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# The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report: 2009

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# **The Afghan-Pakistan War: An Introduction**

**NATO/ISAF, the US government, and UN have provided important unclassified data on the rising intensity of the conflict, but coverage has often been limited and some data are contradictory. Other material has been provided by the UN, or by private organizations like Senlis -- whose results are generally more negative than those of the US and NATO/ISAF.**

**This paper provides a comparison of such data in graphic and map form. No one source can be said to be reliable and no one set of trends is definitive. The only way to track the the trends in the war is to look at different sources and metrics.**

**The reader should also be aware that there are particularly sharp differences in estimates of Taliban and other insurgent influence depending on whether that influence is measures in terms of clashes, poll, presence, or risk to NATO/ISAF, and UN/NGO personnel. This is clearly reflected in the maps in showing the rise of violence, high risk areas, and areas of Taliban influence.**


**The data are further limited by the fact that NATO/ISAF, the US and other sources do not cover the Pakistani side of the fighting. This ignores one of the most critical aspects of the conflict.**

# ***The Rising Intensity of Conflict:***

## ***2001-2008***

# Enemy Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan: May 2003 to March 2009

Number of average daily attacks per month




Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.



# Enemy Initiated Attacks in Afghanistan May 2003 to March 2009

Number of average daily attacks per month



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.

## NATO/ISAF: Key Trends: 1st Quarter 2009 -I

- Revised U.S. Strategy and Additional Resources (27 Mar 09)
  - 17,700 additional troops and 4,000 additional trainers
  - Several hundred civilians for capacity building in governance and economic development
- Increased commitment from the international community
  - The Afghanistan “Big Tent” Conference at the Hague (31 Mar 09): over 70 nations agreed on 4 broad objectives and pledged additional resources
  - NATO Summit (4 Apr 09): 13 NATO nations and 9 non-NATO nations have pledged nearly 5,000 additional troops
    - Six nations (two more pending) have pledged Election Support Forces
    - 17 nations (5 new) have pledged at least 18 Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) & several Police Mentor Teams (PMTs)
    - Other pledges include additional medical teams, helicopters, and cargo & fighter aircraft
  - At least 23 nations have pledged a total of over \$350M (for various support funds including the Election Support Fund, the ANA Trust Fund, the Helo Fund, Reconstruction Fund, and others)\*
  - At least two nations are considering removal or revision of national caveats (Italy and Norway)
- Completed voter registration for Aug 09 Presidential & Provincial Council elections
  - Over 4.5 million new registrants (in addition to nearly 11 million registered in 2004)
  - Approximately 39% of new registrants were female
  - Not a single major security incident
- Reopened 81 schools for over 50,000 students in Helmand, Kandahar, & Uruzgan
  - Announced by Ministry of Education (MoE) on 26 March
    - This is an addition to the approximately 170 schools reopened before the end of 2008
    - MoE expects to continue reopening schools at about 120 per quarter
  - Effort was led by MoE with the support of tribal elders, local councils, and religious scholars

## NATO/ISAF: Key Trends: 1st Quarter 2009 -II

- Enhanced support for Counter-Narcotic (CN) efforts and greater effects
  - Received new authorities from SACEUR (4 Feb 09) to provide support to GIRoA-led CN efforts
  - Increased eradication year to date relative to the same period last year (+158%)
  - Denied the insurgency at least \$1.6M from interdiction efforts
    - Drug and pre-cursor chemical seizures and post-interdiction destructions are up 86%
    - 18 deliberate CN operations conducted through 31 Mar (compared to 14 during same period in '08)
    - 27 nexus targets captured and 9 killed to-date this year
      - 4 of the 9 killed assessed to be senior members of a leading narcotic network
      - Last year to-date only 5 had been captured
- Initiated pilot program for Afghan Public Protection Force
  - Provides enhanced security and extends legitimate governance of GIRoA to designated districts in key provinces to improve stability and strengthen community development
  - Afghan-led and Afghan-decided initiative that relies on increased community responsibility for security
  - Graduated first class (240+ students) on 26 Mar 09 and now operational in Jalreyz District in Wardak Province
  - Second class (200+ vetted students) to begin by end of April (Nerkh District)
- Increased success with High Value Targets on the Joint Prioritized Effects List
  - 27 targets have been killed or captured to-date this year
  - 13% increase relative to the same period last year

