Toward a Stronger U.S.-Taiwan Relationship
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A Report of the CSIS Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan

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*All Task Force members participated in an individual capacity and not as representatives of their respective organizations. The views expressed are their own.

**The findings, recommendations, or policy developments that result from the discussions or work products of the task force were not formulated nor endorsed by Susan Lawrence or CRS.
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Policy Direction and Select Recommendations

The focus of this task force is on U.S. policy toward Taiwan, which should be driven by a clear assessment of American interests. These interests include ensuring that Taiwan remains a secure, stable, healthy, resilient, prosperous, and innovative democratic society that is free from predation and coercion. It is also in the United States’ interest that Taiwan remains integrated into the global economy and continues to serve as a provider of global public goods.

If the United States is to achieve these objectives, Taiwan must steadily build its own core capabilities. Key lines of effort by Taipei should include enhancing its economic growth, innovation, global competitiveness, and economic autonomy; investing in and building a military force capable of executing a credible defense; improving its democratic governance; and amplifying external messaging of Taiwan’s success.

With these interests and goals in mind, the task force first states the basic principles that should guide U.S. policy and then lays out a series of recommendations.

Overall U.S. Policy Direction

- U.S. policy toward Taiwan should be developed and implemented in the context of the full range of its foreign policy and national security objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. These include ensuring the credibility of U.S. commitments to allies and partners, countering coercive and revisionist threats to a free and open regional order, and charting a relationship with China that advances American interests.

- The Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués (as the United States interprets them), and the Six Assurances should continue to be the core framework for U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

- While symbolic gestures are sometimes useful to signal U.S. commitment and resolve, U.S. policy toward Taiwan should comprise substantive actions that meaningfully enhance Taiwan’s security, stability, and prosperity.

- U.S. policymakers should consistently stress to People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials that Taiwan is a genuine democracy in which the people’s views will
ultimately determine Taiwan’s choices about its future. In this context, the task force believes Beijing has the burden to convince the people of Taiwan of its peaceful intentions.

▪ The United States should continue to reject the use of force and coercion by China to achieve its Taiwan objectives and make clear that cross-strait issues must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.

▪ The United States has a strong interest in both sides of the strait maintaining peace and stability and should continue to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by either side.

**Select Policy Recommendations**

▪ Initiate exploratory talks for a bilateral trade agreement (BTA), with the goal of launching formal negotiations as soon as possible.

▪ Bring Taiwan into plurilateral discussions on export controls, cybersecurity, and IT supply chain issues that the United States is holding with other like-minded partners, such as Australia and Japan.

▪ Reaffirm in a high-level public statement that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States and are matters of international concern.

▪ Undertake a high-level, interagency, comprehensive review of Taiwan’s security that includes consideration of whether existing declaratory policy on “strategic ambiguity” is enough for the purposes of deterrence messaging.

▪ Develop a new set of tools to enhance deterrence and better shape the intentions of PRC leaders.

▪ Broaden the scope of U.S.-Taiwan defense dialogues to address threats to Taiwan posed by coercion without violence, such as cyberattacks and disinformation.

▪ Strengthen opportunities for communication between senior officials from the United States and Taiwan, including at the cabinet and sub-cabinet level, on issues of importance to both sides.

▪ Assist Taiwan to expand its engagements with multilateral groupings such as the recently established D10 group of leading democracies. Actively counter Chinese efforts to lobby against Taiwan’s inclusion.

▪ Strengthen coalitions with like-minded countries and take joint actions aimed at expanding Taiwan’s participation in key international organizations.
Introduction

China will be the most consequential relationship confronting the United States over the coming decades. When the United States and China clashed in the early years of the Cold War, Taiwan was often the proximate cause. With the return of U.S.-China strategic competition in the twenty-first century, Taiwan is once again at the epicenter. At one level, the core challenge remains the same as it was during the early Cold War: a dispute about sovereignty, the security of the Western Pacific, and national identity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Yet, from the vantage point of 2020, this dispute is now evolving in the new and very different context of rapidly expanding Chinese military capabilities, foreign interference, and complex intertwined supply chains. The challenges for U.S. policy may be even greater today than they were during the crisis around Taiwan seven decades ago.

U.S. policy toward Taiwan has often been politically sensitive if not divisive. The Carter administration’s normalization of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) in 1979 led a dissatisfied Congress to reassert American commitments to the people of Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act. The struggle for democratization in Taiwan in the 1980s caused divisions within the Taiwanese-American community that at times polarized U.S. support for Taiwan. Populist attacks on the cross-strait status quo by the first Democratic Progressive Party president in the early-2000s prompted pushback from Washington and bitter recriminations in both capitals.

Taiwan remains a sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations, to be sure, but the earlier divisiveness around Taiwan policy has largely subsided in the United States. Americans now see a robust and vibrant democracy in Taiwan and a government in Taipei that is seeking to be a trusted partner to the United States and a responsible stakeholder on global challenges such as Covid-19. Bipartisan support for Taiwan in the U.S. Congress has never been stronger. Yet at the same time, mounting Chinese pressure on Taiwan across political, military, social, and economic domains is reaching dangerous levels. No matter who wins the U.S. presidential election in November 2020, U.S. support for Taiwan is likely to remain strong. However, the direction and nature of that support will have to be framed within the larger context of a new era of strategic competition with China that brings both increased risks and opportunities for Taiwan, the United States, and the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.

With this broader context in mind, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) established a bipartisan CSIS Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan in January
2020 to prepare recommendations for the coming four years and beyond. The task force includes members who have held senior positions of responsibility on Taiwan policy in previous Democratic and Republic administrations as well as experts on national security, business, technology, law, society, the U.S. Congress, human rights, and Taiwan’s politics and society. The task force met monthly from January to August 2020 to consider U.S. strategic interests, diplomacy, defense, trade, and other issues and to receive background briefings from the governments of the United States and Taiwan.

This task force report explains why Taiwan matters to the United States, the framework for U.S. policy toward Taiwan, and the trends that affect economic, defense, and diplomatic aspects of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The report concludes with a set of specific recommendations to upgrade U.S. policy on Taiwan consistent with long-standing U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region while also responding to the new and emerging challenges. The task force members had many thoughts on steps Taipei can take to continue enhancing its security, prosperity, and democracy, but the mission of the task force and the focus of this report is on recommendations for U.S. policy. The members of the task force participated in their individual capacities rather than as representatives of their respective organizations.

**Why Taiwan Matters to the United States**

Today in the United States, public and congressional views of Taiwan are strongly positive. Going forward, U.S. policy must be rooted in an enduring appreciation of how Taiwan's future will impact critical U.S. national interests with respect to values, the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, and economic prosperity. Taiwan has risen in importance in all three of these areas.

**The future of Taiwan is important to American values.** The first half of the twenty-first century will be defined by a systemic competition between the capitalist democracy championed by the United States and its allies and the authoritarian state-led-economy advanced by Beijing. Taiwan sits at the front line of this rivalry, being the target of Beijing's most sophisticated tools of political and cyber interference and economic coercion. If Taiwan's democracy successfully generates domestic policies to protect its freedoms and address the myriad challenges it faces, as well as external policies that are consistent with U.S. interests, it will set an important example to China and the entire world about the resilience of democratic values in the face of Beijing's growing material strength, particularly in the wake of Beijing's crackdown on Hong Kong.

**The future of Taiwan is pivotal to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.** More than any other issue in the region, the fate of Taiwan is central to the issues of war and peace in Asia and globally. In the U.S.-China relationship, it is one of the few issues that could precipitate great power conflict, given Beijing's unwillingness to renounce the use of force and reduce the military buildup around Taiwan. Yet Taiwan also sits at the middle of the first island chain stretching from Japan to the Philippines and the South China Sea. If China neutralized or occupied Taiwan, Japan would be flanked and its sea lanes put at risk. Successful Chinese coercion of Taiwan would also shatter confidence in U.S. security guarantees and the credibility of the hub-and-spokes network of U.S. alliances in the region, which for seven decades has maintained the Pacific Ocean as a barrier against threats to the United States itself.
The future of Taiwan is important to U.S. economic competitiveness and prosperity. Taiwan was the United States’ ninth-largest trading partner in the first half of 2020 but more importantly is one of the world’s leading producers of advanced information and communications technologies, including semiconductors, along with the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and a key link in global supply chains. The integration of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and other Taiwanese high-tech firms with the United States would enhance secure supply chains in the transition to 5G and the Internet of Things (IoT) that will define prosperity in the twenty-first century. In contrast, Chinese control of Taiwan’s semiconductor production capabilities through coercion or trade and technology transfer would allow Beijing to close its significant shortfalls in semiconductor fabrication and leapfrog to dominance across high-tech sectors. Looking further to future technological developments, a deepened supply chain and R&D integration with Taiwan will help bolster U.S. innovation and defense capabilities in areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

The Framework for U.S. Policy on Taiwan

As important as Taiwan is to the United States, the unofficial nature of relations between Taipei and Washington has necessitated a framework built on U.S. domestic law and international communiqués as well as and policy precedents rather than formal treaties per se. Recommendations for U.S. policy must be based on an understanding of the reasons for this framework and its parameters but also the opportunities it presents. The key elements include:

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA): The TRA was enacted by Congress in January 1979 as the United States switched diplomatic relations to the PRC. The act authorized “the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan”; the provision to Taiwan of “arms of a defensive character”; and maintenance of “the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” Because the TRA is the only law within the overall framework of U.S. policy on Taiwan, it is a foundational pillar of that policy in the view of the task force.

The Three Communiqués, or the “One China” Policy1: The parameters for policy toward Taiwan are also set by bipartisan continuation since 1972 of the decision to recognize the PRC. The intention to normalize relations was set forth in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué during the Nixon administration. The normalization of relations was then announced in the second communiqué during the Carter administration in January 1979, which established that “the Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” This language signaled the U.S. decision to avoid recognizing that Taiwan was part of China’s sovereign territory. Another important clause in the normalization communiqué stated, “[t]he United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the

United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” That meant that the PRC government would represent “China” in intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations. The third communiqué, issued during the Reagan administration in 1982, reconfirmed that the United States would adhere to the 1979 communiqué agreement that the PRC was the “sole legal government of China” and stated a conditional pledge by the United States to gradually decrease both the quantity and quality of arms sales to Taiwan. The 1982 statement on arms sales has since been interpreted by Beijing as an unconditional commitment, but the United States always considered any reduction of arms sales as contingent on the communiqué’s subsequent clause emphasizing that both governments “will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough settlement of this issue.” Since China’s military threat to Taiwan increased substantially in subsequent years, the United States has not considered “conditions conducive” to reducing arms sales, particularly given the intent of the TRA.²

The Six Assurances: This memorandum was issued unilaterally by the Reagan administration in 1982 to reassure Taiwan and the U.S. Congress that in its negotiations with the PRC on the third communiqué the United States had not: agreed to revise the TRA; set a specific date for ending arms sales; agreed to consult with Beijing over Taiwan arms sales; or made any changes in the U.S. position on sovereignty over Taiwan. In addition, the United States would not pressure Taipei to negotiate with Beijing or play a mediation role between Beijing and Taipei.³ U.S. policymakers sometimes chose to downplay the Six Assurances in subsequent years, but there is broad and bipartisan consensus in Congress that the Six Assurances must remain an important guidepost of U.S. Taiwan policy.

2 In August 2019, the Trump administration declassified a 1982 internal presidential memo clarifying that “the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences.” See Susan V. Lawrence, “Taiwan: Select Political and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service, August 19, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275.

3 The Six Assurances were first delivered to Taiwan’s president by AIT Director James Lilley. They were declassified by the Trump administration on August 31, 2020. See “Declassified Cables: Taiwan Arms Sales & Six Assurances (1982),” American Institute in Taiwan, https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/six-assurances-1982/.
The United States:
- Has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan;
- Has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan;
- Will not play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing;
- Has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
- Has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and
- Will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.

Opposition to Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo: In April 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly added an important girder to U.S. Taiwan policy when he testified in prepared remarks to the House International Relations Committee that the United States “does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it.” The statement was necessitated by statements from Taipei that appeared to move closer to implying Taiwan’s de jure independence under that name, as compared with the long-standing assertion of the continuing existence of the Republic of China (ROC). U.S. declaratory policy had for some time expressed openness to movement toward peaceful unification if it reflected the will of people on both sides of the strait, but this new element was intended to deter unilateral moves even if they reflected the popular will of the people on Taiwan. Kelly emphasized that the opposition to unilateral changes applied in both directions and was a message for Beijing as well.

