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*Changing Migration
Patterns in North Africa*

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A Report of the
CSIS MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM

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INTRODUCTION

Drive around any capital city in the North African Maghreb and you'll see an increasingly familiar sight: migrants from sub-Saharan Africa panhandling at street corners and intersections. Mostly from West Africa and the Sahel, they are seeking to make the crossing to Europe in search of opportunity. Many travel overland through the Sahara Desert, risking everything just to arrive here. And once they arrive at a coastal departure point, their fates are often in the hands of smugglers, gangs, and militias. The journey on to Europe is dangerous; more than 8,000 people died in 2016 and 2017 alone attempting to cross the sea.¹

Less visible to most observers are the healthcare workers, educated professionals, and growing numbers of children from these same sub-Saharan African countries studying in public classrooms in some of the Maghreb's largest cities. As the Maghreb finds itself more interconnected with the rest of Africa, these starkly different images—migrants on the streets and those in the classroom—underscore the need for policymakers and societies in the Maghreb to grapple with the multidimensional nature of changing migration patterns.

While migration to Europe from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan has leveled off, Africa's massive migration is just getting started—and this presents both opportunity and risk for the Maghreb. From 2011 to 2017, more than 800,000 people crossed the Mediterranean Sea from Africa to reach Europe illegally, nearly two-thirds from sub-Saharan Africa.² Most passed through Libya, where militias rule the country and the distance to European shores is just 180 miles. Western routes through Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have also witnessed an uptick in illegal departures since 2017.³ Much of the migration through North Africa is

irregular—defined as movement across international borders that takes place outside of the legal and regulatory framework.⁴

Several trends in sub-Saharan Africa point to higher rates of migration northward in the years ahead. First, Africa's population is expanding dramatically and is expected to double by 2050, to more than 2.5 billion people.⁵ Population growth of such magnitude will put unprecedented strain on local governments to provide jobs, infrastructure, and basic services, including housing, health care, sanitation, and education, especially in large cities.⁶ Second, sub-Saharan Africa's population is young—nearly 60 percent of its people are under the age of 25—and they are increasingly mobile and networked through cellular communication and new technology. These interconnections have motivated people to seek new opportunities abroad. Third, endemic problems across large swaths of the continent, most importantly conflict, resource scarcity, and environmental degradation, will continue to propel people out of their homes in search of a better life.

While Europe remains the preferred destination for most African migrants, reaching Europe is becoming increasingly difficult. Anti-immigrant populist sentiment is widespread and is affecting asylum laws, border security, and the nature of cooperation with African governments. Europe is becoming more elusive at precisely the time that migration pressures in Africa are increasing. While the number of North Africans trying to reach Europe illegally has steadily declined, the number of sub-Saharan Africans is increasing. The North African Maghreb, more than any other region, is being forced to address these evolving pressures.

For decades, the Maghreb has been both a source of migration to Europe and a gateway for sub-Saharan Africans transiting to Europe. Now, the Maghreb could emerge as a destination for sub-Saharan migrants

seeking new opportunities. Shifting migration patterns and governments' responses to them will have implications for stability and security in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, as well as these governments' bilateral relationships with European and African governments.

Migration poses a difficult test for governments that are already facing rising levels of public discontent over socioeconomic shortcomings. Public perceptions are a big factor: for societies grappling with social protests fueled by high unemployment and poor government services, the notion that migrants are taking jobs and resources, even if they are unfounded, could fuel instability and antigovernment protests. Many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are Christian, which also poses a problem in Muslim countries with restrictions on non-Muslim proselytization and worship. For governments struggling to contain fallout from ongoing social protest, another source of public anger could be destabilizing.

Migration poses a difficult test for governments that are already facing rising levels of public discontent over socioeconomic shortcomings.

Yet, mass migration presents opportunity for the Maghreb as well as risk. Educated migrants with skills can contribute to their new communities, and governments that seek to integrate migrants and manage the issue through cooperation can play a leadership role on migration. Moreover, efforts to integrate diverse migrant populations over time can contribute to more tolerant societies that are less prone to extremist ideas.

Beyond domestic pressures, Maghreb governments face competing demands from European governments, which want North African states to prevent illegal migration through stronger border controls, and from African partners, which are increasingly important to the foreign and economic policies of Maghreb states. At stake in these relationships is a wider range of strategic interests, including aid, trade, border security, intelligence cooperation, and diplomatic support.

Balancing the competing demands and interests of local populations, European partners, African governments, and the migrants themselves will require diplomatic agility and strategic planning. To successfully manage future waves of migration, governments will need the flexibility to respond to unforeseen shifts in migration patterns; they will also need decisive policies and long-term approaches that recognize the opportunities, not merely the threats, that migration into their countries entails.

As countries with large diasporas that have been sources of legal and illegal migration for decades, Maghreb countries have a unique perspective on the multiple angles of the migration challenge. Each country is taking a different approach based on its own distinct combination of considerations. Morocco is pursuing a framework that seeks to manage migration through legal means aimed at integrating some migrants. Algeria is focused on a narrower security-dominated approach, while Tunisia's government is largely distracted by broader political and economic priorities.

This analysis seeks to illustrate how migration patterns in the North African Maghreb are changing and how governments in the region are responding in different ways at an important juncture. It traces the historical arc of the Maghreb from a source of migration to a combined source and transit point for sub-Saharan migrants destined for Europe, and examines how the Maghreb is becoming a destination for sub-Saharan African migration. It addresses the debates migration has sparked in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and examines the diverse policy choices governments are making to address the challenge.

THE MAGHREB



Governments still have an opportunity to think strategically about migration and pursue an approach that not only mitigates risk but also finds opportunity. Doing so will require balancing a complex set of pressures within and beyond their borders.

BACKGROUND: THE MAGHREB AS A MIGRATION CROSSROADS

The Maghreb has played a unique role in human migration for centuries. As the bridge between Europe and Africa, the Maghreb has historically been a crossroads of different civilizations and continents. In antiquity, people from across the Roman Empire's European lands crossed the Mediterranean Sea and settled in North Africa, creating thriving economic centers and mixing with the indigenous populations. It was through these colonies that Christianity spread across the region. More than a millennium later, North Africa became a refuge for Andalusian Jews and Muslims expelled by Catholic Spanish rulers during the Reconquista and later expul-

sions.⁷ Colonization in the 19th century brought another wave of Europeans, largely French migrants and settlers, primarily to Algeria, with smaller numbers to Morocco and Tunisia.⁸

THE MAGHREB AS A SOURCE OF MIGRATION

The 20th century witnessed large waves of migration from the Maghreb to Europe, starting with labor emigration from North Africa in the aftermath of World War I. By 1924, there were roughly 100,000 Algerians living and working in France.⁹ In the decade following World War II, nearly a quarter million North Africans moved to France to fill postwar labor shortages.¹⁰ Most hailed from Algeria, but Moroccans and Tunisians came as well. Within several decades, North African communities expanded not just in France, but across Europe; large centers in Spain, Holland, Belgium, and Italy arose partly due to bilateral agreements that facilitated labor migration. Immigration to Europe be-

came the dream of many North Africans seeking jobs and prosperity. By the mid-1970s, more than 1.4 million Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians lived in Europe.¹¹ Today between 2 percent and 7 percent of the population of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia live there.¹² Though the numbers of illegal migrants from North Africa have declined, the status of illegal residents from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia in Europe remains a major policy issue for governments in Europe and the Maghreb.¹³

For their part, governments in North Africa encouraged migration to relieve excess labor capacity and generate remittances, which became an important source of revenue. By 1976, remittances contributed 5.7 percent of Morocco's GDP and more than 3 percent of Tunisia's.¹⁴ By 2016, these levels rose to 6.8 percent and 4.3 percent, respectively.¹⁵ Emigration became so important that both Morocco and Tunisia established ministries to regulate their citizens living abroad. In 1990, Tunisia established the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment with a mandate to encourage Tunisians' employment abroad.¹⁶ Morocco established a Ministry for Moroccans Residing Abroad in 2000, which since 2013 has also dealt with migration affairs.¹⁷ Both countries also established semiofficial organizations in 1990 to maintain cultural ties with their citizens abroad (and indirectly monitor their political activity).¹⁸ In some cases, governments in the region offered citizens living abroad small business loans in the hopes that their business enterprises would succeed, generating higher revenues to send home.

LIBYA AS AN OUTLIER

While Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia witnessed labor outflows, Libya attracted labor migration. Always an outlier in the region, Libya's oil wealth created hundreds of thousands of jobs—in agriculture, construction, services, and other labor sectors—that were largely filled by migrants.¹⁹ Periodic droughts and famine in the Sahel also forced growing numbers from the Sahel to migrate to Libya in search of work.²⁰ This labor demand intersected with Muammar el-Qaddafi's Pan-African policy and diplomatic

outreach to African leaders. The African continent was critical to Libya from 1992 to 2003, when Libya was under UN sanctions.

