

MAY 2018

CONFRONTING THE GLOBAL FORCED MIGRATION CRISIS

A Report of
the CSIS Task
Force on the
Global Forced
Migration Crisis

Task Force Cochairs

Secretary Tom Ridge
The Honorable Gayle Smith

Project Director

Daniel F. Runde

Principal Authors

Erol K. Yayboke
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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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CSIS Task Force on the Global Forced Migration Crisis
and The CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development

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IV

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The size and scope of the global forced migration¹ crisis are unprecedented. Almost 66 million people worldwide have been forced from home by conflict.² If recent trends continue, this figure could increase to between 180 and 320 million people by 2030. This global crisis already poses serious challenges to economic growth and risks to stability and national security, as well as an enormous human toll affecting tens of millions of people. These issues are on track to get worse; without significant course correction soon, the forced migration issues confronted today will seem simple decades from now.

People in almost every region of the world are being forced from home by armed conflict and violence, persecution, political oppression, economic malfeasance, environmental, climate, and human-induced disasters, or food insecurity and famine. Common threads among these root causes of forced migration are underdevelopment and poor governance. Yet, our efforts to confront the crisis continue to be disproportionately reactive rather than proactive in addressing these and other core issues. All too often this more narrow focus leads to one-off foreign assistance programs that rely on yearly replenishments as armed conflicts and other root causes entrench themselves. In the United States, nearly 13 percent of all foreign assistance is spent on humanitarian relief, a significant portion of which is spent addressing symptoms of forced migration. Worse, more than 10 percent of all foreign assistance (and a much greater percentage of funds meant to confront the global forced migration crisis abroad) is now spent in developed countries receiving forced migrants, a vast increase from just 10 years ago. The bottom line is that we are spending more and more of our limited foreign assistance resources on programs that—while providing critical life-saving support to vulnerable people—address symptoms and not the root causes of forced migration.

Addressing root causes—and the underdevelopment and poor governance so often at their core—requires longer-term, strategic thinking. It requires refocusing efforts on strategies that leverage and go beyond foreign assistance. Strategies to confront the root causes of forced migration must make use of diplomatic, national security, and political tools while also addressing structural issues that require real, long-term development, economic growth, and opportunity creation. An “all hands-on deck” approach—including private-sector actors, public and private foundations, and national, multinational, and global institutions—must be used to mobilize the power of the private sector that is often best positioned to confront key root causes of the forced migration crisis. While there are clear, evidence-based reasons for private-sector engagement, there are grave and broad consequences to not being part of a productive solution. Increasing global forced migration has the potential to economically, socially, and politically destabilize countries and entire regions, thereby putting existing operations and investments at risk while limiting opportunities for future growth.

Ultimately, no country can confront this crisis alone. A coalition led by the United States and its allies represents the best hope for leadership in the global forced migration crisis. U.S. leadership remains feasible and necessary, especially if it wants to shape the way the world responds to this challenge in a manner that also serves U.S. interests. The world continues to look to the United States for leadership and solutions to this global issue, and helping confront the crisis strengthens U.S. claims to continue to lead the world. The United States should broaden the scope of its collective efforts beyond the tactical and reactive, seeing the world through a more strategic lens colored by the challenges posed—and opportunities created—by the forced migration crisis at home and abroad.

V

U.S. policies and actions send strong signals to the world. Unilateral disengagements—from UN-led global efforts or cuts to budgets and refugee resettlement efforts—could reduce burden sharing and collective action toward a shared problem at precisely the moment that they are needed the most. Proposed budget cuts to foreign assistance may be tempting for the United States in the short term but risk creating greater problems and greater flows of people later; doing so could make bad situations worse while weakening our allies and weakening our security in the future. At the same time, some countries (e.g., Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia) will continue to exacerbate the root causes of forced migration while simultaneously doing little to address its symptoms. The United States, its allies, and multilateral institutions should highlight and hold these and other nonconstructive actors accountable for their comparative lack of global leadership.

The consequences of inaction are real and relevant to the United States and its allies. To date, European countries have dealt with the brunt of forced migration flows into the developed world and are showing serious signs of strain from the UK to Greece and Italy to Sweden. This report concludes that it is in the U.S. domestic and national security interests to confront these issues abroad now to mitigate greater challenges for the United States and its European allies later. To accomplish this, a far broader set of stakeholders will be needed. These stakeholders must include but ultimately move beyond the protection of human rights and saving lives into practical solutions that recognize political realities and address root causes.

CSIS convened a task force in the fall of 2017 to study the global forced migration crisis. The task force included a politically, geographically, and technically diverse group of people who engaged in spirited debate and who individually may have some lingering disagreement on the details. However, the task force is united in its belief that increasing levels of forced migration is one of the most pressing challenges of our time, one that requires a pragmatic framework

for viewing the crisis and actionable ideas to confront it. This report presents the findings of the task force, significant desk research, and field research in Bangladesh, Jordan, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, and cities across the United States including Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, and San Diego.

The Introduction to this report provides important information explaining the crisis, including these eight facts you need to know about forced migration:

1. Current forced migration levels are unprecedented (page 10).
2. Protracted displacement is the new normal (page 11).
3. Developing countries are bearing the brunt of this crisis, hosting the vast majority of forced migrants (page 11).
4. Women—specifically women heads of household—and children are at the greatest risk in forced migration crises (page 15).
5. Developed countries are spending over 10 percent of all “foreign assistance” on new arrivals in developed countries (page 16).
6. Most forced migrants do not live in camps but are not completely part of host communities either (page 16).
7. Even if they want to, many forced migrants will never return home (page 17).
8. Forced migrants are not terrorists (page 17).

Chapter I presents domestic consequences of inaction for the United States and its allies, also presenting why global leadership is so important and so aligned with American values. A subsequent spotlight on national security discusses how pushing people into the shadows makes us less safe, how developing strong and resilient developing country economies is a national security issue, and how addressing root causes *there* has national security benefits *here*. Chapters II, III, and IV loosely mirror the path of a forced migrant. Chapter II presents the reasons so many people are

forced from home, including armed conflict and violence, political persecution, natural and human-induced disasters, and food insecurity. Chapter III focuses on the perilous journey faced by forced migrants, including the shadows into which they can fall, how transit routes are becoming destinations themselves, the plight of the internally displaced, and the importance of host communities. A subsequent spotlight on the private sector presents reasons why the private sector should care about forced migration, how it can engage in ways that benefit the bottom line in addition to corporate social responsibility, strategic financing gaps and constraints, and the potential of

entrepreneurial ecosystems. Mirroring the end of the path for some forced migrants, Chapter IV discusses considerations for people arriving in a new home and for the communities that receive them. These considerations include resettlement (and the extremely thorough vetting of those arriving in the United States) and integration into new communities, with a special focus on the role of cities.

Though actionable ideas worthy of broad consideration are presented throughout the report, Chapter V focuses on four big ideas and actions to implement them.

IDEA 1

PROTECT AND SECURE

Respond to current crises, predict future trends, prevent forced migration before it starts, and build greater resiliency in communities when it does happen. The United States should use its diplomatic, development, and—as a last resort—military power to resolve conflicts that force migration and cause instability, making the country and the world less safe.

IDEA 2

LEAD AND PARTNER

The United States should exercise global leadership in the international system seeking greater burden sharing from allies and others.

IDEA 3

DIVERSIFY STAKEHOLDERS

The private sector should be motivated and incentivized to engage responsibly in ways that benefit the bottom line—addressing corporate social responsibility, strategic gaps in business activities, and investment.

IDEA 4

REGULARIZE AND NORMALIZE

The most broadly effective solutions are ones that allow forced migrants to normalize their existence and add value to host communities as quickly as possible.

CSIS TASK FORCE ON THE GLOBAL FORCED MIGRATION CRISIS

VIII

LETTER FROM THE COCHAIRS

We are two people who have served proudly in our government, one of us a Republican under George W. Bush and one a Democrat under Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. We first met when we debated each other, as surrogates, during the 2008 presidential campaign—while each of us scored some points, we actually agreed on more than a few things.

We agreed to cochair this Task Force because CSIS asked us to; because the global forced migration crisis is among the defining issues of our lifetimes; and because we agree that tackling this crisis is bigger than any of us and certainly more important—to today’s world and the future—than our political affiliations. Indeed, it is our view that to politicize this crisis is to worsen it.

We agreed to do this because like many, we can close our eyes and capture that image of a drowned little boy on a beach—a little boy who had to flee his home to grasp even the hope of a decent childhood—a little boy who died before he could garner even a taste of that most basic right.

People around the world gasped in horror at that photo, newscasters cried on air, and activists and some politicians shook their fists at the outrage. But thousands of children, and mothers and fathers, are still drowning at the shoreline.

Global migration—whether borne of the need to flee the countries people call home to escape war, persecution, or death or of the desire to access the opportunities that all of us want—is shaping our countries, our cultures, our economies, and our futures.

The myth is that the mass movement of almost 66 million men, women, and children can be ignored, kicked down the road, or papered over with either words of compassion or blasts of rhetoric. The tragedy—and indeed the danger—is that the world is standing by, and is at best admiring the problem, and at worst refusing to solve it.

We learned in government that as one of our bosses said, “hard things are hard.” Solving this one is indeed difficult; failing to do so is

criminal. We owe it to those countries and communities receiving families in flight—not just in Europe or North America, but also in the Middle East, and Africa and Asia—and indeed to those who are fleeing—to do better.

We owe it to ourselves, and those who will come after, to step up, to take some hard decisions, and to champion political courage over political passivity.

As Americans, we have a particular obligation, and we know at least two things about this country of ours. First, the idea that became the most powerful country in the world was conceived and realized by people from all over the world, many of whom fled danger and oppression to get here. And second, when America leads, the world follows.

We cannot do this alone, but nor can we walk away, for to do so would be to undermine our own security, incur vast economic cost, and abandon the ideals that have earned our country the respect that has enabled us to lead.

Readers won’t agree with every recommendation in this report, or with every turn of analytic phrase—neither do we. But the single fact upon which every single member of this Task Force agrees is that the challenge we face in tackling this crisis is not that the world lacks expertise or ideas—it is that the world, as yet, needs political courage.

It is our hope that by laying out the stark facts about the scope and scale of this crisis and setting forth options, ideas, and recommendations, we might spur policymakers, influencers, and politicians to act on the fact that hard things are hard, but not impossible.

Secretary Tom Ridge
Former Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Former Governor, Pennsylvania

The Honorable Gayle Smith
President and CEO, the ONE Campaign, Former Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

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Words Matter

This report carefully and purposefully uses the broader term “forced migrant” to describe and include anyone who has been forced to leave home. The term—and its usage here—is meant to appreciate the often appropriate and necessarily separate considerations relevant for different groups while acknowledging that not every person forced from home fits conveniently into one group or another.

Its usage is not an attempt to group economic and voluntary migrants together with irregular and forced migrants (including, but not limited to, refugees and internally displaced persons, or IDPs), rather to talk in broader and more inclusive terms. There are many reasons someone would be forced from home and different ways that almost 70 years of international law deals—or does not adequately deal—with them. Even if laws are present and appropriate, adoption of the laws and their implementation can be inconsistent. These laws matter and should—along with their implementation—be strengthened to provide better support to more people forced from home. However, too often policy and definition disagreements dominate debates over what to do about the crisis. Other times their gaps and loopholes allow countries to ignore crises that might not meet global requirements for action but require action nonetheless.

This report will not resolve these decades-long debates over definitions; nor will it fix international law or its implementation. Instead, this report asserts that if “some level of force and compulsion”³ led to the initial displacement, a person is a forced migrant whether or not he or she has an official international designation. This distinction so often determines international response and especially matters to forced migrants themselves, who are the subjects of designations but so often do not actually identify with—or know much about—international law.

Words matter because, while many different terms have been used to describe and assign relevant sections of international law to people dealing with different situations, the term “forced migration” best captures officially forcibly displaced people (refugees, IDPs, and asylum seekers), those for whom there are multiple reasons why they were forced from home (e.g., South Sudan), and those for whom there is a lack of implementation of international law

(e.g., the Rohingya people of Myanmar). It has been noted that “a substantial and increasing number of forced migrants fall outside the existing protection regime and the legal and normative framework that defines it.”⁴ As they navigate their own individual journeys, important but insufficient international law and increasingly restrictive national laws often push people into the shadows. Bangladesh, for example, does not consider Rohingya from Myanmar to be refugees. Although the Rohingya people are able to request protection under the treaties given their “habitual residence,” Bangladesh is not required to do so since they are not a signatory to the relevant international treaty.⁵ While there are relevant treaties with prescriptive language for confronting emergencies, adherence to these treaties as signatories is inconsistent.

The word “migrant” as part of forced migration is specifically used in acknowledgment of the changing nature of displacement, one that sees those forced from home often traveling alongside voluntary migrants in what has also been called “mixed” or “irregular” migration. The United Nations invokes specific terminology to identify and differentiate groups affected by migration, but it also acknowledges interconnectedness between the various groups.⁶ The vulnerabilities and needs of forced migrants are often different—and more acute—than voluntary migrants and the journey can be very different for these diverse groups. Most voluntary migrants cross multiple international borders while a relatively small number of forced migrants make it beyond even one border. Persons forcibly uprooted within their own countries—internally displaced persons, or IDPs—have become increasingly recognized over the past few decades because of their refugee-like needs. Inaction on IDPs could have a destabilizing impact on the affected parts of countries, which could lead to spillover across borders, ultimately adding to forced and irregular migration flows. As noted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “[migrants] and refugees increasingly make use of the same routes and means of transport to get to an overseas destination,”⁷ though it is worth noting that IDPs make up the majority of forced migrants.

Annex A provides a summary of terms used to describe and categorize forced migrants. ●



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KUTUPALONG REFUGEE CAMP, BANGLADESH

Rebekah walked the equivalent of Washington D.C. to Baltimore through contested territory.

REBEKAH DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE

SYRIA

SYRIA.

Her children were in school and she had recently purchased a small plot of land in an olive grove just outside of town. She was working as a lecturer at a local university, working hard to ensure that Sameea—age 12—and Muthana—age 11—could attend university as she had done in nearby Aleppo. She was dreaming about the home they would build when an explosion next door forever changed her and her family’s lives. They didn’t know who or what caused the explosion or why; but it ultimately did not matter to them. Within a few minutes Rebekah, Sameea, and Muthana had left everything behind, unsure if they would ever see any of it again.



There is an unprecedented number of families like Rebekah’s⁸, not just in and around Syria, but in Uganda, El Salvador, Bangladesh, Sweden, the United States, and beyond. The issues surrounding forced migrants are complex. The stubborn persistence of forced migration⁹ all too often leads to denial and inaction, or at best reactions to symptoms, especially in charged political environments. This report exists for those interested in ways to turn burdens into opportunities and concrete steps for what can be done to confront the global forced migration crisis.

Ultimately, the United States and its allies can “pay” now to confront the crisis, or “pay” more later. The world has already begun to witness the costs associated with rising forced migration: record displacement, conflict engulfing whole regions, rising food insecurity, environmental disaster, and other destabilizing trends dominating headlines around the world. But in the long term, these crises could spiral into broader security and economic threats that will undermine U.S. objectives at home and abroad. Several of our security and economic partners could face collapse as more people are forced from home. The issues surrounding forced migration are only getting more complicated and dangerous, and ignoring those consequences is not a sustainable solution.

While many experts and organizations have researched some variation of forced migration (many of which are cited in this

report), current policy debates continue to focus on incomplete and sometimes inaccurate views of critical and complicated issues. Particularly but not uniquely in the United States, global efforts to address the crisis (e.g., the UN global compacts on refugees and migrants) are periodically met with healthy skepticism, questions about their effects on sovereignty, and a view that costs of the crisis are being shouldered disproportionately. While the broader arguments for globally oriented solutions (some discussed in this report) are often viewed in opposition to domestic priorities, this report argues that global partnership is not mutually exclusive to domestic security and economic well-being.

In addition to confronting the root causes of the forced migration crisis (see Chapter II), the United States and its allies should take steps to encourage forced migrants to stay close to their original homes, thus facili-

tating possible return and minimizing onward movement. Many forced migrants share these interests, aspiring to return home or unable to handle costly and risky expedition to a third country. To achieve this goal, more and better support—often but not only in the form of foreign assistance—must be provided to host communities and transit countries to improve stability and their ability to absorb and host more people. Though not on its own, foreign assistance and development resources—especially those that focus on conflict prevention, better governance, and economic growth—can help prevent the collapse of countries that would force more people from home. These resources can also help create job opportunities and new markets for goods and services.

Some proposed solutions for complicated forced migration issues are rejected or ignored because they are considered in-

fringements on sovereignty. An example of this is the U.S. withdrawal from the UN-led global compact on migration process in December 2017. Rejection of the global migration process—however imperfect the process may be, it still includes every country in the world except the United States—“could make the U.S. less safe with less global influence and thus even less control over forced and irregular migration to its borders.”¹¹ To better offer its expert advice on these matters, the Trump administration should fill the assistant secretary of state position in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration as soon as possible, ideally with someone experienced in working with the United Nations and other multilateral entities. State Department leadership and senior policy expertise on this issue is essential and necessary for continued U.S. participation in the UN-led global compact process on refugees (see Annex C).

“Rejection of the global migration process... ‘could make the U.S. less safe with less global influence and thus even less control over forced and irregular migration to its borders.’”

STRAIN ON OUR ALLIES

Despite being high on European and global policy priority lists,¹² the growing global urgency is largely seen as distant in a U.S. domestic policy context, or conflicting with the notions of American sovereignty (see Chapter I). The United States’ European allies have dealt with the brunt of forced migration flows into the developed world and are showing serious signs of strain. While not the only cause of increased nationalism, events such as Brexit and the rise of parties on the extreme ends of the political spectrum can be tied to the arrival of greater numbers of forced migrants at Europe’s door over the past decade.

Our European allies are less willing to host more forced migrants than they were 10 years ago; and that is not going to change


anytime soon. In the summer of 2017, the top EU court ruled that Austria could deport those asylum seekers who did not use Austria as their first point of entry into the European Union back to that first point of entry. This ruling is in line with the 2003 Dublin Regulation that distributes responsibility for reviewing asylum applications, and the asylum seekers themselves, across the European Union.¹³ The Dublin Regulation had been suspended in 2015 because of the potential for the number of forced migrants from Syria to overwhelm other EU countries such as Croatia. After suspending the Dublin Regulation, Austria saw about 90,000 (approximately 1 percent of its population) applications for asylum between 2015 and 2016. Since the end of 2016, Austria has passed new and tougher asylum laws, including its 2017 deportation law,¹⁴ and is now coordinating with other countries around the Balkans and southeast Europe to make tougher border restrictions or push people into Germany and Sweden, complicating broader

EU relations.¹⁵ Additionally, Hungary has proposed and enacted restrictive laws¹⁶ and Bulgaria has earned a reputation as one of Europe’s most hostile points of entry for forced migrants.¹⁷

Over the last few years, Sweden was a top destination for tens of thousands of forced migrants, especially unaccompanied minors. In the summer of 2015, 163,000 people—mainly from Syria and Iraq—arrived at Sweden’s border, many having walked from other EU countries that had rejected their claims of asylum. As a result, Sweden lowered its previously more generous asylum quota, reverting to lower EU minimums. It also instituted a mandatory identification check on its southern border with Denmark for the first time since the 1950s, even closing the border completely for a period of time—an announcement that famously brought the Swedish prime minister to tears on live television.^{18,19,20}

Some will criticize Europe, saying that with these greater restric-

HUMANITARIAN AID TO HOST AND ORIGIN COUNTRIES



GRAPHIC SOURCE

“Humanitarian Aid, Total,” OECD, <https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>¹⁰

tions, implicit or explicit attempts to “outsource” dealing with forced migration to Turkey and countries across central and north Africa are counterproductive. Critics will point to increased tensions in urban areas²¹ and troubling levels of slavery and human trafficking, especially in origin and transit countries,²² though recent history shows that these criticisms might fall on deaf ears. With some exceptions, most European countries’ policies to date have focused on sending people away.²³ Whether a border fence in Hungary or an agreement between a European and African country keeps people away,²⁴ Europe is reducing its welcome even as many more forced and irregular migrants are going to be looking to Europe.

This report concludes that it is in the U.S. domestic and national security interests to confront these issues abroad now to mitigate greater challenges for the United States and our European allies later. The United States has been the global leader on these issues for decades, should remain a global leader in confronting forced migration, and, in doing so, should support and strengthen its allies and productive international efforts and institutions. To accomplish this, it is clear that a far broader set of arguments will be needed. These arguments must recognize the importance of protecting human rights and saving lives, but ultimately move into developing practical solutions that recognize political realities.

A LAGGING SYSTEM

Current international frameworks and agreements (e.g., 1951 refugee convention) for supporting the various types of forced migrants (e.g., refugees, IDPs, and asylum seekers) are executed by an array of organizations (e.g., UNHCR and International Organization for Migration, or IOM) responsible for different groups of people in every region of the world.²⁵ It is an expansive web of people and groups dedicated to this challenge, but that network is strained by the worsening crisis.

In the wake of World War II, various instruments, bodies, and legal classifications were created to care for people affected by disaster in different ways, but also to hold individual countries accountable for maintaining commitments. The 1951 Refugee Convention guarantees certain rights based on status and criteria, but the treaty has some shortcomings. Specifically, not all countries are parties to or have sufficient political will to abide by the convention, IDPs are not included, the convention itself does not cover all forced migrants, and enforcement is inconsistent at best. Consequently, there are shortfalls and gaps in services that have widened as the root causes of forced migration have worsened and diversified, the regions and numbers affected have grown, and the crisis has proliferated. While there is no spe-

cific convention or treaty covering forced migration, international human rights laws obligate states—as primary responsible parties—to ensure civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights for all individuals in the territory and under their jurisdiction.^{26,27,28} Ultimately, it is more important to reflect on what countries actually do rather than what they say or the treaties to which they may or may not be signatories.

The convention has been updated once since 1951 (in 1967); as a result, people forced from their homes increasingly do not qualify for assistance under the global statutes set up decades ago to protect them.²⁹ Some major destination and transit countries for irregular and forced migrants—such as India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and the United States (who is only party to the 1967 protocol)—are not even signatories of the 1951 convention.³⁰ Today’s forced migrants often have difficulty accessing the international assistance provided for refugees or asylum seekers, and all too often fall into the shadows and subsequent generational cycles of poverty. This is particularly true for IDPs who may want to escape across international boundaries but are barred from doing so.³¹

UNHCR and IOM³²—the two primary organizations tasked with managing the impacts of these trends—notably perform well given the complicated international legal framework and their limited resources and operational capabilities; however, these groups rely on governments for funding and access, neither of which is guaranteed. Addressing their funding

and access gaps—UNHCR alone projects a \$4.23 billion gap (53 percent of the funds it needs) as of late 2017³³—will require greater foreign assistance from countries such as the United States. In addition to adequate funding, there needs to be greater flexibility on the part of groups responsible for responding to these crises. UNHCR, for example, receives flexible or “unearmarked” funding from the United States, allowing it to respond to burgeoning and unique crises faster than other organizations such as IOM. But UNHCR and IOM alone cannot deal with all the challenges that forced migration brings. These issues will also require assistance from new donors such as the World Bank and development finance institutions. There are significant, often unique, roles for private enterprise and capital and for public and private philanthropy; however, the issues are often so challenging that many of these private actors will require an expanded vision of public-private partnerships and simplified entry points to ensure sustainable engagement (see Spotlight on the Private Sector).

Unless we address these issues now we will be dealing with much greater economic, national security, and humanitarian consequences over the next 30 years. The costs of inaction are rising quickly. Taking productive action will require recognizing complicated realities, making hard choices, and directly confronting the roots and results of forced migration (see Chapter II). The good news is that the actions we take today can help shape the forced migration scenario we will face tomorrow.

“We are facing an unparalleled emergency, and it is time to expand the roster of on-call responders to include the corporate world, international financial and development institutions, philanthropists, and more. There are many capable actors outside the traditional humanitarian sphere who are ready and eager to engage in addressing the challenge of global forced displacement. It will be vital to include them in bringing about the solutions that are within reach.”

Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The World in 2030

HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 1

Confront the crisis, address root causes, strengthen the rule-based international order, and reduce the flow of forced migration over the medium term. Led by the United States and its allies, a coalition of countries together with the private sector and other stakeholders take productive actions that confront the root causes of forced migration—especially, but not only, conflict—while addressing the short- and long-term needs of those forced from home for protracted periods of time. We find productive ways of integrating those already displaced with host communities or facilitate safe and voluntary return home. Societies that successfully integrate forced migrants benefit from hard-working, grateful participants in their new societies and economies, decreasing the prevalence of xenophobia. The United States and its allies understand that forced migration is a destabilizing global threat and potentially an opportunity that requires collective action to manage. China and Russia continue to contribute little to the solutions, but they pay a global price for this lack of leadership and action. Forced migration levels plateau and eventually decrease by 2030 as the United States and a broad coalition of countries take actions to address the economic, national security, and humanitarian consequences of the global crisis. U.S. global leadership is enhanced by the successful management of the forced migration crisis giving it the ability to influence and lead on other issues.

HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 2

Muddle through, treat forced migration as a humanitarian crisis only, react to the issue *du jour*, and put the rule-based international order under great strain. The United States and its allies view forced migration primarily through homeland security and humanitarian lenses. The focus is on humanitarian aid to officially registered forcibly displaced people, with comparatively little attention or funding given to address root causes of forced migration or to build resiliency in host communities. These efforts have little impact on the conflict-based, environmental, or other root causes. Global forced migration rates continue trends from 2000 to 2015, resulting in as many as 180 million people forced from home by conflict in 2030.³⁴ A further 150 million people are forced from home by environment-related disasters by 2050.³⁵ At the same time, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries reallocate greater amounts of foreign assistance funding to deal with arrivals domestically equivalent to 20 percent of all foreign assistance instead of the over 10 percent in 2018. This focus inward comes at the expense of

other competing priorities for foreign assistance and development budgets, thus further prioritizing responses to symptoms of forced migration as opposed to root causes overseas. A few bad actors posing as refugees or even coming from refugee communities commit crimes in the United States and Europe, leading to increasing levels of antirefugee and antimigrant sentiment and the strengthening of isolationist and nationalist political movements. The temptation for xenophobic reactions to events grows. China and Russia continue to contribute little to the solutions, and periodically make the crisis worse through cynical and purposeful actions, as in the case of Syria. One or two countries hosting millions of forced migrants, likely in the Middle East, collapse under the strain and a lack of external support, creating further geostrategic problems for the United States and its allies.

HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 3

Stand by while chaos ensues. The United States and its allies focus only on the symptoms of forced migration and fail to create collective action to manage the crisis. U.S. resettlement numbers are cut, U.S. foreign assistance budgets are cut or redirected, and conflicts worldwide grow in number and duration. The United States is unable or unwilling to lead any sort of global response. Global forced migration rates rapidly accelerate, resulting in 320 million people forced from home by conflict in 2030.³⁶ A further 150 million people are forced from home by environmental and climate-related disasters by 2050.³⁷ At the same time, OECD donors accelerate the trend of reallocating overseas development resources domestically, resulting in as much as 30 percent allocated to responding to hosting people. Previous commitments to international agreements are abandoned or ignored. The issues of forced migration lead to an almost complete closing of Europe's doors and an even greater disinterest from the United States. The forced migration crisis strains the European Union to a breaking point, leading as many as three countries (e.g., Hungary, Austria, and Poland) to follow a "Brexit path" rather than adhere to collective rules from Brussels on accepting more people. Root causes of forced migration become further entrenched and push more and more people away from home, while new laws in countries that have historically provided refuge now turn people away. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that keeps forced migrants in situations of instability for longer and pushes them into the shadows, thus increasing the risk of their radicalization and decreasing the likelihood that they become members of society in new communities or economically self-sufficient. The number of fragile and failing states increases, stretching already scarce foreign assistance and development resources and eventually reallocating even more funds to provide increased domestic security. As many as five or six countries become destabilized or collapse altogether. A number of U.S. allies (e.g., Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Nigeria) that are hosting large numbers of forced migrants descend into chaos. Any chance for partnership and benefit to the United States rapidly disappears into a downward spiral of instability. ●

THE FACE OF FORCED MIGRATION

Forced migrants are far too often assumed to be floating hopelessly across the Mediterranean Sea or as people arriving destitute at a dusty refugee camp. Though the modern face of forced migration includes such examples, the reality is much more diverse. Given increased global mobility, many forced migrants who cross international boundaries today are the wealthiest, healthiest, and best educated.

Remember Rebekah and her family in Syria? Like a vast number of forced migrants, she only had a few minutes to pack before leaving behind everything she knew. As she did, you would probably wear your nicest clothes and hold on tight to your smartphone that enables you and millions of fellow forced migrants to reach family and friends in the United States as easily as those in Syria. Upon reaching safety in Gaziantep, Turkey, you would then try to normalize your family's existence as quickly as possible, secure a roof over your head, and get your children into school. Over time you would try to find ways to earn money to pay for food, eventually able to take pride in the money you have made through your informal hair salon in your new community. You would proudly wear clean and colorful clothes when discussing your journey with visiting researchers. And even though you do not look like the stereotyped version of a forced migrant, dirty and thin with ripped clothing, you are every bit of one with hauntingly dark memories and an unclear future ahead of you. Perversely, not resembling this stereotype of a forced migrant could

prove counterproductive if it caused one to consequently be passed over for international assistance.

Though they may have all looked different and had different journeys to safety and ultimate prosperity, forced migrants throughout history have had positive impacts on almost every part of industry and society. But beyond notable celebrities, everyday people affected by forced migration crises move on to contribute and thrive in society, enhancing the economic, social, and cultural vitality of the United States.

For Rebekah and the millions of others like her, the "choice" to leave home is not a choice at all. Whether facing violence, persecution, climate-related disasters, food insecurity, or any number of other destabilizing events, almost 66 million people worldwide have been forced to abandon homes, friends, and jobs. On a planet of over 7 billion people, 66 million may not seem like a lot, but given that an overwhelming majority of them come from or find themselves in countries already dealing with underdevelopment and insecurity, the challenges are significant and are not going to be met without concerted efforts to do so.

FAMOUS FORCED MIGRANTS

THEORETICAL PHYSICIST

Albert Einstein

FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Madeleine Albright

FOUNDER OF GOOGLE

Sergey Brin

AUTHOR

Elie Wiesel

FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Henry Kissinger

FOUNDER OF INTEL

Andrew Grove

FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General John Shalikashvili

PHILOSOPHER

Sigmund Freud

EIGHT FACTS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT FORCED MIGRATION

→ **Throughout history**, movement has allowed people to improve their lives in a new place. Voluntary migration has also been the cause of intense political debate for generations that continue to this day. Voluntary migration is perceived to have moved to new and unprecedented levels on its own when, in reality, it has stayed consistent (3 percent) relative to the global population for over 70 years.³⁸ Forced migration—encompassing diverse groups from every region on earth—has grown to its own unprecedented levels in relative and absolute terms from approximately 20 million (0.3 percent of the global population) in 2000 to almost 66 million (1 percent) in 2016.³⁹ The following key facts demonstrate the scale and complexity of the global forced migration crisis.

→ FACT 1

CURRENT FORCED MIGRATION LEVELS ARE UNPRECEDENTED.

By the end of 2016, almost 66 million people worldwide had been forcibly displaced from their homes by conflict and violence,⁴⁰ including 22.5 million refugees—the highest number since World War II—40.3 million people displaced within their own countries (IDPs), and nearly 3 million people seeking asylum in another country. With over 7 billion people on the planet, confronting the challenges of almost 66 million forced migrants will be difficult but should be manageable. What makes this a crisis is its scale, complexity, speed, length, and geographic reach, in addition to the fact that those affected are concentrated (and almost hidden from developed countries) in developing regions, many of which lack the resources to respond to their own challenges, much less an influx of thousands or millions of forced migrants.

In many ways, the global community is still dealing with the effects of displacement and refugees following World War II, when massive numbers of German and Polish nationals were forced from Silesia, East Prussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and other places.⁴¹ Jewish survivors who became forced migrants looked for shelter in an increasingly nonwelcoming Europe and oppressive Soviet Union.⁴² None of these issues were solved in one year or through one overarching policy mechanism. Addressing such a massive disruption required unprecedented levels of international cooperation, leadership, and innovative thinking. Many societies—including but not limited to many in the United States—took responsibility for and benefited from postwar resettlement and immigration, though the benefits were not always quickly apparent.

Interest in today's global forced migration crisis from traditional donors has plateaued at the same time that root causes such as conflict have decentralized and wars with nontraditional and nonstate actors have enabled cyclical degradation of fragile contexts around the world, in turn straining confidence in the *Pax Americana*.⁴³

→ FACT 2


PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT IS THE NEW NORMAL.

Once forced from home, many hope to stay close by in case an opportunity to return presents itself or because they are not capable of traveling any further. But even for those displaced internally within their own country, the evidence points to protracted displacement as a new normal. Though many desire to go home, return to chronically unstable places could result in greater numbers of protracted displacement scenarios, an increasing number of which involve migration to one or multiple destinations outside one's original home country.⁴⁴

Of 60 countries monitored by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) in 2014, 53 showed evidence that “people were living in internal displacement for more than 10 years.”⁴⁵ Another study showed that by the end of 2014, at least 50 percent of IDPs globally had been displaced for more than three years in countries monitored for conflict-induced displacement.⁴⁶

Unsurprisingly, the further away from home a forced migrant goes, the more real protracted displacement becomes. Though there is some discrepancy in aggregated estimates, all point to troubling levels of protracted displacement. The average duration of displacement for current refugees (excluding Afghans), for example, is estimated at 10.3 years with a median duration of 4 years by the World Bank. Including Afghan refugees, the average jumps to 21.2 years with a median duration of 19 years.⁴⁷ UNHCR estimates the average duration of displacement as 26 years at the end of 2015, whereas this figure was 9 years in 1993 and 17 years in 2013.⁴⁸ In other words, even in the most conservative of estimates, half of the world's refugees have spent 4 or more years displaced.

HOSTING SHARE OF GLOBAL REFUGEE POP. (2016)



→ FACT 3


DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE BEARING THE BRUNT OF THIS CRISIS, HOSTING THE VAST MAJORITY OF FORCED MIGRANTS.

Eighty-four percent of refugees—and an alarming 99 percent of IDPs, many of whom have been forced from home but do not have the resources to travel—remain in developing regions.^{49,50} The world's poorest countries disproportionately bear the brunt of the forced migration crisis, especially given their proximity to IDP crises that can spill over into neighboring countries and beyond, and lengthy processes for those lucky enough to even be considered for resettlement somewhere else. This trend of developing countries hosting more forced mi-

GRAPHIC SOURCE

UNHCR, “Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2016.”⁵²

FORCED MIGRATION IS A GLOBAL PHENOMENON



Notable IDP
Scenarios


TOTAL REFUGEES HOSTED HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES VS. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

grants continues to grow, and is especially prevalent in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, which collectively host over 11 million Syrian forced migrants. By comparison, Canada and the United States host fewer than 100,000 Syrian refugees.⁵¹

At the same time, other countries (e.g., Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia) cause or exacerbate the global crisis via direct and indirect hostility toward forced migrants and via strict policies of non-interference (unless invited in) even in the gravest of humanitarian situations.⁵³ Despite its deep involvement in the Syrian conflict, Russia has only contributed roughly 1 percent of its calculated humanitarian “share of the funding burden,” according to one analysis.⁵⁴ China contributes some foreign assistance funds but does not resettle forced migrants in a meaningful way—ostensibly for “cultural reasons”—with only nine Syrian refugees resettled in China in 2015. In its own words, China does not feel obligated to “clean up the mess [led by the United States]”^{55,56}

Ultimately, it is going to be the countries with the capacity to accept greater numbers of forced migrants and the ones currently handling internal displacement issues effectively that are going to determine the future of this crisis. One way for the United States and other developed countries to lead would be to recognize that they are not bearing the brunt of the crisis, and support countries that are. Turkey, for example, was hosting 3.5 million total refugees (3.2 million from Syria) as of October 2017,⁵⁷ whereas the United States averages around 70,000 annual admissions, a number that declined significantly in 2017.⁵⁸

Most headlines and coverage of the global forced migration crisis in the developed world focuses on the minority of people who actually try and travel to Europe or the United States—such as the 2,000 people who drowned in 2017 in the Mediterranean Sea, or the tens of thousands of refugees resettled in the United States. However, developing countries host overwhelming majorities of forced migrants, totaling at least 58 million people globally.⁵⁹ In 2016 alone, 31 million people were settled elsewhere within their own countries, mainly due to natural disaster.⁶⁰



→ FACT 4 WOMEN—SPECIFICALLY WOMEN HEADS OF HOUSE- HOLD—AND CHILDREN ARE AT THE GREATEST RISK IN FORCED MIGRATION CRISES.

In countries with wars that displace large numbers of people, women and girls very often become heads of household and the sole caretakers of their families, or they travel without family members. Today, almost half of the 244 million annual migrants and half of all refugees worldwide are female.^{61,62} Some are driven away from legal avenues for migration given a lack of protection, creating vulnerability that increases as human traffickers, criminal gangs, and even soldiers increasingly prey on them.⁶³ Despite being disproportionately negatively affected by conflict, women are also rarely included in peace processes, even though when women are included, research has shown that peace agreements have a higher chance of lasting longer.^{64,65}

Female forced migrants deal with even greater challenges compared to men, often confronted with sexual assault and exploitation, rape, child marriage, and all types of violence not only as a cause of their displacement but also during their journey, while simultaneously and independently caring for children. Cultural and economic participation can be challenging for women even after reaching relative safety; while many thrive in their new areas, others deal with lingering effects of the root cause of their forced migration while providing childcare in places with new cultures and languages. Being the head of household and sole caretaker makes integration into the formal economy more difficult. Cultivating skills and capabilities is essential to being able to support a family and

have independence. Many women face discrimination, a lack of training, and without access to viable employment (both at home and outside the home). Without targeted and long-term assistance, women heads of household often struggle to integrate into new communities—or even reintegrate in original homes after return—which can lead to multigenerational repercussions for their children and for society as a whole. It is important to note that many women in refugee or IDP camps and urban settings have shown themselves extraordinarily resourceful and entrepreneurial. Reinforcing their skills, introducing new ones, and providing them with work and community-involvement opportunities can better prepare them and their families for a more stable future following return, integration, or resettlement.

Over half the world’s refugees are children.⁶⁶ Many are unaccompanied after their parents were killed or separated from them. In 2015, for example, Sweden experienced over 35,000 unaccompanied minors arriving at its border, many of whom had walked across Europe from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.⁶⁷ Thousands of unaccompanied minors from Central America arrived at the southern U.S. border with Mexico in 2014.⁶⁸ For children born into forced migration contexts, many miss out on education and nutrition—stunting their mental and physical growth—and spend their developmental years in limbo. The longer children stay out of school and without access to a traditional childhood, the harder it is for them to eventually (or ever) catch up and ultimately become productive members of society. Given the protracted nature of today’s forced migration (see Fact 2), these children become a lost generation of people struggling to find productive outlets for themselves and their families.

→ **FACT 5****DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE SPENDING OVER 10 PERCENT OF ALL “FOREIGN ASSISTANCE” ON NEW ARRIVALS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.**

Increased numbers of forced migrants globally have not resulted in enough increased funding to confront the crisis; and a growing portion of the funding that does exist is being diverted to deal with new arrivals in developed countries. Donor countries spent \$15.4 billion in 2016 on hosting forced migrants domestically; this means over 10 percent of all official foreign assistance originally intended to be spent abroad was spent at home.⁶⁹ Driven primarily by European countries after seeing increased numbers of forced migrants arriving at their borders, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (which determines what is considered official development assistance, or ODA, among the world’s richest 30 donors) loosened its rules on what could be counted as ODA, leading some countries to count domestic spending as ODA. Though these rules were clarified somewhat in November 2017,⁷⁰ they still open the door for limited ODA resources to be used domestically, which in effect lessens the resources allocated to address forced migration in developing countries. As a result, many OECD countries and others are increasingly counting domestic program spending on refugees toward ODA.

→ **FACT 6****MOST FORCED MIGRANTS DO NOT LIVE IN CAMPS BUT ARE NOT COMPLETELY PART OF HOST COMMUNITIES EITHER.**

Most forced migrants live in urban or suburban areas, with family and friends, or in slum-like informal settlements, often indistinguishable from voluntary migrants. Estimates place approximately 80 percent of all internally displaced living in urban settings, with 60 percent of refugees living in towns or cities (equating to over 13 million people).⁷¹ Specifically in the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region, approximately 90 percent of the displaced live in urban settings.⁷² While this allows many to work outside the formal economy (often at sub-standard levels of income, health, and safety while exposed to labor violations and predatory employers), it also creates strains on host communities.⁷³ There is also some evidence that urban-dwelling forced migrants are largely overlooked—increasing the risk of harassment, discrimination, arrest, detention, and deportation—while those living in sanctioned or formal camps receive a disproportionate amount of support and attention.⁷⁴

Residing in urban areas does not necessarily mean forced migrants can freely integrate into a host community. On the contrary, forced migrants (especially those outside their home countries) often suffer from state-imposed restrictions on their mobility, their ability to work or exercise their professions, and their ability to open bank accounts or obtain mobile phones. The challenges of global forced migration are linked closely with—and further exacerbate—the well-documented challenges of urbanization.

→ **FACT 7****EVEN IF THEY WANT TO, MANY FORCED MIGRANTS WILL NEVER RETURN HOME.**

If one talks to a forced migrant—like Rebekah from Syria—soon after displacement, her goal will almost always be to return home as soon as possible. As time wears on, however, the realities of protracted displacement make return more complicated: children learn new customs and languages in local schools, jobs become available, and dreams of returning home meet the practicalities of having started new lives elsewhere. Before those long-term considerations, however, safety and security at home are always a prerequisite for return. For some, dreams of returning home were dashed even before they left; who would want to return to a place marred in one’s memory as a place of suffering and torture? For still others, lingering political and security realities make returning impossible. Of 22.5 million refugees, for example, only 552,200 officially returned to their countries of origin, with a majority (384,000) returning to Afghanistan.⁷⁵ Today, throughout the world, protracted displacement, integration, and resettlement—not just talk of return—are the new normal.

→ **FACT 8****FORCED MIGRANTS ARE NOT TERRORISTS.**

A common scenario for forced migrants involves fleeing terrorists in search of safety rather than joining their ranks. Some have sought to connect religious extremism and terrorist attacks to the global forced migration crisis. While we need to separate the vast majority of forced migrants from extremists and terrorists, there is some evidence that restrictive policies and the separation of forced migrants into camps and other concentrated places can create environments conducive to radicalization.⁷⁶ A recent study asserted that radicalization is a threat in crisis situations, and forced migrants in camp situations are susceptible because, among other things, they “have fewer opportunities for personal advancement.”⁷⁷ Another study showed that factors such as “overcrowding, hunger, and poverty” among forced migrants put them at greater risk, but that the determinate factors in radicalization were more likely those largely out of their own control: “actions of the receiving country and its citizens, the refugees’ loss of personal opportunities in prolonged crises, and a lack of integrated programs.”⁷⁸

The evidence does not suggest causal links between increased levels of forced migration and increased terrorist activity. The perception that terrorists take advantage of forced migration flows—especially official, legal, and regular flows—or that forced migrants as people are naturally at any great risk of radicalization are not supported by evidence. For example, the vast majority of those committing acts of terror in Europe are native born or legal residents, not newly arrived forced migrants and no refugee resettled in the United States in the last 30 years has committed a deadly act of terror.⁷⁹ What puts forced migrants at greater risk is their continued concentration near conflict zones and policies that “build fences, engage in push-back operations, criminalize irregular migration and abandon international legal commitments.” These policies ultimately push vulnerable people into the shadows where they could fall prey to nefarious groups such as human traffickers and terrorists. ISIS and other extremist groups have used anti-forced migrant sentiment for recruitment and propaganda purposes.⁸⁰ Consequently, policies that protect forced migrants and other vulnerable people provide productive outlets for them, and keeping them out of the shadows should be core elements of national security strategies.

THE FUTURE

The magnitude of the global forced migration crisis is staggering and growing.⁸¹ Conflicts that produce forced migrants—for example, civil war in South Sudan and ethnic cleansing in Myanmar—are growing in number while previous conflicts—for example, Syria—move from short-term crisis to protracted conflict. This is creating cyclical instability and engenders a domino effect of increasing fragility in some of the most vulnerable yet fastest growing countries in the world.

Despite disproportionate media portrayals to the contrary, most forced migrants do not come to the United States or Europe. 40 percent more people have been displaced in one state in Nigeria than the total number of people who arrived via the Mediterranean in Europe in 2015.⁸² Almost 94 percent of all forced migrants in Africa stay in Africa. These current realities have multigenerational consequences whereby shortcomings in services and opportunities could cripple future opportunities for forced migrants and host community members alike. Children and young people lose access to quality education and opportunities to be productive members of society. The creativity and productivity of

millions of engaged young minds is stifled when they are forced to prioritize survival over innovation and productive work.

Forced migration is an already complex phenomenon without easy solutions, one that will be made increasingly complicated and expensive by projected demographic and economic trends. For example, countries in Africa are expected to have over 800 million young people by 2050.⁸³ Currently, over half of the 420 million young people there are unemployed or inactive in the la-

bor markets, a number that could be larger than the current U.S. population by 2050. Without opportunity and jobs, not only will young people voluntarily migrate, but when coupled with underlying resource and political issues, the continent could be headed toward more frequent war, inequality, oppression, and environmental disaster. By no means is this a darkly realistic future only for African countries; variations of many of these underlying stresses exist across the Middle East, Central, South and Southeast Asia, and Central and South America.



60%

of refugees live in urban settings as opposed to camps.

GRAPHIC SOURCE

UNHCR, "Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2014," 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/556725e69.html#_ga=1.134920948.447548864.1453716833.

Forced migrants find themselves overwhelmingly and increasingly in already underdeveloped places. Their presence strains already struggling economies and shaky governance systems from Uganda to Bangladesh to Lebanon and beyond. Communities that can hardly feed and provide security for themselves are—and will continue to be—hosting forced migrants, giving unprecedented and exceptional scale to the demographic shock.

Forced migrants are often at their most vulnerable immediately after displacement and rely on the goodwill of neighbors and the international community for food, water, and shelter. Because keeping people alive and safe is—and should always be—a top priority, much of the international community's efforts and resources respond to the urgent humanitarian nature of forced migration. While responding to global forced migration is a primarily humanitarian and a security challenge, confronting it is largely a political, governance, national security, and economic development challenge.

In thinking about the future, it is worth acknowledging the "paradox of prosperity": the reality that, in the short term, economic development increases voluntary migration flows.⁸⁴ However, economic development also generally creates disincentives to conflict and greater resiliency to shocks that might otherwise result in forced migration. Economic growth—especially inclusive economic growth—creates jobs and, importantly, provides

productive outlets to the conflicts so often at the root of forced migration. Growth and economic development must be coupled with strengthening political and governance institutions because most drivers of forced migration have their roots in conflicts created by political crises.

The world has changed immensely in the past several decades and the reasons for—and consequences of—global forced migration crisis are vastly different than the ones that sparked the 1951 convention in the wake of World War II. As the nature of conflict moves from armies fighting armies to protracted asymmetrical warfare between a complicated web of armed actors; as the changes in our climate result in harsher living conditions, food insecurity, and instability; as violence and political and cultural extremes challenge the well-being of countless countries; and as a globalized world opens up to everyone with a smartphone, the international community's approach to solutions must also change. Without significant course correction soon, the forced migration issues confronted now will seem simple decades from now. ●


BY THE NUMBERS

INTRODUCTION


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Funding to combat global forced migration is not going where and how it is needed the most.


IN-DONOR REFUGEE COSTS AS A PORTION OF TOTAL ODA




GLOBAL ODA SPENDING BY CATEGORY



SPENDING ON FORCED MIGRATION COMPARED TO GLOBAL HEALTH



PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS BY DURATION (2015)



Since the 1990s, the average years of displacement for all groups has **risen** from less than 10 years to over 25.




