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# "Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build:" The Uncertain Lessons of the Afghan & Iraq Wars:

## Part II - Afghanistan

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*September 21, 2009*

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# **Implementing Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build:**

## **The Afghan Case**


# **Grand Strategic Fallacies: Afghanistan**

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- **Taliban, Al Qa'ida, and other insurgent movements were shattered and could not recover.**
    - **Initial operations were only terrorist bitter enders and could be deal with tactically, rather than in struggle for control of population, ideology, and war of attrition.**
  - **Could shift immediately to post conflict reconstruction; mid and long-term development.**
  - **Political and governance issues could be solved through strong central government, democratic elections, and Western views of human rights and rule of law. Corruption and quality of governance were not critical.**
  - **Pashtun, other ethnic divisions, cultural issues would not emerge as key problems.**
  - **Quality of governance, aid, and services at local level was not critical; only required marginal US military, civil, and funding resources.**
  - **Only needed aid and peace keeping forces; could shift burden to allies.**
  - **Did not need strong and effective Afghan security forces.**
  - **Pakistan was effective ally; “sanctuaries” in Pakistan and ties to ISI did not present critical problems.**
-


# Enemy Initiated Attacks in Afghanistan May 2003 to March 2009

Number of average daily attacks per month



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.



# IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2008



“The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: DOD’s Fight Against IEDs Today and Tomorrow,” US House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, November 2008  
Committee Print 110-11 45-137, p.40

# US Deaths and Casualties in Afghanistan

## As of September 5, 2009



Total Wounded	3896	3120	72	596	108
Total Deaths	569	439	31	80	19
Total Hostile Deaths	464	367	28	53	16

*Underresourcing a Coalition of the  
Impossible and Eight Years of  
Ceding the Initiative Without Unity  
of Effort*




# A “Coalition of the Impossible:” NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area





# ISAF Troop Levels: 2007-2009




# US Troop Levels: Reacting and Losing

## An Increasing Commitment


Number of American troops in Afghanistan, in thousands.

Source: U.S. Central Command



# US Aid to Afghanistan 2001-2009


## In \$ Millions



DOD Aid	0	12.7	176.2	403.9	1909.4	2231.2	7790.5	3320.7	6521.4
Stated Department Aid	192.2	903.9	779	1978.5	2838.5	1133.7	1843.8	2146.3	2694.7

# US Aid to Afghanistan 2001-2009

## In \$ Millions



# US Aid to Afghanistan: 2001-2009

**Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan**  
(appropriations in \$ millions)

Fiscal Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2001-2009 Total
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	0.0	105.5	223.8	900.2	1,312.8	489.7	1,210.7	1,399.5	2,048.0	7,690.2
Development Assistance (DA)	0.0	18.3	35.4	152.0	165.8	187.6	166.8	148.7	0.0	874.6
Child Survival/Health (CSH)	0.0	7.5	49.7	31.0	38.0	41.5	100.8	63.5	58.2	390.2
Migration & Refugee Asst. (MRA)	32.6	135.5	61.5	63.3	47.1	36.0	16.0	42.1	7.0*	441.1
Food Aid <sup>a</sup>	133.6	207.2	71	88.3	108.6	109.6	60	154.7	47.5	980.5
Int'l Narcotics & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	0.0	66.0	0.0	220.0	706.3	232.7	251.7	307.6	484.0	2,268.3
Nonprolif, Anti-Terror, De-mining (NADR)	2.8	44.0	34.8	66.9	40.8	36.1	36.6	28.1	48.6*	338.7
Int'l Military Ed & Training (IMET)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.7	1.4	4.3
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	0.0	57.3	191.0	413.7	396.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,058.8
Other <sup>b</sup>	23.2	262.6	111.8	43.1	22.3	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.0	463.9
<b>Total 150 Account</b>	<b>192.2</b>	<b>903.9</b>	<b>779.0</b>	<b>1,978.5</b>	<b>2,838.5</b>	<b>1,133.7</b>	<b>1,843.8</b>	<b>2,146.3</b>	<b>2,694.7</b>	<b>14,510.6</b>
DOD—Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	995.0	1,908.1	7,406.4	2,750.0	5,606.9	18,666.4
DOD—CERP	0.0	0.0	0.0	39.7	136.0	215.0	206.0	486.0	726.5	1,809.2
DOD—Other <sup>c</sup>	0.0	12.7	176.2	364.2	778.4	108.1	178.1	84.7	188.0	1,890.4
<b>Total DOD Account</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>176.2</b>	<b>403.9</b>	<b>1,909.4</b>	<b>2,231.2</b>	<b>7,790.5</b>	<b>3,320.7</b>	<b>6,521.4</b>	<b>22,366.0</b>
Other Functional Accounts <sup>d</sup>	0.4	25.5	26.6	52.1	147.0	136.1	83.6	352.1	89.4	912.8
<b>Total U.S. Assistance</b>	<b>192.6</b>	<b>942.1</b>	<b>981.8</b>	<b>2,434.5</b>	<b>4,894.9</b>	<b>3,501.0</b>	<b>9,717.9</b>	<b>5,819.1</b>	<b>9,305.5</b>	<b>37,789.4</b>


