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Improving Stability in the Arab World

By Anthony H. Cordesman

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Please provide comments to acordesman@gmail.com



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There is no simple single path to stability in any part of the world, and any comments and suggestion from outside a given region or culture can easily reflect the prejudices of a different culture or seem patronizing and unfair. The fact is, however, that virtually all regions, cultures, and nations are in a constant process of change and evolution and have at least the seeds of serious instability and conflict. Even the world's most developed states have their own stability problems, and every region dominated by developing states faces critical challenges.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is no exception – even if the analysis is confined to the Arab states. Depending on how the MENA region is defined, six states are in a state of serious internal conflict: Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and the Sudan. More states are deeply divided and dealing with serious internal problems and tensions: Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain. Internal tensions and/or low-level conflicts divide Morocco and Algeria, and divide Qatar from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. Outside forces like the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran and Hezbollah have a major impact on the Levant and the Gulf.

Various forms of violent extremism, particularly Sunni and Shi'ite sectarian extremism, pose a threat to every Arab state, and many states face serious tribal, ethnic, and sectarian divisions and discrimination. At the same time, many Arab states lag badly in economic development and effective governance at a time when they are under serious population pressure, face a major youth "bulge", employment problems, and have failed to create fair and balanced patterns of income distribution to meet the needs of their peoples. Many states have failed to fund the needed expansion of their infrastructure, their educational, medical, and other services.

A few states with high levels of petroleum export income are partial exceptions to these economic failures, but these exceptions are generally more apparent than real. Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and Iran are anything but "wealthy" in terms of per capita export income. Marginal exporters like Egypt, Syria, and Yemen have never had large enough exports to qualify as wealthy. Major exporters like Iran, Iraq, Oman and Saudi Arabia have too large a population to rely on petroleum export income, and Bahrain and Kuwait have stability problems despite comparatively high per capita earnings.

As is the case throughout OPEC and most non-OPEC exporters in the world, state control over the petroleum sector and its earning power has led to distorted over-dependence on the petroleum sector, poor distribution of income, over-expansion of the state sector, and corruption. Even small states with exceptional per capita earnings, like Qatar and the UAE, are caught up in other stability problems and every petroleum dependent economy is affected by massive episodic swings in oil prices and export revenues.

Limiting the Impact of the Myth of the "Arab Nation" and Regional Solutions

Most MENA governments have approached the causes of such instability in a state of near denial for decades. Even today, they blame outside or other regional states for their security problems, they ignore or understate internal divisions, and they make little effort to measure the aspect of instability they can quantify.

They largely ignore the work of nearly two decades of UN Arab Development Reports. They lack coherent and meaningful development plans, and are slow to reform or modernize their governance and state sectors and let the pressures for stability grow and accumulate over time. One clear

example is the failure of most governments to even try to react effectively to the lessons of the political upheavals that took began in 2011. So far only one MENA state – Saudi Arabia – has attempted to develop and implement a national reform program on the scale it needs.

The Arab world is also still imprisoned by the myth of the "Arab nation." There is a real cultural affinity among Arab states – in cultural, linguistic and to some extent religious terms. At the same time, the causes of instability and development needs vary sharply by nation even among close neighbors. Annex A to this report provides a summary "scorecard" illustrating just how serious these differences are, and it makes it brutally clear that there is no Arab nation – or common basis for dealing with instability in the Arab world. It is equally clear that trying to export the responsibility for instability to other countries, or explain failures with conspiracy theories has done the Arab world immense damage and represents a series of major failures in leadership.

Nations – their leaders, military, technocrats, and intellectuals – must take responsibility for themselves. Organizations like the Arab League are decades away from being able to effectively address the relatively few common causes of instability that do lend themselves to collective action, and that have been successfully addressed in other regions by outside organizations like the EU and NATO. No mass of donors or mythical body like the International Community is going to solve any MENA country's problems from the outside, fund and manage the effort required, or work around the failures in national leadership and governance.

Even far more narrow definitions of common interest like the Gulf Cooperation Council have never moved beyond a few relatively narrow areas of economic and military cooperation, and national differences has long nearly paralyzed progress in creating standardized military forces, integrated operations and systems, and common training facilities. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Oman have limited security cooperation since the GCC's founding, and tensions between royal families have create problems like the current isolation of Qatar. The GCC may be far more real in terms of addressing internal stability than the Arab League, but it is a long way from being effective and its security cooperation – to the extent it exists – is heavily dependent on outside support from USCENTCOM and the U.S. military.

As for even broader searches for unity – like reform of the United Nations, such reforms may or may not be desirable. The Security Council's long history of doing too little may or may not be worse for Arab states than allowing the General Assembly to do too much. It does allow Arab states to give the Palestinians a kind of ineffective support at a time that Israel is more and more forceful on the ground. At the same time, it disguises the lack of any effective Palestinian leadership and movement, and prospects for effective Arab unity in supporting the Palestinians and a move towards a credible peace progress.

Like the over-ambitious and unrealistic calls for regional cooperation in virtually every other part of the world – and the even sillier search for universal benefits through "globalism" – the "Arab nation," and efforts like unifying incompatible states or developing some form of Arab socialism may be political unavoidable. Taking them seriously, however, does far more harm than good. Arab states, and the entire MENA region, would benefit from far more most effects at focusing on realm world options for cooperation. Pretending to make a myth a reality at best distracts from the actions that offer serious progress.

Coping with the Broader Causes of Instability

There are many areas – like trade agreements, labor mobility, sharing of counterterrorism data, transportation and pipeline systems, water and power, sharing of educational standards and materials, border security and customs, communications and Internet systems where Arab and MENA states can reach productive regional and sub-regional agreements, but there are four additional areas where a focus on the wrong or inadequate forms of regional cooperation can also do more harm than good.

The current approach to the Palestinian issue now does both the Palestinians and Arab states more harm than good. It is brutally clear that the Palestinian issue is not the chief or even a key cause of instability in the MENA region. Religious extremism is far more divisive and destabilizing. North Africa focuses on internal and local causes of instability. The Levant faces both far more serious internal national causes of instability and must now deal with a divided Syria and uncertain Lebanon. The Gulf states– as well as Jordan, Syria, and Iraq – face far more serious outside pressure from Iran as well as separate internal causes of divisiveness. Many Arab Gulf states provide rhetorical support and aid to the Palestinians but tacitly work with Israel to deal with the threat posed by Iran.

The real-world situation is that Arab rhetoric does nothing to prevent Israeli hardliners from steadily creating new facts on the ground while a divided Palestinian movement with two "sub-states" in Gaza and the West Bank, and weak and ineffective leadership is incapable of making a convincing case that it is a credible partner for a two-state solution. The lack of Arab pressure on Israel is directly tied to the lack of a unified and credible Palestinian option, and the credibility of a two-state solution is steadily moving towards the vanishing point. Only far more unified Arab efforts to forge a credible Palestinian option as a peace partner could change this situation, and the prospects for such an effort seem negligible.

Denial of the reality that Islamic extremism is a key regional threat limits cooperation in counterterrorism and reduces efforts to meet the challenge to largely national efforts. A number of Arab states have made real progress in cooperating in some aspects of counterterrorism, but mostly more sweeping efforts are largely hollow political facades. Far too many states also are unwilling to openly come to grips with the threats posed by Sunni and Shi'ite extremism, and the need to modernize their social structure and economies to deal with the realities of a modern global economy.

Meeting the threat of religious extremism requires labeling that extremism as a threat to development and progress, and as much unity as possible in ensuring that the legitimate character of Islam is clearly identified, and extremism is openly identified and rejected. This does not mean rejecting legitimate moderate Islamic political movements, but it does mean openly confronting ideological extremism as a threat, creating tolerance of different Islamic sects, and focusing on future development needs. Here, Saudi Arabia has recently led in making the kind of social changes that are needed in a given country.

The creation of grossly overambitious regional security alliances or the hollow shell of more functional sub-regional security agreements – coupled to the role of outside powers – undermines Arab security at both the regional and national level. Trying to create hollow alliances with the maximum possible number of members does little more than discredit Arab unity and create something closer to "farce" than "force." The recent Saudi efforts of this kind are examples of such efforts.

There are many areas where security agreements between Arab states at a local or sub-regional level could have real merit: An Algerian-Morocco or Egypt-Libya agreement are cases in point. The Gulf Cooperation Council reflects a real need for collective security – both in dealing with Iran and terrorism/extremism – but it cannot work if the key elements like integration, interoperability, standardization, and common facilities and training are at best half implemented. Turning the GCC into a face that disguises major differences between Saudi Arabia and Oman, the isolation and embargo of Qatar, and inadequate links to Kuwait helps undercut the one real-world Arab movement towards effective sub-regional cooperation.

Overdependence on outside powers and a confusion of the volume of arms imports with military effectiveness make Arab states far more vulnerable than they should be. At present, the Arab North African states are far too divided to have any meaningful form of security cooperation or work with Europe and the United States to gain meaningful outside support. The Levant is equally divided and now split into dependence on the United States or Russia with Iran and Turkey playing an increasing role. As noted above, the GCC has increasingly become a Saudi-UAE alliance, with Qatar isolated, Oman on the margins, Bahrain dependent on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait partly isolated, and key potential partners like Iraq and Jordan left outside the alliance.

The MENA region is scarcely the only such case, but building facades almost inevitably means never building the real thing.

Instability Must Be Dealt with One Nation at a Time

The sharp difference in the causes of instability between individual MENA states in virtually every area is one of the most striking single aspects of instability in the MENA region. As noted earlier, Annex A to this report provides a summary "scorecard" illustrating just how serious these differences are. Four other studies that address these differences in even more depth include:

- *Stability in the MENA Region: The Range of Short and Long-Term Causes Region, April 2018*: a graphic update of the trends and differences by MENA country at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/stability-middle-east-range-short-and-long-term-causes>
- *Stability in the MENA Region: The Range of Forces Shaping Stability, Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Volume One: Regional Trends April 2016*, a comparative survey of the key quantitative civil factors and trends shaping stability and instability in the region. This volume is available on the CSIS website at http://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/160419_MENA_Stability_II_Country_01.pdf.
- *Stability in the MENA Region: The Range of Forces Shaping Stability, Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Volume One: Regional Trends April 2016*, a comparative survey of the key quantitative civil factors and trends shaping stability and instability in the region. This volume is available on the CSIS website at http://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/160419_MENA_Stability_II_Country_01.pdf.
- *Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Volume Two: Country-by-Country Trends, April 2016*: a country-by-country risk assessment and survey of the key quantitative civil factors and trends shaping stability and instability in the region. This volume is available on the CSIS website at http://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/160419_MENA_Stability_I_Regional_0.pdf.

Many of the causes of instability are political and ideological or involve other aspects of instability that cannot be quantified. It is clear from Annex A and the other reports referenced above, however, that the differences between nation states are so great in every aspect of instability that they must be addressed primarily on a national level. Talking about an "Arab nation" and regional solutions does have merit in specific areas, but in most parameters, it is simply analytically absurd.

Accordingly, any effort to address the problems involved must focus on the mix of problems, priorities, and available solutions in given Arab states. It is also clear that there is no one priority area. All the major sets of causes interact and attempts to deal with them individually and without concern for other causes will inevitably fail to meet all of the key risks and pressures in every country in the MENA region.

Focusing on the Positive

These are easy issues for an outsider to raise. The practical problem for any organization or government that attempts to deal with the national causes of instability, however, is that exposing national issues and weaknesses is politically embarrassing, can be used by extremist and hardline opposition movements, and may trigger hostile ideological reactions. Few MENA governments are transparent or encourage transparency, and some actively discourage it.

There are several possible ways to avoid or minimize such reasons:

Commission outside studies and reports. It is far easier to deal with an on outside report and set of negative comments or data. Such reports or plans do not commit a government or organization and can be used far more easily. This requires some kind of "firewall" so it is clear that the report is not a product of the sponsor. Contracting with an outside group or working with an international organization like UNDP or the World Bank offers a way of preserving such a distance.

