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Challenges, Changes and Continuity: The United States and a Fragmented Regional Order

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*Send suggested comments and
updates/additions to
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**Burke Chair
In Strategy**

Photo: DAVID FURST/AFP/Getty Images

U.S. Military Strategy and the MENA Region

Three Key U.S. Strategy Documents

- ***National Security Strategy*** issued by the White House—with the authority of the President—on December 17, 2017 and focuses on U.S. domestic and civil programs as well as national security.
- ***National Defense Security Strategy*** issued by the Department of Defense—with the authority of the Secretary of Defense—on January 18, 2018 and focuses on defense and national security.
- ***Presidential defense budget request to Congress for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020.***
This consists of a wide range of documents totaling over 1,000 pages of data in a wide range of different documents. They're summarized in a *Budget Overview* document issued by the Comptroller's Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense but based on the budget and programs approved by the White House and approved by the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This summary is specifically described as presenting the budget in strategic terms.

National Security Strategy

...The United States will respond to the growing political, economic, and military competitions we face around the world. China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence...

... A central continuity in history is the contest for power. The present time period is no different. **Three main sets of challengers – the revisionist powers of China and Russia; the rogue states of Iran and North Korea; and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups – are actively competing against the United States and its allies and partners.**

...making “America first” is critically dependent on allies and strategic partners...

... **Jihadist terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda are determined to attack the United States and radicalize Americans with their hateful ideology.** States and non-state actors undermine social order through drug and human trafficking networks, which they use to commit violent crimes and kill thousands of Americans each year.

Adversaries target sources of American strength, including our democratic system and our economy. They steal and exploit our intellectual property and personal data, interfere in our political processes, target our aviation and maritime sectors, and hold our critical infrastructure at risk. All of these actions threaten the foundations of the American way of life...

Although differing in nature and magnitude, these rivals compete across political, economic, and military arenas, and use technology and information to accelerate these contests, in order to shift regional balances of power in their favor...**These are fundamentally political contests between those who favor repressive systems and those who favor free societies.**

National Defense Strategy

... In the Middle East, Iran is competing with its neighbors, asserting an arc of influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony, using state-sponsored terrorist activities, a growing network of proxies, and its missile program to achieve its objectives.

... We will focus on...elements for achieving a capable alliance and partnership network:

- ***...Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability.*** Our alliances and coalitions are built on free will and shared responsibilities. While we will unapologetically represent America's values and belief in democracy, we will not seek to impose our way of life by force. We will uphold our commitments and we expect allies and partners to contribute an equitable share to our mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities. We have shared responsibilities for resisting authoritarian trends, contesting radical ideologies, and serving as bulwarks against instability.
- ***Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning.*** We will develop new partnerships around shared interests to reinforce regional coalitions and security cooperation. We will provide allies and partners with a clear and consistent message to encourage alliance and coalition commitment, greater defense cooperation, and military investment.
- ***Deepen interoperability.*** Each ally and partner is unique. Combined forces able to act together coherently and effectively to achieve military objectives requires interoperability. Interoperability is a priority for operational concepts, modular force elements, communications, information sharing, and equipment. In consultation with Congress and the Department of State, the Department of Defense will prioritize requests for U.S. military equipment sales, accelerating foreign partner modernization and ability to integrate with U.S. forces. We will train to high-end combat missions in our alliance, bilateral, and multinational exercises.
- ***Form enduring coalitions in the Middle East.*** We will foster a stable and secure Middle East that denies safe havens for terrorists, is not dominated by any power hostile to the United States, and that contributes to stable global energy markets and secure trade routes. We will develop enduring coalitions to consolidate gains we have made in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, to support the lasting defeat of terrorists as we sever their sources of strength and counterbalance Iran.

Key USCENTCOM Partnership Goals

(Adapted from the USCENTCOM Command Narrative)

We envision a more stable and prosperous region with increasingly effective governance, improved security, and trans-regional cooperation to counter state and non-state actors posing a threat to U.S. interests. To this end - our USCENTCOM mission is to direct and enable military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring U.S. interests.