Sources: SIGAR Report to Congress, April 30, 2009; Department of State annual budget presentation documents; and CRS calculations.


Notes: FY2009 figures are estimates. In some cases where funding level is not specified in appropriations language or explanatory statement, amount included is request level or final allocation when available. CERP level is reported allocation, except in FY2009 when it assumes half of appropriation (shared with Iraq) will be allocated to Afghanistan.

*NATO/ISAF Fights an  
Uncoordinated Tactical War,  
Civilians Attempt Post Conflict  
Reconstruction, and Jihadist  
Insurgents Fight a War for Control  
of Territory and the Population*



# The Insurgents Take Hold: UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones: 2005 versus 2007











# Pakistan Becomes a Critical Problem: 2005-2007




# Winning the Tactical Clashes & Losing 15-20% of the Country a Year: UN Accessibility Map 2008






# ICOS Threat Estimate: Fall-Winter 2008






# 2008: East Afghanistan - The US is No Longer “Winning” in the East




## But the Key Battles Are in the South: Kinetic Activity in Afghanistan by Province: 1 Jan 07 - 8 Mar 08



(14 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan are not included as they experienced less than 20 attacks during this time period)

# NATO/ISAF Ignores the Real War?

## Security Summary 2008



DATA DERIVED FROM NATO/JOIS DATABASE

### 2008

24% Afghans perceive improvement,  
19% perceive worsening (Sep 08 poll)

70% of kinetic events continue to occur  
in 10% of the districts

33% increase in Kinetic Events

IED events up 27%....single largest  
cause of casualties

119% more attacks on GIRoA  
5% less Suicide Attacks  
50% more Kidnappings/Assassinations

ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 35%  
Civilian Deaths: up 40% - 46%\*

#### Building Host Nation Capacity:



ANA: 13 more Kandak BNs formed  
46 Kandaks capable of BN Ops

ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD  
13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs  
fielded



## Change In Kinetic Event Density 1 Jan - 28 Dec 07 and 08

- Decreased events in select areas
- Kabul: City 47%; Province 15%  
- ANSF deaths down 61%
  - Garmsir: 43%




- 31% more kinetic events in '08 - same areas
- Increased event levels due to:
  - More ISAF / ANSF operating in more areas
  - Increased asymmetric methods
  - Continued sanctuary in PAK

\*Density range / calibration differs from province to district in order to show differences




UNCLASS // REL USA ISAF NATO

# The Growing Threat to ANA and ANP: 2006-2008



Notes: This data does not necessarily represent a measure of a province's security. For example, a province with no attacks could mean that the ANA experienced no attacks or that its presence and missions in the province were different than in other provinces. Multiple casualties could occur per attack.

Source: CSIS/CA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2009.




Notes: This data does not necessarily represent a measure of a province's security. For example, a province with no attacks could mean that the ANP experienced no attacks or that its presence and missions in the province were different than in other provinces. Multiple casualties could occur per attack.

Source: CSIS/CA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2009.



# A Rising Crisis: Security Summary February 2009

## 2008 Kinetic Activity



40% of Afghans say country headed in right direction, 38% say headed in wrong direction\*

For Jan and Feb 09, 80% of kinetic events occurred in 11% of the districts

### Feb09 vs. Previous 3 Months' Average (i.e. Nov08-Jan09)

- INS Initiated Attacks: +12%
- IED Events: -15% (57% of all casualties since Jan 07)
- Attacks on GIRoA: -37%
- Suicide Attacks: +3%
- Kidnappings/Assassinations: +20%
- ISAF Deaths: +21%
- ANSF Deaths: -27%
- Civilian Deaths: +9%

### Building Host Nation Capacity:\*\*

- ANA: 77 total Kandak BNs formed  
47 Kandaks capable of BN Ops
- ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD  
13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs fielded

*Except for the two items with asterisks, the source of information on this slide is the NATO JOIIS database.*

\* Source: ABC News / BBC / ARD Poll conducted 30 Dec 08 – 12 Jan 09 and published on 9 Feb 09.


