Crossing Borders
How the Migration Crisis Transformed Europe’s External Policy

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Acknowledgments

It has been three years since the peak of Europe’s migration crisis, and we have yet to fully assess its profound implications—be it the continuing rise of anti-immigrant political parties, addressing the forces that propel migrants to Europe, divining the complex policy and budgetary decision-making process in European capitals and in Brussels, or confronting the international legal definitions of asylum and repatriation.

A think tank is in the unique position to be able to look across this complicated policy landscape and try to isolate and present elements of the crisis through a different prism. The prism we selected was an examination of the shifts in the European Union’s external response to the crisis, in the form of development and humanitarian assistance funding as well as border security, defense, and security spending. We chose this lens because the EU is the largest global provider of official development assistance and is an important contributor to global security missions. The United States relies on European nations to contribute generously to a variety of development goals, so we wanted to understand whether, or how, the 2015 migration crisis altered Europe in these two important fields.

Parsing budgetary data to detect shifts in priorities is not glamorous work in the first place, but tracking budget figures means very little without understanding how budgets are constructed and amended, and the meaning behind the zeros and decimal points. We are deeply grateful for the guidance and insights of the officials and experts who helped us understand why certain policy and budget decisions were taken or not taken. Several of these experts and officials participated in our investigative workshop in Brussels in May 2017, and many were interviewed and asked follow-up questions. The European Union is a complex enterprise and, without help from our colleagues in the institutions and in the member states, we would have quickly lost our way amid the various EU instruments, mechanisms, and trust funds.

The level of detail and depth contained in this report is a testament to the expertise of our colleagues at the Migration Policy Institute Europe, specifically Elizabeth Collett and Kate Hooper, who contributed to the report in Chapter 1. They have provided us with a remarkably sharp analysis of
development and humanitarian funding and policy in Europe since 2015. It was a privilege to collaborate with them on this project. Our work on the security and defense analysis would also have been impossible without the dedication of Sara Sandström, and we are truly thankful for her hard work on parsing dense budget data and official documents. In addition, every complex topic requires powerful visuals to help guide the reader; our work is complemented by the talent of our colleagues in the Andreas Dracopoulos iDeas Lab, in particular that of Caroline Amenabar.

Finally, this report would not have been possible without the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation. We hope this report will foster better understanding of the long-term consequences of the migration crisis on European policy.
THE CRISIS

Over the past decade, Europe has been described as being surrounded by a “ring of fire,”¹ from Russia’s military intervention in Europe’s east—which has displaced approximately 1.7 million people²—to the 2011 Arab Spring, which led to the displacement of millions (both internally and externally), not to mention its ripple effects on a fractured Libya and the ongoing and devastating seven-year war in Syria. Conflict, economic and climate insecurity, as well as growing youth populations, greater mobility, and greater access to information and communication technologies have pushed individuals to seek safety and better economic opportunities for themselves and their families in Europe. Borders in North Africa and the Middle East have become increasingly porous as state fragmentation and dysfunction reduce the ability of government authorities to manage them. State institutions have ceased to function normally. Combined, these forces have contributed to the largest influx of migrants Europe has seen in decades, with 1.9 million arrivals to the continent between 2014 and 2017 (and thousands of lives lost at sea during the dangerous crossings of the Mediterranean Sea), and 3.6 million first-time asylum applicants across the 28 EU member states.³

The European Union and its 28 member states have struggled to absorb this large influx of migrants and refugees, and to effectively respond to the humanitarian crises that have led many of these refugees to make the dangerous journey to Europe. The European Union was also forced to acknowledge that it was unable to manage its external borders, as policy focus had been largely dedicated to deconstructing internal borders within the Schengen area. Thus, the seam between

the European Union’s ability to protect and manage its external borders, and the sovereign prerogative of EU member states to manage their national borders was fully exposed and accentuated during the 2015 migration crisis. Whose responsibility is it to manage Europe’s borders? The answer to this question was an unhappy and muddled multilevel coordination effort in which a unified European border policy was absent.

More broadly, migration management remained principally a national mandate for member states that had the budgeting flexibility to address the crisis as a national emergency (though some were still reeling with the lasting effects of the financial crisis). The European Union, however, played a limited coordination role and provided additional financial assistance, yet without the same budgetary flexibility—the European Union being constrained by a seven-year financial framework established well in advance, as well as balanced budget requirements and limited competencies to tackle such a wide-ranging challenge. A similar delicate balance between the European Union and its member states needed to be found in the external aspects of the crisis as well, through policies and instruments targeting the drivers of migration and the negative externalities of instability in areas of the European Union’s neighborhood. As the nature of emigration factors and security threats evolved, the scope of action needed to be broadened and cooperation with third countries became more necessary. Yet the prerogatives of EU officials were not always clear due to a complex foreign and development policy institutional landscape, and member states had their own bilateral plans to tackle the crisis.

But beyond the challenges of mandates and policy implementation, perhaps the most lasting and devastating impact of Europe’s migration crisis has been the unleashing of fear-based public sentiment that extreme political forces deftly exploited and amplified with xenophobic tones, eroding the credibility of and confidence in elected officials and institutions. The exploitation of these fears impacted and shaped the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union and has caused significant fissures between Central and Western EU members. These fears have also inflated the popularity of far-right and, at times, far-left parties that have based their political agenda on immigration restriction and ethno-nationalist ideas. These extreme parties have pushed EU member governments to challenge or resist the European Union’s attempts to redistribute migrants across EU member states and to reform the European Union’s asylum policy. In turn, this has impeded the European Union’s ability to dampen the impact of the crisis (by evenly apportioning asylum applicants across the Union), and to strike agreements with third countries (by guaranteeing certain levels of migrant reception in return for more a proactive return policy).

**THE RESPONSE**

The lack of preparation to address the crisis forced European policymakers to make short-term decisions rather than seek long-term and more durable solutions. These crisis-time decisions affected internal policies and budget choices, but were driven by the need to address public demands for immediate and visible responses through humanitarian aid, development programs, foreign policy action, and security-related missions in the European Union’s neighborhood.
(in countries of origin and transit). This is where we observed the most significant changes to Europe’s external response to the crisis.

The all-enveloping politics surrounding the crisis as it played out across international television screens forced elected officials and policymakers to rapidly shift discourse away from an international, rules-based approach to migration toward a more restrictive stance on uncontrolled immigration. This shift created a cognitive dissonance that is bound to last for some time between the European Union’s espousal of freedom of movement as a fundamental right (e.g., Germany) and the reimposition of national borders coupled with the refusal to accept legitimate asylum seekers (e.g., Hungary). This dissonance continues to be reflected in statements and agreements the European Union has struck over the past three years, and in the Union’s financial decisions through the reallocation of funds, increased budget lines, and the use of budget reserves to respond to the crisis. It is reflected in the many bureaucratic layers and actors involved, from EU agencies to the division of labor between them and the member states, and the member states’ own domestic decisions and political pressures, all of which has rendered crisis decisions even more opaque and difficult to decipher. The crisis has also fueled a need to push the crisis as far away from Europe’s borders as possible, which has in some instances led to policy decisions that actively work against the European Union’s and its member states’ stated development goals in source and transit countries to prevent additional migration. The European Union has yet to fully rectify or resolve this policy dissonance.

In this report, we attempt to sort out this dissonance by quantifying, through budgetary analysis, what shifts occurred in the external dimension of Europe’s migration policy following the crisis through the lens of budgetary decisions made at the EU level, as well as in three member states that received a significant number of asylum seekers and have suffered the political consequences of the crisis: Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands. We view these budgetary decisions (e.g., reallocating resources, increasing overall budgets, and tapping emergency funds) as a quantifiable reflection of policy priorities, and of the shift in these priorities in the past few years. These short-term shifts carry long-term consequences for resources and policy priorities, as well as for the European Union’s future role as a foreign policy and soft power actor.

THE FINDINGS

In all cases, addressing migration has become a top priority in development budgets, particularly in priority countries, with numerous departments and agencies overseeing a multitude of projects relating to the external dimension of migration. Coordination is a massive challenge, adding complexity in an already-difficult institutional and financial landscape. Importantly, efforts to reduce incentives to emigrate in key origin and transit countries have evolved from purely development activities to include security elements, for example, the training and equipping of border control forces in Niger complementing projects promoting economic growth and migrant reinsertion. Across the board, funding has increased for security and stability efforts in these countries, while disarmament and nonproliferation budgets—usually a focus of European efforts—have stagnated. These efforts include crisis management missions to build the capacity of security and border
forces in origin or transit countries such as Niger, Mali, or Libya, and the deployment of national forces to missions in the Sahel, which countries see as stabilizing efforts that can lead to lower migration. Humanitarian, development, and asylum budgets have all experienced budget shortfalls, and have been the main recipients of the subsequent funding increases through the means highlighted above. Successive budget amendments have become a flashing warning sign of crisis budgetary response, sometimes topping up budget lines multiple times in a year.

While shifts in development and humanitarian funding in key countries of origin and transit have been highly visible, we found that swings in some aspects of security and defense budgets have not been as large or obvious. This is partly due to a lack of resources to devote to these issues (in addition to the funding dedicated to development assistance), but also to different priorities at the national level. The European Union as a whole and Germany have allocated the largest funding increases to development efforts as well as security-related missions abroad (mainly in the Sahel region and the Middle East) that address the external dimension of migration, while the Netherlands and Sweden have prioritized the internal dimension of processing asylum seekers, returns, and border control.

Beyond the rising numbers and evolving mandates, the scale of the crisis and the pressure for policymakers to address it as fast as possible have led to numerous funding pledges and statements of new efforts dedicated to improving the “root causes” of migration in third countries, which have sometimes fallen short of their promise. On the one hand, the European Union is adopting comprehensive, regional approaches in places like the Sahel, from addressing security concerns through Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions to working on the economic causes of emigration and developing ways to harness private-sector potential to drive development in origin countries and free up resources in the short and longer term (for example, through the European Investment Bank’s Economic Resilience Initiative). On the other hand, some funds have been pledged multiple times (i.e., for different funds and international initiatives, such as funding for the Facility for Refugees in Turkey being pledged again at the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference), while other pledges have not materialized, instead getting reassigned. In addition, the plethora of action plans and agreements has created long to-do lists, which policymakers have found can take a long time to fulfill. This has created a gap between rhetoric and action that still needs to be addressed. It has also brought into question the transparency of the funds used to tackle the crisis, as many overlap or target multiple goals.

But perhaps the most significant policy evolution has been the political and budgetary blurring of the external and internal dimensions of migration, whereby external development and security efforts in source and transit countries attempt to push the problem farther away from Europe’s borders. This in turn has reinforced the European Union’s internal drive to assert greater control over its borders and hasten repatriations and returns, which tend to externalize the perceived burdens of migration and risk diminishing support for international legal norms.

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4. Interview with European Union External Action Service (EEAS) official.
LOOKING FORWARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Three years on, the European Union and its member states continue to grapple with the consequences of the 2015 migration crisis, both in their relationships with third countries and in dealing with internal cohesion. Though the sense of crisis has receded, migrant arrivals across the Mediterranean have continued, and some EU member states still refuse to accept relocation and resettlement schemes.

The crisis has also impacted the next budget’s negotiations. The European Commission has proposed revising the European Union’s generous “cohesion” funds (meant to reduce regional disparities in wealth and opportunities within the European Union) to account for more indicators than GDP per capita; one of the new criteria would be immigration levels between 2014 and 2017. Importantly, it has also proposed to collapse several funds dedicated to external action (both development and security-related funds) into one “Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument,” along with a 26 percent increase in funding for external actions.

The complex institutional and financial landscape to address the external dimension of migration requires a new format to fund migration-specific action and better coordinate the European Union’s work on the issue. This external action “one-stop-shop” of sorts could help reduce the confusion and redundancy of some programs and instruments and offer clearer counterparts to national actors working on migration management, though civil society has voiced concern that other development issues such as the Sustainable Development Goals and gender equality would receive less funding within this big instrument.

In light of our findings, of Europe’s continued struggle to tackle the migration challenge, and of recent budget developments, we propose the following recommendations:

- Understand and properly assess the chronic nature of the migration challenge. New estimates must be developed over the next decade based on realistic arrivals, continuing crises, and demographic projections in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, as well as the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

- A better understanding of the impact of development and security efforts, as well as funding shifts between priorities, is necessary. Shifts in funding imply trade-offs, and these must be understood.

- The European Union should undertake a “best practices” assessment of the most effective border security and law enforcement capacity-building programs in conflict zones.

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• The European Union, and member states separately, should map out the various ministries and agencies involved in migration-related policies, and establish productive linkages and communication channels across them.
  o The creation of migration “fusion centers” could bring a variety of agencies and actors together at both the country level and in Brussels or capitals (in a format similar to the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre).
  o These “fusion cells” should also directly liaise and share border control information with officials at Europol, Eurojust, and Frontex at both the EU and member-state level.

• The European Union should open participation in the Trust Funds to non-EU countries as a way to harness more investment for recipient countries.

• The European Union and its member states must improve clarity on funding pledges nationally and through the Trust Funds, as well as the rate of allocation and delivery of funds and activities.
  o Greater transparency related to the names of the organizations responsible for implementing migration-related funding and the amount of funds they receive for specific activities would be welcome. However, any public listing of these organizations should be mindful of the potential impact of transparency on their work in certain countries.
  o The European Union and member states should create an alert mechanism for migration-related instruments when large amounts of funds are disbursed over a relatively short period of time to a source or transit country.

• Additional and annual flexibility must be built into the next Multiannual Financial Framework and go beyond the single midterm revision.
Methodological Note

Budgets and appropriations are notoriously dense materials to parse. Thousands of pages lay down the government’s priorities for the next year in numbers and figures that can be hard to decrypt. In a given country, different funding levels have different impacts depending on the recipient; the same amount of money will get you further in one field over another (e.g., education versus defense). Different ministries and agencies are sometimes in charge of overlapping mandates and receive disparate shares of resources allocated to one specific policy objective. This is particularly true in the field of migration, where interior, justice, foreign affairs, and sometimes other ministries are involved. Across EU member states, different ministries are tasked with migration management and the external dimension of migration, creating further confusion in the data. And to add to this complex picture, the European Union itself relies on completely different departments and instruments (with different prerogatives) and has different budgeting rules and standards than its member states.

For this research project, we compared nonstandardized budgetary data to try to identify patterns in the decisionmaking processes linked to the migration crisis. Our assumption is that budgets reflect policy priorities because governments must allocate limited resources among a multitude of policy domains, and their decisions highlight policy preferences for certain domains over others. Based on this assumption, our goal was to observe large trends and shifts in budget decisions, highlight shifting priorities that emerged during the migration crisis, and assess the long-term impact of these budgetary decisions for the European Union’s migration-related and foreign policies, as well as its member states.

To observe these trends, we focused on official budget documents for the European Union and the case study countries. For the European Union, we used the official adopted budgets from 2014 to 2017 (2012 for some instruments to give a broader precrisis perspective), some of the departments’ own documents to analyze mandates, and amending documents as well as the Global Transfer. We based our analysis on commitment appropriations (as opposed to payment appropriations) to better reflect policymakers’ priorities, and to take into account the fact that payment
appropriations are too dependent on delivery and implementation, which can sometimes be delayed or moved forward for a variety of reasons independent of political will. For Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, we referred to official adopted budgets and end-of-year budgets (following amendments and midyear reviews) for 2014 to 2017, and in some cases 2012 and 2013—principally for defense and security issues, as these are often multiyear programs that involve long-term planning and are slow to show upticks or decreases.

Due to the nonstandardized nature of the data, we had to make assumptions in certain situations; we used public declarations, pledges, press releases, and policymaker interviews to ascertain or disprove these assumptions, and we highlight the intentions behind some of these budgetary decisions. We understand that some of these assumptions are debatable, and we encourage the reader to consider these limitations when assessing the analysis.
Introduction

If we fail to provide a common answer to questions of illegal migration, the foundations of the European Union will be called into question.

—Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany

Migration to and within Europe is not a new phenomenon. In the twentieth century, Europe experienced massive population movements in the aftermath of World War II, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and during the conflict in the western Balkans. Europe has repeatedly absorbed multiple types of migration: temporary workers with legal visas, undocumented economic migrants looking for new opportunities, and refugees seeking protection from conflict. The political and public reaction to migration, however, has dramatically changed in the past twenty years, as particularly large migration flows from Africa and the Middle East to Europe have attracted international media attention and heightened public fears. Despite long-standing international conventions and norms establishing protections for the most vulnerable migrants (refugees, asylum seekers), these international legal responsibilities are under serious threat. As European policymakers face a rising tide of intolerance, populism, and xenophobia, maintaining domestic political stability has become paramount.

The type of irregular migration that Europe is experiencing has been largely caused by instability around Europe. There is now a palpable perception that the European Union views migration as the security threat rather than the instability in origin and transit countries that prompts or facilitates people leaving in the first place. In response, there is a growing political demand to keep migrants as far away as possible from Europe’s borders, with some EU leaders suggesting that it will be necessary to establish migrant “camps” outside of the European Union for rejected asylum seekers who are denied entry back to their home countries.
AN INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEM IN SEARCH OF AN EXTERNAL SOLUTION

How do nations address migration externally? Their first instinct is to target the drivers and sources of migration flows, which is commonly referred to as addressing the “root causes” of migration. This overused, catch-all phrase has been rendered meaningless, but in practice it means providing third countries of origin or transit with development and security assistance. While EU member states have used traditional foreign policy tools to control migration flows to Europe, the European Union’s role as an externally facing actor in migration control is a recent development that was partly fueled by the 2015 crisis.

To non-EU audiences, it might seem odd to highlight the European Union’s growing use of conditionality in bilateral relationships, or its evolving development relationship with third countries, as this has long been a fixture of sovereign nations’ foreign and migration management policies. But the European Union’s role as a foreign policy actor has evolved from focusing on soft power...
projection abroad through its generous humanitarian and development assistance, and economic incentives for its neighboring countries, to one that uses an array of security tools that include military missions and economic sanctions.

The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon gave the European Union more institutional coherence to use traditional foreign policy tools such as a foreign ministry (the External Action Service), and successive international crises, such as the 2011 Arab Spring, created the conditions for the European Union to focus on its external policies. While institutional structures are one thing, budgets are another. The European Union’s seven-year budget—the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)—sets out the maximum amounts that EU institutions can spend each year on different policy areas. For the past few years, the European Union has concentrated funds in the east to facilitate integration with new EU members. Despite the 2016 EU Global Strategy calling for greater focus on external policies to address migration, there were limits to what the European Union could do in practice, and financially due to budget constraints. Moreover, the EU policy response has remained fragmented due to member states’ reluctance to transfer too much power away from the national level due to heightened political sensitivities. Finally, the European Union struggled with its own conflictual external image as it simultaneously sought to preserve its neutral, soft power image abroad while attempting to assert a more robust role overseas to assuage criticism of its inability to handle the migration crisis.

In short, the European Union placed itself squarely in the proverbial spot “between a rock and a hard place”: it initially attempted to meet rising expectations for an EU-wide response without an increase in executive authority and budget resources. European migration management was (and remains) mostly a national prerogative, which undermines the development of a pan-European policy. The EU’s role remains limited to coordination and providing financial support (both at an EU level and through national allocations).

A COMPLICATED EU FUNDING LANDSCAPE

As EU policymakers scrambled to respond to the migration crisis, there were significant changes to EU budgets and spending priorities. Within the European Union, public spending on services for new arrivals (ranging from housing and medical care to language training) spiraled upward. Beyond the European Union, national policymakers also increased migration-related funding for key countries of origin, transit, or first asylum for migrants and refugees. This included efforts to strengthen and enforce border control, hasten and increase rates of return for those without legal grounds to remain, and provide assistance to origin, transit, and first asylum countries to try to address the factors driving people to migrate to Europe in the first place. Both the European Union and its member states have reviewed their priorities for development, humanitarian, and security assistance through the lens of migration.

EU funding for the external dimension of migration comes from two key sources:

- The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the European Union’s seven-year spending plan on different policy areas (or “headings”). Migration spending currently falls under
Heading 3 (“Security and Citizenship”) and Heading 4 (“Global Europe”), with the latter accounting for most spending on the external dimension of migration.¹

- The European Development Fund (EDF), which operates outside the EU budget and pools EU member state contributions to provide development aid to African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, and overseas countries and territories. This usually runs on a six-year cycle (the 10th EDF ran from 2008 to 2013, while the 11th EDF runs from 2014 to 2020, concurrent with the current MFF).

Together, the funds and instruments that can be tapped to respond to the external dimension of migration amount to €67 billion for the 2014–2020 MFF (see the diagram above). These sources of funding and their use since the 2015 migration crisis are the focus of this monograph.

Because negotiations for the MFF begin two years in advance, EU policymakers are essentially forced to map out funding priorities for the next decade using data that quickly becomes outdated. For example, the funding levels set for 2015 (when migration flows peaked) for programs that are relevant to migration management were negotiated in 2012 and 2013, with completely different estimates of monthly and yearly immigration levels. The limited flexibility built into the MFF makes it difficult to shift funds between different preset country allocations and policy areas. The few tools with such flexibility at the European Union’s disposition are emergency instruments (reserves and contingency margins) and budget transfers.

**MEMBER STATES’ RESPONSE**

While it is helpful to understand the external responses to the migration crisis at the supranational level, member states largely retain control over migration policy; it is therefore necessary to observe how individual states have responded externally to the crisis, particularly those states that received the greatest volumes of asylum seekers and have had to leverage important government spending to respond to the crisis. This report focuses on the migration policy evolution of three EU countries—Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands—that have all faced political backlash against increased migration as populist and xenophobic parties have gained popularity since 2015.

In 2015, Germany registered 1.1 million asylum applications and has since led some of the European Union’s external efforts to manage migration by concluding agreements with third countries to limit onward migration to Europe (particularly the EU-Turkey agreement). Before the 2015 crisis, Germany’s migration policies focused on addressing the challenges of a rapidly aging population, with much of its migration and development work geared toward skilled migration. Since then, anti-immigrant sentiment has risen; following the 2017 elections, the largest opposition party in the German parliament became the far-right, anti-immigrant, and Euro-skeptical party Alternative for Germany. The new Grand Coalition agreed to spend an additional €2 billion on development and defense (“international responsibilities”), with a €9 billion target for the medium term. Germany has diverted increasing development and humanitarian funds to migration; it has deployed approximately 200 soldiers to Mali as part of a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) mission; and it has agreed to a ceiling of between 180,000 and 220,000 asylum seekers in Germany per year. Recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel succinctly articulated Europe’s dilemma to members of the pan-European center-right political grouping, the European People’s Party, in Munich: “Anyone who believes that a European border police force alone can seal off maritime borders will not do justice to the issue. . . . Security, development and defense policies need to be linked to each other.”

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In 2015, the Netherlands received 44,970 asylum applications, though reports placed the total number of migrants entering the country closer to 200,000.\(^5\) It was one of the first countries to reinstate temporary border controls through mobile border guards in September 2015. The crisis has also fueled far-right forces, with the already popular Party for Freedom becoming the second-largest party in the Dutch parliament in 2017.\(^6\) Since 2015, the government has focused its efforts and investments in key origin and transit countries in Africa and has supported EU deployments in the region. Even prior to the crisis, the Dutch government was investing in the Horn of Africa region. The Netherlands, for example, has managed the Regional Development and Protection Program (RDPP) in the Horn of Africa, which was launched in June 2015—just before the crisis reached its height—and is a donor to the RDPP launched in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq in 2014. Yet the Dutch development budget precrisis was shrinking. The coalition agreement of 2013 outlined €1 billion in cuts to the development budget by 2017 (excluding emergency aid).\(^7\) This built on efforts of the previous coalition (2010–2012) to reduce development spending, cut the number of countries receiving assistance (from 33 to 15), and focus aid more on investment and trade. These trends had to be reversed in light of the rising arrivals of 2015.

At the onset of the migration crisis, Sweden launched generous policies for Syrian nationals and approved the third-most asylum applications in all of Europe in 2015 (162,550).\(^8\) Swedish authorities quickly became overwhelmed, and neighboring Denmark reinstated temporary border controls on the Oresund bridge connecting Sweden to Denmark. Sweden’s second-largest political party, the Sweden Democrats, is an anti-immigration nationalist party. Facing elections in September 2018, it could take the Swedish government a long time to form (similar to the Netherlands and Germany) due to the rise of anti-immigrant parties and the difficult coalition math. Before the crisis, Sweden was a generous provider of overseas development assistance, particularly to the Middle Eastern region (with an emphasis on Syria) in the form of humanitarian assistance and some development assistance.\(^9\) Its national development agency had limited interaction with migration priorities (migration was not included in its mandate), and only a limited number of projects focused on migration and development work.\(^10\) By contrast, in 2016, overseas development assistance budgets faced important cuts to cover high in-country refugee costs; Sweden has

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10. Ibid., 176.
also contributed to Frontex operations in the Mediterranean, but has provided limited support to CSDP missions in the Sahel.

We are still witnessing the aftershocks of Europe’s 2015 migration crisis. It has brought about visible material change to the European Union’s and member states’ external policies, as we lay out in detail in this report. Some identified shifts will appear to be subtle and thought of as unimportant or inconsequential. However, these seemingly subtle budget shifts are early indicators of more significant changes for Europe as a political and foreign actor in the future. Migration is now central to European political dynamics, which will reshape other policy and budgetary priorities. Shrinking financial resources after the United Kingdom departs the European Union will be further stretched. Importantly, the United States relies heavily on the European Union as a development and security assistance actor. And though some of the described budgetary shifts in Europe’s development assistance and security policies will likely fall more in line with U.S. regional security priorities, the United States ultimately risks losing the complementarity of the European Union as an external assistance actor. But the greatest impact of the migration crisis on U.S. interests is undoubtedly the fragmentation of the European Union itself as instability grows in Europe.
Impact of the Crisis on Development and Humanitarian Assistance

The pace and the scale of the migration crisis in Europe caught EU and national policymakers off guard and placed considerable strain on migration and asylum systems. Within the European Union, the costs of hosting large populations of new asylum seekers and migrants placed enormous pressure on local services—and necessitated cuts and reallocations from other parts of EU and national budgets, including development and humanitarian assistance, to cover the shortfall. Meanwhile, policymakers also increased their investments in key sending and transit countries for migrants, in a bid to reduce irregular migration to Europe and prevent the next crisis.

Over the course of 2015 and 2016, EU and national policymakers made significant pledges to address the “drivers” of migration in the Middle East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, explicitly linking development and humanitarian assistance to migration management objectives. The European Union launched three major funding instruments, backed by billions of euros: the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund), designed to support Syrian refugees and host communities, and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, to address the root causes of irregular migration and displacement in Africa. At the national level, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands have all stepped up development and humanitarian assistance for countries or regions sending migrants to Europe, with migration becoming a growing priority in their operations.

EU and national policymakers had limited resources to respond to the crisis as it unfolded. Budget ceilings are set well in advance, with limited flexibility to move money around quickly to respond to emerging needs. As a result, migration-related budgets in 2015 and 2016 came under enormous strain. To finance asylum and reception services within the European Union and pledges to increase support for key sending or transit countries—the latter of which is the focus of this

1. Elizabeth Collett and Kate Hooper of the Migration Policy Institute Europe authored this chapter as a contribution to this monograph.
monograph—policymakers were forced to get creative, tapping emergency funds and reallocating resources from elsewhere. And with many of these emergency funding mechanisms now exhausted, EU and national policymakers have even less capacity to respond to a future crisis.

This chapter explores how the recent crisis shaped EU and national spending on the external dimension of migration, looking at the experiences of the European Union, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. It examines how policymakers mobilized additional resources, particularly from development and humanitarian budgets, to respond to the crisis, looking at both the commitments made and the funding that actually materialized, and explores the broader policy implications that these new investments in third countries portend.

HOW DID THE CRISIS SHAPE EU SPENDING ON MIGRATION IN SENDING AND TRANSIT COUNTRIES?

The migration crisis laid bare the challenges of responding to a rapidly evolving situation. The crisis quickly exhausted much of the European Union’s available funds for migration, prompting a scramble to mobilize funding from other sources, including emergency funding measures, to honor commitments and plug gaps in spending. And where funds were not entirely depleted, policymakers faced two challenges: first, delivering funding quickly enough to keep up with fast-changing needs, and second, ensuring that the recipients of additional funding were equipped to spend this money effectively.

Over the course of 2015 and 2016, the European Union increased its spending on migration in non-EU countries, recognizing that reducing irregular migration to Europe would require investments in sending or transit countries to deter people from undertaking these dangerous journeys in the first place. Following months of discussion, African and European leaders released a Joint Action Plan at the November 2015 Valletta Summit on migration that set out priorities in the areas of addressing drivers of migration, legal migration pathways, protection and asylum, tackling irregular migration, and returns, and launched the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to support its implementation (see below). And in June 2016, the European Union launched the Migration Partnership Framework, which aims to establish tailored compacts with partner countries that help reduce irregular migration to Europe by strengthening borders, bolstering return rates for unauthorized migrants, and addressing drivers of migration. EU migration-related spending has included migration management efforts (for example, improving Libya’s capacity to patrol its coastal...


3. The first partners selected were Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. The Migration Partnership Framework builds on prior EU efforts to collaborate with non-EU countries on migration management, but it is distinguished by its ambition and its integration into foreign policy efforts. For a fuller discussion, see Elizabeth Collett and Aliyyah Ahad, EU Migration Partnerships: A Work in Progress (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2017).
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(waters), improving conditions for refugees and host communities (for example, expanding education and health services in countries hosting Syrian refugees), and investing in livelihood opportunities to try to discourage people from moving. All of this costs money.

Creative Funding Strategies

First, the European Union increased the budget for many of its migration-related funds over the course of 2015–2016. Figure 1.1 illustrates the dramatic changes in these budgets over this period, comparing the budgets adopted at the start of each year with the amounts allocated to these funds at year end. The Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund, for example, saw its budget more than double between 2015 and 2016 as it received additional funding for asylum and reception services and border management activities during the crisis. Similarly, the humanitarian aid budget soared in response to the Syria crisis and other crises in Iraq, South Sudan, Yemen, Lake Chad, and elsewhere, increasing by €1.7 billion over the course of 2016.

With funding priorities and spending ceilings set out years in advance under the EU 2014–2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, the Commission relied heavily on several emergency funds to
plug gaps in their budgets. But by the end of 2016, the Commission had spent all of the money available in both the Emergency Aid Reserve and the Flexibility Instrument, and it was forced to draw on the Contingency Margin (a “last resort” fund, used when all other alternatives are exhausted) to cover additional migration-related expenses. The European Union’s revisions to its budget in the summer of 2017 added yet more money to the emergency funds, and also tweaked the rules to enable the Commission to access additional funding in emergency situations. But the experiences of 2015 and 2016 illustrate the limited options the European Union has for responding directly to large-scale crises.

As well as tapping emergency funds, policymakers were able to repurpose funds from other parts of the budget. EU budget rules limit the ability to move funds from one part of the budget to another, or indeed, for member states to redistribute funds among themselves. In mid-2017, the EU budget was revised to provide an additional €3.9 billion for migration-related measures (both internally and externally) between 2017 and 2020, by reallocating unused funds from other parts of the budget; but at the height of the crisis, policymakers ended up shifting resources between priorities within the same area of the budget as needs emerged.

While this process freed up much-needed money, it raises issues of transparency. Reallocations of funds are difficult to track, for two reasons. First, pledged funding does not always materialize, as it may be committed elsewhere as priorities change. One example is the funds assigned for the EU relocation mechanism, a portion of which was reassigned to resettling Syrians under the

4. See Amending Budget 4/2016, which used the Contingency Margin to free up funds for AMIF and ISF. The Emergency Aid Reserve is designed to provide up to €280 million/year for unforeseen aid in non-EU countries, and the Flexibility Instrument is designed to provide up to €471 million/year to cover expenditures that exceed a budget ceiling. European Commission, DG BUDGET, “Flexibility Instruments,” February 15, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/budg_system/flex/flex_en.cfm.