80% of IDPs live in **urban settings** as opposed to **rural**.




90% of displaced Middle Eastern and North African persons live in **towns and cities** as opposed to **rural settings**.


U.S. REFUGEE INTAKE BY THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE



REFUGEES HOSTED AS A SHARE OF NATIONAL POP. (2016)



PROJECTED GLOBAL DISPLACEMENT SCENARIOS BY MILLIONS OF PEOPLE



A GLOBAL CRISIS

WITH DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES

“It is in our national interest to address this now. Time will only complicate matters and make solutions more costly.”

Governor Luis Fortuño, Former Governor of Puerto Rico

It is easy for many of us to view forced migration as something that only affects people far away. In reality, forced migration is a global crisis that affects the interests of the United States, its allies, and partner nations directly and indirectly every day. Given finite resources and domestic political realities, the choice between fixing problems at home and addressing challenges abroad seems simple. But it is in the primary interest of the United States and its allies to confront the challenges of forced migration abroad now, before they become much bigger challenges and threats to the United States.



This crisis is also straining—and has the potential to break—our allies, creating instability that inherently damages U.S. interests. Addressing issues at the root of forced migration now is cheaper than solving them when they are scattered across the world, manifested in wars, disaster, food insecurity, and famine. Given modern mobility and globalization, these issues will cross all borders eventually.

Lebanon on the Brink

Lebanon hosts more refugees per capita than any other country,^{85,86} accounting for almost 17 percent of its current population and non-Lebanese students—nearly all Syrian—are now the majority in its public schools.⁸⁷ Neighboring Jordan has the next highest ratio, with refugees making up approximately 7 percent its population. Lebanon has long dealt with a complex set of political and economic challenges that make the influx of over 1.2 million Syrians especially taxing and worrisome for future stability in the region. Before the Syrian conflict began, Lebanon already hosted hundreds of thousands of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. Unlike in Jordan, the over 1.2 million Syrians in Leba-

non are not considered “refugees” by the government; they are officially “displaced,” which means there are no officially sanctioned camps and forced migrants are harder to track and assist. Lebanon has long held that it is “not a state for refugees” or settlement, illustrating in stark terms the limitations of international law and the difficulties providing assistance to vulnerable people and their host communities. With the destabilizing addition of over a million forced migrants into a country where the government refuses to care for them and drives many into the shadows, the future could feasibly spell collapse for Lebanon. “I am going to make sure that the world understands that Lebanon is on the verge of a breaking point,” said then-Prime Minister Hariri in March 2017 during a speech on Syrian refugees.⁸⁸ Such a collapse could produce even more forced migrants and cascade into regional failures and proxy conflicts between major regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of whom are actively involved in opposite sides of Lebanese politics. ●


Current U.S. policy debates focus on a few issues—namely resettlement, “burden” sharing, and national security—demonstrating that policymakers have an incomplete or inaccurate picture of the global forced migration crisis. Even within those topics, the focus misses the bigger picture and, in doing so, means the United States and its allies miss out on important opportunities and increases the potential dangers of inaction. It is worth reviewing the arguments before discussing why it is in the best interest of the United States and its allies to care about this global problem and why inaction is a choice with consequences. It is also worth examining in detail the national security arguments for greater confrontation of the forced migration crisis; these are presented in a Spotlight at the end of this chapter.

RESETTLEMENT

Resettlement globally is relatively minuscule; far greater numbers of forced migrants outside of their home countries are being “hosted” rather than permanently resettled. However, U.S. and European resettlement policies send powerful messages to people around the world about global leadership, one that elicits discomfort and security concerns among some, but otherwise comes with comparative long-term benefits based on historical evidence.⁸⁹ Since World War

II, the United States has resettled more refugees than any country in the world, about 3 million people over 40 years.⁹⁰ While still resettling more refugees in real terms than any country in the world, the United States has accepted the fewest refugees in 2017 since 2004,⁹¹ citing national security concerns over vetting procedures—despite having the most extensive vetting system in the world (see “Extremely Thorough Vetting” in Chapter IV)—and skepticism over why

the United States should continue to lead other countries in resettlement in real, not per capita, terms. At the same time, worldwide resettlement needs have not been met, with only 126,291 resettlements of UNHCR’s over 22 million registered refugees in 2016, a number that dropped to 65,109 in 2017.⁹² UNHCR should lead an effort to broaden the base of countries willing to resettle people. Ultimately, rejecting or reducing resettlement commitments subjects people to further horrors and could create enemies out of people just looking for survival.



TURNING BURDENS INTO OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

The Trump administration, like all previous administrations, talks often of “burden sharing,” or the idea that the United States should not be responsible for unilaterally or disproportionately solving the world’s problems. The United States has led the establishment of large networks or countries, multilateral organizations, and processes (often referred to as the rule-based international order) to enable the sharing of various burdens, including forced migration. The United States has been a global leader not just in terms of real resettlement, but in funding to address the roots and results of forced migration. It is in the U.S. national security interest to remain the global leader. Some countries have benefited from the “free ride” of U.S. leadership, have cynically or negligently avoided solving these problems, or decreased commitments over time. Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia, for example, hardly contribute

to the solutions to these global issues and do not have strong refugee acceptance policies. These countries—and others like them—are rarely, if ever, held accountable for a comparative lack of global leadership. A coalition led by the United States and its allies—most of which are democracies with broadly shared values—represents the best hope for leadership in the global forced migration crisis. U.S. leadership remains feasible and remains necessary, especially if it wants to shape the way the world responds to this challenge in ways that also serve U.S. interests. The world continues to look to the United States for leadership and solutions to this global issue and helping solve it strengthens U.S. claims to continue to lead the world.

GRAPHIC SOURCE
UNHCR, “Global Trends in Forced Migration 2016,” <http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf>.

COUNTRIES THAT CAN DO MORE

COUNTRY	REFUGEE ACTIVITY
RUSSIA	Russia has been a polarizing actor in the conflict in Syria that has produced the most forced migrants of any country in the world. Despite its destabilizing role, Russia has not assisted or resettled meaningful numbers of Syrian forced migrants. While the reporting and status of forced migrants within Russia is unverifiable—though some reports show that Russia has only granted refugee status to one Syrian national since 2011 ⁹⁴ —it is clear that the country barely assists the displaced for whom they are at least partly responsible. Russia has a policy of rejecting people without proof of ties to the country. While rejecting forced migrants or deporting them, Russia also does not meet humanitarian aid funding obligations, with one analysis showing its financial contributions equating to 1 percent of its “fair share.” ⁹⁵ There are small pockets of Afghans in Russia and between 200,000 and 300,000 refugees from Ukraine. ^{96,97} While Russia is party to both the 1951 Refugees Convention and the 1967 Protocol, its refusal to assist forced migrants without a Russian background—especially in conflicts such as Syria that they exacerbate—is a dereliction of its international duty.
CHINA	China has no modern refugee resettlement policies nor legislation for asylum seekers and only nine Syrian refugees in the entire country. ⁹⁸ In addition to those excluded from the Middle East, China also does not accept forced migrants from places closer to its borders such as Myanmar. China does contribute some foreign assistance to global forced migration crises and was historically welcoming to Vietnamese refugees—though only those of Chinese origin—in the late 1970s, ⁹⁹ but its resettlement program today is essentially nonexistent. As a growing global power, its poor record runs the risk of encouraging similar noncompliance with the 1951 refugee convention by other states. Of great concern is the fact that China simultaneously rejects escaped North Korean citizens—and often forcibly sends them back into likely persecution in what has been considered a violation of widely accepted principles of <i>non-refoulement</i> ¹⁰⁰ —at the same time that it is actively building refugee camps for them in the event of regime collapse. ¹⁰¹ China does deal with massive internal displacement—mostly from environmental disasters—every year, but its public rejection of refugees is overwhelmingly popular with its citizens. One survey showed 99 percent of Chinese citizens not wanting to resettle Middle Eastern refugees, some citing impacts of the previous One Child Policy as a reason for not wanting to welcome new people. ¹⁰² Consequently, forced migrants rarely list China as a desired destination for resettlement. ¹⁰³

“We should take our fair share. We are good people... I don’t see how you can lead the free world and turn your back on people who are seeking it. Take the Statue of Liberty and tear it down... because we don’t mean it anymore.”

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC)⁹³

JAPAN	Japan is one of the most generous donors to UNHCR financially—giving over US \$175 million in 2017 as the third-highest single country donor (5 percent of the total UNHCR budget)—but since 1981, the country has only accepted approximately 700 refugees. While Middle Eastern and African refugees rarely seek asylum in Japan, the country is also resistant to immigration and refugee resettlement, despite its well-documented decreasing population numbers. ¹⁰⁴ Japan needs to supplement labor shortfalls but integration is notoriously difficult in the country given unique labor and cultural characteristics. ^{105,106} Japan attempts to make up for resettlement shortfalls financially with its foreign assistance and development programs, but its acceptance rate is still glaringly low at 0.2 percent of applications (in comparison, Germany’s acceptance is 40 percent). ¹⁰⁷
SAUDI ARABIA	There is much contention about how many refugees Saudi Arabia hosts. Representatives of the country claim that as many as 500,000 Syrians live there, but the country—and others in the Gulf—is not party to the 1951 convention. The number (which could be as low as zero by some estimations ¹⁰⁸) and the rights of forced migrants in Saudi Arabia are not independently verifiable. It is also unclear how many Yemeni refugees the country assists, given Saudi Arabia’s active and controversial role in ongoing conflicts in Yemen. ¹⁰⁹
INDIA	India has proposed a controversial plan to deport Rohingya refugees to Myanmar and it does not have an official policy of resettling refugees. ^{110,111} Prime Minister Narendra Modi cited concerns over terror links with the 40,000 Rohingya people seeking safety in India. ¹¹²

At the same time, European allies are increasingly dealing with forced migrants arriving at their borders. While most of the globally displaced reside in places already rife with poverty and other issues, millions have walked, driven, or taken boats into all parts of Europe. Twenty-two out of 28 European countries place some variation of “migration” as a top issue for their national foreign assistance strategies.¹¹³ Brexit and the rise of nationalist, nativist, or even overtly xenophobic political elements in countries such as Hungary,¹¹⁴ Austria, Poland, Sweden, and Germany are but a few examples of the real and tangible effects of forced migration on European allies.¹¹⁵ Tensions between European

countries have risen, as states resistant to intake indirectly or directly push refugees, asylum seekers, and other forced migrants to more welcoming countries with social safety nets. Russia has repeatedly attempted to spread false stories about refugees and migrants in Europe¹¹⁶ while being accused of using vulnerable people as part of an “aggressive strategy towards Europe.”¹¹⁷ Instability and tension in Europe could harm U.S. security and economic interests, especially given NATO alliances and extensive trade with the region. It is in the best interest of the United States to assist European allies in maintaining economic growth and security despite these inflows.

“It benefits Dallas to understand the factors which cause people to leave their homelands and how we can do a better job in providing opportunities and working with our collaborative partners in the business, philanthropy and faith-based community to harness opportunities. We know that refugees often come with skills that address the needs of our growing economy.”

Mike Rawlings, Mayor of Dallas

“The San Diego region has a strong reputation as a welcoming place for immigrants and refugees and their contributions to our culture and economy.”

Kevin Faulconer, Republican Mayor of San Diego¹²¹

Beyond ensuring U.S. allies are stable and successful, it is in the best interest of the United States for forced migrants to thrive in their new homes. Nobody wants to forcibly leave home and no country wishes for more forced migration. But these phenomena and emergencies exist, and ignoring them only makes them worse. Instead of seeing forced migrants a threat, or a “burden” to be shared, the United States and its allies should lead efforts to turn the burden of crisis into opportunities for growth.

Though there are strong arguments for renewed U.S. leadership, the United States cannot address the global forced migration crisis alone. The United States should insist that countries not currently responding to these displacement contexts recognize the scale and possible degradation of the global order. At the same

time, policymakers should recognize the benefits to leadership at home and abroad: it keeps us safe, strengthens our economy, and saves lives.¹¹⁸ The United States should participate actively in—and arguably lead—the multi-lateral global compact processes organized by the United Nations (see Annex C) to ensure that U.S. interests are reflected in the ultimate framework. There is a role for the private sector—especially U.S. companies and capital—in addressing these issues and some progress could be made via U.S.-led bilateral trade preference deals that could create economic value for the United States while offering greater opportunity for forced migrants to stay closer to home. For those that do ultimately settle elsewhere, a recent study showed that refugees pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits within eight years of arrival and, if they stay for 20 years,

refugees pay \$21,000 more on average.¹¹⁹ In Miami specifically, the arrival of 125,000 Cuban refugees was shown to have had no effect on unemployment and actually increased average low-skill wages.¹²⁰ (See Spotlight on the Private Sector for more details.)

The United States should also consider the consequences of not leading. Without leadership from the United States and its allies in confronting the root causes and results of forced migration, the number of people forced from home will undoubtedly continue to increase. Uganda, Jordan, Bangladesh, and other countries already grappling with development challenges will face greater pressures that could lead to descent into instability and conflict, driving even more people from their homes. Unable to deal with the burden of hosting forced migrants, countries such as Leba-

non may decide to close their borders and forcibly repatriate over a million Syrian refugees back into a war zone. More irregular arrivals will create more political and economic turmoil in Europe that, in turn, could negatively affect relations with the United States. The consequences of the United States not providing global leadership are a more chaotic, unpredictable, and unsafe world.

OUR VALUES

The United States has been historically welcoming of refugees and other forced migrants who have, time and time again, started businesses, contributed to culture, and strengthened communities. Rooted in religious and humanitarian convictions that have historically defined “American values,” the United States has always assisted those in need. These values underpinned rebuilding efforts following World War II, led to successful integration of Vietnamese “boat people” after the Vietnam War (see textbox below), and served as guiding principles when confronted with the HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa since the 2000s. The United States has long been seen as a beacon of hope to so many around the world. While responding to genuine humanitarian emergencies for all the right reasons, it has also been in our enlightened self-interest to help; when we have helped turn a situation around, we ended up with more friends to share future burdens and more trading partners for American goods and services.¹²³ Additionally, if we are welcoming to the vulnerable, we will have the moral authority with which to ask others to take a share of the burden.

“We should not turn our backs on those refugees who have been shown through extensive vetting to pose no demonstrable threat to our nation, and who have suffered unspeakable horrors, most of them women and children.”

Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham¹²²

“As an immigrant and a Veteran, I know that protecting the most vulnerable people among us via the U.S. resettlement program and humanitarian assistance abroad promotes our core values and protects our national security interests... Both the letter and the spirit of the rule of law, on which our liberties rest, require that we honor legal commitments and procedures established by law.”

Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)^{124,125}

Vietnam’s “Boat People” Thrive and Benefit Their Adopted Home

The first wave of Vietnamese people came to the United States in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Many of these forced migrants, including those known as “boat people,” reached the United States via Camp Pendleton, California, after escaping war and harsh political and socioeconomic conditions back home. At the time, communities in Southern California were reluctant to accept what was viewed as “a new kind of immigrant.” Nearly half a century later, many of the “boat people” and their families, together with subsequent waves of Vietnamese immigrants that came to the United States well into the 1990s, successfully integrated into their adopted country. Today, as the nation’s sixth-largest ethnic population, members of the Vietnamese-American community represent parts of Southern California in local and state governments, and play leading roles in academia, trade and commerce (including firms offering high-skilled, high-paying opportunities), and community service organizations.

Key factors in the successful integration of the Vietnamese included: (i) geography – both in terms of land and real estate availability and the choices made by new arrivals as to where they live (i.e., not restricting homes to a limited area or particular city); (ii) a growing community that was able to take care of early entry problems such as limited language and lack of appropriate job skills; (iii) the first generation’s commitment to ensuring adequate academic and learning opportunities for the second generation and then the second generation for the third; (iv) critical government programs that supported the learning of language, formal schooling, and essential services to ensure basic standards of living, inter-ethnic and cultural experiences, and civic engagement; (v) family reunification that ensured families stayed strong and intact; (vi) not perceiving the Southern Vietnamese as “hostile” or “threats to peace and stability”; and (vii) the faith-based values and ties of many of the immigrants that allowed many families to rely on faith-based institutions for essential social and economic support. ●

It has long been an American value to depoliticize humanitarian funding and priorities. Though the American people have the right and obligation to ask why and where tax dollars are spent overseas—especially development assistance that can more effectively be used to support U.S. foreign policy and security objectives—humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable has largely been protected from periodic bipartisan efforts to politicize and place conditions on it. Recent proposals from the United States to limit humanitarian aid for countries that do not align with the United States on a political level or vote similarly in the

United Nations, if acted upon, would be a departure from tradition.^{126,127} Whereas similar proposals were presented by past Democratic and Republican administrations, the decision was always made to protect humanitarian aid from conditionality. Beyond values alone, there has been a broad understanding that the conditioning of humanitarian aid often complicates crises and can result in greater required investment in the long run. For these and other reasons, no U.S. administration has withheld humanitarian aid for political aims since at least the end of the Cold War.

“I am reminded of the opportunities our great nation has afforded me since I arrived in the United States at a young age. Fleeing Castro’s communist regime, my family and I found the freedom we yearned for in our native homeland. The community I am humbled to represent has thrived, in part, thanks to the contributions of refugees from around the world who have found a safe haven in our great country.”

Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)¹²⁹

Another way for the United States to lead would be to provide greater funding to confront the global forced migration crisis. Especially if the United States lessens the number of refugees it accepts—as has been the recent trend¹²⁸—commensurate increases should be made to foreign assistance. A vacuum in leadership in funding or resettlement is counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy and security objectives and makes it harder for the United States to lead a coalition of allies in what must be a global effort.


The apprehension that many in the United States feel over increasing the number of accepted refugees and other forced migrants into the country cannot and should not be ignored. However, many of these apprehensions are based on more nebulous perceptions of forced migrants potentially shifting cultural values and norms. Assuming forced migrants are criminals or terrorists is not substantiated by data and is a slippery slope into xenophobic territory. It has always been a core part of American values—from welcoming the tired, poor, and huddled masses to Ellis Island to confronting famine in Ethiopia—to accept and assist those in need. In the case of forced migrants, with proper controls and management, the United States can adhere to its values

and actually benefit from its generosity. For generations, people from Ireland, Germany, Russia, Eastern Europe, Armenia, Bosnia, and across Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia—regardless of their religious beliefs—have found safety and opportunity in the United States. Many have gone on to thrive and benefit the country in immeasurable ways.

Today, most forced migrants are either Christians or Muslims.¹³⁰ They petition to resettle in the United States not to hurt it, but to access and contribute to the land of opportunity. Many have faced unimaginable hardship in their homelands, on the journey, and find lingering challenges in new countries. Now—especially in their host communities—they are becoming drivers of economic growth, essential to the fabric of society, and examples of the far-reaching benefits of properly channeling American values.

It is understandable and expected that the United States should exercise its sovereignty and ensure that those coming across its borders will do no harm. Confronting forced migration does not have to violate U.S. security nor economic goals. Rather, confronting forced migration will lead to greater security, stronger allies, and a stronger economy resistant to external shocks.

TOTAL AID FOR FORCED MIGRATION ISSUES



GRAPHICS SOURCE
VizHub, “Financing Global Health 1995–2015,” <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/fgh/>; IFRC, “World Disasters Report 2012,” http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Documents/Secretariat/2012_WDR_Full_Report.pdf; and Development Initiatives, <http://devinit.org/>.¹³⁴

INACTION IS A REAL CHOICE WITH REAL CONSEQUENCES

The proportion of all foreign assistance going to address forced migration issues is growing quickly; however, limited resources are spent on the most immediate emergency and comparatively little is spent on dealing with root causes. If the root causes are not dealt with, far larger amounts of foreign assistance will necessarily go to responding to even more emergencies in the very near future. The United States planned to spend \$49 billion in 2016 on foreign assistance, of which 12.9 percent (\$6.3 billion) was spent on humanitarian relief.


Globally, humanitarian assistance totaled \$20.3 billion, 14 percent of all official development assistance (ODA).^{131,132} In the same year, OECD DAC countries spent over \$25 billion on forced migration issues, or approximately 17.5 percent of all global ODA.¹³³ In other words, the combination of addressing forced migration and humanitarian relief requires a significant portion of all foreign assistance to be spent addressing symptoms—not roots—of forced migration. Additionally, there has been an explosion of resources spent in developed countries dealing with forced migrants, largely in Europe. More than 10 percent of all foreign assistance and over half of all forced migration spending is now diverted do-

mestically, a vast increase from comparatively small percentages just 10 years ago.

Irregular and forced migration are likely to increase over time unless steps are taken now to confront root causes (see Chapter II). If global forced migration rates continue trends from 2000 to 2015, it is estimated that between 180 and 320 million people will be forced from home by conflict in 2030.¹³⁵ Many of the most affected people do not have the financial means to leave their country and thus, upon forced displacement, become wards of the international system.

The global youth bulge—especially prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa—is an opportunity for unparalleled economic growth, if linked properly with education, economics, and infrastructure.^{136,137} At the same time, if social and political progress, personal safety, and jobs do not keep up, there will be more conflict and more forced migration. In large part due to the ubiquity of mobile technology, at no point in history have people around the world been so aware of the opportunities that exist elsewhere and the comparative challenges they experience at home. These issues are already showing in the thousands of unaccompanied minors flowing from Central America

FORCED MIGRANT MOBILE PHONE COVERAGE



GRAPHIC SOURCE
UNHCR, “Connecting Refugees: How Internet and Mobile Connectivity Can Improve Refugee Well-Being and Transform Humanitarian Action,” http://www.unhcr.org/innovation/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/20160707-Connecting-Refugees-Web_with-signature.pdf.

into the United States, or the Syrian and Iraqi children in Sweden, and the millions of young Africans who may be unemployed in coming years. The young people of today will lead their countries tomorrow and will consider the United States and its allies as either friends or foes.

We want these countries to prosper and we want these young people to feel invested in the future of their own societies.¹³⁸ We want countries to be resilient enough to handle shocks that force citizens from their homes. To do this, we need to enable opportunities for stability, economic growth, and development. For those forced to leave, we should seek to keep them close to home (as many forced migrants wish to do anyway), working toward peace in their countries so they can voluntarily return when it is safe to do so. There is unprecedented strain on U.S. allies in the developed and developing world. A number of these countries could be broken by increased levels of forced migration, leading to regional instability and even economic collapse.

People are on the move globally and the root causes of forced migration are increasing in length and number. Armed conflicts are now protracted by default and increasing in number; extreme environmental events are more frequent and destructive. Forced migration is a reality that must be managed, not ignored. The United

States should invest more in predicting forced migration, just as the United States created a global system for early detection of famines and acute food insecurity.¹³⁹ The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., has a similar early warning tool to predict genocide and mass atrocities. Egypt, Lebanon, South Sudan, El Salvador, and others all show signs of instability that could ultimately result in increased forced migration to neighboring countries and beyond. We need to understand how to plan for and prevent future crises. If forced migration is not dealt with appropriately, social, economic, and political unrest within and across countries will become the norm.

Inaction is a real choice with real consequences. Denial and wishing the crisis to simply “go away” (or that someone else will handle it or that it’s someone else’s problem) will only make it worse.

SPOTLIGHT ON

NATIONAL SECURITY

“Above all, the [NATO] alliance must assist in tackling the root of the problem: the war in Syria and the rise of the so-called Islamic State. Dealing with the refugees is like treating the symptoms of a very serious illness; it is helpful but not a cure.”

Adm. (Ret.) James Stavridis, Dean,
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University



There are serious national security concerns and legitimate fears surrounding forced migration. Vulnerable people in transit often use irregular migration routes also used by human and drug traffickers and terrorists, since many have no other recourse for escaping danger. Every country has a sovereign right and duty to protect its borders. The arrival of forced migrants at the border is sometimes considered to pose a threat to that sovereignty; in fact, confronting the global forced migration crisis abroad, bringing people out of the shadows, and dealing effectively with those who do arrive at the border is essential to maintaining national security. Ultimately, national security requires more than walls and restrictions on refugee travel.