By some accounts, the total number of migrants (both regular and irregular) in Libya before Qaddafi's fall in 2011 was approximately 2.5 million, comprising nearly half of the country's population.²¹ During that period, about 1 million Egyptians, more than 1 million sub-Saharan migrants, and more than 130,000 Tunisians lived and worked in Libya.²²


Qaddafi's policy changed dramatically in 2003 when the United Nations lifted sanctions.²³ With new opportunities for European trade and engagement, Qaddafi shifted his diplomatic priorities away from the African continent in favor of cooperation with Europe. Italy in particular boosted its cooperation with Libya and the two countries agreed to enhance intelligence sharing on irregular migration networks, improve Libya's migration control capacity, and conduct joint patrols in the Mediterranean Sea. The European Union also enhanced its cooperation with Libya, and Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, included Libya in efforts to combat illegal migration beginning in 2007.²⁴ At the same time, Libya's government imposed new visa restrictions on African citizens and forcibly deported approximately 250,000 illegal immigrants, mostly to sub-Saharan Africa.²⁵

Qaddafi's abrupt policy change triggered a shift in migration patterns as more sub-Saharan Africans transited through Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.²⁶ By 2004 nearly half of all interdictions of illegal migrants by Spanish authorities involved sub-Saharan Africans, up from only 2 percent in 1996.²⁷

THE MAGHREB AS A TRANSIT POINT FOR IRREGULAR MIGRATION

In the last several decades, the Maghreb has served as a gateway for the vast majority of sub-Saharan Africans seeking to reach Europe illegally. Crossings into Europe via the Maghreb occur along three main routes: the Central Mediterranean route, which arrives in Italy and Malta; the Western Mediterranean

PRIMARY MIGRATION ROUTES THROUGH THE MAGHREB



route to Spain; and the Western African (or Atlantic) route to Spain through the Canary Islands.²⁸ While Libya has grabbed headlines as the main point of departure along the deadly Central Mediterranean route,²⁹ Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have all served as important transit points in the past.

The popularity of the Western Mediterranean route through Morocco stems from its shared land border with the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. For decades, Moroccans and other migrants have seen the enclaves as their ticket to Europe. Spanish-Moroccan cooperation and 18-foot-tall fences topped with razor wire have decreased the number of illegal crossings into the enclaves, but organized efforts to breach the fences periodically occur, with peak crossings in 2005, 2014, 2016, and 2017.³⁰

The Western African route to the Spanish Canary Islands, off of Morocco's Atlantic coast, was the most trafficked route into Europe in the late 2000s, with a peak of 31,600 illegal crossings in 2006.³¹ This route

saw a rapid decline after Spanish cooperation agreements were reached with Moroccan, Mauritanian, and Senegalese authorities. In 2017, Spanish authorities registered just 420 apprehensions along this route.³²

The North African migration landscape has also been dramatically influenced by the collapse of the Qaddafi regime. In the initial chaos, nearly 800,000 migrants residing in Libya fled the country to escape the ensuing violence. An estimated 345,000 fled to Tunisia,³³ with large numbers also fleeing to Egypt, Algeria, Niger, and Chad.³⁴ After the initial exodus of migrants, Libya's political vacuum and stalemate created an opportunity for trafficking networks to turn Libya into a regional migration hub. Since 2011, 90 percent of illegal crossings into Europe from Africa have been detected along the Central Mediterranean route.³⁵ Migrants who take the Central Mediterranean route overwhelmingly depart from Libyan shores, where smuggling networks are deeply entrenched and the cost of sea passage is lower than in neighboring countries. The journey to Europe can cost up to \$420 from



Migrants off the coast of Libya in November 2016.

PHOTO CREDIT: ANDREAS SOLARO/AFP/GTET IMAGES

Libya, but can be as high as \$3,500 from Tunisia³⁶ and \$3,700 from Morocco.³⁷

Migrants transiting through Libya or trapped in the country face widespread violence and abuse, including within detention facilities, as well as exploitation by smugglers and militias.³⁸ It is estimated that up to 20,000 refugees and migrants are currently being held in detention centers run by the Ministry of Interior affiliated with Libya's GNA (Government of National Accord), the internationally recognized government; and thousands more are unofficially held by other militias. Control of migration detention centers can be valuable to militias, both for financial reasons and as a source of legitimacy for their control over territory.³⁹ Documented reports of torture, rape, severe abuse, and slavery have become widespread and illustrate the perils of attempting to transit through Libya.⁴⁰ According to a 2016 International Organization for Migration (IOM) report, 93 percent of migrants interviewed in Europe reported abuse in Libya.⁴¹

As authorities in Libya increasingly prevent departures and conditions in the country become more difficult for migrants, the routes through Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria are becoming more attractive alternatives. While overall detected Central Mediterranean crossings dropped nearly 40 percent from 2016 to 2017, Frontex noted that the number of crossings from Tunisia and Algeria was actually on the rise.⁴² Over the same period, detected land and sea crossings from Morocco and Algeria via the Western Mediterranean route increased 130 percent, after a decade of relative stability achieved by intense border enforcement and security cooperation between governments in the Maghreb and Europe.⁴³

THE MAGHREB AS A DESTINATION FOR SUB-SAHARAN MIGRATION

By virtue of geography, a better economic environment than much of sub-Saharan Africa, and tougher European immigration policy, the Maghreb is becoming a destination for migration, much of it from the broader

African continent. Connections between the Maghreb and parts of sub-Saharan Africa—especially West Africa and the Sahel—run deep. Social, religious, cultural, economic, and diplomatic ties cut across societies and states and have linked people for generations. These historic links, along with more recent policies, transportation infrastructure, and changing conditions in sub-Saharan Africa, have facilitated growing communities of sub-Saharan Africans living in the Maghreb.

Libya still hosts the largest migrant population in the Maghreb, which numbers approximately 790,000.⁴⁴ The majority are Somali or Sudanese nationals, followed by large groups from Comoros, Nigeria, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Djibouti, and Senegal.⁴⁵ Algeria, which has traditionally been open to receiving refugees and migrants, hosts an estimated 100,000 migrants (mostly from sub-Saharan Africa).⁴⁶ Morocco hosts an estimated 100,000 (mostly sub-Saharan African) migrants.⁴⁷ The majority hail from the Republic of Congo, Senegal, Mauritania, and Guinea, but significant numbers of Nigerians, Cameroonian, and other African nationalities also reside in Morocco.⁴⁸ Finally, Tunisia has a relatively smaller estimated population of 60,000,⁴⁹ but data show that the sub-Saharan migrant population is Tunisia's fastest-growing foreign demographic, having more than doubled between 2004 and 2014.⁵⁰ Sub-Saharan residents in Tunisia are mainly nationals of Mali, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Senegal.⁵¹

Most sub-Saharan migrants in the Maghreb lack official residency status and have no legal rights or protections. As a result, they are routinely subject to exploitation by employers and harassment by security services. They typically work in the informal sector. In Morocco, sub-Saharans work primarily in services, domestic work, construction, and commerce.⁵² Some unrecognized migrants resort to begging and prostitution as income generating activities.⁵³ In Libya and Algeria, employment statistics are not readily available, but research shows similar trends; the construction sector is an important source of labor in Algeria, for example.⁵⁴ While migrants are typically single young men between the ages of 20 and 30 from urban areas (men make up about two-thirds of sub-Saharan mi-

grants in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), the numbers of women migrants, and even families, have been increasing, especially in Morocco.⁵⁵

But the idea that migrant populations are dominated by poverty-stricken refugees is a misperception. Several surveys have shown that sub-Saharan migrant populations in Morocco and Tunisia possess a wide range of educational attainment. In Morocco, one survey found that about half of 1,400 migrant respondents studied at the university level, and an additional 37 percent achieved secondary education.⁵⁶ A study in Tunisia found that 54 percent of informal sector migrant workers hold professional or university degrees, some of them from Tunisian institutions.⁵⁷

The idea that migrant populations are dominated by poverty-stricken refugees is a misperception.

In fact, education is an important factor in attracting some migrants to the Maghreb. High schools and universities in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have hosted students from Francophone West Africa for decades. In Morocco, the numbers have steadily risen, from slightly more than 1,000 in 1994 to more than 15,000 today.⁵⁸ In Tunisia, the number of sub-Saharan migrants in universities was estimated to have declined from 12,000 in 2010 to 4,600 in 2016 in the aftermath of the revolution, but the government has declared ambitions to increase this figure to 20,000 by 2020.⁵⁹ According to an Algerian migration expert, African students represent as many as 90 percent of Algeria's 8,000 scholarship-holding students today.⁶⁰ Despite their long-standing presence in the Maghreb educational systems, however, most sub-Saharans face discrimination and are not well integrated into society.⁶¹

Demographic pressures combined with economic, political, and security conditions in sub-Saharan Africa will likely drive hundreds of thousands if not millions of sub-Saharan African people from their homes in the years ahead to pursue better opportunities in the north.

DRIVERS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN MIGRATION

Migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe has likely not reached its peak. Instead, the patterns of the last few years represent the beginning of a much larger mass movement of people. Demographic pressures combined with economic, political, and security conditions in sub-Saharan Africa will likely drive hundreds of thousands if not millions of sub-Saharan African people from their homes in the years ahead to pursue better opportunities in the north. Some will migrate within sub-Saharan Africa, and some will still reach Europe. However, North Africa will become an increasingly important outlet.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND OTHER PRESSURES

Demographics tell a big part of the story of Africa's migration trajectory: the continent's population is expect-

ed to double to 2.5 billion people by 2050, with most of the growth happening south of the Sahara.⁶² It is a young population, with 60 percent of people under the age of 25.⁶³ Nigeria, already the most populous country on the continent with 191 million people, is expected to become the world's third-most populous country, with a projected population of 411 million by 2050.⁶⁴ The country's major metropolis, Lagos, jumped from almost 5 million people in 1990 to more than 12 million in 2014, and is expected to reach nearly 25 million by 2030.⁶⁵


Population growth of such magnitude is putting unprecedented strain on governments to provide jobs, infrastructure, and basic services, including housing, health care, sanitation, and education. In Nigeria, for example, 30 percent of children aged 6 to 11 do not attend primary school.⁶⁶

Broader quality-of-life indicators—including economic opportunity, security, political conflict, and environmental degradation—also suggest a worsening of the conditions that encourage people to migrate. Today, Africa includes 18 out of the world's 20 poorest countries, half of the world's conflicts, and 12 of the world's 20 most corrupt countries.⁶⁷ Environmental degradation caused by drought and pollution will put further pressure on living conditions in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Resource scarcity will further exacerbate domestic political conflict, crime, and violence.