...Our strategic approach is focused on protecting our national interests and those of our partners. It is designed to reflect our values, align our behaviors, and support the National Military Strategy. It is proactive in nature and endeavors to set in motion tangible actions in a purposeful, consistent and continuous manner. Each aspect of our approach - Prepare - Pursue - Prevail - enables the next and collectively contributes to the successful achievement of our goals, objectives and our overall mission.

- ***Prepare the Environment: Readiness in Advance of Crisis***
- ***Pursue Opportunities: Seize the Initiative***
- ***Prevail in Conflict: Win the Current Fight and Plan to Win the Next One***
- ***Ensure an Effective Posture***
- ***Strengthen Allies and Partnerships***

...A coalition approach - at home and abroad - expands our ability to operate on multiple fronts. Strong relationships based upon shared values serve to create greater cohesion and enhance the effectiveness of available resources and capabilities. Integration with partners, within the region and beyond, enhances the benefit of our presence, mitigates resource constraints, and expands the reach of the force. By building the capacity of regional partner nations, we enable them to assume a larger share of the responsibility for securing their sovereign spaces.

- ***Deter and Counter State Aggressors***
- ***Disrupt and Counter Violent Extremist Organizations and their Networks.***

The CENTCOM View of the Partnership Challenge in the MENA Region


Multiple ethnic groups, speaking different languages with hundreds of dialects and confessing multiple religions which transect national borders. Demographics that create opportunities for tension and rivalry.

Geography consists of the intersection of three continents and globally vital commercial sea lanes, flight corridors, pipelines and overland routes. Nations which stretch from North Africa across the Middle East have forms of governance ranging across the political spectrum, including emerging democracies, hereditary monarchies, autocracies, and Islamist theocratic regimes.

The region is among the least secure and stable places of the world. Adversarial relationships among neighboring states, widespread ethnic and sectarian struggles, malign influence and destabilizing activities, cyber-based threats, and growing arsenals of sophisticated conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction all combine to imperil enduring U.S. vital national interests, as well as those of our trusted partners and allies.

The US Role in Fighting Daesh in Iraq and Syria, and Future Force Levels and Spending

How Daesh-Controlled Areas Shrunk: 2015-2019




BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45547595>

Airstrikes Supporting Land Offensives

Coalition strikes

■ Iraq 13,535 ■ Syria 18,826



*Figures are up to 15 January 2019

Source: US Central Command

BBC

The [recapture of Iraq's second city of Mosul](#) in July 2017 was seen as a major breakthrough for the coalition, but the 10-month battle left thousands of civilians dead and saw more than 800,000 others forced to flee their homes in the city.


In October 2017, the Syrian city of Raqqa, so-called capital of the self-styled "caliphate", was re-taken by the SDF with coalition air support, ending three years of rule by IS.

The following month, the Syrian army regained full control of the eastern city of Deir al-Zour, and Iraqi forces retook the key border town of al-Qaim.

President Trump: “ISIS Caliphate two years ago in Red vs. ISIS Caliphate TODAY. (Was even worse in November 2016 before I took office).”



Iraq/Syria | ISIS Physical Caliphate 2017



JOINT STAFF J2 | DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

President Trump: "We just took over you know you kept hearing it was 90%, 92%, the caliphate in Syria, now it's 100%, we just took over 100% caliphate, that means the area of the land we're just have 100% so that's good."



Iraq/Syria | ISIS Physical Caliphate 2019



INR STAFF 32 | DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

“The United States and Our Global Partners Have Liberated All ISIS-Controlled Territory”

STATUS OF TERRITORIAL CONTROL IN SYRIA AS OF 12/31/2018

Turkey and Turkish-backed forces controlled the northwestern enclave of Afrin and territory north of Manbij.


Syrian opposition groups, as well as the al Qaeda-affiliated Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Daesh, remained in areas of Idlib, Aleppo, and Hamah provinces. Syrian regime forces controlled western Syria, where most of the population lives.

