

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Anthony H. Cordesman
Phone: 1.202.775.3270

Email: acordesman@gmail.com

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China's Emerging Power: Cooperation, Competition, or Conflict?

Anthony H. Cordesman

acordesman@gmail.com

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Burke Chair
In Strategy

Setting the Stage: The Chinese Perspective, U.S. Forces in Asia, and China's Growing Strategic Role and Dependence Outside East Asia

Emerging from China's Dark Years: 1839-1976

- **Opium Wars: 1839-1842 and 1856-60**
- **Foreign Concessions/Unequal Treaties: Hong Kong 1842-1997**
- **Taiping Rebellion: 1850-1864**
- **Sino-Japanese War: 1884-1895**
- **Boxer Rebellion 1899 and Siege of Beijing: 1900**
- **Revolution and Warlords: 1911-1937**
- **Manchurian Incident/Japanese Invasion: 1931**
- **Full Japanese Invasion (Marco Polo Bridge/Peking/Nanking): 1937-1945**
- **Chinese Civil War: (1927?) 1945-1949**
- **Korean war: 1950-1953**
- **Sino-Soviet Split: 1960-1984/1989**
- **Great Redoubt, Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution: 1951-?, 1958-1962, 1966-1976**
- **Sino-Vietnam War: 1979**


Rebalancing in Asia and the “60% solution”

China’s Perception of U.S. Presence in the Pacific



Source: National Institute for South China Sea Studies, *Report on the Military Presence of the United States of America in the Asia-Pacific-Region, 2016*, Current affairs Press, Hainan, 2016, p. 47


US Pacific Command (USPACOM) Summary of U.S. Presence in the Pacific



Source: Dod Focus on the Asia-Pacific Region, https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0415_Asia-Pacific-Rebalance/, accessed 8 June 2017, and <http://www.pacom.mil/About-USPACOM/>

. Approximately 375,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel are assigned to the USPACOM area of responsibility. U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of approximately 200 ships (to include five aircraft carrier strike groups), nearly 1,100 aircraft, and more than 130,000 Sailors and civilians dedicated to protecting our mutual security interests. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific includes two Marine Expeditionary Forces and about 86,000 personnel and 640 aircraft assigned. U.S. Pacific Air Forces comprises of approximately 46,000 airmen and civilians and more than 420 aircraft. U.S. Army Pacific has approximately 106,000 personnel from one corps and two divisions, plus over 300 aircraft and five watercraft assigned throughout the AOR from Japan and Korea to Alaska and Hawaii. Of note, component command personnel numbers include more than 1,200 Special Operations personnel. Department of Defense civilian employees in the Pacific Command AOR number about 38,000

The Japanese View of U.S. in Asia: 2016



Strategy

Key Strategic Objectives

China's leaders—including President Xi Jinping—have characterized the initial two decades of the 21st century as a “period of strategic opportunity.” They assess that during this time international conditions will facilitate domestic development and the expansion of China's “comprehensive national power,” which outside observers believe will serve what they assess to be the CCP's overriding strategic objectives:

- Perpetuate CCP rule;
- Maintain domestic stability;
- Sustain economic growth and development;
- Defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity; Secure China's status as a great power and, ultimately, reacquire regional preeminence; and
- Safeguard China's interests abroad.

President Xi's “China Dream” of national rejuvenation. The concept, first articulated by Xi shortly after the 2012 leadership transition, encapsulates a long-standing national aspiration of establishing a powerful and prosperous China. President Xi and other leaders also link the China Dream to two high-profile centenary goals: achieving a “moderately prosperous society” by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP in 2021, and building a “modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” by the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2049.

Key Strategic Concepts

- **Stand strong, but do not provoke the U.S.**
- **Focus on critical national interests: Taiwan. Other focus areas include the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and China's borders with India and North Korea.**
- **Trade force quantity for force quality. Asymmetric Warfare and countervailing power.**
- **"Major progress" toward informatization by 2020 Post-1991 Gulf War) -- roughly analogous to the U.S. military's concept of "net-centric" warfare**
- **Prepare for conflict under modern, high-technology conditions and focus on "winning local wars under informatized conditions." (2204)**
- **Focus on broader regional and global goals: Eight Strategic Tasks (2015)**
- **Safeguard China's interests in new domains such as space and cyberspace;**
- **Maintain strategic deterrence;**
- **If forced to fight, preempt decisively, and with surprise, at an acceptable level for favorable conflict resolution.**
- **Downplay the nuclear dimension and rate of force modernization.**
- **Focus on Western Pacific, security of borders.**
- **Divide U.S. from regional powers; confront them individually.**

Summary of Chinese Strategy in China's 2015 Defense White Paper - I

The world today is undergoing unprecedented changes, and China is at a critical stage of reform and development. In their endeavor to realize the Chinese Dream of great national rejuvenation, the Chinese people aspire to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain peace, pursue development and share prosperity.

China's destiny is vitally interrelated with that of the world as a whole. A prosperous and stable world would provide China with opportunities, while China's peaceful development also offers an opportunity for the whole world. China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion. China's armed forces will remain a staunch force in maintaining world peace.

Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces is a strategic task of China's modernization drive and a security guarantee for China's peaceful development. Subordinate to and serving the national strategic goal, China's military strategy is an overarching guidance for blueprinting and directing the building and employment of the country's armed forces. At this new historical starting point, China's armed forces will adapt themselves to new changes in the national security environment, firmly follow the goal of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to build a strong military for the new situation, implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, accelerate the modernization of national defense and armed forces, resolutely safeguard China's sovereignty, security and development interests, and provide a strong guarantee for achieving the national strategic goal of the "two centenaries" and for realizing the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

I. National Security Situation

In today's world, the global trends toward multi-polarity and economic globalization are intensifying, and an information society is rapidly coming into being. Countries are increasingly bound together in a community of shared destiny. Peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide of the times.

Profound changes are taking place in the international situation, as manifested in the historic changes in the balance of power, global governance structure, Asia-Pacific geostrategic landscape, and international competition in the economic, scientific and technological, and military fields. The forces for world peace are on the rise, so are the factors against war. In the foreseeable future, a world war is unlikely, and the international situation is expected to remain generally peaceful. There are, however, new threats from hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism. International competition for the redistribution of power, rights and interests is tending to intensify. Terrorist activities are growing increasingly worrisome. Hotspot issues, such as ethnic, religious, border and territorial disputes, are complex and volatile. Small-scale wars, conflicts and crises are recurrent in some regions. Therefore, the world still faces both immediate and potential threats of local wars.

Summary of Chinese Strategy in China's 2015 Defense White Paper - II

With a generally favorable external environment, China will remain in an important period of strategic opportunities for its development, a period in which much can be achieved. China's comprehensive national strength, core competitiveness and risk-resistance capacity are notably increasing, and China enjoys growing international standing and influence. Domestically, the Chinese people's standard of living has remarkably improved, and Chinese society remains stable. China, as a large developing country, still faces multiple and complex security threats, as well as increasing external impediments and challenges. Subsistence and development security concerns, as well as traditional and non-traditional security threats are interwoven. Therefore, China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development interests.

As the world economic and strategic center of gravity is shifting ever more rapidly to the Asia-Pacific region, the US carries on its "rebalancing" strategy and enhances its military presence and its military alliances in this region. Japan is sparing no effort to dodge the post-war mechanism, overhauling its military and security policies. Such development has caused grave concerns among other countries in the region. On the issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied. Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China.

It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests. Certain disputes over land territory are still smoldering. The Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia are shrouded in instability and uncertainty. Regional terrorism, separatism and extremism are rampant. All these have a negative impact on the security and stability along China's periphery.

The Taiwan issue bears on China's reunification and long-term development, and reunification is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation. In recent years, cross-Taiwan Straits relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but the root cause of instability has not yet been removed, and the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. Further, China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability. Separatist forces for "East Turkistan independence" and "Tibet independence" have inflicted serious damage, particularly with escalating violent terrorist activities by "East Turkistan independence" forces. Besides, anti-China forces have never given up their attempt to instigate a "color revolution" in this country. Consequently, China faces more challenges in terms of national security and social stability. With the growth of China's national interests, its national security is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue.

Summary of Chinese Strategy in China's 2015 Defense White Paper - III

The world revolution in military affairs (RMA) is proceeding to a new stage. Long-range, precise, smart, stealthy and unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Outer space and cyber space have become new commanding heights in strategic competition among all parties. The form of war is accelerating its evolution to informationization. World major powers are actively adjusting their national security strategies and defense policies, and speeding up their military transformation and force restructuring. The aforementioned revolutionary changes in military technologies and the form of war have not only had a significant impact on the international political and military landscapes, but also posed new and severe challenges to China's military security.