The United States and its allies vet forced migrants extremely well. It is critical to have vigorous vetting and screening of all arrivals and to minimize the risk of bad actors slipping through any cracks in the system. The United States, European Union, and other developed regions typically employ rigorous vetting systems (see “Extremely Thorough Vetting” in Chapter IV) to ensure that the forced migrants granted admittance arrive with the best of intentions. These systems—complete with robust border controls, in-person interview processes, biometric iris scanning, and other assurances—can be supplemented by improved stabilization mechanisms to minimize

security threats and the resulting forced migration in the first place. Some critics of vetting have cited rising terrorist rates in Europe as a reason for limiting admittance of refugees, but those attacks are vastly more often committed by home-grown attackers.¹⁴⁰

As shown in this report, forced migrants are often the most vulnerable and unable to support themselves once displaced. At the same time, international law leaves significant numbers of forced migrants behind; even where such law exists, and response mechanisms and organizations are in place, many are still forced into the shadows by traffickers and smugglers.

Pushing people into the shadows makes us less safe. Travel restrictions for refugees and other forced migrants do little more than temporarily trap people, potentially in dangerous scenarios that could force them into illicit and shadowy transit routes.¹⁴¹ Bringing people out of the shadows and regularizing their journey onward (or back home) is in our national security interest. As noted by UNHCR, if people “are unable to enter a particular state legally, they often employ the services of human smugglers and embark on dangerous sea or land voyages, which many do not survive.”¹⁴² Some forced migrants are also at risk of preventable diseases for which they could have been screened and treated

were they not in the shadows. For example, it is anticipated that at least some of the 50,000 Venezuelans crossing into Colombia each day have not been “immunized against formerly eradicated diseases like measles and diphtheria,” thus increasing public health concerns.¹⁴³

Without more and better ways to regularize the arrival and integration of forced, irregular, and other migrants, more desperate people will be pushed into the shadows, susceptible to predatory elements like human traffickers, “coyotes,”¹⁴⁴ and other smugglers. In this way, human trafficking is intricately linked to forced migration in ways that are rarely discussed. These illegal operators pose a threat to vulnerable populations as well as to security and economic interests of developed and developing countries alike. These operators smuggle forced migrants and victims of trafficking alongside drugs and weapons because they realize there is significant money to be made from desperate people.

Though each is deserving of further study, there are examples of policies that bring vulnerable groups such as forced migrants and victims of trafficking out from the shadows while cracking down on illegal organizations. The United States, for example, recently granted nonimmigrant legal status to victims of trafficking who assist in prosecutions of their traffickers.¹⁴⁵ Much like it cannot and should not confront the global forced migration crisis alone, the United States cannot and should not be expected to improve global security on its own. Countries where illegal organizations operate in the shadows must take greater responsibility for their demise.

Developing strong and resilient developing country economies is a national security issue. Tough immigration policies and rhetoric undeniably win votes in elections, especially in today’s era of rising populism, protectionism, and nationalism. But they have the potential not only to result in a strengthening of illegal

organizations such as ISIS, but to exacerbate development challenges that could destabilize countries and ultimately make the United States and its allies less safe.

In the case of Australia, policy changes in the early 2010s substantially stemmed the flow of irregular migrants arriving by boat. However, tens (or even hundreds) of thousands of people are waiting in neighboring countries for the opportunity to join family and friends.^{146,147} They are not returning home and are creating local and sometimes national issues in countries—for example, Indonesia and Mexico—that are themselves developing and ill equipped to handle the volumes of forced and irregular migrants waiting for the opportunity to journey onward. Simply keeping people out does not solve the issues; in fact, it may lead to greater regional instability that could, in turn, lead to greater dangers and challenges for Australia, Spain, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Morocco, the United States, and so forth.

For domestic political reasons, the developed world may struggle to acknowledge the economic benefits that forced and irregular migrants represent. Perhaps the best compromise for the foreseeable future is to increase opportunities and create incentives for more safe and predictable channels for regularized—and legal—migration, especially for those forced from home. Simultaneously supporting foreign assistance and development can assist countries of first asylum, potentially help to keep people nearer to their homes (e.g., the probability of return of a South Sudanese forced migrant is likely higher in Uganda than it is if that person journeys onward to Europe or the United States), support reconstruction, and reduce “brain drain” that can limit the capacity of a country to emerge from conflict and other root causes of forced migration.¹⁴⁸

Supporting economic growth in developing countries could also result in income

generation opportunities for young people who, upon reaching adulthood in many fragile regions of the world, need opportunities for productive engagement in the economy to avoid being lured abroad or, worse, into the false promises of violent extremism. Regenerating and restarting growth and promoting strong and resilient economies in post-crisis countries are all necessary ingredients for ensuring the national security of the United States and its allies.

Addressing root causes *there* has national security benefits *here*. Once forced from home, most people are willing to do whatever it takes to ensure safety and security in the short term and achieve normalcy in the longer term. If that takes moving through the shadows—especially if more regular and legal means are unavailable—many forced migrants are willing to risk uncertainty and even punishment in countries such as the United States or Sweden if it means escape from the horrors of home. The levels of resilience and work ethic of those that successfully escape tend to be high. For example, Bosnian brothers in Detroit who grew their business during the 2008 economic recession said they could survive anything after escaping genocide in the 1990s.¹⁴⁹

Ultimately, national security needs to include issues far from our borders. It is in the national security interests of the United States and its allies to address the root causes of forced migration (see Chapter II); if fewer people are forced to leave home in the first place, fewer will seek access to the United States by whatever means necessary. An increased focus should also be placed on combating violent extremism in countries that produce large numbers of forced migrants. Violent extremism is not only more prevalent in these places, it kills more people and is a far greater risk to U.S., European, and global security.¹⁵⁰

Where appropriate (e.g., ending armed conflicts), national security actors and

“Refugees are not causing the violence. They are actually the ones fleeing it. Almost all recent terror attacks in our own nation have come from long-term residents or citizens, not new refugees.”

Ed Stetzer, Executive Director, Billy Graham Center, Wheaton College¹⁵⁷

militaries should play a direct role—though these actors should understand the side effects of taking action. Priority should be given to stabilization first in conflict situations, looking out for and addressing civilian movements via close cooperation with diplomatic and development experts. Even if an end to conflict is the justification for armed engagement, security actors must do everything in their power to limit the negative effects of the conflict on innocent civilians; one consequence of not doing so is even more sustained forced migration that could create spillover insecurities elsewhere. Once stability is achieved, national security actors should prioritize peacebuilding and the restoration of the services necessary for people to feel like they can stay and rebuild, supporting early recovery. One way of understanding—and mitigating—negative repercussions is to integrate more civilian diplomatic and development personnel into pretheater trainings, especially those who understand how conflict affects forced migration.

Forced migrants have not committed deadly acts of terror in the United States in at least three decades. It is important to separate vulnerable people—for example, someone forced from home—from nefarious actors such as extrem-

ists and terrorists. In addition to Fact 8 presented in the introduction to this report, it is worth noting that, of the 3.25 million refugees who have arrived in the United States since 1975, only three have successfully committed fatal terrorist attacks, and all three of the attackers were Cuban.^{151,152} Syrian refugees have killed zero U.S. citizens, with zero attacks conducted by Syrians or ISIS in the United States to date.^{153,154} Even the deadliest attack after 9/11 (which itself was not executed by refugees) in San Bernardino was perpetrated by a U.S.-born citizen and a Pakistan-born lawful resident who together had amassed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition legally.

The lack of evidence of deadly violence perpetrated by refugees and other forced migrants can be credited in part to extremely thorough vetting procedures (see Chapter IV). It is also likely that forced migrants are often the ones fleeing terrorists in search of safety rather than joining their ranks.

However, one event could change everything. Though the data shows overwhelmingly that forced migrants are not terrorists, a single crime or act of terror by a refugee or other forced migrant in the United States could shift the broader political narrative against forced migrants and toward more restrictive policies¹⁵⁵ that, as shown above, would have negative repercussions on national security. The vast majority of forced migrants pose no security threat to the United States and have largely positive impacts on their recipient communities.¹⁵⁶

Political leaders must be cognizant of these issues and impulses, focusing attention away from fear of “others” and toward solutions. These policies must necessarily include border security, but must look beyond to a future in which, left unchallenged, conflicts abroad increase in severity and duration, forcing more people from home, into the shadows, and ultimately to our borders. ●

Deaths by Foreign Born Terrorists

VISA CATEGORY	Terrorism Death per Category	Total Terrorists
All	3,024	154
Tourist	2,834	34
Student	158.5	19
Fiancé visa (K-1)	14	1
Lawful Permanent Resident	8	54
Asylum	4	4
Refugee	3	20
Illegal	1	10
Unknown	1.5	9
Visa Waiver Program (VWP)	0	3

The terrorist attacks on 9/11 resulted in the deaths of 2,983 people (excluding the 19 hijackers). Discounting the horrific attacks on 9/11, only 41 people were murdered in the U.S. by foreign-born terrorists between 1975 and 2015. While 1 person is too many, the linkages drawn between refugees, immigration, and terrorism simply do not exist mathematically.

GRAPHIC SOURCE
Alex Nowrasteh, “Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis,” Cato Institute, September 13, 2016, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa798_2.pdf.

Bassima traveled
over 3,000 miles.

*That's longer than
the distance between
Miami and Seattle.*

FORCED FROM

HOME

Bassima left the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2016. Renewed violence across the country between Muslim and Christian groups vying for power¹⁵⁸ finally arrived on her doorstep. After the murder of her brother, the rape of her daughter, and the destruction of their house and theft of their possessions, they made their escape. Desperate for any way out, they were trafficked through Burkina Faso, Mali, and some of the most fragile regions in the world, facing harassment and danger at every stage. The baby her daughter carried as a result of the rape was born in Chad; Bassima now cares for the baby after her daughter died during the journey across West Africa. Now in relative safety in Senegal with little hope of resettlement elsewhere, she considers herself one of the lucky ones.



Like the tens of millions of others forced from home around the world, Bassima thinks little of refugee status, resettlement quotas, “extreme vetting,” or UNHCR and IOM processes that officially define her rights and could influence her future. From the father and his family who walked over 80 miles from Damascus to Jordan with a limp he suffered shielding his daughter from a mortar, to the notary public who was forced to leave The Gambia because she would not sign government medical forms condoning torture of prisoners of war, to the 20-year-old Rohingya mother and widow who watched her family home and husband burn while Burmese soldiers looked on,¹⁵⁹ each story of the almost 66 million people forcibly displaced globally is unique and personal. The choice to leave was ultimately not theirs to make, but they dream of a better future. While the root causes of forced migration range from political, religious, and ethnic persecution to natural disaster, from urbanization and development to armed conflict, Bassima and her fellow forced migrants are united in their singular desire for safety, security, and stability.

FORCED MIGRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY

“No matter what policies the United States and other donors use to stifle the flow of forced migrants from other countries, push factors will continue to force people out of their homes. Bad governance, corruption, political problems, underdevelopment, weak institutions, and social issues create situations in societies where people have no option but to flee. The best way to counter this increasing trend is to focus on the root causes in addition to the symptoms.”

Ambassador Ellen Sauerbrey,
Former Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Population, Refugees
and Migration

The root causes of forced and irregular migration crises today often differ, but most are fundamentally rooted in inadequate or inappropriate responses to conflict or disaster, governance failures, inequality, and underdevelopment. Even in natural disasters, a lack of resilience exacerbates situations and causes more people to forcibly migrate.

As conflicts evolve, so should the responses to them. Beyond changing how the global community assists forced migrants, it must change how the initial and underlying causes of forced migration crises develop and get stuck in cyclical instability. Each crisis requires a tailored response, but it is worth exploring ways to protect and support communities before they experience contexts that drive forced migration.

The international community has rightly focused much attention on protecting and providing for people during their periods of displacement, but conflicts continue to grow and worsen in the meantime, forcing historic numbers of people from home.¹⁶⁰ In fact, many of these initially short-term emergencies—such as the displacement caused by civil war in Somalia in the early 1990s—are now entering their third or fourth decade of humanitarian assistance. The first refu-

gee camp in Dadaab, Kenya, was established in 1991 for escaping Somalis, many of whom have “children and grandchildren born in the camps.”¹⁶¹ The United States and much of the world’s forced migration assistance efforts respond to crises through one-off assistance programs that rely on yearly replenishments as situations protract. If the international community continues to treat forced and irregular migration crises as short-term emergencies rather than symptoms of larger global problems, the average length of displacement will continue to increase.¹⁶²

Protracted displacement could become particularly prevalent if instability continues to inhibit economic growth while more young people need jobs. Current demographic trends, a lack of commensurate job and economic growth, and growing fragility could lead to greater forced migration and even more protracted displacement.¹⁶³ Already developing, fragile, and unstable countries will face increasing demand for public services, health-care, education, jobs, and infrastructure as their populations grow.¹⁶⁴ In the short term, population pressures could lead to more people seeking livelihoods and job security away from home, especially if global mobility becomes easier. The same pres-



ures could also be the source of future conflict that drives people from their homes.

Almost 95 percent of forced migration (including IDPs and refugees) occurs exclusively within developing countries, most within or around cities. Cities contain approximately 60 percent of the global refugee population (and an even greater percentage of the IDP population) and are appealing due to informal settlements and available jobs. But the mass influx of people into these contexts exacerbates existing challenges such as overcrowding and bad infrastructure. As mentioned, 84 percent of refugees live in developing countries, meaning almost 19 million of the world’s most vulnerable people reside in communities that were already unstable and underdeveloped.^{165,166} As developing countries grapple with these disruptive trends, cyclical instability, resource con-

straints, lack of social services, ethnic conflict, environmental disaster, and other emergencies so often at the root of forced migration continue to grow.

Although preventing conflict and other root causes of forced migration is cheaper than responding to them—\$1 of risk-reduction assistance equates to about \$15 in future response—the United States continues to operate primarily via a short-term mindset.^{167,168,169} Admittedly, addressing the long-term, systematic, development-related issues so often at the root of forced migration is challenging and can take years or decades—well beyond typical political and budget cycles.

In addition to providing emergency foreign assistance to respond to immediate crises, the United States and other donors should invest more foreign assistance

resources—and nonassistance resources, such as trade and diplomacy—in confronting the root causes of forced migration. The State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) need to be empowered to operate in concert with one another in these crises, involving political experts, development agencies, and security experts as early as possible in response scenarios. Development programming has not been strategically aligned enough to confront forced migration issues thus far, not focusing enough on resiliency to shocks. As more and more people become forced from home and vulnerable populations complicate existing challenges in new contexts, the international donor community must think of new ways to confront the root causes of forced migration, leveraging new strategies, thought processes, sectors, tools, and partners.

Lessons from the Alliance for Prosperity

Almost 9 percent of the population in the Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—has emigrated away from their countries in the past few years.¹⁷⁰ Widespread lack of economic opportunity, security, and governance drove these people out of their countries, into other developing situations in Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rica. The United States took notice when thousands of unaccompanied minors crossed its southern border in the summer of 2014. Beyond the injustices and horrors these children suffered, leaders in the United States and across Central America understood that this irregular migration was a symptom of larger underdevelopment across the region.

The United States and the Northern Triangle countries assessed the long-term possibilities and issues associated with underdevelopment and migration in the region. In late 2014, in partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank, the Northern Triangle countries launched the “Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity.” The resulting Alliance for Prosperity (AFP) launched in 2016 as a concerted effort by the three Northern Triangle countries, as well as the United States and other Central American countries to jumpstart tax reform, anticorruption efforts, and private-sector opportunities in the region. The United States committed approximately \$750 million to this effort—a 35 percent increase from its previous year’s commitment to the region—to comprehensively, thoroughly, and quickly address the issues that led to the migration crisis.¹⁷¹ Since then, the United States has pledged billions of dollars to the effort, though it remains unclear if Northern Triangle countries have the appetite to maintain focus on prosperity, security, and governance via partnership.¹⁷²

In March 2015, then-Vice President Joe Biden traveled to the Northern Triangle with then-Southcom Commander Gen. John Kelly to advance implementation of the AFP plans. In June 2017, Vice President Mike Pence publicly continued the U.S. commitment to the AFP, support that exists to this day. Though not without its critics,¹⁷³ the AFP is still in its early stages and is worth considering as a model for how stakeholder countries in the global forced migration crisis can make longer-term commitments to address

“The Alliance for Prosperity experience shows that long-term U.S. partnership and leadership matters and can make a difference in countries like El Salvador. Its focus on economic growth, anticorruption, and rule of law offers valuable lessons for how to confront big challenges like the forced migration crisis.”

Juan Jose Daboub, Chairman and CEO, the Daboub Partnership, Former Managing Director of the World Bank and Former Minister of Finance of El Salvador.

widespread and systemic issues through private-sector incentives, tax reform, and security commitments. One particularly relevant component of the model is that with the AFP, Northern Triangle countries themselves are primarily responsible for funding the programs, while the United States represents only a portion of the financial stake. For example, while Central America imported \$27 billion worth of goods from the United States in 2016, foreign assistance to these countries only totaled \$2 billion.¹⁷⁴ The concerted partnership involving all relevant countries, multilaterals entities such as the Inter-American Development Bank, and donors such as the United States is one possible structure for ensuring growth, stability, and independence in forced migration contexts. ●

THE ROOT CAUSES

UNHCR cites three phenomena for the rapid increase and now historic levels of forced displacement: refugee scenarios are becoming more protracted; past conflicts are reigniting or expanding; and there is a general lack of solutions for the root causes of these crises.¹⁷⁵ Forced migration crises are typically based in some mixture of ethnic, political, or religious conflict and violence. But increasingly, environmental disasters, unmanaged urbanization and development, famine, food insecurity, and human-made disasters exacerbate ongoing refugee, displacement, and forced migration scenarios or create new ones. The international community has had difficulty addressing the underlying reasons for (and responding to) these crises through traditional assistance.

A common thread among the root causes discussed in this chapter is underdevelopment and poor governance. Violence and famine manifest differently, for example, but both can typically be attributed to one or both of these factors. Stabilization and famine reduction can prevent forced migration, but stability in both cases also creates space for development and better governance to take hold, increasing resilience to future shocks and thus diminishing the number of people forced from home for indefinite periods of time when they inevitably occur.

The United States should consider placing more USAID missions in places that are current—or likely future—hotspots of forced migration (e.g., Burundi and Central African Republic). To enable this move, the United States could consider closing some missions in middle-income countries. These new missions—and their respective embassies—should be properly equipped with the personnel structure that allows people to make commitments to, and investments in, longer-term solutions to forced migration. Priorities should be given to hiring and training quality local staff to take on senior management positions and programming should include working with and through local organizations, also considering innovative financing mechanisms such as enterprise funds and blended finance. Leaders of these USAID missions should be given more flexibility and less prescription from Washington.

Regional political bodies (e.g., the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and African Union) also have important roles to play and should be encouraged to provide solutions. Pressure from one’s neighbor is often more powerful than pressure from farther abroad. Issues in one country also have greater potential to spill over into neighboring countries. Thus, regional political bodies should take a leading and activist role in addressing the root causes of forced migration. Additionally, the World Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) should be encouraged to increase their involvement

and investment in fragile states that disproportionately produce forced migrants. Significant increases in U.S. and other country funding (e.g., capital increases) to these groups should be contingent on their adequately addressing fragile states that disproportionately produce forced migrants.

While addressing the root causes of forced migration will require dedicated, targeted, and in many cases long-term assistance, successfully achieving stability, development, and better governance represents an unparalleled opportunity for U.S. investment and security in some of the world’s most promising emerging economies. Ensuring stability and development across Africa, for example, could improve growth and access to agriculture (valued at over \$100 billion, and \$1 trillion by 2030), banking (over \$1 trillion since 2008), infrastructure (\$12 billion annually since 2008), cybersecurity and technology, mining, oil and gas, and telecommunications markets.^{176,177} Allowing—via inaction or improper action—forced migration to grow unabated across the developing world would stifle growth in these industries and prevent American consumers and companies from accessing them. The root causes discussed in this chapter destabilize the world and stand in the way of unmeasurable amounts of unrealized economic activity.

Economic collapses, famines, armed conflicts, and climate change and environment-related disasters do not automatically result in forced migration; it is when these are coupled with underde-

velopment and poor governance that a lack of resiliency drives people from their homes for long periods of time. These issues cannot be resolved overnight, and true solutions could take years or decades to achieve; but it is important to understand their underlying root cause before designing necessary solutions.

Below are the main—though not the only—root causes of forced migration.

ARMED CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

Armed conflicts, in all their various forms, are the greatest root cause of protracted displacement and forced migration.¹⁷⁸ Ongoing conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Eritrea, Venezuela, Colombia, and others have combined to force approximately 20 million people from their homes.¹⁷⁹ Common among these conflicts is their protracted nature. Civil wars, on average, last between 7 and 12 years, so even the newest of these (e.g., Syria and Yemen) could presumably last well beyond 2020.¹⁸⁰ That means that not only will masses of people continue to be forced from their homes to new cities, regions, and countries, but they will be displaced longer as peace and security become increasingly elusive.

Armed conflicts often cause abrupt forced migration (e.g., armed actors murder a family member or commit other human rights atrocities), where people like Bassima may not even have

minutes to leave home, potentially never to return. These types of conflicts are also perhaps the hardest ones to prevent and stop, especially since their roots are so often in political and ethnic differences that development assistance is often poorly equipped to address. Addressing the causes of armed conflict and violence is complex and difficult, in part because protagonists rarely enjoy real legitimacy with the population. Peace agreements often revolve around the interests of the warring groups (and their external supporters) rather than those of the public at large.

Despite the diversifying types of conflict and actors, those seeking protection under international law rely on conventions developed in the 1950s. Armed conflict will almost always result in necessary humanitarian and emergency assistance, especially to innocent civilians, and this is an important role for foreign assistance. But it is worth considering ways that development assistance and the international community writ large *can* prevent some armed conflicts from worsening or starting in the first place. Development actors should explore how best to leverage or support nonassistance tools such as human intelligence, statecraft, and diplomacy, acknowledging and learning from past failures. Efforts should incorporate conflict-sensitive lenses and take into account locally relevant political and cultural sensitivities.

As armed conflict and violence spreads, more people are likely to move farther from home and become less likely to eventually

return home.¹⁸¹ But many of the conflicts themselves are rooted in preventable, manageable, or at least monitorable scenarios. The beginning of the conflict in Syria, for example, has been linked to a drought and crop failures that pushed over 1 million people from their rural homes to urban settings and spurred protests against the lack of public services in the Assad government.¹⁸² Violent conflict has been linked to competition for natural resources in several contexts.¹⁸³ In anticipation of future armed conflicts—and thus future forced migration—there may be other developing country contexts around the world where the protection of resources and strengthening of institutions or good governance now could help ensure general security in the future.

By 2030, over half of the world’s poor will live in countries affected by high levels of violent conflict,¹⁸⁴ meaning the most vulnerable populations will be exposed to the most conflict, undoubtedly leading to even higher levels of forced migration. This phenomenon is particularly acute in the Middle East and North Africa; while the region accounts for only 5 percent of the global population, it experiences 68 percent of war-related deaths, contains almost half of the global IDPs, and over half of all refugees.¹⁸⁵

The populations of places like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt are growing rapidly but their economies are not keeping pace; it is plausible to think that these issues, when coupled with an influx of large numbers of Syrians escaping conflict, could eventually result in collapse and

further regional destabilization. Lebanon, for example, has been hosting Palestinian refugees for decades, and the recent influx of Syrians has played a big role in its current economic woes and high unemployment rates, increasing strains on the social fabric. The conflict itself has further disrupted the Lebanese economy as many companies were exporting into a Syrian market that no longer exists. Though forced migrants have the potential to add value to host communities (see Spotlight on the Private Sector), even in countries like Lebanon,¹⁸⁶ these are scenarios where effective development assistance focused on foundational issues could help bolster stability and reduce levels of forced migration.