5. Under the Mid-Term Review, the Flexibility Instrument and Emergency Aid Reserve budgets were expanded (by €150 million and €23 million, respectively), and the EU also changed the rules to allow carryovers from other special instruments, which allowed for a transfer of €646 million to the Flexibility Instrument from the EU Solidarity Fund and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund. Under the new provisions, the Flexibility Instrument and Emergency Aid Reserve budgets can now be deployed across years (i.e., the Commission can deploy funds allocated for future years in the budget), providing the Commission with additional flexibility, and permitted larger transfers of unused payments. Council of the European Union, “EU Revises Its Budget Framework for 2014–2020 to Meet New Priorities,” press release, June 20, 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/20-budget-framework-2014-2020/.


EU-Turkey deal as the scope of the relocation initiative was dialed down. Second, there is a risk of double-counting money as it gets moved around, with different pledges potentially referring to the same pot of money. When the Commission pledged €1 billion to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey when it was established in November 2015, this drew from existing funds for Turkey (such as the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, IPA II). In turn, the Facility pledge was counted again when the Commission pledged €1 billion at the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference in London in February 2016. The same €1 billion pot of money could therefore be counted in three separate ways. Both examples illustrate how simply counting up pledges does not give an accurate picture of how much money is actually being spent.

A separate issue is that some partner countries simply do not have the capacity to administer and effectively spend the additional funds that have been allocated. It takes time to scale up operations, and policymakers need to be realistic about what is possible, especially in fragile countries where the government’s reach is limited and institutions are weak. Increasing migration-related spending is both a question of expanding budgets and building recipients’ capacity to use the money effectively.

New Funding Instruments

The Commission’s second strategy to step up spending on migration was to repurpose more of its external assistance (including development, neighborhood, and humanitarian funds) toward migration-related goals, in part through the creation of several new instruments:

- **The Madad Fund.** Launched in December 2014 as a five-year program, the Madad Fund was designed to coordinate nonhumanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees and host communities in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and the western Balkans. It has pooled about €1.5 billion in funds, primarily from EU funds (the European Neighborhood Instrument [ENI], IPA II, and the Development Cooperation Instrument [DCI]), but including more than €150 million from 22 EU member states and Turkey. Projects have been

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funded in areas such as education and vocational training, health care, and municipal infrastructure.

- **The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.** Launched in November 2015 as a five-year program, the EUTF for Africa is intended to address the factors driving irregular migration and displacement in key sending or transit countries in North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel and Lake Chad region. The EUTF Africa was established with €1.8 billion from the European Commission (including the European Development Fund [EDF]), with the initial expectation that member states would match this contribution, which did not come to fruition. To date, it has pooled about €3.4 billion in funds, primarily from the European Development Fund (about €2.98 billion), but with other funds pledged by other EU funding sources (including DCI, ENI, AMIF, and humanitarian aid [ECHO]), and €414 million combined from EU member states, Switzerland, and Norway. Most of its projects focus on economic development, with its other priority areas including migration management, governance, and basic service provision.

- **The Facility for Refugees in Turkey.** Launched in 2016 to accompany the EU–Turkey Statement, the Facility for Refugees in Turkey aims to coordinate humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance for refugees and host communities in Turkey. The Facility covers the provision of basic services (e.g., health and education), municipal infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, migration management, and socioeconomic support. Between 2016 and 2017, it managed €3 billion in funds, €1 billion of which came from the European Union (including IPA II, ECHO, DCI, ENI, and the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace Commission).
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[IcSP]) and €2 billion from member states.\textsuperscript{16} The Facility is slated to be extended with another €3 billion in funds.\textsuperscript{17}

All three instruments were designed to try to coordinate the money being spent in one or more countries by different EU and national agencies.\textsuperscript{18} They offer a mechanism to pool funds from an array of different policy portfolios, ranging from development assistance to pre-accession funds to humanitarian aid, and try to realize economies of scale. Both the Facility and Trust Funds have delivered funds far quicker than the usual procurement processes. The Facility, for example, programmed €2.9 billion, contracted projects worth €1.7 billion, and disbursed nearly €900 million between 2016 and 2017—a pace that is much quicker than through normal procurement processes, which can take years.\textsuperscript{19}

More broadly, they signal how migration is becoming a rising priority in EU external assistance to key sending or transit countries. The European Development Fund, for example, has provided nearly 90 percent of total funding for the EUTF Africa, with the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) providing additional funds as well. A greater proportion of development and humanitarian assistance, as well as neighborhood funds, are now flowing to Asia and Africa programs, evidenced through the dramatic increase in humanitarian assistance funding for Syria and other crises in 2016. Another example is the Migration Partnership Framework, established by the Commission in June 2016 as a way to work initially with Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal on migration management and returns, addressing the drivers of migration, and expanding legal opportunities for migration.\textsuperscript{20} In January 2017, the budget was amended to provide more resources for the Migration Partnership Framework, with an additional €400 million for DCI’s migration and asylum work in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, €100 million for cooperation with Asia, and another €250 million for ENI’s Mediterranean budget line.\textsuperscript{21}

But ensuring that the use of development and humanitarian assistance for migration-related purposes still respects the objectives and the rules and requirements of these funding streams can prove to be a challenge. Currently, 90 percent of EU external assistance must qualify as overseas


\textsuperscript{18} An important distinction between the two Trust Funds and the Facility is that while that while the Facility coordinates investments, the Trust Funds actually transfer and repackage contributions as Trust Fund–managed initiatives.


development assistance (ODA), setting limits both on which countries can receive assistance and on what types of assistance can be funded. These requirements place restrictions on spending in the security sector, for example, with implications for migration management capacity building in places like Libya. But in practice, spending under the Trust Funds, particularly on migration management activities, reportedly tests the limits of what is permitted under ODA spending, which requires the primary objective to be economic development and bars most spending on security forces or the “promotion of [the] donor’s security interests.”

More broadly, the optics of using development assistance, with its poverty alleviation agenda, to try to reduce migration are challenging, given the established development benefits of migration for sending countries.

These new instruments have added to the flexibility and responsiveness of the EU budget, offering a way to pool the array of different EU and non-EU funds available, and deliver money much more quickly than through regular procurement processes. But they face several challenges. First, the Trust Funds have struggled to get member state buy-in, with the European Union providing the lion’s share of funding to date. In part, this may reflect the relative novelty of this instrument, with member states being hesitant about assigning money to be managed directly by the Trust Fund or waiting to see results, and ongoing pressure on domestic budgets. And in the case of the EUTF Africa, some member states felt they were already contributing through the EDF, which is financed by member states and makes up most of the funding for the Trust Fund. Second, while the Trust Funds rely on trusted implementing partners, who are primarily member state development agencies or international organizations (such as the International Organization for Migration), as part of their efforts to speed up procurement processes, this shuts out other, non-European civil society actors who may be well-placed to deliver services. It also adds to the perception of recycling money: for example, Germany is one of the largest donors to the EUTF Africa, pledging €157.5 million to the EUTF Africa, but the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) is also one of its key implementing partners, implementing €211.6 million in EUTF-funded projects.

Looking forward, the European Union faces the challenge of developing a clear, coordinated strategy for all of the external assistance that is now being channeled toward migration. Policy-makers are under pressure to act quickly to stem migration flows and have mobilized significant resources for key sending or transit countries since 2015. But some of the projects lack clear

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22. Castillejo reports, for example, that despite safeguards on spending for ODA in the EUTF Africa, “a number of EU and member state officials interviewed for this research admitted that some EUTF projects are ‘stretching’ the definition of ODA.” OECD, “Official Development Assistance (ODA),” April 2018, https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/What-is-ODA.pdf; Clare Castillejo, *The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: A Glimpse of the Future for EU Development Cooperation* (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2016), 23.

23. For example, the role of remittances in helping lift households out of poverty is well documented. For a discussion of these issues, see Kate Hooper and Kathleen Newland, *Building Migration into Existing Development Partnerships and Vice Versa* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, forthcoming).


25. GIZ is also participating in a number of projects that are being jointly implemented by several agencies, worth another €215 million. European Commission, “EU MS and Other Donors Contributions”; European Commission, 2017 Annual report EU Trust Fund for Africa, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/2017_tffa_en_web_lowres_final05.pdf.
objectives or, for that matter, measurable outcomes. In one sense, most development interventions could fall under the broad remit of “addressing the root causes of migration,” given this can encapsulate investments in livelihoods and economic development, governance, education and vocational training, health services, and infrastructure. But what does success look like when measured against such broad objectives?

HOW DID THE CRISIS SHAPE MIGRATION-RELATED SPENDING BY GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, AND SWEDEN?

As at the EU level, the migration crisis had a significant impact on national budgets. The scale and pace of arrivals went far beyond the capacity of national asylum and reception systems, and in the scramble to scale up services to meet needs, EU and national policymakers tapped other parts of their budget and emergency funding instruments. As Figure 1.2 illustrates, in-country refugee costs started to subsume national ODA budgets, reducing the resources available for developing countries.26

Meanwhile, migration became a top priority in development budgets, with member states stepping up their support for key sending and transit countries and devoting more resources to address the root causes of migration. This increase in funding for priority countries has come from emergency budget lines, often at the expense of other geographic or thematic priorities, pointing to longer-term shifts in priorities. And with numerous agencies now focused on migration, coordination of these efforts becomes more of a priority, and a challenge.

Germany

In response to the crisis, Germany increased its migration-related spending in non-EU countries and prioritized political partnerships with key countries of origin or transit for migrants, such as Turkey, Afghanistan, and Tunisia. The German government views development and humanitarian assistance as a key part of their response to the migration crisis, in terms of both stabilizing host countries and investing in education, employment, and infrastructure to reduce incentives to leave.27

Prior to the crisis, Germany was already increasing its spending on development and humanitarian aid, with the 2013 coalition treaty committing the government to spending an additional €2 billion on aid to 2017. Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)


carried out some migration-related work (for example, through its efforts to reintegrate refugees and internally displaced people) and its efforts to promote the development benefits of migration (for example, through pilots encouraging the temporary migration of middle- or high-skilled migrants). But the political focal points of BMZ’s work were implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, addressing climate change, and tackling hunger—notably, through a special initiative (set out below).

BMZ was also taking steps to increase its support for fragile states, with a particular emphasis on assistance for Africa. In 2014, BMZ established three special initiatives to (1) promote food security and tackle malnutrition; (2) promote stability and economic development in the Middle East

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28. In 2011, the Federal Foreign Office (AA) and BMZ signed an interministerial agreement setting out their respective responsibilities for humanitarian assistance; while the AA is responsible for most humanitarian assistance (for example, emergency assistance), BMZ is responsible for helping to reconstruct infrastructure, reintegrate displaced people, and provide medium- to long-term food security. OECD, *OECD Development Co-Operation Peer Reviews: Germany, 2015* (Paris: OECD, 2015), 82.
29. Ibid., 54.
and North Africa region; and (3) provide short-term support to displaced people and host communities, with a focus on reintegrating refugees and addressing the drivers of displacement.\textsuperscript{31} The logic behind these initiatives was to offer additional funding for key policy priorities that would complement country-specific allocations, but could be spent more quickly and provide policymakers with more flexibility.\textsuperscript{32}

As the crisis unfolded, more of Germany’s development and humanitarian budgets were diverted to migration. The budgets for the three special initiatives increased year on year, from €160 million in 2014 to €685 million in 2017.\textsuperscript{33} BMZ’s budget line for crisis management and reconstruction also rose, from €49 million in 2014 to reach €500 million in 2017.\textsuperscript{34} The Federal Foreign Office’s budget for humanitarian aid and crisis prevention quadrupled between 2014 and 2017, from €303 million in 2014 to €1.2 billion in 2017. Germany also increased its support for multilateral organizations (primarily contributions to the United Nations) through both its Federal Foreign Office and BMZ budgets. Looking ahead, these spending trends are likely to be maintained. In June 2015, Chancellor Merkel pledged an additional €8.3 billion in funding for development cooperation between 2016 and 2019, focused on drivers of migration.\textsuperscript{35} And in the run-up to the September 2017 election, Chancellor Merkel pledged to increase the development budget by 1.7 percent.\textsuperscript{36}

Like the European Union and other countries in this monograph, Germany faced the challenge of increasing its spending on migration within the parameters of a relatively rigid budget. The annual, top-down structure of Germany’s budget, coupled with its emphasis on staying within budget, makes it quite difficult to reallocate funds to meet emerging needs.\textsuperscript{37} While the government could meet some needs by reallocating funds within budget chapters, or using carryovers from previous

\begin{enumerate}
\item The initial time frame for spending under the special initiatives was initially one year, though it has now increased to two years. Knoll and Sheriff, Making Waves, 141; Government of Germany, “Memorandum for the DAC Peer Review of Germany, 2015,” 22–25.
\item The special initiative for the MENA region’s budget was €20 million in 2014, €35 million in 2015, €70 million in 2016, and €70 million in 2017; the special initiative to tackle root causes and reintegrate refugees’ budget was €70 million in 2014, €70 million in 2015, €300 million in 2016, and €395 million in 2017; and the special initiative to tackle hunger’s budget was €70 million in 2014, €95 million in 2015, €220 million in 2016, and €220 million in 2017. https://www.bundesaushalt-info.de/#/2016/soll/ausgaben/einzelplan/23.html.
\item This budget line (687 06), referred to as transitional support for development and reconstruction in the 2014 and 2015 budgets, was €49 million in 2014, €139 million in 2015, €400 million in 2016, and €500 million in 2017.
\end{enumerate}
years, this proved insufficient. To cover the rising asylum- and integration-related costs for the Länder, the federal government had to resort to supplementary budgets, which are unusual—and can only be carried out after review by the Bundestag's Budget Committee and authorization by the Ministry of Finance. But unlike the Netherlands and Sweden, Germany did not introduce cuts to its development budget to offset the costs of hosting refugees, which rose to €8.3 billion between 2015 and 2016 (see Figure 1.2). Germany counts in-country refugee costs separately from prior development spending; although this increase in refugee costs, coupled with additional development spending, has allowed Germany to reach its ODA spending goal of 0.7 percent of GNI in 2016.

Migration has become a growing priority in Germany's development policy, leading both to increases in migration-related spending and the reframing of its work to focus more on migration. BMZ released an updated strategy paper on its Africa policy in 2016, which placed a far greater weight on migration. The paper emphasized the role of economic development in addressing the drivers of displacement and migration, particularly in North Africa—through both the special initiative for the MENA region and several expanded regional or national economic development initiatives—and a new project ("Skills Initiative for Africa") with the African Union on vocational education and jobs. The paper also announced it would focus its support on six countries sending, hosting, or receiving large numbers of refugees—Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan—as well as the African Union's Open Fund for Policy Advice on Displacement and Migration and UNICEF. BMZ is also focusing more on migration management, through both a number of capacity-building projects implemented by GIZ, with money from BMZ and the EUTF Africa, and expanding its efforts to support voluntary and forced returns of refugees and other migrants.

Germany's growing focus on using development and humanitarian assistance to address the drivers of migration comes with some trade-offs, however. One issue is that this has prompted a

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41. The expanded programs in North Africa included a 2015 infrastructure program for North Africa (which included investment and training programs); an expansion of the G7 MENA Transition Fund; increases for the SANAD Fund, which invests in micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises; and expanded economic development programs in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. BMZ's return promotion programs, initially designed to encourage the temporary return of professionals, are now extended to include returning asylum applicants or refugees, failed asylum seekers, and people issued deportation orders. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), Migration, Integration, Asylum: Political Developments in Germany 2016, Annual Policy Report by the German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN) (Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2017).
shift in geographic focus away from Latin America and Asia to focus on key origin or transit countries. BMZ’s investments are now concentrated in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Pakistan, South Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine, and more broadly the North Africa, West Africa, Horn of Africa, and Balkans regions, most of which send or host migrants on the major routes to Europe. The risk is that other pressing development issues in other parts of the world (such as climate change) may be deprioritized in favor of migration. Another issue is that the political focus on curbing migration to Europe sits uneasily with some of the objectives of Germany’s development and humanitarian assistance. Poverty alleviation is the key priority for BMZ, and curbing migration—a phenomenon that provides concrete development benefits for migrants and sending communities—can run counter to this objective.