The Lebanese Hezbollah operated in areas controlled by the Syrian regime near the Lebanese border.

Daesh remained only in a tiny swath of desert territory around Hajin after losing Hajin to the SDF on December 14.

The Syrian regime moved forces to the west bank of the Euphrates River near Hajin following the U.S. announcement to withdraw troops from Syria.


Source: DoD OIG Analysis of Open Sources



The Changing U.S. Military Role in the MENA Region

US Shift to Lower Personnel Levels: FY2002-FY2017

In thousands of U.S. troops



Sources: DOD, Monthly Boots-on-the Ground reports provided to CRS and congressional defense committees, 2001-June 2014. For month-by-month troop levels, both in-country and in-theater, see **Table A-1**.

Notes: Reflects U.S. troops in-country; excludes troops providing in-theater support or conducting counter-terror operations outside the region.

Radical Shifts in US and Coalition Airpower: 2015-2019

(CAOC) Public Affairs – afcent.pa@afcent.af.mil as of January 31, 2019)

OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

Strike Aircraft (manned)

Number of Weapons Released (Manned & RPA strike assets)

Sorties		Sorties with at least one weapon release		Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total													
2015	21,116			2015	2,426	1,853	1,685	1,862	2,145	1,683	2,823	2,758	2,380	2,694	3,242	3,145	28,696
2016	21,181	2016	9,912	2016	2,718	2,090	2,052	2,582	2,341	3,160	2,439	2,244	2,427	3,038	2,709	2,943	30,743
2017	19,680	2017	11,825	2017	3,600	3,439	3,878	3,274	4,374	4,848	4,313	5,075	3,550	1,642	1,000	584	39,577
2018	16,056	2018	9,944	2018	780	747	294	254	431	356	241	338	758	876	1,424	2,214	8,713
2019	1,390	2019	1,591	2019	2,005												2,005
			368														

Statistics provided includes numbers of sorties (not strikes) and munitions expended by aircraft under CFACC control

Iraq & Syria


	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties	9,514	12,270	14,015	7,782	943
Airlift and Airdrop Sorties	10,050	8,400	9,448	8,450	608
Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)	78,500	72,800	68,537	43,566	2,732
Airlift Passengers	47,200	46,900	76,802	76,369	6,435
Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)	111,200	822,171	641,746	605,670	125,560
Tanker Sorties	14,737	13,064	13,243	8,697	778
Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)	912	804	778	620	58
Aircraft Refuelings	84,381	80,912	70,536	52,061	5,178

Some figures may have changed due to data re-calculation and re-verification

• Assets under CFACC control include a compilation of aircraft from all U.S. military branches of service, as well as Coalition aircraft; however, not all aircraft flying in the AOR fall under CFACC control

US Airstrikes: August 2014 – March 2018

US-led coalition strikes: IRAQ: 13,315 SYRIA: 14,660



Source: IHS Conflict Monitor, 23 Mar 2018

BBC

US Casualty Data as of March 15, 2019

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM U.S. CASUALTY STATUS ¹

	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	Pending	WIA
OIF U.S. Military Casualties	4,410	3,481	929	0	31,957
OIF U.S. DOD Civilian Casualties	13	9	4	0	
Totals	4,423	3,490	933	0	31,957

¹ OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM includes casualties that occurred between March 19, 2003, and Aug. 31, 2010, in the Arabian Sea, Bahrain, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Persian Gulf, Qatar, Red Sea, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Casualties in these countries before March 19, 2003, were considered Operation Enduring Freedom. Personnel injured in OIF who die after Sept. 1, 2010, will be included in OIF statistics.

OPERATION NEW DAWN U.S. CASUALTY STATUS ²

	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	Pending	WIA
OND U.S. Military Casualties	73	38	35	0	295
OND U.S. DOD Civilian Casualties	0	0	0	0	
Totals	73	38	35	0	295

² OPERATION NEW DAWN includes casualties that occurred between Sept. 1, 2010, and Dec. 31, 2011, in the Arabian Sea, Bahrain, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Persian Gulf, Qatar, Red Sea, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Personnel injured in OND who die after Dec. 31, 2011, will be included in OND statistics.

OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE U.S. CASUALTY STATUS ⁵

	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	Pending	WIA
OIR U.S. Military Casualties	72	16	56	0	77
OIR U.S. DOD Civilian Casualties	3	1	2	0	
Totals	75	17	58	0	77


⁵ OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE includes casualties that occurred in Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the Mediterranean Sea east of 25° Longitude, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

Source: Department
of Defense,
<https://dod.defense.gov/News/Casualty-Status/>

US Spending on Wars: September 11, 2001 - September 30, 2018

\$1.566 Trillion Appropriated, \$1.528 Trillion Obligated

■ Noble Eagle: \$28B ■ Afghanistan (OEF/OFS): \$742B ■ Iraq (OIF/OND/Post-OND Activities/OIR): \$758B




Note: Obligations shown by year of appropriation. Excludes classified programs and non-war OCO appropriations.

Source: DoD Comptroller.

The FY2020 U.S. Defense Budget

OCO Manning FY2008-FY2020

Trends in OCO Troop Levels in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan (Annual Average in Thousands)




	FY 2019 PB Request	FY 2020 PB Request ³
Afghanistan (OFS)	11,958	15,000
Iraq/Syria (OIR)	5,765	7,200
In-Theater Support ¹	59,463	46,473
In-CONUS ² /Other Mobilization	16,610	19,149
Total Force Levels	93,796	87,822

¹ In-Theater support includes support for Afghanistan/Iraq/Syria, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) HOA / NW Africa CT, and EDI (including approximately 10,500 afloat forces).

² In-CONUS = In the Continental United States

³ FY 2020 includes Temporary Enabling Force (TEF) support for Afghanistan/Iraq/Syria. This is a change from FY 2019 in which the TEF support was counted as part of In-Theater Support.

OCO Cost Reporting Shifts and Funding Level Trends



OCO CATEGORIES

The FY 2020 OCO request is divided into three requirement categories – direct war, enduring, and OCO for base. Direct War Requirements (\$25.4 billion) – Reflects combat or combat support costs that are not expected to continue once combat operations end at major contingency locations. **Includes in-country war support for Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS) in Afghanistan and Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) in Iraq and Syria. Funds partnership programs such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), and Middle East border security.**

OCO for Enduring Requirements (\$41.3 billion) – Reflects enduring in-theater and CONUS costs that will remain after combat operations end. These costs, historically funded in OCO, include overseas basing, depot maintenance, ship operations, and weapons system sustainment. It also includes the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), and Security Cooperation. Combined, enduring requirements and direct war requirements comprise "traditional" OCO.

OCO for Base Requirements (\$97.9 billion) – Reflects funding for base budget requirements, which support the National Defense Strategy, such as defense readiness, readiness enablers, and munitions, financed in the OCO budget to comply with the base budget defense caps included in current law.

Operation/Activity	FY 2019 Enacted	FY 2020 Request ^{1/2}	Delta FY 2019 – FY 2020
Operation FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS) Direct War Costs	18.5	18.6	+0.1
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) Direct War Costs	8.9	6.9	-2.0
Enduring Theater Requirements and Related Missions	33.7	35.3	+1.6
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI)	6.5	5.9	-0.6
Subtotal	67.6	66.7	-0.9
Prior-Year Rescissions	-1.3	-	+1.3
OCO for Base Requirements ^{1/}	2.5	97.9	+95.4
Emergency Requirements	-	9.2	+9.2
Grand Total	68.8	173.8	+105.0

Numbers may not add due to rounding

1/ The FY 2019 Enacted "OCO for Base Requirements" reflects congressional adds, including the ISR Transfer Fund (\$500 million). The FY 2020 "OCO for Base Requirements" reflects the DoD base budget requirements requested in the OCO budget in order to comply with the base defense caps in current law. Congress does not appropriate by operation, therefore the FY 2019 Enacted column is a DoD estimate by operation.