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5 James Kelly’s statement has a precedent in a 1996 speech by then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher in which he stated, “We have emphasized to both sides the importance of avoiding provocative actions or unilateral measures that would alter the status quo or pose a threat to peaceful resolution of outstanding issues.” See ibid.
Taiwan’s economic resilience may have the most significant impact on U.S. strategic interests but has been the least attended aspect of U.S. policy toward Taiwan for some time. Strengthening U.S.-Taiwan economic ties—especially negotiating a bilateral trade agreement—is key to bolstering Taiwan’s overall security and prosperity and enhancing Taiwan’s confidence in the U.S. commitment. It would also reduce the incongruity between the strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan relations in the security and diplomacy realms and the lack of progress in the economic arena.

Taiwan is an important U.S. economic partner. In 2019, Taiwan was the United States’ tenth-largest trading partner, with total trade valued at $85.5 billion dollars, putting it ahead of countries such as Italy, Vietnam, and Brazil. In the first half of 2020, Taiwan rose a notch to number nine and accounted for 2.2 percent of U.S. exports and 2.6 percent of U.S. imports. In 2017, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) was $17.0 billion (stock), and Taiwanese FDI into the United States was $8.1 billion (stock). The total stock of U.S. FDI in Taiwan reached $17.0 billion in 2017, and Taiwan’s total stock of FDI in the United States reached $8.1 billion in 2017. U.S. services exports to Taiwan totaled $10.0 billion in 2018. With globalization, Taiwan’s prominence as a critical node in global supply chains gives it a salience in the international economy that far exceeds its size, especially regarding high technology. Despite Taiwan’s economic importance to America, there have been no significant bilateral trade or investment agreements signed since 2001. Moreover, the PRC’s relentless campaign to marginalize Taiwan from Asia’s deepening economic integration is a drag on the island’s competitiveness.

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But it is not just Taiwan that is being marginalized. Because of the Trump administration’s aversion to multilateral trade agreements, the United States pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and has shown no interest in being part of either the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, the successor to TPP) or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). As a result, regional economic integration is advancing without both the United States and Taiwan, subjecting goods exports from both economies to higher tariff and other non-tariff barriers. Taiwanese companies therefore have incentives to relocate inside these trading blocs, reducing
employment opportunities in Taiwan. Because Taiwan’s economic marginalization makes it more vulnerable to China’s coercion, it should be a matter a concern for the United States.

In this context, deepening economic ties to the United States is an obvious way to strengthen Taiwan’s economy and reduce its international marginalization and thereby strengthen its overall security. The Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), established in 1994, has served as the primary platform for U.S.-Taiwan economic and trade dialogue. TIFA talks have typically covered issues such as intellectual property, agriculture, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals. With other trading partners, the United States often has used TIFA talks as a mechanism to make incremental progress on issues in order to prepare the way for the eventual launch of formal negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA).

Generally, the two sides have met annually through TIFA when economic relations have been good. When there have been trade frictions, however, the United States frequently has not been willing to hold meetings of the high-level TIFA council, which is typically chaired by the deputy U.S. trade representative (USTR) and Taiwan’s deputy minister of economic affairs.

The Trump administration has not held a single meeting of the TIFA council. Initially, this may have been caused by delays in the nomination and approval of the deputy USTR with responsibility for Taiwan. However, the Trump administration’s intense focus on negotiations with China on a Phase One trade deal was likely a more important factor, combined with the USTR’s continued frustration over Taiwan’s failure to resolve the outstanding beef and pork issues.

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**BEEF AND PORK**

Since the George W. Bush administration, the trade dialogue has been repeatedly disrupted by trade barriers Taiwan has imposed on U.S. beef and pork. Taipei placed restrictions on U.S. beef in response to an outbreak of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States in 2003.

The issue was further inflamed in 2009 when Taiwan reneged on a number of the commitments it had just agreed to in a bilateral beef protocol, including by banning imports of U.S. beef from animals over 30 months of age. The other serious agricultural trade issue that disrupted the TIFA is Taiwan’s barriers to market access for U.S. pork containing the feed additive ractopamine. Taiwan imposed a ban on all imports of beef and pork products containing ractopamine in 2007 on both food safety grounds and because domestic pork producers are a key political interest group. For a five-year period between 2008 and 2012, the United States suspended meetings of the TIFA council because

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13 Elaine Hou and Frances Huang, “Taiwan hopes talks under TIFA will resume this year,” Focus Taiwan, April 19, 2018, https://focustaiwan.tw/business/201804190018.
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Taiwan had not addressed U.S. concerns about beef and pork. Taiwan lifted the ban on ractopamine residues in beef in 2012, and TIFA council talks resumed from 2013 to 2016.

President Tsai announced on August 28, 2020 that Taiwan will ease regulations to allow imports of U.S. pork containing trace amounts of ractopamine and U.S. beef products from cattle aged 30 months and older.

Over the past year, there have been growing calls for a bold transformation of the Taiwan-U.S. economic relationship through the conclusion of a BTA. President Tsai has made repeated calls for such a pact, as has the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei and the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. Such an agreement would both open markets and reduce the marginalization from the international economy that Taiwan has suffered as a result of PRC actions. Over the long run, a BTA, with its array of policy disciplines, would stimulate a structural adjustment in Taiwan’s economy that is long overdue.

**Congressional Views of a BTA with Taiwan**

Congress has long been ambivalent about whether to pursue a BTA with Taiwan, but the level of support has grown dramatically in recent years. This support has expanded well beyond the members of the Taiwan Caucus, as demonstrated by a December 2019 letter signed by nearly 160 members of Congress that was addressed to USTR Robert E. Lighthizer and which called for the launch of a BTA. There is still some skepticism about Taiwan’s readiness for a BTA on Capitol Hill, however, including from members of the House Ways and Means Committee, which has jurisdiction on trade matters. In October 2019, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Taipei International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act, which calls on the administration to “engage in bilateral trade negotiations with Taiwan, with the goal of entering into a free trade agreement.” Yet this language was stripped out by the House Ways and Means Committee when the legislation went to the House of Representatives, likely because of concerns over Taiwan’s policies on beef and pork.

In light of this troubled history and the lack of progress toward a BTA, President Tsai decided to invest significant political capital by taking steps to address U.S. concerns about Taiwan’s policies on beef and pork, which have been the key obstacle to even beginning talks. On August 28, 2020, President Tsai announced that she had instructed her government to ease regulations to allow imports of U.S. pork containing trace amounts of ractopamine and U.S. beef products from cattle aged 30 months and older. President Tsai indicated that these steps were being taken in order to secure Taiwan’s economic future and to promote U.S.-Taiwan relations. This decision, while consistent with international standards and

Taiwan’s own government risk assessments, is not without political risks. Taiwan’s pork producers strongly oppose the policy shift, and public opinion on food safety issues has been extremely volatile in the past. Initial responses from the Departments of State, Commerce, and Agriculture, as well as from the vice president and National Security Council (NSC), to President Tsai’s actions were positive. Notably, however, USTR, which has long been the U.S. agency most skeptical of the potential benefits of a BTA with Taiwan, and which would be the lead U.S. negotiator on a BTA, did not issue a public statement.

On August 31, the State Department also announced the creation of a new dialogue mechanism, an Economic and Commercial Dialogue, led by the Department of State’s undersecretary for economic growth, energy, and environment. This new senior-level annual platform is intended to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan economic ties across a spectrum of priority issues, including reorienting technology and medical product supply chains; enhancing investment screening and intellectual property rights protection; and expanding infrastructure and energy sector collaboration.

Time is a factor for a possible launch of BTA talks with Taiwan. In addition to the U.S. election in November and end of the current presidential term in January, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), the legislation which empowers the president to negotiate trade agreements that will get an up or down vote in the Congress, expires in July 2021.

Even if both sides decide to move forward on a BTA, there are a series of obstacles to U.S.-Taiwan economic agreements that will need to be addressed. The first is the long-standing U.S. government position that the formal parties to bilateral agreements between the United States and Taiwan must be non-government entities. The traditional mechanism has been for these agreements to be concluded between two non-government organizations, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and TECRO, which were established by the United States and Taiwan for the express purpose of conducting substantive bilateral relations in the absence of diplomatic relations.\(^\text{15}\) For example, the 1998 bilateral agreement concerning Taiwan’s accession to the World Trade Organization was an AIT-TECRO agreement, as was the 2009 bilateral agreement reopening the Taiwan market to U.S. beef.\(^\text{16}\) In order to implement each of these previous bilateral agreements, prior specific agreements were required between AIT and each U.S. government agency that would undertake obligations.

This would be much more difficult in the case of a comprehensive BTA because of the large number of executive branch agencies that would need to be bound under these agreements. In addition, there are specific provisions in U.S. FTAs that are enforceable under U.S. law when undertaken as part of an agreement between governments but would potentially require new legal mechanisms if included in an AIT-TECRO agreement. An example of this would be the obligations relating to interstate or investor-state investment dispute settlement provisions, which are typically included in U.S. bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or FTAs.

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Given the complexity of these issues, it would be prudent to determine before formal negotiations begin whether there would need to be a new legal framework for a potential U.S.-Taiwan BTA. The role of Congress in approving a BTA would also have to be defined in advance. Past AIT-TECRO economic pacts were considered executive agreements that did not require congressional approval. An FTA would ordinarily be submitted to both houses of Congress for approval under TPA. Congress is known to jealously guard its prerogatives and would presumably do so with regard to a possible BTA with Taiwan.

In addition to bilateral trade and investment, Taiwan’s role in critical supply chains and geo-economic policies has an importance for the United States that cannot be understated, particularly when advanced, sensitive technologies are involved. Taiwan is an innovator of technologies for which the United States needs to remain at the cutting edge, such as semiconductors. Semiconductors underpin the “must-win” commercial and military technologies of the future, including artificial intelligence, 5G, quantum computing, and autonomous systems.

Taiwan’s semiconductor industry continues to grow in commercial and strategic importance to the United States. TSMC now leads the world in process technology and is the preferred vendor of choice for manufacturing chips for companies such as Apple, QUALCOMM, Nvidia, and others. This increases the importance of Taiwan’s manufacturing centers in Hsinchu and other science parks and the free flow of semiconductor chips from Taiwan to the United States and other markets. There is also the welcome news that TSMC intends to build a 5nm chip manufacturing facility in Phoenix, Arizona, returning America to cutting-edge contract manufacturing.

### Apple’s Top 200 Suppliers by Manufacturer Headquarters (FY 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* “Other” includes the Netherlands (1.5%), Singapore (1.5%), Austria (1.0%), Finland (1.0%), Saudi Arabia (0.5%), Belgium (0.5%), and Switzerland (0.5%).

On the same day that TSMC announced its intent to build a plant in Arizona, the Trump administration placed Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing squarely in the middle of America’s effort to curtail China’s global dominance of 5G by forbidding global chip manufacturers—most significantly TSMC—from selling chips to Huawei. This hobbles a potential competitor while the United States and its allies’ attempt to position other companies to build out the next generation of global telecommunications infrastructure. This area of vulnerability is a genuine pressure point for China.

While TSMC lost a valuable customer, its overall growth in sales and market dominance continues apace for now. The same is true for Taiwan’s overall semiconductor sector. However, the Trump administration’s actions underscore the need for better consultations and coordination of policy. Technology issues are slated to be discussed in the economic dialogue platform that the State Department announced in August 2020. This should facilitate improved cooperation in expanding technology ties as well as addressing shared commercial and security concerns emanating from China.

PRC actions complicate these efforts to improve U.S.-Taiwan cooperation. Two Chinese government-backed semiconductor projects hired more than a hundred TSMC managers and engineers over the past year, which demonstrates how critical Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is to China’s own efforts to dominate the semiconductor industry. Researchers also recently revealed that a Chinese state-sponsored hacker group targeted at least seven Taiwanese chip firms in the past two years.

In sum, the Trump administration, supported by congressional legislation, has made progress in its policy toward Taiwan in the security and diplomacy arenas. These enhancements reflect an understanding of Taiwan’s importance for U.S. national interests. But the Trump administration, like its predecessors, has not based its economic policy toward Taiwan upon the same premise.

