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WELCOMING REMARKS:

Dr. John J. Hamre,

President and CEO, Langone Chair in American Leadership, CSIS

Dr. Geun Lee,

*President,
The Korea Foundation*

KEYNOTE ADDRESS:

Cho Sei-young,

1st Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea

Session I: Peace on the Korean Peninsula

MODERATOR:

Ambassador Mark Lippert,

*Senior Advisor, CSIS Korea Chair;
Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea*

PANELISTS:

Dr. Haksoon Paik,

*President,
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Dr. Intaek Han,

*Research Fellow,
Jeju Peace Institute*

Mr. David Helvey,

*Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs,
U.S. Department of Defense*

Dr. Sue Mi Terry,

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Ambassador Kathleen Stephens,

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Transcript By

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John J. Hamre: Good evening to all of our friends in Korea. Good morning to all of our friends in Washington. We are so pleased to be able to welcome you all to this Korea-U.S. Strategic Forum 2020. And my special thanks to Dr. Lee who heads up the Korea Foundation. He's a great personal friend and a professional friend and colleague. And we're so excited. And thank you, Dr. Lee, for bringing us together again. This is a real opportunity.

We're together this time through the magic of modern collaboration tools. You know, because of the pandemic we can't travel, but we can talk to each other and be together, and really dig in deep to the issues that are important in our day. Before I begin, let me just congratulate Korea for splendid job of handling the coronavirus. You have become our big brother. We look to you for how we ought to do it. We're not doing all that well in this country managing the coronavirus. But you've given us a roadmap on how it could be done well, and I'm very grateful to that leadership.

And let me also say this is an important time to reflect on the anniversary of the start of the Korean War 70 years ago, when we were brought together in a terrible way. But we've stayed together to help promote and create the, you know, strongest, most vibrant Korea ever in history. It's an unfinished job because we still have a divided Korea. And history still will give us the opportunity at some point to bring the Korean people together in peace. And it will be the most important development in my lifetime, surely. I think it'll happen in my lifetime. And it'll be the most important development for peace in Asia. And I'm very excited for that possibility. We'll talk about some of that today.

I really would like to turn, if I may now, to Geun Lee, who is the president of the Korea Foundation. Been leading such a dynamic program these last years. And I'm very proud that we can have this opportunity to partner with you. I know that we're separated by lots of miles, and we're separated by time zones, but we're together right now. And I look forward to hearing your thoughts.

Professor Lee. Oh, somebody needs to unmute Professor Lee.

Geun Lee: Colleagues and friends all over the world, as president of the Korea Foundation it is my privilege to welcome you all to the ROK-U.S. Strategic Forum 2020, the fifth iteration of this annual forum, co-hosted by CSIS and the Korea Foundation. President John Hamre, who is so kind and nice to introduce me in such a great way, and his excellency Cho Sei-young vice foreign minister of the ROK, Ambassador Harry Harris, and the honorable Professor Young-kwan Yoon, and all of our distinguished delegates and guests.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all of you for joining this forum despite your busy schedules, the inconvenience of social distancing, and the time difference. Unlike in previous years, this year's forum is being held as an online conference due to COVID-19. My special thanks go to Dr. Victor Cha, who I had a video conference a few hours ago, and the staff of the Korea chair at CSIS for their exceptional preparation of this online event.

Distinguished delegates, dear colleagues and friends, we are now in the midst of global upheaval due to COVID-19. The novel coronavirus has infected millions, killed hundreds of thousands, and impacted the wellbeing of billions more. This invisible virus is changing the whole world, reordering our daily lives, and pitting us against an unprecedented crisis. Unfortunately, we have come to see vividly just how fragile international solidarity and cooperation can be in the face of the pandemic. Countries are barely managing to cope with their own problems of public health, unemployment, racism, and inequality, let alone being ready to tackle serious issues of international cooperation.

However, we are certain that the collaborative effort of global governance that incorporates core prosperity and universal values will be key to successfully dealing with these new challenges. The power to share information and resources and work together is an indispensable ability that mankind possesses in the fight against this new and lethal virus. At this moment, solidarity and cooperation are the most powerful weapons in the war against COVID-19, alongside our ability to remain flexible and to overcome any selfish short-sightedness.

Dear friends, exactly one year ago today the fourth Korea-U.S. Strategic Forum was held in Washington, D.C. At that time, expectations for sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula remained quite high in Seoul as a series of compacts had been made or planned between the leaders of the ROK, North Korea, the U.S. and China. Since then, many unfortunate changes have occurred. Diplomatic engagement with North Korea to achieve denuclearization has stalled.

We regret that the DPRK has yet to return to the negotiating table, despite our steadfast and patient efforts to promote dialogue and cooperation. Furthermore, North Korea has recently begun to accuse the ROK and the United States nearly daily. They have labeled the historic North Korea-U.S. summit in Singapore an empty promise. Indeed, experts are concerned that Pyongyang might resume military provocations, nullifying any progress achieved since early 2018 among the leaders of the ROK, the U.S., and North Korea.

Certainly, the path to denuclearization and permanent peace on the peninsula is not an easy one. Some may say it is an impossible job. But anyone can accomplish an easy task. Resolving the seemingly impossible is reserved for great leaders and innovative minds. This is one of the reasons why we regularly bring together brilliant minds from both of our countries to exchange wisdom. Peace on the Korean Peninsula is not just in the interests of 80 million Koreans. These security issues disrupt peace and prosperity not only here but also in the greater region of East Asia and around the entire globe – much like how we are witnessing the outbreak of a health crisis in one region disrupts the whole global economy.

Tomorrow marks the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War.

From 1950 to 1953, the Korean Peninsula was devastated by conflict. More than 2.5 million civilians perished. Some 54,000 American soldiers were sacrificed. And more than 3 million Koreans became refugees. As a result of this terrible war, the ceasefire treaty solidifying the 38th parallel remains to this day. The brutal fighting drove the two Koreas apart and left permanent injuries and scars. Such a tragedy should never be repeated.

It is through this conflict that the South Korea-U.S. bilateral relationship grew into one of the strongest in the modern world. This is an alliance forged in blood, transformed through decades of painstaking efforts, striving for lasting peace and prosperity in Korea and beyond. The 138 years of diplomatic relations we have achieved were made possible because of the solid foundation of friendship boasted by our alliance. The Korean government remains firmly committed to staying the course toward denuclearization and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. As we embark on this bold path unwavering collaboration between the ROK and the U.S. is more important than ever. We must continue working towards our shared goal in order to solve the North Korea nuclear issue and to establish peace.

As we work, our alliance is also evolving. It has become a solid foundation in maintaining stability of the liberal international order. Now we are encountering new regional and global issues that we need to tackle together, such as cyber and space security, pandemics, climate change, and global governance of the digital economy. Our wisdom, therefore, should extend beyond the issues on the Korean Peninsula to include these new and significant areas. There is no better venue to start discussing these new issues than this ROK-U.S. Strategic Forum, together with CSIS. I hope this year's forum will serve as the first bilateral launch pad to ignite new intellectual cooperation between our two countries on a wider range of global governance issues.

