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The Changing Security Structure in the Middle East

A Speech to the International Symposium on International
Relations and Security at the Turkish War College

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Working Draft: May 26, 2016

Please provide comments to acordesman@gmail.com



There is nothing new about change in the security structure of the Middle East and North Africa, nor is it new that many key changes seemingly come without warning. The challenge today, however, is not to examine the past but to focus on the future, and here I have been asked to give a keynote speech that addresses four different sets of future trends.

- How changes to the global security system will affect the Middle East,
- How the changes taking place in terrorism affect security and the regional military balance,
- The nature of the changes taking place in the structure of terrorist organizations and behavior,
- And finally, how the impacts of terrorism and new forms of conflict have affected new forms of security problems like the flow of refugees.

A keynote speech should both help set the framework for its conference *and* be at least mildly provocative. As a result, I am going to try to address these issues in ways that present a challenge to conventional wisdom. I also am going to talk about the Middle East as if Turkey was on its edge of it and not simply part of it. This is to some extent an artificial choice, but it allows me to avoid lecturing Turks on Turkey, and sometimes discretion is the better part of valor.

Changes to the Global Security System

Let me begin with the changes to the global security system. There is a tendency to treat these changes in terms of the emergence of China and the reemergence of Russia, and as either a return to the geopolitics of the past or some new form of Cold War. I would suggest that the U.S., Europe, Russia, and China all have security interests in the region, and their respective levels of influence will change over time. These interests, however, are limited: no outside power can dominate the region, and the competing forces within the region will dominate its future – as they do its present.

China

China is clearly emerging as a major global power and one whose dependence on imported petroleum and the secure flow of trade has already led it to seek more secure ways to move energy and goods through Pakistan, Myanmar, and the South China Sea. China has already played a role in the antipiracy campaign in the Indian Ocean and has acquired limited basing rights on the Red Sea in Djibouti.

China has also made major increases in its military spending, is restructuring and modernizing every element of its military force from power projection to strategic nuclear forces, and is emerging as a great power. It may be a decade away from approaching the capabilities of the United States, but it already is spending far more than Russia. The most recent estimates of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) indicate that China spent at least \$155 billion on military forces in 2015, and possibly well over \$200 billion. This is far less than the \$598 billion spent by the U.S. – which still spent some two to four times more than China – but it compares with \$66 billion for Russia – which is roughly 11% of U.S. spending and 43% of Chinese spending.

China has little incentive, however, to project power into the region unless it must do so to protect its economy. If anything, China benefits from the role that the U.S.—and possibly Russia—can play in bringing regional stability. China’s interest in Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific are all of far greater strategic importance, and China can gain the most by using its influence selectively.

Russia

In spite of the spending gap that I have just discussed, Russia remains the world’s second largest military power. It too is modernizing key elements of its forces, and it too is changing its power projection capabilities. This became all too clear from Russia’s use of cruise missiles, bombers, and precision-guided ordinance during its intervention in Syria, and its deployment of the S400 air and missile defense system after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter that entered Turkish air space. Russia then deployed attack helicopters and highly accurate multiple rocket launchers. Russia began building up its naval and air base capabilities in Syria, while simultaneously showing that a combination of its air and land assets could reverse some Arab rebel gains against pro-Assad forces, as well as attack ISIS.

Once again, however, Russia stands to gain the most from selectively using its military power and influence in ways that demonstrate its reemergence as a major active power, giving it leverage in other regions that are of greater strategic interest – such as Russia’s “near abroad” that ranges from Turkey to Scandinavia, and in the region that ranges from Central and South Asia to the Chinese-Russian border.

The United States

As for the United States, it has learned the hard way that military power cannot reshape states like Iraq and Afghanistan, that no military operation can succeed, which does not succeed in both civil and military terms and meet the expectations of the local population, and that the key to success is strategic partnerships.

It is important to note, however, that U.S. strategic plans and defense budgets make it clear that the U.S. has no plans to leave the Middle East or the Gulf. In fact, it now has built up its air presence in six Middle Eastern states, deployed new anti-missile defense ships, and built up its naval strength in the Gulf. It is also introducing major new air attack and air combat capabilities like the F-35. It has regularly made it clear that it is staying in the region, and is committed to its allies, and its military spending data show that U.S. spending cuts have ended.