\*\* Source: CSTC-A.



# Steadily Rising Problems in the South:

## Average Daily Insurgent Initiated Attacks

By Province, January 1, 2009 – May 31, 2009



# Partial Denial: Security Summary (April 2009)

- 64% increase in Insurgent Initiated Attacks<sup>1</sup>
- 80% of attacks occurred in 13% of the districts (Jan-Apr 09)<sup>1</sup>
- IED events up 80% (IEDs caused 60% of casualties Jan-Apr 09)<sup>1</sup>
- 28% increase in CF force strength<sup>5</sup>
- 38% increase in ANA force strength<sup>4</sup>
- 59% increase in CF offensive events<sup>1</sup>

## January to April 2009 Kinetic Activity Density Plot By District



### Footnotes on Sources:

- <sup>1</sup>JOIIS, 4 May.  
<sup>2</sup>ANQAR Survey, 31 Mar.  
<sup>3</sup>CJOC CivCas cell, 2 May.  
<sup>4</sup>CSTC-A, 4 May.  
<sup>5</sup>CJ1, 3 May.

- Civilian Deaths: down 44%<sup>3</sup>
- ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 55%<sup>1</sup>
- ANSF Deaths: up 25%<sup>1</sup>
- (Since Jan 07, ANPs suffered 1.8x more deaths than ANA+ISAF)
- Attacks on GIRoA officials & district centers: up 90%<sup>1</sup>
- Kidnappings/Assassinations: down 17%<sup>1</sup>


### Afghan Perceptions (Mar 09)<sup>2</sup>

- 35% of Afghans say security is better now than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 28%)
- 13% say security is worse than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 17%)

### ANSF<sup>4</sup>

- **ANA:** - 50 of 79 Kandak battalions capable of independent ops  
- Average of 83 total deliberate ops per week in '09 (37 in '08)
- **ANP:** - Focused District Development: 52 districts completed training  
- 14 of 20 Civil Order Police Battalions fielded
- **ABP:** - Focused Border Development: 2 cycles complete (20 companies)  
- 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Cycles underway (14 companies programmed)

## ICOS Estimate of Growth of Taliban Influence: 2007-2009









# Attack Trends: Jan-May 08 Compared to Jan-May 09

Suicide attacks were up 9%




Attacks on GIRoA officials were down 11%  
 Attacks on GIRoA infrastructure were up 156%  
 Attacks on ANA were down 18%  
 Attacks on ANP were up 15%




Complex attacks were up 152%.






Complex attacks include those involving more than one means of attack (i.e. small arms plus IED, small arms plus indirect fire, etc.) or more than 20 insurgents. Complex attack numbers do not include attacks against District Centers



Kidnappings were down 27%  
 The number of Assassinations did not change




# Insurgent Attacks by RC



- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same period in '08, insurgent initiated attacks were:
- Up 78% in RC South
- Up 41% in RC East
- Up 29% in RC Capital
- Up 21% in RC North
- Up 73% in RC West




# Growing Threat to ANA & ANP: October 2006-June 2009



Notes: This data does not necessarily represent a measure of a province's security. For example, a province with no attacks could mean that the ANA experienced no attacks or that its presence and missions in the province were different than in other provinces. Multiple casualties could occur per attack.

Source: CSIS/A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2009.




Notes: This data does not necessarily represent a measure of a province's security. For example, a province with no attacks could mean that the ANP experienced no attacks or that its presence and missions in the province were different than in other provinces. Multiple casualties could occur per attack.

Source: CSIS/A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2009.