## NATO/ISAF: Key Trends: 1st Quarter 2009 -III

- Improved security in many areas despite overall increase in violence
  - Violence over the winter months of 2008-2009 has increased due to:
    - Milder winter
    - Continued freedom of action for insurgents from sanctuaries across the border
    - Deliberate increase in operational tempo by ANSF and ISAF
  - New forces introduced in 2008/2009 in Kapisa, Wardak, Logar Provinces and Garmser District
  - Slight improvements in public perception of security (as of Mar '09 survey)
    - 35% of Afghans say security is better now than it was 6 months ago (last quarter 28%)
      - Kabul 40% (last quarter 29%); Logar 26% (last quarter 8%); Wardak 20% (last quarter 13%); Kapisa 49% (last quarter 30%)
    - 13% say security is worse than it was 6 months ago (last quarter 17%)
      - Kabul 8% (last quarter 9%); Logar 19% (last quarter 28%); Wardak 28% (last quarter 37%); Kapisa 8% (last quarter 15%)
  - Attacks are down significantly within the city and province of Kabul
    - Insurgent initiated attacks in Kabul province were down 10% (Aug 08 – Mar 09 relative to Aug 07 – Mar 08)
    - Insurgent initiated attacks in Kabul City were down 29% (Aug 08 – Mar 09 relative to Aug 07 – Mar 08)
    - ANA and ANP deaths were down 73% in the province (2007 to 2008)
    - Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility began in August 2008
  - Starting to see results in other areas
    - Insurgent initiated attacks down 39% in Kapisa Province (Jan-Mar 09 relative to Jan-Mar 08)
    - Insurgent initiated attacks down 19% in Garmser District (Jan-Mar 09 relative to Jan-Mar 08)


Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009



## SECURITY SUMMARY

- > 33% increase in security incidents
- > 70% of security incidents continue to occur in 10% of the districts
- > IED events up 27% : largest cause of casualties

- 37% increase in ISAF force strength
- 28% increase in ANSF force strength
- 31% increase in offensive operations




- Civilian Casualties: up 40% - 56%
- ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 37%
- ANSF Deaths: up 6%
  - ANPs suffer 3x more casualties than ANA/ISAF
- 124% more attacks on GIRoA
- 50% more kidnappings/assassinations

## ANSF

- ANA: 13 more Kandak/Battalion formed  
46 Kandaks capable of Battalion Ops
- ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD  
13 of 20 ANCOP Battalions fielded

# Security Summary (February 2009)

2008 Kinetic Activity



40% of Afghans say country headed in right direction, 38% say headed in wrong direction\*

For Jan and Feb 09, 80% of kinetic events occurred in 11% of the districts

## Feb09 vs. Previous 3 Months' Average (i.e. Nov08-Jan09)

INS Initiated Attacks: +12% ↑

IED Events: -15% ↓ (57% of all casualties since Jan 07)

Attacks on GIRoA: -37% ↓

Suicide Attacks: +3% ↑

Kidnappings/Assassinations: +20% ↑

ISAF Deaths: +21% ↑

ANSF Deaths: -27% ↓

Civilian Deaths: +9% ↑

## Building Host Nation Capacity:\*\*

ANA: 77 total Kandak BNs formed  
47 Kandaks capable of BN Ops

ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD  
13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs fielded

Except for the two items with asterisks, the source of information on this slide is the NATO JOIIS database.



\* Source: ABC News / BBC / ARD Poll conducted 30 Dec 08 – 12 Jan 09 and published on 9 Feb 09.

\*\* Source: CSTC-A.

