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TRANSCRIPT
The Asia Chessboard Podcast

“The Post-INF Chessboard”

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Andrew Schwartz: Welcome to The Asia Chessboard, the podcast that examines geopolitical dynamics in Asia, and takes an inside look at the making of grand strategy. I’m Andrew Schwartz, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Ben Rimland: In the first episode of 2020, Mike is joined by Tom Karako, Senior Fellow with the CSIS International Security Program, and Director of the Missile Defense Project. Mike and Tom tackle the new hard power reality facing The Asia Chessboard. What will the Indo-Pacific region look like, now that the US is no longer bound by the INF Treaty? After examining the present balance of missile forces in Asia, Mike and Tom examine the doctrinal, strategic, and political realities of deploying intermediate range missiles in Asia. Mike and Tom conclude, by examining how pressure generated by American intermediate range missiles in Asia may lead to a new generation of arms control agreements.

Mike Green: Welcome back to The Asia Chessboard, I'm Mike Green. I'm joined today by my friend and colleague, Tom Karako, from CSIS. Senior Fellow in the Security Program, Director of CSIS’s project on missile defense, and a Kenyon College professor, my alma mater, among other things.

Mike Green: As always, Tom, welcome.

Tom Karako: Good to be here.

Mike Green: We try to let people listening in understand how we got here, and what experiences we bring, but also maybe a bit of a hint for how they can think about their careers if they're still in school. Tell us how you got to CSIS?

Tom Karako: Yeah.

Mike Green: What did you study, what got you into missile defense?

Tom Karako: I was a liberal arts major in college, at the University of Dallas. Went out to grad school at Claremont Graduate University, and was always interested in national security. So, studying political theory and American politics, but always interested in national security. Somewhere along the way, I got especially focused on missile strike, missile defense, and that kind of stuff, and just stuck with it.

Tom Karako: So, went from being an academic, writing about these things, to working on Capitol Hill. Then, bounced back and forth, but ended up here at CSIS about five years ago, and have made a career out of that.

Mike Green: What kind of work are you doing at the Missile Defense project?

Tom Karako: Yeah. We cover all aspects of missile defense, from programs and budgets, policy, strategy, how does this make sense, how does it fit in with the overall
U.S. force posture, but also those of our allies? There's just a whole lot to track there. Air defense, missile defense, but also a lot of strike.

Tom Karako: As it turns out, and we'll get to that in a bit, here, there's just a high demand signal, an increasing demand signal, I would say, for missile based delivery systems over various kinds. There're geopolitical reasons for that, but also tactical ones.

Mike Green: Some key turning points in American strategy towards the Asia-Pacific region have come because of missiles and nuclear weapons. Eisenhower, in the '50s with the New Look, wanted to avoid entangling ground wars in Asia, and hoped nuclear weapons would do it for him. Didn't work, we ended up in Vietnam. Reagan helped to wind down the Cold War, in large part, in the Pacific, because he deployed dual use capable F-16s, the Air Force did, in Misawa, in Japan. Japan was now a target for the Soviet's nuclear forces, and implicated in a way it couldn't escape in U.S. global strategy. So, the Soviets now had a two-front problem, no way around it.

Mike Green: So, at various points in history, how we have addressed nuclear weapons, missile defense, strike, have been really critical to the larger Asia chessboard, for US policy makers and allies, and that's what we want to get into. The issue we're looking at now, most topically, is the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty. Tell us a bit about that, why did we withdraw? It was not really about Asia, or was it?

Tom Karako: Kind of yes and no. Of course, the INF Treaty, the Intermediate range nuclear forces treaty, from 1987. You mentioned Reagan, and deploying F-16s in Japan, but really, with later Carter administration, and Reagan administration, the Soviet Union and United States were deploying intermediate range missiles in Europe.

Tom Karako: In the 1987 treaty, it eliminated that whole category of ballistic and cruise missiles, everything from 500 to 5500 kilometers in range. It took them off the table. The reason was, these fast flyers as they were known, on such short distances, were seen as destabilizing. That the flight times from Moscow to Germany were just very, very short, and getting everything off the table allowed things to have a little more breathing room, in terms of time and space.