Dear friends, this year's forum will be held over the next two days. During the event, we must chart the path ahead with optimism. This is befitting of the ROK-U.S. Strategic Forum. Since its launch in 2016 it has successfully served as a comprehensive dialogue channel for the discussion of critical matters that affect our common interests. I have no doubt that this forum is among the most important and effective forum events that the Korea Foundation presents in cooperation with its foreign partners. I hope that, as always, it'll lead to productive discussions and suggestions about how we can collectively respond to the challenges we face and overcome those problems together. We are lucky to have an extraordinary array of wonderful speakers lined up this year to cover a variety of topics and share their insightful ideas.

Last but not least, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the CSIS for co-organizing this forum, and to all our invited experts and guests for coming together here and now. Now, I turn to a congratulatory video by First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Cho Sei-young. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

Cho Sei-Young

(From video.) Dr. John Hamre, president and CEO of CSIS, Dr. Lee Geun, president of the Korea Foundation, distinguished participants. It would be a privilege to address the distinguished attendees of this forum in any year, but this year marks the 70th anniversary of the Korean War. So today it is a special honor for me to speak to you on how far this alliance has come and how much farther we can go together.

I'd like to begin by sharing with you an anecdote. In Korea, as in other countries, sending face masks and testing kits overseas in the thick of the pandemic is a delicate topic. But when my government decided last month to provide 500,000 masks to American veterans of the Korean War, the Korean public expressed overwhelming support. After 70 years, our boundless gratitude to the Americans who helped defend Korea in its darkest hour has faded not one bit.

The Korea-U.S. alliance is at its essence and inception a security partnership, but in recent decades it has expanded beyond the contours of the military to realms such as free trade and development. Geographically it is no longer limited to the Korean Peninsula and has evolved into a global partnership. Over the past several months, COVID-19 has brought into sharp relief the fact that this alliance concerns not just the difficult and seemingly far-off issues of security or the economy but that it can also directly touch the daily lives and wellbeing of the citizens of our two countries.

The Korean government spares no effort to support the U.S. in the time of need, airlifting hundreds of thousands of testing kits to its ally. In April, upon becoming the first country to hold nationwide elections in the midst of a pandemic, Korea promptly responded to a request by U.S. officials to share its experience of election management. Naturally, this spirit of close collaboration extends to the top. Our president has spoken on the phone on three separate occasions in as many months, underscoring the fact that our shared interests are simply too important to wait out the pandemic.

I believe that the personal trust between our two leaders played an important part in President Trump's decision to invite Korea to the G-7 summit. I don't think it was an accident that the invitation was extended to Korea. We are recognized as among the top 10 countries by measures of economic, military, technological, and other indexes. In fact, it is often the Koreans themselves that are caught staring unfamiliarly into the reflection of a capable, mature figure that they have yet to fully recognize. So in a way, the G-7 invitation represents Korea finally stepping onto the big stage.

But with privilege comes responsibilities. And Korea is ready and willing to take on the duties. For instance, our ODA levels still fall short of what is expected of Korea. That is why Korea's ODA budget for this year was one of the few areas exempted from across the board budget cuts following the pandemic and actually earmarked for increase. Distinguished guests, just as the G-7 invitation signifies recognition of Korea's growth and a change of the international landscape, so too must the U.S.-Korea alliance evolve so that it can embrace the changes of the past 70 years.

I think it was in this context that Deputy Secretary Biegun spoke of the need to renew or rejuvenate the alliance. I understood his core message to be that certain preconditions for launching the alliance have shifted over the past 70 years, and that the partnership needs to also evolve with the times. This is an acute observation, with which I agree completely. It is only natural that Korea raise contributions to the alliance in concert with increased capabilities. At the same time, there is a corresponding expectation among Korean people for genuine recognition and appreciation as an equal partner of the United States.

Striking the right balance between the two will be crucial as the alliance continues to evolve. Allow me to take a moment to share with you our efforts to contribute to the alliance. Foremost, Korea is increasing its financial contributions. For almost 30 years we have supported the U.S. troops in Korea in accordance with the Special Measures Agreement. Last year, the support topped more than \$900 million, an 8.2 percent increase from the year before. 8.2 percent may seem modest until you realize that it is over four times the rate of the economic growth in Korea.

Korea is also top importer of U.S. military equipment. And we have been increasing our own defense budget by an average of 7.5 percent every year since 2017, and now spend 2.6 percent of the GDP on defense. No major U.S. ally spends at a higher figure. These efforts paint a clear picture of an unwavering commitment to the alliance. As you are aware, our two countries are currently engaged in difficult SME talks. Negotiations between countries are never easy, even among the closest allies. But as they say, April showers bring May flowers. And I have not the slightest doubt that we will find the creative solution for moving forward.

The Korean government is also continuing efforts to strengthen its military capabilities. Clearly a stronger Korean military serving alongside the U.S. benefits Korea's own security and national interest. At the same time, it contributes directly to the national interest and strategic goals of the United States also. Distinguished guests, the transition of wartime operational control will be an important symbol of an alliance that is adapting and evolving with its sight set of the future. This will also provide the Korean people with a sense that their country's appreciated as an equal partner of the United States. And we should do our part to make the required conditions for a speedy transition.

The role and status of the U.N. Command is also an important subject in the evolution of the alliance. The UNC has kept the armistice for the past 70 years. While Korea is deeply grateful for these efforts, the Korean public also recognizes that it is time for Korea to take center stage in maintaining peace and security by ending the current state of armistice and establishing a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Lifting dated restraints on developing space and satellite capabilities, which has been placed on Korea decades prior, will be a good place to start.

Across seven decades, the core purpose of the alliance has remained

straightforward: the deterrence of war and the promotion of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. These objectives run through the path of denuclearization and the establishment of a permanent peace regime. Significant progress has been made over the past two years. Along the way, however, we remained clear-eyed about challenges and difficulties we face. Unfortunately, we are once again confronted with the reality of rising tensions between North and South Korea.

Nevertheless, the Korean government will continue efforts to prevent escalation. The stakes are simply too high for us to turn back the clock now or become disheartened by setbacks. Dialogue, steadfast engagement, and a healthy dose of patience are the only constructive options for moving forward. While Northeast Asia is a region more accustomed to rivalry than solidarity, opportunities for real cooperation are by no means lacking. Achieving denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula is one important area in which the United States and China can set aside differences and work toward the common purpose.

We must firmly reject the cynicism and self-fulfilling prophecy that lasting peace in this region is but a pipe dream, now made even more distant by U.S.-China rivalry. Bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table, achieving denuclearization, and creating a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will not only benefit Korea, but also open up opportunities for Washington to implement its strategic objectives in the region. It is such shared strategic goals and interests of our two countries that will ultimately sustain and strengthen the alliance.