## *Losing the People:*

*NATO/ISAF Fails to Provide  
Security, GIRoA Fails to Provide  
Governance and Justice; Aid Never  
Reaches the People, and Casualties  
Create a Critical Backlash*

## Coalition, ANA, and ANP KIA, October 2008-May 2009




# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009



## NATO/ISAF Civilian Deaths in 2008



- Up 46% according to ISAF (JOIIS/NATO) database
- Up 40% according to UNAMA database
- INS cause 80% of civilian casualties\*



\*according to ISAF report procedures / investigations

# Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

- Note: Data from 4 May Farah incident not included (final report not yet released as of 8 Jun)
- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same time period in 2008, civilian deaths were down 27%
- Since Jan 07, insurgents have caused 80% of civilian deaths known by ISAF



ISAF Responsible	
Jan 07 - May 09	20%
Jan 07 - Dec 07	19%
Jan 08 - Dec 08	21%
Jul 08 - May 09	29%
Sep 08 - May 09	22%
Jan 09 - May 09	21%


Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell Formed in CJOC  
Standardized process to investigate incidents of reported civilian casualties

- Among events that have caused civilian casualties attributed to ISAF/OEF Forces, Escalation of Force incidents have been the most frequent cause of civilian casualties, but Close Air Support events have caused the greatest proportion of civilian deaths.

NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED


Source: ISAF CJOC, CIVCAS Tracking Cell, As of 1 Jun 09

## Civilian Casualties: Jan-Jun 2007, 2008 & 2009



2007: Total 684	50	45	104	85	147	253
2008: Total 818	56	168	122	136	164	172
2009: Total 1013	127	149	134	129	261	213


## Civilian Casualties Jan-Jun 2009 by Incident Type



“Afghanistan **Mid Year Bulletin on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict**”,  
*United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Human Rights Unit, 2009, Page 7*




## Civilian Casualties caused by Pro-Government Forces by the Type of Incident from Jan-June 2009



“Afghanistan **Mid Year Bulletin on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict**”,  
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Human Rights Unit, 2009, Page 11

## Anti-Government Elements Attributed Civilian Casualties Jan-Jun 2009



■ Suicide & IED Attacks	28	62	56	56	102	96
■ Assassinations	12	16	14	22	32	14
■ Other tactics	4	2	11	1	29	38

## **Defining the Concept of Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build**

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- **Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.**
  - **Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;**
  - **Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,**
  - **Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.**
-

# Afghanistan as A Host Country

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- **Can influence, but not transform.**
  - **Cannot win as an “occupier:” credible, ongoing transfer to host country leadership and full sovereignty critical.**
  - **Need host country forces to become the face of operations as quickly as possible.**
  - **Tactical gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.**
  - **Must deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values.**
  - **Governance, and government services, are critical, and are most critical at the local and regional level.**
  - **Must find options to deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.**
-



# Realistic and Achievable Objectives

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These include:

- **Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.**
  - **Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.**
  - **Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.**
  - **Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.**
  - **Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.**
-

# Shape

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






















**In the Shape phase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics and the tribes relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), and the economic status of a given area.**

- Develop mix of US, NATO/ISAF, and host country deployments needed to create conditions where the force can credibly clear the insurgents.**
  - Limit insurgent ability to reinforce and disperse.**
-

# “Coalition of the Impossible:” NATO/ISAF Forces




# A “Dog’s Breakfast:” NATO/ISAF Forces July 2009

	Albania	140		Finland	110		Lithuania	200		Spain	780
	Australia	1090		France	3160		Luxemburg	9		Sweden	430
	Austria	3		Georgia	1		Netherlands	1770		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	165
	Azerbaijan	90		Germany	4050		New Zealand	160		Turkey	730
	Belgium	510		Greece	145		Norway	485		Ukraine	10
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2		Hungary	310		Poland	2000		United Arab Emirates	25
	Bulgaria	470		Iceland	8		Portugal	90		United Kingdom	9000
	Canada	2800		Ireland	7		Romania	1025		United States	29950
	Croatia	295		Italy	2795		Singapore	8			
	Czech Republic	340		Jordan	7		Slovakia	230			
	Denmark	700		Latvia	165		Slovenia	80			
	Estonia	150								Total (appx)	64,500



# Allied Troops in Afghanistan by Level of Engagement: July 23, 2009


**Stand Aside**  
**28%**



**Engaged**  
**15%**

**Peripheral**  
**57%**

# Engaged Troops by Nation: July 2009



# Building on a Small Core of ANA Forces



Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed in September 2008, to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin.

As of June 2009, the ANA had an actual strength of approximately 89,500 personnel. This represents 67% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by the end of 2011.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Now, over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA.

# Clear

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**In the clear phase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow.**

**Carefully coordinated international forces and host country security forces eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.**

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# Hold

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**In the hold phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIRoA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul.**


**International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return.**

***Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population.***

**Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.**



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# Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014 (Authorized Personnel)



Source: Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181)*, January 2009, pp.33.