**The Netherlands**

In response to the migration crisis, the Dutch government increased its spending on migration in other countries, including additional funds for the Syria region and the launch of new projects, such as the Addressing the Root Causes Fund (ARC), to address the drivers of displacement and migration. As a result, humanitarian and development funds became more concentrated on key regions of origin or transit for migrants, such as the Syria region and North Africa. At the same time, the spiraling costs of asylum and refugee reception (see Figure 1.2) have subsumed much of the development budget, potentially threatening long-term projects.

Under the 2010–2012 and 2012–2017 coalition governments, the Netherlands had reorganized its development program and introduced deep cuts to the budget as part of its austerity program. The 2010–2012 government narrowed the focus of its development assistance, concentrating on economic development (and deemphasizing some areas, such as education) and moving toward more thematic programming, while the 2012–2017 government introduced a combined aid, trade, and investment portfolio. In response to the economic crisis, the Netherlands cut its development budget by about €1 billion a year from 2012 onward (about 15 percent). The Netherlands also started to report the costs of hosting in-country refugees as part of its ODA expenditure from 2012.

For a number of years, the Netherlands’ top development priorities have been food security, water, security and the rule of law, and sexual and reproductive health and rights; but migration has become a growing priority nonetheless. From 2013, the Netherlands started to invest more deeply in emergency assistance linked to longer-term support for refugees. The Dutch government began increasing its humanitarian assistance budget in 2013, and in 2014 it established a

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44. BMZ, “Tackling the Root Causes of Displacement.”
47. The Netherlands’ ODA budget fell from €6.34 billion in 2011 to €5.52 billion in 2012, with this cut sustained in subsequent years. This brought the Netherlands’ ODA expenditures below 0.7 percent of GNI for the first time in three decades. OECD data, cited in ibid., 28.
48. These four priority themes have remained in place under the past two governments, and the current coalition government.
three-year Emergency Relief Fund with a €570 million budget. The fund operated alongside the existing humanitarian aid budget, with the goal of providing additional resources, improving flexibility (with €120 million set aside as an emergency reserve), and enabling multiyear financing in crisis-hit regions, such as countries neighboring Syria and South Sudan, and West Africa during the Ebola crisis. Among the priorities of the fund were improving conditions for refugees in countries of first asylum, building disaster preparedness, and fostering innovation in delivering assistance. The Netherlands also agreed to administer the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) for the Horn of Africa, launched in June 2015, which pools funds to projects assisting refugees and host communities in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda with input from its Steering Committee. It is also a donor to the RDPP in the Middle East, established the year prior.

As the migration crisis in Europe unfolded, the Netherlands increased its spending on migration and refugees, and in key sending or transit countries, particularly in the Middle East. Humanitarian assistance expenditures rose sharply from 2014, thanks in part to the creation of the Emergency Relief Fund; in 2015, about €110 million in additional unallocated funds were channeled to Syria. In the spring of 2016, the Dutch government announced an additional €260 million for 2016–2017 to support multiyear resilience programming for Syrian refugees and host communities in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Following the Valletta Summit of November 2015 and the launch of the EUTF Africa, the budget for the RDPP for the Horn of Africa increased dramatically; the Netherlands now manages a €150 million portfolio for assisting refugees and host communities, in close coordination with the EUTF Africa’s Horn of Africa regional window.

The government also started to invest much more deeply in addressing the drivers of migration, most notably through the creation of the Local Employment in Africa for Development (LEAD) fund and the Addressing the Root Causes (ARC) fund. The LEAD fund was launched in 2015, with a budget of €25 million to address youth unemployment in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Tunisia. The €125 million ARC fund was established in 2016 to address conflict, instability, and other factors driving irregular migration in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and

49. The Steering Committee includes several European agencies (DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, DG HOME, and EEAS), European countries (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), and UNHCR and IOM as observers.
51. Ibid., 26.
52. Most of its funds come from the EUTF Africa (€130 million), with additional contributions from AMIF (€13 million) and European countries (€9 million combined from the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland). Government of the Netherlands, “Factsheet RDPP Horn of Africa,” unpublished.
Syria. The government also allocated another €25 million in the summer of 2015 to address youth unemployment and migration through the Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF).

But these increases in development and humanitarian spending came as in-country refugee costs subsumed a significant share of the development budget. The costs of hosting refugees and asylum seekers reached €1.6 billion between 2015 and 2016, making up a substantial share of the Netherlands’ overall development budget (see Figure 1.2).

To avoid cuts to other development programming from rising refugee costs, the Dutch government had to leverage a number of creative budgetary tools. The Dutch development cooperation budget has a fixed ceiling that is linked to GDP, and so much of the additional funding came from future planned budgets linked to the expected growth of Dutch GDP up to 2020. Some additional resources also came from the asylum reserve and unused funds in other parts of the Dutch budget. But much of the flexibility in the budget was eventually exhausted. As of 2017, all of the expected increases in economic growth up to and including 2020 had been spent, leaving the government with limited capacity to respond to any potential future crisis. In October 2017, the new coalition government announced it would increase the ODA budget to 2021, to restore earlier cuts and reach 0.7 percent of GNI once more, and in the meantime, it would allocate €1 billion to cover the dip in funding under the previous cabinet. Had this not occurred, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) would have had to consider undertaking deep cuts to some of its development programs.

Migration is now a top priority for the Netherlands’ development cooperation policy. The 2017 coalition agreement vowed to spend more money on both “the causes and the consequences of migration,” providing more aid for refugees and improving reception conditions (including education for refugee children), and adding Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon as priority countries for receiving aid.

56. Author phone interview with Nathalie Lintvelt, Head of the Migration and Development Division, Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands, September 15, 2017.
59. This had been hinted at earlier, e.g., in a September 2016 letter to Parliament, the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation noted the growing role of ODA in addressing the root causes of migration and improving conditions for refugees in countries of first asylum and noted that this was one of the factors the department was using to select partner countries to receive Dutch aid. Letter of November 7, 2016, from the minister for foreign trade and development cooperation to the House of Representatives on progress toward strengthening reception of refugees in the region. Lilianne Ploumen, Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, “Vernieuwing ODA en Partnerlandenlijst,” Letter to the President of the House of Representatives, September 19, 2016, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/2016/09/19/kamerbrief-vernieuwing-oda-en
cuts), the government has committed to spending an additional €140 million in emergency assistance in 2018, which will help compensate for the closing of the Emergency Relief Fund at the end of 2017. The growing focus on refugees and migration has led to closer coordination within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between its development and humanitarian assistance portfolios, and with other ministries, such as the Ministry for Security and Justice.61

While the Netherlands managed to mobilize significant resources to respond to the migration crisis, its response came with some trade-offs. As discussed earlier, these funds came from leveraging future planned budgets, leaving policymakers with a growing hole in their budget, and little flexibility were another crisis to occur before the funds could be restored. Another consideration is that while the creation of additional funds created greater flexibility to respond to the crisis, questions remain about whether this added flexibility merits the additional transaction costs of administering budgets.62 And a final issue is that, at times, actually spending this emergency assistance proved difficult. Much of the emergency funding is provided with a short time frame for spending, which can prove difficult when it necessitates a substantial scaling-up of activities. The pledge of €260 million for Syrian refugees and host communities, for example, was made in May 2016, with the intention of spending €180 million in 2016 and €80 million in 2017.63 After negotiations with the Ministry of Finance, this timeline was extended to 2019—but this illustrates the pressure to spend money quickly and produce short-term results, and the challenges of scaling up capacity even in a donor country.

Sweden

Like the Netherlands, Sweden uses its development budget to cover some of the costs of hosting refugees, which meant that as in-country refugee costs soared in 2015–2016 (see Figure 1.2), funds were diverted from the development and humanitarian aid budgets. The crisis also informed funding and policy priorities, with funds diverted within the budget for the Middle East and humanitarian aid at the expense of other programs (such as thematic cooperation and research).64

Migration has long been a part of Sweden’s foreign assistance, but in the context of maximizing the development benefits of migration by promoting temporary mobility, engaging diasporas, and facilitating the temporary return of skilled migrants. Sweden’s 2013 aid policy strategy framed

62. Ibid.
63. Letter of November 7, 2016, from the minister for foreign trade and development cooperation.
these efforts as part of its objective to lift people out of poverty. Since 2007, Sweden had focused its development assistance more closely on sub-Saharan Africa. But unlike the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Germany, which distribute funds more thematically, most of Sweden’s development assistance is still distributed on a bilateral basis.

Over the past decade, Sweden’s development and humanitarian assistance had focused more on sub-Saharan Africa; but as the migration crisis unfolded, more resources were channeled toward the MENA and Asia regions. Sweden’s development agency (Sida) announced in February 2016 that it would be redistributing funds toward its peace and conflict resolution work in the Middle East, and specifically the Syria region, and increase humanitarian assistance, at the expense of some global programs and research initiatives (e.g., global education and health programming). Between 2015 and 2016, Sida’s allocations for the Middle East and North Africa region rose by about 40 percent (from €75.5 million to €108.4 million), while its humanitarian assistance budget rose from €296.9 million to €380.4 million. Sweden also increased its support for multilateral organizations working on these issues. For example, an amending budget in November 2015 advanced around €212 million (SEK 2 billion) from future years of the budget for multilateral and international organizations working on humanitarian and crisis prevention issues.

Between 2015 and 2016, Sweden’s development budget came under enormous pressure. As in-country refugee costs reached an estimated €2.8 billion (SEK 27.2 billion) between 2015 and 2016, the Swedish government was forced to cut the development budget. Sweden’s development budget operates on a three-year basis, with yearly appropriations, which gives it some flexibility to adjust allocations as needed while maintaining overall funding levels for programs. But the scale of in-country refugee costs, coupled with emerging needs in key sending and transit countries, seemed poised to result in cuts to development programming. When the 2016 budget was unveiled in September 2015, Sweden’s overall ODA budget faced cuts of €1.4 billion (SEK 13 billion) to cover these in-country refugee costs. The government debated whether to divert as much as 60 percent of its development budget to cover in-country refugee costs, eventually

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65. Promoting a “greater capacity to tackle the opportunities and challenges brought about by migration and mobility” was one of the results linked to the 2013 strategy’s objective of “better opportunities for people living in poverty to contribute to and benefit from economic growth and obtain a good education.” Government of Sweden, Aid Policy Framework—The Direction of Swedish Aid, Government Communication 2013/14: 131, Stockholm, March 13, 2014.


70. In the first half of 2016, Sida reported that its Africa and Asia programs were underfunded, for example. Knoll and Sheriff, Making Waves, 165.

71. Sida, “Deductions for In-Country Refugee Costs.”
settling on a cap of 30 percent. In April 2016, the Swedish government proposed cutting the development budget by another €435 million (SEK 4.1 billion) to help cover in-country refugee costs. However, following a fall in the number of arriving asylum seekers, the autumn budget of 2016 restored earlier cuts to development cooperation (with €413 million [SEK 3.9 billion] in funding) and outlined another €265 million (SEK 2.5 billion) in funding for refugee and migrant children, split between humanitarian organizations, investments in fragile states, and other development funding.

Since the onset of the crisis, forced migration and addressing the drivers of migration have become more of a priority in Sweden’s development cooperation. Sida was instructed to work on migration and development issues in a more systematic manner in March 2016. Sweden’s 2016 aid policy strategy announced it would place a greater emphasis on conflict resolution and state-building in its work, including by addressing the drivers of conflict and other types of vulnerability. While it retained its migration and development focus, this objective now included references to addressing the drivers of forced migration (such as humanitarian crises and environmental factors) and promoting livelihood opportunities for refugees and other migrants. Migration management was a bigger focus: in line with Sustainable Development Goal 10.7, it pledged to promote conditions for safe, orderly, and legal migration, and to build countries’ capacity to manage migration (including returns) while safeguarding the rights of migrants and refugees. The 2016 aid policy strategy also emphasized the need to coordinate humanitarian aid more closely with long-term development assistance, particularly in protracted refugee situations.

The changes to Sweden’s development budget between 2015 and 2016 illustrate the vulnerability of long-term development objectives to crises. The surge in costs for hosting refugees and asylum seekers necessitated drastic cuts to the development budget, which were only restored once the number of arrivals started to fall in 2016. Meanwhile, the growing focus on the Middle East and North Africa region came at the cost of funding for other regions (such as sub-Saharan Africa) and thematic programs (e.g., on human rights or education and health programming). Looking ahead, the development budgets for 2017 and 2018 are higher across almost all programs. But another crisis with surging in-country refugee costs would present similar challenges for the Swedish ODA budget.

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75. Knoll and Sheriff, Making Waves, 176.
77. The exceptions are contributions to multilateral development banks and multilateral and international organizations and funds, which received a contribution of SEK 2 billion in 2015–2016 from future years of its budget.
A CASE STUDY: TURKEY

Turkey became the focal point for European external assistance in late 2015 as they sought to curb maritime arrivals via the eastern Mediterranean. In the spring of 2015, growing numbers of people started to cross the Aegean from Turkey to Greece, reaching more than 100,000 people in the month of August alone, and double that in October.78 By the end of 2015, UNHCR recorded 856,723 sea arrivals.79 Greece’s limited asylum and reception infrastructure was quickly overwhelmed, and many moved on largely unchecked through the western Balkans toward northern European countries such as Germany and Sweden. Germany, which received the bulk of asylum claims in 2015, led negotiations with Turkey to try to stem maritime arrivals.80 EU and national policymakers started to tap their development, humanitarian, and, in the case of the European Union, neighborhood and pre-accession budgets as part of this response.

Prior to the migration crisis, Europe already had deep historical, cultural, and economic ties with Turkey.81 As an EU candidate country, Turkey already received EU funds. In 2015, 20 different EU services provided funding to Turkey, totaling €487 million, the bulk of which was for education and research, with smaller pots for security, neighborhood, and pre-accession funding.82 The European Union and its member states were also providing assistance to Syrian refugees in Turkey. Most of EU nonhumanitarian assistance was coming through the Madad Fund, which was established in December 2014 to pool funds worth €1.5 billion for long-term support for Syrian refugees and host communities in the region.83 EU member states were also contributing to the Madad Fund, along with their contributions through the international donor community.

79. Ibid.
81. Large Turkish diaspora communities live in several EU member states, including Germany and the Netherlands. The Government of Turkey estimates that there are 5.5 million Turkish citizens living in Western European countries; this would exclude those who are of Turkish descent but do not hold Turkish citizenship. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa.
82. These data only cover the EU budget directly implemented by the Commission (which is about 20 percent of the EU’s total expenditures). The bulk of Turkey’s funding in 2015 came from Horizon 2020 (€379.6 million), with other funds including the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP; €7.4 million), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI; €6.7 million), and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II (IPA II; €5.4 million). By contrast, in 2016, IPA II funding rose to €666.4 million, and ENI funds rose to €23 million, as part of their contributions to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. European Commission, Financial Transparency System database, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm.
83. Most EU member states do not provide bilateral development aid to Turkey, bar assistance for Syrian refugee populations. Germany, for example, ended its bilateral development aid to Turkey in 2008. https://www.bmz.de/en/countries_regions/Central-Eastern-and-South-Eastern-Europe/tuerkei/index.html.
As Europe started negotiations with Turkey in the summer of 2015, additional funding for Syrian refugees was a top priority. Negotiations in late 2015 led to the Joint Action Plan, launched on November 29, 2015, which agreed to provide Turkey with €3 billion in funding for Syrian refugees, through the newly established Facility for Refugees in Turkey. One billion euros of this sum would come from the EU budget, with €2 billion coming from the member states. But at the negotiations in early March, President Erdogan told European policymakers that Turkey would need double that amount: €6 billion.

Given the chaos of the past few months, policymakers had little option but to agree, with the EU-Turkey Statement signed in March 2016 proposing to split this payment into two €3 billion tranches. The negotiations and their outcome illustrated how the European Union and its member states were willing to pay almost any price to reduce irregular migration to Europe. Not surprisingly, following the EU-Turkey Statement, other key sending or transit countries soon presented requests for additional funding. For example, Niger told European leaders in May 2016 that it would need €1 billion to stem irregular migration through its territory, equivalent to about 15 percent of its GDP.