# Security Summary: Jan-March 2008 vs. Jan-March 2009

- 73% increase in Insurgent Initiated Attacks<sup>1</sup>
- 80% of attacks occurred in 11% of the districts (Jan-Mar 09)<sup>1</sup>
- IED events up 87% (IEDs caused 60% of casualties Jan-Mar 09)<sup>1</sup>
- 20% increase in ISAF force strength<sup>5</sup>
- 38% increase in ANA force strength<sup>4</sup>
- 57% increase in CF offensive events<sup>1</sup>

## January to March 2009 Kinetic Activity Density Plot By District



### Footnotes on Sources:

- <sup>1</sup>JOIIS, 6 Apr 09.  
<sup>2</sup>ANQAR Survey, Mar 09.  
<sup>3</sup>CJOC CivCas cell, 1 Apr 09.  
<sup>4</sup>CSTC-A, 26 Mar 09.  
<sup>5</sup>CJ1, 27 Mar 09.

- Civilian Deaths: down 39%<sup>3</sup>
- ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 78%<sup>1</sup>
- ANSF Deaths: up 75%<sup>1</sup>  
(Since Jan 07, ANPs suffered 1.8x more deaths than ANA+ISAF)
- Attacks on GIRoA officials & district centers: up 64%<sup>1</sup>
- Kidnappings/Assassinations: down 30%<sup>1</sup>

### Afghan Perceptions (Mar 09)<sup>2</sup>

- 35% of Afghans say security is better now than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 28%)
- 13% say security is worse than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 17%)

### ANSF<sup>4</sup>

- **ANA:** - 49 of 77 Kandak battalions capable of independent ops  
- Average of 80 total deliberate ops per week in '09 (37 in '08)
- **ANP:** - Focused District Development underway for 55 districts  
- 13 of 20 Civil Order Police Battalions fielded
- **ABP:** - Focused Border Development: 12 companies completed training  
- 12 companies currently in training




# Security Summary (April 2009)

- 64% increase in Insurgent Initiated Attacks<sup>1</sup>
- 80% of attacks occurred in 13% of the districts (Jan-Apr 09)<sup>1</sup>
- IED events up 80% (IEDs caused 60% of casualties Jan-Apr 09)<sup>1</sup>

- 28% increase in CF force strength<sup>5</sup>
- 38% increase in ANA force strength<sup>4</sup>
- 59% increase in CF offensive events<sup>1</sup>

## January to April 2009 Kinetic Activity Density Plot By District

■ More Activity  
 ■ Less Activity



### Afghan Perceptions (Mar 09)<sup>2</sup>

- 35% of Afghans say security is better now than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 28%)
- 13% say security is worse than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 17%)

### Footnotes on Sources:

- <sup>1</sup>JOIIS, 4 May.
- <sup>2</sup>ANQAR Survey, 31 Mar.
- <sup>3</sup>CJOC CivCas cell, 2 May.
- <sup>4</sup>CSTC-A, 4 May.
- <sup>5</sup>CJ1, 3 May.

- Civilian Deaths: down 44%<sup>3</sup>
- ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 55%<sup>1</sup>
- ANSF Deaths: up 25%<sup>1</sup>
- (Since Jan 07, ANPs suffered 1.8x more deaths than ANA+ISAF)
- Attacks on GIRoA officials & district centers: up 90%<sup>1</sup>
- Kidnappings/Assassinations: down 17%<sup>1</sup>

### ANSF<sup>4</sup>


- **ANA:** - 50 of 79 Kandak battalions capable of independent ops  
- Average of 83 total deliberate ops per week in '09 (37 in '08)
- **ANP:** - Focused District Development: 52 districts completed training  
- 14 of 20 Civil Order Police Battalions fielded
- **ABP:** - Focused Border Development: 2 cycles complete (20 companies)  
- 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Cycles underway (14 companies programmed)



# Insurgent Attacks

- Insurgent initiated attacks were up 64% overall (Jan/Apr 09 v. Jan/Apr 08):
  - Direct Fire attacks were up 57%
  - Indirect Fire attacks were up 44%
  - IEDs were up 81%
  - Surface to Air Fire was up 103%
  - Coalition Force offensive actions were up 59%


