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
Trends in Forced Migration

CSIS Backgrounder

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A Report of the CSIS PROJECT ON PROSPERITY AND DEVELOPMENT



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Executive Summary

Forced migration is disproportionately a developing world challenge, but the implications and impact of forced migration are already being felt globally. The challenges and implications of forced migration are outlined in Annex A of this report and are explored in greater detail in a May 2018 CSIS report: *Confronting the Global Forced Migration Crisis*.¹ As a follow-on to this work, the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development, led by Senior Vice President Daniel Runde, convened a roundtable of experts on February 27, 2019 to address the following research questions:

- What factors impede the development of political consensus on forced migration among states in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations?
- What regional differences exist that make international collaboration on updating legal frameworks difficult?
- Are there hubs of innovation or problem-solving on forced migration that we can look to for ideas and new approaches?

This report serves as a backgrounder and reflects the broad themes that emerged from that expert roundtable and subsequent desk research and interviews.

Global forced migration has important security, environmental, economic, political, and human rights implications that could lead to future global instability. Future trends in forced migration show increasing and deepening issues with significant global consequences. Levels of global forced migration show few signs of decreasing, with crises in places such as Venezuela, Myanmar, and South Sudan driving more people from home and making return all the more difficult. This report discusses how indicators of global instability can be used as proxies to anticipate future forced migration scenarios and the ensuing global consequences. Responding to current forced migration-related challenges and anticipating new ones will require considering the right indicators and trends and pursuing significant collaboration at the international level.

These challenges are deepening and so are the barriers that prevent reaching a consensus on how to address them. Consensus is often hindered by perceived threats to national sovereignty and other domestic political considerations. Donor countries are also

1. Daniel F. Runde and Erol Yayboke, *Confronting the Global Forced Migration Crisis* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2018), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/confronting-global-forced-migration-crisis>.

reallocating resources and efforts domestically—rather than to the roots of the crises—and selectively focusing on major crises at the expense of more local or regional ones. While reaching a consensus on forced migration is challenging, several frameworks and policies do exist at the national and international levels. This report focuses on areas where the structure and implementation of these frameworks could be reevaluated, namely around internally displaced persons (IDPs) and increased responsibility sharing. It also assesses progress on the Global Compacts on refugees and migrants. Though the United States ultimately withdrew from both processes, an overwhelming majority of countries ultimately voted in favor of them. Neither compact will revolutionize global governance overnight, and their success will be contingent on signatories' commitments, but both should be seen as steps in the right direction. Ultimately, the compacts offer important fora for understanding and cooperation between host, transit, and destination countries.

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The primary goals of this report are to explore trends in forced migration and to identify innovative solutions—some new and some preexisting—that can be used to address future crises. These include:

- Convening a multifaceted “coalition of the committed” with governments, private-sector actors, and civil society representatives that could focus more global and regional efforts on the root causes of forced migration;
- Aligning strategies to longer-term trends and goals, as was done for previous global challenges;
- Exploring diversified sources of financing and cooperation with the private sector for forced migrants and their host communities;
- Rethinking the role and function of international institutions to include global and regional compacts, better incorporate IDPs, and increase responsibility sharing;
- Broadening the set of stakeholders to include those countries and non-state actors that have significant resources and geostrategic power but do little to address—and at times may even exacerbate—forced migration crises;
- Looking for and learning from early warning signs;
- Going on offense to hold negative actors at the root of forced migration crises accountable for their actions; and
- Continuing the dialogue around forced migration at the international level.

Introduction

In 2040—seven presidential elections from now—the United States will look remarkably different than it does in 2019. But the world, and especially currently developing countries, could be almost unrecognizable. Increasing forced migration, exacerbated by intractable, long-lasting crises, changing climate patterns, and other global challenges, could make the next 20 years some of the most consequential in human history. How the United States and the international community respond to these challenges and address them at their roots could determine the course of humankind.

These challenges include armed conflict, violations of human rights, population surges and lack of meaningful work, climate change, disruptive technologies, and the global rise of (mainly but not uniquely) non-state, nefarious actors (see Annex A). All of these challenges have the potential to exacerbate the current forced migration crisis that, in turn, will further complicate these issues.² The crisis is defined by the over 70 million people currently forcibly displaced, with countless others migrating irregularly³, and projections that these numbers could easily rise to the hundreds of millions by 2030 (see Figure 1). As the CSIS Task Force on Confronting the Global Forced Migration Crisis concluded in a major report (May 2018), “[this] global crisis already poses serious challenges to economic growth, stability, and national security, as well as an enormous human toll affecting tens of millions of people. Spending on forced migration now accounts for over 10 percent of total [official development assistance or ODA] at over \$25 billion worldwide, yet mostly addresses symptoms of the global crisis rather than root causes or long-term development.”⁴ These challenges are not going to decrease anytime soon unless significant efforts are made to address the roots of the crisis.

Compounding these issues is the reality that solutions to the root causes of the global forced migration crisis are often political. While the international community has at times done an admirable job responding to the symptoms of forced migration and has even improved efforts to bridge historic divides between humanitarian and development actors,

2. Ibid.

3. Erol K. Yayboke and Carmen Garcia Gallego, *Out of the Shadows: Shining a Light on Irregular Migration* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/190826_RundeYaybokeGallego_IrregularMigrations.pdf.

4. Daniel F. Runde and Erol Yayboke, “Confronting the Global Forced Migration Crisis Fact Sheet,” CSIS, May 29, 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180605_CSIS_ForcedMigrationCrisis_onepager.pdf.

the actors at the center of response have had far less success integrating efforts with political or peacemaking actors.⁵ Forced migration is rarely included in peace negotiations (notable exceptions include Liberia and Guatemala), even though its root issues are central to the underlying causes of conflict.⁶

TEXTBOX 1: DEFINING FORCED MIGRATION

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines “forced migration” as “a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g., movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects).”⁷ This definition refers to the increasingly irregular, mixed, and unpredictable flows of people fleeing their homes. The authors use the term partially in recognition that international frameworks, conventions, treaties, and categorizations for people forced from home increasingly leave some people in need of rights and protections behind.⁸ Thus, the term “forced migration” encompasses refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), as does the IOM definition, but also includes stateless persons, asylum seekers, people escaping ethnic, religious, and racial strife, and anyone else who has fled their home for survival.

This report considers migrants moving for seemingly economic reasons separately from those who have been forced from home by, for example, conflict and human rights violations. However, “economic” or “voluntary” migration is discussed here in the context of forced migration because the pursuit of a better economic future is rarely the only reason for movement. Consider, for example, a young, unskilled Congolese woman who is unable to provide for herself and her family. She has low economic prospects and cannot protect herself from gender-based violence. If she had the resources, she could afford to live in a home that had a lock on the front door. She could live in a neighborhood that had streetlights in the evening. She might even have a car. Without access to these protections, her decision to emigrate was likely not based on economic reasons alone. Thus, while it is important to appreciate the differences in migrant motivations, it is also important to acknowledge that rarely is such “economic” migration truly “voluntary,” as jobs and prosperity increasingly define survival and as poverty increasingly poses serious risks to personal safety and security.

5. “Humanitarian Development Nexus,” UNOCHA, <https://www.unocha.org/es/themes/humanitarian-development-nexus>.

6. World Refugee Council (WRC), *A Call to Action: Transforming the Global Refugee System* (Waterloo, Canada: Center for International Governance Innovation, 2019), <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/call-action-transforming-global-refugee-system>.

7. “Key Terms,” IOM, <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>.

8. Runde and Yayboke, *Confronting the Global Forced Migration Crisis*.

1 | Current Trends

A Disproportionately Developing World Challenge with Global Implications

Forced migration is at its highest level in human history. Of the 70.8 million people forcibly displaced by the end of 2018, 25.9 million were refugees, 41.3 million were IDPs, and 3.5 million were asylum seekers (see Figure 2).⁹ More people have been forced from home today than during and after World War II, and the confluence of factors that force these people to flee is intensifying and getting more diffuse.¹⁰ A number of challenges both cause and result in increased levels of forced migration and global instability (see Annex A); these challenges vary in degree and scope based on countries of origin, transit, and destination.

The world can anticipate changing forced migration stories to which global policy will need to adapt. This is especially true in the Global South, where most interstate and intrastate forced migration occurs. Two-thirds of all refugees come from just five countries (Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia), all of which are in the developing world.¹¹ Each country has a different political environment that is more or less receptive to migrants, provides different degrees of protections to refugees, IDPs, and other vulnerable groups of people, and works within the international system to varied degrees, dependent on its national interest.

Forced migrants typically move to the closest place to which they can escape, meaning most stay in the developing world. Most are poor, and generally those with more resources are the ones capable of reaching farther destinations. Illustratively, 80 percent of African migrants never leave Africa.¹² Neighboring countries in the developing world can be similarly fragile as the country from which people are fleeing. When forced migrants arrive, they strain already weak institutions and services of host countries, potentially

9. "Figures at a Glance," UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, June 19, 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.; "Refugee Statistics," UNHCR, 2018, <https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/statistics/>.

12. Lynsey Chutel, "At least 80% of African migrants never leave the continent, but the focus is on Europe," Quartz Africa, February 15, 2019, <https://qz.com/africa/1550885/at-least-80-of-african-migrants-never-leave-the-continent-but-the-focus-is-on-europe/>.

contributing to future conflicts and subsequent displacement. Culturally different and potentially underserved, these host communities could increasingly reject new arrivals, leading to more nationalism, xenophobia, and drastic political shifts akin to those currently being experienced in the Global North.


For example, more than 911,000 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar were in Bangladesh as of April 2019.¹³ The Rohingya are not officially recognized as refugees by the government of Bangladesh and are treated as temporarily displaced persons, so they have limited legal protections, access to education, freedom of movement, and public services. Most refugees are in the area of Cox's Bazaar, which was an extremely poor and densely populated area even before the Rohingyas' arrival.¹⁴ Consequently, the rapid influx of people in refugee-like situations into some Bangladeshi districts has strained land resources and led to wage decreases due to the increased supply of unskilled labor.¹⁵ Conflict has arisen between the forcibly displaced and host communities, and there are few (if any) longer-term plans to assist either the refugees or the local population.¹⁶ These are the types of current forced migration scenarios that have no end in sight and could potentially lead to even more displacement if not properly addressed.

2 | Future Trends

Increasing and Deepening Challenges with Significant Consequences

There are no signs that forced migration levels will decrease. If anything, the global crisis will get worse, continuing to diversify in terms of geography, root causes, affected groups, length of displacement, origins, pathways, and destinations (see Figure 1).¹⁷

Figure 1: Projected Global Displacement Scenarios (by millions of people)



Source: Own estimates from UNHCR data; UNHCR, 'Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016.'

The conservative estimate in Figure 1 takes the 2016 percentage of the global displaced population and assumes that the same percentage will be displaced in 2030, when the population will be higher. The second estimate examines the rate of change in displacement between 2000 and 2016 and assumes that this rate of change will continue at similar levels. While both trendlines are based on simple assumptions, the second—and considerably worse—estimate is not unrealistic, given that global conflicts are increasing in number and extending in duration. Climate change alone suggest direct (e.g., drought) and indirect (e.g., resource-based conflicts) reasons for the rate of change to at least stay constant, if not increase.

17. UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2017), <http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2016/>.

The global forced migration crisis has important security, economic, political, and human rights implications that could lead to further global instability in the future, affecting the United States and the larger international community. U.S. and European security could be threatened by forced migration, but not how it is commonly portrayed. Despite perceptions to the contrary, most forced migrants are not young males, nor do extremist and terrorist networks use displacement pathways into developed countries to significant degrees. Currently, 52 percent of all refugees are children and 50 percent are female, both groups that are more likely to be exposed to sexual violence, human-trafficking, and slavery than to perpetrate extremism.¹⁸ Among the Rohingya in Bangladesh, for example, 80 percent are women and children.¹⁹

The global forced migration crisis has important security, economic, political, and human rights implications that could lead to further global instability in the future.

Nevertheless, forced migration does present real threats. In addition to the obvious threats of conflict so often at the root of forced migration, vulnerable people forced from home recurrently move through irregular pathways frequented by nefarious actors, including terrorists, traffickers, and smugglers, among others, especially when legal pathways are limited.²⁰ For example, the number of irregular Mexican and Central American migrants in the United States has steadily decreased since the early-2000s.²¹ This is partly due to greater border enforcement, higher risks of illegal border crossing, and increased deportations, among other reasons.²² However, increased political attention on the U.S. border has driven many to attempt to enter the United States irregularly out of fear of not being able to do so at all in the future. This has contributed to the number of migrants detained at the U.S. border in the first quarter of 2019 being higher than in the past five years.²³ These irregular migrants are a mix of Central American asylum seekers escaping violence, irregular economic migrants, and others who are at risk of becoming the victims of human trafficking, sexual violence, and other nefarious phenomena, all of which pose legitimate threats.

Another important example is the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. Extreme hyperinflation, food insecurity, insufficient medicine and medical attention, poverty, and severe violence and human rights violations have resulted from Nicolas Maduro's repressive regime and its inability to prevent a massive economic collapse.²⁴ There are over 4 million²⁵ forced

18. UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017.

19. Ibid.

20. Yayboke and Gallego, *Out of the Shadows: Shining a Light on Irregular Migration*.

21. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Illegal Apps Fiscal Years 1925-2018," Department of Homeland Security, 2018, <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Mar/bp-total-apps-fy1925-fy2018.pdf>.

22. Jeffrey S. Passel, D'Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, "Net Migrations from Mexico Falls to Zero – and Perhaps Less," Pew Research Center, April 23, 2012, <https://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/>.

23. "Southwest Border Migration FY 2019," Department of Homeland Security, 2019, <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration>.

24. Moises Rendon and Mark L. Schneider, "Venezuela's Crisis Is Now a Regional Humanitarian Disaster," *CSIS, CSIS Brief*, March 23, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/venezuelas-crisis-now-regional-humanitarian-disaster>.

25. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela Top 4 Million: UNHCR and IOM," UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/6/5cfa2a4a4/refugees-migrants-venezuela-top-4-million-unhcr-iom.html>.

migrants from Venezuela in neighboring Latin American countries, with over 2.2 million currently located in Colombia and Peru.²⁶ The number of Venezuelans seeking refugee status has increased by 8,000 percent since 2014.²⁷ If trends continue, UNHCR and IOM estimate that there will be over 5.3 million refugees and migrants by the end of the year.²⁸ The humanitarian response to the crisis is jointly led by UNHCR and IOM under the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform and implemented under a Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) across 16 countries.²⁹ Neighboring countries have been very generous, granting around 2 million residence permits to Venezuelans, but the crisis is bringing about regional instability.³⁰ For example, an average of 50,000 people crossed the Venezuelan-Colombian border daily in 2018.³¹ Most of them went to Colombia in search of food, health services, and other basic goods, afterwards returning to Venezuela (although an average of 3,000 Venezuelans stayed in Colombia daily).³² These daily migrants are causing tension in communities in Colombia, straining food supplies and medical facilities, and causing previously eradicated diseases such as measles and diphtheria to return.

As the Colombian example shows, the Venezuelan crisis could have social, economic, and security implications across Latin America and even in the United States. In the Caribbean, for example, there are over 147,000 Venezuelans in need but, since most attention is paid to the millions of Venezuelans in Colombia and Peru, the Caribbean islands get little resources or attention.³³ To illustrate, only 5 percent of RMRP funds (\$34 million) were made available to the Caribbean subregion.³⁴ Without enough funds and resources, these Caribbean countries—themselves dealing with challenges of underdevelopment—could see even greater strains to food, health, and other basic systems than in Colombia. With so much pressure across Latin America, Venezuelans, and host communities, could face food shortages, unemployment, and insecurity, leading them to continue migrating, perhaps even to the United States. These challenges exacerbate regional political tensions. And in the meantime, Venezuela remains a social, political, economic, and humanitarian disaster, with an ever-increasing number of people – now in the tens of thousands – fleeing every day.

Policy changes in Europe are also affecting migration routes through the Mediterranean Sea. The “Eastern route” through Greece and the “Central route” through Italy had been the most traveled from 2009-2017.³⁵ In 2018, however, the “Western route” through Spain became the most transited.³⁶ This was partly due to: stricter migration policies in Italy; greater coast

26. Response for Venezuelans, *Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela January - December 2019* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2019), <https://data2.unhcr.org/es/documents/download/67282>; “Venezuela Situation May 2019 Update,” UNHCR, May 2019, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Update%20on%20Venezuela%20Situation%20-%20May%202019.pdf>.

27. “Venezuela situation,” UNHCR, 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html>.

28. Response for Venezuelans, *Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan*.

29. Ibid.; UNHCR, “Venezuela Situation May 2019 Update.”

30. “People with Regular Status Including Resident Permits,” Operational Data Portal by UNHCR, October 5, 2019, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/vensit>.

31. Moises Rendon and Mark L. Schneider, “Venezuela’s Crisis Is Now a Regional Humanitarian Disaster.”

32. Ibid.

33. R4V Response For Venezuelans, “Caribbean Sub-Region Situation Report June - July 2019” (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2019), <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/71377.pdf>.

34. Response for Venezuelans, *Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan*.

35. Phillip Connor, “The most common Mediterranean migration paths into Europe have changed since 2009,” Pew Research Center, September 18, 2018, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/18/the-most-common-mediterranean-migration-paths-into-europe-have-changed-since-2009/>.

36. Ibid.

guard presence in Libya; the EU-Turkey deal for Turkey to accept forced migrants coming from the European Union in exchange for economic incentives; and Spain's decision to allow rescue ships to dock when other countries in Europe did not allow entry.³⁷ Both the United States and European countries have well-equipped vetting systems, but in order to prevent irregular crossings, countries increasingly need to explore avenues for safe, orderly, and regular migration in the short term.

The most significant threats to global security stemming from the forced migration crisis, however, are if host countries in the developing world (e.g., Uganda, Lebanon, and Bangladesh) collapse into chaos. The countries hosting some of the most refugees per capita in the world are at risk of collapse if protracted crises preclude refugee return and if additional forced migrants arrive (as is the current trend). It is possible that the strain on basic services, the economy, and social cohesion in local communities could prove too great for one or more of these countries disproportionately bearing the responsibility of the crisis. The top host countries have among the lowest domestic revenues globally.³⁸ Without sufficient capacity to raise their own revenue, it is difficult to expect these countries to sustain large populations of forced migrants without assistance or more sustainable solutions to the crises that force people from home in the first place.

Indeed, host countries in the developing world are showing significant warning signs that could portend collapse. In Lebanon, the Syrian crisis has negatively impacted infrastructure and access to education, sanitation, security, and electricity.³⁹ In turn, Lebanon has been forced to limit access to residency, employment, and education for refugees. In Turkey, growing concerns include poor living conditions, lack of capacity at the municipal level, and growing tensions and violence due to a lack of support systems and social cohesion.⁴⁰ Turkey's October 2019 incursion into Syria will only exacerbate its challenges at home.⁴¹ And in Uganda, demographic changes and high influxes of refugees have combined to heighten social tensions, especially related to insufficient access to land and jobs, leading to violence and exclusionary attitudes toward the refugee community.⁴² International assistance is not the only way to provide for the needs of forced migrants and, moreover, will not be enough to prevent future challenges on its own; but even the amounts of basic assistance requested by aid agencies have not been met. For example, in Jordan, UNHCR requires \$371.8 million to assist the over 755,000 refugees there, as of July 30, 2019, UNHCR has only received a little over \$96 million—or 26 percent of required funding.⁴³ With these constraints, host communities will be further strained which could lead to further tensions

37. Ibid.

38. Development Initiatives, "Forced Displacement Poverty and Financing," September 2016, http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Forced_Displacement_Poverty_and_Financing_DI_Sept_2016.pdf.

39. "Lebanese NGO's coping with the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon," MEI RRS, July 30, 2018, <https://www.meirss.org/lebanese-ngos-coping-with-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-in-lebanon/>.

40. World Bank Group, *Turkey's Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Road Ahead* (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2015), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/583841468185391586/pdf/102184-WP-P151079-Box394822B-PUBLIC-FINAL-TurkeysResponseToSyrianRefugees-eng-12-17-15.pdf>.

41. Yuliya Talmazan, Mo Abbas, and Keir Simmons, "More than 160,000 Have Fled Northern Syria as Turkish Offensive Escalates," NBC News, October 15, 2019, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/more-160-000-have-fled-northern-syria-turkish-offensive-continues-n1066196>.

42. Heng Zhu et al., "Economic Impact of Refugee Settlements in Uganda," World Food Programme, October 2016, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wfp288256.pdf>.

43. UNHCR, *Jordan: UNHCR Operational Update, July 2019* (UNHCR), <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-unhcr-operational-update-july-2019>.