II. Missions and Strategic Tasks of China's Armed Forces

China's national strategic goal is to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021 when the CPC celebrates its centenary; and the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049 when the People's Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary. It is a Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Dream is to make the country strong. China's armed forces take their dream of making the military strong as part of the Chinese Dream. Without a strong military, a country can be neither safe nor strong. In the new historical period, aiming at the CPC's goal of building a strong military in the new situation, China's armed forces will unswervingly adhere to the principle of the CPC's absolute leadership, uphold combat effectiveness as the sole and fundamental standard, carry on their glorious traditions, and work to build themselves into a people's military that follows the CPC's commands, can fight and win, and boasts a fine style of work.

In the new circumstances, the national security issues facing China encompass far more subjects, extend over a greater range, and cover a longer time span than at any time in the country's history. Internally and externally, the factors at play are more complex than ever before. Therefore, it is necessary to uphold a holistic view of national security, balance internal and external security, homeland and citizen security, traditional and non-traditional security, subsistence and development security, and China's own security and the common security of the world.

To realize China's national strategic goal and implement the holistic view of national security, new requirements have been raised for innovative development of China's military strategy and the accomplishment of military missions and tasks. In response to the new requirement of safeguarding national security and development interests, China's armed forces will work harder to create a favorable strategic posture with more emphasis on the employment of military forces and means, and provide a solid security guarantee for the country's peaceful development. In response to the new requirement arising from the changing security situation, the armed forces will constantly innovate strategic guidance and operational thoughts so as to ensure the capabilities of fighting and winning.

Summary of Chinese Strategy in China's 2015 Defense White Paper - IV

In response to the new requirement arising from the worldwide RMA, the armed forces will pay close attention to the challenges in new security domains, and work hard to seize the strategic initiative in military competition. In response to the new requirement coming from the country's growing strategic interests, the armed forces will actively participate in both regional and international security cooperation and effectively secure China's overseas interests. And in response to the new requirement arising from China's all-round and deepening reform, the armed forces will continue to follow the path of civil-military integration (CMI), actively participate in the country's economic and social construction, and firmly maintain social stability, so as to remain a staunch force for upholding the CPC's ruling position and a reliable force for developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.

China's armed forces will effectively perform their missions in the new historical period, resolutely uphold the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, safeguard China's sovereignty, security and development interests, safeguard the important period of strategic opportunities for China's development, maintain regional and world peace, and strive to provide a strong guarantee for completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects and achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

China's armed forces mainly shoulder the following strategic tasks:

- To deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China's territorial land, air and sea;
- To resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland;
- To safeguard China's security and interests in new domains;
- To safeguard the security of China's overseas interests;
- To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack;
- To participate in regional and international security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace;
- To strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China's political security and social stability; and
- To perform such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interests protection, guard duties, and support for national economic and social development.

Summary of Chinese Strategy in China's 2015 Defense White Paper - V

III. Strategic Guideline of Active Defense

The strategic concept of active defense is the essence of the CPC's military strategic thought. From the long-term practice of revolutionary wars, the people's armed forces have developed a complete set of strategic concepts of active defense, which boils down to: adherence to the unity of strategic defense and operational and tactical offense; adherence to the principles of defense, self-defense and post-emptive strike; and adherence to the stance that "We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked."

Shortly after the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Central Military Commission (CMC) established the military strategic guideline of active defense, and later, in line with the developments and changes in the national security situation, had made a number of major revisions of it. In 1993 the military strategic guideline of the new era was formulated, which took winning local wars in conditions of modern technology, particularly high technology, as the basic point in making preparation for military struggle (PMS). In 2004, the guideline was further substantiated, and the basic point for PMS was modified to winning local wars under conditions of informationization.

China's socialist nature, fundamental national interests and the objective requirement of taking the path of peaceful development all demand that China unswervingly adhere to and enrich the strategic concept of active defense. Guided by national security and development strategies, and required by the situation and their tasks in the new historical period, China's armed forces will continue to implement the military strategic guideline of active defense and enhance military strategic guidance as the times so require. They will further broaden strategic vision, update strategic thinking and make strategic guidance more forward-looking. A holistic approach will be taken to balance war preparation and war prevention, rights protection and stability maintenance, deterrence and warfighting, and operations in wartime and employment of military forces in peacetime. They will lay stress on farsighted planning and management to create a favorable posture, comprehensively manage crises, and resolutely deter and win wars.

To implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, China's armed forces will adjust the basic point for PMS. In line with the evolving form of war and national security situation, the basic point for PMS will be placed on winning informationized local wars, highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS. The armed forces will work to effectively control major crises, properly handle possible chain reactions, and firmly safeguard the country's territorial sovereignty, integrity and security.

To implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, China's armed forces will innovate basic operational doctrines. In response to security threats from different directions and in line with their current capabilities, the armed forces will adhere to the principles of flexibility, mobility and self-dependence so that "you fight your way and I fight my way."

Summary of Chinese Strategy in China's 2015 Defense White Paper - VI

Integrated combat forces will be employed to prevail in system-vs-system operations featuring information dominance, precision strikes and joint operations.

To implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, China's armed forces will optimize the military strategic layout. In view of China's geostrategic environment, the security threats it faces and the strategic tasks they shoulder, the armed forces will make overall planning for strategic deployment and military disposition, in order to clearly divide areas of responsibility for their troops, and enable them to support each other and act as an organic whole. Threats from such new security domains as outer space and cyber space will be dealt with to maintain the common security of the world community. China's armed forces will strengthen international security cooperation in areas crucially related to China's overseas interests, to ensure the security of such interests.

To implement the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, China's armed forces will uphold the following principles:

- To be subordinate to and in the service of the national strategic goal, implement the holistic view of national security, strengthen PMS, prevent crises, deter and win wars;
- To foster a strategic posture favorable to China's peaceful development, adhere to the national defense policy that is defensive in nature, persevere in close coordination of political, military, economic and diplomatic work, and positively cope with comprehensive security threats the country possibly encounters;
- To strike a balance between rights protection and stability maintenance, and make overall planning for both, safeguard national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, and maintain security and stability along China's periphery;
- To endeavor to seize the strategic initiative in military struggle, proactively plan for military struggle in all directions and domains, and grasp the opportunities to accelerate military building, reform and development;
- To employ strategies and tactics featuring flexibility and mobility, give full play to the overall effectiveness of joint operations, concentrate superior forces, and make integrated use of all operational means and methods;
- To make serious preparations to cope with the most complex and difficult scenarios, uphold bottom-line thinking, and do a solid job in all aspects so as to ensure proper responses to such scenarios with ease at any time and in any circumstances;

Summary of Chinese Strategy in China's 2015 Defense White Paper - VII

- To bring into full play the unique political advantages of the people's armed forces, uphold the CPC's absolute leadership over the military, accentuate the cultivation of fighting spirit, enforce strict discipline, improve the professionalism and strength of the troops, build closer relations between the government and the military as well as between the people and the military, and boost the morale of officers and men;
- To give full play to the overall power of the concept of people's war, persist in employing it as an ace weapon to triumph over the enemy, enrich the contents, ways and means of the concept of people's war, and press forward with the shift of the focus of war mobilization from human resources to science and technology; and
- To actively expand military and security cooperation, deepen military relations with major powers, neighboring countries and other developing countries, and promote the establishment of a regional framework for security and cooperation.

DoD View of China's Modernization and Deployment Strategy


China's military modernization is targeting capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. military-technological advantages. To support this modernization, China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-use technologies, including cyber theft, targeted foreign direct investment, and exploitation of the access of private Chinese nationals to such technologies. Several cases emerged in 2016 of China using its intelligence services, and employing other illicit approaches that violate U.S. laws and export controls, to obtain national security and export-restricted technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials.

As China's global footprint and international interests have grown, its military modernization program has become more focused on supporting missions beyond China's periphery, including power projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). In February 2016, China began construction of a military base in Djibouti that could be complete within the next year. China likely will seek to establish additional military bases in countries with which it has longstanding, friendly relationships.