Gang violence is another key driver of forced migration. Ironically, several drug-financed gangs originated in Southern California in the 1980s before traveling abroad, most notably to El Salvador.¹⁸⁷ In the United States, gangs serve as community gathering points for underserved populations. Similar to how organizations like Hezbollah operate in Lebanon—providing services and security for the communities in which they live—gangs are service providers and give identity to marginalized populations. Current federal immigration laws, enforced by the Department of Homeland Security’s Criminal Alien Program,¹⁸⁸ allow for the removal of criminals and confirmed gang members to their respective countries of origin. Due to the sheer number of foreign national gang members identified in the United States,

deportations have been indirectly associated with an increased rate of organized criminal activity in Central America.¹⁸⁹ Past failures in domestic integration policy as well as underdevelopment and fragility abroad ensure the survival of these gangs.

Armed conflict and violence will continue to spur forced migration and will continue to be difficult to monitor or respond to in meaningful ways. But there are ways to predict conflict, and these tools should be explored as ways to predict—and preemptively respond to—future forced migration. If our ability to predict future and resolve ongoing conflict is not improved, the United States and other bilateral donors, as well as neighboring countries, need to be prepared for continued high levels of forced migration.

About 20 percent of the population lives in countries experiencing significant fragility; by 2035, these countries will also be home to 80 percent of the world’s extremely poor.¹⁹⁰ Armed conflicts drive the most people from home and are increasingly impeding development potential; it is time to create a world in which the opposite is true. It is time for development to impede conflict.

PERSECUTION, POLITICAL OPPRESSION, AND ECONOMIC MALFEASANCE

Even without overt armed conflict, people can be forced from home due to violence. Political oppres-

sion and persecution not only stifle personal freedoms, they can force people into subjugation. In Eritrea, for example, the government regularly forces people into limitless military service, leading thousands—especially but not uniquely young men—to flee the country every year for fear of having to live in slavery-like conditions.¹⁹¹ North Korea holds an estimated 80,000–120,000 people in labor camps and threatens to send many more into these horrific conditions.¹⁹²

The authoritarian Maduro regime in Venezuela is destroying the country’s economy,¹⁹³ causing citizens to flee into Colombia, a country itself in the midst of an internal peace process and a continued presence of armed groups that themselves forced many from home in the not-so-distant past. Venezuelans are forced to flee out of fear of violence, active persecution of anyone who disagrees with the regime, and a chillingly pervasive hunger that has caused the average Venezuelan to lose 24 pounds in 2017. Many are traveling as far as Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, and Chile just for safety and basic necessities.¹⁹⁴ Some 629,000 Venezuelans were forced to flee in 2017 alone, victims of persecution, political oppression, and economic malfeasance by the Maduro regime.

Economic malfeasance not only results in the devastation being witnessed in Venezuela; it also manifests in extreme inequality, as was the case in Darfur, Sudan, where tribal struggles for decades have their roots in some groups feeling excluded from the resource wealth and power

sharing from which others have benefited. This feeds into deliberate manipulation of ethnic and religious differences by governments or opposition groups for political purposes and, as has been the case in Darfur for decades, can lead to armed conflict.¹⁹⁵

Though development assistance can address some elements of these root causes, nonassistance tools such as diplomacy, human intelligence, and security cooperation can and should play a role, especially since persecution and economic malfeasance—themselves drivers—can lead to armed conflict that, as discussed above, would produce even more forced migrants.

ENVIRONMENTAL, CLIMATE, AND HUMAN-INDUCED DISASTERS

The international community (and indeed this report¹⁹⁶) typically focuses on the almost 66 million people forcibly displaced by conflict around the world. While these are people who have escaped the horrors of war, prosecution, and violence, they may not actually be the largest group of forced migrants. Since 2008, natural disasters and hazards have forced over 26 million people annually on average from their homes, that is, over 250 million people.¹⁹⁷ In developing countries, already challenging urban overcrowding, resource constraints, poor infrastructure, and a lack of public services are all exacerbated by these climate, environmental, and human-induced disasters. Between 2008 and 2014,

over 180 million people were displaced globally by disaster, mainly by flooding, storms, and earthquakes.¹⁹⁸ Beyond these weather-related emergencies, the World Bank projects that 143 million people just from sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America could be forced from home due to drought, rising sea levels, and other climate-related emergencies by 2050 if no action is taken.¹⁹⁹

It is true that these displacements often have shorter durations than those involving, for example, armed conflict. But climate- and environment-related forced migration can equally destroy a city, village, or community in the same way that a violent conflict or war can. Often these emergencies occur with less warning than conflict, with sudden flooding, fires, and earthquakes forcing people from home quickly. In the Lake Chad basin, for example, a population of over 3 million people across Chad, Niger, and Nigeria have been exposed to insurgency from Boko Haram, severe food shortages, and climate shifts resulting in the almost complete disappearance of the lake.^{200,201} The combination of these factors has led to chronic regional forced migration for millions.²⁰²

There is currently no standard definition of—and thus little protection under international law for—people forced from home due to environmental or climate-induced disasters.²⁰³ Much of the current scientific research links changes in our climate to more frequent severe weather events²⁰⁴ that can result in environmental disasters such as the 2010

“Five times more people are affected by disasters today than a generation ago. As a result of protracted conflict and increased intensity and frequency of natural disasters, people are being forcibly displaced from their homes at unprecedented levels. Our humanitarian community needs more than increased funding to address this global crisis. We need strong and effective leaders at all levels who can develop and implement policies that address the root causes of vulnerability and fragility and provide local actors with the tools and resources to better prepare, respond, and recover from future disaster risks.”

Ky Luu, Director, Initiative for Disaster and Fragility Resilience, George Washington University, Former Director, USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

floods in Pakistan that displaced 11 million people²⁰⁵ and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan that displaced 4 million people in the Philippines and left 1.9 million homeless.²⁰⁶ Even though forced migration in these instances results in temporary internal displacement, the disasters tend to have disproportionately negative effects on the poor, some of whom end up staying for extended periods of time in the largely informal settlements to which they initially escaped.

Every year in Bangladesh, hundreds of thousands of people are forced to move from rural, largely riverine regions, to Dhaka after flooding and monsoons destroy homes and livelihoods. These people typically end up in the city’s informal settlements that are home to approximately 40 percent of Dhaka’s over 14 million residents at any given time.²⁰⁷ Seventy percent of people living in Dhaka’s informal settlements have been displaced by some sort of environmental disaster.²⁰⁸ Uncontrolled flooding destroys rice fields, washes away homes, and disrupts the fishing industry. In a country where approximately 700 rivers and a coastline of 360 miles (580 km) sustain much of the nation’s economy, these environmental disasters disrupt development and stability. Bangladesh already has a complicated path to development given overpopulation, overcrowding and related urbanization issues, air quality concerns, and an influx of 688,000 Rohingya from neighboring Myanmar between August 2017 and January 2018.²⁰⁹

Prevention of environmental and climate change-related disasters is difficult but resilience program-

“Seventy percent of people living in Dhaka’s informal settlements have been displaced by some sort of environmental disaster.”

ming and an increased focus on cyclically vulnerable populations could limit negative effects. In the Bangladesh example, the challenge is in protecting riverine settlements against events that vary in severity but are predictable in occurrence. Doing so could minimize the seasonal flow of millions of people to already impoverished informal settlements within Dhaka and encourage long-term development and stability elsewhere. At the same time, smart improvements—and where appropriate, formalization—must be made to the informal settlements that are home to so many forced migrants, ones that offer greater security and facilitate better access to income generation. The Bangladeshi government, for example, has planned for suburban settlements for millions of people living in Dhaka’s informal settlements, but these new communities do not have access to transit critical for people to access work.

Such planning must be also managed to prevent development or human-induced displacement. While dams, for example, provide vital clean and renewable energy access to billions, their construction has displaced between 40 and 80 million people globally over the

past six decades.^{210,211} Dams once represented a pathway to broader economic development and energy sustainability; now more than ever planning for the displacement of people and consideration of less-disruptive energy alternatives should be given more emphasis. National, government-led planning for development and human-induced forced migration could prevent further informality and poverty.

FOOD INSECURITY AND FAMINE

There are far fewer deaths from famine today than in the 1800s²¹²; however, there has been a troubling recent increase in food insecurity that has, among other things, caused millions of people to leave home.²¹³ Global hunger levels had been in decline over the past decade, a trend that reversed between 2015 and 2016 when the number of undernourished people rose from 777 million to 815 million globally. Malnutrition particularly affects children, with 45 percent of global child mortality attributed to some form of malnutrition.²¹⁴ It is estimated that undernutrition accounts for an economic loss of 11 percent of GDP in Africa and Asia alone every year.²¹⁵

In 2017, over 20 million people across four countries—Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen—were exposed to the risk of famine or famine-like conditions.²¹⁶ Over 6 million people in Somalia alone needed food and livelihoods assistance as of April 2017 amid protracted violent conflict in many parts of the country.²¹⁷ In the 1.5 years preceding August 2017, over 800 thousand people were forced from home due to drought, famine, and/or conflict within cities such as Mogadishu or Baidoa and into neighboring Kenya.²¹⁸ Even in Kenya, East Africa’s largest and most diversified economy, over 75 percent of people make some part of their living in rural areas, most of them in agriculture.²¹⁹ Although Somali forced migrants have lived in Kenya for decades,²²⁰ large and sustained influxes of new Somalis have the potential to disrupt food supplies, increase food prices and decrease purchasing power, degrade agricultural land, and spark conflict—though the direct relationship with food security is complicated.²²¹ Arguably the worst humanitarian crisis is currently in Yemen, where proxy war among regional rivals, lack of humanitarian access, and existing underdevelopment have combined to create near-famine-like conditions.²²²

Food insecurity can lead to greater movement of desperate people; each percentage increase in food insecurity contributes to a corresponding 2 percent rise in migration.²²³ “Many of the people most at risk of starvation in the coming years may be migrants and asylum seekers who

are stuck en route or forcibly returned to places where they are vulnerable,”²²⁴ creating a vicious cycle: food insecurity remains a significant root cause of forced migration at the same time that forced migration—and the conflicts that create it—exacerbates food insecurity and famine. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson partially acknowledged this vicious cycle in March 2018, saying that the “alarming levels of hunger in these areas [East, Central, and West Africa] are largely man-made, as conflicts erupt and people flee their homes.”²²⁵ Despite this acknowledgment, the subsequent new U.S. foreign assistance allocations for famine were announced to be focused on short-term relief priorities such as emergency food, nutrition assistance, safe drinking water, and health programs designed to prevent the spread of disease.²²⁶ These are all important initiatives and strong signals to the broader humanitarian community (the United States is the largest bilateral donor in all four famine-affected countries²²⁷); but these efforts to address symptoms should not come at the expense of long-term solutions to the underlying root causes of food insecurity and famine that force people from their homes not the least of which are protracted conflict and violence. Nor should we discount the important role of diplomacy in addressing these root cause.²²⁸

Those forced from home at any of the five levels of food insecurity²²⁹ often end up internally displaced in similarly struggling communities, in turn straining

their already limited resources.²³⁰ Due to its geographic proximity to several countries that produce forced migrants for myriad reasons, Djibouti has become a destination for Eritreans, Yemenis, Ethiopians, and Somalis looking for transit, shelter, or opportunity. Djibouti has its own battles with its arid climate and frequent drought-like conditions; introducing forced migrants complicates an already challenging situation.²³¹

It is worth noting that all of the famine-related deaths over the last 150 years could have been prevented²³² had there been better (i.e., less “recklessly incompetent”²³³) government policies and the willpower to levy those policies, sophisticated early-warning systems, and the professional humanitarian aid sector currently in place to respond to these crises. FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network) is one example of an adaptable and scalable early-warning system for food insecurity that could have significant impact if adapted for use in predicting forced migration crises.²³⁴ ●



Over the course
of 18 years,
Tesfay walked
over 10,000 miles.

*That's longer than
the distance between
New York City and Sydney.*

Tesfay fled Eritrea in 1999. He now lives in Senegal, scraping by selling coffee in the street. Stable work is not an option since he does not speak French and does not have any papers or official refugee designation. When asked what he did before arriving in Senegal in 2010, his answer was as simple as it was chilling: “I walked.”



He was forced into mandatory and limitless military conscription after his 11th year of schooling. Unwilling to serve in conditions akin to slavery indefinitely,²³⁵ he and thousands of fellow Eritreans fled. Today, Eritrean forced migrants make up the third-largest group of people crossing the Mediterranean into Europe.²³⁶ Tesfay tried to go back to Eritrea after his original escape but was quickly imprisoned. In 2001, he escaped again, this time never to return. He first made his way into Sudan but left there in 2003 due to religious persecution. Since then, he has walked, been trafficked, and journeyed by any means necessary to Libya—attempting to go to Europe but ultimately fleeing violence and slave markets there—Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, The Gambia, and Guinea, ultimately finding relative safety in Senegal in 2016.

THE

JOURNEY

But temporary safety does not mean stability for Tesfay and millions of others like him who fall into a gray area of the global forced migration crisis. Tesfay is registered as a foreigner but not a refugee, since he is part of a group that does not meet the requirements for official refugee status. He is a forced migrant with no regular income, no governmental or international assistance, no family, no education, and very little hope for the future.

Forced migrants like Tesfay fall into a broad category of “mixed migrants” for which international law has few answers.²³⁷ He and the people like him are

not on the front pages or on the nightly news, they are not part of the minority living in refugee camps, and they will probably never make it to Europe or the United States. Unlike Tesfay, most forced migrants that make it outside of their home country cross only one border and typically settle close to their home even within their new place of asylum.²³⁸

No matter the length and duration, the journey of a forced migrant is often characterized by danger, manipulation and trafficking, and the promise of an uncertain future. This journey is also one of the least understood and studied elements of the global forced migration crisis.

GAPS AND SHADOWS

Gaps in the international system

mean that forced migrants like Tesfay often pursue shadowy, illicit, and dangerous paths to what they hope will be eventual safety. Current global classifications and responses for forced, mixed, and otherwise irregular migration do not fit modern realities. Most headlines and coverage of the global forced migration crisis in the developed world focuses on the vast minority of people who attempt travel to Europe or the United States. Though eventual travel to those places may be the goal of many, an overwhelming majority of forced migration journeys take place in the developing world; and many of these journeys involve unimaginable treachery and horror.

An estimated 24.9 million people are trapped in modern slav-

ery around the world as of January 2017, over 70 percent of whom are women or girls.²³⁹ An estimated 600 to 800 thousand people are trafficked internationally every year.²⁴⁰ Whether people initially leave home voluntarily or whether they are forced from home, they often mix ranks during the journey, complicating international responsibility assignments and ultimately responses. Refugees, for example, are a specific categorization with specific prescribed protections under international law. Migrants typically do not enjoy the same legal protection because they are thought to have voluntarily left and thus have personal responsibility for what happens to them after leaving. The reality is that many people fall somewhere in between these clean categorizations, in terms of both the actual reasons for their initial departure and their ability to prove these reasons. Regardless, a vast majority of forced, mixed, and otherwise irregular migrants are ex-

tremely vulnerable, whether they have the right paperwork or not.

As shown in the Spotlight on National Security above, a lack of legal recourse and protection drives forced migrants like Tesfay into the shadows, risking their lives and posing real security risks by strengthening illicit routes that are also used for weapons, drugs, human trafficking, and other nefarious elements. When the United States and its allies do not pay enough attention to people like Tesfay—or the human rights abuses in Eritrea that drove him from home—it forces them into the shadows. The best resolution to this problem may not necessarily be expanding the definition of refugees, asylum seekers, etc. A positive first step might instead be paying more attention to root causes of forced migration and offering more avenues for improving the regularity and legality of the journey, improving safety and security for all in the process.

TRANSIT ROUTES BECOME DESTINATIONS

Tesfay’s treacherous journey—and the millions of similar journeys by forced migrants from around the world—often occur entirely in developing countries that have been historically used as transit routes to safer and more-developed countries. As the numbers and types of forced migrants increase, however, these “transit countries” are themselves becoming the destination and are playing host for indefinite periods of time to an increasing number of people.

Much of the international attention and funding around forced migration focuses on humanitarian response in transit countries hosting refugees or areas within countries that have high levels of IDPs. This is understandable as it is of critical importance to provide immediate, often life-saving assistance. However, this assistance should not come at the expense of greater community resilience that dampens the potentially negative effects of hosting thousands—if not millions—of forced migrants.

Host communities in Turkey, Uganda, and Bangladesh are providing admirable support to large influxes of people, especially given their own existing development challenges; but this support often comes at economic and political costs. For example, Rohingya people—escaping violence in Rakhine State in Myanmar—constitute at least one-third of the population of the Cox’s Bazaar area in Bangladesh as of early 2018.²⁴¹ While Bangladesh and people in Cox’s Bazaar were initially welcoming, that welcome may be wearing thin, especially since the Rohingya are often willing to work daily labor jobs for half the pay of

the locals. Not wanting to alienate voters, Bangladeshi politicians have talked primarily of repatriation,²⁴² oblivious (at least in public statements) to the reality that the Rohingya people are likely not going home anytime soon.²⁴³ Not acknowledging the fact that this “transit route” or point of first asylum might become the ultimate destination for many hampers the ability of foreign assistance agencies and the government itself to play for the future.²⁴⁴ Bangladesh and others disproportionately sharing the burden of the global forced migration crisis deserve recognition and support, especially political, economic, and foreign assistance support that allows them to provide adequate assistance to new arrivals and, importantly, their own communities. The Smart Communities Coalition—cochaired by USAID and Mastercard and including many other public, private, and nonprofit partners²⁴⁵—is a promising example of public-private support to address critical technology and energy challenges faced by forced migrants and their host communities. Similarly, efforts such as the European Union’s Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund) that attempt to focus on longer-term educational, economic, and social needs of host communities deserve further study and support.²⁴⁶ Without these types of support, the influx of people could prove destabilizing to host communities and countries.

Bangladesh is not alone in the challenge to balance domestic political considerations with assistance to and acceptance of forced migrants, especially as transit countries such as Turkey, Uganda, and even Colombia come to terms

Education

Quality education is important for security,²⁴⁷ resilience,²⁴⁸ and future prosperity.²⁴⁹ Being in school, however basic, is a protection mechanism in addition to an education tool. With the average length of displacement in the decades, too often children spend most of their childhoods in displacement. It is in everyone's benefit to prevent the emergence of a "lost generation" of young people. Without education, young forced migrants see no future and are thus more susceptible to radicalization. Education is also critical should displacement ever end (whether via return home or permanent settlement elsewhere). Young people are the future engines of growth, renewal, and leadership; without educating these young people while they are displaced, we are doing ourselves and them a disservice and putting us all at future risk.

Access to quality education should be secured for forced migrants in countries of first arrival immediately, whether in camps or as part of local education structures. Emerging good practice is now focused on integration in local educational systems, with additional assistance as needed. This contributes to building national infrastructure and capacity that will remain if forced migrants return home or are resettled. Local governments should avoid the tendency to view the pro-

vision of education and right to work as creating more incentive to increase the length of stay. In reality, forced migration scenarios are becoming more protracted for external reasons (mainly that they cannot safely return) and providing access to education and local labor markets—especially when providing commensurate increased support to host communities—will ease the short-term burden on local governments and communities. The faster forced migrants can be productive members of society, the better off the host and displaced communities are. Finding and hiring teachers from among the displaced is one way of easing the burden on local education systems, many of which already suffer from a shortage of quality teachers. These teachers can also serve as cultural mediators and a source of support for displaced children in schools.

Education should be closely linked to job creation and local market development both in practice and when discussing the importance of it to forced migrants and the host community. Mentoring, language training, and cultural education are critical—done in such a way that appreciates and addresses perceptions that refugees take jobs and economic opportunities away from local laborers and enterprises. ●

with the more protracted nature of today's crises.

Jordan, for example, has attempted to turn the arrival of over 500 thousand Syrian refugees into long-term economic growth via a European Commission-negotiated "Jordan compact" process, initiated in early 2016²⁵⁰ (not to be confused with the "global compacts" discussed in Annex C). In return for preferential trade terms with the European Union, grants, and loans, Jordan promised to improve access to edu-

cation and legal employment for Syrian refugees. Underneath the details of the Jordan compact lies an important realization: that there would be no need for such an agreement if large numbers of Syrian refugees were going to journey onwards or return home anytime soon.

It is a positive development for countries such as Jordan to realize the protracted nature of displaced Syrians and for them to search for productive solutions. It is also worth mentioning that

"An idle young person that does not care about his life becomes a danger to everyone else's lives."

Lana Abu Hijleh,
Country Director,
Palestine, Global
Communities



the "Jordan compact" is widely seen as one of the first attempts to leverage the private sector to turn a humanitarian situation into one that benefits the host community, the refugees themselves, and the economy. While the model shows promise in that it unites donors, development actors, host countries, and the private sector behind a common goal,²⁵¹ the success of the "Jordan compact" has been mixed.²⁵²

Nevertheless, transit country governments in Jordan, Turkey, Bangladesh, and elsewhere should plan for longer timelines and address the issues of their own host communities in addition to the new arrivals. As was the case with the "Jordan compact," this planning should build upon the understanding that transit countries will increasingly become long-term destinations for forced migrants wanting to

stay closer to home or unable to journey onwards. The United States and its allies should offer a suite of incentives to hosting countries, including building on the successes of the "Jordan compact" for new countries such as Turkey and Bangladesh. On the latter, expanding existing developing country trade preferences with the European Union and the United States, increasing opportunities for migrant workers outside Bangladesh, incorporating other regional partners (e.g., China) into a new compact,²⁵³ and including capital investment in infrastructure from multilateral development banks should all be considered.

For example, the United States should explore expanding its present Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program to ensure it includes countries that are supporting a disproportion-

ate number of forced migrants and are increasingly seen more as destinations rather than transit stops on a journey. For those countries, the United States could revise the program to make sure industries that hired forced migrants and maintained minimum labor standards were included. The EU could do the same with its program for developing countries. These agreements would need to come with pledges of increased production, investment back into the business, and job creation (some of which would go to forced migrants). Jobs should meet minimum, internationally recognized decent work standards. The typical industries in which forced migrants find themselves working—for example, garment factories and agriculture—have been known to employ child labor,²⁵⁴ unsafe exploitative work conditions,²⁵⁵ and wage theft.²⁵⁶ Healthy trade relationships such as these benefit U.S. consumers in numerous ways and employ people who otherwise might travel farther for work. For example, if a new trade arrangement creates new investments and that lead to 100 new jobs, 15 of those would go to forced migrants while the other 85 would go to host community members.²⁵⁷

The consequences of not understanding that transit routes are becoming destinations themselves—and not doing anything about it—are grave. Without such an understanding, the Rohingya people in Bangladesh, for example, face predictable flooding and typhoons without having had a chance to prepare.²⁵⁸ Even if this understanding exists, the

failure to prepare communities and forced migrants for their future together could result in strains that could—as was the case with IDPs in Syria and could be the case with Syrians in Lebanon and Rohingya people in Bangladesh—result in instability and the forcible return of people to a country where persecution is likely (a process commonly referred to as *refoulement*).²⁵⁹

THE PLIGHT OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED

There are twice as many internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world as refugees, despite the latter being given significantly more global attention. There is an undeniable relationship between internal and international forced migration,²⁶¹ yet neither the global compact on refugees nor the global compact on migration (see Annex C) significantly address IDPs. On the one hand, this attention discrepancy is understandable since refugees and other forced migrants cross borders and thus have greater chance to access international protections whereas IDPs are, by definition, still within their home countries. Countries wary of outside intervention generally might be less accepting of international protection for IDPs (and certainly collect and publish less credible data on internal displacement),²⁶² even though IDPs arguably fall into “a vacuum of sovereignty,

The United States and its allies in Europe should support communities in places such as Bangladesh with the transition to longer-term destination. The focus should be on equitable investment and partnerships, whether through innovative compact processes²⁶⁰ or via bilateral and multilateral assistance that supports forced migrants and their new communities.

when the state is unable, or refuses, to assume its responsibilities towards its own population.”²⁶³

Attempting to support IDPs can involve hostile country governments and armed opposition groups that are, themselves, usually on opposite sides of conflict that drove people from their homes in the first place. In the Central African Republic (CAR), for example, diverse factions block any meaningful solutions to repeated conflicts that have forced almost 20 percent of its entire population from home, almost half of whom are internally displaced.²⁶⁴ Because of these conflicts, half of the country is now in need of humanitarian assistance,²⁶⁵ a situation that has important humanitarian and security implications. It is difficult to imagine stability anytime soon in CAR given these unprecedented levels of forced migration and easy to imagine how ongoing instability

“Internal displacement is the canary in the coal mine; the first sign of trouble developing in a country. Tackling it must go beyond emergency response to encompass political, security and development solutions.”