3 | Factors Affecting Consensus around Forced Migration

The global forced migration crisis is having significant domestic political impact. In the European Union, forced migration has already created deep divides and precipitated several major political shifts. It is a “vote-moving” issue, one with easy political soundbites and few sustainable solutions. Political discordance over migration can lead to hardened borders, pushing people into the shadows and precipitating some of the security implications mentioned above. Even though forced migrants and refugees have been shown to provide significant economic benefits to their host communities in Jordan, the European Union, and elsewhere, the continued success of politicians everywhere campaigning on greater limits to migration means that this evidence is not resonating (see Textbox 2).⁴⁴

TEXTBOX 2: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF FORCED MIGRANTS IN HOST COMMUNITIES

Considerable research has been done on how refugees and other forced migrants impact the economies of host countries. While taking in refugees and other forced migrants can be costly, especially in the short-term, evidence suggests that forced migration can have a positive economic impact in host countries in the long term, given the right social, economic, and political conditions.⁴⁵

For example, evidence from Turkey and Jordan shows that Syrian refugees have led to lower consumer prices and have had mixed effects on formal employment, negatively impacting low-wage employment yet positively

44. Philippe LeGrain, *Refugees Work: A Humanitarian Investment That Yields Economic Dividends* (New York: Tent Foundation, May 2016), https://www.tent.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Tent-Open-RefugeesWork_VFINAL-singlepages.pdf; Alex Nowrasteh, Andrew Forrester, and Cole Blondin, “How Mass Immigration Affects Countries with Weak Economic Institutions: A Natural Experiment in Jordan,” CATO Institute, March 2018, <https://www.cato.org/publications/working-paper/how-mass-immigration-affects-countries-weak-economic-institutions-natural>.
45. Erol Yayboke, “Cutting Refugee Resettlement Would be a Strategic Mistake,” *CSIS Commentary*, September 9, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/cutting-refugee-resettlement-would-be-strategic-mistake>.

creating more higher-wage jobs.⁴⁶ Host communities in developing countries can also benefit from economic incentives provided by donor countries to take in more forced migrants, such as the Jordan Compact and the EU-Turkey deal, as mentioned in this report. In Europe, research by the Tent Foundation shows that every euro invested in welcoming refugees yields two euros of economic benefit within five years.⁴⁷ The German Institute for Economic Research also estimates that refugees' contribution to the economy will boost the average income in Germany by 0.5 percent by 2030.⁴⁸

Ultimately, whether refugees and other forced migrants have a positive economic impact on host countries depends on the socioeconomic characteristics of both the migrants and the host country population. Furthermore, success relies on the right policy responses, skills matching initiatives, and assistance needed to ensure that forced migrants can leverage their potential to boost host countries' economies. A number of indicators can determine this impact, such as labor market access, the degree of labor informality in host countries, and the geographic local and concentration of both forced migrants and labor opportunities.⁴⁹

Irrespective of their socioeconomic and development status, countries have different levels of willingness to accept forced migrants due to a mixture of social, economic, and political factors, which leads to concerns over responsibility sharing and sovereignty. Some of this conflict is unavoidable, given that there are finite resources that cannot always be reallocated to domestic issues. Ultimately, the best way to confront forced migration is to end conflict or resource constraints, but this is complicated and beyond what foreign aid or international frameworks can (or even should expect to) do.

All politics is local

Despite periodic moments of “doing good for the sake of doing good” (e.g., aid following a natural disaster), countries overwhelmingly make policy decisions with domestic political considerations in mind. Even in the most altruistic of instances, some element of self-interest undoubtedly enters the equation. Each country—regardless of type (origin, transit, or destination) or region (Global South versus Global North)—thus has different challenges and goals, but each one strongly considers domestic constituencies. If these domestic constituencies are aligned for or against a particular issue, political leaders who do not reflect the views of the public run the risk of not being political leaders for long. An oft-cited constraint is one of resources: why should a country with its own challenges to

46. Michael Clemens, Cindy Huang, and Jimmy Graham, *The Economic and Fiscal Effects of Granting Refugees Formal Labor Market Access* (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, October 2018), <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/economic-and-fiscal-effects-granting-refugees-formal-labor-market-access.pdf>; David Khoudour and Lisa Andersson, “Assessing the contribution of refugees to the development of their host countries,” OECD, 2017, [http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DEV/DOC\(2017\)1&docLanguage=En](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DEV/DOC(2017)1&docLanguage=En).

47. Khoudour and Andersson, “Assessing the contribution of refugees.”

48. Ibid.

49. Clemens, Huang, and Graham, *The Economic and Fiscal Effects of Granting Refugees Formal Labor Market Access*.

economic growth and obligations to absorb new arrivals reallocate finite fiscal resources away from such domestic concerns—ones that directly impact voters—to address issues far from home? The answer is complicated and context-specific, but the case continually needs to be made that addressing challenges abroad before they become domestic concerns is better for national security and for economic and commercial interests and importantly aligns with democratic values.⁵⁰

More money here means less money there

The changing trends in humanitarian spending are indicative of the regional differences in managing forced migration. In 2016, over 10 percent of all official ODA (foreign aid) was spent in donor countries to deal with new arrivals.⁵¹ Foreign aid that once was targeted at issues in developing countries is now being diverted to dealing with forced migrants arriving in donor nations. This shift in funding points to the Global North's response to increasing domestic concerns over migrants (as discussed above) and its focus on addressing forced migration from a short-term perspective. This shift is potentially harmful to the Global South, which must deal with ever increasing numbers of refugees and other forced migrants, partially due to the Global North's unwillingness to increase resettlement numbers.⁵² The Global South must do so with less support from donor countries and while also having to manage IDPs within their own borders, largely independent of foreign support.

Perceived threats to sovereignty

Perceived threats to sovereignty represent another constraint. The United States cited sovereignty concerns as the reason for withdrawal from the Global Compact for Migration process in December 2017. The United States expressed concern that the compacts would become “soft law” and would suggest legal obligation, even though the compacts are legally non-binding and the United States' ability to enact and enforce domestic migration-related laws would not be affected.⁵³ The United States is not unique in using this argument. Above all, these domestic political factors impede the development of political consensus on migration among states and in multilateral forums. It is difficult at best to reach international consensus on how to manage migration and displacement, especially between countries that accept more than their fair share of forced migrants and those that refuse to let any pass through their borders.

TEXTBOX 3: WHY HUMAN RIGHTS MATTER

Though they can get lost in the political discourse, approaches that place human rights and human dignity at the forefront of solutions have led to “better and more sustainable human development outcomes” and

50. Conor M. Savoy and Erol Yayboke, *Reforming and Reorganizing U.S. Foreign Assistance* (Washington, DC: CSIS, July 2017), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/reforming-and-reorganizing-us-foreign-assistance>.

51. Runde and Yayboke, *Confronting the Global Forced Migration Crisis*.

52. Yayboke, “Cutting Refugee Resettlement Would Be a Strategic Mistake.”

53. Yayboke, “The Strategic Implications of Exiting the Global Migration Compact Process”; “National Statement of the United States of America on the Adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration,” United States Mission to the United Nations, December 7, 2018, <https://usun.state.gov/remarks/8841>.

have traditionally enjoyed support across the political spectrum.⁵⁴ Forced migrants suffer from a series of human rights abuses in countries of origin, transit, and destination, including violence, sexual assault, and human trafficking. Certain groups of forced migrants, such as women and children, are even more susceptible to human rights violations. Promoting and protecting the rights and dignities of forced migrants can diminish abuse, improve integration, ease humanitarian access constraints, and lead to more stability. This can be done through policy change and higher public visibility of the issues. For example, several countries do not recognize certain forcibly displaced persons as refugees, stripping them of the legal protections attached to refugee status.⁵⁵

Selective focus

The cases of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, Venezuelans across Latin America, and Syrians in Jordan are well-known and well-documented. Certain groups of forced migrants are less visible but equally vulnerable. One of the weaknesses of placing the (much-needed) global attention on a handful of crises of epic proportions is that many other vulnerable people are at risk of being left behind.

For example, by the time the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces captured the ISIS camp in Baghouz, Syria in March 2019, 60,000 people had fled the camp.⁵⁶ This included 5,000 to 10,000 ISIS fighters and more supporters, but among them were also families and a number of Yazidi women and children that had been taken as slaves from Iraq.⁵⁷ The international community has not asked what is going to happen to these forced migrants as this has been primarily dealt with as a terrorism problem, not a forced migration problem. Many of these forced migrants were moved to the Al Hol camp, where there were over 70,000 people—91 percent of them women and children—by the end of June 2019.⁵⁸ At this camp, 43 percent of the people are Iraqis, and 42 percent are Syrian, showing the complex, cross-border nature of the nearby conflict.⁵⁹ The future of these people and others not in camps is uncertain at best.

There are barely any international efforts to deal with lesser-known complex situations like these that will require a coordinated international response to solve. While these issues may have less visibility because they affect a relatively smaller population, they are equally important and require sustained international attention and humanitarian assistance.

54. Suman Momin, *A Human Rights Based Approach to Refugees: A Look at the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Responses from Germany and the United States* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University School of Law, 2017), <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1066&context=dfisc>.

55. Note: For example, Rohingya people in Bangladesh are not officially recognized as refugees, so it is difficult for them to gain access to education, jobs, healthcare, and other basic services.

56. Bill Chappell, "ISIS Camp in Baghouz Is Captured as U.S. Allies Declare Progress in Syria," NPR, March 19, 2019, <https://www.npr.org/2019/03/19/704730563/isis-camp-in-baghouz-is-captured-as-u-s-allies-celebrate-progress-in-syria>.

57. Ibid.; Paul Rogers and Richard Reeve, "After Baghouz: A Jihadi Archipelago," Oxford Research Group, March 29, 2019, <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/after-baghouz-a-jihadi-archipelago>.

58. OCHA Syria, *Syria: Humanitarian Response in Al Hol Camp Situation Report No. 5 - As of 5 July 2019* (OCHA, 2019), <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Al%20Hol%20sitrep5%20FINAL.pdf>.

59. UNOCHA, "Syria: Humanitarian Response in Al Hol Camp, Situation Report No. 4," ReliefWeb, May 29, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Al%20Hol%20SitRep%20No.4_29May2019_FINAL.pdf.

4 | What Is Being Done About Forced Migration?

While reaching consensus is challenging, several frameworks and policies do exist at the national and international levels to deal with migration of all types. However, many do not reflect the current realities, complexities, and challenges of global forced migration. Especially in today's political environment, there is understandable reticence within the forced migration advocacy and implementation community about revisiting or reopening hard-fought frameworks and policies for debate that do offer some protection to vulnerable people.

International frameworks tend to focus more on the protection of refugees than other forced migrants. They focus on adherence to principles like that of *non-refoulement*, whereby host governments cannot return refugees or asylum seekers to their country of origin if their lives and liberties are imperiled. Though achieving political consensus can be challenging, there are notable instances where global action to address forced migration has resulted in positive action. The protections that currently exist for refugees, for example, would not exist without significant global mobilization after World War II (in 1951) and subsequent efforts to strengthen protections even during the heart of the Cold War (in 1967).⁶⁰ The 1951 Refugee Convention and the subsequent 1967 protocol are important global agreements that should be protected. However, few additional legal protections for refugees have been discussed since. Even the recent Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (see Textbox 4) has been considered only marginally additive.⁶¹

Even where applicable legal structures are in place, many states are unwilling or unable to live up to the obligations in existing frameworks. In addition, these frameworks barely address the climate change-related, political, and conflict factors so often at the root of forced migration. It is hard to address these issues due to political challenges, but this prevents existing frameworks from reflecting current realities.

60. "The 1951 Refugee Convention," UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html>; "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html>.

61. Note: Some would argue "marginally additive" is significantly better than "subtractive," which was a distinct possibility.

Internally displaced persons

One of the main limitations of international frameworks is that they do not adequately address internally displaced persons (IDPs). Though there are UN *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, these are non-binding. Even though 40 countries have laws or policies largely based on these principles, only about a third of these laws and policies have been implemented in an effective way.⁶² A notable exception is the binding African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention) in 2009. It called for member states to take active measures to prevent internal displacement and protect IDPs, incorporating these obligations into domestic law and providing recourse to violations via the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.⁶³ The Kampala Convention is not without its own challenges: not all signatories have ratified it, and not all countries who have ratified the convention have fully adopted its obligations into national law, such as in Nigeria.⁶⁴ Another obvious constraint is that it is only relevant to Africa, whereas internal displacement is a global phenomenon.