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Defense and Security

Although U.S. arms sales to Taiwan get by far the most attention, security cooperation between Taiwan and the United States is both broad and robust. A structured set of dialogue mechanisms are employed to discuss emerging challenges, coordinate policies and activities, manage military contacts, and facilitate cooperation in support of the broader unofficial relationship (see Appendix III for a list of U.S.-Taiwan defense dialogue mechanisms). Publicly reported examples of defense and security cooperation include the dispatch of senior retired U.S. military officers to observe Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang exercises; the holding of a joint U.S.-Taiwan cyber-war exercise in November 2019; and a long-standing U.S. program to train Taiwan’s pilots in Arizona.19

Over the past 25 years, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has increasingly tilted in China’s favor. The mainland’s rapid economic growth, increased defense spending, and multi-decade People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization efforts have eroded Taiwan’s advantages, which historically derived from its technological superiority and its inherent geographic defenses as an island. China’s development of an array of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities has complicated U.S. military plans to intervene in the event of a Chinese invasion or blockade. The shifting cross-strait military balance raises questions about how long Taiwan’s military could hold out in the event of a conflict and how the United States should maintain the military capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan—including whether it is still possible to do so. There are some favorable countrendtrends, including closer U.S.-Japan defense cooperation based on the 2015 revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines and renewed congressional focus on military capabilities in the Western Pacific, as evidenced by the 2020 Indo-Pacfic Deterrence Initiative. However, overall trends in the cross-strait balance point to weakening deterrence.

China’s buildup against Taiwan began in earnest in the latter half of the 1990s. The U.S. dispatch of two aircraft carriers to the area around Taiwan in response to Chinese missile firings near the island in 1996 and the accidental NATO strike on China’s embassy in Serbia in 1999 prompted the PLA to concentrate on developing capabilities to dissuade Taiwan from pursuing independence and to deter U.S. forces from intervening in the event that Chinese leaders decided to seek unification through the use of military force.

19 In May 2015, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton, in a speech on Taiwan policy, revealed that “Our bilateral military exchanges and engagements have nearly doubled in recent years, increasing the quality of interactions between our service members.” Susan Thornton, “Taiwan: A Vital Partner in East Asia,” (speech, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Brookings Institution, May 21, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rsrm/2015/05/242705.htm.
The Taiwan scenario remains Beijing’s top priority and the chief driver of China’s military modernization, even as the intensification of other sovereignty disputes and the expansion of Chinese overseas interests have required the PLA to plan for other contingencies. Should Beijing decide to employ force to punish Taiwan for a perceived move toward independence or to coerce Taipei into making political concessions, its options include seizing Taiwan’s offshore islands or its island in the South China Sea and launching air and missile strikes against select targets on Taiwan. Use of force to achieve unification could involve an air and maritime blockade or a full-scale amphibious invasion to occupy the island. Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks on command and control installations and critical infrastructure.

As part of its “gray zone” strategy to pressure and intimidate Taiwan while staying below the threshold of war, China has stepped up air and naval operations near the island, especially in the aftermath of President Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election in January 2020. PLA fighter and bomber aircraft frequently circumnavigate the island as a show of force and to test Taiwan’s responses. In the first eight months of 2020, Chinese military aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) 20 times. As of October 7, China had conducted 49 military aircraft sorties across the Taiwan Strait centerline this year, after deliberately crossing it in March 2019 for the first time in two decades. China has also sailed its aircraft carriers through the strait on several occasions in recent years, accompanied by escort ships.

Summary of PLA Air Operations near Taiwan on September 18, 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLA ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PLA AIRCRAFT INVOLVED</th>
<th>ROC REACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crossed midline of Taiwan Strait</td>
<td>Two H-6 bombers</td>
<td>Issued radio warnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ</td>
<td>Eight J-16 fighters</td>
<td>Scrambled air patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Four J-11 fighters</td>
<td>Deployed air defense missile system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Four J-10 fighters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Flight Path of PLA Aircraft on September 18, 2020


21 Matt Yu and Joseph Yeh, “Chinese warplanes make most median line crossings in 30 years (update),” Focus Taiwan, October 7, 2020, https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202010070024.
Taiwan currently spends about 2.3 percent of GDP on its military, with an FY 2020 budget of $11.4 billion divided into personnel ($5.2 billion, 46 percent), operations ($3.1 billion, 27 percent), and defense technology and acquisition programs ($3.1 billion, 27 percent). President Tsai has reversed the trend of declining military spending as a percentage of GDP, but the defense budget continues to fall short of the target of 3 percent of GDP, which was first pledged by President Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 and reaffirmed by President Tsai when she took office. The proposed FY 2021 military budget is $12.4 billion, an increase of about 4.4 percent, which compares with a PRC military budget estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at $261 billion for 2019. Taiwan plans an additional $1.9 billion in defense-related expenditures by other parts of the government in FY 2021.

**Comparison of Defense Spending in China and Taiwan**


The Taiwan legislature has sometimes been willing to use a “special budget” to purchase high-end weapons, such as the 2020 purchase of 66 F-16V fighters, but this method has only been possible for high-visibility weapons that also serve as a symbol of U.S. commitment to Taiwan. The United States remains Taiwan’s main supplier of weapons, and there is strong bipartisan support in Congress for continuing to meet Taipei’s defensive needs.

These changes in Taiwan’s security environment have placed it in an increasingly vulnerable position vis-à-vis China. Meeting this challenge has required changing the defense strategy of Taiwan’s armed forces to one that both takes account of the changing threat environment and adjusts to the limited budgetary resources available. Other aspects of Taiwan’s defense—such as personnel, procurement, and training—should change accordingly. Yet Taiwan’s arms purchases have at times reflected
competing institutional priorities rather than the evolving threat environment. The Tsai administration’s request for M-1 Abrams tanks in 2019 is a case in point.\textsuperscript{22}

To better deter China from attempting to achieve unification by force and prepare to defend the island if attacked, Taiwan in 2017 adopted an asymmetrical defense strategy known as the Overall Defense Concept (ODC).\textsuperscript{23} The concept focuses on using asymmetric conventional capabilities optimized to resist a PLA invasion, with a first phase focused on littoral combat up to 100 km from Taiwan’s shores and a second phase focused on annihilating an invasion force on the beaches. It emphasizes the role of smart mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, mobile air defense, and the ability to employ lethal fire on the limited number of potential landing zones over traditional military platforms. The ODC “calls on the military to increase investments in key capabilities including mobility, deception, camouflage, concealment, jamming, redundancy, rapid repair, and reconstitution.”\textsuperscript{24}

This approach makes sense but faces challenges in implementation, including constraints imposed by limited resources, lack of public support, and interservice politics on Taiwan. Problems also persist in Taiwan’s defense efforts, including challenges in shifting to an all-volunteer military and in the readiness of its reserve force.\textsuperscript{25} Taiwan’s reserves today receive as little as five days of training every two years, after only four months of initial active-duty training prior to entering the reserves, and thus cannot make a significant contribution to deterring a Chinese attack. Taipei’s move away from conscription is politically popular, but creating an all-volunteer force requires increased pay, education benefits, and technical training to make military service attractive. As of 2018, Taiwan’s military was only filling about 81 percent of its 188,000 authorized military billets, and increased personnel costs were negatively affecting funds available for training.

Moreover, although the growing threat Taiwan faces from mainland China unquestionably justifies an intense focus on defending Taiwan from invasion, other military tasks also receive significant attention in Taiwan military and strategy documents. These include disaster relief missions both inside and outside Taiwan; defense of Taiwan’s maritime claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea (especially protecting Taiping Island and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands); protection of Taiwan’s airspace and territorial waters; and missions such as counter-piracy and protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Taiwan’s military cannot focus solely on defense against an invasion, but these diverse missions have the potential to divert scarce resources and attention from the most important task.

President Tsai has signaled that she attaches priority to national security and defense reforms. In her second inauguration address delivered on May 20, 2020, Tsai stressed the need to accelerate the development of asymmetric capabilities, reform the military reserve


and mobilization systems, and improve the military’s management institutions. Under Tsai’s leadership, Taiwan is also seeking to strengthen its indigenous defense industry both to enhance security and boost economic growth.

The TRA stipulates that the United States will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services “in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” (See Appendix II for a list of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 2008.) Prior to 2001, arms sales decisions were confined to an annual review of Taiwan’s requests through the Arms Sales Talks (ASTs). The George W. Bush administration sought to normalize arms sales decisions by ending the annual dialogue and granting Taiwan the status of a normal ally, for whom arms sales requests and approval can be managed as necessary. Progress toward normalizing arms sales decisions has continued under the Trump administration.

The TRA also says that it is U.S. policy to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. Section 3 of the TRA further states that in the case “of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom, the President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.”

This formulation does not constitute a treaty-like commitment to defend Taiwan in the event of a military attack, and observers have long termed U.S. policy to be one of “strategic ambiguity” regarding what the United States would do in any given scenario but also “tactical clarity” in that the United States would have the means to deter and defeat aggression. This formulation follows from the TRA’s specific language about potential U.S. intervention which was intended to deter China from any attack on Taiwan while also discouraging provocative actions by Taiwan. However, the shift in the military balance between China and Taiwan together with growing examples of Beijing using military coercion against neighboring states has raised concerns that “strategic ambiguity” is no longer sufficient to keep the peace. For example, China’s development of A2/AD capabilities—including precision-guided cruise and ballistic missiles in conjunction with advanced air and maritime defense systems, fighter aircraft, and anti-satellite weapons—poses challenges to the U.S. ability to “maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force.” China’s gray zone strategy is also clearly aimed at undermining confidence in the American commitment to Taiwan and to U.S. treaty allies in the region by incrementally increasing coercion with impunity. As a result, there have been increasing calls to move to a public declaratory policy of “strategic clarity” regarding the American commitment

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28 Ibid.

to the defense of Taiwan in order to reassure Taipei and U.S. allies and send a deterrent warning to Beijing.\footnote{Richard Haas and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must be Unambiguous,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, September 2, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous.}

Policymakers will have to weigh these factors against the risks associated with any significant changes in declaratory policy, particularly if not matched by concomitant efforts to enhance tactical clarity that the United States has the capability to deter and defeat aggression. Effective deterrence requires more than public statements, no matter how clear. In the case of Taiwan, it includes sound analysis of how Chinese leaders are reading U.S. intentions and of whether the deployment and operations of PLA assets suggest a shift to war. It entails private U.S. messaging through diplomatic and national security channels that applies the general public U.S. warning against using force to the circumstances of any potential crisis. Above all, it requires improving U.S. capabilities, which can have long lead times, to ensure that American intervention would be effective (among other things, to raise the costs and risks to the PLA of an attack). It also mandates shaping Taiwan’s defense strategy and capabilities so that they can hold out until U.S. intervention can occur.

In assessing U.S. intentions, Chinese leaders who might contemplate a military campaign against Taiwan would evaluate all these factors. In effect, they will not only focus on what U.S. leaders say but also what the Pentagon does to prepare for war. If they conclude that American declaratory policy concerning Taiwan’s security is not backed up with sufficient capabilities, they will interpret rhetorical warnings as hollow. How Washington preserves sufficient deterrence can be complicated by the policies that the government in Taipei pursues and whether those policies challenge China’s interests to the point of provoking military action. Based on past experience, Washington must be careful not to give a green light to Taiwan to pursue policies that risk war and are inconsistent with U.S. objectives. The current government in Taipei merits American confidence to justify a possible change in declaratory policy, but there is no guarantee where future governments may take cross-strait relations. Sudden changes in U.S. declaratory policy in the future could in themselves be destabilizing and therefore potentially have both short-term and long-term implications. These are the nuanced considerations that should shape any recalibration of U.S. declaratory policy on Taiwan.
Managing U.S.-Taiwan Dialogue and Cooperation

The conduct of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has fluctuated considerably over the past seven decades. During the post-World War II era, the relationship was anchored in a mutual defense treaty. Official relations were severed in 1979, prompting the U.S. Congress to pass the TRA, which created mechanisms for the conduct of substantive, unofficial ties in the absence of diplomatic relations. In the period since, the relationship has developed along an upward trajectory in terms of frequency and scope of contacts between government officials. Although the slope has fluctuated depending upon events, the direction of the development of the relationship has largely been toward deepening ties. The growth of the relationship also has benefited from bipartisan support in both capitals.

The United States conducts its engagement with counterparts in Taiwan through AIT, an organization that is legally private but operates under the direction of the Department of State. AIT has offices in greater Washington, D.C., Taipei, and Kaohsiung. Taiwan maintains a counterpart organization, TECRO, with offices in Washington, D.C. and 11 other cities across the United States. For its first 23 years, U.S. government employees assigned to AIT technically resigned from government service and were separately hired by AIT. Individuals conducting military and security functions were usually retired military personnel. But the jobs of AIT personnel were to carry out the policies of the United States and their home agencies. All those who had resigned their government positions were guaranteed a return to government service, and their government pensions were adjusted to take account of the time that they worked for this nominally private organization.