For many sub-Saharan Africans who are fleeing conflict or seeking new opportunities, conditions in the Maghreb states of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are often comparatively better than their countries of origin. With the exception of Libya, the Maghreb is free of the kind of interstate conflict and civil war that has beset parts of the continent. Morocco's GDP per capita is almost double or more than that of Senegal, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea, main countries of origin for migrants in the country.⁶⁸ Tunisia and Algeria are even higher in terms of GDP per capita and other human development indicators.⁶⁹ Moreover, services and infrastructure are generally better across the Maghreb, and economic conditions and opportunities more favorable.

MAGHREB AND TOP SOURCE COUNTRIES

GDP PER CAPITA



According to World Bank data 2016

*World Bank, 2011

**World Bank WITS, 2014

EUROPEAN PRESSURES

The conditions driving sub-Saharan African migration to Europe are intensifying just as shifting European policies are making it more difficult to reach European shores and obtain asylum. Growing populist and anti-immigrant political sentiment and overstretched government resources will likely force European immigration and asylum policy shifts.⁷⁰ The result will be rising barriers not only to physically reaching Europe but also to receiving asylum there.

Moroccans, Tunisians, and Algerians attempting to migrate to Europe have already felt this European policy shift. Only in rare cases are citizens of these North African countries granted asylum. In 2017 the German government attempted to pass a law declaring Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia “safe countries of origin.” The law, blocked by the upper house of Parliament, would have

allowed for expedited deportation of rejected asylum seekers from those countries.⁷¹ In the future, European governments or the European Union could classify other African source countries as “safe countries,” making it more difficult for those citizens to receive asylum in Europe. The United Kingdom, for example, currently includes Nigeria on its list of safe countries.⁷² Other potential legal changes could also affect how people are granted asylum. In Australia, for example, migrants who arrive by boat are denied entry and refugee status to deter people from making dangerous sea voyages.⁷³

Europe’s response to illegal migration from Africa is based on three basic approaches: incentivizing North African governments to tighten border security and actively prevent illegal crossings; repatriating denied asylum seekers; and providing aid to source countries to prevent migration. All of these efforts are premised on incentives and aid in exchange for greater securi-

ty-based efforts and cooperation to prevent irregular departures, and they pose important policy questions for North African governments.⁷⁴

While EU leaders have attempted to forge a common response to migration, most European state governments—in particular those most directly affected by irregular crossings—have preferred to address the problem through bilateral agreements with governments in the Maghreb. Italy and Germany have been particularly proactive: Germany’s open door policy, which includes generous benefits, led to an intake of 1.4 million immigrants in 2015, while Italy’s military unilaterally launched a year-long, \$120 million rescue operation in the Mediterranean Sea, while also working directly with Libyan authorities to prevent illegal departures.⁷⁵

In early 2017, Italy and Libya’s GNA signed an agreement to provide aid and training for the Libyan coast guard; in exchange, forces connected to the GNA would patrol and stop illegal migration and keep smugglers from operating in territory under their control.⁷⁶ Press reports claim that the Italian government has also contracted directly with armed militias to detain and stop migrants crossing ille-

gally,⁷⁷ although Italy has formally denied these claims.⁷⁸ The agreements led to a direct decline in arrivals to Italy: illegal arrivals dropped from 23,264 in June 2017 to 11,461 that July, then sank to a low of 3,914 in August.⁷⁹ As of December 2017, however, tens of thousands of migrants remained trapped in inhumane and dangerous conditions in Libyan detention camps.⁸⁰

The Italian government has also pressured international rescue organizations to curb sea rescues of migrants in the hopes this step will further deter attempts to cross the Mediterranean illegally. In July 2017, Italy revealed a new code of conduct for nongovernmental organizations operating in the Mediterranean Sea and threatened to close its ports to any dissenters.⁸¹ NGOs were divided on how to respond to the code, which obligated NGO vessels to let Italian police travel with them. Of eight major aid groups operating in the Mediterranean, five refused to sign the code and three consented.⁸²

Greater security cooperation on migration has led to increased coastal patrols and interdictions, and will make it more difficult to depart by boat from North Africa. In the future, policing Mediterranean waters and de-



Detained migrants in Sabratha, Libya being moved to shelters in October 2017.

PHOTO CREDIT: MAHMUD TURKIA/AFP/GTET IMAGES

parture points in North Africa is likely to become more effective as new technology becomes operational and personnel and funds to prevent migrants from reaching European shores increase.⁸³

In addition to advocating security-centered activities to prevent illegal departures, European governments are pressuring governments in the Maghreb to sign return and readmission agreements, which would allow European governments to send illegal migrants to their country of origin or the country they crossed into Europe from. In 2016, for example, Tunisia and the European Union launched talks on visa facilitation and readmission, although these talks have stalled.⁸⁴ Germany took the lead in efforts to promote readmission agreements after a Tunisian, who had been denied asylum and was awaiting repatriation, attacked a Christmas market in Berlin in December 2016, killing 12 people.⁸⁵ Following the attack, Germany sought to use the promise of bilateral aid to convince Tunisia to accept irregular migrants who come from third countries.⁸⁶ So far, Maghreb governments have largely refused any agreement calling for repatriation of third-country citizens.

Overall, European policy aims address the short-term goal of decreasing the number of migrants arriving in Europe. North African governments are prepared to cooperate, and more effective policing by security forces and governments in the Maghreb will likely lead to temporary decreases of illegal crossings into Europe. However, Maghreb countries will face the burdens of larger numbers of migrants residing in the region. This includes managing populations of migrants that are either detained in border security operations or deterred from attempting illegal sea crossings, and are thus staying in their countries semipermanently.

Cooperation between Maghreb and European governments on irregular migration is not static and has always been dictated by the ups and downs of broader bilateral relations. Periodic diplomatic flare-ups aside, the reality is that reaching Europe illegally from North Africa will become increasingly difficult at the same time that pressures driving migration northward are intensifying. The combination of these factors will force governments in

the Maghreb to address a range of domestic and foreign policy challenges.

Cooperation between Maghreb and European governments on irregular migration is not static and has always been dictated by the ups and downs of broader bilateral relations.

MIGRATION’S IMPACT ON THE MAGHREB

Given their own historical experiences as sources of both legal and illegal migration, governments in the Maghreb are well versed in the complexities of emerging migration dynamics. As the number of migrants has grown, the politics have become more complicated. Maghreb governments must now carefully navigate the competing interests and demands of domestic constituencies, European governments, and African governments, as well as the needs and human rights of migrants.

How governments adapt to changing migration dynamics carries risks and challenges. The migration debate in the Maghreb is set against a social-political backdrop in which every regional government is grappling with some level of domestic protest stemming from socioeconomic grievances and unmet expectations of change. Youth unemployment has reached 21.0 percent in Morocco, 29.1 percent in Algeria, and 35.4 percent in Tunisia;⁸⁷ prices for basic goods are increasing; and public services are not meeting the needs and expec-

tations of citizens. Growing immigration introduces a new element of uncertainty to the domestic landscape at a time of wider debates and contestation.

CHALLENGES FOR GOVERNMENTS

Currently, the numbers of recognized and illegal migrant residents in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are relatively modest compared to these countries' overall populations.⁸⁸ Yet these relatively small inward flows can have outsized social and political reverberations in the Maghreb. An influx of larger numbers of migrants, in the tens of thousands or more, could upset the fragile social-political equilibrium in any Maghreb country and pose a range of challenges for governments.

The first challenge is one of government capacity and resources. Providing for the needs of migrant populations requires a wide range of government expenditures, including security personnel, housing, education services, health care, and job training programs.⁸⁹ As Maghreb states face budget shortfalls, higher public

debt, lower state revenues, and higher unemployment, the expense of caring for migrants could present a particular strain.

Second, even if governments receive external aid to assist with expenses, which most do,⁹⁰ the perception that migrants are taking jobs away from local citizens or drawing away state resources could trigger a backlash against migrant communities as well as governing authorities. Public demonstrations and attacks against migrants have occurred across the region. Racism also plays a factor in shaping attitudes toward sub-Saharan migrants. Numerous reports by international organizations such as Amnesty International, UNICEF, and IOM have reported incidents of racism directed at sub-Saharan migrants across the region.⁹¹ There is a risk that governments will play into public fears by stoking anti-immigrant sentiment in order to distract people from broader government shortcomings.

Third, having large groups of financially dependent and vulnerable migrants congregating in shantytowns, forests, or makeshift camps poses a security risk. Young people in particular could be susceptible to recruitment by criminal gangs or even terrorist networks. So far, there is little evidence suggesting that refugees have been implicated in serious crimes.⁹² Still, the potential exists if people are put in precarious or desperate situations.

