period.

Source: SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Nov 30 2007.
Data reflects enemy attacks targeted against Coalition, ISF, civilians, infrastructure, Iraqi government organizations and reconstruction operations centers.
Average Daily Executed Attacks by Province

These four provinces have approximately 42% of the population but account for 87% of executed attacks.

Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of June 1, 2008. Data reflects executed enemy attacks targeted against coalition, ISF, civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations. Does not include IEDs and mines found and cleared.
I feel safe and secure in my neighborhood

I feel safe traveling outside my neighborhood

Nationwide average = 73%

Nationwide average = 37%

Source: April 2008 Nationwide Poll
Transferring Provincial Control

**FEB 07**

- Anbar
  - Transitioned
  - Not Ready

- Ninewa
- Kirkuk
- Salah Ad Din
- Diyala
- Maysan
- Dhi Qar
- Basra
- Muthanna
- Wasit
- Qadisiyah
- Babil
- Kerbala
- Baghdad
- Ninewa
- Irbil
- Sulaymaniyah

**MAR 08**

- Anbar
- Ninewa
- Kirkuk
- Salah Ad Din
- Diyala
- Maysan
- Dhi Qar
- Basra
- Muthanna
- Wasit
- Qadisiyah
- Babil
- Kerbala
- Baghdad
- Ninewa
- Irbil
- Sulaymaniyah

### Projected Transfer Date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUN 08</td>
<td>Anbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL 08</td>
<td>Qadisiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOV 08</td>
<td>Wasit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOV 08</td>
<td>Babil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC 08</td>
<td>Diyala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC 08</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 09</td>
<td>Salah Ad Din</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 09</td>
<td>Ninewa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Ta‘mim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Petraeus Briefing Slides, April 9, 2008
Some 2.7 million displaced within Iraq

1.2 million before February 2007

1.5 million since

300,000 in first three months of 2008

Iraq: The Challenge of Strategic Patience

- Consolidate gains against Al Qa’ida in Mesopotamia
- Move towards stable accommodation: Change de-Baathification law, provincial powers act and elections, oil law, etc.
- Keep Shi’ite militias (Sadr forces) under control, and prevent more sectarian and ethnic cleansing in greater Baghdad area.
- Consolidate creation of tribal militias, ensure they get proper central government support, and that central government recognizes importance of Sunni Sheiks.
- Stabilize provinces that still have serious conflict - Ninewah, Salahideen, Diyala -- and prevent Al Qa’ida in Mesopotamia forces from moving north.
- Avoid major intra-Shii’ite power struggles and conflicts in south.
- Limit Kurd, Arab, minority fighting in North.
- Resolve the “federalism” issue through peaceful referendums.
- Develop truly capable Iraqi Army and regular forces to phase US role down to overwatch.
- Find solution to failure to develop effective approach to police force, and to dealing with local security forces, militias, and Facilities Protection Force.
- Establish effective local criminal justice system and local, provincial and national government presence.
Future Structure of Iraq

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll

- **Central government**
  - All: 66%
  - Sunnis: 67%
  - Shiites: 10%
  - Kurds: 9%

- **Regional government**
  - All: 23%
  - Sunnis: 3%
  - Shiites: 31%
  - Kurds: 35%

- **Separate states**
  - All: 52%
  - Sunnis: 2%
  - Shiites: 1%
  - Kurds: 1%


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory Quality</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 34
Progress in Political Accommodation

• **Provincial Elections** The CoR is currently reviewing the law, which will set the legal basis and structure of provincial elections.

• **Hydrocarbons Package**: The level of control allocated to the central government in the July 2007 draft version of the framework law (currently in CoR Committee) is the keystone of disagreement; there may be more progress on the Revenue Management Law, currently with the Shura Council, in the coming months.

• **Amnesty Law** **Passed**: The law was approved on February 13; the law was signed by the Presidency Council on February 26 and was implemented in March 2.

• **Pensions Amendment** **Passed**: Published in the Official Gazette in December 2007.

• **De-Ba’athification** **Passed**: Approved by default by the Presidency Council on February 2008. Reform published in the Official Gazette in mid-February.

• **Provincial Powers** **Passed**: The law was approved on February 13; the law was vetoed by the Presidency Council on February 26. The veto was rescinded in March 19.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drafting laws</th>
<th>Enacting</th>
<th>Implementing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### De-Ba’athification
- Not implemented. Mandatory Commission not established.

### Amnesty
- Implementation in process. Thousands approved for amnesty.

### Provincial powers
- Takes effect once provincial elections occur.

### Elections
- **Electoral commission**: Implemented.
- **Provincial election law**: Completed.

### Hydrocarbon laws
- **Framework**: Completed.
- **Revenue sharing**: Completed.
- **Ministry of Oil Restructuring**: Completed.
- **Iraq National Oil Company**: Completed.