In 1992, USTR Carla Hills traveled to Taiwan to attend the annual conference of the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Council. Following a Taiwan Policy Review in 1994, cabinet-level officials were permitted to travel to Taiwan with White House approval on a case-by-case basis. In addition, active-duty military personnel up to the rank of colonel were allowed to travel with prior approval from the Departments of State and Defense. Taiwan officials working in and visiting the United States had better access to their American counterparts than before. In 2003, a provision of the State Department Authorization Act of that year authorized the executive branch to assign U.S. civilian and military officials to be assigned to AIT without having to temporarily resign their government position. AIT moved into
a permanent newly constructed facility in Taipei in 2019, replete with a U.S. flag flying and a U.S. seal above the door, reflecting the United States’ long-term commitment to development of relations with the people of Taiwan.

U.S. Cabinet-level Visits to Taiwan 1978–2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>ADMINISTRATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carla Hills</td>
<td>U.S. Trade Representative</td>
<td>George H.W. Bush</td>
<td>December 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federico Pena</td>
<td>Secretary of Transportation</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>December 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil Lader</td>
<td>Administrator, Small Business Administration</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>December 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Richardson</td>
<td>Secretary of Energy</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>November 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodney E. Slater</td>
<td>Secretary of Transportation</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>June 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gina McCarthy</td>
<td>Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>April 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Azar</td>
<td>Secretary of Health and Human Services</td>
<td>Trump</td>
<td>August 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Over the past four decades, there has been a gradual shift in patterns of U.S.-Taiwan engagement. In the years following the United States’ switch in diplomatic recognition in 1979, Taiwan officials interacted intensively with members of Congress and their staffs. Links between Taiwan diplomats and the U.S. executive branch fluctuated, with periods of particular strength in the Reagan and the George H.W. Bush administrations. This pattern was driven both by the tight restrictions at the time on U.S. executive branch interactions with Taiwan counterparts and by a perception that Congress was playing a leading policy role in protecting Taiwan’s equities in the United States. Since the 1990s, the locus of U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic engagement in Washington has moved gradually toward the executive branch, as officials in the NSC, the State Department, the Defense Department, and throughout the U.S. government have opened their aperture to greater interaction with Taiwan counterparts. Even so, congressional focus on Taiwan remains strong, as reflected by the Congressional Taiwan Caucus remaining the second-largest caucus of its type (behind only Israel), and by the volume of legislation on issues relating to Taiwan. Much recent legislation has not sought to bind the executive branch to act or change policies. Such legislation has been largely welcomed in Taiwan as symbols of American backing. If legislation went further, it could risk creating elevated expectations of American support for Taiwan that the executive branch may find difficult to meet. Non-binding legislative signaling on Taiwan that pushes beyond existing U.S. policy parameters also carries risks of doing more to elevate cross-strait tensions than to advance discrete American objectives or enhance Taiwan’s security.

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Over time, a dense architecture of dialogues has built up to support communication between Washington and Taipei. Broadly speaking, the quality of communication through dialogue channels on strategic and security issues has outpaced those on trade and economic issues.

Defense officials from both sides maintain a tiered set of dialogue mechanisms that meet roughly annually, with dialogues at the strategic level informing lower-level talks at the operational level and the service level. (See Appendix III for a list of U.S.-Taiwan defense dialogues.) National security officials have long maintained a special channel to communicate on the most sensitive issues in the relationship, but such talks are not announced, and the existence of the channel is rarely publicly mentioned. Other similar mechanisms are used to exchange views privately on policy matters of interest to both sides. There also have been dialogue mechanisms on functional issues over the years, most of which have remained private, but some of which, such as the Consultations on Democratic Governance in the Indo-Pacific Region, have been made public. There may be scope for expansion of functional dialogues on legal and human rights issues.

In addition to engaging through established channels of communication, U.S. and Taiwan officials also routinely conduct senior-level discussions to address issues of mutual interest. These exchanges occur most frequently when host government officials meet with the ambassador-equivalent of the other side or when senior officials visit for consultations. AIT’s chairman also travels roughly biannually to Taipei to consult with Taiwan’s senior officials, in addition to accompanying Taiwan’s president on transits of the United States. U.S. cabinet-level officials also travel to Taiwan periodically to address issues within their portfolio. Although infrequent, such cabinet-level visits have occurred in the George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump administrations.

The mechanisms and channels used to manage the relationship have not evolved considerably in recent decades, but the breadth of issues addressed within them has broadened by orders of magnitude. Whereas in previous decades senior officials on both sides devoted most of the bandwidth to exchanges on cross-strait issues and arms sales, now the range of topics of discussion includes issues spanning public health, nonproliferation, secure supply chains, clean energy, religious freedom, disaster relief, environmental protection, and regional security issues such as North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and counter-ISIL coordination. This approach has not only sought to expand the range of U.S.-Taiwan cooperation but also to improve Taiwan’s ability to preserve its international space in the face of possible declines in numbers of diplomatic partners and Beijing’s broader moves to squeeze Taiwan’s international space. The logic guiding U.S. policy has been that the more Taiwan contributes to international public goods, and is seen around the world as doing so, the more dignity and respect Taiwan will enjoy on the world stage.

By and large, the expansion of engagement between U.S. and Taiwan officials has strengthened ties without generating significant negative reaction from Beijing. This is likely because much of the interaction has been conducted in private; alterations to patterns of engagement have been made incrementally; and neither side has sought to draw attention to mechanisms used for policy coordination. Under the Trump administration, more contacts between U.S. and Taiwan officials have been made public than in the past. In instances when both sides have publicized policy exchanges, Beijing has responded—sometimes rhetorically and other times by taking actions to warn Taiwan and the United States against going too far.33

Over recent decades, senior officials in Washington and Taipei in the main have adhered to an unwritten set of rules of the road for maintaining productive unofficial relations. These have included transparency with each other on interactions with the mainland involving cross-strait matters; no surprises on announcements or actions that implicate the other side’s interests; a commitment to treating each other’s officials with dignity and respect; support for bipartisan engagement in the relationship in both directions; and open and frequent private communication. Periods of turbulence in U.S.-Taiwan relations generally have coincided with breeches of these de facto operating guidelines.

Globally, the United States is unique in its depth and diversity of engagement with Taiwan officials, both in terms of substance and in terms of the range of actors involved (i.e., from the legislative and executive branches of government to state and local officials to civil society organizations and beyond). Japan stands next in line, with extensive and growing unofficial ties with Taiwan. Going forward there may be value for U.S. officials to become more proactive in sharing best practices with third-country counterparts about developing in-depth interaction with Taiwan and the benefits that flow from doing so. At the same time, Washington also will need to remain clear-eyed about how it defines “unofficial relations.” The framework of unofficial bilateral relations has enabled Taiwan to prosper, remain secure, and consolidate its democratic institutions over recent decades. As Beijing has increased pressure on Taiwan, Washington has adjusted that framework, providing stronger support, and the United States and Taiwan have brought their respective interests into better alignment while avoiding actions that might provoke a significant reaction from Beijing.

Although the conduct of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has broadened and deepened in recent years, opportunities exist for further expansion. For example, there is potential to increase inbound investment from Taiwan at the state and local level, which would generate jobs. Educational leaders can draw from Taiwan’s cadre of Chinese-language instructors. Medical experts can gain expertise from counterparts in Taiwan on building public health capacity. These forms of cooperation can support efforts to broaden the base of public support in the United States for sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Taiwan ties in the future.

Taiwan’s Participation in the International Community

As part of its effort to isolate and subdue Taiwan, Beijing has long sought to exclude it from the international community. This has included inducing those countries that have had diplomatic relations with Taiwan to switch to the PRC; blocking Taiwan’s participation in international governmental organizations (IGOs), even in cases where Taipei has carefully avoided raising sovereignty issues; pressuring countries to not conclude FTAs with Taiwan; and insisting that the PRC should have the final say over any international activities that Taiwan seeks.

Taiwan’s international isolation is detrimental to American interests because it weakens the confidence of Taiwan’s public in their government’s ability to protect Taiwan’s interests and increases the island’s vulnerability to Beijing’s pressure to coerce its democratically-elected leadership into a political settlement on terms favorable to China. Following the election of Tsai Ing-wen in January 2016, Beijing ended the informal “diplomatic truce” of the Ma Ying-jeou years, and subsequently nearly one-third of Taipei’s then-remaining diplomatic partners switched ties to Beijing. Taiwan has only 15 diplomatic partners left and faces the prospect that China will use various inducements to drive down the number even further.34

Since the Clinton administration’s 1994 Taiwan Policy Review, the United States has supported Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that do not require statehood as a condition of membership and encouraged Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations where its membership is not possible. Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA), the governing body of the World Health Organization (WHO), under the name “Chinese Taipei” for eight years between 2009 and 2016 based on an understanding reached between Taipei and Beijing during the Ma Ying-jeou administration. The PRC conditioned Taiwan’s continued

34 Formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) are maintained by Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Eswatini (the last remaining partner in Africa), and the Holy See (the last remaining partner in Europe). During Tsai’s presidency, those switching ties from Taipei to Beijing include: São Tomé and Príncipe, Burkina Faso, Panama, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Solomon Islands, and Kiribati. Gambia, which had severed ties with the ROC in 2013, established ties with the PRC after Tsai’s election but before her inauguration.
participation on Tsai Ing-wen’s acceptance of the “one China principle”—which states that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China—and intervened to prevent an invitation from being sent to Taipei beginning in 2017. Taiwan’s exemplary performance in response to the Covid-19 pandemic has won praise from around the world and strengthened the case for restoring its observer status in the WHA, although it was again denied access in May of this year.

In 2013, during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, Taiwan attended the triennial Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a “special guest” of the president of the ICAO Council but never received another invitation. Taipei’s requests to participate in the General Assembly of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) have been repeatedly rejected. Using various nomenclatures, Taiwan has been able to join and contribute positively to other international organizations, primarily those focused on economic issues, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Organization (APEC), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), among others. (See Appendix IV for a list of Taiwan’s IGO participation.) In all three cases, this was only because of U.S. pressure. In addition to the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and many countries in the European Union support a larger role for Taiwan in the international community, albeit usually quietly.

In recent years, the United States has strengthened efforts to help Taiwan secure its existing diplomatic partners in part by collaborating with Taiwan to improve domestic governance in targeted countries. For example, in November 2019, the United States and Taiwan sent a joint team to St. Lucia to explore sustainable investment opportunities in infrastructure and economic development. Bolstering Taiwan’s diplomatic relationships is especially important in the Western Hemisphere, where the United States has a strong interest in countering the more malign aspects of PRC policies in the region and limiting expansion of PRC influence. Use of incentives aimed at reinforcing Taiwan’s relations with its remaining diplomatic partners is likely more effective than threats to take punitive actions against countries that cut ties with Taipei. Examples of the latter approach include the Trump administration’s recall of U.S. ambassadors from Latin American countries that recognized the PRC in September 2018 and its threat to reassess U.S. aid to the Solomon Islands after it switched allegiance to Beijing in September 2019.

Taiwan faces significant challenges and threats to its interests due to its exclusion from important international organizations that have a substantial impact on the health, prosperity, and security of the people of Taiwan and that are less able to perform their functions and serve international interests because they must forego the important contributions Taiwan could make. Principal among those are organizations under the United Nations framework.

Beijing’s unrelenting pressure has constrained Taiwan’s ability to participate meaningfully not only in all UN-affiliated organizations but also

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36 These include organizations that play an important role on health and trade-related cooperation such as the World Health Organization, the World Customs Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Taiwan is a member of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) under the nomenclature “Chinese Taipei.”
many IGOs that block Taiwan’s membership (at Beijing’s behest). It has also prevented
Taiwan from joining negotiations for regional FTAs. Going forward, if Taiwan is unable to
join the CPTPP and the RCEP, Taiwan’s international competitiveness will be eroded, and
the further integration of Taiwan into the Indo-Pacific region will be hindered.

Under Xi Jinping, China has intensified its efforts to exclude Taiwan from international
organizations and meetings. In one example, the Chinese delegation attending a meeting
of the Kimberly Process in Perth in May 2017 heckled the Australian hosts and prevented
the proceedings from beginning until the delegation from the “Rough Diamond Trading
Entity of Chinese Taipei” was ejected. Chinese pressure on the United Nations has
resulted in all citizens from Taiwan being barred from entering the UN headquarters in
New York unless they have diplomatic credentials issued by the U.S. Department of State
or a permit issued by Beijing for travel into mainland China.