- China's expanding international economic interests are increasing demands for the PLAN to operate in more distant maritime environments to protect Chinese citizens, investments, and critical sea lines of communication (SLOC).**
- China most likely will seek to establish additional military bases in countries with which it has a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan, and in which there is a precedent for hosting foreign militaries. China's overseas military basing may be constrained by the willingness of countries to support a PLA presence in one of their ports**

Views of China's Role in the Regional Military Balance


The Japanese View of the Asian Balance: 2016



- Notes:
1. Source: "The Military Balance 2016," documents published by the U.S. DoD, etc.
 2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of 2015; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only).
 3. Figures for the U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are those of the Army and Marine Corps personnel combined.
 4. Combat aircraft include Navy and Marine aircraft.
 5. Figures in parentheses show the total number of central units, such as divisions and brigades. That of North Korea shows only divisions. That of Taiwan includes military police as well.
 6. The number of U.S. 7th Fleet vessels and aircraft indicates those which are forward-deployed in Japan and Guam.
 7. Figures of combat aircraft of the U.S. Forces, Japan and the U.S. 7th Fleet include only fighters.

Source: *Defense of Japan, 2016*,
 Ministry of Defense, p. 5,
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_pap/er/2016.html

South Korean View of Comparative Military Strength of Major Powers: 2016 - I



* Sources: *The Military Balance 2016* (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Feb. 2016.), *Defense of Japan 2016*, etc.

South Korean View of Comparative Military Strength of Major Powers: 2016 - II

Number of Troops

Unit: persons

Category	U.S.	Russia	China	Japan
Total	1,381,250	798,000	2,333,000	247,150
Army	509,450	240,000	1,600,000	151,000
Navy	326,800	148,000	235,000	45,500
Air Force	319,950	145,000	398,000	47,100
Others	Marine Corps 185,050 Coast Guard 40,000	Airborne 34,000 Strategic 80,000 Command/support 151,000	Rocket Forces 100,000	Joint Staff Office 3,550

Army

Category	U.S.	Russia	China	Japan
Divisions/Brigades	10/45	4/89	23/128	9/6
Tanks	5,884	20,200	6,540	687
Infantry combat vehicles	6,559	13,900	3,950	68
Reconnaissance vehicles	1,900	2,200	650(light tanks)	162
Armored vehicles	24,377	12,000	4,150	792
Towed artillery	1,242	13,165	6,140	422
Self-propelled guns	1,469	6,120	2,280	166
Multiple launch rocket systems	1,205	4,070	1,872	99
Mortar	2,483	4,130	2,586	1,103
Anti-tank guided weapons	SP 1,512	SP N/A	SP 480	SP 37
Ground-to-air missiles	1,207	1,520	312	700
Helicopters	4,200	1,278	760	412
Aircraft	222	-	8	8

Source: *South Korean Defense White Paper, 2016*, Ministry of Defense, pp. 264-265

Navy


Category	U.S.	Russia	China	Japan
Submarines	57	49	61	18
Strategic nuclear submarines	14	13	4	-
Aircraft carriers	10	1	1	-
Cruisers	22	6	-	-
Destroyers	62	18	19	38
Frigates	4	10	54	9
Patrol and coastal combatants	57	89	199	6
Mine sweepers	11	45	49	27
Amphibious vessels	30	19	50	3
Landing craft	245	30	73	8
Auxiliary ships	71	625	171	28
Fighters	956	72	346	-
Helicopters	720	195	111	131
Marine division	3	3 brigades	2 brigades	-
Tanks	447	250	73	-
Reconnaissance vehicles	252	60	-	-
Amphibious assault APC	1,311	1,000	-	-
Personnel transport APC	2,467	400	152	-
Cannons	1,506	365	40	-
Anti-tank missiles	95	-	-	-
UAV/ISRs	139	-	-	-
Aircraft	445	-	-	-
Helicopters	455	-	-	-

Air Force

Category	U.S.]	Russia	China	Japan
Strategic bombers	157	139	-	-
Bombers	-	-	120	-
Reconnaissance aircraft	ISR-UAV-CISR 454	85	51	17
Command and control aircraft	4	8	5	-
Fighters	FTR-FGR-ATK 1,890	872	1,468	348
Transport aircraft	686	432	325	61
Tankers	461	15	11	5
AWACS	AWE&C-EW 45	18	8	17
Trainers	1,128	204	950	245
Helicopters	161	669	53	46
Civil Reserve Air Fleet	553	-	-	-
EW aircraft	ELINT 33	32	13	3

* Source: The Military Balance 2016 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2016) and Defense of Japan 2016 (Annual White Paper) (August 2016)


The Japanese View of U.S. Global Forces: 2016



Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. DoD (as of September 30, 2015), etc.

2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.

The Japanese View of the Russia: 2016




		Russia	
Total military forces		Approx. 800,000 troops	
Ground forces	Ground troops	Approx. 270,000 troops	
	Tanks	T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 2,700 (Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 20,200 including mothballed tanks)	
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 1,010 vessels Approx. 2,049,000 tons	
	Aircraft carriers	1 vessel	
	Cruisers	4 vessels	
	Destroyers	14 vessels	
	Frigates	32 vessels	
	Submarines	69 vessels	
		Marines	Approx. 35,000 troops
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 1,340 aircraft	
	Modern fighter aircraft	158 MiG-29 aircraft 32 Su-30 aircraft	
		112 MiG-31 aircraft 18 Su-33 aircraft	
200 Su-25 aircraft 57 Su-34 aircraft			
199 Su-27 aircraft 36 Su-35 aircraft			
(4th generation fighter aircraft: Total 812)			
Bombers	16 Tu-160 aircraft 60 Tu-95 aircraft 63 Tu-22M aircraft		
Reference	Population	Approx. 142.40 million	
	Term of service	1 year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)	

Source: *Defense of Japan, 2016*,
Ministry of Defense, p. 75,
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_papers/2016.html

Source: "The Military Balance 2016," etc. Ground troops include 240,000 ground force personnel and 34,000 airborne unit personnel.


Military Spending: The “Universal Metric” of China’s Emerging Power

IMF Estimate of Comparative Rise in GDP: 2000-2021



Source: CIA World Factbook and IMF, *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2016, accessed June, 29 2016, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx>, adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman and Joseph Kendall at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. (* Official exchange rate)


Shifts in Wealth (Per Capita Income)



Source: IMF, *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2016, accessed June 29, 2016, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx> adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman and Joseph Kendall at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

China's Official Spending Estimate – Military vs. GDP: 2007-2016

(In constant 2016 \$US Billions)





China's officially-disclosed military budget grew at an average of 9.8 percent per year in inflation-adjusted terms from 2006 through 2015, and 8.5 percent per year in inflation-adjusted terms from 2007 through 2016

2016 Defense Budget Comparison
(Adjusted for Inflation in \$US Billions)


China (<i>Official Budget</i>)	\$144.3
Russia (<i>National Defense Budget</i>)	\$46.2
Japan	\$47.2
India	\$37.0
Republic of Korea	\$32.8
Taiwan	\$10.5

IISS Estimate of Comparative Military Budgets




Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2017, p. 18

Military Expenditures by UNSC Country: SIPRI 1990-2015 (Current \$US Billions)



China's military-related spending for 2016 exceeded \$180 billion" and its defense budget is expected to increase yearly by an average of 7 percent, growing to \$260 billion by 2020, according to the US Defense Department's 2017 China Military Power


Military Expenditures as Percent of GDP by UNSC Country: SIPRI 1990-2015




Source: SIPRI, *Military Expenditure Data 1988-2015*, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>. Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman and Joseph Kendall at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2016.

China versus Asia: IISS

Defence budgets in states bordering the East and South China seas (2016)¹



China's defence budget and selected other regional budgets¹



Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2017, p. 21

China versus U.S. Convergence in Military Spending: IISS Estimate




Figure 19 China-United States Defence Expenditure Convergence 2001-2050

Source: Source: *IISS Military Balance 2013* p. 256, *China Military Power 2017.*, 66.


Jane's Defense Budgets expects China's defense budget to increase by an annual average of 7 percent...

Growing to \$260 billion by 2020 for a force that, although expanding, is expected over the near-term to remain primarily regional.

As of March 2016, the DoD Comptroller forecasted that U.S. defense budget outlays will reach \$606 billion in current dollars over the same period for a force with a global footprint.