Roberta Cohen, former Senior Adviser to the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons

there will have destabilizing implications for the broader region.

IDPs, like the 688,000 in CAR,²⁶⁶ are often among the most vulnerable forced migrants because they remain relatively close to the cause of their displacement (violence, armed conflict, environmental disasters, etc.) and are thus at greater risk of effects from those and future root causes. They are also often among the poorest forced migrants, as evidenced by the fact that they do not have the financial resources to traverse long distances and borders.

Despite these challenges to supporting IDPs, 2018 presents an opportunity to refocus attention on—and promote more comprehensive compliance with—the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, first adopted in 1998.²⁶⁷ These were the first international standards for internally displaced persons that set forth their rights and the responsibilities of governments, international organizations, and all other actors toward these populations. Although not a binding document, the Guiding Principles have gained significant international standing, some even suggesting they might in time attain customary law. The World Summit Outcome document of 2005 acknowledges them as “an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons.”²⁶⁸ Several regional instruments that are binding on states are based on the Guiding Principles (e.g., the IDP Protocol for protection and assistance of IDPs of the Great Lakes Pact–2006,²⁶⁹ and the African Union Convention for the As-

sistance and Protection of IDPs (Kampala Convention)–2009²⁷⁰, and some 25 governments have adopted laws or policies based on the Guiding Principles, with more on the way.

The problem has been implementation at the national level, which lags significantly behind the needs of IDPs and the standards set forth, necessitating a campaign to mobilize civil society, the private sector, and local and national government offices, with support from regional bodies, international organizations, and donors to:

- Promote national dialogue on internal displacement, covering all phases of displacement (prevention, assistance/protection, and return/integration) as well as all causes of forced migration, and identify the most effective solutions in each society;
- Encourage implementation of existing national laws and policies on internal displacement by publicizing positive examples and strengthening monitoring mechanisms in cooperation with regional and international organizations;
- Introduce national laws and policies in countries where they do not yet exist to promote national responsibility and compliance with the provisions in the Guiding Principles;
- Mobilize and empower IDPs to plan and act collectively;
- Integrate displaced populations and host communities into development plans in affected countries to achieve solutions for protracted cases and reduce numbers of IDPs;
- Encourage 100 percent ratification by states in Africa of the Kampala Convention and persuade those that have ratified to report on their compliance with its provisions;
- Convene regional discussions and promote regional action on behalf of IDPs with the Kampala Convention as a guide.

Internationally, there has been a withdrawal from international IDP protection, despite almost daily occurrences of new and increasingly desperate situations in Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, and beyond. Often the most un-

derrepresented and difficult to support, IDPs also often face the most acute needs. In addition to friends and allies of countries experiencing large amounts of internal displacement, the United Nations has an important role to play in pressuring governments to support—or at least allow access to—IDPs. The United Nations, however, arguably does not give enough attention to IDPs and would benefit from the appointment of a special representative to the secretary general (SRSG) for IDPs. This person would mobilize support to end protracted IDP situations, serve as a primary interlocutor with countries facing these problems on internal displacement issues, and promote new ideas.

There is some precedent for an SRSG position on IDPs. The

United Nations had a voluntary, part-time representative of the secretary general (RSG) on IDPs from 1992 to 2010. The position helped elevate IDP issues and made notable strides in the policy and normative arenas. However, its voluntary, part-time nature limited the scope and impact of its activities. Its replacement in 2010 by a special rapporteur (after the secretary-general ended all voluntary RSGs) had the effect of downgrading the position and creating a gap for IDPs.^{271,272} The special rapporteur does not have the same authority or involvement with the rest of the UN system as the RSG did, is focused primarily on human rights, and has fewer resources, all while also being voluntary and part-time. There is increasing recognition that preventing, responding to, and resolving in-

ternal displacement—and forced migration writ large—requires high-level diplomacy that goes beyond humanitarian and human rights actors. Indeed, there is an urgent need to engage with development actors, the private sector, peacekeeping operations, peace-building initiatives, and climate-change mechanisms. An SRSG for IDPs, reporting directly to the secretary general, and with the status conveyed by that position, would be well placed to work with high-level UN counterparts and governments to move forward a more comprehensive approach to IDPs than is currently possible. The 20th anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement—2018—would be a good time to renew focus on this issue.

SUPPORTING HOST COMMUNITIES AND NEW ARRIVALS

One of the main reasons transit country host communities are hesitant to accept and integrate new arrivals is the perception that they draw resources away from other underserved populations and citizens within a country. This sentiment, especially upon politicization, enables proliferation of the idea that serving new arrivals and serving host communities is mutually exclusive. The best way to counter this sentiment is to provide better support to host communities, ideally bolstering

their resiliency and ability to protect the vulnerable themselves. Forced migrants and the underserved in host communities often have similar challenges, including access to adequate housing, quality education and healthcare, enough food, access to clean water and sanitation, and the ability to earn a living. While the specifics may change dependent on context, these are universal needs between populations whether a forced migrant transits through Dakar, Senegal, or Ga-

ziantep, Turkey. Support to only forced migrants often breeds resentment and social tensions,²⁷³ and gives evidence to the idea that resources are being allocated away from host communities to support new arrivals.

The challenges in providing commensurate services to vulnerable forced migrants and their host communities primarily relate to local adaptation and limited or restricted resources. While basic needs are the same world over,

challenges are specific to specific communities. People in Kampala need housing just like in Gaziantep, but existing issues in each community complicate responses depending on the context. Each instance of forced migration deserves evidence-informed interventions but significant tailoring to context, potentially even at the sub-national level.

Another challenge is the type and availability of resources. Oftentimes donors, NGOs, and even governments prioritize the needs of forced migrants without thinking about commensurate assistance to host communities. With limited foreign assistance budgets, often acute humanitarian needs of new arrivals, and domestic political pressures to support the displaced, it is understandable that this prioritization occurs. Of these acute needs, protection of the most vulnerable, often the elderly and disabled, female heads of household, and unaccompanied children, are the most important. This is not only the right ethical thing to do, it also creates a stronger foundation for the future. Women have been proven to have positive impacts on economic growth and stability and the children of today are the leaders of tomorrow. Cultivating their skills and capacities is essential to their becoming self-supporting. Skills training, income-generating activities, and credit, where possible, will allow women to meet day-to-day subsistence needs, acquire income and assets, avoid prostitution (also for their daughters), and improve their chances for economic self-sufficiency.

Even when addressing these and other urgent humanitarian needs, efforts must be made to pivot quickly to also providing commensurate assistance to host communities, ideally by and through local governments. Developing-country national governments need to see the benefit of allocating resources and competencies to local governments that will help them respond better to crises and build resiliency. Local governments are often “caught between rocks and hard places,” facing the simultaneous challenges of being the front-line response to forced migration and a serious lack of resources with which to respond. Local governments should take responsibility for everyone living under their jurisdiction, regardless of origin. They should be bestowed the formal competencies and be given sufficient resources to make this happen, with an emphasis on the development of strong local leaders. To better support recent arrivals and their historic constituencies, local governments should:

- “develop policies that help to change perceptions of refugees and IDPs so that they are seen as rights-holders, contributors and partners in the development of towns and cities;
- take early action to resolve any emerging conflicts or tensions;
- provide assistance to new arrivals, promote their self-reliance and encourage incorporation of individuals and families into the community;
- ensure access to services and legal support (particularly with regards to tenure and rental agreements);
- provide information on rights, entitlements and available services in ways that are accessible to people from different backgrounds and who speak different language;”²⁷⁴
- encourage national governments—with the assistance of international actors if necessary—to allocate greater shares of tax revenue and formal competencies to the local level to address these issues.

SPOTLIGHT ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR

“The most important role that businesses can play is facilitating and supporting the economic integration of refugees who may be displaced for a generation. And they can do this most effectively when they go beyond traditional philanthropy, and engage refugees as economically productive employees, entrepreneurs, and customers.”

Gideon Maltz, Executive Director, Tent Foundation



An increasing proportion of developed-country foreign assistance budgets is being spent on new arrivals in their countries (see Fact 5 above) at precisely the time when protracted forced migration is becoming the new normal (see Fact 2 above) and the scale and impact of displacement in origin, transit, and new home countries is unprecedented. As a result, funding for short-term emergency relief and forced migration-focused foreign assistance that was previously tight is now, at best, dangerously thin.

This was made clear at the first ever World Humanitarian Summit convened in 2016 in Istanbul, Turkey, by the UN secretary general to “generate commitments to reduce suffering and deliver better for people around the globe.”²⁷⁵ While the summit produced a few tangible results dealing with urgent priorities (e.g., mobilizing new humanitarian donors, ensuring better and broader compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention, and getting countries to commit to upholding humanitarian law),²⁷⁶ it also recognized the vital, often unique roles the private sector²⁷⁷ can and must play in preventing and responding to the forced migration crisis.

Since the 2016 Summit, much of the private-sector focus has been on the

potential roles of multinational corporations (MNCs) and the recognition of early, positive examples being set by companies such as Mastercard, IKEA, and Airbnb.²⁷⁸ MNCs have tremendous power to assist forced migrants in ways that benefit vulnerable people and the bottom line. Among other things, this power is exercised in enacting hiring preferences and choosing suppliers that make similar commitments to support forced migrants and their host communities. Starbucks has made a global commitment to hire 10,000 refugees by 2022, giving them hundreds of millions of dollars in collective earning potential and badly needed additional benefits.²⁷⁹ If done responsibly,²⁸⁰ the Turkish garment industry could have a significant and quick impact on forced migrant employment. Ultimately, private-sector actors can make “unique and valuable contributions to refugee response by engaging refugees not as aid recipients, but as employees, producers, investees, and customers.”²⁸¹ In doing so, these actors gain not just reputational benefits and build brand loyalty, but they also see real impacts on their bottom line.²⁸²

At the same time, there has been comparatively less attention given to the roles of local small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), regional enterpris-

es, informal businesses, global and regional investors and financiers, and the broader entrepreneurial ecosystem. An “all hands-on deck” approach—including private-sector actors (often in the lead), public and private foundations, and public institutions (national, multilateral, global)—must be used to mobilize and unleash the power of the sector that (alone or more often in combination) is often best positioned to confront key root causes of the forced migration crisis.²⁸³

Broadly speaking all of these actors, but in particular national governments whose task it is to correct market failures, must make every effort to unleash the truly transformative potential of the private sector. However, it is important to understand that, while the private sector can provide immense and often unique benefits and resources, it will require responsible engagement by the various private-sector actors to successfully tackle economic, cultural, and political challenges rather than to make things worse. For example, a responsible private-sector actor (whether a business operator or investor) must balance the need for time-bound, bottom-line growth with the need to protect workers’ rights and access to employment, create safe working conditions, and utilize fair recruiting practices. Responsible actors also support equitable access to business ownership, licensing, and capital while contributing to the growth of local SMEs for forced migrants and host community members. In developed markets, a combination of businesses’ increasingly enlightened self-interest and effective government regulations have improved the private sector’s involvement in and compliance with laws surrounding these and other responsible “best work” practices. The same must be true of actions and investments in developing countries that may not have the laws or institutions to ensure responsible private-sector engagement. If business and finance fail to engage responsibly, they risk making things worse.

Why should the private sector care about forced migration? Private-sector actors stand to benefit greatly from stability and economic growth in places affected by forced migration and, in fact, often cannot and will not operate or invest without reasonably stable current or expected future conditions. These benefits can be realized in short- and long-term profits and, often more

importantly, in the creation of new and expanded markets for products and services. Understanding that stability is likely the goal in most forced migration contexts, significant efforts are required to further enable these markets and to de-risk investments through guarantees or other forms of innovative finance. This is a critical role that the U.S. government could play, potentially through the proposed U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) using new or existing authorities and programs.²⁸⁴ The relevant elements of the BUILD Act of 2018 and its creation of a U.S. IDFC should be supported and encouraged to specifically target areas experiencing destabilizing levels of forced migration in coordination with the private sector. If the BUILD Act fails to pass Congress with the relevant mandates to do so, the United States should consider allocating \$300 million to US-AID for an enterprise fund or funds specifically targeting emerging market, early-stage enterprise and SME investments in areas experiencing high levels of forced migration.²⁸⁵

While stability and economic growth in developing countries would result in opportunities for U.S.-based and other MNCs to access new markets, the arrival of forced migrants in developed countries can also increase the availability of labor, which many employers from Stockholm to Dallas desperately need.²⁸⁶ Evidence indicates the relevance of bottom-line-driven reasons to hire forced migrants in addition to the social impact, reputational benefits, and stronger brand loyalty that such hiring might also generate.²⁸⁷ Many employers in Sweden, the United States, and beyond have increased hiring of forced migrants not for corporate social responsibility reasons, but because they are typically more reliable and stay longer at the company, have comparatively higher levels of education, and have fewer complaints in general about the workplace.²⁸⁸ These workers may bring a high level of “foreign” language skills—a valuable long-term asset—while many often arrive with lower levels of “domestic” language skills that may create short-term challenges. A 2017 study showed that Colombian IDPs had “sizable positive effects” on production margins and on “blue-collar employment of formal firms.”²⁸⁹



These benefits are felt even beyond the firm level, with another recent study showing that the investment by governments of “one euro in refugee assistance can yield nearly two euros in economic benefits within five years.”²⁹⁰ Yet another study showed that “Jordan’s economic institutions substantially improved in the decade after the [Kuwaiti Palestinian] refugees arrived.”²⁹¹

While there are clear positive reasons for enterprise and investment engagement, there are grave consequences to not being part of a productive solution. Increasing global forced migration has the potential to economically, socially, and politically destabilize countries and entire regions and thereby put existing operations and investments at risk while limiting opportunities for future expansion of businesses and capital utilization.

Ultimately, economic development-related strategies aimed at the root causes and negative results of forced migration must

be enterprise-led, enterprise-supported, and enterprise-benefiting to be successful, long lasting, and scalable or replicable. To make this happen, private-sector actors—from investors to multinational corporations to small businesses—will have to be informed, enabled, incentivized, and supported. If the issue is framed only as “corporate kindness,” private-sector actors are less likely to take the initiative seriously than if forced migrants are perceived to add tangible value.

Whether working to keep people at home or creating better lives in new home countries, governments should create—with the technical and financial support of international donors and institutions—the good governance, legal, and regulatory frameworks that allow forced migrants the right to employment, training, and education. Governments should also facilitate (or at least not get in the way of) access to finance and broadly create a supportive climate for investment and supply-chain expansion for SMEs.

How can the private sector engage in ways that address the forced migration crisis while also benefiting the bottom line? In the years since the 2016 Istanbul Summit, private-sector actors are increasingly understanding why it benefits them to be involved in creating, developing, and financing durable solutions to the forced migration crisis. Although there are only a few examples of impactful private-sector initiatives to date, as companies move from corporate social responsibility (CSR) to core business operations to engage—from what IKEA has done in Jordan²⁹² to the approach of a technology startup in San Diego²⁹³—it is important and timely to consider not only *why*, but *how* the private sector can best engage.

As shown above, forced migrants are often considered reliable employees who are net contributors to the economy over time, especially when given the right to work both in policy and in practice. Private-sector actors should

provide not only access to jobs at their own companies, but skills and language training, including certification.²⁹⁴ Efforts to introduce online freelance programs (e.g., coding) as viable income-generation opportunities should be studied and, where appropriate, adopted; relatedly, considerable attention should be given to prevalent online connectivity issues in forced migration contexts. The potential of the “gig” and “sharing” economies (e.g., Lyft and Airbnb) should be explored further to better understand how freedom to work can be granted to forced migrants while filling market gaps. A clear target here is allowing forced migrants legal access to the formal economy (i.e., a genuine “right to work”); when forced migrants do not have such rights, they have greater incentive to operate in the shadows of society, are more susceptible to nefarious activities and paying little or nothing in taxes on earned income. “The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that [providing the right to work] is the simplest way to combat the dependency, idleness, and poverty, which foster the alienation that leads to radicalization.”²⁹⁵ At the same time, forced migrants should not be forced into the formal economy against their will. In many developing countries, the informal economy is where most jobs are created and are those the most adaptable to shocks such as the influx of forced migrants. Over time focus should shift to better working conditions, expanded social, and where possible broader participation in the formal economy.

Financial inclusion of forced migrants is also important so that employees and business owners can more easily and seamlessly manage and earn money digitally. Such support efforts (often working with public-sector providers to fill technical and market access gaps) can help SMEs move toward broader inclusive economic growth that creates jobs in origin countries as well as for forced migrants and long-standing members of the host community. Support should be given to other private-sector actors—particularly SMEs—that may have viable business operations but often lack access to necessary distribution channels, specific know-how, networks, or other appropriate resources—whether financial or otherwise—to compete for and capture supply chain contracts or to scale. As with most support efforts in forced migration contexts,

programs that offer services (e.g., skills training and transportation) to forced migrants should be made commensurately to host communities.

Additionally, future bilateral and multilateral efforts should prioritize identifying and utilizing existing skills that forced migrants bring with them. Whether through hiring them for service provision or (ideally) by creating mechanisms through which those with skills can integrate into the private sector, skills identification and matching is important. It is important to build skills that are relevant to the relevant labor market needs.²⁹⁶ Skill-building efforts should be grounded in careful study of demand, ideally driven by—or at least in cooperation with—the relevant private-sector actors.²⁹⁷

While the efforts mentioned above are important and are all “pieces of the puzzle,” a fundamental question of *how* to engage at scale is often a question of matching private-sector actors (including and perhaps especially with emerging entrepreneurs) with the financing that they need at every level. However, while some SMEs in Jordan, for example, face capital constraints, their challenges also include much more fundamental issues of expensive electricity, stifling regulations, and logistical challenges in exporting. Ultimately every business is different, and enterprises will make their own decisions on how to address challenges. In many settings, the most productive way to unleash the power of the private sector is to understand and fill the strategic gaps in financing that exist in almost all forced migration contexts today. This connection between SMEs and capital is challenging and deserving of further study.

One way to approach how private-sector investors can and should engage is to understand and fill the strategic gaps between the existing deal readiness, growth of the deal pipeline, and capitalization.²⁹⁸ In relative and practical terms, deployed capital to confront forced migration barely exists, no matter the type of country (origin, transit, or destination), source of capital (multinational corporation, foundation, pension fund, impact investor, capital markets investor, government, or multilateral), size of target enterprise (large, medium, small, micro), instrument (equity, debt, etc.), or purpose (risk reduction and resiliency, new products and services, technology deployment, etc.).

Forced migrants themselves have been shown to create thriving businesses that boost employment.²⁹⁹ For example, a recent report by the Syrian Economic Forum and Building Markets showed that, in addition to first-time business owners, many experienced Syrian entrepreneurs are expanding businesses in neighboring countries such as Turkey, hiring fellow forced migrants and community members alike.³⁰⁰ Nevertheless, there is significant skepticism in the financial world that there are long enough and wide enough pipelines of financial return-ready enterprises within markets that can accurately be risk-reward evaluated in these contexts. Since early 2017, more than \$1 billion has been pledged to support refugee entrepreneurs or businesses employing forced migrants and supporting the communities in which they live.^{301,302} Despite the growing committed private capital pool to the sector, only a handful of deals have been capitalized or funded.³⁰³

In reality, such enterprises exist and are in need of capital, though many concurrently face the noncapital challenges mentioned above. Understanding why there are gaps between existing deal readiness, growth of the deal pipeline, and capitalization is of strategic importance to addressing how private-sector actors can best engage. The goal should be to create a clear pathway for investment, one that deploys private capital at the scope and scale demanded by the scope and scale of the forced migration crisis. Deal pipelines are weakest where the needs are greatest, so focus must be placed on the most critical—and most protracted—forced migration scenarios. The pathway for investment in these areas requires a coherent system of sourcing and structuring deals and matching investment opportunities to the appropriate class of investor. Deals currently in the pipeline rarely match that which interested investors are seeking; they are typically too small and too risky.

While platforms to connect investors to deals do exist, many are either small-scale platforms that presume existing operational capacity, digital apps to match capital with investments,³⁰⁴ or grand designs to administer multibillion-dollar centrally administered investment funds. Currently, most of the existing available investment opportunities are under \$5 million, offer concessionary financial returns (at best), and entail a level of risk beyond the appetite of typical commercial investors. Some of the deals can only be capitalized by matching them with appropriate angel or seed investment or in some cases early-stage philanthropic funding. Some will require derisking through guarantees or regulatory remediation. Almost all of them will require structuring support and technical assistance to meet the risk, return, and impact expectations of commercial investors. This support cannot be performed by a platform. It requires an intermediary who understands both the language and practice of investment and the reality of forced migration markets and contexts. What is needed are investment bankers for forced migration solutions instead of yet another digital exchange for ready-for-market deals. What is needed is a coherent and strategic system that today does not exist.

It is critical to understand and support entrepreneurial ecosystems if we are to understand how to build deal pipelines and capitalize them. The entrepreneurial spirit of countless forced migrants—many of whom fought through unimaginable horrors to even get to a place where they could even think about rebuilding their lives and creating new businesses—is evident and should be seen as an opportunity for broader economic growth. With adequate access to finance and other relevant support, many forced migrants have gone on to create important businesses that employ innumerable Americans and Europeans in addition to so many

other forced migrants. Similarly, important are the SMEs created by forced migrants that, while each one is not necessarily employing thousands, contribute to their communities through taxes, local philanthropy, and the provision of goods and services that might not otherwise be available. In countless interviews with forced migrant entrepreneurs, the opportunity to build a viable business was enough for them to want to stay and build new homes and productive lives in their new countries; those that continued their journeys (formally or informally) did so only when there were direct impediments to opportunity, dignity, and self-reliance.³⁰⁵

Building out a truly transformative, coherent, and strategic system to bridge these gaps will require significant effort across the private and public sectors. This will require (1) a greater understanding of relevant entrepreneurial ecosystems and the structures, capacities, and motivations that will shape the system's behavior and (2) the availability of public-sector assets that support, drive, or make possible expanded international and regional private-sector involvement. Efforts must build on the growing numbers and strengthened capacities of local private sectors via training, risk capital, and assistance to host governments for legislation and regulation drafting and contract compliance.

Markets, policy, finance, human capital, market culture, and support structures that foster environments in which entrepreneurs are empowered to innovate and succeed³⁰⁶ need to be understood and adapted to forced migration contexts. Especially in the areas that so often face forced migration-related challenges, markets tend to be underdeveloped, policy environments often impede investment as opposed to encouraging it, and “business clusters”³⁰⁷—often credited with creating more entrepreneurial and competitive business environments

“...We must think big while not letting the perfect (e.g., immediate and massive investment) be the enemy of the good.”



elsewhere—are not well understood. Though still in the early stages, several groups—including the Tent Foundation, World Economic Forum, Ascend Fund, Global Development Incubator, and Alight Fund—are all working to bridge this gap in context-specific ways. These and other efforts should be closely studied for lessons on how available capital (over \$1 billion in pledges) can turn into actual investments.