The private sector—including major U.S. companies—is also being subjected to Chinese
pressure, with Beijing coercing international companies to remove references to Taiwan
on their websites, maps, T-shirts, and other products that suggest that Taiwan is on
an equal footing with China. In April 2018, the Civil Aviation Administration of China
(CAAC) sent a letter to 44 international airlines, demanding that they modify language on
their websites so that Taiwan (as well as Hong Kong and Macao) is not listed as a country,
or risk commercial consequences.

In response to intensifying Chinese efforts to quash Taiwan’s international voice, the
Trump administration stepped up coordination with like-minded countries to help
Taipei boost its participation in international organizations, specifically the WHO,
ICAO, and INTERPOL. A coalition of democratic partners including Japan, Canada,
Australia, the United Kingdom, the European Union and some individual EU countries
(Germany, France, and Italy) convene on a quarterly basis to coordinate policies aimed
at promoting Taiwan’s participation in key international organizations. Joint actions
include a collective demarche and a joint letter to the WHO leadership to request the
reinstatement of Taiwan’s observer status in the WHA. The United States has also
invited other countries to join in discussions about providing support to Taiwan’s
bid to increase its participation in the international community, even if they are not
willing to become full participants in the coalition. Collective action by like-minded
countries in support of Taiwan serves as a reminder to Beijing that the United States
is not the only country backing expanded participation for Taiwan in international
organizations. One example of the potential value of multilateral pressure was
demonstrated after the outbreak of Covid-19 when a joint demarche to the WHO
was followed by increased invitations to Taiwan’s health authorities to participate in
several technical meetings.

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37 Robbie Gramer, “Chinese Delegation Blows Up at Anti-Conflict Diamond Meeting to Sideline Taiwan,” Foreign
38 Elson Tong, “Not just officials: Taiwan students blocked from visiting UN public gallery in Geneva,” Hong
39 There is variation in which efforts countries are willing to join; in some cases, coalition members opt to con-
vey their concerns through separate letters or demarches.
In addition, the Trump administration’s establishment of new dialogue mechanisms is enabling the United States and Taiwan to bolster cooperation on issues and regions of shared interests and to include like-minded partners where possible. In September 2019, the United States and Taiwan launched Consultations on Democratic Governance in the Indo-Pacific Region, which seeks to pursue joint projects and enhance cooperation in other ways to assist regional countries in addressing governance challenges. The following month, Washington and Taipei convened the inaugural Pacific Islands Dialogue, which aims to strengthen cooperation among the United States, Taiwan, and like-minded countries to meet the development needs of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in the Pacific.

One example of an innovative U.S. effort to counter Chinese attempts to marginalize Taiwan in the international community is the Global Cooperation Training Framework (GCTF). Created in 2015, the GCTF is a platform through which Taiwan can contribute to addressing global problems and share its expertise. Since its inception, the United States and Taiwan have held more than 20 workshops to provide training and assistance to over 500 participants from governments, the private sector, and civil society in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands. These workshops assist participants with building their own capacities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, democratization, global health, women’s empowerment, media literacy, and energy security (see Appendix V for a list of GCTF workshops.)

For the first three years, the GCTF was a bilateral U.S.-Taiwan program, and workshops were held in Taipei for experts from countries in the Asia-Pacific. Japan became an official GCTF partner in March 2019 and henceforth is co-hosting all workshops and joining annual joint committee planning meetings. Australia participated in the GCTF for the first time in November 2019. Sweden joined as a co-host of a GCTF workshop on Defending Democracy through Media Literacy in September 2019. The GCTF platform has also gone global, with the first workshop outside Taiwan held in Palau in 2019 and a virtual workshop held with Guatemala in 2020. Going forward, there are plans to further expand the frequency, size, and scope of GCTF workshops, including holding more events outside Taiwan and bringing in more like-minded countries to co-host programs.  


Policy Recommendations

The focus of this task force is on U.S. policy toward Taiwan, which should be driven by a clear assessment of American interests. These interests include ensuring that Taiwan remains a secure, stable, healthy, resilient, prosperous, and innovative democratic society that is free from predation and coercion. It is also in the United States’ interest that Taiwan remains integrated into the global economy and continues to serve as a provider of global public goods.

If the United States is to achieve these objectives, Taiwan must steadily build its own core capabilities. Key lines of effort by Taipei should include enhancing its economic growth, innovation, global competitiveness, and economic autonomy; investing in and building a military force capable of executing a credible defense; improving its democratic governance; and amplifying external messaging of Taiwan’s success.

With these interests and goals in mind, the task force first states the basic principles that should guide U.S. policy and then lays out a series of recommendations.

**Overall U.S. Policy Direction**

- U.S. policy toward Taiwan should be developed and implemented in the context of the full range of its foreign policy and national security objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. These include ensuring the credibility of U.S. commitments to allies and partners, countering coercive and revisionist threats to a free and open regional order, and charting a relationship with China that advances American interests.

- The Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués (as the United States interprets them), and the Six Assurances should continue to be the core framework for U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

- While symbolic gestures are sometimes useful to signal U.S. commitment and resolve, U.S. policy toward Taiwan should comprise substantive actions that meaningfully enhance Taiwan’s security, stability, and prosperity.

- U.S. policymakers should consistently stress to PRC officials that Taiwan is a genuine democracy in which the people’s views will ultimately determine Taiwan’s choices about its future. In this context, the task force believes Beijing has the burden to convince the people of Taiwan of its peaceful intentions.
• The United States should continue to reject the use of force and coercion by China to achieve its Taiwan objectives and make clear that cross-strait issues must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.

• The United States has a strong interest in both sides of the strait maintaining peace and stability and should continue to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by either side.

**Economics and Technology**

The economic and technology components of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship have long-term strategic significance and thus, going forward, should be assigned greater priority. Yet, these elements remain among the most underdeveloped aspects of bilateral ties. The task force believes that an economically strong Taiwan is key to reducing its vulnerability to coercion and is an essential component of its security. The United States should take steps to strengthen the bilateral trade and investment relationship with Taiwan and to deepen Taiwan’s economic integration with other key trading partners. Taiwan’s own efforts in this regard are critical. Taiwan has recently taken steps to address long-standing U.S. concerns about domestic food safety regulations on beef and pork. These actions demonstrate that the Tsai administration is prepared to invest substantial political capital to bring Taiwan’s domestic measures into alignment with its multilateral and bilateral obligations and signals Taipei’s readiness to take on the range of commitments that would be required to successfully negotiate and implement an FTA with the United States.

The task force recommends that the next U.S. administration take the following actions:

• Respond immediately to these important steps by Taiwan by formally agreeing to initiate exploratory talks for a bilateral trade agreement (BTA), with the goal of launching formal negotiations as soon as possible.

• Create an interagency study group with Taiwan trade experts to conduct a “gap analysis” aimed at identifying areas where Taiwan’s domestic laws and regulations are not consistent with recent high-standard trade agreements, including the revised United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and United States-Korea (KORUS) FTA.

• Propose creative new frameworks and disciplines to be included as part of the bilateral negotiating agenda, including in areas such as digital trade and healthcare.

• Utilize the recently-announced U.S.-Taiwan Economic and Commercial Dialogue to expand and elevate bilateral cooperation with Taiwan on a range of issues that fall outside of trade negotiations, such as technology security, global supply chains, cyber-enabled economic espionage, labor markets, and energy supply. Ensure the dialogue is interagency and includes representatives from the NSC, Department of Commerce, USTR, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and others, as appropriate.

• Bring Taiwan into plurilateral discussions on export controls, cybersecurity, and IT supply chain issues that the United States is holding with other like-minded partners, such as Australia and Japan.
• Support Taiwan’s participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The United States should also negotiate its own entry into the CPTPP as soon as possible, both because this is fundamentally in the United States’ economic and broader foreign policy interests and because if the United States is not a member, it cannot effectively advocate for Taiwan’s inclusion.

• Encourage and assist Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturers and key suppliers to expand production in the United States.

ESTABLISH LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
• Within the executive branch, develop a legal template for economic agreements with Taiwan (agreements that normally would be in the form of government-to-government agreements) and then seek congressional support/approval for the frameworks as well as for launching negotiations on a BTA.

  ▪ This will require the White House and key agencies to engage the leadership in both houses. Taiwan should conduct a parallel outreach to the Legislative Yuan to mobilize support.

Defense and Security
As the military threat from the PRC intensifies, it is imperative that the United States work with Taiwan to enhance the ability to deter Chinese aggression and coercion. This will require sustained efforts by both Taiwan and the United States, including via defense and security cooperation. To these ends, the task force recommends the following steps:

U.S. INITIATIVES
• Reaffirm in a high-level public statement that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States and are matters of international concern. This statement should highlight that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by aggression or coercion constitutes a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and is therefore of grave concern to the United States. The statement should further highlight that the United States is committed to investing in the deterrence capabilities necessary to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and will consult closely with allies on its plans.

• Undertake a high-level, interagency, comprehensive review of Taiwan’s security, to include, among other things:

  ▪ A rigorous evaluation of the PRC’s current and future capabilities to undertake various kinds of military campaigns and to frustrate any intervention by the United States.

  ▪ An assessment of the PRC leadership’s predilection to use force to accomplish its unification objectives, despite the costs and risks, to include whether it has other options to achieve its objectives that are below the threshold of war.

  ▪ An examination of the present and future capabilities of the United States and Taiwan to respond to the array of potential PLA campaigns against Taiwan, including the obstacles posed by China’s A2/AD assets.
• An evaluation of the present and future capabilities of the Taiwan military to resist a PLA attack for sufficient time for the U.S. armed forces to intervene in force, to include resources available to build those capabilities and the likely degree of public support for a protracted conflict.

• Based on that comprehensive review, develop a new set of tools to enhance deterrence and better shape the intentions of PRC leaders, including by upgrading U.S. military capabilities and improving diplomatic and military channels to communicate U.S. intentions clearly in a crisis. The United States should also consider whether its existing declaratory policy on “strategic ambiguity” is enough for the purposes of deterrence messaging. It should evaluate whether U.S. military capabilities give that declaratory policy credibility and whether a change in declaratory policy would stand the test of time as new leaders come on the scene in Taipei.

• Encourage Taiwan to make decisions regarding defense planning, training, and procurements that further strengthen deterrence and demonstrate Taiwan’s determination to defend itself. This should include sustained defense spending that is linked to the level of threat Taiwan faces and the scale of investment needed to strengthen its ability to defend itself.

• Conduct U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in the following ways:
  □ Notifications of arms sales should be conducted regularly and use the same procedures as are followed with non-NATO allies.
  □ Defense articles and services provided should include survivable, sustainable, and effective capabilities that would undermine PLA efforts to invade or coerce Taiwan; this includes systems capable of conducting distributed, mobile operations in an austere, contested environment.
  □ Launch a multiyear, bilateral initiative to improve identified operational shortfalls in Taiwan’s joint force.

• Launch a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, as an analogue to the European Defense Initiative, to address the eroding military balance in the Pacific. Invest in U.S. capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan, as required under the TRA.

• Help train civilian defense experts from various political parties in Taiwan by inviting promising candidates to participate in American programs such as the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) and the State Department’s International Visitor Program.

• Increase funding for International Military Education and Training (IMET) to enable more civilians from Taiwan to study defense issues in the United States.

• Encourage Taiwan’s civil society organizations to establish institutions outside the Ministry of National Defense that are not funded by the government to engage in independent military/defense analysis.
∫ Dispatch military officers and civilian defense officials to Taiwan as needed based on expertise required and purpose, not rank or title.

**BILATERAL DIALOGUES AND COOPERATION MECHANISMS**
- Rationalize security-related bilateral dialogue mechanisms to ensure appropriate interagency engagement on critical issues by both sides.
- Broaden the scope of U.S.-Taiwan defense dialogues to address threats to Taiwan posed by coercion without violence, such as cyberattacks and disinformation.
- Create an annual joint strategy review and capabilities assessment mechanism in which both sides discuss which defense articles and defense services may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
- Work with Taiwan to enhance its security and counterintelligence capabilities and procedures as part of a broader effort to strengthen closer defense cooperation in sensitive areas.
- Establish a program like the U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program to directly engage Taiwan’s Reserve Command and to encourage modernization, reforms, and greater civil-military integration, as well as to enhance Taiwan’s ability to defend against PRC aggression and respond to humanitarian disasters.

**MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES**
- Include representatives from Japan and Australia in initiatives to experiment with, exercise, and practice innovative concepts of operations and identify necessary capabilities to blunt potential armed aggression by the PLA along the First Island Chain.
- Establish a multilateral defense mechanism to coordinate policies, share assessments, and discuss challenges and opportunities for cooperation and coordination among the United States, Taiwan, and key U.S. allies and partners.
- Include cross-strait scenarios in defense cooperation, capabilities building, and intelligence sharing with Japan and Australia.

**Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy**
The United States should direct its diplomats both at home and abroad to promote cooperation with Taiwan and to assist Taipei in strengthening its relationships with other countries. The task force recommends the United States take the following steps:
- Strengthen opportunities for communication between senior officials from the United States and Taiwan, including at the cabinet and sub-cabinet level, on issues of importance to both sides.
- Dispatch the chair of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) or the deputy assistant secretary of state for China, Mongolia, and Taiwan for consultations with key U.S. allies and partners to explain and align a more robust U.S-led multilateral approach to supporting Taiwan.
• Encourage U.S. ambassadors overseas to actively engage with Taiwan’s ambassadors or representatives at posts where they serve to advance shared interests.

• Encourage U.S. ambassadors at overseas posts to engage with host government officials on issues pertaining to Taiwan, with the goals of explaining U.S. policy objectives toward Taiwan and suggesting ways it might benefit host countries to support U.S. efforts.
  ▪ With governments that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, convey the implications for U.S. interests of shifting diplomatic allegiance to the PRC.

• Calibrate U.S. support for Taiwan to counter or compensate for Chinese pressure tactics.
  ▪ For example, inform China privately that continued poaching of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners will result in a corresponding relaxation of U.S. policy regarding officials from Taiwan transiting the United States.

• Strengthen engagement with the full range of major political parties and key constituencies in Taiwan. Maintain bipartisanship.

• Coordinate with Taiwan to enhance its ability to offer world-class language instruction to American university students and government officials assigned to Chinese-language postings.

COORDINATE WITH TAIWAN ON GLOBAL ISSUES

• Increase efforts to expand the Global Cooperation Training Framework (GCTF) to include more like-minded countries and a broadened range of issues. In addition, work to secure funding to conduct GCTF workshops in collaboration with other countries in Latin America and the Pacific Islands, as well as in other parts of the world where Taiwan maintains close but unofficial relations, such as Eastern Europe and South Asia.
  ▪ Cosponsor a GCTF workshop with Japan to examine best practices for inbound investment in Southeast Asia that highlights Taiwan’s strong track record and deep investment stock in the region.
  ▪ Use the GCTF to share information about malign influence such as disinformation and election interference and to exchange best practices.

• Encourage and support Track 1.5 trilateral strategic discussions with Taiwan among close U.S. allies, particularly Australia and Japan.

• Seek new opportunities to cooperate with Taiwan to promote civil and political rights internationally, including but not limited to freedoms of religion, expression, assembly, and association.

• Expand cooperation between Taiwan and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and include Taiwan in the Blue Dot Network.

• Explore ways to strengthen cooperation with Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific region, building on initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Democratic Governance Consultations and the Pacific Island Dialogue.
• Strengthen efforts with Japan and other like-minded donors—especially with Taiwan’s diplomatic allies—to expand joint aid programs and projects with Taiwan.

• Assist Taiwan to expand its engagements with multilateral groupings such as the recently established D10 group of leading democracies. Actively counter Chinese efforts to lobby against Taiwan’s inclusion.

• Establish additional dialogue mechanisms and forums with Taiwan on issues of shared concern, such as legal matters and human rights, and invite like-minded countries to participate.

• Direct U.S. State Department officials from various regional and functional bureaus to visit Taiwan or otherwise increase interaction with their Taiwan counterparts.

• Create a platform that would enable Taiwan to share with like-minded countries lessons learned and best practices for countering political influence and election interference operations, cyber intrusions, and other threats that subvert democracy.

**International Organizations**

Promoting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations benefits the United States by leveraging Taiwan’s contributions to international public goods, reducing Taiwan’s isolation, and adding a voice or vote that often aligns with U.S. interests. To this end, the United States should develop creative and effective ways to expand Taiwan’s role in international organizations where Taiwan has expertise that can benefit the international community. It should bolster support for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that do not require sovereignty and its meaningful participation where membership is not possible. The United States should take these steps:

• Rebuild global health coordination by working with allies to reform the World Health Organization (WHO) and suspend U.S. withdrawal for a probationary period while reforms are undertaken. By doing so, the United States can more effectively support Taiwan’s bid to regain observer status in the WHO’s World Health Assembly (WHA).

• Direct the State Department to prepare a white paper that makes the legal case for Taiwan’s less-than-membership participation in IGOs for which statehood is a requirement for membership and how that participation is consistent with U.S. policy.

• Instruct American delegations attending meetings of international organizations where Taiwan is excluded—such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), INTERPOL, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the Codex Alimentarius Commission—to meet regularly with representatives from Taiwan before and after major meetings.

  • These meetings should, as a general matter, be made public and held at the head-of-delegation level when possible to enable U.S. representatives to represent Taiwan’s concerns at such meetings.
Strengthen coalitions with like-minded countries and take joint actions aimed at expanding Taiwan’s participation in key international organizations.

- Encourage G7 members to issue a joint statement supporting Taiwan’s reinstatement as an observer to the WHA and its ability to participate meaningfully in, or become a member of (where possible), other international organizations.

- Include specific statements regarding the importance of expanding Taiwan’s participation in U.S. delegations’ opening plenary statements to meetings of international organizations that the U.S. considers crucial for Taiwan’s security.

**Congress and State/Local Governments**

The U.S. Congress and state and local governments have an important role to play in U.S.-Taiwan relations. Congress as well as state and local governments should strengthen engagement with Taiwan and adopt legislation or policies that enhance the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. The task force recommends the following steps:

- Encourage the inclusion of Taiwan as a standard destination of Asia regional travel for delegations from Congress and state and local governments, particularly delegations that are visiting the PRC.

- Ensure that congressional delegations meet with delegates from Taiwan on the sidelines of international meetings, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.

- Encourage key congressional committees in both chambers of Congress to convene at least one hearing annually devoted to Taiwan. In some cases, joint hearings between subcommittees focused on specific issues would be effective forums for education and collaboration on cross-jurisdictional issues.

  - U.S. officials from the Departments of State and Defense should be asked to testify, providing an opportunity for authoritative policy statements that signal to Taiwan, China, and the rest of the world that Congress and the administration attach importance to Taiwan.

- Seek opportunities to explain to governments, media, and the public (where possible) in China and Taiwan about the U.S. legislative process, including how to track the progress of bills and how to interpret the contents and effects of specific legislation.

- Encourage Congress to review the financial support provided to the American Institute of Taiwan (AIT) to ensure the AIT has sufficient resources to conduct its role in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.

- Increase funding for Fulbright Taiwan (Foundation for Scholarly Exchange) and other initiatives that promote U.S.-Taiwan academic exchanges.

- Encourage Boren and other fellowship programs to expand opportunities for study in Taiwan for American students, with an emphasis on students who are concerned about their ability to hold national security positions after studying in the PRC.
About the Task Force Members

Co-Chairs

**Bonnie S. Glaser** is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is concomitantly a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum. From 2008 to 2015, Ms. Glaser was a senior adviser with the Freeman Chair in China Studies, and from 2003 to mid-2008, she was a senior associate in the CSIS International Security Program. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a consultant for various U.S. government offices, including the Departments of Defense and State. Ms. Glaser has written extensively on Chinese foreign and security policy. She is currently a board member of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

**Richard C. Bush** is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies (CEAP) at the Brookings Institution. From 2002-2018, he served as the director of the center, and from 2013-2020 he served as the inaugural Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. He also holds a joint appointment as a nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings John L. Thornton China Center. Bush came to Brookings after serving almost five years as the chairman and managing director of the American Institute in Taiwan. He began his professional career in 1977 with the China Council of the Asia Society. In July 1983, he became a staff consultant on the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. In January 1993, he moved up to the full committee, where he worked on Asia issues and served as liaison with democratic members. In July 1995, he became national intelligence officer for East Asia and a member of the National Intelligence Council (NIC). He left the NIC in 1997 to become head of the American Institute in Taiwan. He is the author of a number of articles on China’s relations with its neighbors, particularly Taiwan. He is currently completing a new book about Taiwan, *Difficult Choices: Taiwan’s Quest for Security and the Good Life*, which will be published by the Brookings Institution Press.

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**Eric G. Altbach** is a senior vice president at Albright Stonebridge Group (ASG), where he assists clients in China, Japan, South Korea, and other East Asian markets in developing strategies for long-term growth. Mr. Altbach has over 20 years of experience working on U.S.-Asia trade and economic relations in the public, private, and social sectors. Prior to joining ASG, Mr. Altbach served as deputy assistant U.S. trade representative for China Affairs, where he was responsible for Taiwan and China, with a particular focus on energy and environment issues. Before that, Mr. Altbach served at the National Security Council (NSC) as director for Asian Economic Affairs, where he led interagency coordination of U.S. Trade and Economic policy for the region and preparations for the president’s participation in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting. He also held several roles at the U.S. Department of State, including serving as a senior economic analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, covering Asian Economic issues. Previously, Mr. Altbach was vice president for Economic and Trade Affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). He also served as a government affairs analyst at the Japan Economic Institute.

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**Jacques deLisle** is the Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law, a professor of Political Science, director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University
of Pennsylvania, and director of the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His writings on Taiwan’s international status and cross-strait relations, China’s engagement with international law, and U.S.-China relations have appeared in *Orbis, The Journal of Contemporary China, Asia Policy,* The China Review, law reviews, and other journals. He is the co-editor of, and contributor to, *After Engagement: Dilemmas in U.S.-China Security Relations* (Brookings, forthcoming 2021); *Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen* (Routledge, forthcoming, 2021); *To Get Rich is Glorious: Challenges Facing China’s Economic Reform and Opening at Forty* (Brookings, 2019); *China’s Global Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century* (Brookings, 2017); *Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou* (Routledge, 2014), *China’s Challenges* (University of Pennsylvania, 2014), and other edited volumes. He has often served as an expert witness on Chinese law and China’s approach to international law and as a participant in U.S. government and international foundation projects involving law reform in China and issues of international law involving China.

**Abraham M. Denmark** is director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a senior fellow at the Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. He is also an adjunct associate professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He participated in this task force in his personal capacity. Denmark is the author of *U.S. Strategy in the Asian Century: Empowering Allies and Partners* (Columbia University Press). He has testified multiple times before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, and his commentary has been featured in several major media outlets, including *Foreign Affairs, the New York Times,* and the *Washington Post.* Denmark previously served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia and has held positions at the National Bureau of Asian Research, the Center for a New American Security, and in the U.S. Intelligence Community. Denmark has received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service from Secretary Ash Carter and was named a 21st Century Leader by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. He is a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the Council on Foreign Relations.

**Rupert Hammond-Chambers** is president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, where he was elected vice president in 1998 and president in 2000. He concurrently is a managing director at BowerGroupAsia (BGA) heading up the Taiwan office and the defense and security practice. Prior to 1994, he served as an associate for development at the Center for Security Policy, a defense and foreign policy think tank in Washington, D.C. Rupert is a member of the board of the Project 2049 Institute. He is also a trustee of Fettes College and is a member of the National Committee on United States-China Relations. Rupert was born and raised in Scotland. He holds a BA from Denison University.

**Ryan Hass** is a fellow and the Michael H. Armacost Chair in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, where he holds a joint appointment to the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He is also the Interim Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. He was part of the inaugural class of David M. Rubenstein fellows at Brookings and is a nonresident affiliated fellow in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. Hass focuses his research and analysis on enhancing policy development on the pressing political, economic, and security challenges facing
the United States in East Asia. From 2013 to 2017, Hass served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Prior to joining NSC, Hass served as a foreign service officer in U.S. Embassy Beijing, where he earned the State Department Director General’s award for impact and originality in reporting. Hass also served in Embassy Seoul and Embassy Ulaanbaatar and domestically in the State Department Offices of Taiwan Coordination and Korean Affairs. Hass received multiple Superior Honor and Meritorious Honor commendations during his 15-year tenure in the Foreign Service.