Fourth, addressing irregular migration will complicate important diplomatic ties between Maghreb governments and their African partners. Morocco and Algeria both expend significant diplomatic effort in Africa promoting their foreign policy objectives. Morocco joined the African Union (AU) in January 2017 and is seeking membership in ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States). It is also expanding large-scale economic ventures that require diplomatic cooperation from its African partners to implement. So far, migration policy has not shaped bilateral ties directly, but a shift in the status quo that undermines the interests of African source countries could create diplomatic tension.

Fifth, the extent of Maghreb governments' willingness to enforce stricter policies preventing irregular migration

The migration debate in the Maghreb is set against a social-political backdrop in which every regional government is grappling with some level of domestic protest stemming from socioeconomic grievances and unmet expectations of change.



A Tunisian flag flies above the Choucha refugee camp near the Libyan border in March 2011.

PHOTO CREDIT: JOEL SAGET/AFP/GTETY IMAGES

from their territory will shape ties with Europe. Irregular migration, primarily from North African countries, has long been high on the bilateral agendas of European governments and their partners in North Africa. Cooperation on migration has been used as a diplomatic tool on both sides, and the level of cooperation on migration has often been one barometer of bilateral relations.

For Maghreb governments, positive bilateral relations with Europe are critical because Europe is the most important trade partner for every country in the region as well as a key source of foreign aid and investment. Tunisia's total trade value with European countries was nearly \$17 billion in 2016; Algeria's and Morocco's were over \$25 billion each; and Libya's was just over \$9 billion.⁹³ The European Union and member states are also important sources of foreign aid for Morocco and Tunisia, particularly for security purposes. EU aid to both countries from 2011 to 2017 has amounted to over \$3.5 billion.⁹⁴ The importance of European trade and assistance to Maghreb countries gives European countries and the European Union considerable leverage over Maghreb governments to shape migration policy.

POLICY DEBATES AND PRIORITIES

All of these challenges have renewed intense public debate in every Maghreb state over sub-Saharan African migration. This is not the first time that Maghreb countries have addressed migration debates. But the current debates and pressures come at a time of heightened public criticism and discontent that governments are trying to manage carefully. Across the Maghreb, governments are taking different approaches to migration, though the policies of each reflect a range of priorities, interests, and needs that may be not be easily reconcilable.

ALGERIA'S SECURITY-FOCUSED APPROACH

Algeria's strong support for national self-determination movements created a political environment that was comparatively open to hosting refugees and migrants. Since the 1970s Algeria has hosted more than 90,000 refugees from Western Sahara.⁹⁵ As migration from sub-Saharan Africa grew and Libya disintegrated into chaos, however, Algeria's approach to irregular migration has become more security-oriented.

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In 2008, the government replaced old legislation, active since 1966, with a new law regulating the entry and stay of foreigners. This new framework has criminalized irregular migration, with penalties applied to both migrants and any national who employs or houses them. It has also empowered local governors to expel irregular migrants from the country.⁹⁶ In 2014, Algeria signed an agreement with Niger that authorized the deportation of irregular Nigerien nationals back across the southern border.⁹⁷ Since then, Algeria has allegedly deported between 10,000 and 20,000 migrants, including third-country nationals.⁹⁸

In summer 2017, public debate over the growing presence of sub-Saharan migrants in the country intensified. With anti-African sentiment voiced on Algerian social media, the government abandoned a proposed measure to regularize thousands of migrants to fill a lack of skilled labor in the country's construction and agricultural sectors. By fall 2017, the government had resumed deportations to Niger.⁹⁹

In spite of taking a more unilateral stance on migration than its neighbors, Algeria has shown some willingness to enter into dialogue with international partners. In

2016, the IOM opened its first office in the country, and the organization was able to observe a repatriation operation to Niger in December of that year.¹⁰⁰ Algeria has also initiated a mobility partnership with the European Union, and it participated in the EU-Africa summit on migration in Valletta, Malta, in November 2015.

TUNISIA'S BALANCING ACT

Tunisia's dependence on international aid and loans since 2011 has placed it in the weakest position relative to its neighbors in facing external pressures. The government has faced both increasing scrutiny over the role of its citizens in terrorist attacks in Europe and pressure from its European partners to repatriate third-country nationals to Tunisia. The result has been a greater willingness to cooperate with Europeans on security measures to prevent illegal sea crossings from Tunisian territory.

Discussions with the European Union regarding migration started in the immediate aftermath of Tunisia's revolution, when tens of thousands of Tunisians were fleeing the country illegally. In 2014, Tunisia signed a "mobility partnership" agreement with the European Union focusing on illegal migration and border security.¹⁰¹ Tunisia's legal framework on migration is still governed by a 2004 law that criminalizes crossing borders illegally.¹⁰² Since 2011, when 7,600 people were arrested as they attempted to leave the country illegally, Tunisian authorities have continued to apprehend between 1,100 and 1,900 people per year.

While three-quarters of these individuals have been Tunisian, the proportion of foreigners (mostly sub-Saharan Africans) is growing. In 2015, the number of foreigners arrested actually exceeded the number of Tunisians.¹⁰³ It is unclear if this is because more sub-Saharan Africans are transiting through Tunisia, or the security forces are making a concerted effort to arrest them.

The mobility partnership agreement also sets priorities in the field of human trafficking and asylum. In 2016, Tunisia passed a law aimed at preventing human trafficking, a phenomenon that has particularly affected Ivorian nationals.¹⁰⁴ While Tunisia has been partner-

ing with UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) to develop an asylum framework since 2011, the draft law has remained under consideration since 2016.¹⁰⁵ In July 2013, Tunisian authorities closed a camp on the Libyan border that had been operated by UNHCR since 2011 and that had received 18,000 migrants a day at the peak of the Libyan crisis. Only 600 migrants remained in the camp at its closure; most previous residents had been either repatriated or resettled in a third country.¹⁰⁶ In 2017, citing security concerns, authorities evacuated the dozens of migrants still present in the camp and demanding asylum.¹⁰⁷

The migration issue's weight has led the Tunisian government to establish dedicated institutions to address it. In 2011, it created a secretary of state for immigration and Tunisians abroad;¹⁰⁸ in 2014, it established the National Observatory for Migration (ONM), tasked with researching and providing proposals on migration issues;¹⁰⁹ and in 2015, the Ministry of Social Affairs and ONM promoted a National Migration Strategy,¹¹⁰ which focuses primarily on Tunisian migration. Tunisia has yet to formulate a plan for the rights of foreign migrants and asylum seekers.¹¹¹

Many migrants are able to enter the country legally owing to visa exemptions for various African nationalities. But the procedures for obtaining the necessary residency permits and work authorizations are slow and costly; documents must also be renewed annually.¹¹² Many migrants fail to obtain the required documents before their initial 90 days, at which time illegal residency fines begin to accrue at a rate of \$8.40 per week. These fines must be paid upon departure even if the individual is later granted residency.¹¹³ Such administrative barriers drive many to work in the informal sector to settle fees and fines. The fines also present a burden for those seeking to leave the country through legal means, and in some cases force migrants to remain in the country to save enough money to pay the fees.

MOROCCO'S REGULARIZATION STRATEGY

Of all the countries in North Africa, Morocco has adopted the most strategic approach to migration. In past years, like its neighbors, Morocco deported large num-

bers of migrants across its borders, and it cooperates closely with its European partners to prevent illegal sea crossings.¹¹⁴ Cooperation with Spain to limit migration, which in the past was manipulated for diplomatic reasons, has improved dramatically. Despite periodic breaches, it is increasingly difficult to depart illegally from Morocco by sea or cross the fences into the Spanish enclaves. Morocco also works bilaterally with European governments and with the European Union to repatriate Moroccan citizens residing illegally in Europe and to address other areas of migration policy.¹¹⁵

Starting in 2013, Morocco added a new element to its migration policy aimed at revising the legal framework on human trafficking, asylum, and migration.¹¹⁶ The centerpiece included a process referred to as "regularization," which essentially grants illegal or unregistered migrants a residence permit (*carte séjour*) and allows them to work legally in the country, access the free public health care system (nonrecognized or illegal migrants are still entitled to emergency medical care), and receive free education through the public education system.¹¹⁷ According to Moroccan government officials, regularized migrants can also qualify for vocational training programs.¹¹⁸

In the program's first phase, from January to December 2014, Morocco's government regularized 25,000 people.¹¹⁹ A February 2015 press release claimed that the majority of applicants were Senegalese (24 percent),

Tunisia's dependence on international aid and loans since 2011 has placed it in the weakest position relative to its neighbors in facing external pressures.



A Moroccan official directs migrants applying for regularization in Rabat in December 2016.

PHOTO CREDIT: FADEL SENNA/AFP/GTET IMAGES

Of all the countries in North Africa, Morocco has adopted the most strategic approach to migration.

followed by Syrians (19 percent), Nigerians (9 percent), and Ivorians (8 percent).¹²⁰ Under the second phase, which started in 2016, the government is examining requests of approximately 18,000 applicants.

Morocco's regularization campaign is part of a direct response to growing numbers of irregular migrants who

are staying in the country for longer periods. Much of the strategy behind Morocco's forward-looking migration policy originated with recommendations from the royally mandated National Human Rights Council (CNDH), which continues to play an important role in monitoring and evaluating migration issues. If fully implemented, the program would bring Morocco more in line with international migration standards.