Conventional Forces and Build-Up

China's Trade-Off Between Quality and Quantity




- Restructure to five regional commands in 2015-2016
- Cut 300,000 more ground troops by end 2017
- Emphasize joint warfare, area denial, engagement outside China

	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2016
Paramilitary	7,000,000	4,300,000	12,000,000	1,200,000	1,100,000	1,500,000	660,000	660,000
Strat Forces/Coast Guard	0	0	90,000	90,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000
Reserves	0	5,000,000	4,000,000	1,200,000	550,000	800,000	510,000	510,000
Air Force	400,000	490,000	470,000	470,000	420,000	400,000	330,000	398,000
Navy/Marines	630,000	350,000	260,000	260,000	220,000	255,000	255,000	235,000
Army	3,600,000	3,160,000	2,300,000	2,200,000	1,700,000	1,600,000	1,600,000	1,600,000

■ Army ■ Navy/Marines ■ Air Force ■ Reserves ■ Strat Forces/Coast Guard ■ Paramilitary

Changing Import Dependence: Total Arms Imports to China, 1994 – 2014 (US\$ millions, 1990 prices)



Source: SIPRI, "Arms Transfers Database, Importer/Exporter TIV Tables," accessed October 24, 2016, <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php>

China's Major Ground Units


Major Ground Units




Ground Forces in End-2016

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces			
	China		Taiwan
	Total	Taiwan Strait Area	Total
Personnel (Active in Combat Units)	850,000	190,000	130,000
Group Armies/Army Corps	18	6	3
<i>Infantry Divisions</i>	12	3	0
<i>Infantry Brigades</i>	23	6	7
<i>Mechanized Infantry Divisions</i>	7	1	0
<i>Mechanized Infantry Brigades</i>	25	6	3
<i>Armor Divisions</i>	1	0	0
<i>Armor Brigades</i>	17	6	4
<i>Army Aviation Brigades and Regiments</i>	11	5	3
<i>Artillery Brigades</i>	22	8	5
Airborne Corps	1	1	0
Amphibious Divisions	2	2	0
Amphibious Brigades	3	3	2
Tanks	7,000	2,000	1,100
Artillery Pieces	8,000	2,600	1,600
<p>Note: The 2016 chart focuses on PLA combat units and applies a changed methodology, resulting in significantly lower personnel numbers than shown in previous reports. This does not reflect a sudden drop in capability. This presentation is likely to change further as the PLA carries out its announced demobilization of 300,000 troops by 2017. This chart also changes how it presents amphibious units, which in the PLA are in both the PLAA and PLAN Marine Corps. The "Taiwan Strait Area" includes select national-level assets and units in the PLA's Eastern and Southern Theaters. The numbers of personnel and systems are approximate.</p>			

China's Changing Army: 1985-2016



China's Army Modernization: Percent of Modern Weapon Systems, 2000-2016



Major Naval Units

China's Major Naval Units



Source: Department of Defense, Chinese Military Power, 2017, p. 27..

Naval Forces in End-2016

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces			
	China		Taiwan
	Total	Eastern and Southern Theater Navies	Total
<i>Aircraft Carriers</i>	1	0	0
<i>Destroyers</i>	31	24	4
<i>Frigates</i>	56	42	22
<i>Corvettes</i>	23	14	1
<i>Tank Landing Ships/ Amphibious Transport Dock</i>	34	32	12
<i>Medium Landing Ships</i>	21	15	4
<i>Diesel Attack Submarines</i>	54	34	4
<i>Nuclear Attack Submarines</i>	5	2	0
<i>Ballistic Missile Submarines</i>	4	4	0
<i>Coastal Patrol (Missile)</i>	88	70	45
<i>Coast Guard Ships</i>	185	N / A	25

Note: The PLAN has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the Eastern and Southern Theater Navies would participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The Northern Theater Navy (not shown) would be responsible primarily for protecting the sea approaches to China, but could provide mission-critical assets to support other fleets. In conflict, China may also employ CCG ships to support military operations.

China's Evolving Precision Strike Capability

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (300-1,000 km). The PLA Rocket Force has approximately 1,200 SRBMs. The force fields advanced variants with improved ranges and accuracy in addition to more sophisticated payloads, while gradually replacing earlier generations that do not possess true precision strike capability.

Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (1,000-3,000 km). The PLA is fielding approximately 200-300 conventional MRBMs to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships operating far from China's shores out to the first island chain.

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (3,000-5,500 km). The PLA is developing a nuclear and conventional road-mobile IRBM, which increases its capability for near-precision strike as far as the "second island chain." The PLAN also is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with sky wave and surface wave OTH radars, which can be used in conjunction with reconnaissance satellites to locate targets at great distances from China, thereby supporting long-range precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs.

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles. The PLA continues to field approximately 200-300 air- and ground-launched LACMs for standoff precision strikes. Air-launched cruise missiles include the YJ-63, KD-88, and the CJ-20 (the air-launched version of the CJ-10 GLCM). China recently adapted the KD-88 LACM, which has an advertised range of more than 100 km, and may be testing a longer-range version. China also is developing the CM-802AKG LACM, an export system that can strike both land and ship targets from fighters or bombers.


Ground-Attack Munitions. The PLAAF has a small number of tactical air-to-surface missiles (ASM) as well as precision-guided munitions including all-weather, satellite-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and laser-guided bombs. China is developing smaller-sized ASMs such as the AR-1, HJ-10 anti-tank, Blue Arrow 7 laser-guided, and KD-2 missiles in conjunction with its increasing development of UAVs. China is also adapting to UAV Global Positioning System-guided munitions such as the FT-5 and LS-6 that are similar to the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles. China deploys a wide range of advanced ASCMs with the YJ-83 series as the most numerous, which are deployed on the majority of China's ships as well as multiple aircraft. China has also outfitted several ships with YJ-62 ASCMs and claims that the new LUYANG III class DDG and future Type 055 CG will be outfitted with a vertically launched variant of the YJ-18 ASCM. The YJ-18 is a long-range torpedo-tube-launched ASCM capable of supersonic terminal sprint which has likely replaced the older YJ-82 on SONG, YUAN, and SHANG class submarines. China has also developed the long range supersonic YJ-12 ASCM for the H-6 bomber. At China's military parade in September 2015, China displayed a ship-to-ship variant of the YJ-12 called the YJ-12A. China also carries the Russian SS-N-22 SUNBURN on four Russian built SOVREMENYY-class DDGs and the Russian SS-N-27b SIZZLER on eight Russian built KILO-class submarines.


Anti-Radiation Weapons. China is starting to integrate an indigenous version of the Russian Kh-31P (AS-17), known as the YJ-91, into its fighter-bomber force. The PLA imported Israeli-made HARPY UAVs and Russian-made anti-radiation missiles during the 1990s.

Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions. The PLA is developing and deploying artillery systems with the range to strike targets within or even across the Taiwan Strait, including the PHL-03 300 mm multiple-rocket launcher (MRL) (greater than 100 km range) and the longer-range AR-3 dual-caliber MRL (out to 220 km range).


China's Naval Modernization: Expanding in PLAN Exercise Locations



China's Naval Modernization: Quality versus Quantity



China's Naval Modernization: Increase in Modern Major Combat Ships



China's Nationwide Air Power: Locations of PLAAF & PLAN Major Aviation Units



Source: Department of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2016*

Major Air Units

China's Major Air Units




Source: Department of Defense, Chinese Military Power, 2017, p. 30..

Air Forces in End-2016

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces			
	China		Taiwan
	Total	Within range of Taiwan	Total
Fighters	1,700	130	384
Bombers/Attack	400	200	0
Transport	475	150	19
Special Mission Aircraft	115	75	25


Note: The chart displays military aircraft only, but the PLAAF may supplement its military transports with civilian aircraft in a combat scenario. The chart categorizes aircraft as "within range of Taiwan" if they are able to conduct combat operations against Taiwan without refueling from their current location; however, the number of aircraft "within range" may be significantly increased through any combination of aircraft forward deployment, decreased ordnance loads, or altered mission profiles.

China's Air Modernization: Total versus Modern Combat Aircraft, 1985-2016



*The following systems are considered modern: J-10, J-10A, J-10B, J-10S, J-11, J-11B, J-11BS, Su-27SK, Su-27UBK, Su-30MKK
 Source: IISS, *Military Balance* 1985-2016 .

China's Air Modernization: Percent of Modern Combat Aircraft, 1985-2016



Note: "Percentage Modern" assesses only combat capable aircraft

Source: IISS, *Military Balance* 1985-2015. Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman and Joseph Kendall at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Nuclear Forces and the Future of “Parity”

China and Nuclear Deterrence - I

Nuclear Triad. China maintains nuclear-capable delivery systems in its missile forces and navy and is developing a strategic bomber that officials expect to have a nuclear mission. Its deployment and integration would provide China with its first credible nuclear “triad” of delivery systems dispersed across land, sea, and air—a posture considered since the Cold War to improve survivability and strategic deterrence.