David J. Keegan is adjunct lecturer in the Chinese Studies Program at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Dr. Keegan teaches a seminar on Taiwan and its relations with the United States and mainland China. He has also taught area studies courses on China, Northeast Asia, and the Pacific at the State Department Foreign Service Institute. He holds a PhD in Chinese history from the University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Keegan served as a foreign service officer in the U.S. State Department for 30 years, specializing in China, Taiwan, and the Asia Pacific region. He served in Jamaica, Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore, and New Zealand. He was deputy director of the American Institute in Taiwan and deputy chief of mission and chargé at the U.S. Embassy in New Zealand. Dr. Keegan also served as: director of the Office of Taiwan Policy in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP), director of the Office of Regional Affairs in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), and director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). He retired from the foreign service in 2012.

Margaret K. Lewis is a professor of Law at Seton Hall University. She has been a Fulbright senior scholar at National Taiwan University, a Public Intellectuals program fellow with the National Committee on United States-China Relations, and a delegate to the United States-Japan Foundation’s United States-Japan Leadership Program. Professor Lewis is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a non-resident affiliated scholar of NYU School of Law’s U.S.-Asia Law Institute. She is spending the 2020-21 academic year in Taiwan as a visiting scholar at the Judge’s Academy and a visiting professor at Academia Sinica.

Walter Lohman is director of The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, the think tank’s oldest research center. Established in 1983, the Asian Studies Center is home to research fellows and scholars who develop recommendations to further American interests in freedom and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Lohman joined Heritage in 2006 as senior research fellow for Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand and was promoted to director the following spring. Since 2013, he has also served as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, where he has led graduate seminars on American foreign policy interests in Southeast Asia and the role of Congress in Asia policy. Lohman previously served for four years as senior vice president and executive director of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council.

Thomas G. Mahnken is president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and a senior research professor at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He was formerly the Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic
Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College. Dr. Mahnken served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Policy Planning from 2006-2009. In that capacity, he was responsible for the department’s major strategic planning functions, including the preparation of guidance for war plans and the development of the defense planning scenarios. He is the author of *Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security* (Stanford University Press, 2014), *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century* (Stanford University Press, 2012), and other works. He is editor of the *Journal of Strategic Studies*. He holds an MA and PhD in international affairs from SAIS and was a summa cum laude graduate of the University of Southern California with BA degrees in history and international relations (with highest honors) and a certificate in defense and strategic studies. In 2009, he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service and in 2016 the Department of the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal.

**Evan S. Medeiros** is a professor and the inaugural Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His research and teaching focuses on the international politics of East Asia, U.S.-China relations, and China’s foreign and national security policies. He has published several books and articles and regularly provides advice to global corporations and commentary to the international media. He previously served for six years on the staff of the National Security Council as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia and then as special assistant to the president and senior director for Asia. In the latter role, Dr. Medeiros served as President Obama’s top advisor on the Asia-Pacific and was responsible for coordinating U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific across the areas of diplomacy, defense policy, economic policy, and intelligence. Dr. Medeiros also advises multinational companies on Asia in his role as a senior advisor at The Asia Group. Prior to joining the White House, Dr. Medeiros also worked for seven years as a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. From 2007-2008, he also served as policy advisor to Secretary Hank Paulson working on the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue at the Treasury Department.

**Phillip C. Saunders** is director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a distinguished research fellow at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. He worked at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he directed the East Asia Nonproliferation Program from 1999-2003 and worked on Asia policy issues as an officer in the United States Air Force from 1989-1993. Dr. Saunders received an A.B. in history from Harvard University and an MPA and PhD from the Princeton School of International and Public Affairs. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, security policy, and military issues. Dr. Saunders is co-author with David Gompert of *The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era of Vulnerability* (NDU Press, 2011) and co-editor of *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA* (NDU Press, 2019) and *PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking* (Stanford University Press, 2015). He has also edited books on Chinese contingency planning, China-Taiwan relations, the Chinese navy, and the Chinese air force and published numerous articles and book chapters on China and Asian security issues.

**Eric Sayers** is an adjunct senior fellow for the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) as well as a vice president at Beacon Global Strategies. Previously, Mr. Sayers was a consultant to the Commander’s Action Group at
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), where he served as special assistant to the commander. In this capacity, he advised Admiral Harry Harris on strategic engagements and special initiatives in the Indo-Pacific theater and Washington D.C. From 2014-2016, Mr. Sayers served as a professional staff member with the majority staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Prior to working on the SASC, he served as defense policy advisor to Congressman J. Randy Forbes (R-VA) from 2011-2014. Before working on Capitol Hill, Mr. Sayers was a resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, where his research focused on the U.S.-Japan alliance and maritime security and naval strategy in Asia. He is a term-member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

**Observer**

**Susan V. Lawrence** is a specialist in Asian affairs at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), a unit of the Library of Congress that provides the U.S. Congress with authoritative, non-partisan research and analysis. Her work focuses on political and security issues related to the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. Immediately before joining CRS in 2010, Ms. Lawrence managed media and legal advocacy campaigns in China as part of a major philanthropic foundation’s global public health initiative. Earlier in her career, she worked for a cumulative 11 years as a Beijing-based bureau chief and staff reporter for major U.S. publications. She was a member of a team that conducted four in-depth interviews with then-Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin over a six-year period in the 1990s. She also worked as a Washington, D.C.-based staff reporter covering U.S. policy toward Asia. Ms. Lawrence earned an AB magna cum laude in East Asian studies from Harvard College and an AM in regional studies – East Asia from Harvard University and spent two years studying modern Chinese history at Peking University as a Harvard-Yenching Institute scholar.

**Rapporteur**

**Ashley Feng** is a former research associate for the Energy, Economics, and Security program at the Center for a New American Security. Her research interests include U.S.-China trade relations, China’s economic policies, and China’s global economic footprint. She also researches the intersection of trade, investment restrictions, and export controls and national security. Prior to CNAS, she was research associate for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), where she researched U.S. policy toward China and Chinese foreign policy. Before CFR, she worked at the National Defense University, the Congressional Research Service, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, and the China Affairs office in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. She received her BA in government and politics and geographical sciences from the University of Maryland and is currently pursuing her MA in Asian studies at Georgetown University. She is fluent in Mandarin Chinese.
Appendix I: Map of Taiwan’s Place in the First Island Chain

# Appendix II: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan (2008–2020)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION OF ARMS PACKAGE</th>
<th>US$ BILLIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 10/3/08    | - (330) Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile defense missiles  
- (32) UGM-84L sub-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles  
- Spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft  
- (182) Javelin anti-armor missiles  
- Upgrade of (4) E-2T aircraft (Hawkeye 2000 configuration)  
- (30) AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters                                                                                                           | $6.4         |
| 1/29/10    | - (114) PAC-3 missile defense missiles  
- (60) UH-60M Black Hawk utility helicopters  
- (12) Harpoon Block II anti-ship telemetry (training) missiles  
- (60) MIDS (follow-on technical support for Po Sheng C4 systems)  
- (2) Osprey-class mine hunting ships                                                                                                                          | $6.4         |
| 9/21/11    | - Retrofit of (145) F-16A/B fighters, with 176 AESA radars, JDAMs, etc.  
- Continuation of training of F-16 pilots at Luke Air Force Base  
- Spare parts for F-16A/B, F-5E/F, C-130H, and IDF aircraft                                                                                                 | $5.9         |
| 12/16/15   | - (208) Javelin Guided Missiles  
- (36) Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs)  
- Taiwan Advanced Tactical Data Link System (TATDLS) and Link-11 Integration  
- Follow-on life-cycle support to maintain the Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVT-1) and Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems (JTIDS) previously procured  
- Sale, refurbishment, and upgrade of (2) Oliver Hazard Perry-class Frigates (FFG-7) and associated weapons systems  
- (13) MK 15 Phalanx Block 1B Baseline 2 Close-in Weapons System (CIWS) Guns, upgrade kits, ammunition, and support  
- (769) TOW 2B Aero, Radio Frequency (RF) Missiles (BGM-71F Series)  
- (250) Block I-92F MANPAD Stinger Missiles                                                                                                                      | $1.7         |

*Includes sales through October 2020.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 6/29/17    | - Surveillance Radar Program (SRP) Operations and Maintenance support
            | - (50) AGM-88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs) and (10) AGM-88B Training HARMs
            | - (16) Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) Block IIIA All-Up Rounds (AUR) and components
            | - (46) MK 48 Mod 6AT Heavyweight Torpedoes (HWT) and support
            | - (168) MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo (LWT) Conversion Kits
            | - (56) AGM-154C Joint-Standoff JSOW Air-to-Ground Missiles
            | - AN/SLQ-32(V)3 Electronic Warfare Systems in support of four (4) ex-KIDD Class (now KEELUNG Class) destroyers  | $1.4  |
| 9/24/18    | - Blanket order requisitions for stock replenishment supply of standard spare parts, repair/replace of spare parts in support of the F-16, C-130, F-5, IDF, and all other aircraft systems and subsystems | $0.3  |
| 4/15/19    | - Continuation of a pilot training program and maintenance/logistics support for F-16 aircraft                   | $0.5  |
| 7/8/19     | - (108) M1A2T Abrams Tanks and related equipment and support
            | - (250) Block I -92F MANPAD Stinger missiles, (4) Block I -92F MANPAD Stinger Fly-to-Buy missiles, and related equipment and support | $2.2  |
| 8/20/19    | - (66) F-16C/D Block 70 aircraft and related equipment                                                           | $8.0  |
| 5/20/20    | - (18) MK-48 Mod6 Advanced Technology (AT) Heavyweight Torpedoes (HWT) and related equipment                      | $0.2  |
| 7/9/20     | - Recertification of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles                                              | $0.6  |
| 10/21/20   | - (11) High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) M142 Launchers
            | - (64) Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) M57 Unitary Missiles
            | - (7) M1152AI High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
            | - (11) M240B Machine Guns, 7.62MM
            | - (17) International Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (IFATDS)                                              | $0.4  |
| 10/21/20   | - (135) AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) Missiles
            | - (4) ATM-84H SLAM-ER Telemetry Missiles
            | - (12) CATM-84H Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM)                                                               | $1.0  |
| 10/21/20   | - (6) MS-110 Recce Pods and related equipment
            | - (3) Transportable Ground Stations
            | - (1) Fixed Ground station                                                                                         | $0.4  |
| 10/26/20   | - (100) Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems (HCDS) consisting of up to (400) RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Surface Launched Missiles and related equipment
            | - (4) RTM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Exercise Missiles                                                                  | $2.4  |

Appendix III: U.S.-Taiwan Bilateral Defense Dialogue Mechanisms

**Core Mechanisms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIALOGUE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monterey Talks (MTs)</td>
<td>• Interagency talks that include officials from the U.S. National Security Council, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Department of Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Objective is to sync interagency discussions and examine all-of-government security issues such as crisis response scenarios, security cooperation, and resiliency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Review Talks (DRTs)</td>
<td>• Defense-focused dialogue featuring senior officials from both uniformed militaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Objective is to discuss defense policy issues as well as setting the agenda for military-related initiatives, security cooperation, exchanges, and other engagements for the coming year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Officers Steering Group (GOSG)</td>
<td>• Driven by INDOPACOM and composed of military leaders from both sides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Objective is to address operational and safety issues under the guidance of the DRTs and determine future engagements between the military services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peripheral Mechanisms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIALOGUE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Conference Visits</td>
<td>• Senior officials from Taiwan meet with senior U.S. officials from the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Occurs on the sidelines of the annual U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff Meetings</td>
<td>• U.S. service chiefs and chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet once with their Taiwan counterparts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Usually occurs on the sidelines of other events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject-Matter Expert Exchanges</td>
<td>• U.S. Department of Defense assessment teams go to Taiwan to review defense requirements and key operational capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Occurs on an as-needed basis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Professional Military Education (PME) | - Military personnel from Taiwan participate across the U.S. PME system, including the military service academies and senior service war colleges  
| Exercise Observations | - U.S. sends retired observers to Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang Joint Operations Exercise, in which senior defense leaders from Taiwan verify doctrinal changes, examine operational concepts, and evaluate warfighting performance. |
| Component Dialogues | - INDOPACOM service components conduct dialogues with Taiwan counterparts on operational issues.  
- Often occur on the sidelines of other events. |

Source: Conversations with former U.S. government officials.
Appendix IV: Taiwan’s International Government Organization (IGO) Participation and Retained Memberships Since Losing Its Seat in the United Nations

Table 1: Taiwan’s Participation in International Governmental Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IGO</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>YEAR JOINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement</td>
<td>Participating fishing entity</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Council for the Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Pacific Fisheries Commissions</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network of Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of World Election Bodies</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
<td>Invited guest</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Methane Initiative</td>
<td>Visitor</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction*</td>
<td>NGO participation</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific Regional Working Group on Environmental Information</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Air Navigation Services Organization</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Renewable Energy Association</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Council for Information Technology in Government Administration</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards and Trade Development Facility</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Frigate Working Group</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Health Assembly</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Versailles Project on Advanced Materials and Standards</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Fisheries Committee</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Customs Organization: Revised Kyoto Convention Management Committee</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Steel Committee</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory Center on World Trade Organization Law</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Social Council of the United Nations*</td>
<td>NGO participation</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley Process</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Competition Committee</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Customs Organization (Technical Committee on Customs Valuation)</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Customs Organization (Technical Committee on Rules of Origin)</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Competition Network</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific Association of Agricultural Research Institutions</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parlamento Centroamericano</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egmont Group</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Asian Election Authorities</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization of Legal Metrology</td>
<td>Associate member,</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>corresponding member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Group on Asian Tax Administration and Research</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Aid Committee</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Grains Council</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>STATUS</td>
<td>YEAR JOINED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*</td>
<td>NGO participation</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Legal Metrology Forum</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association for Science Cooperation in Asia</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Association of Insurance Supervisors</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefish Tuna</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American Bank for Economic Integration</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Satellite System for Search and Rescue</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference of Governors of South East Asian Central Banks</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foro de Presidentes de Poderes Legislativos de Centroamericana y la Cuenca del Caribe</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization of Securities Commissions</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas</td>
<td>Cooperating non-member</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Participation is only through nongovernmental organization (NGO) representation without official government participation. This listing includes only three of the major IGOs in which Taiwan's NGOs participate.