Equally important, the U.S. fully realizes at the policy level that it is not becoming energy independent. The U.S. has sharply reduced petroleum imports as a percent of total U.S. imports, and net petroleum imports to only 4.6 million barrels per day, only 1.5 million barrels per day of which come from the Gulf. At the same time, however, some 37% to 42% of all U.S. imports come from Asian nations dependent on Middle Eastern oil and gas. The U.S. depends on such states for close to a trillion dollars in annual imports, and its dependence on the global economy as a whole is far more critical than its direct dependence on petroleum imports.

The U.S. is not leaving the Gulf anymore than it is leaving Asia or Europe. In fact, for all the past talk of rebalancing its forces to Asia, the FY2017 budget request talks about

balancing a joint force for a global spectrum of conflict, and -- while it mentions the emergence of potential rivalry of threats from China and Russia -- it names Iran, ISIS, and North Korea as the key threats U.S. strategic planning must focus on.

The U.S. strategic guidance summarized in the Department of Defense justification of its FY2017 budget request states that the U.S. will, “continue its contributions to the Asia-Pacific rebalance, while remaining committed to the security of allies and partners in the Middle East. The Department will continue to work with allies and partners in Europe to promote regional security, Euro-Atlantic integration, enhanced military capability, and enhanced interoperability. Across the globe, DoD will ensure that the Joint Force is properly manned, trained, and equipped in the event of a crisis.”

At the same time, it is critical to understand the extent to which the U.S. focuses on strategic partnership, on building up local forces, and creating broader form of “jointness” that can establish a stable level of regional deterrence and deal with the threats of extremism and terrorism. As Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen have all made clear, military power has acute limits, cultures and nations assert their own identities. Successful partnerships offer far more benefits than transformational exercises in nation building

It does seem all too likely that the U.S.-Russian competition for status and influence will play out in the Middle East—although to a lesser extent than it will in Europe—and that NATO allies from Turkey to the Baltic states will face a more assertive Russia. At the same time, it is important to look beyond direct military competition. As the U.S. has shown in Syria and Iraq, and Russia has shown in Syria, strategic partnering offers all the major outside powers—China, Russia, and the U.S.—far more advantages than the search for control and major unilateral military engagements.

The Diverse Patterns of Regional Security Competition and Conflict

Military competition and war in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are, however, far more likely to be driven by regional powers than outside states, as well as by the internal tensions within each state and the forces of Islamist extremism.

This is true in both in the case of creating stable structures of regional military power and deterrence, and in the case of dealing with the growth threats posed by terrorism, non-state actors, and the instability caused by poor governance, weak development, and ethnic, sectarian, and tribal differences.

Region-Wide Military Competition

Figure One shows that direct military competition between regional states – mixed with action by outside states -- remains a critical aspect of the MENA security structure, although it cannot be separated from the threat of violent extremism.

Figure One: Key Pressures on the Middle Eastern and North African Security Structure from West to East

- **Morocco and Algeria:** Spanish Sahara and Polisario
- **Algeria:** Islamist unrest and terrorism, human trafficking
- **Libya:** Civil war and ISIS
- **Tunisia:** Uncertain stability, some ISIS attacks
- **Egypt:** Repression, border problems, Islamists, Sinai war Israel vs. Palestinians in Gaza, West Bank, Sinai issues, Hezbollah
- **Lebanon:** Confessional struggles, Hezbollah vs. Army, border clashes
- **Syria:** ISIS, Arab civil war, Kurds, Turkey, Iran, U.S., Russia
- **Iraq:** ISIS, Arab civil war, Kurds, Turkey, Iran, U.S.
- **Jordan:** Internal tension, refugees, Israel-Palestinian, Syria, Iraq
- **Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE:** Iran, ISIS/AQAP, Iraq, Syria, Shi'ite vs. Sunni, internal divisions, 40-60% cut in petroleum revenues
- **Iran:** Arab threat, Baluchi and Arab internal, vs., expanded regional influence, missile, asymmetric sea-air missile, nuclear
- **Yemen:** Civil war, Houthi, Saleh, Saudi and UAE, Iran, AQAP, ISIS

Iran's Role in Shaping the Options for Future Conflict

This is especially clear in the Gulf. Iran may have paused its nuclear efforts, but continues a major missile build-up while seeking steadily more accurate and lethal conventional warheads. It is also building up an advanced mix of naval-air-missile forces to threaten naval traffic through the Gulf.

At the same time, however, Iran illustrates a key change to the region's security structure that has its parallels in the actions of the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, Turkey and other European states. Iran uses its Al Quds forces and intelligence services to train and assist the forces of friendly states, as well as non-state actors, which can be used to expand its influence or threaten the Gulf. This use of such ties and the threat or reality of irregular warfare to exploit the sectarian, ethnic and other tensions in the region – is as important a change to the global security system as the rise of China and reemergence of Russia.