We need to start somewhere with the goal of achieving scale. Though the question of *how* best to engage deserves innovative thinking and further study, we must think big while not letting the perfect (e.g., immediate and massive investment) be the enemy of the good (i.e., we have to start somewhere). Capital, whether private or public, when taking on the challenging task of building entrepreneurial ecosystems in frontier markets, should itself act entrepreneurially. These actors should execute with existing resources where possible, learn, iterate, and continue executing. Understanding context-specific entrepreneurial ecosystems, there must be new initiatives to develop new investment pipelines learning from successful approaches to SME expansion that exist in other challenging environments. For example, U.S. crowdfunding organization Kiva partnered

with the Alight Fund, the USA for UNHCR,³⁰⁸ and others to launch the World Refugee Fund (WRF), a microfinance matchmaking platform in June 2017, connecting lenders to low-income entrepreneurs around the world. Within 24 hours of its initial launch, the fund raised over \$500,000 for over 500 refugee entrepreneurs.³⁰⁹ For many early-stage entrepreneurs, particularly in frontier or post-conflict markets, the first pathway to business ownership is through micro enterprise. Until the launch of the WRF, most financial service providers refused to serve refugees due to perceptions that their loans were too risky, that they posed a flight risk, and the fact they often have no credit history in their new countries. The success of the WRF demonstrates the significant interest in the United States for providing direct capital to refugee businesses. Early WRF data on repayments also indicates that displaced entrepreneurs—regardless of context—make for good lending customers on par with host entrepreneurs and, in some cases, are less risky. Efforts like these can have profound benefits for improving the self-reliance of forced migrants, increase market viability for U.S. investors or operators, and increase stability in fragile states. ●

Hayyan walked the equivalent of Washington D.C. to Philadelphia through disputed territory.

Zaatari
Refugee
Camp

ARRIVAL IN A

NEW HOME

Hayyan, his wife, and two small children lived in a small apartment in Irbid, Jordan, for four years when they received approval to move to the United States. They had owned a shoe factory just outside Damascus, selling their goods as far away as Algeria. When Syria descended into chaos in 2011, they initially made the decision to stay, hoping that the violence would end and they could get back to their once-prosperous business. Hayyan did not know—or care—whether it was the Assad regime, the Russians, the United States, armed opposition groups, or ISIS that pierced the windows and walls of their family home with bullets practically every night. It did not matter as long as it came to an end. When a missile finally destroyed part of the factory and their home, injuring him in the process, the decision to leave was no longer a decision at all.



After a harrowing journey involving 150 kilometers of walking by night and crawling by day, they finally reached a border crossing that was subsequently closed, stranding an estimated 60,000 of his fellow Syrians in a “no man’s land.”³¹⁰ Once on the Jordanian side, Hayyan and his family promptly registered as refugees with UNHCR, a process that involved extensive interviews, iris scans, and other security checks. Finding temporary refuge in the poor border town of Irbid and having no hope of returning to a life now destroyed, they depleted their life savings to pay for rent while waiting for news on resettlement.

“Safety and security are always prerequisites for return; with the protracted nature of conflicts and situations of political instability today, returning is often infeasible.”

The initial good news came at the beginning of November 2016; Hayyan and his family would be able to join his sister in California. A process meant to take “up to two years” had taken four, but Hayyan did not care. Nervous but relieved, he and his family finally got on a plane in October 2017. He now works in an electronics manufacturing plant. His children are in school. They live in a small house in a suburb of Oakland. Hayyan and his wife have drivers’

licenses and are taking English classes in the evenings. In November, they celebrated Thanksgiving with their new neighbors. Hayyan considers himself to be very lucky, a sentiment backed up by evidence. Less than 1 percent of all refugees are ever resettled, a number that is even smaller for other types of forced migrants (e.g., IDPs).³¹¹ The extremely thorough vetting process that Hayyan went through is not

RETURN HOME

Before talking about resettlement and integration in a third country, it is worth acknowledging that, if one talks to a forced migrant—like Rebekah, Bassima, Tesfay, or Hayyan—soon after displacement, their goal will almost inevitably be to return home as soon as possible. Almost half of all Syrians in Turkey live near the Syrian border, holding onto hope of return.³¹² Even months into the most recent Rohingya crisis of late 2017, officials in Bangladesh refused to talk about much more than when the Rohingya people would return to Myanmar; even though very few—if any—Rohingya would be willing to return voluntarily.³¹³ Returning home is rarely easy and often dangerous, as is the case for the Rohingya people and as was the case for Tesfay upon his first return to, and subsequent imprisonment in, Eritrea.³¹⁴ The same will be true for the Rohingya

perfect, but is worth understanding and, where appropriate, fixing. For the lucky few who do get resettled, arrival in a new home presents challenges for the person, their family, and the host community; these challenges are also worth understanding, especially in the context of cities that have emerged as the new leaders in effective resettlement, integration, and harmonization of forced migrants.


people currently in Bangladesh; they have been persecuted for decades and, after entire villages were burned, have no guarantees of safety if they were to return to Myanmar.³¹⁵ In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where there are more than 4 million IDPs, the majority are seen as enemies of the state as families of rebels and thus have little incentive to return to their original homes.³¹⁶ Safety and security are always prerequisites for return; with the protracted nature of conflicts and situations of political instability today, returning is often infeasible. Many returnees will find their homes and home communities destroyed or fundamentally different; in this way, even return to something that should be familiar could feel new. With return difficult or out of the question, many find that a stop on the journey becomes a permanent home; for a very few others, dreams of resettlement become realities. We must realize that protracted displacement, resettlement, and integration—that is, not just talk of return—are the new normal.

RESETTLEMENT

Hayyan is one of the lucky few to be given a second chance for a future. Less than 1 percent of refugees are resettled annually.³¹⁷ The United States has historically led the world in refugee resettlement,³¹⁸ accepting 78,761 people in 2016; even dropping to 24,559 in 2017, the United States was still the global leader in resettlement.³¹⁹ It is unlikely that resettlement alone will solve the plight of over 22 million refugees and many more forced migrants; however, the actions the United States and its allies take send powerful messages to global populations about global leadership, one that elicits discomfort and security concerns among some, but otherwise comes with comparatively little – if any – long-term strains on domestic resources (see Spotlight on the Private Sector). Forty-nine of 50 U.S. states accepted refugees in 2017 while only 34 countries around the world did the same.³²⁰ Some

countries (e.g., Japan, Russia, and China) largely reject refugees and other forced and irregular migrants that could help address demographic and economic challenges they face. The United States itself could certainly absorb more refugees and other forced migrants from an economic perspective, and many local officials and business leaders in Detroit, San Diego, and Dallas have the capacity to receive greater numbers of forced migrants. These leaders understand the social and economic benefits to welcoming them³²¹ and are worried about the loss of expertise and services at long-standing agencies that could result from fewer resettlements. These leaders understand that higher resettlement rates in their cities has significant social and economic benefits.

“Less than 1 percent of refugees are resettled annually.”



TOP RESETTLEMENT STATES IN THE UNITED STATES (2017)

- | | |
|--------------|------------------|
| 1 California | 6 Michigan |
| 2 Texas | 7 Arizona |
| 3 New York | 8 Pennsylvania |
| 4 Washington | 9 North Carolina |
| 5 Ohio | 10 Georgia |

GRAPHIC SOURCE
UNHCR, “Resettlement in the United States,” <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/resettlement-in-the-united-states.html>.

Extremely Thorough Vetting

Every country has a sovereign right and duty to protect its borders and ensure that those attempting to enter the country do not have bad intentions. Part of that right is the obligation to vet potential arrivals—including refugees and other forced migrants—extremely well. Though the system should not be considered perfect, the United States does have extremely thorough vetting procedures that are worth understanding better.

Refugees are vetted more closely than any other type of person entering the United States via a process that takes, on average, 18 to 24 months and involves at least 20 stages of screening.³²² In almost all cases, refugees are referred by UNHCR for U.S. resettlement after a rigorous screening process of its own that involves fulfillment of at least one specific vulnerability category, in-person interviews, background checks, and collection and analysis of biographical and biometric (often iris and face scans and fingerprints) data.³²³ Once referred by UNHCR, the application is processed by one of the nine Resettlement Support Centers (RSC), funded and managed by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). The RSC collects biographic information, conducts an in-depth interview, and enters all the

applicant's data into the State Department's Worldwide Refugee Admission Processing System (WRAPS). If the applicant is eligible for resettlement, the RSC transmits all the data to U.S. national security agencies including the National Counterterrorism Center, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, or State Department for further screening.

For those who are not disqualified during that process, their screenings from the different agencies are then sent to the State Department and DHS. Those containing "national security indicators" are given additional scrutiny, including referral to the DHS "fraud detection unit." DHS officers interview the applicants and collect biometric data to confirm the information collected by RSCs. If any new information arises, the applicant will be interviewed again and that data will be entered in the WRAPS system.³²⁴ The next step is to screen fingerprints against the FBI, DHS, and DoD databases, which are later reviewed by DHS. Only after successfully completing these steps is the applicant eligible to take a cultural-orientation class and receive a thorough medical examination.

Everything described above happens before a candidate for resettlement sets foot in the United States. At their point of entry, they are subject to additional screening from U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program. If there are no security risk throughout all the stages, the refugee is free to settle in the United States and is greeted upon arrival by representatives from resettlement agencies. ●

After such an extremely thorough vetting process (see text box), resettled refugees are expected to begin their new lives in the United States with only 90 days of assistance from resettlement agencies. These nonprofit agencies determine where to allocate refugee families on a case-by-case basis, though the families are more likely to be settled in a place where they have friends, family, or personal connections.³²⁵ Resettlement agencies also consider cultural and religious dynamics, employment opportunities, availability of affordable housing, and whether communities are typically welcoming to refugees. For example, faith leaders have regularly been champions of refugee resettlement, often sponsoring and helping integrate refugees of all faiths into the community.³²⁶ For those first 90 days resettlement

agencies are responsible for providing food, shelter, medical care, and other services. After that, refugees are expected to be self-sufficient or—if resettlement is done effectively—in places where communities can continue to provide support until they are fully self-sufficient.

In addition to vetting and the overall resettlement figures, policymakers should focus on what happens to forced migrants upon arrival. They should learn from cities that are the new leaders in effective integration, despite the limited timeline of available federal assistance. Ensuring that refugees have opportunities to thrive and are in the proper environments that reward hard work and contributions to society is essential for integration success.



INTEGRATION

Integration³²⁷ into a new community is difficult in the best of circumstances and can be especially challenging for forced migrants after having endured years of hardship and waiting. For resettled refugees, there may be official processes that involve assistance getting a job, going to the doctor, learning a new language, and getting children in school. For other forced migrants—especially those unable to journey past first countries of asylum—the process and timelines for integration are ill defined at best. Integration can take generations; first arrivals may never learn the language of their new community, whereas their children and children's children know little other than their adopted homes. Effectively addressing challenges of integration have economic, political, social, and national security implications.

Germany and Sweden use a specified distribution formula to determine where to resettle refugees, similar to the placement process in the United States.³²⁸ Sweden has taken a unique and major step by allowing permanent resettlement of Syrian refugees due to the unlikelihood of them returning to Syria anytime soon.³²⁹ U.S. resettlement agencies do a credible job resettling refugees, but their processes could be improved thus increasing the chances of quick and successful integration. The United States and its allies should explore the creation of a global matching system for forced migrants whereby the displaced would submit their skills and country preferences and countries would submit their skills preferences. The matching system would then adjudicate the best matches based on these stated prefer-

ences,³³⁰ taking care to account for specific vulnerability criteria (e.g., age and disability status).

Researchers from the Immigration Policy Lab at Stanford University are already investigating a data-driven algorithm that could match refugees to host cities, rather than relying on the usual case-by-case matching systems.³³¹ The model uses skill sets, ethnic background, age, and other characteristics to decide where to best place refugees based on desired social and economic outcomes. This type of skills-and-interest matching model could increase social cohesion and employment rates of refugees (and eventually other forced migrants) at very little taxpayer cost.³³² To make such a system effective in the United States, officials should consider integrating such data-based algorithms into allocation models and, importantly, extending data collection on resettled refugees beyond the initial 90-day period. These data would then be used to further calibrate and improve the model. Medium-sized cities such as Indianapolis, Louisville, or Troy, Michigan, are often great matches for resettlement because of the combination of low living costs and available jobs, resulting in broad economic benefits. For example, refugees have contributed an estimated \$1.6 billion annually just to the economy of central Ohio.³³³

It is important to continue focusing integration efforts on finding more and better jobs to forced migrants and those that need them in the host community. Collecting more and better skills-

related data on forced migrants will help in future allocation. The United States, UNHCR, and others collect “occupation,” but do not include assessments of relevant skills of forced migrants to be resettled. These data should be joined with post-arrival assessments that, together, feed into matching algorithms. Once matches are made, skill-refreshing or -building efforts before arrival should correspond to destination-appropriate needs.

Another important part of integration should also begin well before arrival. New arrivals need to have realistic—and accurate—expectations of the challenges that lay ahead. Most want to work and to put their children in schools, but they should be familiarized with life in the United States before they arrive. If life in the United States does not live up to expectations, new arrivals might revert to hopelessness. Part of making sure this doesn’t happen is setting expectations effectively and accurately. The responsibility for this cultural preparation often falls to NGOs working with refugees and other forced migrants preparing to arrive in the United States or Europe. These efforts should be supported and strengthened.

It is important to quickly and effectively limit opportunities for community members to isolate new arrivals, and for new arrivals to isolate themselves. Though new arrivals benefit from support of previous arrivals (especially those from similar ethnic or religious backgrounds), it is critical that official assistance to forced migrants also be provided to oth-

ers in the community in need. New arrivals should be given ample opportunity to learn the local language, participate in local cultural events (e.g., Hayyan and his family’s celebration of Thanksgiving with their new neighbors in Oakland), and formally and legally earn a living. The Arab-American Chaldean Council (ACC) in Detroit is an excellent example of an organization that serves poor people and those in need from all communities.³³⁴ ACC doctors, for example, serve forced migrants together with people originally from Detroit. This support for the host community in addition to the forced migrant is perhaps the most important quality of successful, and peaceful, integration. Organizations that do this particularly well, for example, ACC, deserve greater attention and support.

Policymakers in the United States and other resettlement and hosting countries are currently dealing with rising nationalism and efforts to separate people rather than integrate them together effectively. Germany and Sweden have yet to halt welcoming refugee policies,³³⁵ but are increasingly dealing with tensions related to forced migration.³³⁶ While forced migrants have been supported by Sweden’s generous welfare system, the national social safety nets have been stretched, resulting in a rise of nationalist and increasingly isolationist policies and political actors. There have been allegations of an increase in the number of rapes in Sweden due to increasing forced migration, when in reality sexual assault

rates (unacceptable at any level) have actually dropped since 2010, well before the recent influx of forced migrants in 2015.³³⁷ Similarly, the Turkish Interior Ministry has rejected claims that crime had increased among and by Syrian refugees.³³⁸

Many of these tensions are related to underlying economic and security fears (real or imagined) attributed to the arrival of new people, thus making successful integration all the more important. In addition to tensions in host communities, a consequence of not effectively integrating new arrivals is that, over time, disenfranchised and marginalized second- or third-generation forced or irregular migrants may pose greater risks to safety and security. While not the only path, rejection and marginalization of young people in particular can lead to radicalization and religious extremism.³³⁹ While blocking new people from entry or marginalizing new arrivals might win votes in elections, it does little to improve safety and security (and likely has opposite effects); whereas improving integration likely does improve safety and security over time.

Policy efforts should thus focus on quick and effective economic integration. Policymakers should create minimum standards for reception and integration of forced migrants, with focus on economic integration and self-sufficiency and the role of local communities, civil society, diaspora groups, and others in the process.³⁴⁰ Ask a forced migrant anywhere in the world what she wants and, more often than not, she will tell

“Ask a forced migrant anywhere in the world what she wants and, more often than not, she will tell you that she wants to be able to provide for her family (i.e., work) and send her children to school.”

you that she wants to be able to provide for her family (i.e., work) and send her children to school. Recent arrivals face challenges in several areas that make getting to work difficult: transportation, skills and education, housing, language, and understanding of local culture. Local efforts to support forced migrants should assess arrivals and focus on the areas that will most quickly allow them to work. All efforts to integrate or otherwise deal with forced migrants in destination countries should seek regular feedback from the forced migrants themselves, alongside local communities and employers.



Despite numerous failed attempts to do so, the European Union should also strive for a common political consensus on resettlement and comprehensive revision of the Common European Asylum System, especially if the burdens of hosting on countries such as Germany and Sweden are to be shared more broadly throughout the European Union.³⁴¹ Policymakers in Germany limit internal movement partly because they fear potential political ramifications of free movement that could create ethnic enclaves. Ultimately people integrate better with freedom of movement within their country of resettlement. This is especially true if granted alongside adequate and durable legal status (even if short of cit-

izenship) and facilitated access to employment, education, and family reunification for spouses and unmarried children under the age of 21. If the goal is to turn a perceived “burden” into economic growth in host communities, nuclear family reunification is especially important. Those that are not together with their families are less willing to integrate and invest in their adopted community; they typically make shorter-term economic decisions and send money home as opposed to shopping in local businesses.

New forced migration crises will emerge across the developing world—especially if we do not adequately address the root causes of such crises—and forced mi-

grants will continue to find new ways of journeying on to Europe and the United States. Increasing numbers of non-Latin American forced, irregular, and voluntary migrants are attempting to cross into the United States from Mexico.³⁴² Current policy treats the symptoms of the underlying root causes of these mixed migration flows at the same time that desperation continues to produce new and creative ways to journey onwards.

To seek effective integration solutions, we must look to a diverse and decentralized group of stakeholders for solutions. Cities, the private sector, nonprofits and NGOs, faith-based groups, and local leaders are best placed to effectively execute integration strategies. ●

LOCAL IMPACT

Cities are the New Leaders

Thanks to technology and the ubiquity of smart phones, forced migrants typically have a sense of the country to which they are destined. Each country of first asylum, other host country, or official resettlement destination has a certain reputation that sets certain expectations. However, what forced migrants quickly realize is that, while national policies may matter to them obliquely, the face of their new home is defined by the city, town, or village.

Forced migration is an increasingly urban phenomenon tied to challenges with urbanization. Of the 22 million refugees worldwide, 60 percent live in cities and, though data on this is lacking, this percentage is likely much higher for IDPs.³⁴³ Efforts to confront forced migration should thus consider urbanization challenges and strengthen existing urban systems, aligning with longer-term urban development goals where appropriate.³⁴⁴ It is worth noting that even displacement camps are often very similar in structure to urban informal settlements (aka slums); the international community should work to transform camps into more formal settlements; or at least to better integrate them in the local community and economy.³⁴⁵

It is at this more local level that leadership has the most potential for impact. This is also where there are many lessons to be learned. Thus, “[cities] are the frontline players in dealing with refugees”³⁴⁶ and other forced migrants. City leaders deserve a greater role in addressing the responses to—and indeed solutions to root causes of—the global forced migration crisis.³⁴⁷

City and local-level issues are typically less political and more pragmatic. “I don’t have the time to politicize migration of any kind,” said one city official in Dallas. “Our city is growing too fast and receives so many refugees we’ve created a welcoming & immigrant affairs office to harness the contributions of refugees and immigrants in our city. Through this office, Dallas is undergoing an extensive process involving a broad spectrum of community leaders, including leaders who are immigrants and refugees themselves, to develop a strategic welcoming plan. The plan includes a comprehensive approach to addressing equitable delivery of city services, economic and educational opportunities, safety and health, and civic engagement.” Cities such as these should be des-

“Due in large part to our robust economy and relatively low-cost of living, the DFW area has resettled a significant number of refugees—approximately 2,500 annually in Dallas alone. The full integration of newcomers in the life and flow of our city is critical and we have long relied on the faith-based and community-based organizations to shoulder much of the work. Now, we are bringing local governmental leadership to the efforts.”

Mike Rawlings, Mayor of Dallas

tinuations of choice for forced migrants and the institutions and governments that decide where to send them. Some control is useful, as uncontrolled flows of people into a city without good administrative capacity and strong infrastructure could further weaken the city and lead to tension and even violence.³⁴⁸ As the primary people dealing with forced migration on a daily basis, it is important to integrate city officials into these allocation systems, something that is not done often enough.³⁴⁹

City leadership is not only evident in the United States. Kilis is a city in southern Turkey about 4 miles from the Syrian border that has been the scene of repeated rocket attacks perpetrated by various armed groups over the last few years. Despite the bombings, its city leadership made a conscious decision years ago to accept and integrate their neighbors from across the border, ultimately resulting in a doubling of its population since the beginning of the Syrian civil war.³⁵⁰ Over time – and with deliberate support and funding from local officials – Turks and Syrians have come together in schools and community centers to learn computer, cooking, hairdressing, language, and other skills. So close to the bloodshed and violence in northern Syria that forced them from home, Syrian forced migrants and their hosts in Kilis together exhibit one of the best examples of integration.³⁵¹

Though they may not always appear on the front page of the newspaper, stories of hosting and resettlement in places such as Detroit, Kilis, Dallas, Malmo, Nashville, Boise, Louisville, and countless other cities are overwhelmingly not political. They are stories of people having suffered greatly being given new opportunities in welcoming cities, towns, and villages, many of which are happy to have them contribute to the local economy and community. ●

TAKING ACTION

Forced migration is a complex and global crisis, one that lends itself to local and locally driven solutions. Since the crisis is global, solutions will require involvement of resources and expertise on a global scale; however, the specifics are often locally based, in part because of specific historic, cultural, ethnic, and religious components. Many ideas exist, though many are politically challenging, expensive, tough to implement, and require leadership and flexibility to accomplish. This report does not attempt to address every instance of forced migration; the report does present throughout actionable ideas worthy of broad consideration. Some of these ideas have the potential to change the nature of forced migration and ultimately reduce the number of forced migrants. Each idea³⁵² below includes recommendations on how to turn the idea into action while attempting to reconcile national interest with international need.

IDEA 1

PROTECT AND SECURE

Respond to current crises, predict future trends, prevent forced migration before it starts, and build greater resiliency in communities when it does happen. The United States should use its diplomatic, development, and—as a last resort—military power to resolve conflicts that force migration and cause instability that makes the country and the world less safe.

Actions to operationalize this idea:

- 1.1 Increase congressional leadership on these issues. Increase the number of Senate and House hearings and conduct more congressional and staff delegations to understand the root causes of forced migration. The goal is to increase U.S. leadership on these issues, as well as identify the appropriate targeted increases in foreign assistance, trade preferences, partnerships with allies, and targeted increases in resettlements by the United States.³⁵³
- 1.2 Fill the assistant secretary of state position in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, ideally with someone experienced in working with the United Nations and other multi-lateral entities. (Introduction)
- 1.3 Develop a forced migration early-warning system. (Chapter I)
- 1.4 Place more USAID missions in forced migration “hot spots.” (Chapter IV)
- 1.5 Focus national security efforts on bringing forced migrants out of the shadows, working with development agencies and partnering with governments to offer better safety, support, and more opportunities as incentive. (Spotlight on National Security)
- 1.6 Acknowledge that both humanitarian and development efforts are needed in confronting forced migration and provide appropriate financial support to both. Limit reallocation of foreign assistance budgets to support arriving forced migrants (Introduction) while providing greater support to addressing root causes (Chapter II).
- 1.7 Incorporate diplomacy and development experts into national security planning exercises. (Spotlight on National Security)

IDEA 2

LEAD AND PARTNER

The United States should exercise global leadership in the international system seeking greater burden sharing from allies and others.