The program also serves several important foreign policy goals. First, welcoming and providing rights for sub-Saharan migrants strengthens Morocco's soft power in Africa, where it seeks to boost its economic and diplomatic influence, partly in pursuit of support for its sovereignty over Western Sahara. Second, providing sub-Saharan migrants with rights and legal protections is consistent with Morocco's efforts to portray itself as a tolerant society. Finally, registering migrants with government authorities creates a more efficient

mechanism to monitor migrant populations' activity. It provides a useful database for intelligence and security purposes that Morocco can in turn leverage for bilateral cooperation purposes—and that ultimately will help Moroccan security forces regulate migration flows and border security.¹²¹

But there are also costs and risks to the program. While it is difficult to get even rough cost estimates for different aspects of the regularization campaign, the program requires the efforts of a large number of government agencies and personnel; these include the Ministry for Moroccans Residing Abroad and Migration Affairs, as well as the ministries of foreign affairs, health, housing, education, and interior and border security agencies. One independent estimate claims that approximately 10,000 security personnel are involved in migration-related activity, including border management.¹²² The Moroccan government had opened 83 offices as of January 2014 to deal with the regularization program.¹²³ In addition, approximately 25 NGOs advocating for migrant rights have been granted legal status since the regularization campaign started.¹²⁴

One particularly sensitive challenge will be finding sufficient jobs for large numbers of regularized migrants. The current level is manageable, as most migrants work in the informal sector. But it is unlikely that Morocco has the capacity to absorb tens of thousands of additional irregular migrants. Nor is it clear how many unregistered migrants remain in the country. Finding employment for migrants will be an important part of ensuring that the regularization is a stabilizing rather than destabilizing policy.

Integrating larger numbers of students is also an issue. In 2013, Morocco's Ministry of Education reported 110 children of African migrants enrolled in the informal education sector.¹²⁵ The government issued a directive in 2013 formally opening Moroccan schools to the children of migrants and by the end of 2017, more than 6,000 children of African migrants were enrolled in the education system.¹²⁶ While the current numbers represent a small fraction of the 7 million students in the school system, the policy comes at a time of heightened debate over ending free education and introducing fees for higher-income families.¹²⁷

Morocco's regularization campaign is part of a direct response to growing numbers of irregular migrants who are staying in the country for longer periods.

In parallel to the regularization campaign, Morocco also facilitates a voluntary return assistance program, which began in 2005 and is partially funded by the IOM. A 2014 media report claimed that this program cost the Moroccan government over \$3,000 for each migrant choosing to return to his or her country of origin.¹²⁸ An EU report claims that in 2016 and 2017, between 1,200 and 1,500 migrants enlisted in the program, and an additional 5,500 migrants will be returned to their country of origin in 2018–19.¹²⁹

Morocco has also taken a high-profile role on migration inside the African Union since returning to the body in 2017. In 2015, even before it officially returned, the body designated Morocco to represent the continent at the Council of the IOM.¹³⁰ Morocco has used this new platform to play a more active leadership role on migration. In a January 2018 address to the African Union, King Mohammed VI called for a new migration agenda, including establishing an “African Migration Observatory” based in Morocco to observe migration trends and facilitate the exchange of information among AU members.¹³¹ He also proposed the creation of an AU special envoy for migration to coordinate migration-specific AU policies. Beyond Africa, Morocco is currently co-president with Germany of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, which will hold its 11th meeting in Marrakech in December 2018.



A young sub-Saharan migrant attends Arabic class at a school in the Moroccan capital Rabat in May 2014.

PHOTO CREDIT: FADEL SENNA/AFP/GTET IMAGES

LOOKING FORWARD

Migration from sub-Saharan Africa poses a test to which each Maghreb government is responding differently. There is no solution to the problem of mass migration for the foreseeable future. As migration pressures in sub-Saharan Africa mount and Europe grows less receptive to migrants, a large part of the burden will fall on the Maghreb. While the numbers of irregular sub-Saharan migrants in the Maghreb are relatively manageable at the moment, an increase in irregular migration will pose new challenges to governments already grappling with deep structural problems and instability.

Those governments that respond with short-term answers or that view migration primarily as a threat will likely undermine their own interests. Those governments that seek to accommodate and integrate certain migrant communities through regularization programs will be in a better position to manage the challenges and to frame broader multilateral approaches to the migration issue. They stand to benefit in other ways as well: educated migrants from sub-Saharan Africa could

be a net gain for the Maghreb, which has faced its own brain drain in recent decades.

Whether the Maghreb can successfully manage irregular migration and contribute to a more pragmatic international response depends on several factors:

Maghreb government policies. The migration issue is a test for Maghreb governments and societies. To manage the challenge effectively, Maghreb governments will need to adopt more strategic approaches that go beyond short-term calculations and consider the longer-term benefits of genuinely integrating migrants.

Regularization of irregular migrants, which includes providing residency status, work permission, and basic protections, appears to be the most pragmatic response to growing numbers of irregular migrants in the Maghreb. Countries like Morocco that are pursuing regularization policies will likely benefit diplomatically and economically, despite short-term risks. Countries that view sub-Saharan migration as a threat will likely lose out on opportunities to create more vibrant

Maghreb governments will need to adopt more strategic approaches that go beyond short-term calculations and consider the longer-term benefits of genuinely integrating migrants.

economies and societies. More broadly, Maghreb governments will have to provide leadership on this issue, given the impact migration will have on their societies.

Libya's trajectory. A long-term plan to manage illegal migration in the region requires a politically stable Libya that is economically viable. Libya's role as a transit point for illegal migration has been well documented since 2011. However, Libya's potential to reemerge as a destination and market for excess labor in sub-Saharan Africa will have an important impact on migration to the entire Maghreb, and could shape migration patterns in the years ahead.

Should Libya stabilize, it could once again become a destination for labor migration and attract excess labor from neighboring countries. As long as Libya remains politically deadlocked, however, the country will be dominated by militias and criminal gangs who will manipulate migration flows in ways that undermine North Africa.

Maghreb-EU-African cooperation. Migration source, destination, and transit countries all use migration as a diplomatic tool and source of leverage with partner governments. Europe would like to address the migration problem by giving aid to sending and transit countries in exchange for security measures that limit the departure of irregular migrants from North African shores and

from source countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a short-sighted approach that avoids addressing the root causes of migration. Instead, it overly securitizes migration policy. Similarly, Maghreb policies that focus on maintaining border security and preventing illegal departures address only one aspect of the challenge, and risk deepening the alienation of migrant populations.

It is increasingly important that Maghreb governments, the European Union, and African governments coordinate their efforts more closely in order to manage the issue. This includes discussion of aid, repatriation, and formalization of migration channels so that opportunities for legal migration expand. Without such coordination, policies will strain diplomatic relations, undermine regional security, and create unforeseen consequences for all.

Ultimately, governments in the Maghreb will be responsible for what happens in their countries. Now is the time to prepare while the issue is still manageable. Having sent large segments of their populations abroad for the last half century, the Maghreb states are in a better position than most to understand the complex dynamics surrounding migrant communities as well as the necessity of migration.

As Europe, North America, and other societies become more diverse, it is unreasonable to expect that the Maghreb will remain ethnically and religiously static. Most dynamic societies and economies in North America and Europe are characterized by diverse waves of migration. In Europe, North Africans have contributed to that dynamism. There is no reason why the Maghreb should or could be immune from the effects of legitimate migration. To the contrary, adopting strategic policies that welcome migrants could over time contribute to creating more vibrant and resilient societies in the Maghreb.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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ENDNOTES