- Kinetic events increased substantially this year relative to the same period last year
  - Deliberate increase in operational tempo by ANSF and ISAF
  - Milder winter
  - Continued freedom of action for insurgents from sanctuaries across the border



# Insurgent Attacks

- Insurgent initiated attacks were up 59% overall (Jan-May '09 v. Jan-May '08):
  - Direct Fire attacks were up 61%
  - Indirect Fire attacks were up 46%
  - IEDs were up 64%
  - Surface to Air Fire was up 48%
  - Coalition Force offensive actions were up 34%

- Kinetic events increased substantially this year relative to the same period last year
  - Deliberate increase in operational tempo by ANSF and ISAF
  - Milder winter
  - Continued freedom of action for insurgents from sanctuaries across the border




Source: JOLIS, 2 Jun 09

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
# IED Events (Found and Detonated)

- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same period during 2008:
  - Total IED events were up 64%
  - IED discoveries (finds plus turn-ins) were up 68%
- Since January 2007, discoveries have accounted for 55% of all IED events




# IED Related Casualties

- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same time period in 2008
  - Total casualties from IEDs were up only 7% despite a 64% increase in IED events
- IEDs remain the leading cause of total casualties
  - 58% of all casualties resulted from IEDs during the period Jan-May '09
  - 66% of all civilian casualties resulted from IEDs during the period Jan-May '09




# Attack Trends: Jan-May 08 Compared to Jan-May 09

Suicide attacks were up 9%




Attacks on GIRoA officials were down 11%  
Attacks on GIRoA infrastructure were up 156%  
Attacks on ANA were down 18%  
Attacks on ANP were up 15%




Complex attacks were up 152%.

Complex attacks include those involving more than one means of attack (i.e. small arms plus IED, small arms plus indirect fire, etc.) or more than 20 insurgents. Complex attack numbers do not include attacks against District Centers




Kidnappings were down 27%  
The number of Assassinations did not change



# Pro-Government Security Activities: 2007-2009

## Cache, IED turn-ins, and anti-INS activity

- 2009 Pro-GIRoA Events (through May): 188
- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same time period in 2008, Pro-GIRoA Events were down 11%




Source: JOIIS, 2 Jun 09

NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

# Attacks on Convoys

Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same time period in 2008, attacks on convoys are down 21%



Source: JOIIS, 2 Jun 09


NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

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# Cargo Flow, AFG=PAK Ground Supply Routes

- Comparing Jan - May '09 to the same time period in 2008:
  - Truck volume is up 61%
  - Number of trucks pilfered or damaged is down 53%
- From Jan - May '09, approximately 0.3% of cargo was affected by attacks



Source: US TRANSCOM, as of 5 Jun 09

NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED




# ***The Rising Impact of Terrorism:***

***2001-2008***

## **Global Patterns in Terrorism versus Terrorism in Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in 2008**

- **Approximately 11,800 terrorist attacks against noncombatants occurred in various countries during 2008, resulting in over 54,000 deaths, injuries and kidnappings.**
- **Compared to 2007, attacks decreased by 2,700, or 18 percent, in 2008 while deaths due to terrorism decreased by 6,700, or 30 percent.**
- **As was the case last year, the largest number of reported terrorist attacks occurred in the Near East, but unlike previous years, South Asia had the greater number of fatalities. These two regions were the locations for 75 percent of the 235 high-casualty attacks (those that killed 10 or more people) in 2008.**
- **Attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan accounted for about 55 percent of all attacks**
- **Of the 11,770 reported attacks, about 4,600, or nearly 40 percent, occurred in the Near East where approximately 5,500 fatalities, or 35 percent of the worldwide total, were reported for 2008.**
- **Attacks in Iraq have continued to decline since 2007.**
- **Another 35 percent of the attacks occurred in South Asia with Afghanistan and Pakistan registering increased attacks.**
- **Attacks in Pakistan more than doubled in 2008.**

Comparison of High-Fatality Sunni Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan versus Rest of World from 2004 to 2008