Distinguished guests, five months have passed since the world was thrust into the unimaginable reality. Predictions abound as to what the post-corona era will look like. Some project a future in which decades of meticulous works to create an open and connected world is dialed back. Under this scenario, self-reliance and naked competition among nations become the norm. This represent the future of deglobalization. Others predict, in fact they yearn for, a world brought together in its fight against the pandemic and problems that define go-it-alone solutions.

Under this scenario, global resources are consolidated, and connectivity deepens. Call this the future of re-globalization. Our world is interdependent like never before. So the only way to fight global problems is through inclusion, not exclusion. By committing ourselves to cooperation, not by going down our separate paths. COVID-19 is testing not only the immunity of individuals, but also the immunity and resilience of the liberal international order itself. I am hopeful that, unlike COVID-19, the post-COVID world will not catch us off guard. We have a choice to make between linking arms versus retreating into our respective borders.

As you may be aware, Korea's open, democratic, and transparent approach during the pandemic has been praised as a winning formula for fighting infectious disease. However, we did not set out to promote these values, per se, rather our health authorities found themselves embracing a certain set of

principles as a touchstone against which acceptability of new COVID-19 measures was assessed. When sharing our experience with health professionals from around the globe, we have been emphasizing the potency of the open and transparent approach at every turn. We will continue to stress these principles, working alongside partners like United States.

COVID-19 is prompting like-minded countries to pool resources like never before, with the realization that no one is safe until everyone is. This is yet another area in which the U.S.-Korea partnership can shine. Distinguished guests, our changing world is presenting the alliance, 70 years young, with constant opportunities for cooperation and growth. The United States and Korea are time-tested teammates in one of the most successful partnership the world has seen since the Second World War. But we must not be complacent or satisfied even.

Despite all of our remarkable achievements and successes, I am convinced that this alliance can and should be pushed to evolve into a partnership that is even more effective, even more adaptable. While the United States and Korea have been co-authoring new chapters of history every single year for 70 years, I firmly believe that the best days of the alliance lies ahead still. Thank you.

Announcer: “Session I: Peace on the Korean Peninsula” covers the U.S.-ROK alliance in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Korean War, how a transition to a permanent peace on the peninsula could work, and the security, economic, and political requirements for that transition. Moderated by Ambassador Mark Lippert, senior advisor at the CSIS Korea chair and former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea. This session features: Mr. David Helvey, Dr. Haksoon Paik, Dr. Intaek Han, Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, and Dr. Sue Mi Terry.

Audience, please welcome Ambassador Mark Lippert.

Mark Lippert: All right. Good morning everybody here in the United States. Good evening, everybody in Korea. And good day to everybody else around the world who’s tuning into this very important, very timely broadcast of this very important conference. I’m Mark Lippert. I’m going to moderate this panel here today. And we’re not going to go through introductions. We don’t need a lot of setup, because we’ve had some excellent opening remarks and some excellent video presentations that really set the frame well here today.

I will just say, we are gathered here today to talk about, as was alluded to in the opening comments, some of the hard problems. We brought together some of the best minds to deal with these, present company excluded. There’s a sense that while these are difficult problems, one of – some of the comments early, well, there should be a sense of optimism because we’ve done great things together in the past. We’re doing great things today. And we can do this as an alliance.

A couple of other quick things. The alliance is global now. It’s not just about

the Korean Peninsula, not just about Northeast Asia, but the world is watching what the United States and Korea do. And there are new issues that have come to the fore, that were outlined I think very, very effectively in terms of space, cyber, environment, energy – things that we need to work on together as an alliance and a bilateral relationship.

So for this panel, we're going to try to do all of that in about an hour. And we're going to touch on three main themes. One, the state of the alliance and a historical lookback. Two, peace, why it is still elusive, what elements are needed. And three, some of these newer pieces that I just discussed, that may come in, as well as peppering in some of the issues of today that are important pivot points going forward.

So with that, I'm going to go right to questions. And I'm going to turn the first question over to Ambassador Stephens – Ambassador Kathy Stephens, who really does need no introduction. And, Kathy, Ambassador Stephens, apologies, let's just take a step back. Recognizing the 70th anniversary of the Korean War, can you reflect on, in your time on the peninsula and all these different iterations, some of the two or three most important events in terms of the development of the alliance, progress towards peace, and maybe why peace proved elusive. But just that – just to get us going here with a broader perspective, Ambassador Stephens.

Kathleen Stephens: Well, Ambassador Lippert, Mark, thank you very much. It's great to join you. You told me this question was coming, and I've tried to reflect on it. And we are marking the 70th anniversary of a terrible day that I first learned to call yugi-o, just June 25th, that's all that you had to say for Koreans to remember the trauma of that day and what followed.

So, you know, I mean, I can talk about a lot of significant events. And I think the vice minister just now alluded to many in the alliance and in the search for peace and dealing with the unfinished business. But I think on a day like this we do have to reflect, yeah, on the history, on the kind of origin story of this alliance. And I think we, Americans, are learning that actually history does matter. And I – you know, a few years ago I visited the Truman Library in Missouri. And I read Truman's farewell address when he left the presidency after a very eventful time. And his address actually says: The most important decision of his presidency was the decision to defend the Republic of Korea in 1950. And that's always stuck with me.

Now, there's a lot more history there, but my point is just I think we need to understand that history better, and understand that also our alliance was actually formed, as we know, in the context of the armistice, of the so-called temporary armistice. So we had a temporary armistice and an alliance, which has turned out to be not so temporary. So I think a lot of reflection on history and understanding that better, and not seeing it purely through the lens of all that's followed, is important to get to what – and also how that's seen from North Korea.

And I guess the other point I would make, since you asked me specific events,

is most than – as more of a process, I think, in terms of the alliance, where our alliance actually became a kind of values – truly values-oriented alliance. I mean, you know, more than what we were against. We were against communist aggression. We were against what that represented. But what I saw in my years in Korea, I actually was in Korea when President Carter was elected and he brought in a human rights agenda which was very, in some ways, destabilizing to the alliance but over time became a part of our values alliance.

And even more important what I saw in the 1980s, and it was a continuum of course, was Koreans saying: We have values too. And those are values we share. Against torture. For human rights. For elections and democracy. And seeing all that blossom really did change the nature of the alliance. So I think that's the context in which now we have a very different platform for thinking about the unfinished business on the peninsula, which is, of course, kind of extending those opportunities, if you like, and a more – and reconciliation on a still-divided peninsula.

Mark Lippert: All right. Thanks, Kathy. Ambassador Stephens. Great, great setup. There's a reason I came to you first. I know you, to use a baseball analogy, would hit it out of the park. And you've really got us off and running.