2/ The "Direct War" and "Enduring Requirements" were developed for FY 2020 and have been applied as an estimate to the FY 2019 appropriation.

OCO FY2020 Request by Functional/Mission Category

(\$US Current Billions)

OCO and Emergency Budget	FY 2019 Enacted	FY 2020 Request	Delta FY 2019 to FY 2020
Operations/Force Protection	14.5	14.2	-0.3
In-Theater Support	19.5	20.0	+0.5
Defense Threat Reduction Agency / Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat	0.5	0.5	-
Equipment Reset and Readiness	8.6	8.1	-0.5
Classified Programs	9.9	10.5	+0.6
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	4.9	4.8	-0.1
Support for Coalition Forces	1.0	0.6	-0.4
Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)	1.4	1.0	-0.4
Security Cooperation	0.8	1.1	+0.3
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)	6.5	5.9	-0.6
Subtotal	67.6	66.7	-0.9
ISR Transfer Fund	0.5	-	-0.5
OCO for Base Requirements	2.0	97.9	+95.9
Emergency Requirements	-	9.2	+9.2
Prior-Year Rescissions	-1.3	-	+1.3
Total	68.8	173.8	+105.0

Numbers may not add due to rounding

The request supports the following activities:

- Executing DoD's counterterrorism and train, advise, assist missions in Afghanistan to support the President's South Asia strategy as leaders work to negotiate a settlement that safeguards national interests
- **Sustaining personnel forward deployed to the Middle East to continue operations to ensure an enduring defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and allow flexibility for a deliberate, coordinated, disciplined withdrawal from Syria**
- **Building the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces and Syrian opposition forces to counter ISIS in support of the United States' comprehensive regional strategy**
- Conducting U.S. Central Command in-country and in-theater support activities, including intelligence support to military operations
- Enhancing U.S. deterrence activities in Eastern Europe to assure North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partners and deter aggressive actors

Source: OSD Comptroller, FY2020 Budget Overview, pp. 6.3-6.9.

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) (\$4.8 billion): This request funds the sustainment, infrastructure, equipment, and training requirements for up to 352,000 members of the Afghan National Army and National Police as well as up to 30,000 Afghan Local Police. The request supports further development of the ANDSF as an effective and sustainable force to combat a resilient insurgency and as a reliable counterterrorism partner with the United States. A key element of the request is funding for the final year of the President of Afghanistan's four-year ANDSF Roadmap to increase the capacity and combat effectiveness of the AAF and the ASSF and seize the initiative in the fight against insurgent and terrorist forces, strengthen and restructure Afghan Security Institutions, and facilitate a political settlement to the war.

Support for Coalition Forces (\$0.6 billion): Amounts requested to finance coalition, friendly forces, and a variety of support requirements for key foreign partners who wish to participate in U.S. military operations but lack financial means. Such support reduces the burden on U.S. forces and is critical to overall mission success. The FY 2020 budget request for support for coalition forces includes \$450 million for the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) and \$150 million for the Lift and Sustain program. The FY 2020 CSF request of \$450 million reflects a \$450 million (50 percent) decrease from the FY 2019 enacted level of \$900 million due to the continuing suspension of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan based on the President's January 4, 2018, guidance.

Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) (\$1.0 billion): The United States Government's strategy to counter ISIS directed DoD to conduct a campaign to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIS. The focus of DoD's efforts is to work by, with, and through the Government of Iraq's Security Forces and Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) forces to build key security force capabilities and promote longer term regional stability.

The FY 2020 CTEF budget request strengthens the security capabilities of DOD partners countering ISIS to secure territory liberated from ISIS and counter future ISIS threats by training and equipping partner security forces. The training, equipment, and operational support in this request will facilitate the consolidation of gains achieved against ISIS and prevent its reemergence. The \$1,045 million request includes \$745 million to assist the Iraqi Security Forces and \$300 million to assist the Vetted Syrian Opposition. The FY 2020 budget also realigns \$250 million from the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund to Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, for implementation by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in order to align DoD authorities and funding to support border security requirements for partner nations fighting ISIS.