### Disarmament and demobilization
- No legislation drafted.

---

1. Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, UN and Iraqi government data.

---

"The provincial powers law set an October 1, 2006, deadline for holding provincial elections."
Living Apart
ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll

54% live in Shiite-only or Sunni-only areas
31% live in mostly-Shiite or mostly-Sunni areas
15% live in mixed areas

Views on PKK Activities
ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll

Turkish incursions vs. PKK justified
- Sunnis: 66%
- Shiites: 22%
- Kurds: 37%

Iraqi gov't not doing enough to control PKK
- Sunnis: 80%
- Shiites: 58%
- Kurds: 34%

March 2008
Iraq Security Forces Expenditures

Execution in Billions

2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009

Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008

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How US Iraqi Security Forces Aid Funds Have Been Spent

- **Defense Forces** $6.71 Billion
  - Training and Operations $0.14 (2%)
  - Sustainment $1.42 (21%)
  - Infrastructure $2.27 (34%)
  - Equipment and Transportation $2.87 (43%)

- **Interior Forces** $4.09 Billion
  - Training and Operations $1.67 (41%)
  - Sustainment $0.45 (11%)
  - Infrastructure $0.99 (24%)
  - Equipment and Transportation $0.98 (24%)

**Total Obligated** $11.23 Billion

**Note:** Numbers are affected by rounding. Allocation detail for ISFF funding is unavailable this quarter; therefore, the percentages in this graphic are calculated using dollars obligated.

Near Term Iraqi Force Goals

Source: OJCS, December 2007
## Iraqi Combat Battalion Generation

### Infantry, Armor, Special Operations, and National Police Battalions

#### JAN 2007
- 115 Battalions
  - 93 Battalions in the lead
  - 27 National Police
  - 88 Iraqi Army

#### MAR 2008
- 171 Battalions
  - 112 Battalions in the lead
  - 36 National Police
  - 76 Iraqi Army

#### DEC 2008 (Projected)
- 187 Battalions
  - 44 National Police
  - 143 Iraqi Army

---

**Operational Readiness Assessment = ORA**

*Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008*
MoD Forces: Operational Readiness
April 2008

Source: MNF-I as of May 13, 2008 (based on Apr 08 data). Does not include units not yet formed or not reporting.

Mol National Police Forces: Operational Readiness
April 2008

- Capable of planning, executing and sustaining COIN operations
- Capable of planning, executing and sustaining COIN operations with Iraqi or Coalition support
- Partially capable of conducting COIN operations with Coalition units
- Incapable of conducting COIN operations
- Units Planned

Source: MNF-I as of May 13, 08 (based on Apr 08 data). Does not include units not yet formed or not reporting.

Sons of Iraq
Concerned Local Citizens

Total Contracted: 91,641
Volunteers: 4,605
Sunni: 78%
Shia: 19%
Other: 3%

Transitioned: 21,128
Anbar: 8,206
Iraqi Security Forces: 8,241
Non-Security Employment: 4,681

Costs:
Average Monthly CERP: $16M

Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008
Total Reconstruction Funds Now = $113.9 Billion

a. Includes August 11, 2004 transfer of $86 million cash from the Central Bank of Iraq for CERP at the authorization of the Ministry of Finance.
b. In previous Quarterly Reports, SIGIR reported approximately $20 billion in DFI cumulative deposits to fund Iraqi government operations and reconstruction programs. SIGIR has redefined that number to include only reconstruction funding, which is approximately $7 billion, according to GAO Report 05-876 (July 28, 2005, p. 2).
c. Table 2.1 includes a breakdown of Iraqi capital budget expenditures, CY 2003-2008.
d. Where Iraq-only appropriations are unavailable, SIGIR assigned 85% for Iraq based on historical trends.
e. May include humanitarian aid or other types of assistance.
f. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, January 4, 2008.

Note: This quarter, SIGIR changed methodology for reporting international donor pledges. Beginning with the January 2008 Quarterly and Semianual Report to Congress, SIGIR will use the official U.S. government source — DoS:NEA-I — as the sources for pledge data. The dollar change from last quarter is due to the revised reporting method.
Living Conditions Since 2/04
ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll

- Freedom of movement
- Live w/out persecution
- Medical care
- Clean water
- Jobs
- Fuel
- Electricity

% positive

---|---|---|---|---
44% | 38% | 30% | 19% | 12%

Uncertain Spending & Budget Sharing

- Spend on salaries, central government operating costs, but not on capital development.

- At end 2007, had spent 71% of salary budget, 25% of capital budget.

- Total Capital budget for 2007 was $10.1 billion, or 25% of total vs. 18% in 2006.

- But, $6.4B of $10.1 billion was for central government ministries, $1.6 billion went to Kurdish region, and only $2.1 billion went to other provinces.