Providing a wide range of comparisons that do not highlight any given, country's problems. Reports, studies, and plans that make it clear that all countries have problems, that highlight recent progress where it has actually occurred, provide comparisons with other regions to show that the Arab world is not unique, and keep criticism in perspective, allow a focus on the national issues that are key problems, analysis of the areas where broader regional cooperation might actually help, and avoid "spotlighting" a given country. At the same time, countries that are broadly recognized as problem countries – like the Assad regime in Syria – can be addressed more directly.

Focus on the solution and not the problem. The purpose of such exercises is not to highlight the problem but show there are credible solutions. Making it clear that governments have good, credible options, and can take an evolutionary approach is a key way to defuse the critical aspects of an analysis.

Where possible, highlight cases where a given approach affects several countries: showing that a given problem and/or solution affects several countries. Most plans and solutions become more politically palatable when they are shown to affect many countries.

Bring in government and opposition voices from the start or as soon as possible. The best-case option is working directly with a given government where this is possible, and the government involved is willing to face its problems and accept reasonable levels of

criticism. In general, however, it will often be best to bring in government and opposition voices on an ex-officio basis. This will help make it clear that the effort is not an attack on a given government and does not ignore internal divisions and can often be a source of real world expertise that outsiders lack.

Bring in a range of Arab expertise. Outside or foreign experts can help, but the key to success will be showing that calls for change and reform are supported by Arab experts with Arab cultural backgrounds. Once again, the Arab Development reports provide illustrations of such efforts, international organizations like UNDP and the World Bank, and individual Arab experts and consultants are all a way of providing such expertise.

All these steps do involve some form of compromise with a purely academic or objective effort. They also, however, reflect the reality that the goal is to actually solve problems and not simply highlight them. It is also clear that simply offering criticism almost never works.

Goals Are Not Plans, and Only Plans and Actual Implementation Really Count

Another key way to accentuate the positive aspects of efforts to reduce instability – and make real progress – is to develop actual plans that can credibly be implemented. There is little or no purpose in setting forth yet another wish list of goals. Study after study has ended with such efforts and in being largely ignored or in setting unrealistic or poorly prioritized objectives. A real-world effort must:

Actually present a plan, not simply goals. No one in any region needs more statements of goals that do not provide credible plans with credible actions, resources, budgets, timelines, and measures of effectiveness to implement them. It is important to set the right goals, but far too many past efforts have set goals without ever showing how they can actually be met.

Concentrate on near term objectives as well as longer term goals. Focusing on near term actions and progress, and the art of the possible also reduces the tendency to create impossible expectations and demands for resources or outside aid.

Avoid efforts that focus on a small part of a problem. Fixing a given narrow problem effectively dodges the real issue. Narrowly focused project aid, military assistance, and humanitarian aids tend to focus on band aids rather than meaningful solutions. No nation can do everything at once, but efforts that only address narrow parts of key national needs effectively defer meaningful efforts rather than make real progress.

Avoid seeking unrealistic, support, aid and solutions from the outside. Far too many assessments of solutions to reducing instability seek impossible levels of security and economic aid from the outside. Such aid is almost never actually forthcoming, and appealing to an international community with no known address, aid conferences where nations pledge without making real commitments, and/or placing unrealistic demands on neighboring or outside state does not help. It is far better to focus on real world options – most of which will ultimately have to be large self-financed – and make actual progress.

Don't make best case assumptions: Far too many efforts lay the groundwork for rejection or failure by making best case, rather than real-world assumptions.

Reflect key national needs for political compromise and stability. Stability does not come from setting national goals that do not address key ethnic, sectarian, tribal, regional, and

other differences, or key parts of the population that are seriously disadvantaged. One key – and often critical – failure of the IMF, UNDP, World Bank, and of national plans as well – is the failure to address the need to provide solutions and compromises that recognize the key divisions in a given country rather call for national actions that key factions cannot support.

Avoid extreme or adversarial solutions. Hardline solutions to problems like terrorism that do not address the causes or that label significant amounts of the population as enemies – or that attack outside or foreign states without offering some path towards diplomacy do more to sustain instability than reduce it.

Once again, the goal should be to create real-world and achievable progress where government can accept the reality of the problem, and the credibility of the solution.

ANNEX A

Instability in the MENA Region, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Key Conflict States: A Comparative Score Card

HOST COUNTRY NATIONAL BUILDING IS THE SECOND HALF OF VICTORY	2
MEASURING THE LEVEL OF NEED: THE LIMITS OF METRICS.....	2
BUT, WARNING SIGNALS ARE WARNING SIGNALS	3
ASSESSING THE "SCORES" FOR MENA AND OTHER CONFLICT COUNTRIES	3
COMPARING WORLD BANK GOVERNANCE RATINGS	5
TABLE ONE: COMPARING WORLD BANK GOVERNANCE RATINGS	6
COMPARING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION, URBANIZATION, AND SECURITY BURDEN CHALLENGES	7
TABLE TWO: COMPARING HDI, CORRUPTION, URBANIZATION, AND SECURITY BURDEN CHALLENGES	7
COMPARING POPULATION PRESSURE: 1950-2050.....	8
TABLE THREE: COMPARING POPULATION PRESSURE: 1950-2050	10
COMPARING THE YOUTH "BULGE".....	11
TABLE FOUR: COMPARING THE YOUTH "BULGE"	12
COMPARING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES	13
TABLE FIVE: COMPARING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES	15
COMPARING EDUCATIONAL, DEPENDENCY, AND MEDICAL CHALLENGES.....	16
TABLE SIX: COMPARING EDUCATIONAL, SUPPORT, AND MEDICAL CHALLENGES.....	18
COMPARING ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY: TABLE SEVEN	19
TABLE SEVEN: COMPARATIVE ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY.....	20

If the U.S. is to fight extremism and instability in the Middle East, North Africa, and other key conflict countries in the developing world, it must address the civil dimension of war as well as the military one. "Hearts and minds" may seem to be a cliché, but battle for security and stability does involve religion, politics, governance, and economics as well as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Half of the war and half of a successful strategy must focus on the ability of "failed" government to win the trust and support of their peoples.

"Nation building" has become a remarkably unpopular concept in U.S. policy circles since U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is important to note, however, that the fact that U.S. failed to "transform" Afghanistan and Iraq – just as it failed to transform Vietnam – does not mean that it can ignore the reality that military force and security assistance can only deal with half the problem – and that military force and security assistance only become useful *after* a given state's stability has degenerated to the point where there is civil war or a major security challenge.

Host Country National Building is the Second Half of Victory

A successful effort to limit terrorism, extremism, and civil conflict must be a civil-military effort and requires a true "whole of government approach." It is also clear that "nation building" does not have to involve massive U.S. spending or U.S. effort to rapidly transform a nation's political system, governance, economy, and social structure. The key elements of successful nation building are almost always ones where a nation needs to make its own systems effective. They require internal reforms rather than major outside expertise and resources. In fact, it is clear that the U.S. cannot really help a host country government that cannot help itself.

What is required are U.S. efforts to help nations make enough progress in their own way to go from being states that fail their peoples to becoming states that meet their people's needs and expectations. As we should have learned in Vietnam, no meaningful military victory can be won by a government that does not win – or maintain – the support of its own people.

One way or another, the challenges posed by terrorism and extremism – and the other factors driving civil conflict – must be dealt with through successful host country "nation building" at the civil level. *Prevention* requires a primary focus on such civil challenges. *Actual conflict* requires a focus on counterterrorism or military activity, but no one can really win a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency struggle without creating civil support for the government or the moderate factions that the U.S. backs.

If the fighting is successful, *conflict termination* and *lasting stability* do still require effective security forces, but the key focus shifts to the civil dimension. Failing to deal with the forces dividing a nation at the political, governance, and economic level will often mean a return to violence and the eventual triumph of extremist elements.

Measuring the Level of Need: The Limits of Metrics

The need for civil reform is all too clear in the MENA region and in the conflict countries where the U.S. is now providing military and counterterrorism support. The current prognosis is all too grim for all too many such countries. Their performance in every key civil dimension ranges from poor to dismal. The problems that studies by the World Bank and UNDP warned could lead to a crisis in the early 2000s have deteriorated steadily since that time – driven in part by local conflicts, the broad series of political upheavals that began in 2011, and the roughly 50% crash in petroleum export revenues that began in 2014.

There is no set of metrics that can reliably summarize the level of civil stability or instability in any given state. Ideology and other "intangibles" have a very real impact, and metrics and scoring of such factors are often lacking or impossible. "Unquantifiables" are key factors: the divisiveness of religion, ethnic and tribal tensions, the quality and integrity of the politics and governance driving popular support, and the repressiveness of a regime on its peoples.

Public opinion polls can provide some indicators as to the depth of religious, sectarian, ethnic, and tribal tension – and as to the level of support for the government or moderate factions – but, they are uncertain tools at best. Many countries do not allow meaningful or honest polling and polling specific factions to measure the level of anger or tension is often difficult and unreliable, and, as the Arab Spring showed in 2011, a single catalytic event can radically shift the entire balance of a nation's stability. Ideology and other "intangibles" have a very real impact.

Similarly, there are many areas where international statistics are unreliable, are not reported, or are

not comparable. Nations often report better figures than are credible for political or propaganda reasons – although they also sometimes exaggerate problems to get aid or outside support. The lack of international statistical standardization poses equally serious problems. Various elements of the U.S. government, for example, can produce different estimates of GNP and other economic factors.

These differences grow when one examines the differences in the estimates of different countries, NGO, and international organizations. Consistency in estimate can also be a warning that a wide range of estimates are based on the same source – which may or may not be supported by meaningful and timely data collection. Transparency is often lacking as to how estimates were made, when and with what level of certainty, and the motives behind given estimates are often shaped by self-interest. To paraphrase Mark Twain, "figures don't lie, but liar's figure."

But, Warning Signals Are Warning Signals

There are, however, metrics that clearly do act as warnings that given governments face major problems in terms of meeting the needs of their peoples and dealing with key causes of instability. It is clear from these metrics – and from the nature of the countries that have bad scores – that they can provide warning of the level of civil success or failure in a given state, its vulnerability to terrorism and extremism, and the level of problems it faces in achieving medium- to long-term stability.

The level of coverage and reporting of these metrics does vary sharply by country. Some potentially critical metrics receive little credible reporting because they are so embarrassing. It is often clear that a given country is reporting impossible or highly improbably data. It is also clear that individual nations differ so much – even in the case of neighboring states – that no one set of data will provide a clear warning that a given state is a "failed state," and at the point where its stability may suddenly collapse, or serious civil conflict may begin. As a result, assessments in depth need to be made on a country-by-country basis – using all the data available on that particular country – rather than concentrating on the limited areas where enough data are comparable and have a broad level credibility.

Even then, there is no magic correlation between such metrics and civil war, high levels of terrorism, or insurgent threats. No one metric dominates, and exogenous factors like leadership, religion, political protests, or a random event can trigger a sudden shift from apparent stability to political turmoil, internal conflict, or collapse of the state. *But*, it is often possible to detect where the pressure is high. It is rarely possible to predict when – if ever – such pressure will explode.

Moreover, the following comparisons do show that some countries perform far worse than others in a wide range of critical respects. They highlight governments that fail their peoples on a broad level and show all too clearly that the forces that have helped lead to violence in nations like Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan Somalia, the Sudans, Syria, and Yemen have elements in common.

Assessing the "Scores" for MENA and Other Conflict Countries

Several conclusions emerge from the data. One clear conclusion is that there is no single metric which dominates even the areas of unrest and tension that can be quantified, and that any effort to create a summary score – or to tie given metrics to some prediction of a nation's future – cannot

have any analytic validity. Many of the metrics presented do provide important warning signals. They show just how critical the civil dimension of instability really is. They also show that any effort to bring stability and security from the outside that ignores the need of a host country to engage in effective nation building is simply unbelievably stupid.