One of the main limitations of international frameworks is that they do not adequately address internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Drafting international law on IDPs is difficult; IDPs are located within the sovereign borders of their country of origin, and those nations have a responsibility to protect IDPs. But IDPs are a highly vulnerable class of people and greatly outnumber global refugees and asylum seekers. It is worth revisiting how to encourage national and local governments to improve implementation of the laws and policies on IDPs to which they have committed. UNHCR's Global Protection Cluster (known as GP20) and the UN-appointed special rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons are steps in the right direction, but far more is needed.⁶⁵ For example, most foreign aid on forced migration goes toward assisting refugees and asylum seekers. In a world of finite (and in some cases diminishing) foreign aid resources, this prioritization comes at the detriment of support to IDPs. Lack of adequate support to IDPs is an important and consequential gap, and not just for humanitarian reasons; national development programs can be set back by large numbers of IDPs without additional assistance, and IDP levels (as a result of conflict and human rights abuses) tend to be strong predictors of future crises leading to cross-border movements.

Uneven responsibility sharing

Responses to forced migration in the Global North have been uneven and inconsistent. Using acceptance of forced migrants as an imperfect proxy, some countries, such as China and Russia, have completely closed borders (see Annex B), while others continue to accept moderate numbers of forced migrants. Some nations have tried to punish developing countries by withdrawing foreign aid, while others have extended humanitarian spending both overseas and at home (see Figure 2).⁶⁶ In the developing world, responses have been equally varied. Some of them take impressive proportions of refugees (see Figure 3), while others do not take any at all.⁶⁷

Figure 2: Cumulative Displaced Persons vs. Annual Humanitarian Spending



Source: IDMC, GRID 2017: Global Report on Internal Displacement; UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017.


Moreover, existing frameworks often leave out global responsibility sharing and international recognition (though the former is mentioned in the Global Compacts—see Textbox 3). There are few repercussions for countries that take limited or no forced migrants, nor are there rewards for nations that take in disproportionate numbers of refugees, beyond the organic contributions that those persons make to an economy.⁶⁸ Moreover, responsibility is not shared among different kinds of forced migrants; refugees and asylum seekers often get the most attention and legal recognition, while responses to IDPs and other forced migrants receive significantly less funding, policy focus, and international attention. Among the other challenges created, these discrepancies can promote xenophobia in countries that do not receive support for their generosity, creating political hurdles that can make obtaining international consensus on migration more difficult.

66. Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), *GRID 2017: Global Report on Internal Displacement* (Geneva: 2017), <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2017/pdfs/2017-GRID.pdf>.

67. UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016*.

68. *Ibid.*

Figure 3: Refugees as a Share of National Population (2016)



Source: UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016.

Recent reforms: The Global Compacts and beyond

The international community has recognized some of these limitations and has tried to extend how it addresses forced migration at a global level. Most recently, the United Nations led two simultaneous Global Compact processes (see Textbox 4). These compacts can only succeed or make way for further progress with significant buy-in from signatory countries. It remains to be seen how much progress will be made, and substantial challenges remain. For example, the compacts do not address IDPs nor do they address the threats posed by climate change in a significant way.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, they are important and show promising signs of positive impact. At the launch of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in Marrakesh in December 2018, for example, the governments of Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras presented a Comprehensive Development Plan aimed at improving development cooperation and addressing root causes of forced migration from Central America.⁷⁰ Though several countries (including the United States) did not end up agreeing to the UN-led Global Compacts on refugees and migration, the fact that a large majority of UN member states signed onto such global efforts – and that some tangible results are already being seen – should be viewed as a step in the right direction.⁷¹

69. Note: The GCM calls for greater analysis and cooperation to understand the effects of climate change and develop resilience strategies (Objective 2, h-1), but the language is broad, vague, and brief. The GCM does not address IDPs at all. The GCR does not mention climate and does not set any protections for IDPs. See: “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” United Nations, July 11, 2018, <https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/migration.pdf>; UNHCR, *Global compact on refugees* (New York: 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf.

70. “Foreign Ministers of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico Presented Comprehensive Development Plan in the Framework of the Conference on the Global Compact for Migration,” Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), December 10, 2018, <https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/foreign-ministers-salvador-guatemala-honduras-and-mexico-presented-comprehensive>.

71. Note: Though not a perfect corollary, it is worth remembering that the process that led to the signing of the 2015 Paris Agreement started with the participation of U.S. President George H.W. Bush and other world leaders at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, which established the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. As with migration pre-Global Compact, no significant global agreement existed on climate change before 1992, and it still took over 20 years for it to result in the Paris Agreement.

TEXTBOX 4: WHAT'S NEXT FOR THE GLOBAL COMPACTS?⁷²

The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) are the results of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, adopted by the United Nations in September 2016. While both compacts spurred from the New York Declaration, they were developed via distinct processes. The GCR was led by UNHCR to support existing frameworks on refugees, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 protocol guarantee. The GCR addresses the need to improve data collection, cooperation, and support for host countries. Its emphasis on job creation and livelihoods for refugees and host community members is novel, but it does not add to the existing legal frameworks. The GCM involved much more direct participation by member states and was the first attempt to produce a seminal global framework on migration. It aims to confront root causes, reduce risks for migrants, and address concerns of host nations and communities while emphasizing the values of sovereignty, human rights, and responsibility sharing.⁷³ The GCM highlights collective commitment and cooperation. Rather than impose guidelines on migration policy, it proposes frameworks for a better coordinated response to the challenges.

The United States withdrew from the GCM negotiations in late 2017.⁷⁴ Other countries followed suit, including Israel, Hungary, Czechia, Poland, and Australia, ultimately leading to 152 votes in favor, 5 against, 12 abstentions, and 24 countries not voting.⁷⁵ The United States also withdrew its support from the GCR in November 2018.⁷⁶ Only the United States and Hungary voted against the GCR, with 181 votes in favor, 3 abstentions, and 7 countries not voting.⁷⁷ The United States was the first country to withdraw from the GCM, and its later withdrawal from the GCR sent a strong signal. The United States cited sovereignty concerns as the reason for withdrawal from both, even though the compacts are legally non-binding. In fact, it is unlikely that the compacts will ever become binding international law, given that migration is a highly divisive issue in the international community. Rather than infringe on sovereignty, the GCM calls on devising a collective effort to govern migration in a more beneficial manner.⁷⁸ It seeks collaboration while respecting sovereignty.

72. Yayboke and Gallego, *Out of the Shadows: Shining a Light on Irregular Migration*.

73. "Refugees and Migrants," United Nations, 2019, <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact>.

74. Rhoda Margesson, "The Global Compact on Migration (CGM) and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, April 10, 2019, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11003.pdf>.

75. Nayla Rush, "A Historic Victory for the UN: Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees Adopted This Week," Center for Immigration Studies, December 20, 2018, <https://cis.org/Rush/Historic-Victory-UN-Global-Compacts-Migration-and-Refugees-Adopted-Week>.

76. Margesson, "The Global Compact on Migration (CGM) and U.S. Policy."

77. Nayla Rush, "Global Compact for Refugees Adopted Today," Center for Immigration Studies, December 17, 2018, <https://cis.org/Rush/Global-Compact-Refugees-Adopted-Today>.

78. Kathleen Newland, "Global Governance of International Migration 2.0: What Lies Ahead?" Migration Policy Institute, February 2019, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/governance-international-migration>.

Ultimately, neither compact will revolutionize global governance overnight, and their success will be contingent on signatories' commitments.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, they set an important basis and forum for understanding and cooperation between host, transit, and destination countries. To carry these initiatives forward, UNHCR developed the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) under the GCR, an adoptable response plan for countries to better manage refugee influxes at the global, regional, national, and local levels. Fifteen countries, including Afghanistan, Mexico, and several others in Central America and Africa, have already rolled out the CRRF.⁸⁰ Moving forward, more countries can adopt the CRRF and use UNHCR's toolkit and good practices through the CRRF Digital Portal, which is the primary repository of information for CRRF implementation.⁸¹ The GCR also includes important responsibility-sharing elements, including a proposal for regular ministerial meetings to review progress on financial, policy, and other pledges.⁸² The IOM has a similar information bank called the Migrants in Countries of Crisis (MICIC) repository.⁸³ These information-sharing initiatives are essential to advance work on the compacts, as countries can learn from best practices to manage forced migrants within their borders.

Some governments are exploring innovative policy levers to address forced migration challenges, with mixed success. For example, the European Union has provided trade and other incentives to encourage third countries to continue hosting refugees. A well-known example of this is the Jordan Compact.⁸⁴ In the case of Jordan, provisions were made to increase labor access for Syrian refugees to the garment sector. Though it was novel to include trade as an incentive, the Jordan Compact did not sufficiently consult with forced migrants who, rather than take undesirable jobs in the garment sector—with long hours, low pay, and little benefits—have opted to work in the informal or agricultural sectors. As a result, the Jordan Compact's target to provide work permits to 200,000 Syrian refugees is far from being fulfilled, and of the permits issued, only 3 percent have been issued to women.⁸⁵ Work permits may not have been the right goal in the first place. Nevertheless, the Jordan Compact was the first of its kind and has adapted to growing challenges since its original implementation in 2016. For example, the rules of origin (ROO) agreement to export to Europe has shifted. Before, only companies in special economic zones (SEZs) employing refugees as at least 15 percent of total workforce were eligible for relaxed ROO

79. Ibid.

80. "CRRF Global Digital Portal," UNHCR, <http://www.globalcrrf.org/>.

81. Ibid.

82. WRC, *A Call to Action*.

83. "About MICIC," Migrants in Countries in Crisis, IOM, <https://micicinitiative.iom.int/about-micic/background>.

84. Cindy Huang and Kate Gough, "The Jordan Compact: Three Years on, Where Do We Stand?" Center for Global Development, March 11, 2019, <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/jordan-compact-three-years-on>; Veronique Barbelet, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, and Dina Mansour-Ille, "The Jordan Compact: lessons learnt and implications for future refugee compacts," ODI, February 2018, <https://www.odi.org/publications/11045-jordan-compact-lessons-learnt-and-implications-future-refugee-compacts>.

85. Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner, "Learning from the Jordan Compact," *Forced Migration Review*, February 2018, <https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/lenner-turner>; Laura Buffoni, "The Jordan Compact Would Work Better If We Listened to Refugees," *News Deeply*, July 9, 2018, <https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/07/09/the-jordan-compact-would-work-better-if-we-listened-to-refugees>.

agreements; recently, the European Union agreed to extend relaxed ROO agreements outside of SEZs (conditional on Jordan granting 60,000 work permits to refugees) to prevent some of the challenges of working in SEZs, such as SEZs being far from where refugees live and jobs at SEZs often being unfavorable.⁸⁶

Similar international collaboration has occurred in Turkey, Lebanon, and Ethiopia. In Lebanon, a multi-stakeholder initiative was started in 2013 to increase access to education for all Lebanese and refugee children.⁸⁷ In 2016, the European Union and Turkey signed a deal to send people who arrive irregularly in Europe to Turkey in exchange for accepting formally processed refugees and asylum seekers into the European Union and providing €6 billion in financial aid to Turkey.⁸⁸ Through the Ethiopia Jobs Compact of 2016, donor countries led by the European Investment Bank and the World Bank provided Ethiopia with a \$500 million package to build industrial parks that are meant to employ 100,000 people, including 30 percent refugees.⁸⁹ Lessons learned from these examples can be applied in similar countries that accept high numbers of refugees (e.g., Bangladesh).⁹⁰ However, even these initiatives do not tackle root causes at countries of origin. They may be successful in providing adequate living conditions for refugees and support to host countries and communities, but they do little to stop forced migration from happening in the first place.