- Central government ministries get 76% of total budget, Finance Ministry gets 34%.

## Iraqi Capital Budgets for Reconstruction: 2003-2008


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Capital Budget (In Dinars)</th>
<th>Conversion Rate (Dinar/USD)</th>
<th>Iraqi Capital Budget ($US)</th>
<th>Document Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Not Provided in Dinars</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$609,500,000</td>
<td>“Republic of Iraq: Budget Revenues and Expenses 2003, July – December”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5,114,323,000,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>$3,409,548,667</td>
<td>“Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly: The State General Budget for 2005”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7,550,000,000,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>$5,033,333,333</td>
<td>“Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly: The State General Budget for 2005”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9,272,000,000,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>$6,181,333,333</td>
<td>“GOI Budget” [as approved by TNA and written into law December 2005]; U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>15,671,227,000,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>$13,059,000,000</td>
<td>“Approved Iraqi Federal Budget for 2008”; U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 4/3/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$38,355,615,333</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iraqi Capital Budget Expenditure By Province: 2003-2008

The Cost of Dividing the Country: Infrastructure and Iraqi Oil Fields

The Case for National Unity

- Single port.
- Integrated road net. Rail net cross ethnic & sectarian areas
- Water & irrigation systems. Agricultural exports.
- Secure oil exports; refinery & product needs.
- Electric and gas generation.
- Air traffic and overflight rights.
- Network of state-owned enterprises.
Iraqi Oil Exports

- 2006 Revenue Estimate: $31.3 Billion
- 2007 Revenue Estimate: $41.0 Billion
- 2008 Revenue Estimate: $31.5 Billion (ytd)

US State Department, Iraq: Weekly Status Report, June 18, 2008. Pg 15
The Iraqi Product Import Crisis

Note: This is a daily average for June 9 – June 15

- Diesel: 18.6 ML supply of 24.5 ML target
- Kerosene: 8.3 ML supply of 14.6 ML target
- Gasoline: 12.6 ML supply of 26.8 ML target
- LPG: 3,403 tons supply of 5,100 tons target

US State Department, Iraq: Weekly Status Report, June 18, 2008. Pg 16
The Iraqi Electricity Crisis

Daily Electricity Supplied and Estimated Demand in Iraq Since January 2004

- Daily electricity demand June 11-17 was 4% above the same period last year. Daily supply from the grid was 9% above the year-earlier period and met 56% of demand, compared with 51% for the year-earlier period.

- For June 10-16 average hours of power from the grid after meeting demand from essential services were Baghdad: 11.0 and national 11.4. Year-ago levels were Baghdad 5.6 and national 10.3.
Arab Public Opinion on Iraq War

Which of the following is your biggest concern about the consequences of the war in Iraq? (Choose two)

- Iran is now a more powerful state
  - 2006, 15%
  - 2008, 8%

- Iraq may be divided
  - 2006, 49%
  - 2008, 40%

- US will continue to dominate Iraq long after the transfer of power to the Iraqis
  - 2006, 42%
  - 2008, 40%

- Continuing trouble in Iraq will divert attention from other issues such as the Palestinian question
  - 2006, 31%
  - 2008, 42%

- Iraq will remain unstable and spread instability in the region
  - 2006, 42%
  - 2008, 59%

Source: Shibley Telhami, 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll Poll Survey of the Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International) Conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE
Since the surge of American forces in Iraq, the number of violent incidents has significantly declined in many parts of Iraq. Which of the following is closest to your view?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>W/Egypt</th>
<th>W/O Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is an indication that the surge is working and will increase the chance of a stable political settlement in Iraq</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The reduction of violence has little to do with the American surge, but still believe that the situation in Iraq is headed toward a stable political settlement</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The reduction of violence has little to do with the American surge, and it is only a matter of time before violence increases again</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t believe the reports of a significant reduction in violence</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shibley Telhami, 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll Survey of the Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International) Conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE.
Arab Public Opinion on US Impact on Iraq

What do you believe would happen in Iraq if the US quickly withdrew its forces?

- **Civil war will expand rapidly**
  - With Egypt, 15%
  - Without Egypt, 18%

- **The situation will not change**
  - With Egypt, 17%
  - Without Egypt, 20%

- **Iraqis will find a way to bridge their differences**
  - With Egypt, 61%
  - Without Egypt, 58%

Source: Shibley Telhami, 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll Survey of the Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International) International) Conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE.
Security Impact on GCC States

- Stable and secure Iraq critical to Gulf security.
- Political accommodation and national unity critical to limiting Iranian influence and spillover of Iraqi Sunni-Shi’ite power struggles.
- Strong Iraq self-defense capability is critical buffer to security of the entire Gulf.
- Support and aid from GCC states is a critical element of Gulf security.