Iran's mix of missiles and conventional forces also presents the most serious threat of something approach regular warfare in the region. Yet, it is also important to note that much will depend on Iran's future access to advanced weapons, and how much and how well it spends. It involves a focus on:

- Smart ballistic and cruise missiles
- Advanced surface-to-air missiles with some anti-missile capabilities.
- Search for advanced combat aircraft.
- Passive defense through Dispersal, tunnels, sheltering.

- Sea-air missiles, smart mines, anti-ship, subs, submersibles, cyber, and space?
- Artillery rockets, anti-armor systems while seeking an indigenous production capability.
- Mixes of “conventional” and “irregular” forces using regular combat force, IRGC, and popular militias for internal defense in depth.
- Cyber and electronic warfare, space?

But, it is important to note that the bulk of Iran’s conventional forces are still heavily dependent on vintage 1970s U.S. and European arms that have never been supported by the seller country since the fall of the Shah in 1979. Additionally, Iran relies on relatively low-to-moderate quality imports from Russia, China, and Vietnam.

Iran is also still heavily dependent on combat-worn aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, land weapons, and ships it imported from the United States and Europe before the fall of the Shah. It has lacked access to most imports of advanced modern weapons since 1980, and has made comparatively few recent arms imports in spite of the fact that it has done so much to drive up the arms imports of neighboring Arab states, and has lost substantial arms during the Iran-Iraq War.

Force Quality versus Force Quantity, and the Role of Arms Transfers

This illustrates another important aspect of change in the region’s security structure. Force size has become less important than force quality, and the relative rate of modernization and technology is critical at every level of conflict from counterterrorism to major war.

It is also important to note that the very different approaches given states take to strategic partnerships – or simply seeking influence or some form of proxy – involves the growing use of arms transfers. Iran’s arms transfers to Syria, and its transfers of steadily more precise and long-range missiles to the Hezbollah, give Iran new forms of leverage -- just as Russia’s deployment of S-400s to Syria and transfers of S-300s to Iran give Russia strategic leverage.

At the same time, regional powers like Turkey, Israel, and key Arab states all benefit from access to superior U.S. and Western weapons, aid in areas like cyber warfare, and advances in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) technology. A U.S. Congressional Research Service study that draws on official U.S. estimates indicates that,¹

The Near East has generally been the largest arms market in the developing world. In the earlier period (2007-2010), it ranked first with 49.5% of the total value of all developing nations arms transfer agreements (\$87.9 billion in current dollars). The Asia region ranked second in 2007-2010 with 30.8% of these agreements (\$54.8 billion in current dollars). During 2011-2014, the Near East region again placed first with 60.1% of all developing nations agreements (\$148.5 billion in current dollars). The Asia region ranked second in 2011-2014 with \$72.4 billion of these agreements or 29.3%

¹ Catherine A. Theohary, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014*, CRS 7-5700 R44320, December 21, 2015, p. 13

The United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with the Near East during the 2007-2010 period with 53.5% of their total value (\$47 billion in current dollars). The United Kingdom was second during these years with 12.2% (\$10.7 billion in current dollars). Recently, from 2011 to 2014, the United States dominated in arms agreements with this region with almost \$86.9 billion (in current dollars), a 58.5% share. Russia accounted for 14.4% of the region's agreements in the most recent period (\$21.4 billion in current dollars)

From 2007-2010, Saudi Arabia was the largest purchaser with an agreements value of \$29.6 billion. In 2011-2014 Saudi Arabia again held the largest number of agreements with a total value of \$56.4 billion (in current dollars). India was again second with \$38.1 billion

This same study shows that the Arab GCC states ordered nearly 200 times more arms during 2007-2014 than Iran ordered, and took delivery on 74 times more new arms than Iran did. This advantage also rose with time. The Arab GCC states ordered a total of \$135.9 billion in new orders, and took \$44.2 billion worth of deliveries during 2007-2014 – largely from the United States.

Iran has made limited progress in manufacturing its own arms, and the CRS report does not cover its nuclear and most missile efforts. However, the CRS study shows that Iran only imported \$700 million worth of arms in 2007-2010, and imported less than \$50 million worth in 2011-2014, for a total of little more than \$700 million in 2007-2014. It took delivery on only \$500 million worth of arms in 2007-2010, and \$100 million in 2011-2014, for a total of \$600 million.