In 2016, the PLAAF commander referred publicly to the military’s efforts to produce **an advanced long-range strategic bomber**, a platform observers tied to nuclear arms. Past PLA writings expressed the need to develop a “stealth strategic bomber,” suggesting aspirations to field a strategic bomber with a nuclear delivery capability. The PLARF and PLAN are responsible for land- and sea-based nuclear capabilities. The PLAAF does not currently have a nuclear mission.

In 2016, China began fielding the **DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which is capable of conducting conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets and conventional strikes against naval targets in the western Pacific Ocean. Development of the new multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capable, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the CSS-X-20 (DF-41), continued in 2016.**

The PLARF also continues to enhance its silo-based ICBMs and is adding more survivable, mobile delivery systems. China’s ICBM arsenal to date consists of approximately **75-100 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A) and MIRV-equipped Mod 3 (DF-5B); the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1 and 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the shorter range CSS-3 (DF-4). The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States.**

Since 2002, the PLAN has constructed ten nuclear submarines—two SHANG I-class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II-class SSNs (Type 093A), and **four JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094), which are equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).** China’s four operational JIN-class SSBNs represent China’s first credible, sea-based nuclear deterrent. **China’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN, will likely begin construction in the early-2020s, and reportedly will be armed with the JL-3, a follow-on SLBM.**

Over the next decade, China probably will construct a new variant of the SHANG class, the Type 093B guided-missile nuclear attack submarines (SSGN), which not only would improve the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability but might also provide it with a more clandestine land-attack option.

China and Nuclear Deterrence - II

Launch On Warning. PLA writings express the value of a “launch on warning” nuclear posture, an approach to deterrence that uses heightened readiness, improved surveillance, and streamlined decision-making processes to enable a more rapid response to enemy attack. These writings highlight the posture’s consistency with China’s NFU policy, suggesting that it may be an aspiration for China’s nuclear forces. China is working to develop a space-based early warning capability that could support this posture in the future.


The PLA continues to maintain a robust and technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program protecting all aspects of its military forces, including C2, logistics, missile systems, and naval forces. China’s NFU nuclear policy also contributed to the construction of UGFs for the country’s nuclear forces, which may have planned to survive an initial nuclear strike.

China began to update and to expand its military UGF program in the mid- to late-1980s. This modernization effort took on a renewed urgency following China’s observation of U.S. and coalition air operations during the 1991 Gulf War and their use in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. These military campaigns convinced China that it needed to build more survivable, deeply buried facilities, resulting in the PLA’s widespread UGF construction effort over the past fifteen years .

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
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The Shifting Global Nuclear Balance: 1945-2017- I



The Shifting Global Nuclear Balance: 1945-2017- II

Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories, 2017



Country	Deployed Strategic	Deployed Nonstrategic	Reserve/ Nondeployed	Military Stockpile	Total Inventory
Russia	1,910 ^a	0 ^b	2,390 ^c	4,300	7,000 ^d
United States	1,650 ^e	150 ^f	2,200 ^g	4,000 ^h	6,800 ⁱ
France	280 ^j	n.a.	10 ^j	300	300
China	0 ^k	? ^k	270	270	270 ^k
United Kingdom	120 ^l	n.a.	95	215	215 ^l
Israel	0	n.a.	80	80	80 ^m
Pakistan	0	n.a.	120-130	120-130	120-130 ⁿ
India	0	n.a.	110-120	110-120	110-120 ^o
North Korea	0	n.a.	?	?	? ^p
Total:^q	~3,960	~150	~5,300	~9,400	~14,900

China is thought to have “[several hundred warheads](#),” far less than the 1,600-3,000 that have been suggested by some. None of the warheads are thought to be fully deployed but kept in storage under central control. The existence of a Chinese non-strategic nuclear arsenal is uncertain. The Chinese arsenal is increasing with production of new warheads for DF-31/31A and JL-2 missiles.

Chinese Nuclear Forces

Type	NATO designation	Number of launchers	Year deployed	Range (kilometers)	Warhead x yield (kilotons)	Number of warheads
Land-based ballistic missiles						
DF-4	CSS-3	~10	1980	5500+	1 × 3300	~10
DF-5A	CSS-4 Mod 2	~10	1981	13,000+	1 × 4000–5000	~10
DF-5B	CSS-4 Mod 3	~10	2015	~12,000	3 × 200–300	~30
DF-15	CSS-6	?	1990	600	1 × ?	? ^a
DF-21	CSS-5 Mods 1, 2, 6	~80	1991, 2000, 2016	2150	1 × 200–300	~80 ^b
DF-26	?	?	(2017)	4000+	1 × 200–300	?
DF-31	CSS-10 Mod 1	~8	2006	7000+	1 × 200–300	~8
DF-31A	CSS-10 Mod 2	~25	2007	11,000+	1 × 200–300	~25
DF-41	CSS-X-20	n.a.	?	?	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Subtotal:</i>		~143				~163 ^c
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles^d						
JL-1	CSS-NX-3	n.a.	1986	1000+	1 × 200–300	n.a.
JL-2	CSS-NX-14	(48)	(2015)	7000+	1 × 200–300	(48)
<i>Subtotal:</i>		(48)				(48)
Aircraft						
H-6 ^e	B-6	~20	1965	3100+	1 × bomb	~20
Fighters ^f	?	?	?	n.a.	1 × bomb	?
Cruise Missiles^g						
DH-10	CJ-10	~250	2006?	1500?	1 × ?	?
DH-20?	CJ-20?	?	?	?	1 × ?	?
Total						~183 (260) ^h

^aThe CIA concluded in 1993 that China “almost certainly” had developed a warhead for the DF-15, although it is unclear if the capability was fielded.

^bThis table only counts nuclear versions DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) and DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2), each of which has fewer than 50 launchers deployed. The conventional DF-21C and DF-21D are not counted.

^cThe missile and warhead inventory may be larger than the number of launchers, some of which can be reused to fire additional missiles.

^dThe JL-1 is no longer thought to be operational, and the JL-2 may be close to becoming fully operational. Warheads for the JL-1 may have been retired by now, and warheads for the JL-2 have been produced.

^eBombers were used to conduct at least 12 of China’s nuclear test explosions between 1965 and 1979. We believe that a small number of China’s H-6 bombers may have a secondary nuclear mission. The aircraft range is equivalent to combat radius, which for some H-6 bombers can be extended with air refueling.

^fA fighter-bomber was used in a nuclear test in 1972, but it is unknown whether a tactical bomb capability has been fielded.


^gUS Air Force intelligence lists the ground-launched DH-10 land-attack cruise missile as “conventional or nuclear.” US Air Force Global Strike Command also lists the air-launched cruise missile CJ-20 as nuclear-capable, but it is unclear whether that finding comes from a coordinated intelligence assessment.

^hThe number in parentheses includes the 48 warheads produced for the four existing nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, as well as about 30 additional warheads (including warheads for the DF-26, those awaiting dismantlement, and a small inventory of spares), for a total stockpile of approximately 260 warheads.

China's Missile Forces


China's Missile Forces			
System	Missiles	Launchers	Estimated Range
ICBM	75-100	50-75	5,400-13,000+ km
MRBM	200-300	100-125	1,500+ km
SRBM	1,000-1,200	250-300	300-1000 km
GLCM	200-300	40-55	1,500+ km
LACM	200-300	40-55	1,500+ km

China's Missile Ranges



Note: The above image shows a simplified indication of the potential reach of each type of missile taking Beijing as a central point.

China's Long-Range Missile Ranges



Source:
Chinese
Military Power,
2017, DoD, p.
33.

Space, Anti-Space, and Cyber


China's Joint Strategic Support Force (Est. 2015)

Space and Counterspace. PLA strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems—and to deny them to adversaries—as central to enabling modern informatized warfare. As a result, the PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space. Although PLA doctrine does not appear to address space operations as a unique operational “campaign,” space operations will probably form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and serve a key role in enabling actions that counter third-party intervention. China is seeking to utilize space systems to establish a real-time and accurate surveillance, reconnaissance and warning system, and to enhance C2 in joint operations. These advancements include the Beidou navigation satellite system and space surveillance capabilities that can monitor objects across the globe and in space.

