The Civil Side of Counterterrorism

A Presentation to the 7th Xiangshan Forum

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October 12, 2016

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Introduction

Seven minutes is a very short time in which to make points about new approaches to counterterrorism. Accordingly, I'm going to rush throu8gh several key sets of data, and leave you with a presentation that includes both some back up sides and a bibliography that provides a full explanation of each point I raise.

The key points I want make can be summarized as follows:

- Just as development cannot occur without stability and security, stability and security cannot be achieved without development. Counterterrorism must look beyond simply fighting terrorism and insurgency, and address the underlying causes of instability and violence.

- Change requires time, and an effective strategy for counterterrorism must look at time periods of a decade or more, and future trends. Focusing on the current threat alone is a certain recipe for failure.

- One key trend is the rapid growth of Islam throughout much of the world, and the need for partnership with the Islamic world and moderate, largely Islamic states. Demonizing all of Islam over the action of a small extremist minority is an equally certain recipe for failure.

- Both the West and the East have adopted the wrong approaches to the deeper upheavals within the Islamic world. As the Arab Development Reports warned as early as 2002, These upheavals are the product of failed secularism and governance, failed development, failed governance, corruption, and massive population pressure. The Western view that "Arab spring" could bring effective stability and development when every such upheaval lacked moderate leaders a that could govern, had political experience, and could move towards development was a triumph of optimism over experience. The The East focus on "color revolutions" and conspiracy theories has been an exercise in equally absurd political opportunism.

I can only rush through a few key indicators in the time I have available, but each illustrates the scale of the problems involved, and the need to look beyond the threat of the moment, parochial attitudes towards Islam, and focus on cooperation between the West, the East, and the Islamic world.

The Global Impact of Islam: 2010-2050

Number of people, 2010-2050, in billions

Christians and Hindus rise by 35%

2.92 billion

2.76

Christians

2.17

During the next four decades, Islam will grow faster than any other major world religion.

Muslims

1.6

Muslims rise by 73% or 1.6 billion.

% of global population, 2010-2050

Christians

31.4%   31.4%

29.7

Muslims

23.2

By 2050, Christians and Muslims will make up nearly equal shares of the world's population.

Muslims will grow by 6. 5% as a share of the global population.

The Growth of Muslim Populations: 2010-2050

	YEAR	REGION'S TOTAL POPULATION	REGION'S MUSLIM POPULATION	% MUSLIM IN REGION
Asia-Pacific	2010	4,054,940,000	986,420,000	24.3%
	2050	4,937,900,000	1,457,720,000	29.5
Middle East-North Africa	2010	341,020,000	317,070,000	93.0
	2050	588,960,000	551,900,000	93.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	2010	822,730,000	248,420,000	30.2
	2050	1,899,960,000	669,710,000	35.2
Europe	2010	742,550,000	43,470,000	5.9
	2050	696,330,000	70,870,000	10.2
North America	2010	344,530,000	3,480,000	1.0
	2050	435,420,000	10,350,000	2.4
Latin America-Caribbean	2010	590,080,000	840,000	0.1
	2050	748,620,000	940,000	0.1

Source: The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050
Population estimates are rounded to the nearest 10,000. Percentages are calculated from unrounded numbers.

The primary growth is outside the MENA region:

- +5.2% of population in Asia

- +5.6% in Sub-Saharan Africa

- +4.3% in Europe

May have the same impact globally as the emergence of China

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The Rise of Terrorism in Islamic Regions

52,295 Incidents
Grow 3-4 times in 5 years
– if do not include insurgency

Years: (between 2010 and 2015), All incidents regardless of doubt. **Region:** (South Asia; Central Asia; Middle East & North Africa; Subsaharan Africa)
Source: START Data Base, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

The Rise of Terrorism in the MENA Region

22,953 Incidents
- Grow 2-3 times in 5 years if do not include insurgency.
- Only 38% can be attributed to ISIS/Daesh

Ideology: Middle Eastern Support for ISIS: 2016

Percent Who Agree that Islamic State's Tactics Are Compatible with Islam		
Jordan	Agree 1.0	Refuse/Don't Know 1.4
Morocco	1.5	3.6
Tunisia	5.3	3.9
Palestine	8.9	2.7
Algeria	8.1	4.9

Percent Who Agree with Islamic State's Tactics		
Jordan	0.8	0.7
Morocco	0.4	1.1
Tunisia	1.4	1.4
Palestine	5.5	1.8
Algeria	4.4	3.3

Percent Who Agree with Islamic State's Goals		
Jordan	0.4	1.1
Morocco	0.7	2.2
Tunisia	1.7	1.7
Palestine	6.4	1.5
Algeria	4.6	3.9

Legend: ■ Agree ■ Refuse/Don't Know

Not many Arabs sympathize with the Islamic State. The percent agreeing with the Islamic State's goals range from 0.4 percent in Jordan to 6.4 percent in the Palestinian territories. The percent agreeing with the Islamic State's use of violence range from 0.4 percent in Morocco to 5.4 percent in the Palestinian territories. The percent agreeing that the Islamic State's tactics are compatible with Islam range from 1.0 percent in Jordan to 8.9 percent n the Palestinian territories.