Tom Karako: That treaty lasted a good, long time, but beginning, really, in the Bush administration, Russia began signaling in different ways that they're surrounded by countries that have intermediate range missiles, and they don't have them themselves, and that concerned them. As it turned out, they started testing and deploying some of these things, probably in the late 2000s. The United States, the Obama administration, called them on it, finally, publicly, in 2014. Then, the Trump administration, a full five years after that, pulled out, formally, pursuant to the Treaty's terms.
Tom Karako: So, now what we're looking at is both Russia, that has some of this stuff already, and the United States is developing some of it. The big question is, okay, we've had this big gap, in terms of delivery systems from 500 to 5500, and what makes sense, in terms of filling that gap?

Mike Green: You're talking about kilometers, range?

Tom Karako: Right, excuse me.

Mike Green: Those numbers?

Tom Karako: Yeah.

Mike Green: What is the missile balance, right now? Remember in the 60s, there was this ... Well, you weren't around, probably.

Tom Karako: The missile gap?

Mike Green: The big missile gap.

Tom Karako: Yeah, yeah.

Mike Green: What is the missile balance in Asia right now, between the U.S. and its allies?

Tom Karako: Yeah.

Mike Green: On one hand, and say, for example, China?

Tom Karako: It was Kennedy who played the missile gap card, against Eisenhower.

Tom Karako: The missile gap, as it were, for the Asia-Pacific region in particular, is pretty lopsided. Because, the other big country in the world that wasn't bound by the INF Treaty, was of course, China. So, China has various defense goals, for the region especially, and I think it's something like 85% of their missile forces are within this range. Well, it doesn't really need to be all that long range to hit targets in Japan, or some of their other neighbors.

Tom Karako: So, in terms of the balance, in terms of numbers, it's pretty lopsided. Now, that's not to say, however, that the US and its allies don't have some pretty important strike capabilities, but, back to the manned versus unmanned, we've got more capable manned aircraft, some of our other allies do.

Tom Karako: The other thing that happened in 1987 was another non-treaty, non-binding agreement called the Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR. It limited the transfer of missile technology, of anything, really, over 300 kilometers in range. I mention that because, over the years, as the United States has led the non-proliferation effort on missile technology, China has pushed back and said,
"You're developing, you're selling manned aircraft, F-16s, and what have you, to the folks around us. What's the difference in capability between a manned aircraft and a missile? Why are you limiting one and not the other?"

Tom Karako: So, here we are, we've taken away the INF restrictions, and had this proliferation, not just among adversaries, but among friends and allies, of getting more and more ... some manned, but lots of unmanned missile capabilities in the region.

Mike Green: The withdrawal from the INF Treaty creates, now, the legal possibility for a menu of capabilities for the U.S., and perhaps allies like Japan. There's the question of what, operationally, you would want in a high-end war fighting scenario, or for deterrents. There's a question of what you would want, operationally, if you were the Pentagon, or the INDOPACOM Commander, to fight a high end war against an adversary.

Tom Karako: Mm-hmm (affirmative).

Mike Green: ... who has a lot of missiles. Then, there's the question of what you can afford, because we don't have most of these missiles with this range, because we were constrained by the treaty. So, what can you afford? Then, there's the question of, what can you base, and what can you deploy? Politically, very complicated, and we should get into those.

Mike Green: Let's start with the ideal operational world. What kind of capabilities could we now develop that would have utility for deterrents, in a post-INF age?

Tom Karako: Right. I neglected earlier, describing the INF Treaty, to say that it really only limited ground based systems. Of course, sea based missiles of any range have, in principle, always been permitted. Likewise, air launch missiles of any range have always been permitted. So, really what this class is, is ground based missiles.

Tom Karako: Now, having said that, the flip side of stuffing a bunch of cruise missiles into an aircraft, or stuffing them into launch tubes on a ship is that, at that point, an adversary can target the platform.

Mike Green: Right.

Tom Karako: Right? You hit the archer, rather than the arrows kind of thing, and you take out everything aboard. So, what this really comes down to, staying with the operational side is how can you complicate the surveillance and targeting job, for whoever it is your adversary is, let's just say China, by spreading things out? Instead of taking out a handful of bombers, or a handful of ships, which China certainly is prioritizing, can you spread these things out on land, and complicate their surveillance and targeting job force?
Tom Karako: That, I think, is the primary potential utility of this stuff. If you had a bunch of ground bases missiles, for instance, you wouldn't put them all in one place, and put them in concrete. The real operational utility is making them mobile.