Table 2: Organizations Taiwan Has Maintained Membership in Since Losing Its Seat in the United Nations in 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>YEAR JOINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Fertilizer Technology Center for the Asian and Pacific Region</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Cotton Advisory Committee</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Seed Testing Association</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Productivity Organization</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Organization for Animal Health</td>
<td>Full member</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Department of Public Information*</td>
<td>NGO participation</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Participation is only through nongovernmental organization (NGO) representation without official government participation.

Appendix V: Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) Programs (August 2015–September 2020)

All programs have been co-hosted by the United States and Taiwan, with additional co-hosts as noted below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PROGRAM NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 12-14, 2015</td>
<td>Workshop on Molecular Diagnosis of MERS-CoV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 7-8, 2015</td>
<td>International Conference on Dengue Prevention and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 11, 2016</td>
<td>Workshop on Enhancing Prosperity and Opportunity for Women in Asia-Pacific Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13-15, 2016</td>
<td>Workshop on Laboratory Diagnosis for Zika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16-17, 2016</td>
<td>Conference on Energy Efficiency in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 5-11, 2016</td>
<td>Workshop on E-Commerce Facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 25-28, 2017</td>
<td>Workshop on Laboratory Diagnosis for Mosquito-borne Viral Diseases (Dengue, Zika, and Chikungunya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5-7, 2017</td>
<td>Workshop on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 14-16, 2017</td>
<td>Workshop on Building a Bright Future for Women Entrepreneurs in Tech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 4-8, 2017</td>
<td>Workshop on Enhancing Broadband Penetration and Bridging the Digital Divide in the Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 23-26, 2018</td>
<td>Workshop on Laboratory Diagnosis of Enteroviruses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 14-15, 2018</td>
<td>Workshop on Combating Transnational Crime and Forensic Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 18-19, 2018</td>
<td>Workshop on Defending Democracy Through Media Literacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 10-12, 2018</td>
<td>Workshop on Achieving 50-50: Empowering Women Leaders in the Indo-Pacific Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 14, 2018</td>
<td>Workshop on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 26-28, 2019</td>
<td>Workshop on Anti-Corruption in the Public and Private Sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16-18, 2019</td>
<td>Workshop on Women’s Economic Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30-May 4, 2019</td>
<td>Workshop on the Programmatic Management of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28-31, 2019</td>
<td>Workshop on Network Security and Emerging Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 10-11, 2019</td>
<td>Workshop on Defending Democracy Through Media Literacy II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 29-October 2, 2019</td>
<td>International Austronesian Languages Revitalization Forum*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 20-22, 2019</td>
<td>Workshop on Good Energy Governance in the Indo-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 29, 2020</td>
<td>Online Workshop on Combating COVID-19 Disinformation and Strengthening Media Literacy in the Indo-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24, 2020</td>
<td>Online Workshop on Preparing for a Potential Second Wave of Coronavirus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 9, 2020</td>
<td>Online Workshop on Helping Countries Deploy Digital Tools to Respond to COVID-19 in the Western Hemisphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 29, 2020</td>
<td>Virtual GCTF on Advancing International Development through Public Partnership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The International Austronesian Languages Revitalization Forum took place in Koror, Palau. All other GCTF programming from 2015–2019 took place in Taipei. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, 2020 programming has been exclusively online.*

Appendix VI: Key Taiwan-Related U.S. Legislation (2008–September 2020)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELECT SENSE OF CONGRESS AND POLICY LANGUAGE</th>
<th>BINDING LANGUAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• It is the sense of Congress that the U.S. Trade Representative “should consult with Congress on opportunities for further strengthening bilateral trade and economic relations between the U.S. and Taiwan.”</td>
<td>• “Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on the steps taken” to support Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships and to adjust U.S. engagement with nations on the basis of whether they have upgraded relations with Taiwan or taken actions to undermine Taiwan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It should be U.S. policy to advocate for “for Taiwan’s membership in all international organizations in which statehood is not a requirement and in which the United States is also a participant”; and “for Taiwan to be granted observer status in other appropriate international organizations.”</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• It is the sense of Congress that the U.S. government should “support Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships as well as other partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world”; “consider . . . increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan”; and “consider . . . in alignment with United States foreign policy interests and in consultation with Congress, altering its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that take serious or significant actions to undermine the security or prosperity of Taiwan.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## SELECT SENSE OF CONGRESS AND POLICY LANGUAGE

- Sec. 1260D - It is the sense of Congress that the United States should:
  - “Continue to strengthen defense and security cooperation with Taiwan.”
  - “Strongly support the acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services . . . that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan.”
  - “Continue efforts to improve the predictability of United States arms sales to Taiwan.”

- Sec. 1260D - It is the sense of Congress that the secretary of defense should:
  - “Promote policies concerning exchanges that enhance the security of Taiwan.”
  - “Consider options . . . to expand the scale and scope of humanitarian assistance and disaster response cooperation with Taiwan and other regional partners so as to improve disaster response planning and preparedness.”
  - “Continue regular transits of United States Navy vessels through the Taiwan Strait . . . and encourage allies and partners to follow suit in conducting such transits.”

## BINDING LANGUAGE

- Sec. 1260B - “The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the following:
  - “The feasibility of establishing a high-level, interagency United States-Taiwan working group for coordinating responses to emerging issues related to cybersecurity.”
  - “A discussion of the Department of Defense’s current and future plans to engage with Taiwan in cybersecurity activities.”
  - “A discussion of obstacles encountered in forming, executing, or implementing agreements with Taiwan for cybersecurity activities.”
  - “Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines should be included.”

- Sec. 1260C - The secretary of defense in conjunction with the secretary of state shall conduct a review of and report on the PRC and Chinese Communist Party’s effect on “the security, or the social and economic system of the people of Taiwan;” “the military balance of power between the PRC and Taiwan;” “the expectation that the future of Taiwan will continue to be determined by peaceful means”; and “the role of United States policy toward Taiwan.”

- Sec. 5513 - “Not later than 45 days after the date of the election for the President and Vice President of Taiwan in 2020, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on any (1) influence operations conducted by China to interfere in or undermine such election; and (2) efforts by the United States to disrupt such operations.”

### Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-409) – Enacted 12/31/2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELECT SENSE OF CONGRESS AND OTHER HORTATORY LANGUAGE</th>
<th>BINDING LANGUAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• It is the sense of Congress that the United States should “recognize the value of . . . ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and security partners within Asia and elsewhere, including . . . Taiwan.”</td>
<td>• “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State . . . shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on a strategic framework to administer programs, projects, and activities of the United States to support diplomatic and economic engagement between the United States and ASEAN member countries for the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “The President should conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces.”</td>
<td>• “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the President shall submit a report to Congress that . . . includes a country-by-country assessment of priority areas for United States engagement and capacity building assistance.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “The President should encourage the travel of high level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELECT SENSE OF CONGRESS LANGUAGE</th>
<th>BINDING LANGUAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Sec. 1258 - It is the sense of Congress that the United States should:</td>
<td>• Sec. 1257 - “The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with appropriate counterparts of Taiwan, conduct a comprehensive assessment of Taiwan’s military forces, particularly Taiwan’s reserves. The assessment shall provide recommendations to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, readiness, and resilience of Taiwan’s self-defense capability”; and “The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing” an assessment of Taiwan’s military forces, recommendations, and a plan for relevant U.S. actions on the matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Strengthen defense and security cooperation with Taiwan to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Strongly support the acquisition by Taiwan of defensive weapons . . . with a particular emphasis on asymmetric warfare and undersea warfare capabilities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Improve the predictability of arms sales to Taiwan.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Expand cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief” with Taiwan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sec. 1258 - It is the sense of Congress that the secretary of defense should “promote Department of Defense policies concerning exchanges that enhance the security of Taiwan”; and “consider supporting the visit of a United States hospital ship to Taiwan.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taiwan Travel Act (P.L. 115-135) – Enacted 3/18/2018

**SELECT SENSE OF CONGRESS AND POLICY LANGUAGE**

- It is the sense of Congress that “the United States Government should encourage visits between officials from the United States and Taiwan at all levels.”
- It should be U.S. policy to “allow officials at all levels of the United States Government, including Cabinet-level national security officials, general officers, and other executive branch officials, to travel to Taiwan to meet their Taiwanese counterparts”; to “allow high-level officials of Taiwan to enter the United States, under conditions which demonstrate appropriate respect for the dignity of such official, and to meet with officials of the United States, including officials from the Department of State and the Department of Defense and other Cabinet agencies”; and “encourage [TECRO], and any other instrumentality established by Taiwan, to conduct business in the United States, including activities which involve participation by Members of Congress, officials of Federal, State, or local governments of the United States, or any high-level official of Taiwan.”


**SELECT SENSE OF CONGRESS LANGUAGE**

- Sec. 1284 - “The Secretary of Defense should carry out a program of exchanges of senior military officers and senior officials between the United States and Taiwan designed to improve military to military relations between the United States and Taiwan.”


**SELECT SENSE OF CONGRESS LANGUAGE**

- Sec. 1259A - It is the sense of Congress that “the United States should consider opportunities to help enhance the maritime capabilities and nautical skills of the Taiwanese navy that may contribute to Taiwan’s self-defense and to regional peace and stability”; and “the [PRC] and Taiwan should be afforded opportunities to participate in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief portions of future multilateral exercises, such as the Pacific Partnership, Pacific Angel, and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises, to increase their respective capacities to conduct these types of operations.”

**BINDING LANGUAGE**

- Sec. 1256 - “The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submit to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the self-defense capabilities of Taiwan.” The report shall contain:
  - “A description of the key assumptions made regarding the impact of the [PLA] on the maritime or territorial security of Taiwan.”
  - “An assessment of the force posture, capabilities, and readiness of the armed forces of Taiwan for maintaining the maritime or territorial security of Taiwan.”
  - “Recommendations for further security cooperation and assistance efforts between Taiwan and the [US].”
  - “Any other matters the Secretary determines to be appropriate.”

Taiwan Observer Status (P.L. 113-17) – Enacted 7/12/2013

**BINDING LANGUAGE**

- The secretary of state shall “develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the next triennial ICAO Assembly . . . and other related meetings, activities, and mechanisms thereafter”; and “instruct the United States Mission to the ICAO to officially request observer status for Taiwan at the triennial ICAO Assembly . . . and to actively urge ICAO member states to support such observer status and participation for Taiwan.”
- “Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report, in unclassified form, describing the United States strategy to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan at the triennial ICAO Assembly and at subsequent ICAO Assemblies and at other related meetings, activities, and mechanisms thereafter.”


**SELECT SENSE OF CONGRESS LANGUAGE**

- Sec. 1281 - It is the sense of Congress that “the United States, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, should continue to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability”; and “the President should take steps to address Taiwan’s shortfall in fighter aircraft, whether through the sale of F-16 C/D aircraft or other aircraft of similar capability, as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”

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