History has shown that outside transformational nation building efforts are almost certain to fail. However, it has also shown that states that fail their peoples in many critical areas cannot win their trust and support, and that such failures make the defeat of extremist, terrorism and insurgent movements vastly more difficult – if not impossible. Decoupling the use of force in a given country from an effective host country effort at nation building makes lasting stability and security tenuous at best and is often the prelude to new rounds of violence and civil war. The use of military force and counterterrorism is often critical: there is no stability without security. The civil side, however, is at least acritical: there is no security without stability.

Metrics like those presented in this study must, however, be tied to narrative analysis and examination and kept in the proper proportion and perspective. They too are only half the story. Once again, they must be tied to an examination of religious and ideological issues, national politics, leadership, and conflict social values that cannot be quantified

A second key conclusion is that the problems that have led to today's extremist and terrorist threats, and the political and social upheavals in many MENA and South Asia countries are likely to continue for at least a decade and possibly two. The level of many of the pressures shown in these Tables will not diminish for more than a decade. There is little reason to assume that more countries will have leadership that is dramatically more successful than in the past. And, moving entire nations and societies is a slow task at best and one that can often lead to major regressions as a result of political upheavals, failed or extreme revolutions, terrorist and insurgent threats, and open civil war.

Finally, the United States needs to take a very clear look at the mix of different problems reflected in the data that apply to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria – three countries where it now is deploying combat forces or playing a major "train and assist" role in aiding its military and counterterrorism forces. Correlation may not be causation, but it is all too clear that virtually all such states are "failed states" in terms of the past and usually the current quality of host country governance and civil efforts.

This is a clear warning that focusing only on the security dimension is a recipe for expensive failure, that U.S. efforts to link aid and support to host country civil progress and reforms are critical, and that there will often be little point in initiating or sustaining U.S. security efforts where the host country is incapable or unwilling to make its own efforts in nation building. Strategic triage is already vital in a region and world with so many areas of instability the U.S. must put its resources in countries that show they are willing and committed to helping themselves.

Comparing World Bank Governance Ratings

The World Bank is one key source of such metrics. It makes detailed annual assessments of the quality of governance in 215 of the countries in the world. These rankings are not tied to given political systems, ideologies, or views of human rights. They are shown in **Table One** – and are scored from 0 to 100 – the lowest to highest performance. They include an overall national ranking, and then a breakdown in five key elements, including three – political stability and violence, rule of law, and corruption – that are key measures of overall stability.¹

As is the case with all of the Tables in this report, nations with low scores in a critical area are marked with a yellow background. Countries that appear to have a good rating, but where that data are almost certainly grossly false are also marked in yellow.

As Table One shows, the 22 countries in the Middle East and North Africa had overall governance scores in 2016 that ranged from a low of 1.92 (Libya) to a high of 87.10 (Israel). The scores of five other conflict or failed states – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, the Sudan, and South Sudan - - ranged from 0.00 for Somalia to a still dismal 27.40 for Pakistan. In contrast, the three countries shown as controls in this and the following Tables had a range of scores. Japan led with a score of 95.7. The U.S. had a score of 89.9, and a rapidly developing China had a score of 68.3.

This range of scores helps illustrate the level of risk in a given country, and the relative need for some form of "nation building." It is striking to look at the differences between the overall ranking for a given country and its scores for political stability and violence, rule of law, corruption, public voice and accountability, and regulatory quality. The ranking for three critical US warfighting countries are particularly low: Afghanistan is only 8.17, Iraq is only 9.13, and Syria is a truly dismal 2.88. Even the highest scored countries have some area of weakness, and many MENA countries have an exceptionally low score for political stability and violence, while the score for "Other Conflict" states is universally dismal.

Corruption – which polls show is one of the most critical single metrics of how many citizens distrust their government and feel it has failed – is another key warning signal. Rule of Law is another warning of a "failed state," and – more controversially – so is Public Voice and Accountability. Here, the World Bank sometimes seems to have only a limited understanding of the level of censorship and activity by internal security forces.

It is important to note that the key countries where the U.S. is now fighting and providing major aid and support – Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria –not only have some of the worst scores and rankings of any country in the world in the areas shown in Table One, but this is also true of all of the Tables and scores shown in this analysis. Correlation is not causation, but it is obvious that some of the most violent and extreme countries in the region and the world are among the worst performing. They are "failed states" in far too many areas, and examples of failed secularism as well.

Table One: Comparing World Bank Governance Ratings
 (Percentile Rank is rank compared to all
 countries in the world. 0 is lowest. 100 is the highest)

	Government Effectiveness	Political Stability & Absence of Violence	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption	Public Voice & Account-	Regulatory Quality	
Maghreb							
Algeria	35.10		13.33	20.67	28.37	24.63	10.58
Libya	1.92		3.33	1.92	0.96	9.85	0.48
Morocco	50.48		34.76	54.81	50.48	28.08	49.04
Tunisia	49.04		19.05	56.25	55.29	54.68	38.94
W. Sahara	–		–	–	–	–	–
Levant							
Egypt	22.12		8.57	35.58	35.10	18.23	24.52
Gaza	–		–	–	–	–	–
Israel	87.50		11.43	84.62	78.37	71.43	87.02
Jordan	59.13		26.67	68.27	64.42	26.60	55.29
Lebanon	37.98		7.14	24.52	17.79	31.03	43.75
Syria	2.88		0.00	4.33	1.92	2.96	4.33
Palestinian West Bank	35.58		4.76	32.69	26.92	22.66	56.25
Gulf							
Bahrain	73.08		11.90	67.79	62.50	12.32	76.44
Iran	47.12		17.14	16.35	31.73	5.42	6.73
Iraq	9.13		2.86	3.85	4.33	14.78	8.65
Kuwait	52.88		40.95	58.65	51.44	28.57	49.52
Oman	55.77		68.57	68.75	62.98	20.20	71.63
Qatar	79.33		81.90	77.88	81.25	20.69	73.08
Saudi Arabia	60.58		27.62	64.90	59.62	3.94	54.81
UAE	91.83		71.43	75.00	82.69	19.20	82.69
Yemen	2.40		0.48	7.21	2.88	7.88	12.50
Other Conflict							
Afghanistan	8.17		1.43	2.40	4.81	16.26	13.46
Pakistan	27.40		0.95	23.56	23.56	27.09	29.33
Somalia	0.00		1.90	0.00	1.44	1.48	0.96
Sudan	6.25		4.29	8.17	2.40	3.45	4.81
South Sudan	0.48		2.38	0.96	0.48	6.40	2.88
Controls							
U.S.	89.9		69.5	90.4	89.9	81.3	88.5
Europe/EU	–		–	–	–	–	–
China	68.3		27.1	43.8	50.0	4.9	44.2
Japan	95.7		82.4	89.4	91.3	79.3	85.1

Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues and .World Bank Governance Indicators, 2015, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>.

Comparing Human Development, Corruption, Urbanization, and Security Burden Challenges

The second table expands the coverage provided by the World Bank's governance indicators. The first column provides a UN ranking of overall human development – the extent to which a given state meets key human development needs – for 188 countries. This time it is "1" that marks the highest score. MENA scores vary extremely sharply, ranging from Yemen (only 168 out of 188) to Israel (19 versus 18 for the U.S. and 0 for Japan.) The "Other Conflict" countries range from 147th to 176th – all in the bottom quarter of the world's nations.ⁱⁱ

The second column shows the rate of urbanization. Urbanization may not seem an indicator of stress initially, but the level of urbanization has increased strikingly in the developing world since 1970, and high percentages now indicate a serious strain on housing, infrastructure, market-drive jobs, and unemployment; a significant departure from previous social norms; and pressure that push once stable sects, ethnicities, tribes etc. in new ways for the first time.ⁱⁱⁱ

The third column shows the Transparency International ranking of corruption by country in a scoring of 176 countries. Transparency International examines a wide range of such estimates and does explain its rankings in detail.^{iv} Its rankings go from "1" as least corrupt to 176 as the world's most corrupt. MENA countries range from 19 for Israel (very good) to 168 for Yemen (terrible). All the "Other Conflict" countries have terrible scores, with Somalia reaching the bottom at 176. As is the case in many other categories, the scores for three U.S. warfighting countries are also low: Afghanistan is 169, Iraq is 166, and Syria is 173.

The fourth and fifth columns show the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) estimate of the burden of military spending during 2014-2016. Manpower numbers are generally only a marginal burden in nations that have chronic youth unemployment, but total military spending is often a major burden on the economy and prospects for development. Afghanistan, Iraq, Oman, and Saudi Arabia have been spending at unaffordable levels. Egypt's spending is only affordable because it does not count U.S. aid and understates actual costs. All of the other countries marked in yellow have too high a burden compared to control states.

Table Two: Comparing HDI, Corruption, Urbanization, and Security Burden Challenges

	UN Human Development Rank (of 188) 2016	CIA % of Urbanization Rank (of 176)	Transparency International Corruption % of GDP 2014-2016	IISS Military Burden 2016 Active Personnel Uniformed	
Maghreb					
Algeria	83	74	108	5.6-6.3	130
Libya	47	80	170	-	-
Morocco	123	63	90	3.2-3.4	196
Tunisia	97	68	75	2.0-2.5	78
W. Sahara	-	-	-	-	-
Levant					
Egypt	111	45	198	1.9-2.2	439
Gaza	-	-	-	-	-
Israel	19	94	28	6.1-7.5	177
Jordan	86	88	57	4.4-4.5	101
Lebanon	76	88	136	2.7-3.5	60
Syria	149	59	173	-	-

Palestinian West Bank	–	73	–	–	–
Gulf					
Bahrain	47	91	70	4.0-4.9	8
Iran	69	76	131	3.6-3.9	523
Iraq	121	73	166	8.5-12.9	64
Kuwait	51	98	75	2.9-3.8	16
Oman	52	86	64	11.8-15.4	43
Qatar	33	99	31	2.4-2.9	12
Saudi Arabia	38	85	62	8.9-12.7	227
UAE	42	88	24	–	63
Yemen	168	(39?)	170	–	20
Other Conflict					
Afghanistan	164	31	169	14.0-16.2	171
Pakistan	147	41	116	2.6-2.7	654
Somalia	176	44	176	–	20
Sudan	170	36	170	–	244
South Sudan	175	24	175	2.9-8.5	185
Controls					
U.S.	18	82	18	3.3-3.5	1,347
Europe/EU	–	–	–	1.4-1.4	249
China	79	59	79	1.2-1.3	2,183
Japan	20	94	20	1.0-1.0	247

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from CIA *World Factbook*, accessed August 30, 2017, Tables 8, 11 and Dashboard 2 to *UN Human Development Report 2016*, and World Bank “Ease of Doing Business Indicators, 2016,” <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>.

Comparing Population Pressure: 1950-2050

Table Three draws on population estimates from the International Data Base (IDB) of the U.S. Census Bureau. Its estimates track broadly with UN and other estimates, but many countries have not held a current census or any real census, and those that have done so recently have discovered that their previous estimates were too low.^v

The data in Table Three shows that the MENA region is experiencing population growth at levels that have become a demographic nightmare. Only Israel and a handful of the wealthiest Gulf oil exporters have been able to keep up with the education, health, water, and other infrastructure demands of explosive growth in a region which has limited water and large areas of desert.

The fourth column, which shows the times the population multiplied between 1950 and 2017, helps explain the rapid rate of urbanization and high migration rates in countries with limited arable land and water, and many of the countries listed are conflict countries already or have had major political upheavals. The fifth column, which shows estimated population growth between 2017-2050, shows that many countries will experience growing pressure for more than the next 30 years unless they make massive progress towards development despite significant estimated declines in their birth rate.

The failure of virtually all MENA and “Other Conflict” countries to develop effective birth control programs – driven in part by religion – is one of the most serious single destabilizing forces affecting their societies, economies, and ability to govern effectively. As the next chart shows, it has already created a massive "youth bulge" and unemployment program – which led to housing, services, education, and medical problems in many countries – and done much to make the population vulnerable to extremism.