86. Huang and Gough, "The Jordan Compact: Three Years On, Where Do We Stand?"

87. Cindy Huang and Nazanin Ash, *Refugee Compacts: Addressing the Crisis of Protracted Displacement* (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development and International Rescue Committee, 2017), <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/Refugee-Compacts-Report.pdf>.

88. "The EU-Turkey refugee agreement: A review," DW, March 18, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/the-eu-turkey-refugee-agreement-a-review/a-43028295>.

89. Huang and Ash, *Refugee Compacts: Addressing the Crisis of Protracted Displacement*.

90. Cindy Huang, "New Opportunities for Bangladeshi Citizens and Rohingya Refugees: A Refugee Compact for Bangladesh," Center for Global Development, February 7, 2018, <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-opportunities-bangladeshi-citizens-and-rohingya-refugees-refugee-compact-bangladesh>.

5 | Innovative Solutions to Address Forced Migration

Though challenges are many and problems are great, there are hubs of innovation and problem-solving that are worth further exploration. From multilateral to hyper-local, solutions to forced migration—especially root causes—will require an “all-of-the above” and “all-hands-on-deck” approach. Here are eight innovative approaches to consider, some of which are new and some which are already being used.

1: Convening a “coalition of the committed”

While the global system for dealing with forced migrants is neither perfect nor comprehensive, it has provided—and continues to provide—important basic rights to many forced migrants. It has helped start conversations and initiatives on how to meet the needs of forced migrants and countries of origin, transit, and destination. Rather than withdrawing support from the existing system, it is worth exploring ways to strengthen and expand international responses to forced migration. Importantly, these efforts should focus much more on addressing the root causes of forced migration while still responding to its symptoms. Without addressing root causes, the vicious cycle presented in Figure 7 (Annex 1) will continue.

If the international community is to respond effectively to the global forced migration crisis, an ambitious and multifaceted “coalition of the committed” could prove useful. At the international level, a system or network for global responsibility sharing, recognition, and diplomatic pressure—a coalition of governments, private-sector and civil society actors, and others committed to addressing the root causes of forced migration—could be convened to meet this need.⁹¹ Admittedly, building these structures will be difficult in today’s political environments, but efforts can start at the international, regional, national, or community levels, depending on different actors’ and countries’ willingness to collaborate.

Greater global collaboration can also push countries to acknowledge more rights for forced migrants within their borders. For example, Bangladesh is a non-signatory to the 1951

91. Note: The World Refugee Council report calls for the establishment of a “Global Action Network for the Forcibly Displaced” and contains many useful elements to consider, including membership makeup, agenda setting, tasks and work products, and whether or not to have a “home base” for such a group. See: WRC, *A Call to Action*.

Refugee Convention and does not consider the Rohingya from Myanmar to be refugees, despite the convention being customary international law and therefore arguably binding, even in countries that are not parties to it. The lack of legal recognition poses significant challenges, such as lack to adequate shelter, education, safety for women and children, basic services, and jobs.⁹² In turn, this causes many Rohingya to refuse to use UNHCR's and other organizations' services out of fear that their names will be recorded and added to "repatriation lists."⁹³ International pressure to recognize the Rohingya as refugees and abide by customary international law could help increase access and legal protection.

2: Aligning strategies to longer-term trends and goals

Longer-term responses to forced migration need to cover a 20-year or longer time horizon in some cases. This is particularly important in protracted situations, as displaced persons in protracted situations (meaning they have been displaced for five or more years) remain displaced for an average of nearly 20 years (see Figure 5 in Annex 1). As of the end of 2018, 78 percent of all refugees—or 15.9 million people—are in protracted displacement situations.⁹⁴ Many IDPs have been in displacement for decades. Long-term strategies also need to acknowledge that economic growth and development often happen slowly and unevenly, and that modern forced migration includes environmental, political, and conflict dimensions.

To address some of these longer-term issues, the international community and individual nations could explore establishing a formal yet flexible system, whether independently or via existing organizations. This could be related to, the same as, or separate from the "coalition of the committed" mentioned above; the point is to mobilize meaningful support. More study is needed to determine the best modality for this. Regardless of where it is housed, a global responsibility-sharing system could be backed by something akin to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which the United States was instrumental in creating and to which it continues to provide significant resources and leadership.⁹⁵ This system could target its efforts and resources at well-developed plans that are situationally tailored and target root causes.

The international community can look at successful long-term initiatives for ideas, such as the global effort to combat the HIV/AIDS crisis and Plan Colombia—both of which were carried out with significant U.S. leadership. The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has received constant bipartisan support for its mission to combat HIV/AIDS since its inception in 2003. Through PEPFAR, more than 17 million people in over 50 countries have received antiretroviral treatment, and over 2.4 million infants have been born HIV-free from HIV-positive mothers.⁹⁶

92. "Bangladesh Rohingya Emergency," UNHCR, 2018, <https://www.unhcr.org/ph/campaigns/rohingya-emergency>; UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017*.

93. "Rohingya refugees refuse to go back to Myanmar," *The Economist*, November 22, 2018, <https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/11/22/rohingya-refugees-in-bangladesh-refuse-to-go-back-to-myanmar>.

94. UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018* (UNHCR, 2019), <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/>.

95. See: "Overview," The Global Fund, <https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/>.

96. "About Us," The United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, <https://www.pepfar.gov/about/270968.htm>.

Plan Colombia, created in 2000, has also seen considerable success. Colombia is now freer, more prosperous, more peaceful, and safer than it was in the 1990s. The country still faces considerable challenges, but Colombia has made important development progress and is now even a member of the OECD. This progress was partly due to U.S. leadership in Plan Colombia, to which the United States contributed nearly \$10 billion from 2000 to 2016.⁹⁷ A similar global initiative or fund tied to country-specific plans, led by the United States and other global powers, could greatly ameliorate current and future forced migration crises.

Country-specific plans must consider local needs and count on the support of local and international actors. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, has carried out successful programming that can decrease forced migration in the long term. In El Salvador, USAID-funded “place-based” initiatives targeted at law enforcement and community-based violence prevention programs helped reduce violence in the municipalities where the program was enacted by 61 percent.⁹⁸ Other bilateral and multilateral actors are doing similar work in El Salvador, such as the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and investment funds and development finance institutions from the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. USAID has also carried out initiatives in employment, domestic resource mobilization, governance, education, economic competitiveness, and civil society, all of which can improve conditions in host countries, create jobs, and increase government transparency, reducing forced migration in the long term.⁹⁹ These kinds of initiatives can be replicated in different regions of the world, taking into account local needs and community participation.

3: Exploring diversified sources of financing and cooperation with the private sector

The current model of financing responses to forced migration challenges is outdated and insufficient. Funds designed for short-term humanitarian aid are used to support refugees and other forced migrants for years, if not decades. Multi-year funding is hard to come by, sometimes because host communities do not want to consider the reality of long-term displacement but often because “short-term” humanitarian aid funds are more easily programmable. The focus of funding could be on creating self-reliance in forced migrant communities and resiliency in the communities that host them.¹⁰⁰

It is also important to increase access to finance for forced migrants and their host communities. Most funding for forced migrants comes in the form of humanitarian grants and foreign aid. These are important but often insufficient to meet growing and complicated needs. Multilateral development banks (MDBs), for example, are increasingly entering this space through risk mitigation and low-interest loans to host countries.¹⁰¹

97. Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Peace Colombia - A New Era of Partnership between the United States and Colombia,” The White House of President Barack Obama, February 4, 2016, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/04/fact-sheet-peace-colombia-new-era-partnership-between-united-states-and>.

98. “USAID/El Salvador Country Fact Sheet,” USAID, July 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1862/El_Salvador_External_Fact_Sheet_July_2018.pdf.

99. Ibid.

100. WRC, *A Call to Action*.

101. Development Initiatives, “Forced Displacement Poverty and Financing.”

Other stakeholders, such as development finance institutions (DFIs)—including the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation—and the private sector, have explored but largely stayed away from the forced migration finance space. This can increase capacity building in host countries, benefiting both forced migrants (including IDPs) and local communities, and can promote investment and development in countries of origin, incentivizing forced migrants to go back home (when or if it becomes safe to do so) to better living conditions and greater job opportunities.

The private sector will be the source of employment for many forced migrants, so it is important to listen to private-sector suggestions and concerns and leverage its skills to develop successful labor market integration plans. Moreover, forced migrants are considered reliable employees and net contributors to the economy over time.¹⁰² They have language skills, tend to have comparatively higher levels of education, and stay longer at companies.¹⁰³ All of these qualities are attractive to private-sector actors, from multinational companies to small- and medium-sized enterprises. To benefit both forced migrants and the private sector, the latter can integrate social impact into its core business model and help expand financial inclusion to forced migrants, among others.

Several innovative initiatives are being carried out in the private-sector space. For example, the Tent Foundation helps businesses better integrate refugees into the private sector by exploring employment, service delivery, and investment opportunities.¹⁰⁴ So far, Tent Partnerships have impacted 200,000 refugees in 34 countries.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, the Refugee Investment Network (RIN) is an impact investment and blended finance firm that aims to close the gap between refugees and capital markets.¹⁰⁶ By 2030, RIN aims to produce over 1 million jobs and unlock \$1 billion in investment deals.¹⁰⁷ These initiatives will benefit the private sector in forced migration contexts and help forced migrants find meaningful employment opportunities.

Led by the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank group, a diverse combination of partners created the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCF), which is specifically designed to support countries hosting large populations of forced migrants.¹⁰⁸ The World Bank added to the GCF effort by opening its own \$2 billion window for “states seeking longer-term solutions benefiting refugees and host communities.”¹⁰⁹ Host communities are often hosts to IDPs, so these solutions can benefit them as well and prevent tensions. The international community could explore new and innovative ways to finance growing and changing needs vis-à-vis forced migration. These efforts are certainly a step in that direction and worthy of consideration, support, and replication (e.g., the IMF could launch a similar concessional financing effort and efforts could be extended to specifically help IDPs as well).

102. Runde and Yayboke, *Confronting the Global Forced Migration Crisis*.

103. *Ibid.*

104. “Our Work,” Tent Foundation, <https://www.tent.org/our-work/>.

105. “Members,” Tent Foundation, <https://www.tent.org/members/>.

106. “About,” Refugee Investment Network, <https://www.refugeeinvestments.org/about>.

107. *Ibid.*

108. “About Us,” Global Concessional Financing Facility, <https://globalcff.org/about-us/>.