Let's go for a Korea perspective to Haksoon Paik. Dr. Paik, you have held a range of different positions. You also have been in and around this relationship, in and around this alliance doing very important work. And just a minute or two of your time to get us off and running in terms of a broader context, a broader perspective.

Haksoon Paik: Thank you very much, Ambassador Lippert. It's really great we are connected like this, have conversation in these trying times. It's truly comforting.

Ambassador Stephens mentioned, you know, values-oriented, you know, alliance. But in addition to that, let me think of, you know, three events which – in which resiliencies – resilience of the alliance has been amply expressed and contributed to the development and strengthening of the alliance cooperation, despite all kinds of challenges in the past. First of all, Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty was signed just after the Korean Armistice agreement was signed. But we were already allies before the Korean War. We fought together in the war and protected the interests of both countries on the Korean Peninsula and in this region of the world.

Second, we fought again together as allies in the Vietnam War, Iraq War, and also the war in Afghanistan. Third, South Korea could overcome financial crisis 1997-98 thanks to U.S. support. It will be Rubin rescue, so called. Robert Rubin was the Treasury secretary in the Clinton administration at that time. Thanks to U.S. support we could resurrect our economy, helping stabilize the, you know, so-called liberal economic order in Asia, and beyond, for all of us.

Those three events are talked about with the resilience side of our alliance.

But, you know, if give me more time a little later, I share with you my thought on frustration side as well. Thank you, Ambassador Lippert.

Mark Lippert: Well, excellent, excellent intervention. And, again, we came to you first, doctor, in part because we knew you, working with Ambassador Stephens, in the true spirit of the alliance, would get us up and running. So excellent intervention. Really appreciate it.

OK, I'm going to come to Mr. Dave Helvey. Dave, you are the current U.S. government official on this panel. You are in the Pentagon. You are a very senior member of the Pentagon. You too have been around in terms of a whole range of perspectives on the alliance. You just heard from Ambassador Stephens. You just heard from Dr. Paik. Some of the elements were defense in nature, some of them were finance. But they spoke to a resilience about the alliance. Can you just walk us through, from where you sit, what is your perspective on the state of the alliance today? Where the U.S. and the Korean governments are working together? Where are the gaps? And where is this all headed?

David Helvey: Well, thank you, Mr. Ambassador, Mark. And thank you to CSIS for giving me an opportunity to participate in this truly special and important forum. And I'm also particularly glad that we can meet virtually, even if we can't meet in person.

I'd like to kind of start by just kind of reflecting on what it is we're celebrating today and tomorrow, the 70th anniversary of the Korean War. And I think this really does, Mark, speak to the question that you posed to me. Yeah, the 70th anniversary of the start of the Korean War is really meaningful at this time in the alliance. I know there's a lot of stress and tension on the alliance, but I think it's important to kind of remember how we got to where we are.

And I think about in this context the memorial here in Washington, D.C. to the Korean War, and the words that are emblazoned on the memorial. That says that, you know, this is a memorial to remember the American people, the 1.5 million Americans who answered their country's call to defend a country they never knew and a people that they never met. I think that speaks to the spirit of sacrifice, but the willingness on the part of those American soldiers, citizens, to come to Korea's aid at a time of a crisis.

Seventy years from that point today, though, I think we should also look back and say that those words were true then, but they're no longer true now. We know Korea. We know Korea deeply. We know the Korean people. We have deep and extensive people-to-people ties based on a long, rich history of our alliance relationship that extends far beyond the defense aspects of the relationship.

But speaking to those, you know, I can say with certainty that our defense alliance with Korea today, militarily speaking, is truly unique – one of the most capable and one of the most effective alliances – precisely because of those deep bonds and ties that we have that are manifest in the combined force. The

interoperability of that combined force creates and enables, and the capabilities that that combined force brings not only to ensuring deterrence and appropriate defense on the peninsula but also our ability to work together in service of our combined shared objectives globally.

We had heard, you know, previously about our fighting together in Vietnam and Iraq, Afghanistan. I think that really speaks to how close we are as an alliance. And, you know, to your point, Mark, in your introductory remarks, you know, this truly has evolved from a military alliance focused on the peninsula to one that is truly global in nature and encompasses support for free markets, civic engagement, you know, the people-to-people exchanges that we talked about, education, tourism, mutual respect.

And in 2015, we announced a new agenda for new frontiers for areas for cooperation in the alliance, some of which you highlighted, but one of which is particularly important today, where we talked about cooperation on global health security and to advance our ability to counter biological threats. I think the COVID environment that we're in today kind of underscores the foresight that the leadership of both countries put into that new frontiers agenda in 2015. But there's other areas as well. Science and technology, collaboration, space and cyber. These truly are at the cutting edge of where this alliance can be, should be. And I think this is an area where we need to continue moving.

So looking into the future, I see that, you know, this type of cooperation – not only in terms of the military dynamics, continued focus on deterrence and defense on the peninsula, evolving this alliance to be much more global in nature, I think that can continue. It should continue. And I want to see it continue. In the defense space, I would note that Korea over the past decade has gone from a net security recipient to a net security provider. It is truly a partner for us and for others for peace, and security, and stability in the region. And in this respect, you see the South Korean increased capacity based on the economic performance really contributes to effective alliance capabilities, able to service our shared vision.

I think we need to continue working with our ROK allies to identify and address future security challenges to both of us, as well as to the region more broadly, including things as how we can work together to support the rules-based international order, how we can support things like freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes. But also I think there's room for us as an alliance to be able to work on how we can cooperate in terms of our security, cooperation, and capacity building of third parties.

And this is particularly important because as each of us has very precious and limited resources to dedicate to that task, being able to pool those resources together makes a much more efficient and effective way of addressing security cooperation needs and capacity needs of our partners. And by pooling those resources, it also lightens the burden that each of us has to carry. So I think that's an important consideration.

I would be remiss if I did not say that I'd like to see South Korea and Japan be able to work more closely together, not only bilaterally but multilaterally with us and with other like-minded partners. Again, being able to contribute cooperatively and collectively I think is the way to ensure that we're participating in a networked security architecture in the region – something I know that Victor Cha has spoken of with great eloquence in the past.

So looking to the future, I'd like to see the Republic of Korea become even more active in global security initiatives. The ROK is a respected friend and trusted partner to many around the region and the world. And it has a tremendous capacity to be able to do good. And so we'd like to be a partner in that and we'd like to support that. And so, again, thanks for that question. And really appreciate, again, the opportunity to be here this morning.

Mark Lippert: All right. Thanks, Mr. Helvey. Thanks, Dave. Really appreciate it.

OK, we are going to bring in the expertise of Dr. Han, who is sitting there in what looks like a very big room. I think it befits his – the comments he's going to make, that are going to be very big. But in all seriousness, we've heard some discussion about resilience, stress, values, sacrifice, adaptability, interoperability, broadening multilaterally and globally. Dr. Han, we really could use your expertise here. Korean perspective, global perspective on really the same question. Here and how today, where is – what's your assessment of the state of the alliance, how the two governments, the two peoples are working together? And where are we headed? And where should we be headed?