The Facility for Refugees in Turkey was set up to pool and coordinate EU and member state resources—and, crucially, to deliver money much more quickly. While Turkey receives large sums of pre-accession assistance, for example, there have been long backlogs in distributing this money, with regular procurement processes for IPA II taking months or even years. By contrast, the Facility managed to contract €3 billion in two years. Using the Facility funds, the European Union was able to launch two flagship initiatives—the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) and the Conditional Cash Transfers for Education (CCTE)—and funded an array of different projects, primarily in the health care and education sectors. The Facility has undoubtedly made a difference; the ESSN had provided social assistance to nearly 1.2 million vulnerable refugees as of February 2018, while the CCTE had provided cash transfers to about 260,000 refugee families sending children to school as of January 2018. The Facility is a good example of EU innovation in the way it delivers money in times of need.

At the same time, a closer look at Europe’s funding pledges for Turkey reveal how limited their resources actually are. Member states spent months debating how to pay for their initial €2 billion

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84. Member state contributions would be added to the EU budget as external assigned revenue, which meant that unlike the EU Trust Funds, the money remained part of the EU budget.
contribution, eventually deciding on a distribution key based on their share of EU gross national income (GNI). To finance its €1 billion contribution, the European Union tapped €310 million in humanitarian assistance, €650 million in IPA II funds already earmarked for Turkey, and €20 million each from DCI and IcSP funds. The €1 billion was not, therefore, “new” money for Turkey. Instead, the European Union was recycling money from other priorities and, crucially, figuring out ways to more quickly disburse funds that were already committed to Turkey. In turn, about €300 million of the Facility’s fund were routed through the Madad Fund. Moving money around in this manner adds to the challenge of parsing out just how much money Europe is spending in Turkey.

As Europe prepares to give Turkey another €3 billion by the end of 2018, the debate has restarted about how to share costs between the European Union and member states. Several member states called on the European Union to fund the entire €3 billion in late 2017, but in March 2018 the European Union announced the second tranche would be funded according to the same ratio as the first, resulting in deadlock. The Commission has now agreed to reverse this ratio, funding €2 billion of the next tranche with member states providing another €1 billion.

In part, this reluctance may stem from the optics of giving money to Turkey in light of worsening relations with some EU member states. The Facility must navigate increasingly tense EU-Turkey relations, and in turn manage Turkish expectations both about the speed with which money can be delivered, and about managing the Facility projects directly (on which the European Union has largely demurred). The speed with which money was committed has also raised questions about how well it has been spent. The European Court of Auditors is due to audit the Facility this year, focusing on its management and results, which may answer nagging concerns about whether the European Union has sufficient oversight of the projects being funded. But the heat of this debate raises questions about whether EU or national policymakers really have another €3 billion at their disposal.


90. The funds came from budget lines 23 02 01 ("Delivery of Rapid, Effective and Needs-Based Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid"), 22 02 03 (IPA II—"Support to Turkey"), 21 02 (DCI), and 19 02 01 (IcSP—"Response to Crisis and Emerging Crisis"). European Court of Auditors (ECA), Background Paper: Facility for Refugees in Turkey, March 2018, 6, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/BP_TRF/BP_Turkey_Refugee_Facility_EN.pdf.


93. See, for example, the breakdown in diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Netherlands, which contributed €93.9 million to the first tranche, and strained relations between Turkey and Germany, which was the largest contributor to the first tranche (€427.5 million). Council of the European Union, “Refugee Facility for Turkey: Member States Agree.”

94. The Facility has committed €660 million to projects headed by Turkish government agencies (the Directorate-General for Migration Management [DGMM], €60 million; the Ministry of National Education, €300 million; and the Ministry of Health, €300 million). European Commission, “EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey: Projects Committed/Decided.”
These questions illustrate a broader quandary for EU and national policymakers looking to invest “upstream” in migration management. What constitutes “value for money” for European policymakers in their investments in Turkey or other key sending or transit countries? And if the European Union’s investments in Turkey—a long-term partner of the European Union, with robust institutions—are coming under such scrutiny, what does that mean for European investments in other key transit or sending countries, where governance is weaker and corruption may be rife?
Impact of the Crisis on Security and Defense Budgets

The migration crisis is posing one of the most significant challenges to the long-term stability and cohesion of the European Union and the political stability of its member states. Between 2014 and 2016 alone, the 28 EU member states received more than 3 million asylum applications combined and found themselves ill-equipped to manage the crisis from both a policy and a budgetary standpoint. This is true for development and humanitarian funding, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, but also for security and defense budgets, which have been increasingly tapped to address the crisis, as European policymakers have sought to respond to greater domestic calls for enhanced security measures.1

While the EU’s development and humanitarian agenda and its asylum framework are well known though evolving to substantially reduce migration, its ability to manage migration has evolved to become a more pressing security matter.2 The nature of security itself has expanded since the end of the Cold War to include a broad set of threats to stability, beyond traditional interstate conflict and military force. Uncontrolled migration is an example of a new challenge that arises from zones of instability in the European Union’s neighborhood and can itself threaten stability between EU member states (whether on its own or as a result of poor management). Thus, Europe’s external action on migration has necessarily broadened to cooperate with more actors, and to expand the scope of action well beyond Europe’s borders.

Since 2015, Europe has had to reassess its policy and budgetary priorities in the external dimension of the crisis and has opened the aperture of migration management policy to include foreign policy, security, and defense actors. Indeed, the European Union has traditionally focused its foreign and security policy on promoting peace and stability, human rights, democracy, good governance, and sustainable growth in countries beyond its borders. Today, European leaders

1. Both sets of issues, development and security, as they relate to migration, are treated separately in this monograph due to their different aims, decisionmaking structures, and actors.
respond to the migration crisis by increasingly placing policy emphasis on border security at home as well as in origin and transit countries to reduce outward flows of migration. Moreover, the line between internal and external security has become increasingly blurred through increased police (and in some cases military) presence within states, enhanced border checks and controls, and intensified training and security-sector reform missions in origin and transit countries. European military interventions in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia have increasingly been justified as a muscular response to uncontrolled migratory flows, as these flows are now cast as security threats in themselves. Foreign policy decisions have also become more focused on European countries’ security assessment of their neighborhood, and as their way of addressing migration-related security concerns with third countries.

Across the European Union and within our three case study countries (Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands), increasing budgetary resources have been allocated to security and stabilization efforts in origin or transit countries from where migrants seeking to enter the European Union hail (e.g., Mali, Niger, Libya). These resources have been reallocated from other budget lines or have come from an increase in the overall budget. Border control has also been prioritized financially and politically as programs initially designed for development purposes have been reprogrammed to enhance security. While disarmament and nonproliferation programs, which typically receive generous funding, have not seen a parallel increase, European NATO countries and non-NATO countries in close proximity to Russia have enhanced border security and collective defense measures, reflecting a clear shift in international security priorities to the defense of borders against both state actors and unregulated migration flows. The European Union and Germany have shown the largest increases in funding for security-related missions abroad, with a particular focus on priority countries in the Sahel and the Middle East. Sweden and the Netherlands have focused their funding priorities more visibly on increasing the speed of processing and deporting asylum seekers, as repatriation has become a tool of security policy.

To assess these budgetary decisions and shifts, we analyzed budget data from 2012 to 2017 for the European Union and our three case study countries. We highlight several instruments and missions that are relevant to the external dimension of the migration crisis, some of which underwent significant budgetary increases (while keeping in mind that external security and defense competencies at the EU level are limited). We also analyzed foreign policy instruments that allow the European Union to take action in the field of migration management. Finally, our analysis addresses border security spending at the EU level, as border management at the European Union’s external borders has taken on an increasingly outward-facing role in recent years, and focuses on the costs associated with this external role (as opposed to internal assistance given to member states, for example). The different national defense and security organizational structures and budget line items complicate comparative analysis of spending, requiring us to interpret nonstandardized data.

INCREASED RELIANCE ON EU FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY INSTRUMENTS

The European Union’s position as a globally generous development and humanitarian actor is well established.5 Ironically, there is empirical evidence to suggest that a rise in median income due to great strides in development can lead to greater mobility for an individual. Therefore, generous development policies may in fact have encouraged population mobility.6 Other analysts have suggested that this increased level of mobility has further weakened states, as the most skilled and capable have departed for greater opportunities. Furthermore, the slow progress in governance and rule of law has fostered additional mobility—after all, it is easier to change countries (through mobility) than governments7—and EU efforts in this field of development have lagged.

However, the European Union’s role as a foreign policy and security actor has taken a longer and more winding road, partly due to the defined legal aspects of security competencies within EU treaties and to the reluctance of member states to relinquish their sovereign control in this field. Yet at the turn of the 2010s and with the Arab Spring, and even more so at the onset of the 2015 migration crisis, it became clear that a Union-wide response was necessary to address the acute instability in Europe’s neighborhood (though foreign and security policy competencies remain split between the European Union and member states, and between myriad institutions and agencies).

Following the Arab Spring, the EU Neighborhood Policy focused on the so-called 3 Ms (money, mobility, markets) to help create and sustain economic growth as well as build “deep democracy” and respect for universal values.8 However, the mobility element has partly lost steam and instead become a challenge for Europe despite laudable initial aspirations. In responding to the 2015 crisis, the European Union should have been nimbler in its approach, as it dealt successfully with two waves of migration beginning in the 1990s (it received 700,000 applications from asylum seekers and refugees in 1993 alone,9 and between 1989 and 1993 some 4 million Europeans left their homes, mainly from the east to the west10), with migrants from post-Soviet states and the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.

For far too long, the European Union focused its actions on policies that fell under interior ministries’ portfolios, which addressed mainly asylum policies.11 The fast-moving nature of the 2015 migration crisis precipitated an immediate reliance on hastily negotiated border agreements and security tools, in addition to traditional migration management tools, to address the challenges at hand. And given the lack of agreed views on the level of acceptance of migrants (e.g., from Germany’s *Wilkommen* posture to Hungary’s zero-acceptance of migrants), the European Union’s consensus-based decisionmaking structure broke down and appeared only to function around security measures as the lowest common denominator for crisis management.12

To gauge the EU security response to the migration crisis and its associated funding shifts, we analyzed the instruments and agencies that we deemed most relevant to the external dimension of both security issues, and the European Union’s relationship with countries of interest (origin or transit) in the context of the migration crisis. EU funding decisions and actions in the security and foreign policy fields in origin and transit countries, as they relate to migration, can be broadly categorized in three trends: (1) capacity building; (2) mandate expansion and adaptation (including a shift in geographical focus, and the use of crisis management as a migration control tool); and (3) border control as the externalization of security concerns. Relevant EU instruments belong in one or more of these categories, as we explain in this section.13

This section describes these funding and policy shifts through changes in several EU instruments and programs’ funding and mandate (instruments that implement EU priorities and translate its foreign and security policy into action). We describe the arc of evolution of the EU response to the crisis and how the migration crisis is shaping the long-term budgetary, foreign policy, and security impact on Europe as a foreign policy and security actor. Overall, the European Union’s security-related actions have tended to focus more on migration-relevant topics (border management, antitrafficking, and smuggling efforts) and areas (cities or geographic areas along migratory routes). Though certain crisis-management missions coincide with areas of instability, their mandate does not always address the most acute needs, and these decisions carry long-term consequences for the European Union’s role as a foreign policy and security actor.

**Capacity Building and Scaling Up**

At the onset of the crisis, the European Union found itself ill-equipped to tackle rapidly rising migrant arrivals and increasingly busy migration routes in and near the EU neighborhood as well as further afield. Indeed, EU foreign policy had long been based on “concentric circles” of priority: structural reforms are prioritized in the direct neighborhood (western Balkans) in view of future enlargement; economic ties and lighter reforms are encouraged in the “near abroad” (places such as Belarus and Morocco); and the European Union deployed traditional development tools in more

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12. Ibid.
13. More detail on these instruments’ link to migration and foreign policy is provided in the annex.
distant places such as sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. This concentric approach made sense in a benign security environment with well-managed borders. However, the 2015 crisis demonstrated the limitations of the European Union’s existing toolbox, which could neither stem the flow of individuals leaving their country for Europe nor handle the scale of arrivals at the European Union’s southern, maritime borders.

To remedy these shortcomings, one strategy EU policymakers adopted was to grow some existing instruments to operate on a larger scale or further away (instruments potentially relevant to migration), and to directly engage with select external actors that were seen as necessary to control flows. While this makes sense for some elements of the EU response (e.g., funding boosts for Internal Security Fund programs focused on border management), providing greater levels of funding to areas and actors that are incapable of absorbing these funds limits their overall policy effectiveness and encourages misdirection and public criticism of wasted taxpayer resources.

Moreover, the “go-to” and well-known instruments may appear attractive in the near term, but may not be best suited for a specific goal (e.g., Frontex versus Common Security and Defense

Policy [CSDP missions]. Perhaps most dangerously, directing generous resources to actors whose rule-of-law record and governance framework is mixed could in the long term exacerbate migration flows as governance and stability fail to improve, or deteriorate.

This was particularly visible for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), and security-sector reform efforts more broadly. An increasing number of IcSP operations have focused on aiding security and police forces in migration-relevant countries such as Niger and Mali, and the training of border police in Cameroon (a mission worth almost €4 million) to better enforce border control and support border security (the mission in Mali goes beyond borders to support security forces and civil protection). The largest single action funded by the IcSP, costing €20 million, was launched in 2016 to support the Turkish Coast Guard’s operational capacity to manage migration flows in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, with a focus on search-and-rescue operations and the fight against organized criminal groups engaged in human trafficking. Though the Turkish Coast Guard’s work has contributed to lowering migrant arrivals to Europe, search-and-rescue NGOs have voiced concerns over the Coast Guard’s potential violations of international law, questioning the sustainability of such agreements for EU migration control efforts.

The crisis also prompted a massive scaling up of Frontex’s operations, principally focused on internal capacity building but also on the agency’s role in the security of external borders, its increased prerogatives in returns, and, most importantly, its new ability to carry out operations on the territory of non-EU countries (under certain circumstances)—its externally facing competencies. It was remodeled into a European Border and Coast Guard in 2016, supported by a €95 million funding increase (177 percent from 2015 to 2016) and a threefold increase in the funds allocated for return cooperation, even after downward amendments in 2016. EU leaders have also attempted to build up the agency’s capacity by aiming for a total of 1,000 staff by 2020, up

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17. Representing just over 6 percent of the IcSP’s 2016 budget (€317.89 million).
from 488 at the end of 2017.\textsuperscript{22} Yet despite its staff growing by a third from 2015 to 2016, Frontex cannot identify enough hires to meet the goals set by EU policymakers, and so it may struggle to implement its mandate as it attempts to balance between national demands and EU competencies.\textsuperscript{23}

**Mandate Expansion and Adaptation**

The second shift is in the European Union’s financial and policy approach to and mandates around the external security dimension of migration. For a long time, EU crisis management and peace and stability tools (from the IcSP to CSDP missions) have been needs-based, responding to emergencies wherever they arise and largely disconnected from political interests. Since 2015, there has been greater emphasis on migration-oriented missions or tasks, some of which began in 2011 after the Arab Spring and the disruption it brought to the EU neighborhood.\textsuperscript{24} Although some crisis management and external action tools (civil and military) had been adapted to integrate counter-terrorism at the EU level after the September 11 attacks,\textsuperscript{25} the pace and breadth of the evolution toward migration control and the geographic shift in certain instruments have been robust since 2015 and could challenge the European Union’s excellent reputation as a development and foreign assistance actor, as the long-term effectiveness of some missions is increasingly called into question—particularly when their mandate is expanded to include multiple or complex goals.

The European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI), as one of the main instruments underpinning external EU action, has long been the frontline tool to address challenges in the EU neighborhood. It exemplifies the type of instruments that the European Union has traditionally relied on to carry out migration-related actions by expanding its original mandate or rebalancing its geographic focus. The European Union demonstrated early on its interest in using the types of partnership and resources the ENI provides to fund crisis management actions in its neighborhood, including on issues of migration. As early as 2011–2012, the Arab Spring prompted the European Union to rethink its relationship with its southern Mediterranean neighbors in the field of migration through partnerships that would align with ENI/European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) goals.\textsuperscript{26} The growing importance of the ENI was reflected in its remarkable funding increases in the 2014–2020...
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).\textsuperscript{27} In 2015, the ENP was broadened to include irregular migration and security threats,\textsuperscript{28} and its increased financial allocation reflected the importance of this particular tool in the EU approach to migration in third countries in its neighborhood. With a new emphasis on security, there is an enhanced requirement to coordinate and collaborate activities related to conflict prevention, crisis management, and security-sector reform—all crucial for the EU effort to curb migration and foster stability in some key neighborhood countries, sometimes through security-related actions more than traditional development means. Increasingly, the ENI is the tool of choice for external EU efforts to tackle migratory pressures, including through security-related actions, as well as a shift from traditional goals (rule of law, poverty alleviation) toward security aims.\textsuperscript{29} This enhanced focus on security and conflict prevention, as well as the geographic focus on important partners for migration, shows the European Union’s push to aim this funding-heavy tool toward migration mitigation.