These data do not include the other arms transfers affecting the competition between Iran and Russia on the one side, and the U.S. and Arab states on the other in shaping the civil war in Syria. They do, however, affect the equally serious competition for influence over Iraq – another major petroleum exporter. Although Iraq is subject to considerable Iranian influence, it has also had massive military support from the United States and should be seen as a separate case from the Iran-Arab Gulf arms race. Iraq bought \$5.6 billion worth of arms in 2007-2010, and a massive \$21.7 billion worth in 2011-2014. It took delivery on \$2.6 billion worth of arms imports in 2007-2010, and this total rose to \$6.1 billion in 2011-2014.

Projecting Power by Combining Arms Transfer with “Train and Assist” and Limited Military Action

Looking region-wide, the changes in its security structure will be increasingly affected by a mix of U.S., Russian, and Chinese influence, and their military cadres and arms transfers will be a key tool in creating valid strategic partnerships. Outside powers will also recognize that such partnerships are far easier and safer ways to project power than by committing combat forces.

This already is a key structural change in the global security system. It is also one that not only affects regional states, but every non-state actor that can either be used or exploited to act as some form of military or political proxy to serve the ends of outside nations. To put it bluntly, neither the region's states nor its non-state actors can really be bought or even safely rented. Wherever a partnership does not serve valid mutual interests, it becomes a contest to see who can use whom the most.

Changes in the Way that Terrorism Affects Security and the Regional Military Balance

This brings me to the second major issue that I have been asked to address, and here, I will challenge the way the topic has been presented. I would not underestimate terrorism for a moment. I've had colleagues killed by terrorists while serving overseas. I live less than a mile from the Pentagon, I was originally scheduled to be there on 9/11, friends of mine were in the areas hit in the attack, and it took a week to begin to establish something approaching a normal pattern of life around the Pentagon.

From Terrorism to Insurgency in “Failed State Wars”

But, we are now dealing with something very different from the threat of “terrorism” per se. Terrorism is now generally only one facet of what might be called “failed state wars.” The upheavals that began in 2011 were not the result of terrorism, and—if anything—they created patterns of broader civil conflict that made it possible for some non-state actors like ISIS to go from terrorism to insurgency.

World Bank, IMF, and UNDP studies show that the worst governments and economics in the MENA region are some of the most corrupt, poorly performing, and incompetent regimes in the world. They make many of their citizens lose faith in secular alternatives and the rule of law, and create the base on which revolutions and extremism can feed.

UN and U.S. Census Bureau studies show that they also have populations that are—on an average—more than five times larger than they were in 1950, and will increase by another 50% between 2010 and 2050. CIA studies show that these states have gone from largely rural to hyperurbanized with grossly inadequate infrastructure and massive slums, and that most of the population no longer lives anything that resembles a traditional life.

It is no coincidence that the worst governments of the region’s “failed states” are the ones that faced massive upheavals in 2011. It is no coincidence that states with massive percentage of unemployed youth—or youth that see no future—face instability. And it is no coincidence that failed secularism in the region has led to religious and ideological extremism. Rule by repression, discrimination against major ethnic groups, repression of religion by sect or faith, gross corruption at the top of government and gross inequalities of income, have their inevitable consequences. They breed revolution and violence.

Failed states do not justify civil violence, a decline into extremism, or terrorist attacks. But it is not terrorism that is the real cause of the current violence in the worst governed states in the region. Many other regional states have good enough governments and economies to marginalize terrorism, but still experience a certain level of sporadic individual attacks.

Consider, for a moment, the worst cases like Iraq, Libya, Iran, Syria, and Yemen. The military threat is not really terrorism at all. It is insurgency, and violent movements capable of challenging or defeating government military and security forces. It is internal divisions that outside nations and extremist movements can use and exploit, and it is not simply a matter of military force but ideological and political conflict that extends far beyond the most extreme or “terrorist” movement and divides the entire nation on

sectarian, ethnic, tribal, regional, and economic lines. It is conflicts where no purely military victory is possible that the civil dimension – the “hearts and minds” – must be won as well as the battle for security.

The New Patterns in Regional Internal Violence

The current battles against Daesh, ISIL, or ISIS—and against Al Qaida—are shown in **Figure Two**. It is a familiar map, but it is not a map of terrorism. It is a map of effort to use irregular warfare and insurgency to seize control of given states. Terrorism is only one means to that end, and defining the difference between terrorism and irregular or asymmetric war is effectively impossible.

This becomes all too clear from the data on the growth of such violence in the Middle East, and the rest of the world, that is reflected in the START database, which is used by the U.S. State Department in its annual report on terrorism. This data is shown in **Figures Three through Figure Six**. These data lag behind the most recent fighting, but they still show a frightening growth in the number of attacks, casualties, and humanitarian costs like the creation of refugees.