Intaek Han: Thank you. Firstly, my assessment of Korea-U.S. alliance, as we commemorate 70th anniversary of the Korean War, I think what's remarkable about our alliance is that we are commemorating only one Korean War, not two or not three. This is rather puzzling, given the fact that there has been a lot of nuclear tests, numerous missile tests, and of course all these threats and the blew up – explosion of inter-Korean liaison offices. All this would expect – would lead one to expect there would be more conflict on the Korean Peninsula. But the history is that there has been only one major conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which took place 70 years ago.

And how come there is only one major conflict on the Korean Peninsula since 1953, when Korea and the United States formed alliance? I think the main factor has been the Korea-U.S. alliance. In particular, the security guarantee that U.S. offered to South Korea was the key to stability and the prosperity of South Korea. So U.S.-South Korea alliance, or Korea-U.S. alliance has offered more than security guarantee, actually. It has provided an environment in which South Korea could transform itself from one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the most prosperous market economies, and also one of the most vibrant democracies in the world. So in this aspect I think the alliance has been beneficial not only to Korea, but also to the United States as well.

Now the United States has a – has an ally that is more than military partner

but shares common values and also has same economic and political systems. And the success of the alliance I think has also unexpected consequences. One of them is burden sharing issue. As the size of South Korean economy grows both in absolute terms and also relative to American economy, there is now increasing pressure on South Korea to pay more to keep American troops on its soil. But this increasing call for bigger burden sharing is not specific to South Korea-U.S. alliance. But it is common also in U.S.-German, U.S.-Japanese alliance as well. So as long as the relative position of the U.S. economy declines and American public favors isolationism, the burden sharing issue will not go away.

Now turning to the gaps and also future directions of alliance, South Korea and the United States have been close allies since the United States came to rescue Korea during the Korean War. And their alliance will have to go through some fundamental changes in the future if North Korea keeps developing its long-range nuclear missiles as well as cyber capabilities. At the core of South Korea-U.S. alliance has been American nuclear umbrella for South Korea. While North Korea's ICBMs do not directly threaten South Korea, they will threaten South Korea indirectly by weakening American nuclear umbrella. It is not difficult to imagine how the development of North Korean nuclear missile capabilities undermines the credibility, the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear umbrella for South Korea.

Also, the U.S.-South Korea – the Korea-U.S. alliance is less than effective in deterring the North from launching cyberattacks on the South, or even on the United States. The North has already launched successful cyberattacks on South Korea and U.S. targets as well, such as Sony Pictures Entertainment. Lastly, but possibly more important, the Korea-U.S. alliance as it currently exists is unable to lead the North to denuclearize or provide incentives to implement regime change. On the contrary, past behavior by North indicates that a stronger Korea-U.S. alliance is likely to harden rather than soften North Korea's stance. So also an effort to strengthen and update the Korea-U.S. alliance in response to new threat from the North seems to agitate China and deepen the security guarantee – security dilemma between the U.S. and North Korea, as well as between the United States and China.

Since the formation of alliance, South Korea and United States have been great partners. To deal with rising threat most countries need to strengthen and modernize the alliance. I think strengthening and modernization of the alliance requires more discussion between two countries than more weapons. And I'm happy that the forum provides much needed opportunity for such discussion. Thank you.

Mark Lippert:

Excellent, Dr. Han. Really appreciate the intervention there. A lot of deep thinking and analysis. Let me pull out one theme that you weaved throughout your remarks, which is that – something we haven't discussed is North Korea and the situation there, and what their impact is on peace on the peninsula.

And for that, I want to bring in Dr. Terry. Dr. Terry, you know, as I just mentioned, part of the reason we haven't seen peace on the peninsula are the

actions of North Korea. And you know, we've seen some significant developments over the last week, including last night. But just – can you take us through a little bit of a broader perspective. Where are the North Koreans today? Where have they been? Where are they going? Your thoughts on the North Korea piece of discussion we're having here today.

Sue Mi Terry:

Sure. So let's start with where the North Koreans have been. Obviously, the North in the past decades have relentlessly pursued their nuclear program, with the goal of gaining international acceptance of North Korea as a responsible nuclear weapons power. And through four different U.S. presidents, you know, for almost three decades now we made little progress on the denuclearization front. And not surprisingly, we are at an impasse, yet again, with North Korea today and little progress has been made, despite U.S. president having met with the North Korean leader three times now.

And adding to all of this is worsening inter-Korean relations, as you've just mentioned, as we've seen in the past week, with North Korea blowing up the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong, really the key symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation. And, you know, the latest provocations follow year-long dissatisfaction that North Korea had with South Korea, showing their dissatisfaction with – you know, sort of with the short-range missile tests, and practicing strike drills with the Blue House replica, and so on.

And I think what the North Koreans are doing right now is this is all part of broader strategy to pressure Seoul, to really split from Washington, and for Seoul to make concessions, particularly on the sanctions front. In the Hanoi summit Kim Jong-un made it very clear that what he wanted, first and foremost, was sanctions relief. And now that the economic situation in North Korea is more dire, as it's struggling with the secondary effects of the prevention measures they have taken to prevent coronavirus. So now they are determined to create and manufacture crisis with South Korea.

North Korea just yesterday, today, just mentioned that Kim Jong-un now has suspended military action plan against South Korea. But this doesn't – this is a tactical move. I think Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un are playing good cop/bad cop. But it doesn't change the fact that what North Korea wants, what it's override goal is to get sanctions relief and to put a wedge between South Korea and the United States.

And if I could just quickly mention where are headed in terms of DPRK-U.S. relations also, I think North Korea, after they're done with South Korea in terms of provocations, they will have to turn its attention to Washington and dial up pressure on Washington. It's an election year, after all. Pre-corona North Korea's missile and nuclear activity was already on an escalatory path, right? A frequency of North Korean provocations closely resembled the first months of 2017 with the short-range missile tests. And North Korea's usual MO is a brinkmanship strategy to overcome domestic stresses. And there are domestic stresses in North Korea. So and they have to ramp up provocations to dial up pressure in Washington. There's plenty of things that they can do besides an ICBM and nuclear test. We can talk about that a little bit later.

One final point, and I'll just conclude here, is that, you know, there was some discussion among the Korea watchers where Trump – President Trump and Kim Jong-un will go for a last-minute, 11th hour deal, an October surprise where North Korea agrees to, you know, partly freeze its WMD program for partial sanctions relief. And I do think – I used to think that this was very unlikely. It's almost July, after all. But I do have to wonder about this because Kim did himself leave a very small opening earlier this year when he said he would freeze the nuclear program or reduce the nuclear program if conditions are met. And now when you have seen this Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un playing good cop/bad cop, I'm wondering if he's trying to go for that last possible minute deal with President Trump. So I leave that as an open possibility. And I'll conclude here for right now.