The European Union has mobilized its foreign policy apparatus more broadly to act upon migration causes by relying on its main foreign and security policy mechanism. Crisis management missions included within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have taken on a greater role—and have received increased funding—in tackling security issues that are seen as fueling migration;\textsuperscript{30} recent CSDP missions have focused more on African and southern Mediterranean countries (origin or transit countries such as Niger, Mali, or Libya).\textsuperscript{31} Notably, some CSDP missions’ mandates have shifted to focus more on the European Union’s need for migration control. For example, the EU Capacity Building Mission in support of the Malian Internal Security Forces (EUCAP Sahel Mali) was launched in 2014 to provide assistance and advice to the national police, gendarmerie, and guard in the implementation of security reforms in Mali (in response to the 2012 conflict in northern Mali and the ensuing destabilization of the country). After a strategic review in 2016, EUCAP Sahel Mali’s mandate was expanded to include the strengthening of internal security


\textsuperscript{28} The ENI was listed as one instrument in the EU’s external action in the field of security capacity-building with partner countries (JOIN[2015] 17 Final).


\textsuperscript{30} Interview with EEAS official.

\textsuperscript{31} Eight out of 10 missions started or renewed in 2015 or after were location in those regions. At the same time, big budget items within the policy such as the EU monitoring mission in Georgia and EULEX Kosovo have received less funding.
forces in the fight against terrorism, as well as managing migration flows and border management.\footnote{Interview with EEAS official.} This review also extended the mission to January 2019, which includes enhancing interoperability and coordination of the internal security forces of the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger), a French-led initiative.

IcSP missions have also increasingly intervened through actions related to migration and counter-terrorism as a response to mounting crises in 2015, including from a security angle.\footnote{European Commission DG BUDGET, \textit{Report on Budgetary and Financial Management, Financial Year 2015}, April 5, 2016, 71.} From four security-sector reform missions in 2015, the Instrument now operates 17, all but two of which are in key countries of origin or transit (the two being Yemen and Ukraine, although Ukraine could potentially become a country of origin pending future instability). More importantly, major EU funding actions since the 2015 crisis have focused on Libya (voluntary return of migrants or stranded migrants from sub-Saharan Africa), Tunisia (border management as well as countering violent extremism), the western Balkans (migration-related actions, e.g., fighting organized crime in the context of migrant smuggling), and Chad and Nigeria (tackling the threat from Boko Haram).\footnote{Ibid., 72.}

These shifts have made the use of security and defense forces for migration goals more explicit, from CSDP missions and funding to the use of security-sector reform for migration control. In addition, they have contributed to a broader shift of EU foreign and security policy away from its focus on promoting peace and rule of law, toward the aim of curbing migration—at times geographically at odds with where the most acute security crises are, and which would benefit more from EU support on their own merit, rather than as prioritized areas of migration (origin or transit). The risk inherent in these shifts is that the European Union will come to see migration as a security or stability risk and avoid an analysis of how existing foreign and security policies and instruments may contribute to increased migration.

**Border Control as the Externalization of Security Concerns**

Border control is to a large extent an internal concern for EU member states based on the principle of subsidiarity, which dictates that national, regional, or local action is the primary mode of action unless EU action is more effective.\footnote{“Subsidiarity,” EUR-Lex, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/subsidiarity.html.} However, the European Union has a role to play in protecting external borders and harmonizing border management across member states—a role it has taken on with some urgency since 2015. External border control serves as both a shield against perceived and real threats from outside the European Union and as a way to keep security concerns as far away from EU borders as possible. This is particularly true in the case of the migration crisis, as the European Union has sought through recent policy and funding decisions to push threats to its borders further and further away, toward origin and transit countries.\footnote{Anna Movern, “The ‘Refugee Crisis’ in the Mediterranean: The Role of EU States, Civil Society and Art,” openDemocracy, April 18, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/anna-movern/refugee-crisis-in-mediterranean-role-of-eu-states-civil-society-and-art.} Enhanced external border control appears to have a direct impact on the reduction in migrant arrivals,
particularly following the signing of the EU-Turkey agreement—and as such has become the measure of an effective EU migration policy in the eyes of some policymakers.

The external border control issue has also been tied to cross-border crime all along migration routes, specifically smuggling. Though smuggling of illegal goods and products is within the traditional purview of border control actors, the smuggling of migrants has gained increased attention from policymakers in light of its role in feeding flows within Africa and toward Europe. Smuggling of migrants also seems to be increasingly presented as a security issue rather than a humanitarian question (focusing on smuggling as the core issue, rather than the people who migrate and their reasons for doing so). As a result, border control is increasingly securitized and focused on antismuggling and antitrafficking operations to limit migration flows. Border control missions that focus less on search and rescue than on surveillance and smuggling lose an important element of human security.

Frontex exemplifies the European Union’s emphasis on external border control. Though a lot of its work still focuses on internal European borders and providing support to member states, its 2016 structural change, mandate expansion, and funding boost prioritize a stronger externally facing mission (for example, liaison officers in third countries, emergency deployment of coast guard officers, intelligence collection at the external borders and in Africa, including through the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community). Frontex operations at external borders, specifically in the Mediterranean Sea (such as Joint Operation Triton), have prioritized border control and surveillance, with the search-and-rescue function coming second. Joint Operation Themis, which replaced Triton in February 2018, has an “enhanced law enforcement focus,” including the detection of terrorist threats, and an operational area spanning from Algeria to Turkey.

The IcSP has also contributed to this trend: multiple projects categorized as security-sector reform were linked to border control in important origin and transit countries, from Niger to Tunisia and Turkey. Indeed, the EU approach to security-sector reform in countries of origin and transit has a heavier focus on the parts of law enforcement that deal with border control and antismuggling operations. For example, IcSP has funded capacity building for third countries’ police and border authorities in the fight against organized crime in the context of migrant smuggling, in direct collaboration with Frontex, in part to improve border management and security.

The fact that some CSDP operations that initially focused on training armed or police forces in professional methods, international law, or leadership skills have in recent years acquired a

37. It is important to note that smuggling and trafficking are not equivalent, particularly as they relate to migrants: the former can be voluntary (paying a smuggler for passage), while the latter is forced (the person becomes the object of a transaction).
migrant-focused mandate (and increased funding along with this renewed mandate, e.g., EUCAP Sahel Mali on irregular migration and border control), is another element of this projection of border control well beyond EU borders. EU officials in Mali have acknowledged that border management and borders more broadly have become a crucial aspect of their work.41

While EU member states and Frontex have worked with third countries for years on border management, particularly at sea through joint patrols,42 efforts since the 2015 crisis have intensified to prevent onward movement by migrants (including pushback of boats closer to third countries’ territorial waters) than in purely search-and-rescue missions. Earlier cooperation with third countries has become more ambitious, leading, for example, to CSDP missions like EUNAVFOR MED—Operation Sophia in the southern central Mediterranean (see below for more detail), and the opening of the Seahorse Mediterranean network to third countries (the first one to be Libya), a satellite-supported surveillance and communication infrastructure to share reports of maritime incidents among participating countries and strengthen border surveillance systems in North

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The European Union has become increasingly willing to use security and military assets, as well as funding, to fulfill its migration-related goals.

Though investing in border management (and migration containment) at home and in third countries makes sense from the EU perspective, the attention given to border control along migration routes can divert important resources needed elsewhere. Cooperation with third countries can also create challenges when their security and border apparatus lacks the capacity to absorb the support provided by EU resources or does not actively promote the rule of law. Repressive and/or aggressive border management in regions like the Sahel also risks disrupting centuries-old migration patterns that have created positive economic dynamics in the region, potentially aggravating unrest and conflict.

SECURITY, DEFENSE, AND INTELLIGENCE FUNDING AT THE MEMBER-STATE LEVEL

Across the three countries analyzed here—Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands—the emphasis has been placed on improving security and stability in origin or transit countries along migratory routes. They all remain involved in military deployments in priority countries, though the Netherlands and Germany have focused more on security-sector reform and peacekeeping, while Sweden has prioritized action through multilateral forums. Border control at the European Union’s borders and along migration routes is an important element of funding decisions, and all three contribute to coast guard operations in the Mediterranean Sea to disrupt human trafficking networks and control arrivals at the European Union’s borders. Return agreements with third countries have taken an important place in foreign policy decisions.

Germany: A Paradigm Shift in Foreign Policy and Military Deployments

For years, Germany has been an attractive destination for migrants; over 15 percent of its population are foreign-born, and the country has loosened constraints on skilled migration in recent years. But the 2015 crisis brought on a surge in arrivals for which Germany was not prepared. On August 31, 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel surprised the German and European people by unilaterally declaring at a press conference, “I put it simply, Germany is a strong country... we have

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44. Davitti and Ursu, “Why Securitising the Sahel Will Not Stop Migration.”
45. Both Germany and the Netherlands are part of a recent non-EU, French-led initiative, the European Intervention Initiative (EII), which brings together 10 EU countries that are willing and able to intervene militarily in crises. It is believed this could be a supplement to military operations in the Sahel. See Paul Taylor, “Emmanuel Macron’s Coalition of the Willing,” POLITICO, May 2, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macrons-eu-defense-army-coalition-of-the-willing-military-cooperation/.
managed so many things—we can do this,” which came to be interpreted as an “open door” policy in the face of unprecedented migrant arrivals through the eastern Mediterranean and Balkan routes. This announcement, and the ensuing peak in migrant arrivals to Germany, put the German administration, civil society, and budget under stress, particularly as a balanced budget remains a cornerstone of Germany’s economic policy.

The migration crisis spurred a flurry of external security and defense policy actions, principally through increased deployments and the recalibration of foreign policy through rising funding for crisis prevention and conflict resolution to address instability in origin and transit countries. Germany has also focused on securing German and EU borders, has worked to ensure that each EU member state would show solidarity and accept refugee quotas, and has implemented stopgap measures in transit or origin countries in the European Union’s neighborhood. Though Germans have been unwilling to invest substantially in readiness or in building a capable military force, Germany’s military has deployed forces to third countries hosting or sending large numbers of migrants to the European Union.

Some have seen a paradigm shift in Germany’s external response to the crisis through these changes in military deployments and foreign policy decisions. The visible increase in the defense budget over the past three years is due to the increase in German military deployments abroad as well as missions related to migration management. Germany provides forces and military equipment for a variety of missions in origin and transit countries, from helicopters in Mali to frigates in the Mediterranean for EUNAVFOR MED and stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Germany has contributed an increasing number of troops to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)—with force increases from 650 to 1,000 (the largest current military deployment for Germany), as approved by the Bundestag—as well as combat helicopters. This contribution was framed as a necessary effort to stabilize Mali and the Sahel region in response to France’s request to EU member states under Article 42.7 of the Lisbon


48. Funding for crisis prevention, stabilization, and conflict mitigation, within the “Securing Peace and Stability” budget subheading, rose by €150 million from 2015 to 2016.


51. Partly to tackle the renewed threat from Russia, including NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Eastern Europe, and to address Germany’s military readiness issues.

52. Afghanistan and Kosovo were, respectively, the second and fifth countries sending the most asylum applicants to Germany in 2015. See Ann Singleton, Adrian Carrasco Heiermann, and Denis Kierans, Migration, Asylum and Refugees in Germany: Understanding the Data, Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, Data Briefing No. 1 (January 2016), https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/Germany/Germany-Data-Briefing-1Jan2016.pdf.

Treaty following the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015, and tied this stabilization to Europe, as the Sahel region is a key migration path to Europe.54

Outside of MINUSMA, between 150 and 350 German soldiers are stationed in southern Mali in the context of the EU training mission for the Malian army [the number of troops fluctuates].55,56 The Bundeswehr maintains a base in Niger’s capital, Niamey, and has contributed motorcycles and satellite phones to the police and the military in the country as part of the bilateral assistance to stop migrant trafficking.57 Germany also strongly supports the defense collaboration effort of the G5 Sahel countries, tightening collaboration between the police and military personnel of Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Chad.

While the Bundeswehr has been active in other transit zones and origin countries (deployment within NATO’s mission to stem illegal trafficking in the Aegean Sea; troop contribution to the anti-ISIL coalition to train the Iraqi Peshmerga and to the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan58), its efforts in the Sahel are the most direct sign of Germany’s efforts to stem the flow of migrants by addressing the security situation in some of the biggest origin and transit countries, where terrorist groups foster violence, thus uprooting people, and smugglers take advantage of the vacuum to feed migration flows further. In line with EU efforts, Germany has

54. Ibid.
focused on stabilization in key regions in Africa, but by doing so has taken its attention away from other traditional security issues such as arms control. Indeed, the country’s efforts to stabilize many of these countries are visible in the almost threefold increase in budget commitments in 2016 for contributions to international measures of crisis prevention, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution (e.g., police literacy training program in Afghanistan), and the almost doubling of spending for peace and stability efforts—the broader budget line that includes peacekeeping and crisis prevention measures. At the same time, the budget for disarmament and arms control measures has stagnated in the past three years, and even decreased since 2012, partly due to the lack of international momentum around arms control efforts. The 2018 government coalition agreement pledged to increase defense spending and development assistance by €2 billion for the 2018–2021 period (tied by a one-to-one increase), in order to sustain Germany’s commitment to its alliances and to peace and security.59

The Netherlands: Borders, Peace, and Security, but Smaller Deployments

In 2015, the Netherlands received nearly double the number of asylum applications it had received in 2014, reaching 44,970 applications (or 2.7 per 1,000 residents).60 It was one of the first countries in Europe to use some form of border control when it deployed mobile border guards in September 2015. Yet the government has also been one of the largest national contributors to EU efforts to manage the crisis beyond Europe’s borders and to development and humanitarian funding for countries of origin and transit (see Chapter 1). In parallel, the Netherlands has increased its funding for international cooperation and military missions61 and boosted its international security and stability efforts in migration-relevant countries in Europe’s south. While the country’s recent security strategy highlights migration as a potential threat (including through terrorists entering migrant flows), it also recognizes the need not to address it purely from an instability and insecurity perspective.62

The Dutch military has maintained its presence in several missions that it sees as relevant to migration flows,63 though that presence remains small in missions like EUTM Mali. Its biggest deployment is with MINUSMA, where the 11th Airmobile Brigade provides intelligence-gathering support and where it flew seven attack and transport helicopters over the past three years; the helicopters’ mission has now been taken over by the German military.64 The Netherlands also provides troops

61. The defense budget has seen a steady increase over the past six years, and there have been substantial funding amendments in 2015 (+€542 million) and in 2016 (+€845 million). Part of this increase is also due to NATO commitments (email correspondence with a Dutch MFA official).
63. Email correspondence with a Dutch MFA official.
to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, in Iraq for training and advice, for EUBAM Libya, and for EUTM Mali. Contributions to NATO activities and international cooperation have ticked up since 2015; a Dutch frigate joined NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 2 in 2016 to map human trafficking networks in the Aegean Sea in 2016.

The Netherlands has also enhanced peace and security activities in important migration countries in North Africa and Syria. Efforts to limit irregular migration in North Africa and to improve migration cooperation also received more attention. At the same time, funding for security and stability actions rose in 2016 to support security-sector reform activities, as well as peacebuilding and rule-of-law development. Migration cooperation and relief was explicitly cited as a reason for the new injection of funds into the security and stability budget line in 2017, particularly through security-sector reform in North Africa and Mali, support to the Lebanese border guard authorities, and the prevention of radicalization in the Sahel. This focus is in line with the European Union’s emphasis on security-sector reform as a way to improve border security and security forces’ ability to restore stability in countries of origin or transit. Interestingly, Dutch investments in disarmament and arms control have gone down since 2014, while the Netherlands has reversed previous declines in military spending, vowing to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2024 in support of NATO collective defense objectives.