There are good political and propaganda reasons to label violent non-state actors as “terrorists.” It delegitimizes them regardless of their character, justification, or the failures of the state that led to violent opposition. The fact remains, however, from a military point of view, it is not the reality we face, it does not address the key issue of creating a stable state if extremism and insurgency can be defeated, and — as the Assad regime shows all too clearly — it serves the interest of the worst governments and leaders as well as the best.

Figure Two: The Growing Threat from Violent Islamic Extremist Non-State Actors




Source: Missy Ryan and Hassan Morajea, "In Libya, the Islamic State's black banner rises by the Mediterranean," *Washington Post*, October 8, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-libya-the-islamic-states-black-banner-rises-by-the-mediterranean/2015/10/08/15f3de1a-56fc-11e5-8bb1-b488d231bba2_story.html

Figure Three: The Rising Level of Violence as Terrorism Shifts to Insurgency: 2000-2014


Number of Incidents

The majority of terrorist incidents are highly centralised. In 2014, 57 per cent of all attacks occurred in five countries; Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Syria. However the rest of the world suffered a 54 per cent increase in terrorist incidents in 2013.



Source: Vision of Humanity. *Global terrorism Index Report*, 2014 http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 14.



Figure Four: The Rising Level of Deaths as Terrorism Shifts to Insurgency: 2000-2014



NOTE: In 2011 there was a change in the data collection methodology for terrorist acts. The methodology change did not materially alter the results as the increase in terrorism is verifiable. For more information on the methodology change please see Annex D in the 2014 Global Terrorism Index.

Source: Vision of Humanity. *Global terrorism Index Report*, 2014 http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 14.


Figure Five: The Killing Impact of Given Islamist Extremist Movements



NOTE: There were 53,948 battle-related deaths recorded between the Assad regime and Syrian insurgents which includes ISIL amongst other groups. This means the figures of battle-related deaths for ISIL are likely to be much higher.

Source: Vision of Humanity. *Global terrorism Index Report*, 2014 http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 14.

Figure Six: The Humanitarian Impact as Terrorism Shifts to Insurgency in Terms of Refugees: 2000-2014



Source: Vision of Humanity. *Global terrorism Index Report*, 2014 http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 14.

Changes in the Structure of Terrorist Organizations and Behavior

This brings me to the third topic I've been asked to address: changes in the behavior and structure of terrorist organizations. Once again, I'm going to challenge the way in which the topic was presented to me.

I do need to begin by recognizing that the topic it is all too valid *if* it is considered in its current narrow context. There is no doubt that ISIS, Al Qaida, and other extremist movements are becoming steadily more sophisticated, competent, experienced, and capable. Anyone concerned with the security structure of the region must address a wide range of important changes in terrorist organizations and in their behavior.

These changes include:

- Steadily improving messaging, use of social networking, use of the Internet, and use of other communications tools.
- A broadening, and usually partially covert recruiting and indoctrination base.
- Better organization at every level from "Islamic" teaching to cell structures, suicide attacks, uses of IEDs and booby traps, creation of military unit like structures, governance, and control of volunteers and populations.
- Combinations of fundraising, exploiting local economies and economic targets, and exploitation of local resources like drug, petroleum, archeological black markets, etc.
- Creating survivable networks and cells where attacks on leaders or given elements have limited impact, and recovery is quicker and more effective.
- Improvements in communications discipline, movement patterns, encryption and deception, and cyber operations; as well as understanding of hostile intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability.
- Use of affiliates, outside support, and foreign volunteers and international mobility.
- Use of other local non-state actors – religious, political, and paramilitary.
- Manipulation of casualty and collateral damage data.
- Techniques for control of local populations.
- Shifts in patterns of attack and expansion of areas of operation to stress counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces, as well as create acclimate of fear.
- Expansion of areas of operation to Europe and outside the MENA region.
- Improved intelligence and focus on weak enemy combat units, elements of government, and opportunities created by corruption and sectarian and ethnic tension.
- Better uses of human shields, civilian populations, and conversions of settled and built up areas into "fortress-like" defenses.


These changes, however, are only part of the story. Far too often, if the state involved is weak, divided, lacks unity, and has critical divisions; the problem goes far beyond the terrorists. Sectarian and ethnic divisions, tribal and regional divisions, divided governments and security forces, and outside interference and forces create threats that are as serious as the main terrorist or extremist insurgent threat.