## Terrorist Incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2005-2008:

### *Incidents of Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan\**

	<b><u>2005</u></b>	<b><u>2006</u></b>	<b><u>2007</u></b>	<b><u>2008</u></b>
Terrorist attacks in Iraq	3,467	6,631	6,210	3,258
Attacks resulting in at least 1 death, injury, or kidnapping	2,837	6,028	5,573	2,902
People killed, injured, or kidnapped as a result of terrorism	20,722	38,878	44,012	19,083

Terrorist attacks in Afghanistan	494	968	1,125	1,220
Attacks resulting in at least 1 death, injury, or kidnapping	369	694	890	948
People killed, injured, or kidnapped as a result of terrorism	1,551	3,556	4,662	5,423

Office of the Coordinator for  
Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on  
Terrorism 2008* April 2009, United States  
Department of State, Released April 2009, p.  
348 .

## Terrorism Attacks and Deaths: Iraq vs. Rest of World: 2005-2008

### Incidents of Terrorism Worldwide\*


	<u>2005</u>	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>
Attacks worldwide	11,157	14,545	14,506	11,770
Attacks resulting in death, injury, or kidnapping of at least 1 person	8,025	11,311	11,123	8,438
Attacks resulting in the death of at least one individual	5,127	7,428	7,255	5,067
Attacks resulting in the death of zero individuals	6,030	7,117	7,251	6,703
Attacks resulting in the death of only one individual	2,880	4,139	3,994	2,889
Attacks resulting in the death of at least 10 individuals	226	293	353	235
Attacks resulting in the injury of at least one individual	3,842	5,796	6,256	4,888
Attacks resulting in the kidnapping of at least one individual	1,475	1,733	1,459	1,125

People killed, injured or kidnapped as a result of terrorism	74,280	74,709	71,608	54,747
People worldwide killed as a result of terrorism	14,560	20,468	22,508	15,765
People worldwide injured as a result of terrorism	24,875	38,386	44,118	34,124
People worldwide kidnapped as a result of terrorism	34,845	15,855	4,982	4,858

National Counterterrorism Center,  
*2008 Report on Terrorism*, 30 April 2009,  
<http://www.nctc.gov/>, p. 348.

## Terrorism Related Deaths: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq & Rest of World: 2008

Chart 3 - Deaths by Method




15,765 Total Deaths

There is some double counting when multiple methods are used.


National Counterterrorism Center,  
*2008 Report on Terrorism*, 30 April 2009,  
<http://www.nctc.gov/>, p. 24.

## Trends in Person-borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) vs. Suicide Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) Attacks in Iraq: 2005-2008




# Sunni High-Fatality Attacks Grouped by Month of Attack

## 2004 to 2008






## Terrorist Incidents and Casualties in Afghanistan: 2005-2008




## Deaths from Terrorism: 2007 vs. 2008



Data from the National Counterterrorism Center.


"Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan", Andrew M. Exum, Nathaniel C. Fick, Ahmed A. Humayun, David J. Kilcullen", June 2009, Page 11

## Terrorism Related Kidnappings: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq & Rest of World: 2008




National Counterterrorism Center, *2008 Report on Terrorism*, 30 April 2009, <http://www.nctc.gov/>, p. 27.

## Terrorism Related Deaths: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq & Rest of World: 2008



## Trends in Person-borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) vs. Suicide Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2008




# ***Afghan Perceptions of the Rising Intensity of Conflict:***

## ***2001-2008***

# Public Perception of Security in March 2009

Results from the last two surveys indicate a potential reversal in the downward trend of security perceptions. As of March, 85% say the security situation in their local area is good or fair.

*How is the security situation in your local area?*




Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

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# Public Perception of changes in Security

Perception of an improving security climate has increased two quarters in a row; 86% of Afghans believe security is the same or better in their mantaqa.

*Is security in your mantaqa better, the same or worse than it was 6 months ago?*



Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.


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# Public Perception of Security

Despite criticism, the Afghan National Police leads as the local provider of security for Afghans.