1. This figure is based on United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) numbers for persons reported dead or missing in the Mediterranean Sea en route to Italy and Spain. UNHCR, “Operational Portal: Refugee Situations—Mediterranean Situation,” April 18, 2018, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>.
2. A total of 4.5 million people applied for asylum in the European Union from 2011 to 2017. This figure reflects first-time asylum applicants, rather than total asylum applicants (4.9 million), because individuals can apply for asylum more than once, such as in multiple countries. See Eurostat, “Asylum Statistics: Tables and Figures” [MS Excel download], updated March 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Asylum_applicants. Frontex, Europe’s external border agency, collects monthly data on illegal border crossings reported by EU member states. The data represent detected illegal border crossings; they do not account for individuals who have attempted multiple illegal crossings nor those who have crossed borders legally. Frontex reported 821,355 detected crossings along the Central Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean, and Western African routes from 2011-17, 531,553 of which were reported as undertaken by a sub-Saharan African national. See Frontex, “Detections of Illegal Border-Crossings Statistics,” updated March 2018, <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map/>.
3. Egypt has also been a transit point for sub-Saharan migration and hosts significant migrant populations, primarily from Sudan. While Egypt’s migration experience is significant, it is beyond the scope of this analysis.
4. There is no universally agreed upon definition of irregular migration. According to the International Organization for Migration (the UN Migration Agency), irregular migration is “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries.” Illegal migration by contrast is generally associated with migration that is coordinated by criminal or smuggling networks. IOM, “Key Migration Terms,” <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>.
5. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision: Key Findings & Advance Tables (New York: United Nations, 2017), 1, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf.
6. Nigeria’s major metropolis Lagos, for example, jumped from almost 5 million people in 1990 to more than 12 million in 2014, and is expected to reach nearly 25 million by 2030. UNDESA, Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Highlights (New York: United Nations, 2014), <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/publications/files/wup2014-highlights.Pdf>.
7. After the final defeat of the Muslim Umayyad dynasty in 1492, Spanish rulers expelled Jews and Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula. The cultural impact of these migrations from the Iberian Peninsula to North Africa can still be seen in centers of Andalusian culture across the Maghreb. Estimates of the number of Jews expelled vary and range from 40,000 to 350,000. Muslims forced to convert to Catholicism were also expelled at various points, culminating in the expulsion of several hundred thousand in 1609. See Joseph Perez, *History of a Tragedy: The Expulsion of the Jews from Spain*, trans. Helen Nader (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press), 89. See also Trevor Dadson, *Tolerance and Coexistence in Early Modern Spain: Old Christians and Moriscos in the Campo de la Calatrava* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Tamesis Books, 2014), 147.
8. Most of Algeria’s French population returned to France during Algeria’s war of independence, which ended in 1962. In total, nearly 1 million French citizens lived in Algeria before its independence. Many of the French colonists—or *pieds noirs* as they became known in French—settled in Algeria seeking economic opportunities. See Abdellatif Fadloullah, “Migratory Flows from the Countries of the South to Western Countries,” in *Migration and Development Co-operation*, ed. Raimondo Cagiano de Azevedo (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 1994), 25.
9. Ibid., 23.
10. Ibid., 24.
11. Ibid., 25.
12. These figures include only residents of Europe born in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia and exclude second- and third-generation citizens of those countries born in Europe. See Françoise de Bel-Air, “Migration Profile: Morocco,” Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence, April 2016, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/41124/MPC_PB_2016_05.pdf?sequence=Palgrave%20Macmillan%20UK.1&isAllowed=y; Françoise de Bel-Air, “Migration Profile: Tunisia,” Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence, December 2016, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/45144/MPC_PB_2016_08.pdf; Françoise de Bel-Air, “Migration Profile: Algeria,” Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence, June 2013, 1, http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Algeria.pdf.
13. Workers from the Maghreb were also attracted to jobs in the Persian Gulf’s Arab states. In the 1970s, job opportunities in oil-rich Libya attracted high-skill workers from the Maghreb, especially Tunisia. More recently, immigration to North America has also accelerated, especially for educated and more highly skilled people.
14. World Bank, “Personal Remittances, Received (percent of GDP),” <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?end=2016&locations=MA-TN&start=1976>.
15. World Bank Group and KNONAD, “Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook. Special Topic: Return Migration,” Migration and Development Brief 28, October 2017, 25, <http://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Migration%20and%20Development%20Report%202012-14-17%20web.pdf>.
16. De Bel-Air, “Migration Profile: Tunisia.”
17. De Bel-Air, “Migration Profile: Morocco.”
18. These include Morocco’s Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Abroad and Tunisia’s Office for Tunisians Abroad.

19. Hein de Haas, "Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends," Migration Policy Institute, November 1, 2006, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trans-saharan-migration-north-africa-and-eu-historical-roots-and-current-trends>.
20. Severe droughts in the Sahel in the late 1960s, early 1970s, and early 1980s killed livestock and created food shortages in the region, forcing migration north. The drought that began in 1968 and continued until 1974 reportedly killed nearly 40 percent of livestock in the Sahel. Arezo Malakooti, "Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads," *Altai Consulting for UNHCR*, November 2013, <https://www.alticonsulting.com/insights/mixed-migration-libya-at-the-crossroads/>.
21. According to the 2006 Libyan census, the number of regular or recognized migrants in the country was approximately 350,000, but these figures intentionally masked the numbers of foreign laborers and unregistered migrants in the country. Migration Policy Centre Team, "MPC-Migration Profile: Libya," June 2013, http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Libya.pdf; IOM, "Libyan Crisis: One Month into IOM's Response," March 28, 2010, 8, <https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/media/docs/reports/MENA-One-Month-Report.pdf>.
22. According to the International Organization for Migration, Libya hosted 1 million Egyptians, 80,000 Pakistanis, 59,000 Sudanese, 63,000 Bangladeshis, and "a large population of Sub-Saharan Africans, mainly from Niger, Chad, Mali, Nigeria, and Ghana." Given that the overall migrant population was estimated to be 2.5 million, and given that the figures add up to approximately 1.2 million, it can be assumed that at least 1 million sub-Saharanans lived in Libya prior to 2011. IOM, "Libyan Crisis," 8. This figure is corroborated by de Haas, "Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU." Meanwhile, IOM monitoring in coordination with Tunisian authorities and UNHCR tracked 136,749 Tunisian returnees from Libya between February and October 2011. IOM, *Humanitarian Response to the Libyan Crisis: February-December 2011 Report*, 2011, 10-11, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/final_mena_10_months_compressed.pdf.
23. The United Nations lifted sanctions in September 2003 when Libya accepted responsibility for the 1988 bombing of PAN AM flight 103, which killed 259 people. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1506, "The decision [to lift sanctions] became possible after Libya accepted responsibility for the actions of its officials, renounced terrorism and arranged for payment of appropriate compensation for the families of the victims. Libya also expressed its commitment to cooperate with any further requests for information in connection with the investigation." United Nations, "Security Council Lifts Sanctions Imposed on Libya: Resolution 1506 Adopted by Vote of 13 in Favour, with 2 Abstentions (France, United States)," press release, September 12, 2003, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7868.doc.htm>.
24. Frontex, "Frontex-Led EU Illegal Immigration Technical Mission to Libya: 28 May-5 JUNE 2007," www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu-libya-frontex-report.pdf. See also EU Justice and Home Affairs Council, "Cooperation with Libya on Migration Issues, Council Conclusions," press release, Luxembourg, June 3, 2005, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-05-114_en.htm.
25. Migration Policy Centre Team, "MPC-Migration Profile: Libya."
26. De Haas, "Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU."
27. Spanish Ministry of Interior, cited in Julien Simon, "Irregular Transit Migration in the Mediterranean: Facts, Figures and Insights," in *Mediterranean Transit Migration*, ed. Ninna Nyberg Sorenson (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006), 39, <http://dlib.scu.ac.ir/bitstream/Ebook/35623/2/8776051412.pdf>.
28. Fewer sub-Saharan African migrants, mostly from East Africa, also make the journey to Europe from the Middle East by way of the Eastern Mediterranean route to Cyprus and Greece. See Frontex, "Migratory Map," <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map/>; Frontex, "Migratory Routes," <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/western-african-route/>.
29. The International Organization for Migration reported 14,500 deaths along the Central Mediterranean route from January 2014 to July 2017, with 2,224 deaths in the first seven months of 2017 alone. This means an estimated 1 in 36 migrants died attempting to make the journey from Libya, Tunisia, or Algeria. See IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Center, "The Central Mediterranean Route: Migrant Fatalities: January 2014-July 2017," August 2017, <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/sites/default/files/c-med-fatalities-briefing-july-2017.pdf>.
30. Migrants became a subject of concern for Spanish and Moroccan authorities when over 100 migrants stormed the border fences around Melilla in September 2005. "Immigrants Storm Spanish Enclave," BBC, September 27, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4286252.stm>. In 2014, between 16,000 and 19,000 migrants attempted to cross the border, although only 2,000-5,000 made it. Media reports from 2014 cite different figures: *The Daily Star* reported that 16,000 migrants tried to storm the border and more than 2,000 made it across; *Business Insider* reported that nearly 4,700 migrants made it across; *The Guardian* claimed that 2,100 had been successful out of the 19,000 who attempted the crossing. See "Six Hundred Migrants Storm Spain Border, 30 Enter: Government," *The Daily Star*, December 2, 2014, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2014/Dec-02/279630-six-hundred-migrants-storm-spain-border-30-enter-government.ashx>; Roland Lloyd Parry and Ingrid Bazinet, "There's a Violent Crisis Brewing on the Europe-Africa Border," *Business Insider*, December 25, 2014, <http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-international-tragedy-on-europes-brutal-african-borders-2014-12>; "Uneasy Calm Descends over Melilla, Spain's Heavily Fortified African Enclave," *The Guardian*, September 8, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/melilla-fences-spain-morocco-migration-europe>. In December 2016, over 800 migrants attempted to cross the border, and in January–February 2017, over 1,800 migrants attempted to cross. "African Migrants Cross Border Fence into Spanish Enclave Ceuta," Reuters, December 9, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-spain/african-migrants-cross-border-fence-into-spanish-enclave-ceuta-idUSKBN13Y15J>; "Hundreds of Migrants Storm Fence to Reach Spanish Enclave of Ceuta," BBC, February 17, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39002111>.