The constantly changing maps of the fighting in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen—and the zones of influence that given sects, ethnicities, and tribes control—are clear warnings that religious extremists or “terrorists” are only one part of the conflict, and only one threat to stability which will still be uncertain at best even if the extremist movements are largely defeated. The history of Syria is particularly grim, and it is the Assad regime that ultimately has been the far more serious source of real terrorism than ISIS.

UN and virtually all other casualty reporting shows that the pro-Assad forces have killed and wounded far more civilians than ISIS and the movements tied to Al Qaida. Pro-Assad forces have created far more internally displaced persons and refugees, and have done far more economic damage.


More broadly, the maps of areas of influence in **Figure Seven** and **Figure Eight** show just how deep the sectarian and ethnic divisions in Syria and Iraq have become, and maps of Libya and Yemen would send the same message. No amount of tactical victory over terrorist or extremist movements can guarantee any form of lasting security or stability without political and economic changes that will bring more unity and allow the civil side of ongoing or potential conflict to be resolved. Moreover, every state that faces an internal crisis in the region is both a potential new target of terrorism and a potential source of new sectarian, ethnic, or other form of conflict growing out of its internal divisions.

Figure Seven: The Key Factions Fighting in Syria: March 2016



Source: *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/13/world/middleeast/syria-control-isis-maps-cease-fire-civil-war-five-years.html>

Figure Eight: The Key Factions Dividing Iraq: May 2016



Source: Institute for the Study of War, May 23, 2016; <http://www.understandingwar.org/background/iraq-control-terrain-map-may-23-2016>

How the Impact of Terrorism and New Forms of Conflict have Affected New Forms of Security Problems like the Flow of Refugees

Let me close by touching on the last topic I've been asked to address: How the impact of terrorism and new forms of conflict have affected new forms of security problems like the flow of refugees, and how these security problems have altered relations between states in ways like the Turkish agreement with the EU. I understand how important these issues are to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Europe. And, while the U.S. is the largest aid donor to Syria, I am also ashamed as an American that we have not accepted more Syrian refugees.

Security and the Impact of Islam

But, important as the refugee problem now is, it is scarcely the key issue affecting the future security structure of Syria – much less the Middle East. First, the current refugee crisis is only part of a far broader shift in both regional and global demographics that will make future relations between Muslims and non-Muslims an even more critical aspect of security.

Work by the Pew Trust, one of the most respected analytic centers in the world studying the shifts in global opinion and populations, shows that Muslims are increasing far more quickly as a share of the global population than other religions – projections that are supported by both UN and U.S. population estimates.

In global terms, the Pew Trust estimated that the number of Muslims would increase from 1.6 billion to 2.79 billion between 2010 and 2015. Islam's share of the world's religious population would grow from 23% to 31%. The only other two religions that will experience major increases—Christianity and Hinduism—will increase only to the level where their share of the global population remains roughly constant at 31% and 15% respectively.²

If one looks at the projections for the MENA region, the number of Muslims is estimated to remain roughly 93% of the total population, but the total number of Muslims will increase by over 74% -- from 317 million to 552 million.

Other surveys consistently show that Muslims in the region put a strong emphasis on living by Sharia and their faith, and that political legitimacy, stability, and security all require their government to take this into account. These surveys also show that effective governance, rising above corruption and the narrow self-interest at the top of government is critical to maintaining popular support.³

² Pew Research Center, *The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050*, April 2, 2015, <http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/>.

³ Pew Research Center, (<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslimpopulations-much-disdain-for-isis/>); <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/07/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/>.

The security problem is not today's refugee crisis; the real security problem is to both build far stronger bridges across the gaps between different faiths, and for Middle Eastern governments to take the beliefs of their peoples fully into account.

How Can These Wars End?

Syria is the case that makes this all too clear. The UN and other sources recognize that the population of Syria has dropped from over 22 million people to less than 18 million. There are over four million Syrian refugees, many already in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. There also, however, are well over seven million Syrians in Syria that have lost their homes, jobs, and businesses. There are over 300,000 civilians dead and far more wounded. The Syrian economy—one of the least developed in the region in terms of per capita income in 2011—is now probably under one third of its 2011 level.

No war can really end that does not address an issue far more critical than the EU-Turkish refugee bargain. This question is: How does Syria rebuild? How does any temporary form of unity or civil-political settlement turn into a lasting, functional settlement? How do you go from the tactical to the strategic to the grand strategic with any lasting effect? How do you address the spillover of the Kurdish issue, the role of Iran and Hezbollah, or the tensions among Sunni, Shi'ites and Alawites that affect Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, and the entire region?