Mike Green: Mm-hmm (affirmative).

Tom Karako: And hiding their location. That way, from a deterrence perspective, they don't know where to target them, and they don't know exactly where they're coming from. Therefore, they know that if something breaks out, that they'll have X number of fires coming their way. So, it complicates things a bit.

Mike Green: And what would these assets, these missiles, and now because of the treaty, potentially ground-based missiles, what would they put at risk that would deter an adversary? Is it what some people call deterrence by denial? They try to ... Let's use China, as an example, try to send forces to take Taiwan, or East China Sea? Deterrence by denial, we can take them out, we'll have enough missiles to do it, enough cruise missiles, and therefore it's not worth it. Or, is this more punitive, deterrence by punishment? The deep strike, the ability to hit them in a way they can now range easily with their missiles, Japan, Taiwan, Guam.

Tom Karako: Yeah.

Mike Green: Just talking operationally, I think the politics are very different. Whether you're talking deterrence by denial in the maritime domain, or politics by punishment, which is holding assets at risk, deep inside an adversary. Politically, very different, but operationally, what's the mix that would be on the table?

Tom Karako: Right. I think it's, first of all, important to table that everybody is talking only about conventionally armed missiles.

Mike Green: Right.

Tom Karako: That's important to get out there, in terms of ground basing. Right? The United States has various nuclear forces, sea based and otherwise, but this would probably be conventional, and it's going to be precision strike.

Tom Karako: So, these things have multi-mission, they can be re-targeted at various things. The job is to be flexible. But, one can imagine, especially, let's just say, coastal defenses, or air defenses, that might thwart and complicate Chinese aggression against their neighbors and that kind of thing. Potentially, if you put an anti-ship killer seeker on it, ground-based missiles going after other ships, is certainly plausible, too.

Tom Karako: I think it's a variety of things.

Mike Green: Mm-hmm (affirmative).
Tom Karako: Hitting their ships, and other air targets. China is also creating some depth for themselves, with all of these islands. They're putting air defenses on those islands, and other assets, other things. One can imagine that, in a conflict, those might become targets, too.

Mike Green: So, the politics, then, get complicated. Let's go to budget. We have some serious challenges with the DOD budget, as you know well, from unfunded mandates, for personnel, just the cost of sustaining the force and so on. Is this where we should be spending our money?

Tom Karako: Actually, I think it is. I think this is a fairly cost effective investment. By the "it", let me define that as, again, your ground based fires, longer than 500 kilometers. I say that, not just about Asia, but globally.

Tom Karako: A couple years back, we looked at ... Ben Hodges, who was the head of U.S. Europe [Command] at the time, and looked around and said, "Look, the Russians have got a lot of rockets, they've got a lot of missiles, and we just don't." The U.S. had just divested itself, especially the U.S. Army, of a lot of this capability. So, what you've seen over the past couple years, especially just sticking with the Army for a minute, a lot of investment in what the Army calls long range precision fires. They're getting a longer range howitzer, their artillery look more like rockets. They're getting rockets, at longer range, that look like missiles, and missiles with greater range. Why? Because we want to stand off, we don't want to have to be on top of an adversary before we can him them with these fires.

Mike Green: Which is a challenge in the Western Pacific, where we operated with impunity for most of the post-war period but now, because of the so called A2AD, anti-access, area denial capabilities China's developed over the last two decades, they can hit a lot of stuff in the first and second island chain, in the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Just to foot stamp your point, it's a much tougher environment to put a carrier battle group into, or even to flow in tactical air.

Tom Karako: Right, absolutely.

Mike Green: They can reach out and hit so far, you need longer range so you can stand off.

Tom Karako: The tyranny of distance in the Asia-Pacific certainly applies there. So, the underinvestment for, you might say, the Europe type scenario has had double effects over here, because you've got to cross a lot of water before you get to your target. Absolutely, there's that, but that's the Army's number one modernization priority, is long range fires. That, I think, is exactly right, because we have to restore that.

Tom Karako: So, back to the question on the table was, what is the relative utility of ground based fires, relative to sea and air? Folks at the Air Force come back and say, "Well, we can do it all with an F-35."
Mike Green: Mm-hmm (affirmative).