109. WRC, *A Call to Action*.

4: Rethinking the role and function of international institutions

Though not the only international institution, the UN remains the primary multilateral venue for global issues like forced migration. It is worth rethinking its role and function, especially in the context of growing forced migration challenges around the world. To address a significant gap, the UN could designate a primary and secondary (or support) agency to be responsible for IDPs. UNHCR, for example, spent only \$594 million—or 14.1 percent of its annual expenditure—on assisting IDPs in 2018, even though IDPs make up a large majority of forced migrants.¹¹⁰ UNHCR may not have the capacity to lead the IDP effort, but with the cooperation of the IOM—which became a UN-related organization in 2016—it might be possible. IOM and UNHCR work closely in many countries and have already cooperated successfully in Venezuela, coordinating efforts between 95 NGOs and international organizations in 16 countries under the RMRP and even appointing a Joint Special Representative for Venezuelan refugees and migrants.¹¹¹ This platform model could be replicated in other areas and extended to cover IDPs. OCHA should be included in these efforts; it has an important role to play in coordinating international action on IDPs in the field and via its Inter-Agency Standing Committee (ISAC), the primary mechanism in the UN system for inter-agency coordination.¹¹²

Bilateral initiatives can incentivize destination countries to grant better access and protections to forced migrants. As mentioned above, the Jordan Compact provides important lessons on how to structure assistance that goes beyond foreign aid, but similar initiatives must be created in consultation with a wider variety of stakeholders, including international organizations, civil society, and the affected forced migrants themselves.¹¹³ This will help avoid unintended consequences and improve integration.

International organizations (e.g., UNHCR and IOM) should continue to play an important role in resettling forced migrants. Accepting forced migrants—albeit in predetermined numbers and only after a thorough vetting process—can improve relationships between countries of origin and the international community, which may prove beneficial in the long run. Not leading or engaging in the global forced migration discussion is a threat to national sovereignty, with significant national security, economic, and human rights implications. Leadership can lead to greater responsibility sharing, while a lack of leadership can lead countries to disengage, resulting ultimately in higher levels of overall burden and lower levels of responsibility sharing. To address this challenge, some have called for the formation of a “group of international jurists with the mandate to draft a new protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention,” specifically around greater responsibility sharing.¹¹⁴

110. “Financials,” UNHCR, 2018, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/financial>.

111. Response for Venezuelans (R4V), *Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela: January - December 2019* (UNHCR and IOM, 2019), <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2019%20RMRP%20Venezuela%20%28December%202018%29.pdf>.

112. “IASC Structure and Working Method,” IASC, January 2019, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/iasc_structure-and-working-method_2019-2020_web.pdf.

113. Huang and Gough, “The Jordan Compact: Three Years on, Where Do We Stand?”

114. WRC, *A Call to Action*.

5: Broadening the set of stakeholders

A wider range of state and non-state actors will likely be needed to address the global forced migration crisis. Discussions on forced migration have been mostly Western-focused (e.g., what should the European Union do to stem the flow of Africans crossing the Mediterranean?). There have been few efforts to bring in the Gulf countries, Russia, or China into the conversation—all of which take few, if any, forced migrants and have significant resources and geostrategic power (see Annex B). Other countries, such as Iran, host many refugees but are rarely consulted for broader geostrategic reasons. It is important to bring these actors into the conversation because they have significant global influence and could eventually become part of the solution to root causes (e.g., sustainable solutions in Syria will likely include Russia and Iran).

Limiting the set of stakeholders is not without consequence. For example, Iran could close its borders and strain the forced migration system further. Other countries could follow suit if there was a refugee expulsion in Iran, especially countries already hosting high numbers of refugees like Lebanon, Uganda, or Bangladesh. To avoid this and other negative scenarios, it is important to bring non-Western voices into negotiations and policy initiatives. Non-Western voices can also be additive in the sense that they can bring legitimacy to global initiatives. The Paris Agreement on climate, for example, was partly successful because the United States and China initially supported it.¹¹⁵ From the 197 countries that adopted the Paris Agreement, 179 have drafted climate proposals with formal approval.¹¹⁶ The Paris Agreement was innovative in that it allowed signatories to set their own targets around a global challenge.¹¹⁷ This was not the case for the GCM, for example, due to its vague language and lack of provisions for countries to set their own targets (see Textbox 4).

Armed non-state actors (ANSAs) play a similarly important role in addressing the root causes of conflict—and thus forced migration—and should not be forgotten. Incorporating ANSAs into the discussion can improve access to humanitarian aid in areas where it is most needed and can facilitate reintegration of displaced persons post conflict. Strengthening partnerships at the local, national, and international level is essential for this endeavor and for stabilization efforts.¹¹⁸ While engaging with ANSAs can be difficult, it is critical in stabilization contexts (which have the potential to force the most people from home) and must be done in light of common objectives and approaches.¹¹⁹ Civil society and NGOs are important stakeholders in any solution to forced migration, especially when dealing with ANSAs. For example, Geneva Call is a neutral, non-governmental organization that facilitates dialogue with armed non-state actors and promotes respect for international humanitarian norms. It has engaged with over 100 ANSAs, and 61 ANSAs have agreed to abide by certain humanitarian norms, such as banning the use of anti-

115. Melissa Denchak, “Paris Climate Agreement: Everything You Need to Know,” NRDC, December 12, 2018, <https://www.nrdc.org/stories/paris-climate-agreement-everything-you-need-know>.

116. *Ibid.*

117. *Ibid.*

118. Erol Yayboke et al., “Pursuing Effective and Conflict-Aware Stabilization: Partnering for Success,” CSIS, *CSIS Brief*, April 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/pursuing-effective-and-conflict-aware-stabilization-partnering-success>.

119. *Ibid.*

personnel mines, protecting children, and prohibiting sexual violence.¹²⁰ Collaborating with civil society organizations such as Geneva Call can help engage ANSAs and could result in agreements on how ANSAs treat forced migrants, especially in fragile countries.

6: Looking for and learning from early warning signs

To a certain extent, the international community can anticipate future trends based on past and current information. But to do so, countries of origin, transit, and destination must first elevate policies based on evidence and try to be more proactive than reactive. Some examples of early warning signs for future forced migration crises include increased levels of IDPs, high unemployment, resource constraints, weak governance, conflict, and severe human rights problems. Ultimately, these indicators can also be used to predict larger global challenges and instability, with the number of forced migrants acting as a barometer for severity.

Nevertheless, preventive action is possible, and the international community can look for early warning signs in phenomena associated with migration. The International Crisis Group (ICG), for example, has identified a number of early warning signs for conflict.¹²¹ While not always causally related, conflict often leads to forced migration, so the early warning signs of conflict are worth exploring. According to the ICG, these include: (1) discontent, radicalization, or polarization among political leaders, elites, and opposition groups; (2) dissatisfaction of or with the military; (3) violence and discontent in peripheral regions far from the reach of a centralized government apparatus; and (4) internationalization, including foreign countries' intervention via the provision of military support or disruptive diplomacy and non-state actors, including extremist organizations, that take advantage of political instability.¹²² All these signs have been observed in recent forced migration crises that have stemmed from conflict, including in the Central African Republic, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen. While not easy to prevent, the ICG suggests that “preventive” or “framework” diplomacy can help build regional networks to reduce tensions and seek out mutually beneficial peace options.¹²³ Regional powers, multilateral organizations, civil society, and local communities can all play important roles in these endeavors. Moreover, establishing regional networks preventively can create fora to discuss how to handle forcibly displaced persons should conflicts escalate.

UN Human Rights (OHCHR) has also analyzed the relationship between economic, social, and cultural rights violations and conflict, violence, and social unrest—all factors that can contribute to a person's decision to migrate irregularly or forcibly.¹²⁴ Rights violations most often occur among marginalized populations and result from food and water insecurity, youth unemployment, and health crises.¹²⁵ Importantly, several risk factors can exacerbate the consequences of these phenomena, including severe inequality, lack of access to

120. “Mission,” Geneva Call, <https://genevacall.org/who-we-are/>; “Deed of Commitment,” Geneva Call, <https://genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/>.

121. International Crisis Group, *Seizing the Moment: From Early Warning to Early Action* (Brussels: June 2016), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/seizing-moment-early-warning-early-action>.

122. *Ibid.*

123. *Ibid.*

124. UNOHCHR, *Early warning and economic, social, and cultural rights* (New York: 2016), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ESCR/EarlyWarning_ESCR_2016_en.pdf.


125. *Ibid.*

grievance mechanisms, lack of meaningful consultation, shrinking space for civil society, lack of media freedom, unequal access to natural resources, and degradation in social services and employment.¹²⁶ The combination of these with rising ethnic and intertribal tensions—like those seen in Sudan in 2002 and 2003, for example—should be sufficient to signal a crisis (in Sudan’s case, a genocide) to come. While some of these factors may not necessarily result in forced migration, they can severely undermine human dignity, which can result in forced migration when combined with other push factors. These are the rights violations and privations of human dignity that must be analyzed as indicators of forced migration crises to come.

It is worth considering a FEWS-NET like program to identify early warning signs for forced migration. FEWS-NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network) is an adaptable, scalable, early-warning system for food insecurity that could have significant impact if adapted for use in predicting forced migration crises.¹²⁷ In order to predict migration crises more effectively, data collection at the global level is necessary. However, such data does exist, and a FEWS-NET-like program could leverage existing sources effectively.

Importantly, data can also be used to indicate when forced migration challenges may slow down. These include some more overt signs—such as cessations of hostility, changes in government, restorations of human rights, or declining rates of persecution—while others are less obvious—such as economic growth and stabilizing demographics, as was the case in Mexico. Mexico was a net exporter of migrants to the United States for many decades. But as Mexico’s economy has grown, as its demographics have stabilized, and as recent U.S. policies have signaled a less-welcoming approach to migrants, migration from Mexico to the United States slowed considerably (see Figure 4).¹²⁸

Figure 4: Immigration from Mexico to the United States vs. GDP per Capita



Source: “GDP per capita (current US\$), Mexico,” World Bank Development Indicators, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=MX>; Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, “Net Migrations from Mexico Falls to Zero – and Perhaps Less.”

126. Ibid.

127. Runde and Yayboke, *Confronting the Global Forced Migration Crisis*; Also see “Our Work,” FEWS NET, <http://fews.net/our-work>.

128. “GDP per capita (current US\$), Mexico,” World Bank Development Indicators, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=MX>; Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, “Net Migrations from Mexico Falls to Zero – and Perhaps Less.”

While U.S. and Mexican migration policies still treat Mexico as a source of migrants, the landscape is changing to adapt to new realities. Today, Mexico has become a destination for Central and South Americans fleeing instability, weak governance, and threats from gangs, drug- and human-trafficking organizations, and other violent actors.¹²⁹ A key factor contributing to decreased emigration from Mexico is economic growth. Research by the Center for Global Development (CGD) suggests that when countries reach a certain level of wealth, around \$8,000 GDP per capita, emigration decreases.¹³⁰ Mexico surpassed this level of GDP per capita in 2005, which correlates with the beginning of a large decline in migration from Mexico (see Figure 4).¹³¹ This is a potential indicator of where migration—including forced migration—may decrease in the future, conditional on the absence of conflict and other severe privations of human dignity and given the right economic, social, and political conditions, as was the case in Mexico. The downside to this theory of the connection between migration and GDP is that, in the short term, countries' movement from developing to middle-income status will likely result in greater levels of migration, both forced and economic.¹³² Research suggests that, as countries first begin to move up the development ladder, they have more income, education, and aspirations that encourage emigration.¹³³ This trend reverses in the long term, but countries' transitions from lower-income to middle- and upper-middle-income can take decades.

Economic development—especially growth that is inclusive in nature—is not without its own challenges. Elites that have benefited from the status quo will fight to remain in power and to capture the benefits of growth. Disagreements between those with visions of democracy and those comfortable with current systems could result in more conflict and more forced migration in the short term. However, like in Mexico, greater economic growth, even if it has short-term consequences, has shown significant positive results in the longer term.