***“Who most brings security to your area?”***




***“ANP”***

54% in July 07  
46% in July 08  
51% in Sep 08  
50% in Dec 08  
44% in Mar 09

30.1% of Afghans view traditional sources (Shuras, Elders, Own Selves) as primary security providers.

***“How often do you see the Police in your Mantaqa?”***




Dec-08  
Mar-09


# Public Perception of ANSF Propriety

ANA has a more positive image than the ANP. Perceptions of improper behaviors by the ANA have remained relatively low while those of the ANP have decreased.

*"Have you seen or heard the police in your mantaqa doing anything improper?"*




*"Have you seen or heard the National Army doing anything improper lately?"*




**ANP "some"**  
47% in Jul 07  
50% in Jul 08  
42% in Sep 08  
44% in Dec 08  
41% in Mar 09

Mar 09




Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

Mar 09




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
## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09




# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Positive Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09




# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009



## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Biggest Danger to Afghanistan : 2-2009




# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Who Afghans Mainly Blame for Violence: 2007 vs. 2009-2






# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Freedom of Movement: 2007 vs. 2009-2



# Afghan Perceptions of Freedom of movement: 2007-2009


**Public Perception: "How safe do you feel driving outside your Mantaqa during the day?"**

Overall, nearly 7 in 10 Afghans feel at least a little safe using the roads in their districts.




## Attacks within 500m of ISAF Routes

- Comparing Jan-Mar '09 to the same time period in 2008, attacks within 500 meters of ISAF routes were up 51%
- Results of increased security measures (implemented Sep 08):
  - Fewer attacks on bridges
  - Less effective attacks



# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Most Likely Outcome of War




# ***Expanding Zones of Violence and Taliban Activity***

# Extreme Risk Areas

- **Extreme Risk/Hostile Environment classification (pink... now makes up about one third of the surface area of the country.**
- **Main areas... affected, i.e. areas where the deteriorating security situation has been assessed as an Extreme Risk/Hostile Environment thereby causing less accessibility to programs, are:**
  - **The southern and extreme northern parts of Helmand Province, most of Kandahar Province, a portion of northern Nimroz Province and most of Zabul and Uruzgan Provinces.**
  - **The rest of Paktika Province not previously colored pink.**
  - **The “Tora Bora” area of southern Nangahar Province.**
  - **The extreme northern area of Nuristan Province.**
- **Medium Risk/Unstable Environments added include parts of Farah, Badghis and Faryab Provinces.**
- **Low Risk/Permissive Environments (i.e. improved) include parts of Maydan Wardak, Badakshan (northern tip), Takhar and Baghlan Provinces.**
- ***These improved areas are insignificant when seen against the large areas which deteriorated. It is also possible that some of these “improved” areas may soon revert back to previous assessments.***


UN Department of Safety and security, Afghanistan, Half-Year Review of the Security situation in Afghanistan, Topic Assessment, 02/07, August 13, 2007

# UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones: 2005 versus 2007




## Shift in Location of Violence: 2007 vs. 2008

Rise in Percent in the first quarter of 2008 versus the first quarter of 2007






**May 2006**




**Areas where the  
accessibility  
deteriorated  
between May 2006  
and May 2007**

**May 2007**




**Areas where the  
accessibility  
improved between  
May 2006 and May  
2007**




Senlis Afghanistan,  
Decision Point 2008,  
London, 2008, p. 17

## *Taliban Presence in November 2008*




## The Limits of Governance: “Government” vs. Taliban control in the South (Senlis estimate, November 2007)



# Kinetic Activity in Afghanistan by Province


## 1 Jan 07 - 8 Mar 08




(14 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan are not included as they experienced less than 20 attacks during this time period)




UN ACCESSIBILITY MAP  
SECURITY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT ARE COMPLEMENTARY



# UN Accessibility Map 2008








# NATO/ISAF Events Map in 2008


**Change In Kinetic Event Density**  
1 Jan - 28 Dec 07 and 08

- Decreased events in select areas
- Kabul: City 47%; Province 15%  
- ANSF deaths down 61%
  - Garmsir: 43%