Mark Lippert: OK, Sue. Lots of food for thought. Lots of tantalizing questions.

I'm going to come back to Dr. Han quickly. Dr. Han, talk to us about what Dr. Terry just mentioned, the inter-Korean piece. That dynamic – you know, you heard what Dr. Terry say – her assessment, North trying to split the alliance and use kind of the inter-Korean peace there. Where are we in terms of the state of the inter-Korean peace? That's an important element here. Can you just talk about your thoughts there vis-à-vis the alliance and the situation on the peninsula?

Intaek Han: Yeah. I think we all know what occurred between South Korea and North Korea recently. North Korea shut down the communication lines, blew up the inter-Korean liaison office which was built for them, and then threatened and then suddenly postponed moving troops into the DMZ. And they also threatened then suddenly postponed sending anti-Moon Jae-in leaflet using balloons. So of course, these actions can be cancelled, and new decisions can be made at any time. But these really puzzling events and tension has been rising on the Korean Peninsula during the past weeks.

So what do we make – what do we make of these events? What we, for instance, these events say about inter-Korean relations, especially about inter-Korean channel. Do both Koreas get along well with each other? Obviously not. The North wants the South to expand inter-Korean cooperation. The North will push the United States to lift sanctions. This is something South has been – has failed to do – deliver so far. So North Koreans are angry about – angry to South Korea. Do they actually talk with each other? How about inter-Korean communications channel? I think the answer is yes. I think through these events North Koreans actually talking to South Korea. And also, possibly to the United States, to Americans as well.

And also, I think that the main audience of recent events may be actually in North Korean residents, among North Korean population. What we are seeing now may be a very carefully directly choreographed, tightly controlled political signaling where the roles are clearly preassigned. Kim Yo-jong plays such a role, other people play such an other role. And the limit has been clearly defined. First of all, there was no territorial intrusion. There was no human

life lost. So why the rhetorics have been harsh? And the actions, while very dramatic, there was little or zero risk that these provocations go out of control and escalate into military conflict.

Secondly, as Dr. Terry mentioned, the roles have been clearly divided. And the targets – I think this is also important as well – targets have been carefully selected. For instance, the North Korea has not criticized Mr. Trump or the United – or the United States this time, has they? So despite all these provocations, I think that relations between Chairman Kim and Mr. Trump are more or less remain intact and, quite possibly, relations between Chairman Kim and Mr. Moon may be still OK. And because obviously Kim Yo-jong played the back-up role, and only to be stopped by her elder brother.

And one important question would be why did North express anger in such a dramatic way? I think – I think that they had to. They had to do it to save the face of their leader, whose image was tarnished by anti-Kim leaflets. So the dramatic action was needed to be taken in public so that North Koreans could see that. So all in all, my impression about the North based on recent moves is that North Korea is very strategic actor and becomes quite suddenly inviolable when its leader is openly challenged. I think that sums up my impression. Thank you.

Mark Lippert: Excellent. Excellent, Dr. Han. Let me – I'm going to go to Dave Helvey. But before I do, one follow up to you quickly. You really laid down a comprehensive diplomatic, military landscape of drivers for behavior from North Korea. What about the economic piece? You know, there have been reports of the North Koreans issuing bonds, sanctions, all of that that, you know, is, I guess, impacting pretty – a weak economy in North Korea. Do you – just quickly, do you think that is also in the mix here as well?

Intaek Han: I think so. Now this actually led to one of the points that I mentioned towards the end of the conversation. North Korean economy is in bad shape right now. And this, even after Chairman Kim stood with Mr. Trump three times. And both he and also North Korean population all expected something to come from these meetings. But they didn't come. Nothing – no major concessions have been made and the sanctions are still there, the economy is still bad, and in fact it may be worsening rapidly due to the COVID-19. So in this kind of deterring situation sometimes you need to make diversionary tactics. And that may be what happened this time.

Mark Lippert: OK. Thank you. Let's go to Dave. Mr. Helvey, just – you just heard a very complicated matrix from Dr. Terry, Dr. Han of, you know, military provocations, signaling, possible diplomatic breakthroughs, economic sanctions. Given where things stand on the peninsula from your vantage point, what is the current state of defense and deterrence? And how does that lead into possible U.S. receptivity to diplomatic entreaties?

David Helvey: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for that question. You know, I think, as Dr. Han said in his earlier response, it is important to remember that together the United States and the Republic of Korea – we've been successful

in deterring North Korea from large-scale aggression, or any attempts to unify the peninsula by force. And I think it's important to kind of underscore that deterrence at that fundamental and most basic level still obtains and remains very strong and very effective.

Now, that hasn't meant that there's been the absence of provocations. We've seen provocations recently. We've seen, you know, certainly, you know, more lethal provocations – whether it's the box mine incident, the sinking of the Cheonan, or the shelling of Yeonpyeong in recent years, or the cyberattacks that Dr. Han also mentioned. But I think that basic, fundamental deterrence that the alliance provides still obtains. And I think that's important to remember.

Our security commitment to the Republic of Korea, as well as to Japan I would add, remains ironclad, both in terms of the will and the capabilities that we're able to bring, the capabilities that are on the peninsula, and the capabilities that we would bring to the peninsula in the event of a crisis. And, of course, the capabilities that are resident off the peninsula that provide that fundamental deterrent capability. That we don't need to go into detail, but it is there based on our strategic forces.

Yeah, as many of you know – and I think this is something that's kind of been a theme of the conversation thus far this morning – Korea remains the hardest of hard targets. It's hard to determine tactically what North Korea's going to do on a day-to-day basis, even though I think we'd all agree that strategically North Korea, particularly under Kim Jong-un, is very predictable and understandable.

But it is hard to tell what's going to happen the next day, the next week, or the next month. And as we have seen just in the past several hours, you know, shifts from – focused on, you know, preparing for potential provocation to putting those on hold. So I think it underscores the need to be able to monitor the situation in North Korea carefully. And it – and to maintain our preparations to be able to respond to events as they happen and anticipate them.

As far as any specific provocations that North Korea may carry out in the future, it's obviously hard to speculate. We have been monitoring the overall increase in rhetoric in threats against Seoul. We know that the efforts to date in this recent cycle have been focused mostly on Seoul and President Moon. But I think it also kind of underscores, this is – that, you know, maintaining alliance readiness and alliance capabilities is so critically important.

And I think – you know, there's – one important consideration that we have within the Department of Defense is we have to look at and be prepared for threats as they are, not necessarily as we'd like them to be. And so, I mean, having that kind of realistic appraisal. And that's why having the combined force there is critically important. And having that – having that effective deterrent and having the strong combine force I do think is important to diplomacy.