Information Operations (IO). China assesses that an essential element, if not a fundamental prerequisite, of its ability to counter third-party intervention is the ability to control the information spectrum in the modern battlespace. PLA authors often cite this capability—sometimes termed “information blockade” or “information dominance”—as necessary to seize the initiative and set the conditions needed to achieve air and sea superiority. China’s “information blockade” concept likely envisions the employment of military and non-military instruments of state power across the battlespace, including in cyberspace and space. China’s investments in advanced EW systems, counterspace weapons, and cyber operations—combined with more traditional forms of control such as propaganda and denial through opacity—reflect the priority the PLA places on information advantage.

Cyberoperations. Chinese cyberattack operations could support A2/AD by targeting critical nodes to disrupt adversary networks throughout the region. China believes its cyber capabilities and personnel lag behind the United States. To deal with these perceived deficiencies, China is improving training and domestic innovation to achieve its cyber capability development goals. PLA researchers advocate seizing “cyberspace superiority” by using offensive cyber operations to deter or degrade an adversary’s ability to conduct military operations against China.

China's Active Satellites



China: New Satellites Launched Per Year 2010-2014




Table 2: Chinese versus U.S. Space Launches, 2010–2014

	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>
Chinese Launches (Satellites Deployed)	15 (20)	19 (18)	19 (25)	14 (17)	16 (19)
U.S. Launches (Satellites Deployed)	15 (41)	19 (39)	16 (35)	20 (85)	23 (110)

Source: DoD Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, April 2015; Source: “China’s Space and Counterspace Programs”, 2015 Report to Congress, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2015, p. 294, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF


China's Direct-Ascent ASAT Tests

Date	Orbital Debris	Missile	Notes
July 2005	No	SC-19	Rocket test
February 2006	No	SC-19	Failed intercept and destruction of an orbital target
January 2007	Yes	SC-19	Successful intercept and destruction of an orbital target
January 2010	No	SC-19	Successful intercept and destruction of a suborbital target
January 2013	No	SC-19	Successful intercept and destruction of a suborbital target
May 2013	No	DN-2	Rocket test
July 2014	No	SC-19	Successful intercept and destruction of a suborbital target

Source: "China's Space and Counterspace Programs", 2015 Report to Congress, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2015, p. 294, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF

Expanding Strategic Needs

China's Global Export Levels in 2014



China's Expanding Strategic Interests: One Belt, One Road (OBOR) - I




[James Griffiths](#), "Just what is this One Belt, One Road thing anyway?", CNN, Updated 10:16 PM ET, May 11, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/11/asia/china-one-belt-one-road-explainer/index.html>

China's Expanding Strategic Interests: One Belt, One Road (OBOR) - II

MERICS China Mapping

One Belt, One Road: With the Silk Road Initiative, China Aims to Build a Global Infrastructure Network

Projects completed and planned: December 2015



China's Energy Needs

China's Top Crude Suppliers 2016		
Country	Volume (1,000 barrels/day)	Percentage of Imported Crude Oil
Russia	1,009	13
Saudi Arabia	847	11
Angola	773	10
Iraq	641	8
Oman	640	8
Iran	531	7
Venezuela	320	4
Brazil	288	4
Kuwait	278	4
UAE	251	3
Others	2,029	27
Total	7,607	99

CHINA'S ENERGY STRATEGY

China's engagement, investment, and foreign construction related to energy remained active in 2016. China invests in energy projects in more than 40 countries. This ambitious investment in energy assets is driven primarily by China's desire to ensure reliable, diverse energy sources to support economic growth, a need that heightens its interest in areas such as Central Asia and the Strait of Malacca that are critical to the transport of natural gas and oil respectively. The Chinese companies involved are also interested in increasing profitability and access to advanced technologies.

China hopes to diversify both energy suppliers and transport options. As a net importer of oil and natural gas, China relies on trade and seeks to maintain a supply chain that is less susceptible to external disruption.

In 2016, China imported oil to meet approximately 64 percent of its need. This figure is projected to grow to approximately 80 percent by 2035, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). Also in 2016, 36 percent of China's natural gas demand was met with imports, and is projected to grow to 42 percent by 2035, according to the IEA. China continues to look primarily to the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Russia/Central Asia to satisfy its growing oil and gas demands.

China is particularly reliant on unimpeded SLOCs like the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. In 2016, approximately 80 percent of China's oil imports and 11 percent of natural gas imports transited the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. Despite China's efforts, the sheer volume of oil and liquefied natural gas that is imported to China from the Middle East and Africa will continue to make strategic SLOCs important to China.

Separate crude oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan to China illustrate efforts to increase overland supply. China plans to double the capacity of its pipeline to Russia from 300,000 to 600,000 barrels per day (b/d) by 2018. Additionally, in 2015, construction was finished on the 440,000-b/d Burma-China oil pipeline; however, transit fees negotiations currently are being finalized so the pipeline is not yet fully operational. This pipeline bypasses the Strait of Malacca by transporting crude oil from Kyaukpaya, Burma to Kunming, China. The crude oil for this pipeline will be supplied by Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern and African countries.


Approximately 46 percent of China's natural gas imports (34.2 billion cubic meters (bcm)) came from Turkmenistan by pipeline via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This pipeline is currently designed to carry 55 bcm per year with plans to expand it to 80 bcm per year. A natural gas pipeline connecting China to Burma is designed to deliver 12 bcm per year, but shipped 3.9 bcm of gas in 2016. The Russia-China natural gas pipeline is in the initial construction phase. The pipeline is expected to deliver up to 38 bcm of gas per year by 2035; initial flows are scheduled to start by 2019.

Chinese Dependence on the Flow of Petroleum Exports


Daily transit volumes through world maritime oil chokepoints



Major crude oil trade flows in the South China Sea (2011)
million barrels per day




Major LNG trade flows in the South China Sea (2011)
trillion cubic feet



<https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10671>, and <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-tonics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC>

China's Energy Transport Routes

China's Energy Import Transit Routes



Northeast Asia and the Koreas

South Korean View of Comparative Military Strength of the Two Koreas: 2016 (As of December 2016)

- Marine Corps included with Army
- North Korean artillery do not include 76.2 mm guns with infantry regiments

		Category	South Korea	North Korea		
Troops (peacetime)	Army		490,000	1,100,000		
	Navy		70,000 (including 29,000 Marine Corps troops)	60,000		
	Air Force		65,000	110,000		
	Strategic Force		-	10,000		
	Total		625,000	1,280,000		
Major Forces	Army	Units	Corps	12 (including Special Warfare Command)	17	
			Divisions	43 (including Marine Corps)	82	
			Maneuver Brigades	15 (including Marine Corps)	74 (Reserve Military Training Brigade not included)	
		Equipment	Tanks	2,400 (including Marine Corps)	4,300	
			Armored Vehicles	2,700 (including Marine Corps)	2,500	
			Cannons	5,700 (including Marine Corps)	8,600	
			MLRS/MRLs	200	5,500	
			Ground-to-ground missiles	60 launchers	100 launchers (Strategic force)	
			Submarines		10	70
			Navy	Surface Vessels	Combatants	110
	Amphibious ships	10			250	
	Mine warfare vessels (mine sweeping boats)	10			20	
	Support and auxiliary vessels	20			40	
	Air Force	Combat aircraft	410	810		
		Surveillance & control aircraft	60 (including those belonging to the Navy)	30		
		Transport aircraft (including AN-2)	50	330		
		Trainers	180	170		
	Helicopters (Army/Navy/Air Force)		690	290		
	Reserve Troops		3,100,000 (including officer candidates, wartime labor call, and secondment and alternative service personnel)	7,620,000 (including Reserve Military Training Unit, Worker-Peasant Red Guards, and Red Youth Guard)		

Source: *South Korean Defense White Paper, 2016*, Ministry of Defense, p. 268.