Tom Karako: Well, okay, but in terms of cost, human beings live on the land. It turns out, you can have more stuff on land, and it’s cheaper to operate and maintain than a really expensive naval platform, or really expensive air platform, as it turns out. So, there’s utility, in terms of cost and budget, to finding a cheaper way to have ordinance that is ground based, as opposed to these more exquisite and expensive platforms.

Mike Green: So, in the Western Pacific, the Army has had that profile, on the Korean Peninsula, it’s not really had it on Japan. This would be a brave new world for the U.S.-Japan alliance, and potentially for other allies. The Philippines, much more complicated, politically. Taiwan, who knows? But, the Army’s not had that profile, of reaching out and touching the way it has in NATO.

Mike Green: It raises the question, are we looking at a more Army-centric U.S.-Japan alliance, potentially? Where else are you going to put them, if not Japan?

Tom Karako: Yeah. First of all, I’d like to point out, we always look at the INF range missiles of our adversaries, of North Korea, China, that kind of thing. We don’t pay as much attention to the fact that Taiwan, for instance, and South Korea, they’ve been getting some missiles of their own.

Mike Green: Mm-hmm (affirmative).

Tom Karako: There’s utility to that. I think it’s important to see there’s other things going on, our friends are investing in this kind of capability, and for good reason.

Tom Karako: I guess, on the Japan basing thing, I see a lot of merit there. I see merit in the long term, if handled properly, and with a lot of close consultation with our Japanese allies, that this could really be a new foundation for U.S.-Japan defense relations, rather than a distraction. Hopefully, it will be a strengthening, rather than a weakening.

Tom Karako: I would frame it in this sense, as well. If we could find a way to strengthen the overall defense posture of our two countries, relative to our common adversaries, using conventional strike, that’s what we’re supposed to be doing, in terms of not just relying on nuclear weapons, and nuclear deterrence. I see the value of having greater conventional deterrence, rather than just falling back on the nuclear side.

Mike Green: That’s interesting. The Japanese government, in its last defense plan, opened an active examination of what they call standoff weapons, this kind of capability. Implicitly, it was short of INF ranges, but now, potentially, one could argue longer, it depends on the party to the treaty. But, this is a capability the Japanese government is actively looking at, they call it standoff weapons.
Mike Green: That decision, by the Japanese government, caused much less uproar than the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty, it was very interesting. It leads me to think that, perhaps, the most likely path forward to a standoff capability in Japan will not be the U.S. Army, it's going to be the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

Tom Karako: Mm-hmm (affirmative).

Mike Green: Politically, I would argue, an easier sell in Japan. That raises the question, then, ... I think that deterrence capability is good for us, for the United States, but it raises the question, the U.S.-Japan alliance, the division of roles, missions, and capabilities, historically, has been one in which the US is the spear, and Japan is the shield. Now, Japan is going to have a spear.

Mike Green: So, we have not had a joint and combined command with Japan, like we have with Korea. To me, the only way we make this work is to start moving towards something much closer to a joint and combined command. So that neither side shoots, without some concept of operations, some joint shared intel, some joint decision making process. Then, maybe the Army develops these, but they're deployable. Japan has the capability, and down the road, if things get hot, we have a joint concept of operations, and we can deploy.

Tom Karako: Yeah.

Mike Green: Maybe with long ranges. Is that a scenario that seems realistic to you?

Tom Karako: Look, you know the politics better than anybody, but if you had a situation where Japan is pursuing that kind of counterattack, standoff capability, such that is, you might say, kosher, for domestic politics, I would hope that there would nonetheless be, at least, the planning. Such that, if you needed to move things in that are non-Japan ... There's going to be limits on their budget, right?

Mike Green: Right.

Tom Karako: So, we're stronger together, in terms of this stuff, so having at least the prospect for the mass that the U.S. can bring to bear, that just seems like a really important thing to build in.

Mike Green: Right. We should emphasize that neither of us is in the U.S., let alone the Japanese government. The two governments are just beginning to conceptually consider what this means. So, our discussion, I think, is actually further ahead of where the official dialogue is. But, since we’re not in the government, we can do that.

Tom Karako: Right.