Grand Strategy Requires Civil as Well as Military Victory

How do you shape the matching security and civil dimensions of a grand strategy that can offer real hope of a lasting form of conflict resolution in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen? How do you shape an outcome that is as resistant as possible to the rebirth of terrorism, extremism, and sectarian and ethnic violence? What is the role of outside military and security forces?

In wars where victory is defined largely in terms of healing the impact of civil conflicts, forging new concept of unity, and transforming failed states into effective governance and development; the answer has to be a new civil order. Military and security efforts will ultimately only be successful to the extent that they create the conditions that make this possible. There cannot be stability without security, but the upheavals of 2011 also teach that there cannot be lasting security and stability through the use of force and repression.

Clausewitz famously warned in his book *On War* that,

War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to War relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means, the Art of War in general and the Commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one. But however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view is the object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.

If we are to establish a future security structure that meets our common values, we must never lose sight of the grand strategic objective even if it may take decades to achieve.

More than that we are talking about four existing wars in nations with over 80 million people. Walls, security zones, and rejection are not an ethical or valid solution to even the temporary aspects of the human dimension of war.

Annex A: Arms Transfers and Their Impact on the Security Structure in the Middle East

Figure A1: The Role of Arms Transfers in the Gulf and Iran's Slow Rate of Military Modernization Compared to the GCC States

(In millions of current U.S. Dollars)

Country	Arms Orders			Arms Deliveries		
	<u>2007-2010</u>	<u>2011-2014</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>2007-2010</u>	<u>2011-2014</u>	<u>Total</u>
Saudi Arabia	29,600	56,400	86,000	10,900	16,000	26,900
Other GCC Countries						
Bahrain	500	500	1,000	500	400	900
Kuwait	3,300	4,000	7,300	1,300	1,600	2,900
Oman	3,000	8,800	11,800	500	3,100	3,600
Qatar	1,000	6,200	7,200	200	900	1,100
UAE	13,500	9,100	22,600	2,000	6,800	8,800
Sub-Total	21,300	28,600	49,900	4,500	12,800	17,300
Total GCC	50,900	85,000	135,900	15,400	28,800	44,200
Iraq	5,600	21,700	27,300	2,600	6,600	9,200
Iran	700	0*	700	500	100	600
Yemen	900	200	1,100	400	100	500
Total	58,100	106,900	165,000	18,900	35,600	71,800

*Less than \$50 million. 0=data less than \$50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest \$100 million.

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, and is called *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014*, CRS 7-5700 R44320, December 21, 2015

Figure A2: Arms Transfer Agreements with Near East, by Supplier: 2007-2014
(in millions of current U.S. dollars)

Recipient Country	U.S.	Russia	China	Major West European	All Other European	All Others	Total
2011 - 2014							
Algeria	0	7,700	600	4,600	100	100	13,100
Bahrain	300	100	0	0	100	0	500
Egypt	2,000	3,600	200	2,400	700	200	9,100
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iraq	8,300	7,900	200	400	1,500	3,400	21,700
Israel	6,700	0	0	1,700	0	0	8,400
Jordan	1,200	0	100	0	200	200	1,700
Kuwait	3,500	400	0	100	0	0	4,000
Lebanon	400	100	0	0	0	0	500
Libya	0	0	0	0	300	0	300
Morocco	200	0	0	0	0	0	200
Oman	2,300	0	0	4,400	300	1,000	8,000
Qatar	100	0	0	5,200	900	0	6,200
Saudi Arabia	47,000	0	600	6,500	2,200	100	56,400
Syria	0	1,500	0	0	100	0	1,600
Tunisia	100	0	0	0	0	0	100
U.A.E.	7,400	100	0	600	700	300	9,100
Yemen	0	0	100	0	100	0	200
2007 - 2010							
Algeria	0	2,000	600	400	100	0	3,100
Bahrain	500	0	0	0	0	0	500
Egypt	7,100	300	800	200	300	0	8,700
Iran	0	400	0	0	100	200	700
Iraq	3,900	400	100	500	500	200	5,600
Israel	1,900	0	0	0	0	0	1,900
Jordan	1,200	0	0	0	100	0	1,300
Kuwait	2,300	700	300	0	0	0	3,300
Lebanon	200	0	0	0	0	300	500
Libya	0	100	0	900	300	0	1,300
Morocco	2,600	0	500	1,000	1,000	0	5,100
Oman	200	0	0	2,800	0	0	3,000
Qatar	200	0	100	700	0	0	1,000
Saudi Arabia	13,200	0	0	14,800	1,500	100	29,600
Syria	0	3,600	600	0	0	200	4,400
Tunisia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
U.A.E.	10,200	0	100	1,700	1,500	0	13,500
Yemen	0	400	0	100	300	100	900

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, and is called *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014*, CRS 7-5700 R44320, December 21, 2015.