Finally, the Netherlands has placed an emphasis on border control, including at the European Union’s external border. It has renewed investment in the branch of the military that is responsible for border control tasks (Royal Marechaussee), and in the navy, whose ships are used in border control missions. The country has provided additional contributions to Frontex missions, for

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66. Funding increases in 2017 for this budget line focused specifically on these countries. See 1st Addendum to the 2017 Budget: Foreign Affairs—Explanatory Note, Government of the Netherlands, 2017, http://www.rijsbegroting.nl/2017/uitvoering/1e_suppletore,kst234747.html. The overall funding for these activities has increased over the past four years, more than doubling between 2013 and 2016 (from €432 million to €1,020 million), with frequent budget revisions to increase these amounts.


68. This area aims to promote “Dutch and international security and stability through targeted bilateral and multilateral cooperation and promoting democratic transition in priority areas, especially in the ring around Europe. . . . Many of the cross-border threats to which the Netherlands is exposed are of such a size and complexity that an integrated approach and cooperation is required at an international level. Examples are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and violent extremism, refugee flows . . .” (emphasis added). From “Article 2: Security and Stability—Determination of the Budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (V) for the Year 2017,” Government of the Netherlands, 2016, http://www.rijsbegroting.nl/2017/voorbereiding/begroting,kst225873_7.html.

69. 1st Addendum to the 2017 Budget: Foreign Affairs.

70. In 2017, €19 million were transferred from the Security and Justice heading to the Marechaussee, of which €7.5 million was for increased border control, necessary for deployments related to the migration issue. See 1st Addendum to the 2017 Budget: Defense—Explanatory Note, Government of the Netherlands, 2017, http://www.rijsbegroting.nl/2017/uitvoering/1e_suppletore,kst234735.html.
which the Netherlands contributes ships like the HNMLS *Rotterdam* in EUNAVFOR MED, coast guard personnel, and military police personnel in the Mediterranean.\(^{71}\)

**Sweden: Limited Deployments with a Focus on Borders and Returns**

In 2015, Sweden received the second largest number of asylum seekers per capita (16.7 per 1,000 residents, or close to 163,000 asylum seekers overall\(^{72}\)), double the absolute number of refugees that it had received in 1992 during the Balkan wars. Initially offering a generous policy for Syrian nationals, Sweden has reversed some of these policies to discourage asylum seekers and has reinstated some border controls. The country has taken a series of measures to limit the political and budgetary impact of the migration challenge, taking a different approach than Germany to the security and defense aspects of the crisis. Indeed, the resources devoted to the external aspect of migration in the realm of security and defense have not seen a substantial increase since 2015, with the focus of the Swedish government remaining mostly on the domestic aspects of migration management. And though Sweden has increased its defense spending, it has largely been used to improve territorial defense against potential Russian aggression.\(^{73}\)

Sweden has also focused on multilateral channels to improve conditions in origin and transit countries for migrants who do not qualify for asylum, as well as on improving bilateral relations to encourage returns and repatriations—a tool increasingly used to reexternalize the migration burden and address security concerns linked to rejected asylum seekers who remain in Europe. Some return and repatriation decisions have prompted questions as to whether migration pressures were impacting Sweden’s foreign policy decisions toward countries of origin or transit. Indeed, in 2016, Sweden signed return agreements with Morocco and Afghanistan to repatriate failed asylum seekers, sparking debates in both cases: in the first case, a week before the agreement with Morocco, Sweden decided against recognizing Western Sahara as an independent country (a disputed territory with Morocco), a decision that some see as motivated by the need to strike an agreement with Rabat;\(^{74}\) in the second case, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has advised against all travel to Afghanistan due to security concerns, but the migration agency has continued to repatriate Afghan nationals to their country.\(^{75}\)

On the military side, part of Sweden’s response to the migration crisis has been focused on the protection of external borders: the resources allocated to the Swedish Coast Guard have been

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slightly reinforced in light of its continued involvement in the Mediterranean in support of Operations Triton and Poseidon (coastal patrol boats), and the armed forces have sent staff to EUNAVFOR MED’s headquarters in Rome. Sweden is also involved in missions in key countries of origin and transit, though to a lesser extent than Germany: it is an active contributor to MINUSMA, with a contingent of over 300 soldiers performing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tasks; it contributes troops to EUTM Mali; and it has deployed personnel to the anti-ISIL coalition (training of Iraqi armed forces) and in Afghanistan for Resolute Support Mission.

At the same time, and as observed in Germany, Sweden’s contribution to disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, which have traditionally been a focus of Swedish foreign policy, has diminished over the years, as have activities dedicated to advancing peace and security. The latter saw a return to precrisis funding levels in 2017, in parallel with a decrease in internal migration management (reduced needs for the migration authority’s staff led to over €70 million in budget cuts), suggesting that the sharp downturn in migrant arrivals has freed up resources for Sweden to focus once more on peace and security activities.

A CASE STUDY: LIBYA

The central Mediterranean migration route, mainly linking the Libyan coast to Italy (Lampedusa Island), has long been in use by sub-Saharan and North African migrants. In 2008 alone, close to 40,000 crossings were detected along the route. A much criticized agreement between Italy and Libya in 2009 all but stopped these flows. However, the Arab Spring and its destabilization of the region led to the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, leaving Libya void of a central government and plagued by conflict since 2014, and leading to it once again becoming a primary route for migrants. Between 2014 and 2016, over half a million border crossings through the central Mediterranean route were registered.

The eastern Mediterranean route has largely been closed due to the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement. The European Union pledged €6 billion to Turkey to alleviate the country’s economic burden from

78. Syria and Afghanistan are the top two countries of origin for asylum seekers in Sweden. “Forsvarsmaktens arsredovisning 2017.”
79. Both areas underwent downward amendments in the 2015 budget process.
82. Ibid.
hosting nearly 3 million refugees, to prevent migrants from leaving Turkey, and for Turkey’s acceptance of migrant returns (see Chapter 1). Migration flows to Europe were largely redirected toward the central Mediterranean route, though the populations taking this path were different from those taking the eastern Mediterranean route, including sub-Saharan or West African migrants from Eritrea or Nigeria rather than Syrian and Iraqi migrants (see map of migration routes in the Introduction).

Libya splintered following the fall of Gaddafi, which left large, ungoverned spaces in which smuggling and trafficking networks grew in resources and size, leading tens of thousands of individuals to attempt a very dangerous crossing through the Mediterranean. Thousands of deaths and disappearances occurred at sea.\(^{83}\) Faced with a dramatic increase in arrivals from Libya and growing international focus on the tragic deaths caused by unseaworthy, overcrowded boats capsizing in the Mediterranean, the European Union and its member states, under the leadership of Italy,\(^{84}\) sought relief similar to that provided by the EU-Turkey agreement. But the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya offered few of the conditions that Turkey did (in terms of safety, capacity, and territorial control), and Libya lacked a central authority with which to negotiate; this led to agreements struck by Italy with a variety of Libyan political and military factions to prevent migrants from leaving Libyan territorial waters.\(^{85}\)

This is an illustrative example of Europe’s urgent search for short-term relief from migratory flows, and of the changes to its development, foreign, and security policy. These policies have consequences for the migrants journeying through Libya, for the long-term stability of the country itself, and for the efficacy of EU policies and funding decisions.

Prior to the 2014 uptick in migrant arrivals across the central Mediterranean, the European Union initiated the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya in 2013, a civilian CSDP mission, to support Libyan (GNA) border authorities in improving border security and developing a national integrated border management strategy. In 2014 the mission was forced to move its headquarters to Tunisia due to rising tensions in Libya, but it continued to support the Libyan Naval Coast Guard and Customs. EUBAM Libya’s mandate was amended in 2016 to turn it into a planning mission foreseeing broader capacity-building for border authorities, as well as a comprehensive civilian security-sector reform process that includes cooperation with the Ministries of Interior and Justice.\(^{86}\)

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\(^{83}\) For a detailed account of Libya’s evolution since Muhammar Gaddafi’s death, see Frederic Wehrey, *The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).


EUBAM Libya has been extended five times since its launch, and its resources have increased despite continued difficult conditions on the ground (the mission remains based in Tunis) and limited absorption capacity from Libyan forces, which are only a partial representation of the country’s clans and localities. The mission’s focus on border control has a clear relation to the European Union’s interest in stemming migrant flows through Libya, but its effectiveness remains limited so long as Libya’s political landscape does not stabilize. Nevertheless, in February 2018, EUBAM Libya signed an agreement with the Libyan Ministry of Justice to establish cooperation in improving the criminal justice system in Libya. In March 2018, Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and the GNA endorsed a formal request to EUBAM to lead the drafting of a white paper on border security and management reform in Libya.

Another CSDP mission, EUNAVFOR MED—Operation Sophia, was established in 2015 to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the southern central Mediterranean. It was given an ambitious, multiphase mandate that involved access to Libyan territorial waters, and ultimately Libyan territory—which would have necessitated Libyan authorization or a UN mandate (neither of which the European Union was able to secure). The mission also has an element of search and rescue. Like EUBAM Libya, Operation Sophia was amended in 2016 to involve training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy and enforcement of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya. This amendment provided the European Union with proxy access to Libyan waters, where the Libyan Coast Guard could in turn assist in carrying out some of the tasks Operation Sophia was unable to in its limited area of operation (see the map of military missions above).

The mission has been extended twice, its resources increased each time, with contributions from 27 of the 28 EU member states (all but Denmark, which has opted out of participating in CSDP missions). However, its effectiveness in disrupting smuggling and trafficking networks has been limited, partly due to an unclear mandate. Its deterrent effects on migration have also been limited, while the mission has been criticized for turning a blind eye to the Libyan Coast Guard.
and Navy’s human rights violations and collaboration with smugglers and traffickers (though EU officials defend the training’s strong vetting process).95

EU member states also tried to address migration flows through the central Mediterranean. In October 2013, Italy launched its own national mission, Mare Nostrum, which was a combined humanitarian and military operation that focused on migration flows through the Strait of Sicily to safeguard life at sea and tackle human trafficking as well as migrant smuggling.96 This operation ended in October 2014, though Italy’s operation Constant Vigilance maintains a maritime and aircraft patrol in the Strait.

Frontex’s Operation Triton took over the Italian efforts to patrol maritime borders, but it had a narrower mandate and area of operation. Triton also began with limited resources and member state contributions, which affected its effectiveness. The operation received criticism over the lack of an explicit search-and-rescue mandate and its focus on disrupting smuggling operations (EU-NAVFOR MED was created to reinforce this goal with a military mission, and coordinated with Operation Triton).97 Beginning with a monthly budget of €2.9 million, EU leaders tripled Triton’s funding in 2015 to match Operation Mare Nostrum’s budget levels and respond to migratory pressures.98 The budget increase was not matched with an expansion of the operational area, which led to criticism that EU leaders were not addressing the extent of search-and-rescue needs in the broader Mediterranean.99

It should be noted, however, that parallel EU support to Libya has been ongoing since the fall of the Gaddafi regime. The European Union maintains its cooperation with the GNA to rebuild institutions and improve socioeconomic conditions; its Stabilisation Facility has also budgeted €12 million for the 2016–2019 period to rehabilitate schools and restore public infrastructure. It has mobilized over €180 million for migration-related projects (including for the protection of vulnerable migrants across Libya), and allocated €120 million for support to civil society, governance, and mediation efforts (among others) through the ENI and the IcSP.100 Coordination among these various efforts is carried out in Brussels through weekly meetings of the relevant departments and laid out in the European Union’s Action in Libya on Migration road map.101


After two CSDP missions, one Frontex mission, and one ongoing national mission, there was a 35 percent decrease in arrivals through the central Mediterranean route from 2016 to 2017—but no end in sight.\textsuperscript{102} Thus far in 2018, over 10,000 migrants have attempted to reach Italy through the central Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{103} This short-term reduction, although welcome, has come at a long-term cost. The European Union, and Italy in particular, have provided significant resources to Libyan institutions that do not have the ability to absorb them and are so far unable to deliver results in support of an ambitious mandate. Moreover, unclear, broad, or unrealistically ambitious mandates have needed to be repeatedly amended, clarified, and adapted over time in recognition of the difficult and complex situation on the ground and of overly ambitious goals that may not have taken into account the complicated institutional and political landscape of Libya today. The European Union and Italy’s focus on border control, trafficking networks, and preventing additional migration to Europe—which are urgently needed in the short term—provides material support to different political or subnational factions and risks prolonging the conflict and increasing instability and the likelihood of future migration to Europe, barring a political resolution among opposing factions in the near future. This fragile domestic situation brings into question the effectiveness of European funding decisions, and these efforts potentially hurt the development of better governance within the targeted institutions.

Beyond the human tragedy of migrants stranded in Libya and lives lost at sea, sustained flows from Libya through the central Mediterranean continue to impact the cohesion of the European Union and political stability in Italy (the new government in Rome is defending a distinctly anti-immigration platform). European efforts to reach a political settlement within Libya and to alleviate migration flows will be hampered by this continued lack of cohesion. There is no EU instrument, fund, or national coast guard effort that can confront this new reality; without political will, EU and national actions in Libya risk remaining marred by criticism and ineffectiveness.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.

For both the European Union and the case study countries of Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, the extent of the crisis in 2015 created budget shortfalls that were addressed by reallocating resources, increasing overall budgets, and tapping emergency funds. In the case of the Netherlands, policymakers went so far as to tap future reserves to increase development assistance. While this type of governmental and organizational response is anticipated, what is less well understood is that these budget changes came at the expense of other humanitarian, development, and asylum programs that served the needs of populations before they contemplated migrating to Europe. It was also clear throughout the crisis that EU officials and officials in case study countries believed their responses were insufficient given the magnitude of the task and the subsequent political crisis. European officials participated in a nearly continuous process of budget amendments to keep increasing budget lines that addressed migration, occasionally multiple times within a short period. Throwing euros or krona at the problem, however, did not necessarily translate into a more effective response to the crisis.

Migration now has the full attention of European policymakers; irregular migration and migratory pressures feature prominently in the European Commission’s priorities for the next MFF, including in the financing of external instruments. The European Union’s development work’s focus on poverty alleviation, rule of law, democracy promotion, and anticorruption is increasingly questioned, while border security, security-sector reform, and attempts to prevent human trafficking take a more prominent place in relations with key third countries. Of course, the elements that can reduce “push factors” for migration sometimes overlap with traditional EU development goals, but much activity is seen through the lens of migration and risks distracting from other priorities.

Instruments and programs that, before the crisis, were purely development initiatives in key origin and transit countries have seen their efforts complemented by a broad array of security activities, at times via similar funding streams (e.g., IcSP). With increased funding prioritization for security and stability efforts in these countries, the budgets of more traditional European security initiatives, such as disarmament and nonproliferation, have stagnated.

Different countries and organizations have taken different approaches to budgetary responses to the migration crisis. Both the European Union and Germany have allocated the largest funding increases to development efforts as well as security-related missions abroad (mainly in the Sahel region and the Middle East), that is, to addressing the external dimension of the crisis. For their part, the Netherlands and Sweden have focused more on the internal dimension by prioritizing the processing of asylum seekers, returns, and domestic border control. In many ways, this may be a distinction without a difference, as external and internal aspects of migration have become increasingly intertwined, whereby development and security efforts in source and transit countries reduce migrant arrivals to Europe, which is seen as a more stable outcome. Border control and more rapid returns also reduce migrant arrivals. Both internal and external actions enhance internal stability.

Because of the intense political and budgetary prioritization, there are now numerous EU and national departments and agencies that oversee a multitude of projects relating to the external dimension of migration. Coordination across these various actors is a growing challenge, adding complexity to an already difficult institutional and financial landscape. Not only did national ministries struggle initially to keep track of each other’s work, but different countries have tasked different ministries with migration-related prerogatives, greatly complicating cross-country cooperation across Europe.