7: Going on offense

Funding and implementing agencies responding to forced migration challenges are not suitable for proactively addressing the root causes of forced migration. Many of these approaches are political and would require agencies to compromise their critical role as providers of impartial or neutral humanitarian assistance. But there are ideas worthy of consideration and future study on how to hold those responsible for forced migration accountable.

In a recent report, the World Refugee Council calls for the repurposing of frozen assets. They argue that “financial measures should be used as a tool for holding governments accountable for displacing people, specifically, by repurposing frozen assets and working

129. Erol Yayboke, “Cutting U.S. aid to the Northern Triangle could drive more migration,” *Axios*, April 4, 2019, <https://www.axios.com/cutting-us-aid-to-northern-triangle-could-drive-more-migration-92a9c7c9-d668-4b81-a5af-66e3499ecd57.html>; Mark L. Schneider, “Cutting Off Assistance to Central America,” *CSIS, Commentary*, April 19, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/cutting-assistance-central-america>.

130. Michael A. Clemens and Hannah M. Postel, “Can Development Assistance Deter Emigration?” Center for Global Development, February 2018, <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/can-development-assistance-deter-emigration.pdf>.

131. “GDP per capita (current US\$), Mexico,” World Bank Development Indicators.

132. Clemens and Postel, “Can Development Assistance Deter Emigration?”

133. *Ibid.*

with international financial institutions.” A version of this is already happening in Switzerland, with funds from dictators and corrupt leaders such as Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), Jean-Claude Duvalier (Haiti), Mobutu Sese Seko (former Zaire), and others seized and returned by Swiss banks for redistribution.¹³⁴

Another example of going on offense is the Sentry, an initiative of the broader Enough Project, which itself aims to end mass atrocities. The Sentry is a “team of policy analysts, regional experts, and financial forensic investigators that follows the money in order to create consequences for those funding and profiting from genocide or other mass atrocities.”¹³⁵ Similar efforts could target those people, governments, and organizations responsible for forced migration.

8: Continuing the dialogue

All the innovative solutions discussed above can only succeed with sustained international dialogue. Individual nations, international organizations, civil society, local communities, and other relevant stakeholders should continue collaborating and advancing innovative short-, medium-, and long-term solutions. Ultimately, forced migration is an issue that is not going away anytime soon; as such, it requires continued attention from the international community.

134. WRC, *A Call to Action*.

135. “The Sentry,” Enough Project, <https://enoughproject.org/about/the-sentry>.

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Annex A | The Causes and Symptoms of Forced Migration

Forced migration does not happen willingly, easily, or overnight. Forced migration results from a combination of root causes (i.e., fundamental reasons that make people feel forced to leave their homes) and triggering events (i.e., specific conditions that allow for migration at a certain time). There are several root causes that can lead to forced migration, included but not limited to:


1. Ongoing and New Conflicts: An increasing number of conflicts have begun around the world in recent decades, while very few have ended.¹³⁶ While these conflicts are not on the same scale as the great wars of the past, the role of non-state actors, geographic diversity, climate change, and disruptive technology mean that today's conflicts result in greater levels of forced migration and irregular migration. As conflicts persist, displacement situations become more protracted in nature. Two-thirds of all refugees—or 13.4 million people—are in protracted refugee situations (meaning that a group of 25,000 or more refugees has been displaced for five or more years, per UNHCR definition).¹³⁷ The average protracted situation has been going on for over 18 years (see Figure 5).¹³⁸

136. "Uppsala Conflict Data Program," Uppsala University, 2017, <https://ucdp.uu.se/#/encyclopedia>.

137. For intermittent protracted refugee scenarios, conflicts' most recent continuous years counted. See Figure 7 in UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017* (UNHCR, 2018), <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/>.

138. Ibid.

Figure 5: Protracted Refugee Situations by Duration (end-2017)



Source: Own calculations from UNHCR data. UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017*.

The longer people live in displacement, the less likely they are to return home and the greater need there is for neighboring or regional countries to integrate them. The challenges to integration of forced migrants can in turn become a source of conflict.

2. Democratic Retreat Amid Great Power Competition: Global challenges to democracy have increased in recent years, in part due to increased competition between a growing number of influential global powers. In Europe, Brexit has demonstrated growing dissatisfaction with international institutions and their perceived influence on national sovereignty, just as nationalistic and xenophobic governing minorities have begun to rise in some countries. As globalization increases commerce, transportation, and forced and voluntary migration for economic, political, conflict, environmental, or other reasons, groups that historically benefitted from a past defined by comparatively less mobility have responded by limiting democracy in the name of sovereignty. Globally, 89 of 167 democracies receded in 2018.¹³⁹

Historically, democratic countries and their leaders have led global responses to forced migration crises and the establishment of the current global system, however imperfect.¹⁴⁰ Non-democratic countries (e.g., Russia and China) have historically exacerbated crises (e.g., Syria), failed to provide meaningful leadership in resolving conflicts, or rejected a productive role in addressing the roots and results of forced migration.¹⁴¹ If the trend of democratic retreat continues, more conflict and fewer protections for forced migrants can be expected. The retreat of democracy worldwide has thus become an integral component of a vicious cycle between forced migration and instability (see Figure 7).

3. Demographics and Economic Opportunity: The world population is getting much older and much younger at the same time. In Germany and Japan, populations are

139. "Democracy continues its disturbing retreat," *The Economist*, January 31, 2018, <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/01/31/democracy-continues-its-disturbing-retreat>.

140. Note: The limitations of the current system are discussed earlier in the report. However imperfect the current system may be, having mechanisms through which countries can play a productive role is important, especially when the alternative (no global system, countries left to their own devices) would likely produce much higher levels of instability.

141. Runde and Yayboke, *Confronting the Global Forced Migration Crisis*.

aging at a rate that strains national labor supplies and social safety nets. At the same time, the youth population is booming in Africa and remains high in Asia. Over the next 15 years, 600 million jobs will have to be created to absorb the number of youths that will enter the job market.¹⁴² These youths are increasingly competing for good jobs that may not exist in their countries of origin but that do exist in countries like Germany and Japan, which youths can increasingly visualize thanks to social media.

Though this youth bulge in the Global South could be an opportunity for aging countries in the Global North, developed countries continue to harden borders and keep potential workers out. Continual economic underdevelopment in emerging markets could lead to widespread migration, conflict, and instability. In Africa alone, 10 to 12 million youths enter the workforce annually, while only 3.1 million jobs are created.¹⁴³ This lack of adequate employment opportunities will be an important driver of African migration unless there are significant policy changes to address these shortfalls.

4. Rise of the Global South: Many developing countries that are or have been foreign aid recipients now have stated preferences for trade and investment over foreign assistance. For example, U.S. aid to a country might focus on improving health outcomes, even while that country's government collects more revenue and uses it more effectively, including for the delivery of health services. As they increasingly look to their own governments for basic services, people in that country might look to the United States and other international actors for modern infrastructure, technology, and increased regional and international trade. These emerging markets represent a tremendous opportunity for international businesses to capture market share in industries and build consumer bases for the future.

As the United States has increasingly withdrawn from the global stage, competitors like China have emerged and are reaping the economic benefits in developing countries. At the same time, these competitors are enabling bad governance and leaving many emerging markets saddled with unsustainable debt. As new generations seek out global engagement and good jobs, China has emerged as the main international partner, particularly in Africa. But Chinese predatory lending and support for autocracy could prove destabilizing, leading to resource-based wars, unsustainable infrastructure development, and receding democracy in developing countries.¹⁴⁴ These are all factors that contribute to increased levels of forced migration. The rise of the Global South is thus a tremendous opportunity for partnership, economic innovation, and stability; it is also at the front lines of competing visions of development by great powers.

142. Romina Bandura and MacKenzie Hammond, *The Future of Global Stability: The World of Work in Developing Countries Volume 1: A National Security Priority for the United States* (Washington, DC: CSIS, October 2018), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/volume-1-national-security-priority-united-states>.


143. African Development Bank (AfDB), "Jobs for Youth in Africa," March 2016, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Images/high_5s/Job_youth_Africa_Job_youth_Africa.pdf.

144. Though natural resources like oil, gold, uranium, and other minerals get much of the attention, future resource-based wars are likely to result from much more fundamental and climate change-related challenges, like the access to water access and food production. Chinese engagement rarely—if ever—considers these factors. See: Haggai Matsiko, "Kiggundu moves to fix Karuma dam cracks," *The Independent*, December 12, 2016, <https://www.independent.co.ug/analysis-kiggundu-moves-fix-karuma-dam-cracks/>; Nic Cheeseman, *A Divided Continent: BTI 2018 - Regional Report Africa* (Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019), <https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/a-divided-continent/>.

5. Technology and Labor: Digital technology is changing the way the world communicates and does business. This “fourth industrial revolution” (4IR) could unleash innovation and lead to sustainable prosperity. However, there are major challenges facing developing world institutions, including urbanization-driven inequality, a lack of skilled human capital, and the erosion of the social contract.¹⁴⁵ In developing countries, access to technology and new resources could empower new models for development and labor. If managed incorrectly, technological change could displace workers and thus lead to increased forced migration. Moreover, this change could be used as a weapon to attack democratic institutions, abuse personal privacy, exacerbate changes in climate, and fuel resentment of inequity in society, all of which, in turn, creates the conditions necessary for future forced migration.

6. Changes in Climate and Environment: Climate change and natural disasters have a tangible impact on migration and people’s livelihoods all over the world. An average of 24 million people have been displaced annually from 2008 to 2018 due to disaster (a total of 263 million people).¹⁴⁶ The figures of disaster-induced displacement are much higher than those of conflict- and violence-induced displacement, although they are often left in the shadows (see Figure 6).¹⁴⁷

Figure 6: New Displacements due to Conflict and Disasters



Source: IDMC, *GRID 2019: Global Report on Internal Displacement*.

Developing countries are more susceptible to climate change given economic reliance on agriculture and lagging infrastructure. But high-income and middle-income countries have also been hit hard by phenomena that can be tied to fluctuations in climate, such as wildfires, flooding, drought, and extreme cold and storms. To illustrate, the Philippines had the most new displacements due to disaster in 2018 (at 3.8 million), followed closely by China (3.7 million) and India (2.6 million).¹⁴⁸ However, the United States had the fourth-highest number of disaster-related

145. Daniel F. Runde and David S. Spiro, *Rebooting the Innovation Agenda: The Need for Resilient Institutions* (Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2019), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebooting-innovation-agenda>.

146. Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), *GRID 2019: Global Report on Internal Displacement* (Geneva: 2019), <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2019/>.