South Korean View of Comparative Economies of the Two Koreas: 2016

Category	South Korea		North Korea		Comparison (South Korea/North Korea)	
	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015
Nominal GNI (trillion won)	1,490.8	1,565.8	34.2	34.5	43.7	45.4
Per-capita GNI (ten thousand won)	2,956	3,094	139	139	21.3	22.3
Economic Growth Rate (%)	3.3	2.6	1.0	-1.1	-	-
Trade Volume (USD 100 million)	10,981.8	9,632.6	76.1	62.5	144.3	154.1
Population (thousand)	50,424	50,617	24,662	24,779	2.0	2.0

* Source: The Bank of Korea

* GNI (Gross National Income): Since 1993, major countries and international organizations such as the UN and IMF have replaced GNP with GNI (GNI = GNP)

The Japanese View of the Korean Balance: 2016



		North Korea	ROK	U.S. Forces in Korea
Total armed forces		Approx. 1.19 million personnel	Approx. 628,000 personnel	Approx. 25,000 personnel
Army	Ground troops	Approx. 1.02 million personnel	Approx. 495,000 personnel	Approx. 17,000 personnel
	Tanks	T-62, T-54/-55, etc. Approx. 3,500	M-48, K-1, T-80 etc. Approx. 2,400	M-1
Navy	Naval vessels	Approx. 780; 104,000 tons	Approx. 240; 211,000 tons	Supporting corps only
	Destroyers		12	
	Frigates	4	11	
	Submarines	20	13	
	Marines		Approx. 29,000 personnel	
Air Force	Combat aircraft	Approx. 560	Approx. 620	Approx. 80
	3rd and 4th generation fighter aircraft	Mig-23 x 56 Mig-29 x 18 Su-25 x 34	F-4 x 70 F-16 x 164 F-15 x 60	F-16 x 60
Reference	Population	Approx. 25 million	Approx. 49 million	
	Term of service	Army: 5–12 years Navy: 5–10 years Air Force: 3–4 years	Army: 21 months Navy: 23 months Air Force: 24 months	

Source: *Defense of Japan, 2016*, Ministry of Defense, p. 20, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_pap/er/2016.html

Source: "The Military Balance 2016," etc.

The Japanese View of Chinese Activity Near Japan - I

Chinese naval vessels have sailed several times in the following areas (examples of activities since 2014):


- (1) Vessels sailed through Soya Strait in December 2014 (four vessels, westward) and in August 2015 (five vessels, eastward).
- (2) In February 2016, four vessels including Luhu-class destroyer sailed through Tsugaru Strait.
- (3) In December 2014, vessels transited Osumi Strait and moved from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, and then sailed through Soya Strait westward. In August 2015, vessels transited Soya Strait from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean, and then navigated in the high seas of the Bering Sea. Subsequently, the vessels sailed the Pacific Ocean, transited between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, and moved to the East China Sea. In February 2016, vessels sailed through Tsugaru Strait from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean, and then transited Osumi Strait from the Pacific Ocean to the East China Sea.
- (4) In December 2015 and February 2016, an AGI conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula.
- (5) Vessels transited Osumi Strait in June (three vessels, westward) and December 2014 (five vessels, eastward), in December 2015 (three vessels, eastward), and in February (four vessels, westward) and March 2016 (two vessels, eastward).
- (6) Vessels passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advanced to the Pacific Ocean in March (three vessels), May (two vessels), and June 2014 (three vessels), in February (two vessels), June (two vessels), July (three vessels), and December 2015 (three vessels), and in April (three vessels twice) and June 2016 (five vessels).
- (7) In March 2014, three vessels sailed the Pacific Ocean southwest of the main island of Okinawa.
- (8) Vessels transited between Yonaguni Island and Nakanokami Island in March 2014 (four vessels, northeastward), in August 2015 (three vessels, northward), and in April 2016 (three vessels, northward).
- (9) Government vessels have intruded into territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands since December 2008 and intruded into territorial waters intermittently since September 2012. In November 2015, an AGI conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands. Since December 2015, government vessels carrying what appears to be cannons have repeatedly intruded into territorial waters. In June 2016, a frigate entered the contiguous zone north of the Senkaku Islands, and an AGI conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands.

In addition, in March 2015, two vessels including Sovremenny-class destroyer (10) sailed between Amamioshima Island and Yokotejima Island in the southwest direction. In June 2016, an AGI (11) sailed in territorial waters near Kuchinoerabu Island and then (12) in the contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island. Furthermore, in January 2013, a Jiangkai I-class frigate is suspected to have directed fire-control radar at a helicopter based on an MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea. In the same month, a Jiangwei II-class frigate directed fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea.

In the South China Sea, incidents have occurred, including standoffs between Chinese and Philippine vessels and Chinese and Vietnamese vessels.



The Japanese View of Chinese Activity Near Japan - II



Taiwan

China's Amphibious Capabilities

The PLA continues to make modest gains in amphibious warfare by integrating new capabilities and training consistently. Its amphibious warfare capability focuses on two geographic areas: the PLAA focuses its amphibious efforts on a Taiwan invasion while the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) focuses on small island seizures in the South China Sea, with a potential emerging mission in the Senkakus. Both the PLAA and the PLANMC continue to integrate closely with the PLAN's amphibious forces and the PLAA's Maritime Transport Squadron.


In 2016, amphibious elements of the PLAA's 1st Group Army and 31st Group Army continued to improve their ability to conduct and sustain amphibious operations. The 1st Group Army's training in the newly formed Eastern Theater featured new components, including real-time ISR, precision targeting for close air support assets, and nighttime reconnaissance and attack training. The 31st Group Army's training in the Southern Theater demonstrated a combined ground warfare concept in which amphibious and ground forces used an integrated command information system to coordinate a multi-pronged assault. This exercise included armor, infantry, and artillery units from both regular army and amphibious units, integrated with army aviation, chemical defense, and special warfare units.

The two PLANMC brigades conducted battalion-level amphibious training at their respective training areas in Guangdong (Southern Theater). The training focused on swimming amphibious armored vehicles from sea to shore, small boat assault, and deployment of special forces by helicopter. The PLANMC also participated in two bilateral exercises, one with Russia and one with Thailand; however, these exercises do not appear to have been very advanced.

The PLAN added the fourth YUZHAO-class LPD to its amphibious fleet in 2016, along with three new LSTs. Both classes are integrated into PLAA and PLANMC routine amphibious training.

Japanese View of Taiwan Balance: 2014

Fig. I-1-3-3 Deployment and Strength of the People's Liberation Army




		China	Taiwan (Reference)
Total military forces		Approx. 2.3 million troops	Approx. 290,000 troops
Ground forces	Group troops	Approx. 1.6 million troops	Approx. 200,000 troops
	Tanks	Type-99A, Type-98A, Type-96A, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 7,600 vehicles	M-60, M-48A/H and others Approx. 1,200 vehicles
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 890 vessels / 1,423 thousand tons	Approx. 410 vessels / 201,000 tons
	Destroyers & frigates	Approx. 70 vessels	Approx. 30 vessels
	Submarines	Approx. 60 vessels	4 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 10,000 troops	Approx. 15,000 troops
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 2,580 aircraft	Approx. 500 aircraft
	Modern fighters aircraft	J-10 x 264 Su-27/J-11 x 328 Su-30 x 97 (Fourth-generation fighters x 689)	Mirage 2000 x 56 F-16 x 145 F-CK-1 (IDF) x 128 (Fourth-generation fighters x 329)
Reference	Population	Approx. 1.360 billion	Approx. 23 million
	Term of service	2 years	1 year

Source: Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan*, 2014

Source: The Military Balance (2014) and others.

The Japanese View of the China-Taiwan Balance: 2016



Notes: 1. ● Theater headquarters ■ Theater Army organization
 2. Theater boundaries have not been officially announced. The above map is prepared based on U.S. DoD reports, media reports, etc.


		China	Taiwan (Reference)
Total military forces		Approx. 2.3 million troops	Approx. 220,000 troops
Ground forces	Group troops	Approx. 1.6 million troops	Approx. 130,000 troops
	Tanks, etc.	Type-99/A, Type-98/A, Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 7,200 vehicles	M-60, M-48A/H and others Approx. 1,200 vehicles
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 880 vessels / 1,502,000 tons	Approx. 390 vessels / 210,000 tons
	Aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates	Approx. 70 vessels	Approx. 30 vessels
	Submarines	Approx. 60 vessels	4 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 10,000 troops	Approx. 10,000 troops
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 2,720 aircraft	Approx. 510 aircraft
	Modern fighters aircraft	J-10 x 347 Su-27/J-11 x 352 Su-30 x 97 J-15 x 14 (Fourth-generation fighters (total): 810)	Mirage 2000 x 56 F-16 x 145 F-CK-1 (IDF) x 128 (Fourth-generation fighters (total): 329)
Reference	Population	Approx. 1.37 billion	Approx. 23 million
	Term of service	2 years	1 year

Source: *Defense of Japan, 2016*, Ministry of Defense, p. 49, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2016.html

Dashed Lines, Outer Island Chains and Possible Direct Confrontation

China's Territorial Claims

China's Territorial Claims




China's Perception of U.S. Presence in the Outer Island Chain



Source: National Institute for South China Sea Studies, *Report on the Military Presence of the United States of America in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2016*, Current affairs Press, Hainan, 2016, p. 47

Key Areas of Dispute

Island groups involved in principal disputes



Source: Ronald O' Rourke, *Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, R42784, May 31, 2016, p. 10.