Table Three: Comparing Population Pressure: 1950-2050

	Population in Millions		Growth in Times		Growth in Percent	
	1950	2017 2050	1950-2017	2017-2050		
Maghreb						
Algeria	8.9	41.0	55.4	X4.6		35%
Libya	0.961	6.7	9.0	X7.0		34%
Morocco	9.3	34.0	43.0	X3.7		26%
Tunisia	3.5	11.4	12.78	X3.3		11%
W. Sahara	0.091	0.603	1.2	X6.6		99%
Levant						
Egypt	21.2	97.0	168.9	X4.6		74%
Gaza	0.245	1.8	3.1	X7.3		72%
Israel	1.3	8.3	12.4	X6.4		49%
Jordan	0.561	10.2	15.6	X18.2		53%
Lebanon	1.4	6.2	5.6	X4.4		-10%
Syria	3.5	18.0	31.2	X5.1		73%
West Bank	0.6771	2.7	4.2	X3.5		56%
Gulf						
Bahrain	0.114	1.4	1.8	X12.3		29%
Iran	16.4	82.0	98.6	X5.0		20%
Iraq	5.2	37.1	76.5	X7.1		106%
Kuwait	0.1456	2.9	3.9	X20.0		34%
Oman	0.489.	3.4	5.4	X7.0		59%
Qatar	0.025	2.4	2.6	X92.0		13%
Saudi Arabia	3.9	28.6	40.3	X7.3		41%
UAE	0.72	6.1	8.0	X8.4		31%
Yemen	4.8	28.0	46.1	X5.8		65%
Other Conflict						
Afghanistan	8.2	34.1	63.8	X4.2		87%
Pakistan	40.4	204.9	290.8	X5.1		42%
Somalia	2.4	11.0	22.6	X4.6		105%
Sudan	6.5	5.2	7.6	X-0.2		46%
South Sudan	2.7	13.0	26.8	X4.8		58%
Controls						
U.S.	151.9	326.6	398.3	X2.2		22%
Europe/EU	378.3	513.8	506.9	X1.4		-1.3%
China	562.5	1,379.3	1,301.6	X2.5		-9%
Japan	83.8	126.5	107.2	X1.5		-15%

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB, accessed August 30, 2017), <https://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>

Comparing the Youth "Bulge"

Table Four uses the International Database of the U.S. Census Bureau to quantify how the pressure of the “youth bulge” of young men and women from birth to 24 years of age will affect given nations over the next quarter of a century. Table Four then compares such growth with UN estimates of current youth unemployment. The numbers are necessarily uncertain, but the data for birth to 14 years show that there already is massive regional pressure on every aspect of governance, infrastructure, services, and employment throughout the MENA region, and that such pressure is critical in Afghanistan and the other conflict states.

This pressure would be dangerously destabilizing even for states that had no other sources of instability, but it is occurring in states which do have many other sources of instability. As a result, it may well trigger new waves of popular unrest and instability like those that occurred in 2011. Other work by the World Bank also shows that these pressures are notably higher in the MENA area and “Other Conflict” states than in other developing regions – although the problem is all too real in most of the developing world.

The UN unemployment data also sharply understates the existing level of problems with youth unemployment. This is partly the result of the fact that governments do not want to report the real level of their nations’ problems. It also, however, is the result of the fact that the figures generally only include direct unemployment.

They do not reflect disguised unemployment where low-paid or unproductive jobs pay but make little or no increase in productive output. They do not reflect massive waste of scarce national resources on state owned enterprises and government jobs that have little or no productive output by consuming major investment resources and wasting educational capacity and infrastructure support. Experts often estimate that the real-world combination of direct and disguised youth unemployment makes the true percentages some 50% to 100% larger than the UN figures for youth unemployment reported in column seven.

In many cases in poorer states, gross government overemployment has also reached the saturation level. There simply is no more money to fund government employment even for better educated youth. This waste of resources also interacts with corruption and nepotism, and the resulting favoritism and misallocation of resources exacerbates religious, ethnic, tribal, and regional tensions – problems likely to grow steadily worse as the waves of new entrants to the labor market increase over time.

Arguably, such pressures help explain why many opponents of given governments are relatively well-educated and well-off compared to the nation’s poor. The poor face a life of working in economies where merit does not determine career success, and which are filled with empty dead-end jobs. The truly poor must focus on getting any form of income simply to survive. At the same time, they are all too visible to those who have enough resources to protest or turn towards extremism and who have their own personnel motives to reject their governments and sometimes turn to extremist and revolutionary causes.

Table Four: Comparing the Youth "Bulge"

	0-14 Years		15-19 Years		20-24 Years	
	Millions	% of Total	Millions	% of Total	Millions	% of Total
Maghreb						
Algeria	12.0	29.3			2.9	7.0
Libya	1.7	25.8			0.568	8.5
Morocco	8.8	25.8			2.9	8.5
Tunisia	2.9	25.1			0.752	6.6
W. Sahara	0.23	37.2			0.62	10.3
Levant						
Egypt	32.3	33.3			9.0	9.3
Gaza	19.8	24.2			5.6	6.8
Israel	2.3	27.5			4.1	10.5
Jordan	3.6	34.7			1.1	10.4
Lebanon	1.5	24.1			0.51	8.2
Syria	5.7	31.6			1.8	10.2
West Bank/ Palestinian	1.0	36.5			0.31	11.2
Gulf						
Bahrain	0.269	19.1			0.098	7.0
Iran	19.8	24.2			5.6	6.8
Iraq	15.5	39.5			4.1	10.5
Kuwait	0.719	25.0			0.176	6.2
Oman	1.0	30.1			0.304	8.9
Qatar	0.292	12.6			0.092	4.0
Saudi Arabia	7.5	26.1			2.5	8.8
UAE	1.3	21.0			0.31	5.2
Yemen	11.2	39.8			3.2	11.3
Other Conflict						
Afghanistan	14.0	40.9			4.1	1.9
Pakistan	64.3	31.4			22.1	10.8
Somalia	4.8	43.1			1.2	10.8
Sudan	14.4	38.67			4.3	11.5
South Sudan	5.8	44.4			1.5	11.4
Controls						
U.S.	61.2	18.7			21.1	6.5
Europe/EU	79.7	15.5			26.8	5.2
China	236.6	17.2			79.8	5.8
Japan	16.2	12.8			6.0	4.8

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDP, accessed August 30, 2017), Millions

Comparing Economic Challenges

Table Five shows a wide range of economic metrics that can help drive populations toward extremism and violence, including per capita income, percentage of severe poverty, petroleum income, ease of doing business, and severe malnutrition. Once again, countries differ sharply in the quality and honesty of their reporting. There also are many metrics that raise so many doubts – or reflect so little reporting by a broad spectrum of countries – that they cannot be meaningfully compared.

The data on GDP per capita does, however, broadly reflect real radical differences in national wealth, although the national ranking often tells more than the total dollar figure. Any nation with a ranking from 100 to 200 is in trouble. Afghanistan, Somalia, and the South Sudan have such low rankings that they are a warning that they can trigger serious unrest and violence. Moreover, these are national averages that disguise the fact that massive levels of corruption, nepotism, and cronyism; discrimination against given factions; and concentration of monetary wealth in given trades, professions, and areas of government, mean that wealth is poorly shared and distributed and often contributes little to national development.

The data for multidimensional poverty in the MENA region is so limited and untrustworthy that many are little more than the product of an international liar's contest. In the real world, many MENA countries should report the high levels shown for Afghanistan, the Sudan, and the rest of the "Other Conflict" countries.

The data on petroleum income per capita only show figures for OPEC countries, but they make a key point about all of the energy exporters listed. Only Kuwait and Qatar have true "oil wealth" in the ability to sustain the key elements of their economy for all their native citizens with energy exports. The other exporting states must sharply diversify their economies to survive, but the UAE is the only state shown that has yet to do so.

The lack of progress in removing barriers to business development is shown in the World Bank rankings in Column Five. Only six countries have made anything like the progress needed. Far too many MENA governments, and all of the "Other Conflict" countries still have dismal rankings and governments that seriously undermine the ability of their nations to properly develop and meet the needs of their peoples.

The data on the percent of severe child malnutrition is another area where many countries do not report or are grossly dishonest in understating the true figure. The real figures for many MENA countries have to be much higher, although the high levels reported for "Other Conflict" countries may be broadly realistic.

At the same time, these metrics do not reflect a key problem in economic transition affecting many of the countries listed – which have large areas of desert or non-arable terrain and serious limits to renewal water supplies. Most were agricultural societies in 1950, many with large elements living on the land or as nomads at near the subsistence level. The amount of arable land was fixed – or shrinking because of water, land misuse, and falling levels of rainfall. Capital was lacking to improve efficiency and output, and massive population increases forced steadily growing percentages of the total population into seeking service or industrial jobs in urban areas. At the same time, population increases and more efficient farming in other areas led to steadily growing food imports. National efforts at agricultural reform were limited and most largely failed. This has greatly increased the impact of economic and social change, and stress, in many MENA and "Other

Conflict” countries.

Finally, these metrics have the same broad limitation common to all of the data presented in this report: They reflect national averages and do not reflect the differences between key factions or groups in a nation: religious, sectarian, racial, ethnic, tribal, regional, etc. These differences, and the discrimination that causes them, can be a key source of extremism and political violence.

Table Five: Comparing Economic Challenges

	CIA Per Capita Income (2016/PPP) \$US	UN Severe Multi-Dimen Poverty (%) Overall economy	UN Youth Unemploy- ment (%) Severe 2010-2015	World Bank Ease of Doing Business (rank)	UN % Child Malnutrition: Under Age 5-	
Maghreb						
Algeria	15,000	109	—	28.6	157	(11.7)
Libya	14,200	115	(0.1)	50.0	188	21.0+
Morocco	8,400	147	4.9(?)	19.3	69	14.9
Tunisia	11,700	131	(0.2)	34.5	78	(10.1)
W. Sahara	—	—	—	—	—	—
Levant						
Egypt	12,000	125	(0.4)	19.5	123	22.3
Gaza	—	—	—	—	—	—
Israel	34,800	55	—	8.1	53	—
Jordan	18,500	91	(0.1)	33.4	119	(7.8)
Lebanon	18,500	91	(1.3)	21.6	127	(16.5)
Syria	2,900	194	(1.3)	28.5	174	27.5
Palestinian West Bank	4,300	175	(0.2)	39.8	141	(7.4)
Gulf						
Bahrain	50,300	24	—	(5.4)	64	—
Iran	18,100	92	—	24.1	121	(6.8)
Iraq	16,500	101	(2.5)	35.1	166	22.6
Kuwait	71,300	11	—	17.3	103	5.8
Oman	43,700	37	—	19.3	67	14.1
Qatar	129,700	2	—	(0.8)	84	—
Saudi Arabia	54,100	21	—	—	95	9.3
UAE	67,700	14	—	11.1	27	—
Yemen	2,500	216	(19.4)	(30.1)	180	46.5
Other Conflict						
Afghanistan	2,000	204	29.8	19.9	184	40.9
Pakistan	5,100	171	26.5	(10.7)	145	45.0
Somalia	400	230	(11.7)	63.6	190	25.9
Sudan	4,500	172	31.9	22.5	169	38.2
South Sudan	1,700	212	6.6	—	186	31.1
Controls						
U.S.	57,300	20	—	11.8	9	2.1
Europe/EU	39,200	43	—	—	—	—
China	14,600	112	(1.0)	12.1	79	9.4
Japan	38,900	44	—	5.3	35	7.1

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from CIA *World Factbook*, accessed August 30, 2017), Tables 8, 11 and Dashboard 2 to *UN Human Development Report 2016*, and World Bank “Ease of Doing Business Indicators, 2016,” <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>.

Comparing Educational, Dependency, and Medical Challenges

Table Six presents several different metrics that provide possible indications of the stress on given populations coming from a lack of adequate education, from the fact that rapid population growth and increased life expectancy have created extremely high levels of dependence by non-workers on the work force, and from the failure of medical services to improve at a broad-based enough level to sharply reduce infant and child mortality.

The choice of such metrics reflects serious limits in the data. Several conventional metrics are not shown because of their uncertainty and the fact they may not reflect causes of serious internal tension and unrest.