Security Cooperation (\$1.1 billion): The FY 2020 budget request maintains the existing security cooperation account at \$811 million, which funds counterterrorism, crisis response, and other security cooperation support to partner nations. The FY 2020 budget also realigns \$250 million from the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund to the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide appropriation for implementation by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in order to align DoD authorities and funding to support border security requirements for partner nations fighting ISIS.

Security Cooperation funds support programs to enable partner nations to deter and defeat existing and evolving terrorist and other transnational threats. Training and equipping partner nations allows U.S. forces to be more readily available for other contingency operations, build better relationships with partners, and promote global security in a more cost-effective manner.

Dealing with a Fragmented Regional Order

MENA: Dealing With the Broader AOR



The Core MENA Region

Middle East and North Africa (MENA)



The 18 Core MENA Countries

- | | |
|------------|------------------|
| 1. Algeria | 10. Libya |
| 2. Bahrain | 11. Morocco |
| 3. Egypt | 12. Oman |
| 4. Iran | 13. Qatar |
| 5. Iraq | 14. Saudi Arabia |
| 6. Israel | 15. Syria |
| 7. Jordan | 16. Tunisia |
| 8. Kuwait | 17. UAE |
| 9. Lebanon | 18. Yemen |

MENA – Major Strategic Subregions

Gulf

North Africa



Morocco, Algeria, Polisario


Arab-Israeli, Iranian Influence



Key Areas of Gulf Security Instability

- Iranian threat – high technology, missiles, cyber, air, naval, NBC mixed with hybrid political-military operations
- Arab fracture lines, self-inflicted wounds, 2003 invasion
- Iraqi instability
- Reemergence of “Daesh/” New Extremist threats
- Syrian “spillover” into Gulf region
- Egyptian, Saudi, UAE, Bahrain boycott of Qatar
- Role of Oman and Kuwait
- Role of Turkey, Russia, China
- Yemeni “civil” war
- Reconstruction and Development
- **Shift in U.S. dependence from petroleum imports to dependence on exports to key sources of manufacture imports**

Iran's Key Areas of Strategic Influence



The Iranian Threat


- Uncertainties surrounding Iran's **nuclear weapons programs**, chemical warfare programs, and potential biological warfare programs.
- Ongoing **changes in Iran's major ballistic and cruise missile programs** -- and intelligence and targeting assets -- that will give it a **major precision strike capability using conventional high explosive warheads**. Replace weapons of mass destruction with strikes on key military and civil targets in ways that make them weapons of mass effectiveness. Coupled to Iran's acquisition of the Russian S-300 missile system -- its first major modern land-based air defense system since the fall of the Shah -- and a serious potential shift in the regional air balance.
- **Steady expansion of an asymmetric mix of naval-missile-air forces** that can challenge or attack petroleum exports, shipping traffic, and naval forces throughout the Gulf, in and outside the Strait of Hormuz, and increasingly in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. They include steadily more advanced anti-ship missiles, submarines, submersibles, missile attack craft, "suicide" boats, and smart mines
- **Iran's success in exploiting the divisions, fracture lines, and self-inflicted political wounds in the Arab world** through the support, arming, and training of forces like the Hezbollah, Houthi, pro-Assad forces, some of the popular militias in Iraq, and Shi'ite extremist factions in Bahrain.