Mike Green: And think about the ups and down sides to each approach.
Mike Green: People talk about the downside to it. One concern is, how do you control escalation? Look, these missiles are going to be dual-use capable. Even if we say they're not nuclear, they're going to be dual-use capable. How do you avoid a dangerous escalation, where the adversary doesn't know whether your fires are nuclear or conventional?

Tom Karako: Mm-hmm (affirmative). That particular problem is posed ... In theory, in principle, the United States has been firing Tomahawks, and conventional ALCMs, traditional air launch cruise missiles, over the years, and whether it's Bosnia, Iraq, or wherever, and we've yet to have somebody think that one of those is carrying a nuclear weapon. There's got to be context. Obviously, it's got to be in the context, and that kind of thing.

Tom Karako: But, I think Congress ... I think it was a couple years ago, I'm not sure of the exact status right now. But, at some point, Congress said, "We need to be looking into a conventional variance of things like LRSO, and that kind of thing."

Mike Green: You have to explain what that is.

Tom Karako: Yeah, long range standoff weapon, which is basically the replacement for this very old, 1980s, nuclear cruise missile. But, look, it comes down to, what are you trying to do? Are you trying to have a delivery system that can reach such-and-such a range, such-and-such targets? It makes good sense to have conventional variants of that.

Tom Karako: I don't put just all that much worry, just because a cruise missile ... Frankly, a B-52. Look, B-52s can carry nuclear weapons.

Mike Green: Yeah.

Tom Karako: Right? This whole thing, I think, tends to be a bit of a canard, and overblown a little bit.

Mike Green: The other critique you sometimes hear is, we've been shooting Tomahawks at countries that can't afford to win a missile race with us. The Chinese can build a lot of missiles. So, what do you say to that? Maybe you can address the larger context. This is one capability, one asset. I assume there's a broader web of things you'd want to complicate? An adversary is planning AI, cyber, whatever.

Mike Green: In terms of just mass, we're talking about an adversary, potentially in China, that can afford a lot of stuff.

Tom Karako: Yeah, that's important, because sometimes you can look at a single capability in a stovepipe, rather than seeing how it all fits together.

Tom Karako: So, whether it's ground based fires or what have you, it's all going to come down to how does this fit into a joint, multi-domain kind of approach to this
stuff. How does this support the U.S. or Japanese F-35 operations, and vice versa? Of course, it has to be a combination of all that.

Tom Karako: I would put in there, as well, UAVS, right?

Mike Green: Mm-hmm (affirmative).

Tom Karako: You saw the Chinese deploy a very cool drone show at the Olympics, things like that. That's, really I think, the tip of the spear for mass. You see a lot of interest in, and I'm really interested in this, in decoys.

Mike Green: Yeah.

Tom Karako: Decoys, whether it's decoy drones, decoys that look like aircraft, again, trying to find different ways to complicate their surveillance and targeting.

Tom Karako: But, the other way to deal with mass is to look for the critical nodes to kill them, because those drones have to talk to some ground station.

Mike Green: Mm-hmm (affirmative).

Tom Karako: They're presumably only so good as they can survive electromagnetic jamming of various kinds, or we can somehow interfere with their own targeting and communications, as well.

Tom Karako: Those are the capabilities, not INF missiles, but those are the other capabilities that, obviously, have to be brought all together.

Mike Green: The kind of standoff weapons the U.S. would be able to deploy now, post-INF Treaty, the kind of, for now, shorter range standoff weapons that Japan, for example, is looking at, it is one piece of a network of capabilities, that gives you more options, more survivability, more flexibility, and just generally complicates and adversary's planning and deters them, because they can't be sure they can win.

Mike Green: People always talk about the 1980s, and the INF Treaty in '87, but also the deployment of Pershings, and those capabilities. Very controversial, huge protests, we now know, funded in large part by the KGB.

Tom Karako: Right.

Mike Green: Also, spontaneous, in Western Europe. Handled badly, this could lead to the kind of protests and backlashes ... We have a hard time in Japan, managing bases, sometimes, especially in Okinawa. There's some risk, politically, of backlash against the alliance, if not handled well.
Mike Green: The lesson from the ‘80s is that there's an upside, because it seems to me that ... Not seems to me, it's a historical fact. The US Alliance with NATO, we rode that wave, we came out stronger. And, as you know, the INF Treaty was supposed to move the SS-20s, the Soviet stuff, over the Ural Mountains, and then Nakasone, in Japan, said to Reagan, "Whoa, not in our backyard, thank you very much." So, the result was that NATO, and the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the G7 Western leaders, for the first time, were talking with once voice about how to contain the Soviet Union, and deal with this problem.