- "Literacy" often is a guesstimate or exaggerated and represents large numbers of people where it has minimal functionality - if any. It does not show whether a population is being educated in ways that allow it to cope with modern economic, social, and political needs.
- "Life expectancy" is also often guesstimated and/or is sometimes exaggerated by projecting reductions in infant/child mortality into longer life spans and entire lifetime later. It also is not clear that estimated differences in survival to a given old age have any impact as a major political motivation. The figure is too abstract to affect public perceptions.
- The data on access to safe drinking water and adequate sewage and sanitation services was too unreliable to use, and – like many other areas of data – clearly was often not updated to reflect the impact of years of civil conflict and political upheavals.

Key potential metrics are simply not available. There are no reliable figures on actual access to education and medical services, or on popular attitudes towards their cost and availability. Stability is dependent on perceptions, expectations, and the level of dissatisfaction among key elements of a nation's population, not on measures of performance per se. In the previous cases, it was easy to judge that large elements of the population would react to poor national performance. It is far harder in areas where partial polling and the content of public protests rarely focus on what may be key underlying pressures for instability.

That said, the critical differences in mean years of schooling – which often represent goals rather than actual achievements – do warn when a nation is failing to educate its workforce. The fact that the level of government spending on education is not reported or is sometimes far too low to serve a young population is both a warning that education is inadequate and that large numbers of parents may become dependent on any source of education for their children they can get, regardless of its adequacy and ideological/extremist content. Similarly, the figures for "some" secondary education are a key indication of what percentage of youth is really being trained for the era they will live and work in.

The CIA data on youth and elderly "dependency ratios" provide key metrics as to level of stress on employed and unemployed adults coming from the "youth bulge," and from increases in the percentage of surviving elderly.^{vi} Every adult that faces such burdens is almost certain to see them as a key metric of stress. The figures are very high for all but a few of the wealthier MENA states, and extremely high for "Other Conflict" countries. They are critically high for Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan.

The infant and child mortality data seem likely to impact heavily on adult perceptions as well as those of the emerging generation. It is unclear how reliable such data are, but the reported

percentages are still high for Egypt, Morocco, the Palestinians, Iran, and Yemen; and very high for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and the Sudans. It is also likely that parents perceive government medical aid to be more deficient when there is a large increase between infant mortality and other deaths under five years of age – deaths which affect children with a well-established family identity.

Table Six: Comparing Educational, Support, and Medical Challenges

	Mean Years of Schooling	Government Spending on Education as % of GDP*	% with some Secondary Education	Dependency Ratio** Youth 0-14 Old Age 65+	Mortality Rate*** Infant Under Five		
Maghreb							
Algeria	7.8	—	—	34.9	43.6	9.1	21.8 25.5
Libya	7.3	—	—	(55.1)	44.5	6.9	11.4 13.4
Morocco	5.0	—	—	29.4	40.9	9.3	23.7 27.6
Tunisia	7.1	6.2	—	43.9	33.8	11.0	12.1 14.0
W. Sahara	—	—	—	—	—	—	— —
Levant							
Egypt	7.1	—	—	(61.4)	53.8	8.5	22.3 24.0
Gaza	—	—	—	—	—	—	— —
Israel	12.8	5.9	—	88.8	45.7	18.4	3.2 4.0
Jordan	10.1	—	—	81.3	58.5	6.2	15.4 7.9
Lebanon	8.6	2.6	—	54.2	35.4	12.0	7.1 8.3
Syria	5.1	—	—	(38.9)	63.1	6.9	11.1 12.9
Palestinian West Bank	9.9	—	—	58.8	70.8	5.2	18.0 21.1
Gulf							
Bahrain	9.4	2.6	—	57.9	28.2	3.2	5.3 6.2
Iran	8.8	3.0	—	67.7	33.1	7.1	13.4 15.5
Iraq	6.6	—	—	(45.6)	73.2	5.9	26.5 32.0
Kuwait	7.3	—	—	57.4	—	—	7.3 8.6
Oman	8.1	5.0	—	58.8	26.7	3.4	9.9 11.6
Qatar	9.8	3.5	—	68.4	18.6	1.4	6.8 8.0
Saudi Arabia	9.6	—	—	66.5	41.7	4.2	12.5 14.5
UAE	9.5	—	—	67.7	16.4	1.3	5.9 6.8
Yemen	3.0	—	—	(24.4)	70.7	4.9	33.8 41.9
Other Conflict							
Afghanistan	3.6	4.8	—	(22.2)	82.3	4.6	66.3 91.1
Pakistan	5.1	2.5	—	35.4	57.9	7.4	65.8 81.1
Somalia	—	—	—	—	92.5	5.6	85.0 136.8
Sudan	3.5	—	—	16.3	72.1	5.9	47.6 70.1
South Sudan	4.8	0.8	—	—	77.3	6.4	60.3 92.6
Controls							
U.S.	13.2	5.3	—	95.3	28.6	22.3	5.6 6.5
Europe/EU	—	—	—	—	—	—	— —
China	7.6	—	—	75.0	23.5	13.0	9.2 10.7
Japan	12.5	3.8	—	91.9	21.1	43.3	2.0 2.7

* Like national poverty data, and percent of GDP spent on health, countries generally do not report negative data or exaggerate their performance. ** per 100, ages 15-64. ***per 1,000.

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from CIA *World Factbook*, accessed August 30, 2017), Tables 1, 7, 8 and 9 to UN *Human Development Report 2016*.

Comparing Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Diversity: Table Seven

The data in **Table Seven** is a warning that high levels of possible religious sectarian, ethnic, and other differences can also divide a given country. The data is uncertain. Most data are not based on any reliable survey or census. It is often notional totals and may or may not reflect real sources of tension, violence, and pressure for extremism.

The CIA data shown is often badly dated with no clear source for the estimate, and recent conflicts have often led to extensive migration of minorities and persecution or attacks on given groups that are only partially reflected in to data. The CIA data on religion in the MENA region is supplemented with summary data from the State Department's International Religious Freedom Report for 2014, which help show the religious divisions before the full impact of the recent political upheavals, violence, civil fighting, and changes in population location or migration in many of the states listed. A more up-to-date and more comprehensive estimate of religious divisions is available for some countries in the International Religious Freedom Report for 2016. (<https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/>) but it's sources and accuracy are unclear.

There is a clear need for far better mapping of – and data on – such divisions. They have been sources of significant tension and violence in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the /Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Yemen, but tribalism has probably been far more important in Libya and Somalia, and regional differences are often important as well.

The lack of proper analysis also sharply affects the quality of U.S. official and virtually all non-governmental analysis of terrorism. The data does not properly attempt to characterize the sect, ethnic, or other factional identity of the attacker and the target. Many sources also tend to ignore forced or voluntary defensive migration and segregation, and scattered casualties that are not clearly tied to a terrorist group. The end result is to understate the scale of the problem and – in open source reporting – the gap between coverage of more overt terrorist attacks and the lack of coverage of sporadic violence and the equivalent of "hate crimes."

Table Seven: Comparative Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Diversity

MAGHREB***Morocco***

Ethnicity: Arab-Berber 99.1%, other 1%

Religion: Total population 33 million (July 2014 estimate). More than 99 percent is Sunni Muslim. Groups together constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Christians, Jews, Shia Muslims, and Bahais. According to Jewish community leaders, there are an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Jews, approximately 2,500 of whom reside in Casablanca. The Rabat and Marrakech Jewish communities each have approximately 100 members. The predominantly Roman Catholic and Protestant foreign resident Christian community consists of approximately 5,000 members, although some clergy estimate the number to be as high as 25,000. Most foreign resident Christians live in the Casablanca, Tangier, and Rabat urban areas. The Protestant community includes the French Protestant community (Evangelical Church of Morocco (EEM, its French acronym)); the Moroccan Association of Protestant Churches (AMEP, its French acronym), a network of autonomous, generally English-speaking foreign resident communities; and Anglican churches in Casablanca and Tangier. There is a Russian Orthodox church in Rabat and a Greek Orthodox church in Casablanca. Various local Christian leaders estimate that there are 4,000 to 8,000 citizen Christians (mostly ethnic Amazigh) who attend “house” churches and live predominantly in the south. There are an estimated 3,000 to 8,000 Shia Muslims, most of them foreign residents from Lebanon, Syria, or Iraq, but including a small number of citizens. There are 350-400 Bahais in urban areas, particularly in Tangier. There are no known Shia mosques or Bahai houses of worship. (State) Muslim 99% (official; virtually all Sunni, <0.1% Shia), other 1% (includes Christian, Jewish, and Baha'i), Jewish about 6,000 (2010 est.) (CIA)

Language: Hassaniya Arabic, Moroccan Arabic, Berber languages (Tamazight (official), Tachelhit, Tarifit), French often the language of business, government, and diplomacy.

Algeria

Ethnicity: Arab-Berber 99%, European less than 1% (*note:* almost all Algerians are Berber in origin, not Arab; the minority who identify themselves as Berber live mostly in the mountainous region of Kabylie east of Algiers; the Berbers are also Muslim but identify with their Berber rather than Arab cultural heritage; Berbers have long agitated, sometimes violently, for autonomy; the government is unlikely to grant autonomy but has offered to

begin sponsoring teaching Berber language in schools)

Religion: Total population 38.8 million (July 2014 estimate). More than 99 percent is Sunni Muslim. Groups together constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Christians, Jews, and a small community of Ibadi Muslims residing in the province of Ghardaia. Some religious leaders estimate there are fewer than 200 Jews. Unofficial estimates of the number of Christians range from 20,000 to 100,000, although these estimates cannot be confirmed. For security reasons stemming mainly from civil conflict during the mid-1990s, Christians reside mostly in the cities of Algiers, Annaba, and Oran. The Christian community includes Roman Catholics and Protestant groups including Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Reformed Christians, and Anglicans. Some Protestant groups have evangelical wings, most of whose members live in the Kabylie region. The Christian foreign resident population is difficult to estimate, but this group makes up the majority of Christians in the country. In recent years, students and illegal immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa comprise an increasing proportion of this population, and of the overall Christian community. One Christian leader estimates that his church has between 20,000 and 40,000 foreign members, compared to fewer than 100 citizen members. Another religious leader estimates there are between 1,000 and 1,500 Egyptian Coptic Christians residing in the country. (State). : Sunni Muslim (state religion) 99%, Christian and Jewish 1% (CIA)

Language: Arabic (official), French (lingua franca), Berber or Tamazight (official); dialects include Kabyle Berber (Taqbaylit), Shawiya Berber (Tacawit), Mzab Berber, Tuareg Berber (Tamahaq)

Libya

Ethnicity: Berber and Arab 97%, other 3% (includes Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Turks, Indians, and Tunisians)

Religion: Population 6.2 million, of which 97 percent are Sunni Muslim and the remaining 3 percent includes

Christians, Hindus, Bahais, Ahmadi Muslims, Buddhists, and Jews (July 2014 estimate). Many members of the Amazigh ethnic minority are Ibadi Muslims; nearly all other non-Sunni Muslims are foreign residents. Small Christian communities consist almost exclusively of sub-Saharan African and Egyptian migrants and a small number of U.S. and European residents. There are an estimated 50,000 Coptic Christians who are mostly Egyptian foreign residents. There are also very small numbers of Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Greek and Russian Orthodox and nondenominational Christians, many of whom are foreign workers. There are no reliable estimates of the small Jewish population. (State). Muslim (official; virtually all Sunni) 96.6%, Christian 2.7%, Buddhist 0.3%, Hindu <.1, Jewish <.1, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated 0.2%, other <.1note: non-Sunni Muslims include native Ibadhi Muslims (<1% of the population) and foreign Muslims (2010 est.) (CIA)

Language: Arabic (official), Italian, English (all widely understood in the major cities); Berber (Nafusi, Ghadamis, Suknah, Awjilah, Tamasheq)

Tunisia

Ethnicity: Arab 98%, European 1%, Jewish and other 1%.