And this gets to the point that Ambassador Lippert raised. It's our view that maintaining an effective deterrent based on a ready force, a force that is prepared to – in the terms that many, you know, USFK commanders have referred to, you know, to be prepared to fight tonight, is important precisely because that helps to create the type of environment within which multilateral diplomacy, aimed at the final and fully verified denuclearization of North Korea, can take place.

It's hard to talk if there's no security. And so maintaining that basic deterrence is an important part of the diplomatic outreach. And I also think that that basic deterrence and the capabilities that we bring, that our partners bring, is also important to the effort to maintain the integrity of the will – the true will of the international community and its representative manifest in U.N. Security Council resolution.

You know, enforcing sanctions, whether it's against ship-to-ship transfers, or restrictions on other types of commodities, or access to financial markets is an important part of enabling that diplomacy to obtain. And we, within the Department of Defense, view that as being an important part of our role as well, is helping to create those capabilities.

With respect to what the future may hold, our policy, as I've said, remains very much focused on denuclearization. And it's a denuclearization that we believe can only realistically be obtained through a diplomatic process. I mean, certainly our strong preference. We've made some progress in the past but it's not clear if North Korea is intent to move forward together with a denuclearization agenda that will result in a much brighter future for the people on the north side of the Korean Peninsula. Over.

Mark Lippert: All right. Thanks. Thanks, Dave. Really appreciate the insights there. Just one quick follow up. On some of the things we're watching, you mentioned a whole array of possible threats, provocations. Would this also include asymmetric capabilities the North is developing – cyber, special operations forces, things of that nature? And do you believe the alliance is ready for, you know, provocations based around those functional areas?

David Helvey: Well, yeah, I think you're right to point out that North Korea has the capability to launch a number of different types of provocations that kind of run the range from, you know, the conventional through to conventional and irregular. You know, we are aware of and we're prepared to respond to provocations, you know, including in the cyber and special operations types of threats. But I would also say these are areas that we need to constantly invest in, we need to constantly focus our efforts to ensure that we're making the right types of investments, and that we are improving.

I think, you know, the one thing that is absolutely clear over the 70 years that we've been dealing with this challenge – you know, 70 years since the beginning of the Korean War – is that the North Koreans – or, North Korea presents a very agile and adaptable adversary. And so even if we have

confidence today that we can address the threats that are presented, we know that those threats are going to change. We know those threats are going to evolve. And that requires that our alliance also be adaptable, our alliance also be agile, and our alliance evolve to stay ahead of – not just to follow, but to stay ahead of the threats that North Korea presents. Over.

Mark Lippert:

All right. Thanks so much. We've been slowly making our way back to Haksoon, Dr. Paik. And we apologize for not – you know, it feels like a little while since we've heard from you. And we haven't utilized your expertise as much as we should. So I'm going to give you two questions here. First, just any – let me – I'll ask them both together, and maybe you can put them together. First, just any comments on what you've heard so far? We take it any which way you want. And you know, so any direction there? But more importantly and more broadly, one of the charges of this panel is to talk about peace on the peninsula, what's been missing?

And we do have some new elements on the peninsula, a president of the United States who's been willing to meet face-to-face with the North Korean leadership. A willingness to scale back in or cancel exercises to make North Korea feel more secure. A progressive president in South Korea, who seems very determined and has put personal political capital on the line to work towards peace and work – and a relationship with the North. These are new elements that often folks have said – some analysts have said, if we just had this, or this basket of things, we could move forward. On the other hand, the last couple of weeks has shown some turbulence.

Now, maybe we're headed towards a negotiation, an October surprise, as Sue mentioned, Dr. Terry. But just your thoughts on both. Any comment on what the panel has said, number one. And number two, the elements of peace that either are missing, or are there, or what else we need to do to move forward.

Haksoon Paik:

Thank you, Ambassador Lippert. We talked about, you know, the problems we have been experiencing with North Korea by others on this panel. So just let me focus on the peace issue you mentioned. And in answering your question, I think that, you know, we have necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Necessary conditions for peace include end the war declaration, no more military exercises against each other, and peace treaty. Three of them, in my opinion.

And on the other hand, we can include the following five items as sufficient conditions. The first two of which are controversial, as we all know. Number one, denuclearization. Second, sanctions removal and arms control. Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperation. And also, political will of the top leaders and their key advisors to strike a deal and to faithfully carry it out, which is not an easy job, as vividly and powerfully revealed by John Bolton's memoir. And so I think, you know, these are the conditions for, you know, making a peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula as a possibility in the future.

But, if you give me time, let me share with you some of my thoughts on the –

not the bright side of our alliance for the last seven decades until now. Let me point out three things. First, you know, this has to do with our frustration or concerns of our alliance capability. First, our inability to end the war, start a peace on the Korean Peninsula, and denuclearize North Korea, even though almost seven decades were given for us and they lapsed. Another point has to do with this defense cost-sharing negotiation this time.

You know, this really hurts. The forceful demand for a 500 percent increase in South Korea's defense burden sharing is a nonstarter, or a message, if you will. Which makes South Koreans ask, is this America we used to know? That's what the alliance is for? It truly hurt, and it still does.

Finally, let me point out that leadership styles and the way they present the issues do matter. Think about the differences about Bill Clinton – you know, Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, for instance. I think, you know, leaders on both sides, Korea and United States, should present issues and options in a negotiable way and in a solvable way between allies.

Thank you for the time. I can share my thoughts on the concerns and frustration side of our alliance, even though we had tremendous success and resilience, as I mentioned, and the contribution our alliance has made in the past.

Mark Lippert:

OK. Thanks for the insights. We are getting close to time here so I want to bring in Ambassador Stephens, who we too also have neglected.

Kathy, just a couple of questions for you. Anything to dovetail off of the very good intervention from Dr. Paik, number one. And number two, the last point, that leaders matter. So you know, we're headed up to an election year in the United States. Any advice you might have for either a second Trump term or a new Biden administration? I know these are big questions, but just any way you want to take it. And then we'll probably go to Q&A from the audience.

Kathleen Stephens:

Yeah, thanks, Mark. I really appreciate the comments that have been made and I endorse just about all of them. Picking up on Haksoon's, Dr. Paik's, point, I mean, I think the context that our alliance and our efforts vis-à-vis North Korea is important. And it's underlying but maybe just to state it, I think we really are in an unprecedented and still unpredictable eye of the storm of political, social, geopolitical flux. And that's affecting everything.

In terms of – I mean, kind of also what's missing, I think I want to answer that a little bit. And given the constellation of positive things that I think you rightly highlighted as we try to work on the North Korean issue, I think it's been a perennial issue in this effort that in both countries, in the Republic of Korea and the United States, the effort has become somewhat partisan. And I think because – and this goes to – because I think that any success we're going to have on the denuclearization front, on the inter-Korean reconciliation front, on the overall challenges is a process, and a pretty long process, we need – easy for me to say as a nonpolitician – but we need to try within our own

political systems to have a strong bipartisan or even nonpartisan support for it.