Mike Green: I mention that because, diplomatically, and in terms of the geopolitics, there's some downside risk to playing this wrong, and showing lack of solidarity. But, played right, this shows a real solidarity, and it seems to me, it could link NATO and Japan, around some of these problems, and Australia and other allies. How do you see the geopolitics of this one?

Tom Karako: Yeah. I think that's critical, and it's one reason why it's so important to really keep the focus, and our no-kidding planning on conventional versus nuclear. You raise the Jolly Roger on a nuclear deployment, and then you have the nuclear freeze movement that you were alluding to in Europe. The Trump administration, to its credit, took its time for the deployment, and it did consult with the Merkels of the world, and other folks, and allowed them the time to explain to their publics that this wasn't about bringing back nuclear weapons to Europe, or otherwise.

Tom Karako: So, staying on that message is going to be important. I really hesitate to go down the dual capability kind of thing, like I was saying.

Mike Green: Right.

Tom Karako: We need to say what we mean, and mean what we say, in terms of conventionally armed. We've got nuclear weapons in subs, and other things, we probably don't need to put them on land. I think there is utility to having ground based fires that are just conventional. Let's do what we say, there. I think that allows us to avoid that fight, because, I'll tell you what ... As you know, in the 1980s, that could have gone a different direction. Are we better or worse at managing that kind of three dimensional diplomacy right now? I wouldn't want to run that risk.

Tom Karako: Opening up a fight, opening up a Pandora's Box that we don't know where it'd lead would probably be a bad idea.

Mike Green: Let me end by asking about arms control. Sometimes, commentators who support withdrawal from the INF say, it was the deployment of these capabilities in Western Europe that was such a challenge for the Soviets, they had no choice. They came in, and they negotiated this treaty. We deployed them to counter the Soviet's overwhelming conventional capability, which was growing.
Of course, we’re talking 1987. Gorbachev was in power, the Soviets were running out of money. If we look at the China example, Xi Jinping is not Gorbachev. In fact, he gives speeches condemning Gorbachev's choices. China's got a lot of money. On the other hand, China wasn't in the INF Treaty, they're getting a free pass.

Is there a scenario, maybe not right away, but down the road, where this gets us into some arms control talks with the Chinese we've not been able to do?

Possibly, but I think folks really get ahead of themselves, and actually undercut that goal, by putting the cart before the horse and running right towards the arms control agreement. It's kind of a security blanket, because that's what you know.

Mike Green: Right.

As you said, you didn't get INF until you had deployments for a number of years. So, before we can get even get to that ... By the way, I don't even know if we are sure of exactly what is the thing that one would want to arms control.

Mm-hmm (affirmative).

Is it just INF missiles? Is it UAVs? Is it something else? I think we have to totally reset the table. The context, the technological, and geopolitical context is very different now. I don't think we know exactly what are the objects of such a potential arms control agreement, it may be very different. It probably would be different. We haven't used the word hypersonic missile in this conversation, yet. In principle, a hypersonic, maneuverable glide vehicle wasn't covered under the INF Treaty, because it was neither ballistic or cruise. So, do you go after any kind of missile whose delivery system can maneuver? Well, that's kind of all of them.

So, I think we may have to spend a bit of time in the wilderness, in terms of arms control. We're kind of getting there already, as these things go away, and aren't necessarily replaced. I think, either in terms of trilateralizing the New START, or whether it's something like this, we need to reset the overall table, and we need to be in a position of strength relative to China, before we can get them to negotiate about just a about anything.

Tom Karako, this is a complicated issue technically, operationally, geopolitically, and diplomatically, legally. You've helped make it a little clearer, and easier to understand. I also think you made us appreciate that this is the beginning of a very long chapter. It's going to have a big impact on the Asia Chessboard, on our strategy. We don't know what yet, but we know we have some decisions to make, you made it a lot clearer for us, so thank you.

Thank you, pleasure to be here.
Andrew Schwartz: Thanks for listening. For more on strategy, and the Asia Program's work, visit the CSIS website, at CSIS.org, and click on the Asia Program page.