Religion: Total population 10.9 million (July 2014 estimate), of which approximately 99 percent is Sunni Muslim. Groups that together constitute the remaining 1 percent of the population include Christians, Jews, Shia Muslims, and Bahais. Roman Catholics comprise 88 percent of Christians. Catholic officials estimate membership at fewer than 5,000, widely dispersed throughout the country. The remaining Christian population is composed of Protestants, Russian Orthodox, French Reformists, Anglicans, Seventh-day Adventists, Greek Orthodox, and Jehovah's Witnesses. The Jewish population numbers approximately 1,500. One-third of the Jewish population lives in and around the capital and the remainder lives on the island of Djerba and the neighboring town of Zarzis. A Jewish community has resided in the country for more than 2,500 years. There is no official data on nonbelievers. (State). Muslim (official; Sunni) 99.1%, other (includes Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha'i) 1%. (CIA)

Language : Arabic (official, one of the languages of commerce), French (commerce), Berber (Tamazight); despite having no official status, French plays a

major role in the country and is spoken by about two-thirds of the population

LEVANT

Egypt

Ethnicity: Egyptian 99.6%, other 0.4% (2006 census)

Religion: Total population 86.9 million (July 2014 estimate). Approximately 90 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim and approximately 10 percent is Christian. The majority of Christians belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church. Other Christian communities together constitute less than 2 percent of the population and include the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic (Armenian, Chaldean, Greek, Melkite, Roman, and Syrian), Maronite, Orthodox (Greek and Syrian), Anglican/Episcopalian, and Protestant churches, which range in size from several thousand to hundreds of thousands. The Protestant community includes Presbyterians, Baptists, Brethren, Open Brethren, Seventh-day Adventists, Revival of Holiness (Nahdat al-Qadaasa), Faith (Al- Eyman), Church of God, Christian Model Church (Al-Mithaal Al-Masihi), Apostolic, Grace (An-Ni'ma), Pentecostal, Apostolic Grace, Church of Christ, Gospel Missionary (Al-Kiraaza bil Ingil), and the Message Church of Holland (Ar-Risaala). Christians reside throughout the country, although the percentage of Christians is higher in Upper Egypt and in some sections of Cairo and Alexandria. Shia Muslims constitute less than 1 percent of the population. Some press accounts estimated the number of atheists to be as high as four million, although other accounts placed their number in the low thousands. There are also small groups of Quranists and Ahmadi Muslims. Accurate numbers for the Jewish community are difficult to determine, but it is believed to number no more than 40 persons. There are 1,000 to 1,500 Jehovah's Witnesses and about 2,000 Bahais. There are many foreign resident adherents of various religious groups, including Roman Catholics, Protestants, and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). : Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 90%, Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox, other Christians include Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, and Anglican) 10% (2012 est.) (CIA)

-Language: Arabic (official), English and French widely understood by educated classes.

Israel and Palestinian

Ethnicity: Jewish 75% (of which Israel-born 74.4%, Europe/America/Oceania-born 17.4%, Africa-born 5.1%, Asia-born 3.1%), non-Jewish 25% (mostly Arab) (2013 est. Approximately 20,500 Israeli settlers live in the Golan Heights; approximately 211,640 Israeli settlers live in East Jerusalem (2014))

Religion: Population 7.8 million (July 2014 estimate that includes settlers living in the Occupied Territories). According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), approximately 75 percent of the population is Jewish, 17 percent Muslim, 2 percent Christian, and 1.6 percent Druze. The remaining 4 percent consists of relatively small communities of Bahais, Samaritans, Karaites, Jehovah's Witnesses, and those the CBS classifies as "other" – mostly persons who identify themselves as Jewish but do not satisfy the Orthodox Jewish definition of "Jewish" the government uses for civil procedures, including many immigrants from the former Soviet Union. The majority of non-Jewish citizens are of Arab origin. According to an April poll by the Rafi Smith Institute conducted for the media outlet Ynet, more than half of Jewish Israelis define themselves as secular (53 percent), 26 percent define themselves as "traditional, religious," and 21 percent define themselves as "ultra-Orthodox/religious." Among those aged 34 and younger, 30 percent define themselves as ultra-Orthodox/religious while among adults over 50 only 15 percent defined themselves as such. A 2013 Israel Democracy Institute's (IDI) Guttman Center poll shows that between 500,000 and 600,000 traditional and secular Jews feel a sense of belonging to the Conservative or Reform streams of Judaism. There is also a community of approximately 20,000 Messianic Jews. Religious communities often are concentrated in geographical areas according to religious beliefs, with a high concentration of communities of Bedouin Muslims in the Negev (south) and many majority Druze, Christian, and Muslim communities in the Galilee (north), some of which are homogenous and some a mix of these religious groups. There are many Druze Syrian and mixed Christian and Druze communities in the Occupied Golan Heights. The country continues to undergo demographic changes due to the higher birth rate of the Haredi community and certain Muslim communities. According to the CBS, there are approximately 109,000 foreign workers and an additional 93,000 illegal foreign workers and 54,000 African migrants and asylum seekers residing in the country. Foreign workers were members of many different religious groups, and include Protestants, Roman Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and Muslims. The U.S. government estimates the population is 2.7 million in the West Bank and 1.8 million in the Gaza Strip (July 2014 estimates). Roughly 98 percent of the Palestinian residents of these territories are Sunni Muslims. According to the 2014 Statistical Yearbook of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 515,200 Jews live in Jerusalem, accounting for approximately 62 percent of the city's population. The Israeli Ministry of Interior reported in 2012 that 350,150 Jews reside in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Although there is no official count, in 2008 there were approximately 52,000 Christians in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem according to a survey conducted by the Diyar Consortium, a Lutheran ecumenical institution. According to local Christian leaders, Palestinian Christian emigration has accelerated since 2001. A lower birth rate among Palestinian Christians is also a factor in their shrinking numbers. A majority of Christians are Greek Orthodox; the remainder includes Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Armenian Orthodox, Copts, Maronites, Ethiopian Orthodox, and members of Protestant denominations. Christians are concentrated primarily in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Nablus, although smaller communities exist elsewhere. Approximately 400 Samaritans (practitioners of Samaritanism, which is related to but distinct from Judaism) as well as a small number of evangelical Christians and Jehovah's Witnesses reside in the West Bank. (State) Jewish 75%, Muslim 17.5%, Christian 2%, Druze 1.6%, other 3.9% (2013 est.) (CIA).

Language: Hebrew (official), Arabic (used officially for Arab minority), English (most commonly used foreign language)

Jordan

Ethnicity: Arab 98%, Circassian 1%, Armenian 1%. Note: Jordan has been the recipient of refugees from countries around the MENA region: 1,979,580 Palestinian refugees (UNRWA-2011); 63,037 Iraqi refugees (2012); 515,068 Syrian refugees (2013). Major flow of refugees from Syria and Iraq and elsewhere are not updated in CIA estimate.

Religion: Population 7.9 million (July 2014 estimate), 97.2 percent of which is Sunni Muslim. Christians are 2.2 percent of the population, and groups that together constitute less than 1 percent of the population include Shia Muslims, Bahais, and Druze. These estimates do not include migrant workers or Syrian refugees, a population the Jordanian government estimates at 1.4 million and is made up of largely Sunni Muslims. (State). Christians tend to

live in urban areas such as Amman, Fuhais, and Madaba. Migrant workers from South and East Asia are often Christian or Hindu. (State). Muslim 97.2% (official; predominantly Sunni), Christian 2.2% (majority Greek Orthodox, but some Greek and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Protestant

denominations), Buddhist 0.4%, Hindu 0.1%, Jewish <.1, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated <.1, other <.1 (2010 est.)

(CIA)

Language: Arabic (official), English (widely understood among upper and middle classes)

Lebanon

Ethnicity: Arab 95%, Armenian 4%, other 1%; *note:* many Christian Lebanese do not identify themselves as Arab but rather as descendants of the ancient Canaanites and prefer to be called Phoenicians

Religion: Population 5.9 million (July 2014 estimate), which includes approximately 4.5 million citizens and approximately 1.4 million refugees fleeing the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, as well as a legacy Palestinian refugee population. Statistics Lebanon, an independent firm, estimates that 56.2 percent of the citizen population is Muslim (27.9 percent Sunni and 20.6 percent Shia), 35.5 percent Christian (which includes Maronite Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, and other Christians), 5.3 percent Druze, and small numbers of Jews, Bahais, Ismailis, Alawites, Buddhists, Hindus, and members of The Church of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). The last official census was conducted in 1932, and therefore no accurate official estimate of the country's religious demographics exists. Many persons fleeing religious mistreatment and discrimination in neighboring states reside in the country, including Kurds, Sunnis, Shia, and Chaldeans from Iraq, as well as Coptic Christians from Egypt and Sudan. According to the secretary-general of the Syriac League, approximately 10,000 Iraqi Christians and 3,000 to 4,000 Coptic Christians reside in the country. Additionally, approximately 1.15 million registered Syrian refugees and 44,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria reside in the country. The refugees are largely Sunni but include Shia and Christians. Approximately 450,000 Palestinians are registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), of which between 250,000 to 350,000 are believed to be present in the country. Palestinians largely live in refugee camps established during the initial influxes that took place between 1948 and 1971. The Palestinian population is largely Sunni. (State). Muslim 54% (27% Sunni, 27% Shia), Christian 40.5% (includes 21% Maronite Catholic, 8% Greek Orthodox, 5% Greek Catholic, 6.5% other Christian), Druze 5.6%, very small numbers of Jews, Baha'is, Buddhists, Hindus, and Mormons. *note:* 18 religious sects recognized (CIA).

Language: Arabic (official), French, English, Armenian.

Syria

Ethnicity: Arab 90.3%, Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7%. *note:* approximately 18,700 Israeli settlers live in the Golan Heights (July 2011 est.)

Religion: Total population approximately 17.9 million (July 2014 estimate). Sunni Muslims are estimated to constitute 74 percent of the population and are present throughout the country. The Sunni population includes ethnic Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, Chechens, and some Turkomans. Other Muslim groups, including Alawites, Ismailis, and Shia, together constitute 13 percent. Druze account for 3 percent of the population. Christian groups, constituted 10 percent of the population before the civil war, although the Christian population may have been reduced to less than 8 percent as Christians continue to flee the country. Before the war there were small Jewish populations in Aleppo and Damascus, although there is no reliable information to confirm their continued residency or current size. Media and NGO reports and a social media page purportedly administered by Syrian Jews stated there were fewer than 20 Jews left in the country. There was also a Yezidi population of approximately 80,000 before the war, but media reports indicate that it has grown due to Iraqi Yezidis fleeing across the border into Syria. All population figures and demographic percentages are estimates that contain a considerable degree of uncertainty due to the ongoing civil war and resulting large-scale population displacement. Most Christians belong to the autonomous Orthodox churches, the Eastern Catholic (or Uniate) churches (in full communion with the Roman Catholic pope), or the Assyrian Church of the East and other affiliated independent Nestorian churches. Most Christians live in and around Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Latakia, or in the Hasakah governorate in the northeast section of the country. While the country hosted hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Christian refugees before the conflict, the majority of the Iraqi Christian population has since moved to neighboring countries or returned to Iraq. The majority of Alawites live in the mountainous areas of the coastal Latakia governorate, but they also have a significant presence in the cities of Latakia, Tartous, Homs, and Damascus. Many Druze live in the Jabal al-Arab (Jabal al-Druze) region in the southern governorate of Suweida, where they constitute the majority of the local population. Yezidis are found primarily in the northeast and in Aleppo. The highest concentration of Ismailis is in the city of Salamiyeh in the Hama governorate. (State) Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13%), Christian 10% (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%, Jewish (few remaining in Damascus and Aleppo) (CIA; No Update)

since 2011)

Language: Arabic (official), Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian (widely understood); French, English (somewhat understood)

GULF

Bahrain

Ethnicity: Bahraini 46%, Asian 45.5%, other Arabs 4.7%, African 1.6%, European 1%, other 1.2% (includes Gulf Co-operative country nationals, North and South Americans, and Oceanians) (2010 est.)