EUROPEAN UNION

It is with some irony that, in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, the European Union reduced funding for internal security and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (i.e., crisis management operations, conflict prevention, nonproliferation measures, special representatives) in 2012–2013, which was visibly reversed at the peak of the migration crisis in 2015–2016. The European Union is still struggling to reverse the trend. It suffered some of the most difficult budget shortfalls at the onset of the crisis, which continue to this day. Due to its balanced budget requirement and its seven-year budget cycle (making it less reactive to changes in policy), the European Union had limited pools of discretionary funding to tap to respond to the challenge. In 2016, its migration-related allocations went above the agreed budget ceiling, causing other budget trade-offs.

The crisis also led the European Union to create new funding instruments worth billions of euros in addition to making funding reallocations, increasing budgets, and depleting reserves (and the Contingency Margin, the last-resort fund when other reserves have been used). However, “new” is not an entirely accurate description; many of these new instruments were “repackaged” funds that had already been pledged, such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the EU Regional Trust
Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (the Madad Fund), and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. The impetus behind these new instruments was largely to sidestep the regular, complicated EU procurement process, and to pool national funds along with EU funds. But the benefit of the sidestep may have been lost with the complicated design of pooled and rebranded funds, which seems to confuse the bureaucratic designers themselves. Moreover, EU officials ran into another obstacle: the more the European Union produced these new instruments, the less the member states wished to contribute to them as they feared it would dilute their national control and decision power over ultimate fund allocation. Finally, and importantly, there is a risk that budgets and programs focused on the short term and dependent on contingency funding ultimately hamper the difficult task of long-term budget prioritization and investments, particularly in third countries.

Though the increases in EU funding for development, security and stabilization efforts enacted since 2015 have been welcomed by policymakers and some actors in priority countries, they have highlighted another challenge: agencies and organizations receiving the newly allocated funds do not always have the capacity to process these funds and deliver the associated services fast enough. For example, Frontex received a whopping 225 percent increase in Commission contributions from 2015 to 2016, and was tasked with growing the staff pool to 1,000 by 2020, but funding needs were downgraded in 2017 due to the delay in hiring new staff. Implementers in development programs are facing similar issues; an increased budget is therefore not the only piece of the puzzle in tackling the migration challenge. The fast scaling up of resources has addressed important needs, but risks jeopardizing the establishment of clear plans and benchmarks for the successful use of those funds.

More broadly, the crisis made clear that Lisbon Treaty-era foreign policy instruments have not unified the European Union’s external policies. On the contrary, the multiplicity of entities—from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, to the Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations—created additional confusion by fragmenting the structures of decisionmaking. Sources of funding for the various instruments involved in the response to the crisis are also fragmented. Importantly, policymakers have created new forms of partnerships with priority countries (such as migration compacts, a partnership framework for cooperation with key countries), sometimes bypassing or duplicating the work done through the European Neighborhood Policy or the Instrument for Pre-Accession and the Commissioner for Enlargement, whose focus is meant to be broader than migration-related challenges. The focus of certain instruments’ work in regions of interest has sometimes shifted from poverty reduction toward security and conflict prevention—for example, in the ENI’s work in Mediterranean countries. The European Union’s foreign policy decisions since 2015 have certainly prioritized agreements with migrant-sending countries that place an emphasis on migrant returns and repatriation and have shifted the geographic focus of development programs to Asia and Africa (away from Latin America and eastern Asia), and of security missions, mainly to Africa and the Middle East. EU-led security missions have seen spending and mandates expanded in transit and origin countries (e.g., Libya, Niger, Mali).
MEMBER STATES: GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, AND SWEDEN

For all three EU member states, the capacity of national asylum and reception systems was pushed to its limits in 2015 and 2016. New budget lines and emergency funding instruments were created and deployed, including the use of development budgets to cover domestic spending related to migrant arrivals. Overwhelmed by the peak arrivals of 2015, all three countries reinstated temporary border controls or mobile border units. Germany and Sweden used the emergency provisions of the Schengen Agreement and have repeatedly renewed these controls every six months for the past three years; this signals that a return to regular Schengen order is highly unlikely. Thus, border control is paramount for all three. All three remain involved in military deployments in priority countries for the migration crisis, principally MINUSMA, and in the Mediterranean Sea for coast guard operations to disrupt human trafficking networks and, by extension, for control of arrivals at the European Union’s external borders. Counterterrorism has received increased attention amid concerns that migrant flows could create security risks domestically. A common emphasis has also been placed on more rapid returns and repatriations of asylum seekers whose requests were denied. Overall, migration has become a clearer priority for development, humanitarian, and security budgets, at times forcing the deprioritization of other regions and issues. But, importantly, the crisis has forced better internal coordination across ministries and portfolios dealing with the various aspects of migration.

These are the areas of commonality across the three member states, but Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden have taken different approaches to certain other aspects of the crisis.

Strict national budget criteria and balanced budget requirements have constrained overall spending and development budgets for Germany and the Netherlands. Sweden has maintained its development spending at about 1 percent of GDP, but the targets of development aid have shifted from sub-Saharan Africa to the MENA and Asia regions since the crisis, and migration-related programs have superseded other issues such as global education or health, in addition to using development funding for in-country refugee costs. But the migration crisis has also pushed governments to circumvent budget constraints. It was necessary for Sweden and the Netherlands to advance funding from future budgets. Germany, enjoying budget surpluses (a rarity across the Union), principally used budget carryovers from previous years. To offset rising in-country refugee costs, both the Netherlands and Sweden used a mixture of current and future development funding, while Germany included those costs in separate budget lines covering prior development spending and through additional spending.

The three countries’ views on the external dimension of migration have also taken different forms. In Sweden, activities focusing on security have not taken up a larger share of the total budget since 2015. The Netherlands and Germany, however, have both placed a growing emphasis on peace and stability actions in priority countries in the Sahel and the Middle East, focusing primarily on security-sector reform, peacekeeping, and the prevention of radicalization. Sweden, for its part, has prioritized action through multilateral forums. This may point to the different security cultures of the countries; the Netherlands and Germany, as members of NATO, can respond to external
security challenges, whereas Sweden, as a nonaligned country, must rely on other multilateral forums.

Despite different institutional structures, budgetary constraints, and strategic cultures, the overall strategy has remained relatively similar across the three countries after the initial period of intense arrivals: striving to keep a certain balance between security-related activities to tackle the crisis, and aid and development efforts to mitigate additional migration.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As we examine the aftermath of the 2015 migration crisis in 2018, European officials appear to be sanguine that the crisis has ebbed. Although arrivals may be down thanks to the agreement with Turkey and increased collaboration with the Libyan Coast Guard, the drivers of migration and the demographic realities of origin countries will likely contradict this impression of relief. The issue remains, and the European Union and its member states must now move out of crisis response and begin long-term policy formulation to address effective migration management and reception. The word “crisis” itself is a misleading term and should be replaced with Europe’s chronic migration vision for the future. In light of these realities, we recommend the following:

- Understand and properly assess the chronic nature of the migration challenge. Europe has typically underestimated the level and direction of migration flows. New estimates must be developed over the next decade based on realistic arrivals, continuing crises, and demographic projections in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, as well as the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

- Relatedly, a better understanding of the impact of development and security efforts, as well as funding shifts between priorities, is necessary. There is an increasing potential for tension between the aims and objectives of the European Union’s humanitarian, development, and stabilization efforts in third countries, particularly in light of recent research suggesting that rising incomes in developing countries (a positive indicator and objective for development assistance) can lead to increased emigration.2 On the other hand, shifting EU development objectives away from strengthening the rule of law, good governance, and civil society development toward border security and migration prevention may exacerbate migratory pressures. Shifts in funding imply trade-offs, and these must be understood.

- The European Union should undertake a “best practices” assessment of the most effective border security and law enforcement capacity-building programs in conflict zones. When undertaking more controversial types of activities (such as with the Libyan Coast Guard), training in rule-of-law principles should be strengthened and streamlined across each activity.

- The European Union, and member states separately, should map out the various ministries and agencies involved in migration-related policies, and establish productive linkages and communication channels across them.

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2. Clemens and Postel, “Can Development Assistance Deter Emigration?”
The creation of migration “fusion centers” could bring a variety of agencies and actors together at both the country level and in Brussels or capitals (in a format similar to the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre).

These fusion cells should also directly liaise and share border-control information with officials at Europol, Eurojust, and Frontex at both the EU and member-state level.

- The European Union should open participation in the Trust Funds to non-EU countries as a way to harness more investment for recipient countries.
- The European Union and its member states must improve clarity on funding pledges nationally and through the Trust Funds, as well as the rate of allocation and delivery of funds and activities.
  - Greater transparency related to the names of the organizations responsible for implementing migration-related funding and the amount of funds they receive for specific activities would be welcome. However, any public listing of these organizations should be mindful of the potential impact of transparency on their work in certain countries.
  - The European Union and member states should create an alert mechanism for migration-related instruments when large amounts of funds are disbursed over a relatively short period of time to a source or transit country.
- Rather than rely on the suboptimal funding reserves or emergency contingencies, additional and annual flexibility must be built into the next MFF and go beyond the single midterm revision. This flexibility should be based on migration assessments and future predictions for the 2021–2027 period.
Annex: EU Funds and Relevant National Ministries

This annex aims to provide context and insight into some of the instruments that were used in the European Union’s response to the migration crisis, as well as the relevant ministries involved at the national level. Not all instruments mentioned in the report are listed here; only those whose connection to migration management is less evident, and those whose description was shortened for clarity in the main body of the report, are laid out in this section.

EUROPEAN UNION

European Neighborhood Instrument

The ENI (named European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument [ENPI] prior to 2014) is the primary funding and support vehicle for the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which allows the European Union to cooperate with certain partner countries of the east and south on priority areas such as democracy, rule of law, and security. Some of the ENP countries are directly relevant to the migration issue as they are origin or transit countries, or they host a substantial number of refugees and migrants: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are all potential partners under the ENP and ENI. Launched in 2004, the ENP’s goal was to achieve the closest possible political association with the European Union’s neighbors, primarily as a tool for economic opportunities through greater cross-border and multicountry cooperation.

The ENI is one of the European Union’s largest funding streams for foreign assistance, representing 24 percent of the “Global Europe” category’s expenditures (Heading 4).1 Since its evolution from the ENPI, it has taken on a more incentive-based approach, giving the European Union more flexibility to use a “more for more” approach with its ENP partner countries, that is, adapting the levels of assistance to the capacity of the countries and the fulfillment of the existing partnership agreements.

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programs. Importantly, the ENPI did not cover security as a separate category, or migration issues at all.

The intent to use the ENI as a way to boost collaboration with the European Union’s neighbors was made clear in the EU Agenda on Migration of May 2015, which stated that “the forthcoming Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy will also aim to set out proposals in close partnerships with our neighbours for a more focused cooperation on issues of common concern, including migration,” and that “initiatives in key African and neighbourhood countries could be supported by . . . EU funding and related initiatives in the context of EU neighbourhood and development policies.”

Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace

Named the Instrument for Stability (IfS) prior to 2014, the IcSP supports security initiatives and peacebuilding activities in partner countries (over 310 projects in around 75 countries) as part of a new generation of instruments to finance the European Union’s external action. Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region are the largest recipients of IcSP-funded assistance, and 2015 represented the busiest year for new missions: 108 projects were launched, compared to 20 in 2014 and 82 in 2016. The IcSP provides both short-term crisis response through actions that are not included in the European Union’s seven-year budget (the Multiannual Financial Framework) as they respond to unforeseen crises and emergencies (“nonprogrammable” actions, administered by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments), and long-term support against global and transregional threats (administered by DG DEVCO). By creating a “more explicit link between security and development policies,” and bridging the gap between foreign policy and international development, the short-term, nonprogrammable component of the IcSP makes it one of the most rapid reactive tools at the European Union’s disposal that go beyond regular budget decisions.

In December 2017, the IcSP was amended to include a new focus that places a greater emphasis on security in the IcSP’s mission: capacity building in support of security and development. Designed as a new type of assistance, it extends “the EU’s assistance to the military actors of partner countries, under exceptional and clearly defined circumstances, with a sustainable development objective” in a further effort to create a link between security and development; this would allow IcSP operations to be counted as ODA per the DAC’s guidelines on security expenditures and peacebuilding. This new approach will benefit from a €100 million funding increase for

2018–2020 through a reallocation of funds within Heading 4 (but excluding this reallocation from funds allocated to the Development Cooperation Instrument).

**Common Foreign and Security Policy**

The CFSP aims to preserve peace and strengthen international security, laying out the European Union’s external priorities through policy and operations abroad. The CFSP, in line with the EU Global Strategy, dictates foreign policy and security priorities and concerns, while tools such as the IcSP and the Common Security and Defense Policy implement these priorities through crisis management, peacebuilding, or capacity-building missions. Still in accordance with the EU Global Strategy, the CFSP funds only civilian missions under the CSDP, while missions with military or defense implications are financially covered by member states through a special mechanism. The common costs of military missions, however, can be covered by EU funds (e.g., administrative costs). Civilian missions relate to civilian crisis management or capacity-building such as border guard training, while military missions involve military assets such as ships and weapons, for example, the training of military forces. Civilian CSDP missions have historically constituted 80 to 90 percent of the CFSP budget.

CFSP, which can be used in unforeseen emergencies, was flagged in 2016 as a vital instrument as part of the European Union’s investment in its external security, including tackling the migrant crisis through CSDP contributions and ongoing missions.6

**European Border and Coast Guard Agency—Frontex**

In response to the need for stronger external borders to accompany the removal of internal borders in the Schengen area, in 2004 European leaders created Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. Headquartered in Warsaw, with only 45 employees, and in recognition of the European Union’s new and expanded eastern border, its aim was to implement common rules on standards and procedures for the control of the European Union’s external borders and improve the integrated management of these borders. Member states’ national prerogatives in the area of border control required EU officials to focus Frontex on coordination and technical support for member states.7

In September 2016, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders became the European Border and Coast Guard Agency only nine months after the Commission presented its legislative proposal to expand Frontex’s mandate. With remarkable institutional speed, the agency grew its staff ranks by a third within a year (recruiting 134 new permanent staff in 2015), including liaison officers in relevant third countries, and will be able to...

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purchase its own equipment as well as deploy it in border operations on short notice, thanks to a rapid reaction pool of at least 1,500 officers. The agency is now authorized to propose to organize returns on its own initiative, rather than previously only assisting member states in returns and coordinating joint returns (multiple member states).

Frontex also now has liaison officers in member states who are able to travel to non-EU countries to carry out operational activities. The agency has a strengthened role in cooperation with third countries, “in particular neighbouring [sic] countries and countries of origin and transit for irregular migration” (emphasis added).8 Its role in the fight against cross-border crime and terrorism has been recognized, while European leaders have expanded its mandate to return migrants and its ability to collect personal data (e.g., fingerprints) for migration management purposes.9

GERMANY

In Germany, funding for the external dimension of migration is split between the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Foreign Office (AA), which manages humanitarian funding. The Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) is responsible for migration management (including asylum and resettlement), and its policy portfolio includes returns and reintegration (increasingly, in partnership with BMZ). The Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg) is in charge of troop deployments, as well as EU- and NATO-led military missions (including CSDP missions).

THE NETHERLANDS

In the Netherlands, the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs covers development, humanitarian assistance, and Dutch relations with the European Union and multilateral organizations, and consequently it is the key agency dealing with the external dimension of migration. However, the Ministry of Security and Justice is responsible for migration management, including returns and readmission. It is also in charge of counterterrorism and national security policy. The Ministry of Defense oversees contributions to NATO as well as the navy and the Marechaussee, both of which are involved in the NATO, Frontex, and CSDP missions addressing migration in the Mediterranean. With this division of labor in mind, almost all of the funds related to the external dimension of migration are channeled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a small portion channeled through the Ministry of Defense.

SWEDEN

In Sweden, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for development and humanitarian assistance. It oversees the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), which delivers about half of the ODA budget, which includes development and humanitarian aid, with the rest allocated to international organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank.10 As a result, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and its agencies are the primary actors dealing with the external dimension of migration. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Justice and the Swedish Migration Agency retain responsibility for migration management, including returns and reintegration. In addition, the Ministry of Defense oversees international military deployments, including EU and UN missions, and ad hoc cooperation with NATO (Sweden is not a member of the alliance); it is also in charge of coast guard funding and thus regulates the coast guard’s participation in Frontex missions.


Annex: EU Funds and Relevant National Ministries
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