Actions to operationalize this idea:

- 2.1 Build on the lessons from the Alliance for Prosperity, with the United States leading a global alliance to confront the root causes of forced migration, mobilizing \$10 billion per year for 10 years via bilateral, multilateral, developing country, and private capital commitments. Beyond funding pledges, the global alliance should mandate local participation and ownership, addressing systemic issues through private-sector incentives, tax reform, and security commitments. (Chapter II)
- 2.2 Remain active as a full participant in the global compact for refugees. Because of the strategic value of doing so, the United States should strongly consider rejoining the global compact for migration process.³⁵⁴ Push for the greater consideration of IDPs and weather- and climate-related forced migration in the compacts. (Annex C)
- 2.3 Create a compact for Bangladesh specific to its handling of the Rohingya crisis, taking lessons from Jordan and Lebanon and including innovative ideas as part of a suite of incentives.³⁵⁵ (Chapter III)
- 2.4 Acknowledge and reward (e.g., via increased focus in future refugee and migration compact implementation processes) positive policies and actions by countries—many of which are dealing with economic and security challenges themselves—that are, in effect, providing a global public good by hosting large numbers of forced migrants. (Chapter III)
- 2.5 Encourage more World Bank and other multilateral development bank involvement in fragile states that disproportionately produce forced migrants.^{356,357} The World Bank, through replenishing International Development Association (IDA) resources, has made an important move in this direction with \$2 billion made available to host countries for managing long-term solutions and to prevent their collapse.³⁵⁸ Other multilateral development banks and development finance institutions (e.g., International Finance Corporation) should pilot contingent financing schemes to help origin countries prevent forced migration and to help host countries prepare for future shocks.³⁵⁹ Significant increases in U.S. and other country funding (e.g., capital increases) to these institutions should be contingent on their adequately addressing fragile states that disproportionately produce or host forced migrants. (Chapter II)
- 2.6 Create a country index that measures the existence, content, and implementation of policies on forced migration. Countries should be considered in a “portfolio approach” against a standardized set of criteria, requiring more and better data.³⁶⁰
- 2.7 Appoint a special representative of the secretary general (SRSG) at the international level to raise visibility to and advocate solutions for internally displaced persons (IDPs), if necessary elevating the special rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs into this position.³⁶¹ (Chapter III)
- 2.8 Reinforce implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on internal displacement. (Chapter III)
- 2.9 Assess U.S. funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), pressuring Saudi Arabia and others to increase their contributions and placing the agency on a future regional reform agenda.

IDEA 3

DIVERSIFY STAKEHOLDERS

The private sector should be motivated and incentivized to responsibly engage in ways that benefit the bottom line—in addition to corporate social responsibility, strategic gaps in business activities, investment, and private-sector engagement should be addressed.

Actions to operationalize this idea:

- 3.1 Support the elements of S.2463 - BUILD Act of 2018 and its proposed U.S. International Development Finance Corporation that could be leveraged to increase productive private-sector engagement in fragile states. Expand the focus of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), enterprise funds, and USAID’s Development Credit Authority to respond to forced migration. (Spotlight on the Private Sector)
- 3.2 Expand trade relations with countries that provide a common good by disproportionately hosting forced migrants, for example, Turkey, Bangladesh, and Uganda. (Chapter III)
- 3.3 Focus foreign assistance increasingly on governance, strengthening the business environment and technical capabilities, and other reforms that create an enabling environment for private-sector growth in forced migration contexts. Recognize forced migrants as drivers of future economic growth and job creation, rather than just beneficiaries of CSR. (Spotlight on the Private Sector)
- 3.4 Support efforts such as the World Refugee Fund that seek to connect lenders to low-income forced migrant entrepreneurs. (Spotlight on the Private Sector)
- 3.5 Commission further study of how best to expand deal readiness, growth of the deal pipeline, and capitalization, while closing the strategic gaps that exist today between them. Highlight and support replication of successful and scalable efforts. (Spotlight on the Private Sector)

IDEA 4

REGULARIZE AND NORMALIZE

The most broadly effective solutions are ones that allow forced migrants to normalize their existence and add value to host communities as quickly as possible.

Actions to operationalize this idea:

- 4.1 Secure access to quality education for forced migrants as quickly as possible with commensurate increased support to host community education structures. (Chapter III)
- 4.2 Allow the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance to spend funds on formal education for forced migrants and their host communities, including outside of displacement camps. (Introduction)
- 4.3 Provide greater resources and federal support to mayors and other local leaders resettling refugees and asylees, with more weight given to areas where more forced migrants are resettling. (Chapter IV)
- 4.4 Strengthen efforts to allow for and find more and better jobs for forced migrants—including giving forced migrants legal rights to work—and those that need them in the host community. (Spotlight on the Private Sector)
- 4.5 Maintain the U.S. refugee family reunification visa program—especially for spouses and unmarried children under the age of 21—of resettled refugees and asylees. (Chapter IV)
- 4.6 Extend data collection for resettled refugees in the United States from 90 to 365 days. Make these data available to researchers studying ways to improve the efficient allocation of people to result in the highest possible levels of economic integration. (Chapter IV)
- 4.7 Explore the creation of an algorithmic skills, jobs, and country matching system for global forced migration. (Chapter IV)
- 4.8 Prioritize protection of the most vulnerable, often female heads of household and unaccompanied children. (Chapter III)

Annex A

Glossary

ASYLUM SEEKER

A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, the person must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any nonnational in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds.

DE FACTO REFUGEE

Persons not recognized as refugees within the meaning of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967, and who are unable or, for reasons recognized as valid, unwilling to return to the country of their nationality or, if they have no nationality, to the country of their habitual residence.

FORCED MIGRANT

Similar to forcibly displaced person. This report chooses to primarily use this broader term, taken originally from the World Disasters Report 2012³⁶² though used often elsewhere, to draw extra attention to the burgeoning reality that displacement from one’s home often results in migration and, as such, should be considered within similar contexts. Since many forced migrants end up on the fringes of society with tenuous, if any, protection under international law, a forced migrant is also similar to an irregular migrant and a migrant.

FORCIBLY DISPLACED PERSON

Similar to forced migrant. A person who has been forced from home, emigrated under duress or where an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or manmade causes. This term encompasses refugees, internally displaced persons, as well as people displaced by natu-

ral or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, food insecurity, or economic malfeasance.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED

PERSON (IDP)

Person or group of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

IRREGULAR MIGRANT

Someone who, owing to illegal entry or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The term applies to migrants who violate a country’s admission rules and any other person not authorized to remain in the host country (also called clandestine/illegal/undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation).

MIGRANT

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his or her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is. IOM concerns itself with migrants and migration-related issues and, in agreement with relevant states, with migrants who are in need of international migration services. At the international level, no universally accepted definition of migrant exists.

REFUGEE

A person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his

nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Art. 1(2), 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality.” Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees include persons who flee their country “because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”

1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

STATELESS PERSON

A person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law. As such, a stateless person lacks those rights attributable to national-diplomatic protection of a state, no inherent right of sojourn in the state of residence, and no right of return in case he or she travels.

UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons

VULNERABLE GROUP

Any group or sector of society that is at higher risk of being subjected to discriminatory practices, violence, natural or environmental disasters, or economic hardship than other groups within the state; any group or sector of society (such as women, children, the disabled, or the elderly) that is at higher risk in periods of conflict and crisis. ●

Annex B

The Global Architecture

In conflict and crisis settings, the terms used to describe people who are fleeing violence, insecurity, or persecution are often used interchangeably. However, in law and practice, there are important distinctions between a refugee, migrant, internally displaced person (IDP), and other categories of vulnerable people on the move.

Migrants, including those fleeing dire economic conditions or political unrest, do not have a special protected status under international law (though they are protected under general human rights law). According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), an estimated 244 million people currently live outside of their country of origin, “many having moved for a variety of reasons in which the search for protection and the search for opportunity are inextricably intertwined.”³⁶³ Migrants, especially those in irregular situations, often inhabit the most marginalized segments of society. Without legal status, they “tend to live and work in the shadows, afraid to complain, denied rights and freedoms.”³⁶⁴ These circumstances make migrants particularly vulnerable to abuse, exploitation, and trafficking. While organizations like IOM work to support states with migration and migrants themselves, there are gaps in international services for modern forced migration. However, IOM’s recent status as a “related organization” to the United Nations will allow both to coordinate more closely

on issues of migration and is thus a step in the right direction.³⁶⁵

Governments are allowed to deport migrants who arrive illegally and have not obtained the necessary authorizations and documentation. However, migrants do not forfeit their human rights at borders, even if they are crossing illegally.³⁶⁶ The United Nations has elaborated on the obligations of states for ensuring the human rights of migrants. In its Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders, OHCHR explains: “International borders are not zones of exclusion or exception for human rights obligations. States are entitled to exercise jurisdiction at their international borders, but they must do so in light of their human rights obligations. This means that the human rights of all persons at international borders must be respected in the pursuit of border control, law enforcement and other State objectives, regardless of which authorities perform border governance measures and where such measures take place.”³⁶⁷

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are perhaps in the most perilous situation, as they are typically without any effective protection or assistance. Of the almost 66 million people around the world who have been forced to leave their homes, over 40 million are IDPs.³⁶⁸ There is no international legal instrument specifically designed to protect them, nor is there a single agency or organization mandated to provide protection and assistance to IDPs. The core dilemma for IDPs is the issue of state sovereignty: “under international law, IDPs are the responsibility of their

own government, yet it is often this very government that has persecuted and displaced them.”³⁶⁹ Like all human beings, IDPs have rights that are enshrined in international human rights instruments and norms. In situations of armed conflict, moreover, they enjoy the various protections provided to civilians by international humanitarian law.³⁷⁰ *The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* codified the rights germane to IDPs, including prohibitions on physical violence, arbitrary detention, restrictions on freedom of movement, and guarantees for basic humanitarian assistance and access to education, economic opportunity, equal and fair treatment under the law, political participation, and return or resettlement. However, recourse is limited when these rights are violated, though it does exist. For example, under the African Union Convention for the Assistance and Protection of IDPs in Africa—the Kampala Convention—which came into effect in 2012, recourse is available via the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

There is an emerging debate about how to characterize those forced from home, for example, because of the effects of environmental, climate, and human-induced disasters or food insecurity and famine.³⁷¹ Existing international law and instruments designed for refugees do not explicitly provide for those who are displaced due to these factors; likewise, they do not qualify as voluntary or economic migrants. Therefore, these individuals—many of whom this report categorizes as forced migrants—do not have a clear legal status or international

protection specific to their situation. If these displaced individuals remain within their country, they would be categorized as IDPs. International human rights treaties state that they apply to everyone within the jurisdiction of the country, but the implementation of those protections is lacking. Similarly, the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* are a standard—not a law—and therefore do not hold institutions accountable for applying those agreements constructively.³⁷²

The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol guarantee certain protections for asylum seekers and refugees and create obligations for states. There are approximately 2 million asylum seekers and over 22 million refugees around the world today, over half of whom are under the age of 18. Under the fundamental principle of non-*refoulement* in international law, host governments cannot send asylum seekers or refugees back to countries where their lives and liberty would be in danger.³⁷³ Unlike political asylum, which applies to those who can prove a well-grounded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, non-*refoulement* refers to the generic repatriation of people, including refugees, into war zones and other disaster situations.³⁷⁴ Asylum seeker and refugee rights go beyond physical protection. They are due the same rights and basic assistance as any other foreigner who is a legal resident, including freedom of thought, movement, freedom from torture and degrading treatment, as well

as the right to access education, healthcare, and dignified work. However, if an asylum seeker is denied refugee status, he or she may be expelled in accordance with human rights standards.

While the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was the first effort to codify the rights of refugees, these rights have evolved over the past 65 years.³⁷⁵ The legal architecture today is piecemeal and often inadequate. Developed in the wake of World War II, it offers selective protection based on antiquated rules and is riddled with loopholes that allow countries to opt out of certain provisions. For example, despite hosting over 3 million displaced Syrians, Turkey excludes these people from the rights granted under the 1951 Convention because Turkey limits the scope of the convention’s application to European asylum seekers only.³⁷⁶ As a nonsignatory country to the 1951 convention, Bangladesh also does not consider Rohingya from Myanmar to be refugees; though they do allow for them to be provided with similar support, they are not required to do so since they are not a signatory.

Efforts at reform have been made but developed countries—where few people end up compared to the tens of millions displaced internally and regionally in developing countries—have little political incentive to change or respond to the problem collectively. The erosion of political will from Germany to the United States to the United Kingdom further weakens the application of agreements to which states have previously committed themselves.

Some experts argue that the current definitions and legal frameworks are sufficient for those forcibly displaced by circumstances that do not meet the criteria for refugee status. They argue that opening up the Convention for renegotiation or attempting to create new legal instruments to protect refugees would likely carry significant risks in the current political environment. The fear is that some states would use it as an opportunity to weaken protections for refugees or diminish their international obligations. Rather than altering the legal framework, it is the political support and will to implement it that requires attention.

Others believe that it is necessary to create a new international legal framework or expand the definition for refugees, given the legal limbo facing those forced from home by environmental, climate, and human-induced disasters or food insecurity and famine. This would afford these individuals special protections that would mirror those for refugees, considering the similarly forced nature of their emigration. Just as refugees are unable to return to their homes because of the well-founded fear of persecution or death, so too can these individuals not return due to factors beyond their control.

An outstanding issue is that any major reform will need champion governments in developed and developing regions. The future makeup of the coalition of governments pushing for reform of the system is unclear, though there is a clear need for leadership of such a coalition. ●

Annex C

The Global Compacts

The first drafts of the UN Compacts on Refugees and Migrants were published in early 2018. These draft compacts are a result of a process spurred by the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, adopted in September 2016 by 193 countries.³⁷⁷ The draft compacts represent the collective aims of the signing countries in response to the global refugee and migration crises, but each document approaches the issues via different processes and for different aims.³⁷⁸

The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) came out with its “Zero Draft” in January 2018.³⁷⁹ The compact outlines a set of commitments that consist of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and its underlining measures. Among its actionable commitments, it addresses the need to: improve support for host countries and communities, improve capacity and response, focus on data collection and dissemination, strengthen networks for refugees and cooperation among all stakeholders, broaden support and protection of refugees, use resources efficiently, and facilitate efforts for global solidarity. Those leading the GCR process are quick to note that it is not a relitigation of previous refugee-related treaties and standards; rather the GCR is a process that builds upon these existing structures.

The “Zero Draft” of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and

Regular Migration (GCM) was published in February 2018.³⁸⁰ The draft laid out 22 ambitious, actionable commitments that shared some similarities with the Global Compact on Refugees. This complementarity should be encouraged (and is the underlying reason for this joint Annex on both compacts), especially language that deals with protection issues, human trafficking, etc., that are experienced by both refugees and migrants. Ultimately, overlap is better than gaps between the two compacts. Some of the measures specific to the GCM include: aligning workforce programs with labor market needs, expanding pathways for legal migration, strengthening response to smuggling and trafficking, improving protection of unaccompanied children and other vulnerabilities, protecting the right to life, eliminating forms of discrimination, and improving the financial inclusion of migrants, to name a few. Whereas refugee-related treaties and standards have been around for decades, the GCM is widely considered to be among the first efforts to produce a seminal document on migration. It is anticipated that the GCM will produce a final document in July 2018, with a rollout conference planned for December 10 and 11 in Morocco. The Morocco conference should be viewed as similar to the Rio 1992 climate conference; in other words, Morocco is the beginning of a long process that—even decades later—could result in something akin to the 2015 Paris climate agreement.

The United States recently announced in December 2017 its

decision to pull out of the migration compact process, but continues to participate in the refugee compact process. As the only country to withdraw from the global migration compact process, the United States claimed that it “could undermine the sovereign right of the U.S. to enforce [its] immigration laws and secure [its] borders.”³⁸¹ Similar arguments have been made by other member states, though no others have withdrawn over these concerns. However, the compact itself will not be a legally binding document and therefore does not threaten state sovereignty, given that most policy changes will be bilateral or regional.³⁸² To this end, these agreements will not even attempt to decide U.S. border control policies or immigration laws; this is a supporting framework of multilateral efforts to better manage migration flows. Despite the nonbinding nature of the migration compact, issues of sovereignty remain a preoccupation in discussions.

On the other hand, there remain significant gaps within the actions set out by these drafts that warrant U.S. skepticism; these actions will require further analysis and negotiation. One such area to consider is the overlapping features between the two compacts; for example, both compacts call for provisions in migration policy that promote family reunification rather than hinder it. The negotiations have been heavily focused on security concerns; while this debate may not translate into the process directly, by opting out of the migra-

tion compact process, the United States risks losing leverage on its own national security interests. The compacts both address social security entitlements, with the migration compact calling for the “portability” of those benefits for migrants. This will require a detailed strategy for implementation that standardizes instruments to enable portable benefits. These gaps and others are important for the United States to identify and gauge what elements need to be considered in the forthcoming consultations. It is interesting to note that municipalities are actively participating in the process; however, despite the critical role of cities in the forced migration crisis, it remains to be seen how their efforts will be reconciled with the broader compact process.

The categories of migrants covered in the compact will be more difficult to amend once they are adopted, and there is a real risk that vulnerable groups will fall between the cracks. There currently exists no framework for disaster displacement, something that should be considered in the process now before it is too late to include. Similarly, weather-related displacement has been the source of much debate. At present, it is not clear whether this component should be included in the GCM because many say that it would likely warrant its own process. Whether as an official part of the compact process or not, the role of weather, climate, and other disasters in forcing people from their homes from Bangladesh to the Maldives to Haiti and beyond is undeniable

and must be part of the conversation. Efforts to address the repercussions of these types of forced migration must focus on IDPs as well as refugees that cross international boundaries. IDPs in general do not get enough attention in the compacts, which is in line with the consistent gap in attention in larger forced migration-related policies around IDPs. Origin countries and multilaterals should increasingly include IDP concerns into discussions of refugee return and resettlement.³⁸³

There is no one answer to solve the migration crisis, but recognizing conflicting interests and working toward common goals will help collectively guide future actions in governing movements yet to come.³⁸⁴ It is worth noting that the compacts will not immediately result in a treaty or international law. There is an expectation that implementation mechanisms will evolve—especially on the migration compact—partly because the compact process will be finalized before any UN internal reform process is completed. Nevertheless, multilateral strategic efforts like these are important to set the tone for international cooperation and guidelines for managing migration flows. Without such agreements, there is no incentive for improved and coordinated response to a reality that will persist and escalate, especially with demographic changes and increasing populations in both developed and developing countries.

While these are only the beginning drafts, these documents set the platform for future negotiations and dialogue. However,

without a strong leadership presence in this process, the United States loses its opportunity to direct the extent of the change and compromise in these frameworks. Participation in these compact processes will establish and maintain strong relationships that will benefit the United States in the future. It would be a strategic disadvantage to not have a voice in the compact process; especially as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia step up their leadership in the processes as the United States steps back, the United States risks losing its regional influence and opportunity to shape this global platform. This is important because both refugee and migration issues will, in some form or another and sooner rather than later, affect the United States. They may not impact the United States on the scale commensurate with its allies in Europe yet, but the need for stronger governance frameworks and solutions for migration will be precedent so long as populations are on the move. The need for collective response frameworks, data dissemination, and early-warning systems align with the U.S. national security interest. Such potential unforeseen threats cannot be addressed unilaterally, it will require international dialogue and cooperation. It’s better to be on the team now without any binding contract than miss out on an opportunity to collaborate multilaterally when and if we ever need the support that our allies are seeking. ●

Annex D

Additional Views

Matthew Reynolds,
Regional Representative for
the United States and the
Caribbean, United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)

As the UN Refugee Agency, we have some concern with the term “forced migration” and the resulting conflation of very different forms of movement that require different policy responses. Migration remains—predominantly—a voluntary choice over which most participants maintain agency. In contrast, forced displacement is driven by life-threatening factors over which the displaced have little control. There are significant differences between making a voluntary decision to live and work outside of one’s country and being forced to leave by conflict, war, or persecution. There are very few instances where persons displaced by conflict and those forced from home by environmental disasters or economic development physically coexist side by side. A policy response for one situation will rarely benefit multiple groups.

Despite the significant media attention to the movement of refugees and migrants across the Mediterranean, the vast majority of forcibly displaced people do not move far from home. Most refugees cross only one international border and remain in a neighboring host country (generally in the developing world). In contrast, economic migrants

often cross several international frontiers—and are predominantly young men, whereas most of the forcibly uprooted are women and children.

Despite the present level of forced displacement, the problem is manageable with sufficient political will. More than anything else, displaced persons need peace and security at home. Yet, addressing the root causes of conflict has proven elusive in recent decades. The new approach championed by UNHCR and involving governments, humanitarian and development agencies, international financial institutions, and the private sector, focuses on supporting host countries while enabling refugees to work, educate their children, and lead as normal a life as possible. If refugees are empowered to act as their own agents of change, the resulting benefits will accrue not only to them but to their host communities and, eventually, to their home countries. ●

Annex E

List of Entities Consulted for this Report

21st Century China Center at UC San Diego

ACCESS Detroit

African Development Bank Uganda

Alliance San Diego

American Chamber of Commerce Uganda

American Refugee Committee

Amnesty International Senegal

Arab American and Chaldean Council (ACC)

Arab American National Museum

Archdiocese of Los Angeles

Association Conseil pour L'Action (ACA)

Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (SGDD-ASAM)

Atlantic Council

Bangladesh Enterprise Institute

Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies

Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust

Bangladesh National Human Rights Commission

Baytna Syria

Better Shelter

BRAC

BRAC Institute of Governance and Development

Break Bread, Break Borders

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration at the U.S. Department of State

CARE International

CATO Institute

Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at UC San Diego

Center for Genocide Studies at the University of Dhaka

Center for Global Development

Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration at the University of Southern California

Centre Africain pour la Prévention et la Résolution des Conflits (VIVRE CAPREC)

City of Dallas

City of Detroit Development Office

Collateral Repair Project

CrossBoundary

CSIS Americas Program

CSIS Europe Program

CSIS Global Food Security Project

CSIS Human Rights Initiative

CSIS Middle East Program

CSIS Southeast Asia Program

CSIS Turkey Project

Dallas Regional Chamber of Commerce

Department for International Development of the United Kingdom

Department of Economics at UC San Diego

Department of Immigration and Border Protection of the Commonwealth of Australia

Design for Peace

Development Initiatives

Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (AFAD)

Edraak Education Initiative

Embassy of the United States Bangladesh

Embassy of the United States Mali

Embassy of the United States Senegal

Embassy of the United States Sweden

Embassy of the United States Uganda

European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)

Global Communities

Global Detroit

Graduate School of Education & Information Studies at UCLA

HOPES ECHO Education Trust Fund

Human Rights Commission of the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey

IKEA Foundation

IKEA Retail

Institute for Immigration, Globalization, and Education at UCLA

Institute of Armenian Studies at the University of Southern California

International Committee of the Red Cross

International Committee of the Red Cross Uganda

International Media Support

International Medical Corps

International Rescue Committee Dallas

International Rescue Committee San Diego

Invest Detroit

IOM Bangladesh

IOM Uganda

Jesuit Refugee Services Jordan

Jesuit Refugee Services Uganda

Justice and Development Party of Turkey (AK Parti)

KEYS Academies

Kilimo Trust

LATRA

MCE Social Capital

MENACatalyst

Midwestern Freight Systems

Migration Policy Institute

Miguel Contreras Foundation

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda

Ministry of Justice in the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden

Mosaic Family Services Dallas

National Public Radio

Nordic Welfare Centre

Norwegian Refugee Council Jordan

Norwegian Refugee Council USA

Office of the Mayor of Gaziantep

Office of the Mayor of Kilis

Office of the Mayor of the City of Dallas

Office of the Mayor of the City of Detroit

Office of the Mayor of the City of San Diego

Office of the President of the Republic of Turkey

Open Society Foundations

PATH Adult Education

Queen Rania Foundation

Refugee Subcommittee of the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey

Refugees International

Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (RADDHO)

Research Initiatives Bangladesh

SaferWorld	UNDP Jordan
Samaritas Detroit	
San Diego Regional Economic Development Council	UNDP Turkey
San Diego Union-Tribune	UNHCR Bangladesh
School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego	UNHCR Jordan
School of Law at UCLA	
Small Enterprise Assistance Funds	UNHCR Livelihoods
Southwest Solutions Adult Learning Lab	
SREO Consulting	UNHCR Senegal
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	UNHCR Turkey
Survivors of Torture International San Diego	UNHCR Uganda
Swedfund	
Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR)	UNOCHA Jordan
Swedish Delegation for the Employment of Young People and Newly Arrived Migrants (DUA)	UNRWA
Sync Accelerator	USAID Bangladesh
Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS)	USAID Mali
Syrian Economic Forum	
Tamkeen Legal Aid	USAID Senegal
Techfugees Summit	
Timbro	USAID Uganda
Turkish Red Crescent	
U.S. African Development Foundation	World Bank Uganda
U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) Detroit	World Vision Uganda
U.S. Department of State	Zaman International
UCLA Blueprint	
UN Habitat Jordan	

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ENDNOTES

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9 The term “forced migration” is used carefully and deliberately; see the earlier text box “Words Matter” for more explanation.

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