# ANA and ANP Casualties: 2006-2008



Note: <sup>a</sup> Numbers are as of 8/22/2009.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2009.

# US Aid to Afghan Security Forces

ASFF AVAILABLE FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR

(\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.

ASFF FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON

(\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 2/28/2009 and

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS BY BUDGET ACTIVITY, FY 2005-2009

(\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of 6/30/2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.

# Progress in ANA Funding: As of 1 July 2009


**STATUS OF ASFF FUNDS FOR ANA INFRA-STRUCTURE, FY 2005-2009 (\$ MILLIONS)**



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of 6/30/2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.

**STATUS OF ASFF FUNDS FOR ANA EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION, FY 2005-2009 (\$ MILLIONS)**




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of June 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.



# ANA Readiness: As of 1 July 2009

## ANA CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS (ANA UNITS)




Note: May not include the support, close air support, and MEDEVAC.

Source: DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2009. Numbers as of 5/23/2009.

SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009*, p. 55.

# Progress in ANP Funding: As of 1 July 2009

STATUS OF ASFF FUNDS FOR ANP  
EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION,  
FY 2005-2009 (\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of June 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.

# ANP Readiness: As of 1 July 2009


STATUS OF ASFF FUNDS FOR ANP  
EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION,  
FY 2005-2009 (\$ MILLIONS)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of June 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.

# ANP Projects Cancelled Due to Security Concerns: As of 1 July 2009




Source: DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2009. Numbers as of 5/23/2009.

CSTC-A reported that it cancelled 28 ANP construction projects for security reasons. Of these, one contract was terminated for convenience and 27 projects were de-scoped from existing contracts. The awarded amounts on these contracts totaled \$33.53 million.<sup>134</sup> As illustrated, these security concerns affected projects in all regions of Afghanistan except for the northern region.


# Public Perception of ANSF Propriety

ANA has a more positive image than the ANP. Perceptions of improper behaviors by the ANA have remained relatively low while those of the ANP have decreased.

*"Have you seen or heard the police in your mantaqa doing anything improper?"*




*"Have you seen or heard the National Army doing anything improper lately?"*




**ANP "some"**  
 47% in Jul 07  
 50% in Jul 08  
 42% in Sep 08  
 44% in Dec 08  
 41% in Mar 09

Mar 09



Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

Mar 09



NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED



# Build

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**In the build phase, the U.S., members of the international community, and Afghans take advantage of the security and stability established in the clear and hold phases to build the human capital, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to achieve a stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan.**

**The U.S. and other members of the international community provide advisory services and training to the leaders and lawmakers who govern the country. International trainers and mentors help build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).**

**The Afghan citizens who will staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprise of the country receive aid, education, and training. The international community works to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.**

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# A “Coalition of the Impossible:” Mix of NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area

## Regional Command Capital: (appx ISAF strength 6,200)

- HQ ISAF KABUL (COMPOSITE)
- HQ RC(C) KABUL (FRA)
- KAIA (POL)

## Regional Command South: (appx ISAF strength 29,400)

- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NLD) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
- Forward Support Base KANDAHAR (multinational)
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

## Regional Command West: (appx ISAF strength 3,400)

- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)


## Regional Command North: (appx ISAF strength 5,600)

- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

## Regional Command East: (appx ISAF strength 19,900)

- |                                     |                        |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| • HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM                |                        |
| • Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA) |                        |
| • PRT LOGAR (CZE)                   | • PRT GHAZNI (POL,USA) |
| • PRT SHARANA (USA)                 | • PRT ASADABAD (USA)   |
| • PRT KHOST (USA)                   | • PRT BAGRAM (USA)     |
| • PRT METHER LAM (USA)              | • PRT NURISTAN (USA)   |
| • PRT BAMYAN (NZL)                  | • PRT WARDAK (TUR)     |
| • PRT PANJSHIR (USA)                | • PRT GARDEZ (USA)     |
| • PRT JALALABAD (USA)               |                        |

# US Aid Spending on Afghanistan: As of 1 July 2009



Note: Numbers affected by rounding. <sup>1</sup> DoI, DoD, DoS, U.S. Treasury, USAID, and other agencies. <sup>2</sup> Supplemental passed as of 6/24/2009.

Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009 and 7/13/2009; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2009; DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/2/2009; DoI/DOA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2009; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009 and 7/13/2009; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2009; OMB, responses to SIGAR data call, 9/30/2008 and 7/16/2009.

# Cumulative US Civil Aid to Afghanistan: FY2002-FY2008

Sector	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007 (reg. + supp)	FY2008 (reg. + supp)	FY2002- FY2008
Agriculture	27	56	50	77	27	67	31	335
Alternative Livelihoods	3	1	5	185	121	229	121	665
Roads	51	142	354	276	250	365	398	1836
Power	3		77	286	66	195	203	830
Water	2	1	27	21	1	2	1	54
Econ. Growth	21	12	84	91	46	69	61	383
Education	19	21	104	86	51	63	53	397
Health	8	56	83	111	52	113	66	489
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund	38	40	67	87	45	46	45	368
Support to Afghan Gov't	3		36	31	15	15	17	117
Democracy	22	34	132	88	17	134	17	444
Rule of Law	4	8	21	15	6	10	4	68
PRT Programs		11	56	85	20	126	30	328
Program Suppt	5	6	17	16	4	35	15	98
Internally Displaced Persons	108	23	10			-		141
Food Aid	159	51	49	57	60	-	10	386
Civilian Assistance						10		10
<b>Totals</b>	<b>471</b>	<b>462</b>	<b>1171</b>	<b>1510</b>	<b>779</b>	<b>1478</b>	<b>1108</b>	<b>6979</b>

## International Aid Pledges to Afghanistan

	(\$ in millions)
Britain	2,897
World Bank	2,803
Asia Development Bank	2,200
Japan	1,900
European Commission (EC)	1,768
Netherlands	1,697
Canada	1,479
India	1,200
Iran	1,164
Germany	1,108
Norway	977
Denmark	683
Italy	637
Saudi Arabia	533
Total Non-U.S. Pledges (including donors not listed)	25,800 (includes pledges at April 2009 NATO summit)

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008 report, p. 140. This table lists donors pledging over \$500 million total.



# US Economic (ESF) Aid to Afghanistan

ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR

(\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2009.

ESF FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD

COMPARISON (\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Sources: USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/28/2009 and 7/10/2009.

# US Development Assistance Aid to Afghanistan

**DA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR**  
(\$ MILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. DA funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

**DA FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON**  
(\$ MILLIONS)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2009.

# US Counter-Narcotics Spending on to Afghanistan


INL ALLOTMENTS BY FISCAL YEAR (\$ MILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. INL funding terms (allotted, obligated, liquidated) reported as provided by DoS and INL, except as specified.

Sources: DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/2/2009 and 7/15/2009.

INL FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON (\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. INL funding terms (allotted, obligated, liquidated) reported as provided by DoS and INL, except as specified.

Sources: DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/2/2009 and 7/15/2009.


# US CERP Aid to Afghanistan

**CERP FUNDING BY FISCAL YEAR**  
(\$ MILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include interagency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (funded, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.  
Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2009.

**CERP FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON**  
(\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (funded, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.  
Source: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2009 and 7/14/2009.

# Addressing Six Centers of Gravity

---

- *Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.*
  - *Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.*
  - *Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).*
  - *Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.*
  - *Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.*
  - *Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF's formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.*
-



# Dealing with the Legacies of Past Failures

---

- **Defeat the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.**
  - **Create an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.**
  - **Build up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to first support NATO/ISAF, then take the lead, and eventually replace NATO/ISAF forces or limit the mission of the remaining forces to an advisory role.**
  - **Give the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.**
  - **Create an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts claim a unity of effort they do not have, are wasteful and sometimes corrupt, and often pursue unrealistic and unachievable goals. They provide unintentional aid to both the insurgency and Afghan corruption and the abuses of power brokers.**
  - **Deal with the de facto sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF's formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.**
-

## **Execute and Resource an Integrated Civilian-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy**

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**U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will execute two priority missions:**

- 1) securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al-Qaida and its allies in order to provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective government control; and**
- 2) training and partnering with the ANSF so that those forces are able to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow the United States and other international forces to decrease their role in combat operations.**

**Security operations are integrated with governance and economic development efforts led by civilian agencies. Security operations will separate the population from the insurgents and provide the space and time in which stabilization and reconstruction activities can take hold. Security operations will be coupled with a strategic communications campaign to counter the terror and misinformation campaigns of the insurgents.**

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