Key Areas of Instability in Syria and the Levant



- **Syrian civil war and Assad regime**
- **Iranian and Hezbollah influence**
- **Russian influence**
- **Ethnic, sectarian, tribal tensions.**
- **Turkey: Sunni Islamic, Qatar, Syria-Iraq-and Kurds**
- **Israel and Palestinian**
- **Stability of Lebanon, Jordan**
- **Refugee resettlement/absorption**
- **Reconstruction and Development**

**Idlib:
March
2019:**

Source: Institute for the Study of War, 8.3.1`9https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-6_mWKHsIZII/XIP4jVAJtrI/AAAAAAAAAKOA/MuEy1FrrbmArbK6aw2RCjYINwL1c5agFwCLcBGAs/s1600/20190308%2BTSK%2BPatrols%2Bin%2BNW%2BSyria.png



Syria: Control of Euphrates and East: March 8, 2019




Key Areas of Instability in North Africa

- **Stability of Egypt, threat in Sinai**
- **Instability in Tunisia**
- **Civil war in Libya**
- **New Regime in Algeria**
- **Moroccan-Algerian Tensions over Western Sahara**
- **Sudan**
- **Sub-Saharan migration, drugs, and human trafficking**
- **Reconstruction and Development**

The Continuing Challenge of Extremism and Terrorism


Conflict and Extremism: Arabs are 5.2% of Global Population, But...



Report team calculations based on START 2015, SIPRI 2015, UCDP/PRIO 2015, UCDP 2015, UN DESA 2013, and UNRWA 2015. UNDP,


Source: Arab Human Development Report, 2016, UN, 2016, p. 176

Map of START Estimate of Attacks in or Near the MENA Area in 1975-2015



ODNI Map of Violent Extremist Operating Areas in 2017


Sunni Violent Extremists' Primary Operating Areas as of 2017



17-15890 12-17

Worldwide Terrorist-Extremist Incidents by Region: 1970-2017 (Less State-Terrorism and Insurgencies)

Maximum Number of Terrorist Incidents by Region (Less Insurgencies and State Terrorism): 1970 - 2017




Source: Adapted from START Global Terrorism Data Base,

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2017&dt2=a11®ion=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8; March 31, 2018

The Rise of Terrorism in the MENA Region: Incidents In 2010-2017

- 31,684 Incidents
- 37% of Global Total
- Only 44% of largely Islamic regions
- Only 25% attributed to Daesh and Al Qaida
- 20% to ISIS/Daesh



Reshaping Strategic Partnerships

Four Key Areas of Focus

- **Partnership dialogue**
- **Meeting the extremist and terrorist threat**
- **Dealing with changing military threats**
- **Meeting changing military requirements**

Changing Military Goals and Missions Since 2001-2011

Current

- **Prepare the Environment:** *Readiness in Advance of Crisis*
- **Deter and Counter State Aggressors**
- **Prevail in Conflict:**
- **Disrupt and Counter Violent Extremist Organizations and their Networks**

New

- *Cooperate with – and assist -- strategic partners and other members of the CENTCOM coalition*
- *Conduct advanced and more flexible forms of joint and coalition warfare.*
- *Deter or win all levels and types of conventional and hybrid warfare and politico-military asymmetric challenges from hostile states and non-state actors.*
- *Counter outside financial, political, arms transfers, and military assistance support of hostile regional states and non-state actors*
- *Manage and dominate the process of escalation and conflict termination.*
- *Protect the population, minimize civil casualties and collateral damage, and carry out civil-military operations.*
- *Provide ongoing and emergency support to maintain civil stability, and aid to civil governance, law enforcement, and paramilitary forces.*
- *Provide emergency support and aid for civil crises, disasters.*
- *Successful anticipate and react to technological, tactical, and hybrid warfare changes*

The Diverse Base of Regional Strategic Partners:

MENA Military Forces in 2018

	Country	Defense Budget (US\$B)	Budget as % of GDP	Active Military Personnel*	Main Battle Tanks	Major Combat Ships**	Combat Aircraft ***
1.	Algeria	9.93	5.3%	130,000	1,467	9	135
2.	Bahrain	1.48	10%	8,200	180	1	38
3.	Egypt	2.90	1.2%	438,500	2,480	15	578
4.	Iran	19.6	4.6%	523,000	1,513+	10	336
5.	Iraq	17.3	7.5%	64,000	393	0	65
6.	Israel	66.3	5.1%	169,500	490	8	352
7.	Jordan	1.63	3.9%	100,500	282	0	59
8.	Kuwait	6.18	4.3%	17,500	293	0	66
9.	Lebanon	2.12	3.7%	56,600	334	0	9
10.	Libya	?	?	?	?	0	5+
11.	Morocco	3.63	3.1%	195,800	602	8	90
12.	Oman	8.95	11.0%	42,600	117	5	63
13.	Qatar	8.8*****	4.7%	16,500	62	0	18
14.	Saudi Arabia	82.9	10.8%	227,000	900	11	407
15.	Syria	4.5*****	?	139,000	?	2	236
16.	Tunisia	0.915	2.2%	35,800	84	0	23
17.	UAE	11.00*****	9.0%	63,000	385	7	156
18.	Yemen	?	?	40,000	?	0	0

* Regular military forces, royal guards, and IRGC; Does not include paramilitary or reserves


** Major surface and submarines using IISS definition, with some larger corvettes added.

*** Air Force only, using IISS definition


**** Author's estimate, No IISS estimate.

Adapted from the **IISS Military Balance, 2019**

The Diverse Base of Regional Strategic Partners: Comparative Estimates of Military Spending (\$US Billions)



The Diverse Base of Regional Strategic Partners: Comparative Estimates of Military Spending as % of GDP



Ongoing Changes in the Nature of Warfare = Military Operations

- Increased use of air mobility
- Precision/Deep strike -- integrated air-missile forces
- Artificial intelligence
- Cyber operations-warfare; Electronics warfare
- Advances in ballistic and cruise missiles and air/missile defense
- Threat to space-based systems
- Ideological and information operations/warfare
- Use, support of, non-state actors, volunteers, arms transfers, train and assist.
- Political, asymmetric, hybrid operations/warfare
- Sectarian, ethnic, tribal, "faction" and "fault line" conflicts.
- Increasing limits on civilian casualties and collateral damage; unilateral restraint versus use of civilians as shields/hostages. Fundamental changes in IS&R and targeting.
- Increased role of civil-military operations.
- Support and protection of governance, rule of law, and internal security operations.
- Integration and speed of IS&R, C4I, and Battle Management
- Redefining "jointness" in terms of time, scale, options, and operations

Sun Tzu and the MENA Region -- Hybrid Warfare 2600 Years Ago

- *The one who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be victorious.*
- *The one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements.*
- *Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.*
 - *Warfare is the Tao of deception. Thus although you are capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When your objective is nearby, make it appear distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby. Display profits to entice him.*
 - *Create disorder (in their forces) and take them. If they are substantial, prepare for them; if they are strong, avoid them. If they are angry, perturb them; be deferential to foster their arrogance. If they are rested, force them to exert themselves. If they are united, cause them to be separated.*
 - *Attack where they are unprepared. Go forth where they will not expect it. These are the ways military strategists are victorious.*

Ralph D. Sawyer's *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, 1994, and Patrick Lefler, *Sun Tzu and The Art of War: Avoid direct confrontations at all costs*; August 22, 2010

Meeting Changing Military Requirements

- **Common/standardized training**
- **Interoperability and common munitions and support.**
- **Centralized or common maintenance, repair, and modernization.**
- **Coordinated force and modernization plans.**
- **Integrated battle management; air, control, and warning; air defense; blue/red force tracking, maritime surveillance facilities**
- **Integrated and centralized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) facilities.**
- **Standardized secure communications and data formats/transfers.**
- **Specialization and contingency plans to use different levels and types of national weapons mixes and capabilities in complementary ways.**
- **Creation of key rapid deployment contingency facilities and prepositioning.**
- **Integrated biometrics, human factor, facial recognition, and surveillance/intelligence systems.**
- **Common cyber defense and cyberwarfare systems and efforts.**
- **Turnkey systems that are normally securely national but that can integrate on contingency basis.**
- **Advanced/centralized common training and simulation facilities, ranges and exercise grounds.**