Kinetic Event Density  
Increasing




Kabul\* '07



Kabul\* '08



Garmsir '07




Garmsir '08



- 31% more kinetic events in '08 - same areas
- Increased event levels due to:
  - More ISAF / ANSF operating in more areas
  - Increased asymmetric methods
  - Continued sanctuary in PAK


\*Density range / calibration differs from province to district in order to show differences



UNCLASS // REL USA ISAF NATO






# Average Daily Insurgent Initiated Attacks

By Province, January 1, 2009 – May 31, 2009





# Insurgent Attacks by RC




- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same period in '08, insurgent initiated attacks were:
- Up 78% in RC South
- Up 41% in RC East
- Up 29% in RC Capital
- Up 21% in RC North
- Up 73% in RC West

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
Source: JOIIS, 2 Jun 09

5

## *Violence in Kabul in 2008*



## *Taliban Activity in Kabul in 2008*







## AFGHANS TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY IN KABUL

- 31% of Kabul residents believed security has improved from June to Dec 2008. Only 10% thought security has deteriorated (ANQAR<sup>1</sup>).
- Recorded incidents / reported crime reduced after the transfer of responsibility.
- ANSF casualties in Kabul dropped 61% in 2008.


<sup>1</sup>Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Report




Phase 1 - Kabul City - 31 Aug 08



Phase 2 - Northern Districts 31 Oct 08



Phase 3 - Southern Districts 31 Dec 08





# ***The Shifting Nature of the Threat***

# **The Shifting Nature of the Threat and Afghan Attitudes Towards the Taliban and Other Threat Elements**

**There are no reliable estimates of the trends in the strength of full and part time cadres for the four main threat groups: Taliban, Taliban in Pakistan, Haqqani Network (HQN), Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddun (HiG), and Al Qa'ida. All, however, seem to have grown and found at least partial sanctuaries since 2001, and especially since 2003.**

**The intelligence community has not declassified maps of the areas influenced or dominated by such groups since late 2006 (p. 55). US experts have, however, noted that the Taliban has split between a more traditional Afghan Taliban under Omar in the south and a more splintered Taliban with closer links to Al Qa'ida, the HiG, and HQN in the east and Pakistan**

**The US Director of National Intelligence and has also warned that threat activity continues to grow and outpace the development of Afghan forces, and US experts indicate that the Taliban has clear regional goals for expanding its influence and presence throughout Afghanistan in 2008.**

**As for public attitudes, Afghans do not support terrorism, and are largely negative towards the Taliban – although more supportive of Al Qa'ida. They are, however, sufficiently concerned over the course of the war to advocate negotiations between the government and Taliban and a limited majority favor a coalition government. Afghans are also more supportive of the Taliban in the Pashtun south.**

## Afghan Insurgent Groups

- Three major groups in East and South.
- Forces in East (Western Pakistan):
  - **Taliban (5,000-10,000 permanent Tier One fighters; unknown number of part-time Tier Two fighters.**
  - **Haqqani Network (HQN),**
  - **and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG)**
- Al Qa'ida provides major support to insurgents in western border area of Pakistan
- Omar Leads classic Taliban hierarchy in South
- FATA area (“Waziristan”) and Baluchistan are major sanctuaries in Pakistani border area.
- Pakistani government has ceded control of some areas.
- Part of ISI supports insurgent groups.
- Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan -- including Pakistani Taliban -- and foreign volunteers

# Threat Outlook

- **Potential for two distinct insurgencies: A Kandahari-based Taliban in the South and an interconnected insurgency in the East.**
- **The insurgency in the east will likely continue to operate as a distributed network, with less influence from the Taliban leadership and increasing influence from Al-Qaida.**
- **In the East, the insurgency is expected to increase its offensive operations within the FATA against the Pakistan Military as well as within the settled areas of Pakistan to destabilize the country.**
- **With gains made in 2007, insurgent elements in Pakistan will use the winter months to reconstitute, reequip, and emerge in 2008 as a stronger and more viable threat to GIRoA, ISAF, and the GoP.**
- **Pakistan's growing civil unrest, political turmoil, and security concerns focused on India will continue to divert security resources from the FATA.**