31. This figure is based on interdictions by Spanish authorities. In addition to Morocco, departures along this route could also occur directly from Senegal and Mauritania. Frontex, "Western African Route," <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/western-african-route/>. Spanish authorities apprehended between 15,000 and 21,000 people across all routes into its territory in the years 2002–04, of whom 7,000–9,000 were sub-Saharan Africans; see Spanish Ministry of Interior, cited in Simon, "Irregular Transit Migration in the Mediterranean," 39, <http://dlib.scu.ac.ir/bitstream/Ebook/35623/2/8776051412.pdf>.
32. Frontex, "Western African Route"; "Forward Defence," *The Economist*, October 15, 2015, <https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21674726-what-other-europeans-can-learn-spanish-efforts-limit-illegal-migration-forward-defence>.
33. This included 136,749 Tunisians who returned to Tunisia from Libya.
34. IOM, *Humanitarian Response to the Libyan Crisis*, 2.
35. The Central Mediterranean route is defined by arrivals in Italy and Malta. Frontex, Europe's external border agency, collects monthly data on illegal border crossings reported by EU member states. The data represent detected illegal border crossings; they do not account for individuals who have attempted multiple illegal crossings nor those who have crossed borders legally. See Frontex, "Detections of Illegal Border-Crossings Statistics," updated January 2018, <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/>.
36. Observatoire Maghrébin des Migrations, *Rapport: Migration non réglementaire—Tunisie 2017 (3ème trimestre)* (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux, 2017), 21, <http://ftdes.net/rapports/fr.omm3.2017.pdf>. See also Frontex, *FRAN Quarterly* Quarter 3 (July–September 2017): 8, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2017.pdf.
37. According to media reports, migrants with money can hire a boat for \$1,500 from Morocco and sail across the Strait of Gibraltar. For \$3,700, migrants can be smuggled in the body-work of cars or boats and pass from Morocco through to the Spanish North African enclaves of Melilla or Ceuta. See Parry and Bazinet, "There's a Violent Crisis Brewing."
38. Amnesty International, *Libya's Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses against Europe-Bound Refugees and Migrants* (London: Amnesty International, 2017), 42, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1975612017ENGLISH.PDF>.
39. Fransje Molenaar and Floor El Kamouni-Janssen, "Turning the Tide: The Politics of Irregular Migration in the Sahel and Libya," CRU Report, Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, February 2017, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/turning_the_tide.pdf.
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41. IOM, "Analysis: Flow Monitoring Surveys—The Human Trafficking and Other Exploitative Practices Prevalence Indication Survey," June–October 2016, 3–4, http://migration.iom.int/docs/Analysis_Flow_Monitoring_and_Human_Trafficking_Surveys_in_the_Mediterranean_and_Beyond_3_November_2016.pdf.
42. While Frontex does not have data on points of departure, this observation is based on the number of detected crossings by Tunisian and Algerian nationals, who typically make the journey from their own countries. See Frontex, *FRAN Quarterly* Quarter 3, 8.
43. Frontex, "Western Mediterranean Route," <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/western-mediterranean-route/>.
44. UNDESA, "Migration Wall Chart," 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/wallchart/docs/MigrationWallChart2017.pdf>.
45. Pew Research Center, "Origins and Destinations of the World's Migrants, from 1990–2017: Libya," February 28, 2018, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/02/28/global-migrant-stocks/?country=LY&date=2017>; UNDESA, "Migration Wall Chart."
46. This number also includes Syrian and Yemeni nationals. See European Commission, "Rapport sur l'état des relations UE-Algérie dans le cadre de la PEV rénovée," March 2017, 9, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/rapport_sur_letat_des_relations_ue-algerie_dans_le_cadre_de_la_pev_renovee_03_2017_2.pdf.
47. Pew Research Center, "Origins and Destinations of the World's Migrants, from 1990–2017: Morocco," February 28, 2018, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/02/28/global-migrant-stocks/?country=MA&date=2017>.
48. Ibid.
49. Pew Research Center, "Origins and Destinations of the World's Migrants, from 1990–2017: Tunisia," February 28, 2018, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/02/28/global-migrant-stocks/?country=TN&date=2017>. The most recent census data from 2014 show that 7,500 migrants from sub-Saharan Africa reside in Tunisia. Katharina Natter, "Revolution and Political Transition in Tunisia: A Migration Game Changer?," Migration Policy Institute, May 28, 2015, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/revolution-and-political-transition-tunisia-migration-game-changer>.
50. National Institute of Statistics, Republic of Tunisia, "Recensement général de la population et de l'habitat [RGPH] 2014—Principaux indicateurs," March 2017, 34, http://www.ins.nat.tn/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/rgph-chiffres-web_0.pdf.
51. Ibid., 34.
52. Fouzi Mourji, Jean-Noël Ferrié, Saadia Radi, and Mehdi Alioua, *Les Migrants Subsahariens au Maroc* (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2016), 66. A 2013 UN report corroborates this statement as well, although not with statistics; see UNCEA-AN (Nations Unies Commission économique pour l'Afrique Bureau pour l'Afrique du Nord), *La problématique de la migration dans les politiques et stratégies de développement en Afrique du Nord* (Rabat, Morocco: UNCEA-AN, 2014), 16, https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/problematique_de_la_migration_fr.pdf.

53. Mourji et al., *Les Migrants Subsahariens au Maroc* 64; Myriam Cherti and Peter Grant, *The Myth of Transit: Sub-Saharan Migration in Morocco* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2013), 16, https://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2013/07/myth-of-transit-morocco-ENG_June2013_11051.pdf.
54. Concerning migrants in Libya, a Danish Refugee Council survey found that construction, cleaning, and mechanics were the most common sectors in which respondents were employed. Danish Refugee Council, “We Risk Our Lives for Our Daily Bread”: Findings of the Danish Refugee Council Study of Mixed Migration in Libya,” December 2013, 25, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Danish%20Refugee%20Council%20Report%20_%20Risking%20our%20Lives_Mixed%20Migrants%20in%20Libya_Dec%202013.pdf. Concerning migrants in Algeria, Medecins du Monde (MdM)—which coordinates a national migration platform comprising of 17 NGOs—found that most remained in the country to work in construction in the south before returning home after an average stay of 3.2 years. Médecins du Monde, “Algérie,” <http://www.medecinsdumonde.org/en/node/6857>.
55. A 2016 survey by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of more than 1,400 migrants in Morocco showed that 91 percent of respondents were from urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa, 70 percent of them were male, and the average age of respondents was 27 years old (54 percent of respondents were between the ages of 25 and 34). Mourji et al., *Les Migrants Subsahariens au Maroc*, 26. A report by the Institute for Public Policy Research in 2013 found that the average age of its 50 interviewees was 31. Cherti and Grant, *The Myth of Transit*, 16. Similar figures were found for migrants residing in Tunisia and Algeria as well. A report commissioned for the International Labour Organization found that 55 percent of migrant workers in the informal sector were aged 20–29 and that 71 percent were single. It was based on triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data from 15 in-depth interviews with institutional actors, four focus groups with a total of 49 migrants in major cities, 15 in-depth interviews with migrants, and questionnaires distributed to 120 immigrant workers across the country. See Lassaad Labidi, Lofti Bennour, and Ali Jaidi, *L'emploi formel et informel des travailleurs immigrés en Tunisie* (International Labour Organization, 2017), 69, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_554853.pdf. A 2016 report by IOM Niger found that migrants who enlisted in its assisted return program, a plurality of whom (39 percent) had previously resided in Algeria, were overwhelmingly single males in their 20s: of 6,283 migrants interviewed, 93 percent were male, 72 percent were aged 18–29, and 59 percent were single. IOM, *IOM Niger: 2016 Migrant Profiling Report* (Geneva: IOM, 2017), https://gmdac.iom.int/sites/default/files/Web%20Version%20-%20IOM%20Niger%202016%20Profiling%20Report_EN.pdf. The 2013 Danish Refugee Council survey found that 82 percent of its 1,031 migrant respondents in Libya were single, 88 percent were male, and 57 percent were 19–29 years old. Although the survey did not limit itself to just sub-Saharan migrants, the majority of its respondents were sub-Saharan, meaning that its results are likely indicative of the major sub-Saharan migrant population trends. Danish Refugee Council, “We Risk Our Lives for Our Daily Bread,” 15–18.
56. Mourji et al., *Les Migrants Subsahariens au Maroc*, 26. The Institute for Public Policy Research report (Cherti and Grant,
- The Myth of Transit*, 15) also claimed, without statistics, that irregular migrants in Morocco were mostly well educated, with many holding the equivalent of a high school diploma or above and only a minority being illiterate.
57. Labidi, Bennour, and Jaidi, *L'emploi formel et informel des travailleurs immigrés en Tunisie*, 70.
58. A 2009 article in the journal *Méditerranée* said that in 1994, 1,040 sub-Saharan African students were enrolled in Moroccan universities. Johara Berriane, “Les étudiants subsahariens au Maroc: des migrants parmi d’autres?” *Méditerranée* 113 (2009): 147, <http://journals.openedition.org/mediterrane/3843>. A 2012 report from the Institut Royale des Etudes Stratégiques further stated that since 2000, over 15,000 African students have studied at Moroccan universities. M. Saïd Dkhissi, M. Mohammed Amine Lezar, M. Yahia Abou El Farah, M. Mhamed Echkoundi, and M. Mohamed Amattat, “Les relations Maroc-Afrique: les voies d'une stratégie globale et rénovée,” Institut Royale des Études Stratégiques, November 2012, 84, http://www.ires.ma/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/RAPPORT_AFRIQUE.pdf.
59. “Loukil: On vise à multiplier le nombre d'étudiants africains en Tunisie (Vidéos),” *Mosaique FM*, August 16, 2017, <https://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/actualite-midi-show/188227/loukil-on-vise-a-multiplier-le-nombre-d-etudiants-africains-en-tunisie>. “La Tunisie ambitionne d'accueillir 20.000 étudiants africains en 2020,” *Mosaique FM*, February 23, 2018, <https://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/actualite-national-tunisie/296158/la-tunisie-ambitionne-d'accueillir-20-000-etudiants-africains-en-2020>.
60. “Mohamed Saïd Musette, directeur de recherche au CREAD, spécialiste des questions migratoires: ‘l’Algérie n’a toujours pas de loi sur les réfugiés,’” *El Watan*, July 9, 2017, http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/l-algerie-n-a-toujours-pas-de-loi-sur-les-refugies-09-07-2017-348680_109.php.
61. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation survey found that over 70 percent of respondents identified themselves as not integrated into Moroccan society. Mourji et al., *Les Migrants Subsahariens au Maroc*, 99.
62. UNDESA, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision*, 2017, <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/> (custom data acquired via website).
63. UNDESA, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision: Key Findings & Advance Tables*.
64. Ibid., 29–30.
65. UNDESA, Population Division, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Highlights*.
66. UNICEF, “Nigeria: Quality Basic Education: The Situation,” <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/education.html>.
67. Africa includes 18 out of the world’s 20 poorest countries as measured by GDP per capita. The CIA World Factbook, “Country Comparison: GDP—per Capita (PPP),” 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rank-order/2004rank.html>. More than half of UN peacekeeping operations are in Africa. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Peacekeeping Fact Sheet,” June 30,