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Source: Map prepared by CRS using base maps provided by Esri.


Notes: Disputed islands have been enlarged to make them more visible.

Eastern Theater

Eastern Theater




China's Conventional Strike Range



Source:
Department of
Defense,
Chinese
Military Power,
2017, p. 32.

Shifting Balance of Capability in the Taiwan Straits:

Taiwan Strait SAM and SRBM Coverage



China's Amphibious Capabilities

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
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Air Defense Zone (ADIZ) Issues



The South China Sea

The Japanese View of Southeast Asia Balance: 2016



Notes: 1. Source: "The Military Balance 2016," etc. The size of each block indicates relative size using Japan as the base size.

There are limits to the comparisons of national defense budgets which have simply been converted into U.S. dollars when the different elements are taken into consideration, such as each country's exchange rate fluctuations and price levels. However, as the purchasing power parities of Southeast Asian countries are not published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (except Indonesia), this figure intentionally represents the national defense budgets of Japan and other countries that have been converted into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate published by the Ministry of Finance of Japan.

2. For Japan, the force strength shows the actual strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2015; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of the number of combat aircraft of the ASDF (excluding transport aircraft) and that of the MSDF (fixed-wing aircraft only).

The Japanese national defense budget is the initial budget excluding the cost of the SACO, the share of the U.S. Forces realignment costs.

The Japanese national defense expenditures are the initial budget excluding SACO-related expenses (4.6 billion yen), excluding the portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community (142.6 billion yen) out of the U.S. Forces realignment expenses and expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft.

3. The national defense budget of China is from the Finance Minister's Budget Report to the National People's congress in 2016.

4. The national defense budget of the ROK is from ROK Ministry of National Defense sources from 2016, etc.

5. The national defense budget for all of Southeast Asia represents the sum of the 2015 figures for each country according to "The Military Balance 2016." However, the sum uses 2014 figures from "The Military Balance 2015" for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

6. The national defense budget of China and the ROK is expressed in U.S. dollars and is calculated using the FY2016 Ministry of Finance exchange rates of 120 yen to 1 dollar, 19 yeh to 1 yuan, and 110 yen to 1,000 won.

7. The Japanese national defense budget is expressed in U.S. dollars converting 2016 figures using the FY2016 Ministry of Finance exchange rate of 120 yen to 1 dollar.

Southern Theater

Southern Theater




One View of the South China Sea Dispute




Source: BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39165080>.

China's Perception of U.S. Presence in the Southern Pacific and South China Sea



Source: National Institute for South China Sea Studies, *Report on the Military Presence of the United States of America in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2016*, Current affairs Press, Hainan, 2016, p. 47

Chinese Outposts in the Spratleys



Building Island Bases: Mischief Reef



Source: Department of Defense, Chinese Military Power, 2017, p. 13..

Possible Military facilities on New “Islands”



Source: BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39165080>.

The U.S. Department of Defense View in 2017

SHORE-BASED INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION CONTINUES IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

China's Spratly Islands outpost expansion effort is currently focused on building out the land-based capabilities of its three largest outposts—Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs—after completion of its four smaller outposts early in 2016. No substantial land has been reclaimed at any of the outposts since China ended its artificial island creation in the Spratly Islands in late 2015 after adding over 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. Major construction features at the largest outposts include new airfields—all with runways at least 8,800 feet in length—large port facilities, and water and fuel storage. As of late 2016, China was constructing 24 fighter-sized hangars, fixed-weapons positions, barracks, administration buildings, and communication facilities at each of the three outposts. Once all these facilities are complete, China will have the capacity to house up to three regiments of fighters in the Spratly Islands.


China has completed shore-based infrastructure on its four smallest outposts in the Spratly Islands: Johnson, Gaven, Hughes, and Cuarteron Reefs. Since early 2016, China has installed fixed, land-based naval guns on each outpost and improved communications infrastructure.

CHINA'S USE OF LOW-INTENSITY COERCION IN MARITIME DISPUTES

China continues to exercise low-intensity coercion to advance its claims in the East and South China Seas. During periods of tension, official statements and state media seek to portray China as reactive. China uses an opportunistically timed progression of incremental but intensifying steps to attempt to increase effective control over disputed areas and avoid escalation to military conflict. China also uses economic incentives and punitive trade policies to deter opposition to China's actions in the region. In 2016, China used CCG, maritime militia, and fishing ships to surge its maritime presence at various disputed South China Sea features following July's arbitration ruling. At the same time, it extended economic cooperation in exchange for shelving disputes with the Philippines. Conversely, China restricted Philippine fruit imports during the height of Scarborough Reef tensions in 2012.

China's West and the Common Threat of Terrorism and Instability


The Possible Impact of the of South Asia Balance: 2016




- Notes: 1. Figures based on "The Military Balance 2016," etc.
 2. Combat aircraft include naval aircraft.

Terrorist Incidents in Central Asia Region

1970-
2015




2010-
2015




Terrorist Incidents in East Asia Region


1970-
2015



2010-
2015



Terrorism in Heavily Islamic Nations: 2010-2015




Years: (between 2010 and 2015), All incidents regardless of doubt. **Region:** (South Asia; Central Asia; Middle East & North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa)


Source: START Data Base, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>, and

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2010&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=®ion=10&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

Key Terrorist Threats in MENA and Africa: 2016




Terrorism in the MENA Region: 2010-2015



Source: START Data Base, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>, and https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2010&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=®ion=10&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.


Terrorist Incidents in China: 2000-2015

(127 Incidents)




Terrorist Incidents in China: 1970-2015


1970-
2015




2010-
2015




Terrorist Attack Types in China: 2000-2015



Terrorist Target Types in China: 2000-2015



Terrorist Weapons Types in China: 2000-2015



Chinese-U.S. Mil-to-Mil Engagements and Exercises

Mil to Mil Exchanges in 2016

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO CHINA

	<i>Month (2016)</i>
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations to China	July
U.S. Chief of Staff of the Army to China	August

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO UNITED STATES

PRC Western Theater Commander to the United States	November
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HIGH-LEVEL MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENTS

Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Indonesia	April
International Seapower Symposium in the United States	September

RECURRENT EXCHANGES

Defense Policy Coordination Talks in China	January
Intersessional Strategic Security Dialogue in China	May
Strategic Security Dialogue in China	June
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group in the United States and Plenary in China	May/ November
Joint Staff Strategy Talks	September
Interim Strategic Security Dialogue in China	November

ACADEMIC EXCHANGES

U.S. Air War College Delegation to China	February
U.S. National War College Delegation to China	April
PLA participation in U.S. Military Academy Sandhurst Competition	April
PLA Nanjing Army Command College (NJACC) to the United States	April
PLA Air Force Command College to the United States	April
U.S. National Defense University CAPSTONE to China	May
U.S. Marine War College Delegation to China	May
PLA National Defense University "Dragons" to the United States	June
PLAN Command College to the United States	June
PLA and U.S. National Defense University Strategic Discussion in the United States	November

FUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES

USN Ship Visit (USS BLUE RIDGE) to China	May
USN Ship Visit (USS BENFOLD) to China	August
PLAN Ships Visit (2 FFGs & 1 AO) to San Diego	December
PLA Mid-Level Officer Delegation to the United States	October
Disaster Management Exchange in China	November

JOINT AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISES

COBRA GOLD in Thailand	January
RIMPAC 2016	June
KHAAN QUEST in Mongolia	May

Mil to Mil Exercises Planned for 2017

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO CHINA

U.S. Senior Defense or Military Leader to China (TBD)

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO UNITED STATES

PRC Senior Defense or Military Leader to the United States (TBD)

INSTITUTIONALIZED EXCHANGES

Defense Policy Coordination Talks (TBD)

Joint Staff Strategy Talks (TBD)

MMCA Plenary and Working Groups (TBD)

Army-to-Army Dialogue Mechanism (TBD)

Disaster Management Exchange (TBD)

Mid-Level Officer Exchange (TBD)

Military Medicine Exchange (TBD)

Defense Consultative Talks (TBD)

Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue (TBD)

ACADEMIC EXCHANGES

PRC Academy delegation to the United States (TBD)

U.S. NDU or Academy delegation to China (TBD)

FUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES

PLAN Ship Visits to the United States (TBD)

U.S. Navy Ship Visits to China (TBD)

Peacekeeping Exchange in the United States or China (TBD)