The Civil Side: Massive Demographic Pressure

MENA in	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Millions	81.8	105.5	137.6	184.7	252.5	310.4	376.9	420.1	520.7	581.3	635.8

- **MENA Growth in 1950-2010 was 4.5 times.**
 - *Egypt grew 4.5 times between 1950 and 2016.*
  - *Iraq grew 7.4 times*
  - *Libya grew 6.8 times*
  - *Syria grew 4.9 times*
  - *Yemen grew 5.7 times*
- **Projected MENA Growth in 2010-2015 is 59%.**

Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base, Accessed September 2016.
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
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The Civil Side: Youth Bulge

(Percentage of Native Population Below 25)

An extremely young population and massive numbers of young men and women desperate for careers, jobs, marriage, a home, and a family. The CIA estimates that an extraordinary 36.7% of Iraq's population is 0-14 years of age, and 19.6% is 15-24 years of age, and Iraq is nearly 70% urbanized. Its economy, politics, and social tensions will be under acute population pressure for at least another two decades.

	Afghanistan	Yemen	Iraq	Jordan	Syria	Oman	Egypt	Saudi Arabia	Algeria	Libya	Morocco	Iran	Lebanon	Kuwait	Tunisia	Bahrain	UAE	Qatar
0-14	42	41.7	36.7	35.8	33.1	30.4	32.1	27.6	28.4	26.9	26.7	23.7	25.2	25.4	23	19.7	20.7	12.5
15-24	22.2	21.1	19.6	20.4	20.2	19.9	17.8	19.3	17.4	18.2	17.7	18.7	17.2	15.3	16	15.9	13.7	13.4

Axis Title

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2014, Accessed April 2014,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ .

The Civil Side: GDP Per Capita

Critical failures in development fuel terrorism and instability

	Bahrain	Egypt	Iran	Iraq	Kuwait	Libya	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	Syria	Tunisia	UAE	Yemen
CIA GDP Estimate, PPP	49,000	10,900	17,400	15,300	70,700	15,900	43,800	137,200	52,300	5,100	11,300	66,300	3,800
World Bank GDP Estimate, PPP	45,500	10,529	17,303	15,057	73,246	15,597	38,631	140,649	51,924	0	11,436	67,674	3,785
IMF GDP Estimate, PPP	50,169	11,262	17,572	15,113	70,259	14,855	44,728	133,040	53,565	0	11,450	66,967	2,670

GDP Figures: "*GDP per Capita (current US$),*" *The World Bank,* accessed February 10, 2016. Wealth Figures: "Global Wealth Data Book 2012," Credit Suisse, October 2015, Accessed February 11, 2016, p. 19-22.

The Civil Side: Governance

Failed governance leads to violence and extremism, or civil conflict. Authoritarianism and repression do not suppress them, simply bottle them up until they explode.

Lower ranking = less effective government

	UAE	Qatar	Bahrain	Oman	Saudi Arabia	Tunisia	Kuwait	Morocco	Jordan	Lebanon	Alegeria	Iran	Egypt	Iraq	Yemen	Syria	Afghanistan	Libya
Gov. Effectiveness	91	89	78	70	66	63	62	61	60	51	44	43	31	25	20	17	14	12

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
The Civil Side: Corruption

Corruption breeds anger and extremism: See Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan

Corruption Index

177 is worst corruption ranking in the world

Corruption Index	Qatar	UAE	Jordan	Saudi Arabia	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Tunisia	Morocco	Egypt	Algeria	Lebanon	Iran	Syria	Yemen	Libya	Iraq	Afghanistan
Corruption Index	22	23	45	48	50	55	60	76	88	88	88	123	130	154	154	161	161	166

Axis Title

Y-axis: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 2015 (Ranked 0-177, from least to most corrupt)

Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index "The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be."

Back Up Slides

The Global Impact of Islam: 2010-2050

Number of people, 2010-2050, in billions

Christians
2.17 → 2.92 billion

Muslims
1.6 → 2.76

During the next four decades, Islam will grow faster than any other major world religion.

Unaffiliated
1.13 → 1.23

Hindus
1.03 → 1.38

The unaffiliated population will increase by nearly 10% in the decades ahead. But ...

Buddhists
0.49 → 0.49

Folk Religions
0.40 → 0.45

Other Religions
0.06 → 0.06

Jews
0.01 → 0.02

2010 — 2050

% of global population, 2010-2050

Christians
31.4% → 31.4%

Muslims
23.2 → 29.7

By 2050, Christians and Muslims will make up nearly equal shares of the world's population.