- 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>. Sub-Saharan Africa is also home to 12 of the top 20 most corrupt countries as defined by Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Five Arab countries rank among the top 20 most corrupt, but barring Libya, none are in North Africa. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table.
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October 12, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3394_en.htm. European Commission, “Migration: Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos on Renewed Support for Italy and Progress Made on Relocation and Resettlement,” press release, July 26, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-2169_en.htm.

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86. In March 2017, the German Federal Development Minister, Gerd Mueller, opened the German-Tunisian Centre for Jobs, Migration, and Reintegration in Tunis with the goal of creating “permanent prospects for people to remain in Tunisia.” Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), “Tunisia: Opportunities for a Fresh Start and Prospects for Remaining,” press release, March 3, 2017, <https://www.giz.de/en/html/43582.html>.
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88. According to the most recent census results, legal foreign residents represent less than half of a percent of the population in each country. In 2014, Tunisia’s foreign residents represented 0.49 percent of its 10.98 million inhabitants; in 2014, Morocco’s foreign residents represented 0.26 percent of its 33.9 million inhabitants; in 2008, Algeria’s foreign residents represented 0.27 percent of its approximately 34 million inhabitants. See (respectively) National Institute of Statistics, Republic of Tunisia, “Recensement général de la population et de l’habitat 2014,” March 2017, 6, 30, http://www.ins.nat.tn/sites/default/files/publication/pdf/rgph-chiffres-web_0.pdf; De Bel-Air, “Migration Profile: Morocco,” 3; De Bel-Air, “Migration Profile: Algeria,” 3.
89. Past European regularization programs cost millions of dollars. France spent over \$7 million in 1997; Spain spent over \$12 million in 2005; and Italy spent \$35 million in 2004. International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), *Country Studies, Appendix A of Study on Practices in the Area of Regularisation of Illegally-Staying Third-Country Nationals in the Member States of the EU*, ed. Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Albert Kraler (Vienna: ICMPD, 2009), 16–89, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/legal-migration/pdf/general/regime_appendix_a_january_2009_en.pdf.
90. Examples of governments that have received such aid include Morocco, where IOM and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) fund a Joint Migration and Development Initiative that works to develop the government’s migration agenda and reinforce the capacity of local authorities to deal with migration. In both Morocco and Tunisia, IOM and UNDP run the Global Forum on Migration and Development, which aims to integrate migration into mainstream government policies and institutions. In Algeria, IOM works with the Ministry of Health to fight HIV/AIDS and collaborates with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to improve land management strategies and increase migrant employment rates. For details see the IOM website at <https://www.iom.int/countries>.
91. Amnesty International, *Libya Is Full of Cruelty: Stories of Abduction, Sexual Violence, and Abuse from Migrants and Refugees* (London: Amnesty International, 2015), 24, http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports_and_Briefings_2015/Libya_is_full_of_cruelty.pdf; UNICEF and IOM, *Harrowing Journeys: Children and Youth on the Move across the Mediterranean Sea, at Risk of Trafficking and Expulsion* (New York and Geneva: UNICEF and IOM, 2017), https://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Harrowing_Journeys_Children_and_youth_on_the_move_across_the_Mediterranean.pdf. Amnesty International also accused Algeria of racial profiling in its October 2017 expulsion of over 2,000 sub-Saharan migrants. Amnesty International, “Mass Racial Profiling Used to Deport More than 2,000 sub-Saharan Migrants,” October 23, 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/algeria-mass-racial-profiling-used-to-deport-more-than-2000-sub-saharan-migrants/>. In Tunisia, 92 percent of migrants interviewed by the North Africa Mixed Migration Hub in December 2016 witnessed or experienced racism and discrimination. North Africa Mixed Migration Hub, “Survey Snapshot: Tunisia,” December 2016, <http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Tunisia-MHub-Survey-Snapshot-December-2016.pdf>.
92. According to a senior Moroccan security official, very few refugees have been implicated in crimes. Author interview, Rabat, Morocco, July 13, 2017.
93. Data (2016) gathered from the Observatory of Economic Complexity, <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/>.
94. The European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) is the key financial instrument used to support EU cooperation with Morocco. For the 2014–17 period, bilateral assistance to Morocco under the ENI ranged between €700 million and €800 million (\$866 million to \$1 billion). Meanwhile, from 2011 to 2016, EU assistance to Tunisia amounted to €2 billion (nearly \$2.5 billion), although Tunisia also received additional funding from the European Union under a variety of smaller initiatives. European Commission, “European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations,” https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/overview_en.
95. Algeria hosts approximately 90,000 refugees from Western Sahara. UNHCR, “Operational Update: Algeria: 1 September–31 December 2017,” January 2018, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Algeria%20Operational%20Update%20-%20Sept-Dec%202017.pdf>.
96. Law 08-11 of June 25, 2008. See Mohamed Saïb Musette and Noureddine Khaled, “L’Algérie, pays d’immigration?,” *Hommes & Migrations* 1298 (July 2012): 58–59, <http://journals.openedition.org/hommesmigrations/1884>.
97. Algeria has also signed an agreement with Mali. While deportations are more infrequent, possibly owing to the security situation in northern Mali, there is evidence that they do occur. In March 2018 Algerian authorities reportedly deported

over 100 migrants into northern Mali. Human Rights Watch, "Algeria: Deported Migrants Robbed in Mali," March 14, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/14/algeria-deported-migrants-robbed-mali>.

98. In October 2017, Niger's foreign minister claimed that Algeria had deported more than 20,000 Nigeriens over the previous four years, and that his government had asked the Algerian authorities to cease deporting third-country nationals. In February 2018, the Nigerien interior minister complained that Algeria had not ceased such deportations. In December 2017, the Algerian interior minister claimed that over 10,000 African migrants were returned to their countries "since the beginning of the operation," without specifying a time frame or nationalities. "Le Niger, préoccupé par le rapatriement de ses ressortissants en Algérie," BBC, October 28, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/afrique/41788781>; "Expulsions de Nigériens d'Algérie : à Agadez, le ministre de l'Interieur réagit," RFI Afrique, February 22, 2018, <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180222-expulsions-algerie-niger-migrants-ministre-interieur-bazoum-mohamed-proteste>; "Noureddine bedoui: tem tarhil akthar min 10 alaf ra`iya ifriqi ila baladihom al-asli [Noureddine Bedoui: There has been an expulsion of over 10 thousand African citizens to their countries of origin]" Ennahar TV (posted on YouTube), December 22, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z_UZwDqNFcc.
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100. European Commission, "Rapport sur l'état des relations UE-Algérie," 9.
101. European Commission, "Les relations entre l'Union Européenne et la Tunisie," May 10, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1263_fr.htm.
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119. National Human Rights Council, "Atelier sur les dispositifs de protection et d'intégration des migrants au Maroc," March 2017, <http://www.cndh.ma/fr/actualites/atelier-sur-les-dispositifs-de-protection-et-dintegration-des-migrants-au-maroc>. Applicants' formal request to receive legal status includes an appeals process that is chaired by CNDH. According to Moroccan officials, all women and children applying are accepted.
120. Over 116 countries of origin were recorded during these first few months of the application process. National Human Rights Council, "Amaliya al-taswiya al-istithana'iya la-wadhi'ya al-muhajirin: qubul 'azid min 50 fi al-ma'iya 'adad al-talabat [Extraordinary regularization operation of migrant status: Acceptance of more than 50 percent of the total number of applications]," <http://www.cndh.ma/ar/actualites/mly-ltswy-lstthnyy-lwdy-lmhjrym-qbwz-zyd-mn-50-fy-lmy-mn-dd-ltbt>.
121. Initially Moroccan security agencies were skeptical of the regularization process, but they have come to accept its utility. Author interview with senior Moroccan security official, Rabat, Morocco, July 13, 2017.
122. Author interview with independent migration expert, Rabat, Morocco, July 13, 2017.
123. National Human Rights Council, "Migration: La Commission Nationale de Recours Adopte de Nouvelles Mesures Permettant de Regulariser 92 % des Etrangers Ayant Depose des Demandes de Regularisation," October 26, 2015, <http://www.cndh.ma/fr/communiques/migration-la-commission-nationale-de-recours-adopte-de-nouvelles-mesures-permettant-de>.
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