Religion: Total population 1.3 million (July 2014 estimate), with Bahraini citizens making up slightly less than half the population. Citizens are 99 percent Muslim, while Christians, Hindus, Bahais, and Jews constitute the remaining 1 percent. According to Jewish community members, there are approximately 36-40 Jewish citizens, or six families, in the country. Foreigners, mostly from South Asia and from other Arab countries, constitute an estimated 51 percent of the total population. A majority of these immigrants are migrant workers from South Asia and the Philippines. More than half of resident foreigners are non-Muslim, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians (primarily Roman Catholic, Protestant, Syrian Orthodox, and Mar Thoma from South India), Bahais, and Sikhs. Muslims make up 75.3 percent of the total population of citizens and noncitizens, and Christians comprise 8.1 percent of the total population. The government does not publish statistics regarding the sectarian breakdown between Shia and Sunni citizens; however, Shia are widely believed to represent a majority of the country's citizen population. Although prevailing evidence indicates Shia constitute over 50 percent of citizens, Sunnis continued to dominate political life. Of the 40 members of the Shura Council, the upper house of parliament appointed in December, 17 were Shia, one Jewish, and one Christian. Six of the 23 cabinet ministers, also appointed in December, were Shia, including one of the five deputy prime ministers. (State). Muslim 70.3%, Christian 14.5%, Hindu 9.8%, Buddhist 2.5%, Jewish 0.6%, folk religion <1, unaffiliated 1.9%, other 0.2% (2010 est.) (CIA)

Language: Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu.

Iran

Ethnicity Persian 61%, Azeri 16%, Kurd 10%, Lur 6%, Baloch 2%, Arab 2%, Turkmen and Turkic tribes 2%, other 1% (2013) Current: Persian, Azeri, Kurd, Lur, Baloch, Arab, Turkmen and Turkic tribes

Religion: Total population 80.8 million (July 2014 estimate). Muslims constitute 99 percent of the population; 90 percent are Shia and 9 percent Sunni (mostly Turkmen, Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds living in the northeast, southwest, southeast, and northwest, respectively). There are no official statistics available on the size of the Sufi Muslim population; however, some reports estimate that several million Iranians practice Sufism. Groups constituting the remaining 1 percent of the population include Bahais, Christians, Jews, Sabean-Mandaeans, Zoroastrians, and Yarsanis. The three largest non-Muslim minorities are Bahais, Christians, and Yarsanis. Bahais number approximately 300,000 and are heavily concentrated in Tehran and Semnan. According to UN data, 300,000 Christians live in the country, although some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) estimate there may be as many as 370,000. The Statistical Center of Iran reports there are 117,700. The majority of Christians are ethnic Armenians concentrated in Tehran and Isfahan. Unofficial estimates of the Assyrian Christian population range between 10,000 and 20,000. There are also Protestant denominations, including evangelical groups. Christian groups outside the country estimate the size of the Protestant community to be less than 10,000, although many Protestants reportedly practice in secret. Yarsanis, mainly located in Luristan and Gurani-speaking areas of southern Kurdistan, have often been classified by the government as Shia Muslims practicing Sufism. Yarsanis, however, identify Yarsan as a distinct faith (known in Iraq as Kaka'i). There is no official count of Yarsanis, but one NGO and some leaders in the Yarsani faith estimate there are up to one million. There are from 5,000 to 10,000 Sabean-Mandaeans. The Statistical Center of Iran estimated in 2011 that there were approximately 25,300 Zoroastrians, who are primarily ethnic Persians; however, Zoroastrian groups report 60,000 members. Similarly, Iranian census statistics in 2012 reported there were fewer than 9,000 Jews, while media estimate there are as many as 25,000. (State) Muslim (official) 99.4% (Shia 90-95%, Sunni 5-10%), other (includes Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian) 0.3%, unspecified 0.4% (2011 est.) (CIA)

Language: Persian and Persian dialects 58%, Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, Arabic 1%, Turkish 1%, other 2% (2013):

Now: Persian (official), Azeri Turkic and Turkic dialects, Kurdish, Gilaki and Mazandarani, Luri, Balochi, Arabic, other

Iraq

Ethnicity: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5% (many minority citizens have left)

Religion: Total population 32.6 million (July 2014 estimate). Religious demography statistics vary due to violence, internal migration, and governmental tracking capability. Numbers cited are often estimates from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious community leaders. According to 2010 government statistics, the most recent statistics available, 97 percent of the population is Muslim. Shia Muslims, predominantly Arabs but including Turkmen, Shabak, Faili (Shia) Kurds, and others, constitute 60 to 65 percent of the population. Arab and Kurdish Sunni Muslims make up 31 to 37 percent of the population, with 18 to 20 percent representing Sunni Kurds, 12 to 16 percent Sunni Arabs, and the remaining 1 to 2 percent Sunni Turkmen. Approximately 3 percent of the population is composed of Christians, Yezidis, Sabean-Mandaeans, Bahais, Kakais (sometimes referred to as Ahl-e Haqq), and a very small number of Jews. Shia, although predominantly located in the south and east, are the majority in Baghdad and have communities in most parts of the country. Sunnis form the majority in the west, center, and the north of the country. Christian leaders estimate there are approximately 400,000-500,000 Christians, a significant decline over the last 10 years from a pre-2002 estimate of 800,000-1.4 million. Approximately two-thirds of Christians are Chaldeans (an eastern rite of the Catholic Church), nearly one-fifth are Assyrians (Church of the East), and the remainder are Syriacs (Eastern Orthodox and Catholic), Armenians (Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox), Anglicans, and other Protestants. Evangelical Christians reportedly number approximately 5,000. Yezidi leaders report that most of the approximately 500,000 Yezidis reside in the north. Estimates of the size of the Sabean-Mandaean community, vary. According to Sabean-Mandaean leaders, about 1,000-2,000 remain in the country, predominantly in southern Iraq with small pockets in Kurdistan and Baghdad. Bahai leaders report fewer than 2,000 members, spread throughout the country in small groups. According to Kakai activists, their community numbers approximately 100,000, mainly in villages southeast of Kirkuk, in Diyala and Erbil in the north, and in Karbala. Fewer than 10 Jews reportedly reside in Baghdad. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, an estimated 900,000 Iraqis of diverse religious backgrounds remain internally displaced due to sectarian violence between 2006 and 2008. Following ISIL's incursions into Anbar in January and throughout Ninewa and areas of the disputed internal boundaries between June and August, an additional 1.8 million people were displaced. Due to the challenges in gaining access to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in areas of conflict, as well as the government's limited capacity in registering IDPs, the exact number of religious minorities among those displaced remains unknown. ISIL's abuses disproportionately affected religious minorities, with between 100,000 and 200,000 Christians, an estimated 300,000 Yezidis, and several thousand Kakais displaced throughout the country. In the wake of this displacement, high concentrations of these minorities now reside in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). State Muslim (official) 99% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian 0.8%, Hindu <.1, Buddhist <.1, Jewish <.1, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated .1, other <.1. Note: while there has been voluntary relocation of many Christian families to northern Iraq, recent reporting indicates that the overall Christian population may have dropped by as much as 50 percent since the fall of the Saddam HUSSEIN regime in 2003, with many fleeing to Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon (2010 est.) (CIA)

Language: Arabic (official), Kurdish (official), Turkmen (a Turkish dialect) and Assyrian (Neo-Aramaic) are official in areas where they constitute a majority of the population), Armenian.

Kuwait

Ethnicity: Kuwaiti 31.3%, other Arab 27.9%, Asian 37.8%, African 1.9%, other 1.1% (includes European, North American, South American, and Australian) (2013 est.)

Religion: Population 2.7 million (July 2014 estimate). In 2014, the national governmental Public Authority for Civil Information reported that there are 1.2 million citizens and 2.8 million non-citizens. The national census does not distinguish between Shia and Sunni Muslims. Estimates derived from voting records and personal status documents indicate that approximately 70 percent of citizens, including the ruling family, adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam. A majority of the remaining 30 percent of citizens are Shia Muslims. A few hundred Christians and some Bahais are Kuwaiti citizens. Among the non-citizen residents, approximately 150,000 are Shia and a larger, although unknown number, are Sunni. There are an estimated 600,000 non-citizen Hindus and approximately 450,000 Christians. There are also an estimated 100,000 Buddhists, 10,000 Sikhs, and 400 Bahais. While some areas have relatively high concentrations of either Sunnis or Shia, most areas are religiously well-integrated. (State) Muslim (official) 76.7%, Christian 17.3%, other and unspecified 5.9%.

Language: Arabic (official), Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Turkoman (a Turkish dialect), Assyrian (Neo-Aramaic), Armenian. Note: represents the total population; about 69% of the population consists of immigrants (2013 est.) (CIA)

Language: Arabic (official), English widely spoken.

Oman

Ethnicity: Arab, Baluchi, South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi), African

Religion: Total population 3.2 million (July 2014 estimate). Citizens constitute 55 percent of the total population. An estimated 75 percent of citizens, including Sultan Qaboos and members of the royal family, are Ibadhi Muslims (Ibadhi Islam is distinct from Shia and Sunni Islam and is the historically dominant religious group). Shia Muslims comprise less than 5 percent of citizens, and live mainly in the capital area and along the northern coast. A few extended families of naturalized ethnic Indians are mainly Hindu or Christian. The remainder of the citizen population is Sunni Muslim. The majority of non-Muslims are foreign workers from South Asia. Non-citizen religious groups include Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Bahais, and Christians. Christian groups are centered in the major urban areas of Muscat, Sohar, and Salalah and include Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant congregations. These groups tend to organize along linguistic and ethnic lines - See more at: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper> Muslim (official; majority are Ibadhi, lesser numbers of Sunni and Shia) 85.9%, Christian 6.5%, Hindu 5.5%, Buddhist 0.8%, Jewish <.1, other 1%, unaffiliated 0.2%. Note: approximately 75% of Omani citizens, who compose almost 70% of the country's total population, are Ibadhi Muslims; the Omani government does not keep statistics on religious affiliation (2013) (2010 est.)

Language: Arabic (official), English, Baluchi, Urdu, Indian dialects.

Qatar

Ethnicity: Arab 40%, Indian 18%, Pakistani 18%, Iranian 10%, other 14%

Religion: Total population 2.1 million (July 2014 estimate). Citizens make up approximately 10.5 percent of the population. Sunni Muslims constitute between 85 and 95 percent of citizens, with the remainder Shia Muslims. Most noncitizens are Sunni or Shia Muslims, Hindus, Christians, or Buddhists. While the government does not release figures regarding religious affiliation, noncitizen estimates are available from Christian groups and local embassies. The Hindu community, almost exclusively from India and Nepal, comprises more than 35 percent of noncitizens. Roman Catholics are approximately 20 percent of the noncitizen population, while Buddhists, largely from South, Southeast, and East Asia, are approximately 7 percent of noncitizens. Groups constituting less than 5 percent of the population include Anglicans, Egyptian Copts, Bahais of Iranian or Lebanese origin, and members of the Greek and other Eastern Orthodox Churches. (State) Muslim 77.5%, Christian 8.5%, other (includes mainly Hindu and other Indian religions) 14% (2004 est.) (CIA)

Language: Arabic (official), English commonly used as a second language

Saudi Arabia

Ethnicity: Arab 90%, Afro-Asian 10%

Religion:

Total population 27.3 million (July 2014 estimate). Approximately 85 to 90 percent of citizens are Sunni Muslims who predominantly adhere to the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence. Shia constitute 10 to 15 percent of the citizen population. Approximately 80 percent of Shia in the country are "Twelvers" (followers of Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Mahdi, whom they recognize as the Twelfth Imam) and are primarily located in the Eastern Province. Nakhawala, or "Medina Shia," are also Twelvers and reside in small numbers in the western Hejaz region. Estimates place their numbers at approximately 1,000. Twelver Shia adhere to the Jafari school of jurisprudence. Most of the remaining Shia population are Sulaimaniya Ismailis, also known as "Sevens" (those who branched off from the Twelvers to follow Isma'il ibn Jafar as the Seventh Imam). Sevens number approximately 700,000 and reside primarily in Najran Province, where they represent the majority of the province's inhabitants. Pockets of Zaydis, another offshoot of Shia Islam, number approximately 20,000 and exist primarily in the provinces of Jizan and Najran along the border with Yemen. UN data indicate foreigners constitute more than 30 percent of the total population. Similarly, foreign embassies indicate the foreign population in the country, including many undocumented migrants,

may exceed 10 million. According to the Pew Research Center, this population includes approximately 1.2 million Christians (including Eastern Orthodox, Protestants, and Roman Catholics); 310,000 Hindus; 180,000 religiously unaffiliated (including atheists, agnostics, and people who did not identify with any particular religion); 90,000 Buddhists; 70,000 followers of folk religions; and 70,000 followers of other religions. Muslim (official; citizens are 85-90% Sunni and 10-15% Shia), other (includes Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh) (2012 est.). (State) Note: despite having a large expatriate community of various faiths (more than 30% of the population), most forms of public religious expression inconsistent with the government-sanctioned interpretation of Sunni Islam are restricted; non-Muslims are not allowed to have Saudi citizenship and non-Muslim places of worship are not permitted (2013) (CIA)

Language: Arabic (official)

UAE

Ethnicity: Emirati 19%, other Arab and Iranian 23%, South Asian 50%, other expatriates (includes Westerners and East Asians) 8% (1982). Note: less than 20% are UAE citizens (1982)

Religion: Total population 5.65 million (July 2014 estimate), based on the results of the 2005 census. The UN estimates the total population is 9.4 million (July 2014 estimate). An estimated 89 percent of residents are noncitizens. More than 85 percent of citizens are Sunni Muslims, and an estimated 15 percent or fewer are Shia Muslims. Shia Muslims are concentrated in the emirates of Dubai and Sharjah. Noncitizen residents predominantly come from South and Southeast Asia, although there are substantial numbers from the Middle East, Europe, Central Asia, and North America. According to a 2005 Ministry of Economy census, 76 percent of the total population is Muslim, 9 percent is Christian, and 15 percent belongs to other religious groups, primarily Hindu or Buddhist. Groups together constituting less than 5 percent of the population include Parsis, Bahais, Druze, Sikhs, Ahmadis, Ismailis, Dawoodi Bohra Muslims, and Jews. These estimates differ from official census figures because they do not take into account the many temporary visitors and workers, and categorize Bahais and Druze as Muslim. Although no official statistics are available for the respective populations of non-citizen Sunni and Shia Muslims, media estimates indicate that up to 20 percent of the non-citizen Muslim population is Shia. (State) Muslim (Islam; official) 76%, Christian 9%, other (primarily Hindu and Buddhist, less than 5% of the population consists of Parsi, Baha'i, Druze, Sikh, Ahmadi, Ismaili, Dawoodi Bohra Muslim, and Jewish) 15%. Note: represents the total population; about 85% of the population consists of noncitizens (2005 est.) (CIA)

Language: Arabic (official), Persian, English, Hindi, Urdu.

Yemen

Ethnicity: predominantly Arab; but also Afro-Arab, South Asians, Europeans.

Religion: total population is 26 million (July 2014 estimate). Most citizens are Muslim, belonging either to the Zaydi order of Shia Islam or the Shafa'i order of Sunni Islam. While there are no official statistics, 65 percent of the population is estimated to be Sunni and 35 percent is estimated to be Shia. According to Ismaili sources, there are nearly one million Ismaili Muslims, with the largest group of approximately 14,000 concentrated in the Haraz district near Sana'a. There is an indeterminate number of Twelver Shia (residing mainly in the north) and Sufis. Groups together comprising less than 1 percent of the population include Jews, Bahais, Hindus, and Christians, many of whom are refugees or temporary foreign residents. Christian groups include Roman Catholics and Anglicans. The once-sizeable Jewish community is the only indigenous non-Muslim minority religious group. Fewer than 200 Jews remain after decades of emigration to Israel; they reside mainly in Sana'a and the Rayda district of Amran Governorate. (State) Muslim 99.1% (official; virtually all are citizens, an estimated 65% are Sunni and 35% are Shia), other 0.9% (includes Jewish, Baha'i, Hindu, and Christian; many are refugees or temporary foreign residents) (2010 est.) (CIA)

Language: Arabic (official). note: a distinct Socotri language is widely used on Socotra Island and Archipelago; Mahri is still fairly widely spoken in eastern Yemen

OTHER CONFLICT

Afghanistan

Ethnicity: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, other (includes smaller numbers of Baloch, Turkmen, Nuristani, Pamiri, Arab, Gujar, Brahui, Qizilbash, Aimaq, Pashai, and Kyrgyz) Note: current statistical data on the sensitive subject of ethnicity in Afghanistan are not available, and ethnicity data from small samples of respondents to opinion polls are not a reliable alternative; Afghanistan's 2004 constitution recognizes 14 ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Baloch, Turkmen, Nuristani, Pamiri, Arab, Gujar, Brahui, Qizilbash, Aimaq, and Pashai (2015)

Religion: Muslim 99.7% (Sunni 84.7 - 89.7%, Shia 10 - 15%), other 0.3% (2009 est.)

Language: Afghan Persian or Dari (official) 50%, Pashto (official) 35%, Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) 11%, 30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashai) 4%, much bilingualism, but Dari functions as the lingua franca. Note: the Turkic languages Uzbek and Turkmen, as well as Balochi, Pashai, Nuristani, and Pamiri are the third official languages in areas where the majority speaks them

Pakistan

Ethnicity: Punjabi 44.7%, Pashtun (Pathan) 15.4%, Sindhi 14.1%, Sariaki 8.4%, Muhajirs 7.6%, Balochi 3.6%, other 6.3%

Religion: Muslim (official) 96.4% (Sunni 85-90%, Shia 10-15%), other (includes Christian and Hindu) 3.6% (2010 est.)

Language: Punjabi 48%, Sindhi 12%, Saraiki (a Punjabi variant) 10%, Pashto (alternate name, Pashtu) 8%, Urdu (official) 8%, Balochi 3%, Hindko 2%, Brahui 1%, English (official; lingua franca of Pakistani elite and most government ministries), Burushaski, and other 8%

Somalia

Ethnicity: Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs)

Religion: Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)

Language: Somali (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter), Arabic (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter), Italian, English

Sudan

Ethnicity: Sudanese Arab (approximately 70%), Fur, Beja, Nuba, Fallata

Religion: Arabic (official), English (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, Fur

Language: Sunni Muslim, small Christian minority

South Sudan:

Ethnicity: Dinka 35.8%, Nuer 15.6%, Shilluk, Azande, Bari, Kakwa, Kuku, Murle, Mandari, Didinga, Ndogo, Bviri, Lndi, Anuak, Bongo, Lango, Dungotona, Acholi, Baka, Fertit (2011 est.)

Religion: animist, Christian

Language: English (official), Arabic (includes Juba and Sudanese variants), regional languages include Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Zande, Shilluk

Source: Adapted from CIA *World Factbook*, accessed April 11, 2016 and September 20, 2017; State Department Report on International Religious Freedom Report for 2014.

Footnotes and Key Definitions

ⁱ The Indicators are defined as:

- **Voice and Accountability (VA)** – capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
- **Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV)** – capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
- *(b) The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies:*
- **Government Effectiveness (GE)** – capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
- **Regulatory Quality (RQ)** – capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. (c) *The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them:*
- **Rule of Law (RL)** – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
- **Control of Corruption (CC)** – capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

See <https://www.google.com/search?q=World+Bank+governance+indicators&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8>

ⁱⁱ The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. The HDI can also be used to question national policy choices, asking how two countries with the same level of GNI per capita can end up with different human development outcomes. These contrasts can stimulate debate about government policy priorities. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions.

The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean. Refer to [Technical notes](#) for more details.

The HDI simplifies and captures only part of what human development entails. It does not reflect on inequalities, poverty, human security, empowerment, etc. The HDRO offers the other composite indices as broader proxy on some of the key issues of human development, inequality, gender disparity and poverty.

See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>.

ⁱⁱⁱ This number is derived for 2016 out of two CIA estimates in the *World Factbook*. The first, the *urban population for 2015*, described the percentage of the total population then living in urban areas, as defined by the country. The second, added the annual *rate of urbanization*, which describes the projected average rate of change of the size of the urban population over the given period of time to the figure for 2015. An *urban agglomeration* is defined as

comprising the city or town proper and also the suburban fringe or thickly settled territory lying outside of, and adjacent to, the boundaries of the city.

Dependency ratios are a measure of the age structure of a population. They relate the number of individuals that are likely to be economically "dependent" on the support of others. Dependency ratios contrast the ratio of youths (ages 0-14) and the elderly (ages 65+) to the number of those in the working-age group (ages 15-64). Changes in the dependency ratio provide an indication of potential social support requirements resulting from changes in population age structures. As fertility levels decline, the dependency ratio initially falls because the proportion of youths decreases while the proportion of the population of working age increases. As fertility levels continue to decline, dependency ratios eventually increase because the proportion of the population of working age starts to decline and the proportion of elderly persons continues to increase.

total dependency ratio - The total dependency ratio is the ratio of combined youth population (ages 0-14) and elderly population (ages 65+) per 100 people of working age (ages 15-64). A high total dependency ratio indicates that the working-age population and the overall economy face a greater burden to support and provide social services for youth and elderly persons, who are often economically dependent.

youth dependency ratio - The youth dependency ratio is the ratio of the youth population (ages 0-14) per 100 people of working age (ages 15-64). A high youth dependency ratio indicates that a greater investment needs to be made in schooling and other services for children.

elderly dependency ratio - The elderly dependency ratio is the ratio of the elderly population (ages 65+) per 100 people of working age (ages 15-64). Increases in the elderly dependency ratio put added pressure on governments to fund pensions and healthcare.

potential support ratio - The potential support ratio is the number of working-age people (ages 15-64) per one elderly person (ages 65+). As a population ages, the potential support ratio tends to fall, meaning there are fewer potential workers to support the elderly.

^{iv} See https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.

Transparency International states that, "The **lower-ranked countries** in our index are plagued by untrustworthy and badly functioning public institutions like the police and judiciary. Even where anti-corruption laws are on the books, in practice they're often skirted or ignored. People frequently face situations of bribery and extortion, rely on basic services that have been undermined by the misappropriation of funds, and confront official indifference when seeking redress from authorities that are on the take. Grand corruption thrives in such settings...collusion between businesses and politicians siphons off billions of dollars in revenue from national economies, benefitting the few at the expense of the many. This kind of systemic grand corruption violates human rights, prevents sustainable development and fuels social exclusion.

Higher-ranked countries tend to have higher degrees of press freedom, access to information about public expenditure, stronger standards of integrity for public officials, and independent judicial systems. But high-scoring countries can't afford to be complacent, either. While the most obvious forms of corruption may not scar citizens' daily lives in all these places, the higher-ranked countries are not immune to closed-door deals, conflicts of interest, illicit finance, and patchy law enforcement that can distort public policy and exacerbate corruption at home and abroad."

^v See <https://www.census.gov/population/international/about/index.html> for a full description of the database and the key issues affecting such estimates.

^{vi} The CIA reports that dependency ratios are a measure of the age structure of a population. They relate the number of individuals that are likely to be economically "dependent" on the support of others. Dependency ratios contrast the ratio of youths (ages 0-14) and the elderly (ages 65+) to the number of those in the working-age group (ages 15-64). Changes in the dependency ratio provide an indication of potential social support requirements resulting from changes in population age structures. As fertility levels decline, the dependency ratio initially falls because the proportion of youths decreases while the proportion of the population of working age increases. As fertility levels continue to decline, dependency ratios eventually increase because the proportion of the population of working age starts to decline and the proportion of elderly persons continues to increase.

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A full listing of all these factors – which sometimes does not agree with the current listings in the CIA *World Factbook*, can be found at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2261.html>.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the [Center for Strategic and International Studies](#) in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the [U.S. Department of Defense](#) and the [U.S. Department of State](#).