Figure A3: Arms Deliveries to Near East, by Supplier: 2007-2014
(in millions of current U.S. dollars)

Recipient Country	U.S.	Russia	China	Major West European ^a	All Other European	All Others	Total
2011-2014							
Algeria	0	4,600	300	100	100	0	5,100
Bahrain	300	0	0	0	100	0	400
Egypt	4,200	800	700	100	300	0	6,100
Iran	0	100	0	0	0	0	100
Iraq	3,100	2,200	100	500	400	300	6,600
Israel	3,600	0	0	800	0	0	4,400
Jordan	1,200	100	0	0	100	200	1,600
Kuwait	1,400	100	100	0	0	0	1,600
Lebanon	200	0	0	0	0	0	200
Libya	0	0	0	0	200	0	200
Morocco	1,500	0	0	1,000	900	0	3,400
Oman	700	0	0	2,300	100	0	3,100
Qatar	100	0	0	700	100	0	900
Saudi Arabia	9,000	0	500	5,700	700	100	16,000
Syria	0	2,100	200	0	0	100	2,400
Tunisia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
U.A.E.	4,000	300	0	1,300	1,200	0	6,800
Yemen	0	0	0	0	100	0	100
2007-2010							
Algeria	0	4,100	400	200	0	0	4,700
Bahrain	500	0	0	0	0	0	500
Egypt	4,000	300	300	100	200	0	4,900
Iran	0	400	0	0	0	100	500
Iraq	2,000	200	0	100	200	100	2,600
Israel	4,400	300	0	0	0	0	4,700
Jordan	900	100	100	0	300	0	1,400
Kuwait	1,300	0	0	0	0	0	1,300
Lebanon	1,400	0	0	0	0	100	1,500
Libya	0	100	0	800	200	0	1,100
Morocco	200	100	500	0	100	0	900
Oman	200	0	0	500	0	0	500
Qatar	0	0	0	200	0	0	200
Saudi Arabia	5,300	0	600	4,300	700	0	10,900
Syria	0	1,400	400	0	100	300	2,200
Tunisia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
U.A.E.	800	300	100	500	300	0	2,000
Yemen	0	200	0	0	100	100	400

Source: U.S. government.

Notes: 0=data less than \$50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest \$100 million.


a. Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, and is called *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014*, CRS 7-5700 R44320, December 21, 2015.

**Annex B:
“Failed States,”
Violence and
Instability**

Figure B1: The Growing Global Impact of Islam


Growth in Islamic Population: 2010-2050



Source: The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050
PEW RESEARCH CENTER


Source: the Pew Research Center, **The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050**, April 2, 2015, <http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/>.

Support for Making Sharia the Official Law by Country



(<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslimpopulations-much-disdain-for-isis/>); <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/07/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/>.

Figure B2: Government Effectiveness and Failed Secularism



Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, Accessed June, 2015
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>


Figure B3: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Ranking (Out of 177)



Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index "The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be."

Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Accessed February, 2016.
<http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/#results-table>


Figure B4: GDP Per Capita: High Earners vs. Failed States



GDP Figures: "GDP per Capita (current US\$)," *The World Bank*, accessed February 10, 2016. Wealth Figures: "Global Wealth Data Book 2012," Credit Suisse, October 2015, Accessed February 11, 2016, p. 19-22.

Figure B3: Demographic Pressure – Part One

Demographic Pressure in North Africa: 1950-2015 (in Thousands)



Demographic Pressure in Arab-Israeli Countries: 1950-2050 (in Thousands)






Figure B3: Demographic Pressure – Part Two
Demographic Pressure in Gulf Countries: 1950-2050 (in Thousands)




Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base, Accessed April 2015.
<http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>

Figure B4: The Youth Bulge and Unemployment
(Percentage of Native Population Below 25)



Source: Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2014, Accessed April 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>


Total and Youth Unemployment Rates by Region (2008):
The Threat From POAYMs



Source: IMF, *World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia*, October 2010, p. 38


Figure B6: The Impact of Hyperurbanization

Percentages of Urbanization in 2016



Source: CIA, Accessed April 2016. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html>

Growing Hyperurbanization: 1950-2030



Source: <http://www.citymetric.com/skylines/amazing-map-shows-how-urbanisation-has-accelerated-1950-1709>.