147. *Ibid.*

148. *Global Internal Displacement Database*, IMDC, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>.

displacements, at over 1.2 million.¹⁴⁹ As more people abandon rural communities for urban centers and economic opportunity, these climate change-related phenomena could impact larger populations, especially if infrastructure continues to falter. If no action is taken, the World Bank predicts that more than 143 million people will be forced to move within their own countries due to climate by 2050.¹⁵⁰

7. Violations of Human Rights: Some of the aforementioned causes are linked to violations of human rights. The 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights lists some of the inalienable rights and freedoms of all people, which are nevertheless disrespected in some countries. Often these include: rights to life, liberty, security, equal pay for equal work, and education; freedom of thought, religion, and peaceful assembly; equality before the law; and the right to not be subject to slavery, arbitrary arrest, or torture.¹⁵¹ Some of these violations of human rights are suffered in countries of origin, pushing people from home. A clear example is the ethnic and religious persecution of the Rohingya, forced to flee their homes in Myanmar. But other violations occur in transit and destination countries, as forced migrants in these countries can also be denied rights, such as access to education and equality before the law. Indeed, in Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index, the scores of eight democracies have declined in recent years due to their treatment of migrants.¹⁵² To bring awareness to some of these issues, UN Human Rights conducts periodic country assessments and recommendations to protect human rights and abide by existing treaties, which can be found in the Universal Human Rights Index.¹⁵³ Unfortunately, these recommendations are all too often ignored.

All of these, among others, are commonly referred to as root causes of forced migration. A common thread tying all these root causes together is the absence of human dignity or factors that contribute to dignity, such as having proper homes, food, education, basic services, jobs, and security, among others. Forced migration, in turn, causes a variety of things. These include:

1. International Disagreement: Nations quarrel over blurred lines of legal responsibility and costs of irregular migration.

2. Strains on Transit and Destination Countries, International Organizations, NGOs, and Local Communities: All of these stakeholders must pay the upfront costs of receiving, managing, and integrating, in some cases, forced migrants. This can cause pushback from local communities if they feel like migrants are receiving undue benefits from the government and straining job markets, access to healthcare, and education.

3. Development Hinderance in Countries of Origin: Development can be hindered in countries of origin due to significant brain drain and tensions with the international community over refugees and other forced migrants and within countries of origin over IDPs.

149. Ibid.

150. Rigaud et al., *Groundswell: preparing for internal climate migration*.

151. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations, 1948, <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html>.


152. Freedom House, *Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019* (Washington, DC: 2019), <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat>.

153. "Universal Human Rights Index," UNOHCHR, <https://uhri.ohchr.org/en/>.

4. Further Loss of Human Dignity: The above causes can make migrants feel unwelcome in new communities, leading to isolation and discrimination. Forced migrants are more likely to be in poverty than local communities and are often victims of physical and sexual violence both in transit and at destinations. These factors further the loss of dignity that migrants were attempting to escape in the first place.

The above can be classified as “symptoms” of forced migration. The causes and symptoms are all interconnected in that they can all lead to, or are a byproduct of, global instability. This has important implications at the international level, as it can lead to greater hostility toward forced migrants, less migrant-friendly political climates, and disagreement on how to adapt legal frameworks to deal with migrants all over the world. Indeed, the current system has created a significant divide between countries of origin (which are often incapable of acting upon the root causes that lead people to leave in the first place), countries of transit and destination (which, irrespective of whether they are welcoming to migrants or not, must manage increased costs and resource constraints due to great influxes of people), and donor countries (which front humanitarian assistance to help migrants in destination countries while trying to manage the number of migrants they accept themselves based on political attitudes). In short, the causes and symptoms of forced migration create a vicious, self-reinforcing cycle (Figure 7).

Figure 7: A Vicious Cycle: Forced Migration as a Symptom and a Cause of Global Instability



Annex B | How Great Power Competitors Fare on Forced Migration

Russia

Russia has been a polarizing actor in the conflict in Syria, which has produced the most forced migrants of any country in the world. Despite its destabilizing role, Russia has not assisted or resettled meaningful numbers of Syrian forced migrants. While the reporting and status of forced migrants within Russia is unverifiable—though some reports show that Russia has only granted refugee status to one Syrian national since 2011—it is clear that the country barely assists the displaced for whom they are at least partly responsible.¹⁵⁴ Russia has a policy of rejecting people without proof of ties to the country. While rejecting forced migrants or deporting them, Russia also does not meet humanitarian aid funding obligations, with one analysis showing its financial contributions equating to 1 percent of its “fair share.”¹⁵⁵ There are small pockets of Afghans in Russia and between 200,000 and 300,000 refugees from Ukraine.¹⁵⁶ While Russia is party to both the 1951 Refugees Convention and the 1967 Protocol, its refusal to assist forced migrants without a Russian background—especially in conflicts which they exacerbate, such as Syria—is a dereliction of its international duty.

China

China has few modern refugee resettlement policies for asylum seekers and, consequently, was hosting only nine Syrian refugees in the entire country as of early 2018.¹⁵⁷ Article 46 of China’s Administration Law of Entry and Exit of 2013 does include provisions for granting temporary refugee status, though China has yet to apply this article in practice.¹⁵⁸

154. Mariya Petkova, “Why Russia refuses to give refugee status to Syrians,” Al Jazeera, January 17, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/russia-refuses-give-refugee-status-syrians-180116095003651.html>.

155. When Austria and Hungary pushed people out of their countries, it led to increased strain on Sweden and Germany. Anemona Hartocollis, “Traveling in Europe’s River of Migrants,” *New York Times*, September 9, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/reporters-notebook/migrants/denmark-march-sweden>.

156. “Ukraine: Internally Displaced People,” United Nations, August 21, 2015, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20Internally%20Displaced%20People%20Map%2021AUG15.pdf>; UNHCR, *Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2016*.

157. Liang Pan, “Why China Isn’t Hosting Syrian Refugees,” *Foreign Policy*, February 26, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/26/china-host-syrian-islam-refugee-crisis-migrant/>.

158. “Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China,” State Council of the People’s Republic of China, September 10, 2014, http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws_regulations/2014/09/22/content_281474988553532.htm.

In addition to those excluded from the Middle East, China also does not accept forced migrants from places closer to its borders, such as Myanmar. China does contribute some foreign assistance to global forced migration crises and was historically welcoming to Vietnamese refugees—though only those of Chinese origin—in the late-1970s, but its resettlement program today is essentially nonexistent.¹⁵⁹ As a growing global power, its poor record runs the risk of encouraging similar noncompliance with the 1951 refugee convention by other states. Concerningly, China simultaneously rejects escaped North Korean citizens—and often forcibly sends them back into likely persecution, a violation of the widely accepted principles of non-refoulement—at the same time that it is actively building refugee camps for them in China in the event of regime collapse in North Korea.¹⁶⁰ China does deal with massive internal displacement—mostly from environmental disasters—every year, but its public rejection of refugees is overwhelmingly popular with its citizens. One survey showed 99 percent of Chinese citizens not wanting to resettle Middle Eastern refugees, some citing impacts of the previous One Child Policy as a reason for not wanting to welcome new people.¹⁶¹ Consequently, forced migrants rarely list China as a desired destination for resettlement.¹⁶²

Source: This analysis of Russia and China's performance on forced migration is adapted from Runde and Yayboke, *Confronting the Global Forced Migration Crisis*.

Annex C | The World in 2030

Hypothetical Scenario 1

Confront the crisis, address root causes, strengthen the rules-based international order, and reduce the flow of forced migration over the medium term. Led by the United States and its allies, a coalition of countries together with the private sector and other stakeholders take productive actions that confront the root causes of forced migration—especially, but not only, conflict—while addressing the short- and long-term needs of those forced from home for protracted periods of time, whether internally or externally. The coalition finds productive ways of integrating those already displaced with host communities or facilitating safe and voluntary return home. Societies that successfully integrate forced migrants benefit from hard-working, grateful participants in their new societies and economies, decreasing the prevalence of xenophobia. The United States and its allies understand that forced migration is a destabilizing global threat and potentially an opportunity that requires collective action to manage. China and Russia continue to contribute little to the solutions, but they pay a global price for this lack of leadership and action. Forced migration levels plateau and eventually decrease by 2030 as the United States and a broad coalition of countries take actions to address the economic, national security, and humanitarian consequences of the global crisis. U.S. global leadership is enhanced by the successful management of the forced migration crisis, giving it the ability to influence and lead on other issues.

Hypothetical Scenario 2

Muddle through, treat forced migration as a humanitarian crisis only, react to the issue ad hoc, and put the rules-based international order under great strain. The United States and its allies view forced migration primarily through homeland security and humanitarian lenses. The focus is on humanitarian aid to registered forcibly displaced people, with comparatively little attention or funding given to address root causes of forced migration or to build resiliency in host communities. These efforts have little impact on the conflict-based, environmental, or other root causes. Global forced migration rates continue trends from 2000 to 2015, resulting in as many as 180 million people forced from home by conflict in 2030.¹⁶³ A further 150 million people are forced from home by environment-related disasters by 2050.¹⁶⁴ At the

163. Projections based on calculations and trends in UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016*.

164. “Meet the Human Faces of Climate Migration,” World Bank, March 19, 2018, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/03/19/meet-the-human-faces-of-climate-migration>.

same time, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries reallocate greater amounts of foreign assistance funding to deal with arrivals domestically, equivalent to 20 percent of all foreign assistance, instead of the 2018 estimated need of over 10 percent. This focus inward comes at the expense of other competing priorities for foreign assistance and development budgets, further prioritizing responses to symptoms of forced migration as opposed to root causes overseas. A few bad actors posing as refugees or even coming from refugee communities commit crimes, leading to increasing levels of antirefugee and antimigrant sentiment and the strengthening of isolationist and nationalist political movements. The temptation for xenophobic reactions to events grows. China and Russia continue to contribute little to the solutions and periodically make crises worse through cynical and purposeful actions, as in the case of Syria. One or two countries hosting millions of forced migrants, likely in the Middle East, collapse under the strain and a lack of external support, creating further geostrategic problems for the United States and its allies.

Hypothetical Scenario 3

Stand by while chaos ensues. The United States and its allies focus only on the symptoms of forced migration and fail to create collective action to manage the crisis. U.S. resettlement numbers are cut, U.S. foreign assistance budgets are cut or redirected, and conflicts worldwide grow in number and duration. The United States is unable or unwilling to lead any sort of global response. Global forced migration rates rapidly accelerate, resulting in 320 million people forced from home by conflict in 2030.¹⁶⁵ A further 150 million people are forced from home by environmental and climate-related disasters by 2050.¹⁶⁶ At the same time, OECD donors accelerate the trend of reallocating overseas development resources domestically, resulting in as much as 30 percent allocated to responding to hosting people. Previous commitments to international agreements are abandoned or ignored. The issues of forced migration lead to an almost complete closing of Europe's doors and an even greater disinterest from the United States. The forced migration crisis strains the European Union to a breaking point, leading as many as three countries (e.g., Hungary, Austria, and Poland) to follow a "Brexit path" rather than adhere to collective rules from Brussels on accepting more people. Root causes of forced migration become further entrenched and push more and more people away from home, while new laws in countries that have historically provided refuge now turn people away. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that keeps forced migrants in situations of instability for longer and pushes them into the shadows, thus increasing the risk of their radicalization and decreasing the likelihood that they become members of society in new communities or become economically self-sufficient. The number of fragile and failing states increases, stretching already scarce foreign assistance and development resources and eventually reallocating even more funds to providing increased domestic security. As many as five or six countries become destabilized or collapse altogether. A number of U.S. allies (e.g., Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Nigeria) that are hosting large numbers of forced migrants descend into chaos. Any chance for partnership and benefit to the United States rapidly disappears into a downward spiral of instability.

Source: These scenarios are adapted from Runde and Yayboke, *Confronting the Forced Migration Crisis*.

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Though not an exhaustive list of references cited, these are the most important works consulted during development of this report.

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