Unaffiliated
16.4 → 13.2

Hindus
15.0 → 14.9

... from 2010 to 2050, the religiously unaffiliated will decline as a share of the global population.

Buddhists
7.1 → 5.2

Folk Religions
5.9 → 4.8

Other Religions
0.8 → 0.7

Jews
0.2 → 0.2

2010 — 2050

Source: The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050

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The Civil Side: Demographics by Country

## Demographic Pressure in Gulf Countries: 1950-2050 (in Thousands)

Multiplication factors represent the change in population from 1950 to 2015

Multiplication factors: Bahrain x11.71, Iraq x7.18, Kuwait x19.23, Oman x6.72, Qatar x87.8, Saudi Arabia x7.19, UAE x80.28, Yemen x5.6, Iran x5.0

	Bahrain	Iraq	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Yemen	Iran
1950	115	5,163	145	489	25	3,860	72	4,777	16,357
1965	191	7,971	476	682	70	5,327	144	6,510	25,040
1975	259	11,118	1,007	920	165	7,208	523	7,934	33,467
1985	423	15,694	1,733	1,497	342	13,330	1,363	10,540	48,619
1995	582	19,658	1,664	2,139	510	18,755	2,458	14,832	64,217
2005	916	27,538	2,257	2,697	973	23,642	4,087	20,003	72,283
2015	1,347	37,056	2,789	3,287	2,195	27,752	5,780	26,737	81,824
2025	1,580	47,657	3,169	3,981	2,563	31,877	7,063	32,822	90,481
2035	1,700	59,262	3,482	4,601	2,574	35,614	7,773	38,437	95,772
2045	1,806	70,923	3,751	5,147	2,548	38,781	8,024	43,709	99,181
2050	1,847	76,519	3,863	5,402	2,559	40,251	8,019	46,081	100,045

Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base, Accessed April 2015.
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
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Middle Eastern Support for ISIS: 2016 – Part Two
Support with and Without Focus on ISIS actions

Figure 2. Attitudes toward Islamic State of Younger Less Educated Men and Others

Figure 3. Support for Islamic State's Goals by Control and Treatments among Younger Less Educated Men

Percent of Poorly Educated Younger Men Agreeing with Islamic State's Goals

Public Perceptions of the Importance of Sharia

% of Muslims who favor making sharia the official law in their country

Southern-Eastern Europe

Country	%
Russia**	42
Kosovo	20
Bosnia-Herz.	15
Albania	12

Central Asia

Country	%
Kyrgyzstan	35
Tajikistan	27
Turkey	12
Kazakhstan	10
Azerbaijan	8

Southeast Asia

Country	%
Malaysia	86
Thailand^**	77
Indonesia	72

South Asia

Country	%
Afghanistan	99
Pakistan	84
Bangladesh	82

Middle East-North Africa

Country	%
Iraq	91
Palestinian terr.	89
Morocco	83
Egypt	74
Jordan	71
Tunisia	56
Lebanon	29

Sub-Saharan Africa*

Country	%
Niger	86
Djibouti	82
DR Congo	74
Nigeria	71
Uganda	66
Ethiopia	65
Mozambique	65
Kenya	64
Mali	63
Ghana	58
Senegal	55
Cameroon	53
Liberia	52
Chad	47
Guinea Bissau	47
Tanzania	37

Recent surveys show (that most people in several countries with significant Muslim populations have an unfavorable view of ISIS, including virtually all respondents in Lebanon and 94% in Jordan.

Relatively small shares say they see ISIS favorably. In some countries, considerable portions of the population do not offer an opinion about ISIS, including a majority (62%) of Pakistanis.

Favorable views of ISIS are somewhat higher in Nigeria (14%) than most other nations. Among Nigerian Muslims, 20% say they see ISIS favorably (compared with 7% of Nigerian Christians). The Nigerian militant group Boko Haram, which has been conducting a terrorist campaign in the country for years, has sworn allegiance to ISIS.

More generally, Muslims mostly say that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilians in the name of Islam are rarely or never justified, including 92% in Indonesia and 91% in Iraq. In the United States, a 2011 survey found that 86% of Muslims …say that such tactics are rarely or never justified. An additional 7% say suicide bombings are sometimes justified and 1% say they are often justified in these circumstances.

In a few countries, a quarter or more of Muslims say that these acts of violence are at least sometimes justified, including 40% in the Palestinian territories, 39% in Afghanistan, 29% in Egypt and 26% in Bangladesh.

In many cases, people in countries with large Muslim populations are as concerned as Western nations...about the threat of Islamic extremism, and have become increasingly concerned in recent years. About two-thirds of people in Nigeria (68%) and Lebanon (67%) said earlier this year they are *very* concerned about Islamic extremism in their country, both up significantly since 2013.

Bioliography of Sources with Detailed Data on Causes on Terrorism and Instability

References

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