I also think that, you know, while we talk a lot about – and kind of matching up the denuclearization effort with the inter-Korean effort – I think that's been, you know, better in words than in deeds. And we need to find a way to integrate that more. So I'm getting into the advice part I guess now. And have a – again have a sustainable process, both on the – you know, on the kind of political bipartisan side in both countries where it's been a problem, but also in kind of understanding that, yeah, this cannot be – and this goes to the alliance as well – purely transactional, purely – I mean, there's a place and a time for big events. But there's a lot of – lot of kind of slow, hard work that has to be done. And there has to be the resilience of not only the alliance but of our own political systems to deal with that.

And my final point would be, we haven't really touched on it, but that kind of regional dimension. I mean, David certainly mentioned, and rightly, the importance of other alliance relationships, such as Japan and the United States has, and the importance of the Korea-Japan relationship. But there is that topic called China. And the many anxieties, I think, in the Republic of Korea, maybe about being forced to choose between China and the United States on a whole variety of fronts. And that obviously is the context in which we also have to look at the alliance.

But also, I don't think we're going to get to a sustainable settlement, if you like, on the Korean Peninsula with a kind of – as one of our colleagues sometimes calls it – with after-action drive-by reports to Beijing. We've got to figure out a way to really – even in a very difficult time in our bilateral relationship with China, to bring a more regional and multilateral dimension to our efforts.

Mark Lippert: OK. Great stuff, Kathy. We've got about three or four minutes left and about three or four questions from the audience. So I'm going to try to give everybody about a minute here. And, Kathy, back to you with this one. You just mentioned China. This really fits neatly with what you just – your recent intervention and analysis.

Does the U.S.-China – this is a student from Yale University. Does the U.S.-China relationship make it harder for Moon Jae-in and the South Korean government to talk to North Korea? And maybe perhaps I would add, what about the linkage between inter-Korean talks and the nuclear program, that I think the Moon administration, you know, promulgated early in their tenure?

Kathleen Stephens: Yeah. Well, I mean, I'd want to hear from a Korean about the difficulties of the Moon Jae-in government. But I guess my answer would be, in a word, yes. I think at a time of rising tensions between China and the United States makes certainly diplomacy vis-à-vis North Korea more difficult, but also just more broadly the whole range of issues that Seoul looks at much more difficult.

Mark Lippert: OK. Let me go to Haksoon just for a real quick follow up on that. Same question to you, Dr. Paik. The U.S.-China relations in terms of inter-Korean

conversations and dialogue.

Haksoon Paik: We have been just experiencing all the difficulties just between the United States and Japan on the one side and China and the others on the other side. And, you know, even though there is a growing tension and rivalry, but I don't think this will continue to the extent we see these days. You know, election is over. Over in the United States – and China will have to deal with the new government in the United States. And they will just, you know, calm down a little bit the benefits of both sides. And this will create a better opportunity for the countries like Korea and others, you know, who are very much seriously hurt by the relentless competition, and particularly verbal attacks from both sides on each other. So I'm watching this very closely but looking forward to a better lining – a silver lining after the election in the United States.

Mark Lippert: OK. Thank you. Excellent.

Dr. Terry, question for you specifically. Our viewer asked you to answer this question. Essentially, the Bolton book. You just wrote a column about it. They had – the question is scale of one to 10, the Bolton book, especially in terms of its accuracy. I'm going to try to fill in some of the blanks here. Its accuracy and critiques of negotiations with North Korea.

Sue Mi Terry: I don't question the facts are accurately told from Bolton's perspective. I don't think he was actively thinking he was going to lie. Now, I'm not necessarily – agreeing with Ambassador Bolton's perspective and views, but I do think his book shows he just took very meticulous notes. So these are the truths, as he sees them. But as a reader, you know, Ambassador Bolton's viewpoint. It's very well-known. So I think a reader, a smart reader can sort of go through the book and understand about that. But I don't think he was actively making things up, if that's what you're asking.

Mark Lippert: OK. Absolutely. Great. And we're going to get to this last one. We're over time, but I'm going to ask. This is a question directed at the Americans. So it's from a student. And this question is: Can the U.S. ever give up the ROK as an ally? And the student asked – they asked for a realistic not a theoretical answer.

So I'm going to – Dave, you're a practitioner. I'm just going to ask you not to answer the whole theoretical question, but within the Pentagon each and every day thousands of hardworking men and women in uniform on both sides of the Pacific, as well as the ROK counterparts, are working to make this alliance stronger, as you outlined earlier. Is that a fair – anything you want to say, just about the practical modalities on that question? Since they asked for a realistic answer.

David Helvey: No, thanks for that and thanks for that question. And absolutely we are committed to this alliance. I mean, it's an alliance that's based not just on a military presence, but it's an alliance that's based on our shared values, our shared democratic political systems, our shared economies. I mean, this is

something that certainly, you know, supports the interests of both nations and the region. So our alliance is strong. And that's something we're going to continue focusing on and make it even better. Over.

Mark Lippert: All right. Last question – last word to Kathy. Kathy, same question to you. You're a former ambassador, a practitioner, number one. And number two, to this day you work on the alliance from different hats, including the KEI, as well as you're chair of the Korea Society. So same question to you, in a realistic, non-theoretical manner.

Kathleen Stephens: Yeah. Well, maybe also on a somewhat personal and emotional matter, I would say if by alliance, I mean, you know, we mean the relationship between the people of Korea and the people of the United States, I think it's an incredibly deep thing. And it has deepened beyond my imagination over the 40-plus years that I've been following Korea. And I think all of us kind of feel it. If we mean alliance in terms of the security alliance and how we work together that way, I mean, first of all, it's lasted a lot longer than most security/military alliances do. But it is – it will respond to changes in the world.

And in fact, our security alliance does – in 1953 – does envision a world in which there's a different kind of security order in Northeast Asia. So I don't want to send out any tremors there, but I think, right, you know, let's not assume – we're in a state of great flux here. But I think the very deep relationship between our two – again, our shared values, our shared sense of – our shared challenges is going to underpin a very important relationship. But what the future of the security alliance and relationship is I think will depend on the evolution of great-power relationships and also our ability to try to finish the unfinished business in a positive way on the Korean Peninsula in terms of division and suffering.

Mark Lippert: OK, that – excellent way to end. That sets up day two tomorrow of the CSIS-Korea Foundation conference. Tune in tomorrow, 8:00 a.m. Eastern time. What did they say on the old "Batman" show? I'm dating myself. "Same bat-time, same bat-channel." And we really look forward to another day of excellent discussion, excellent deliberations, finding areas where we can work together, finding areas by which – that will do exactly what Kathy said, work on this alliance, make it a dynamic entity that has a bright future for decades to come.

So thanks, everybody. Really appreciate the participants, those who stayed up late in Korea, those who woke up early in the United States, and all the viewers. We apologize we didn't get to every question. But that just means more questions, more time for day two. Thanks again.