# **Adapting Insurgency in the FATA and Afghanistan**

- **Insurgency within the FATA and RC East has significantly evolved over 2007; it is no longer a traditional rigid structure, operating in a top to bottom order, and more importantly, no longer a Taliban-dominant insurgent network.**
- **Interacting networks including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat Mohammad-e drive the concept of the insurgency in Afghanistan.**
- **The interactions that occur between differing networks are governed by a set of internal rules, a basic ideology, which in turn generate state the entire insurgency.**
- **Over 2007, the Taliban leadership in the south has been weakened as a result of the capture or kill of senior Taliban leaders.**
- **While the insurgency in the south remains Taliban-led, the once overarching influence of the Taliban over the insurgency in the east is diminishing.**
- **The insurgency in the east has become a conglomerate of disparate insurgent groups, operating independently from the once prevailing influence of the Taliban senior leadership in the south.**

# Insurgency's Objectives in Afghanistan


- **Regional Command North:** To destabilize the northern provinces in order to undermine security and discredit GIRoA in a region considered stable.
- **Regional Command West:** To expand established insurgent support areas in the western provinces in order to destabilize the western provinces and facilitate the movement of personnel, weapons, and ammunition to insurgents in the south.
- **Regional Command South:** To retain control of historical insurgent operational and support areas in order to isolate Kandahar from the influence of the central government in Kabul and restrict ISAF freedom of movement along HWY 1.
- **Regional Command East:** To sustain operations within the eastern provinces with increasing use of asymmetric tactics as the insurgency becomes more interconnected among disparate insurgent groups and increasingly influenced by Al-Qaida tactics.



# ***Afghan Perceptions of the of the Threat***

# Afghan Perceptions: INS v. GIRoA Influence: 2008-2009

*"Between the Anti-Government Elements (AGE)\* and the Government, who has more influence in your area?"*




\* Word used in Dari & Pashto to encompass all AGES

Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

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
# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Is Taliban Resurgent? : 2-2009




The Taliban are far from achieving popular support -- across a range of measures the group still is shunned by large majorities of Afghans. But 22 percent say it has at least some support in their area, and this soars to 57 percent in the Southwest overall, including 64 percent in its home base, Kandahar. That's up sharply from 44 percent in the Southwest last year, and up from 41 percent in Kandahar. There's also evidence the Taliban have made some progress rebranding themselves. Twenty-four percent of Afghans say it's their impression the Taliban "have changed and become more moderate" -- far from a majority, but one in four. And that view spikes in some provinces -- most notably, to 58 percent in Wardak and 53 percent in Nangarhar, bordering Kabul to the west and east, respectively. People who see the Taliban as more moderate are 20 points more likely to favor negotiating with the movement, and less supportive of the U.S. and NATO/ISAF presence in

**Afghanistan**


# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Who Afghans Mainly Blame for Violence: 2007 vs. 2009-2



## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Trend in Experience with Taliban Violence :2006-2009/2




## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Experience with Taliban Violence by Province: 2009/2







## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: At Least Some Support for the Taliban : 2007 versus 2009/2



# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Taliban More Moderate?: 2009/2




# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Should The Government Negotiate with the Taliban? 2009-2




# ***The Cost in Blood: Trends in Casualties***

## Total Casualties: Iraq vs. Afghanistan Through January 3, 2009



\* Non-hostile deaths includes: Accident, Illness, self-inflicted, undetermined, and pending.


# MONTHLY CASUALTIES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: 2008



Iraq: Wounded	234	215	328	330	195
Iraq: Killed	34	25	36	42	15
Afghanistan: Wounded	11	12	42	28	77
Afghanistan: Killed	7	1	6	5	14




# Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan: First Six Months of 2007 versus 2008 (Killed)



# NATO/ISAF Civilian Deaths in 2008



- Up 46% according to ISAF (JOIIS/NATO) database
- Up 40% according to UNAMA database
- INS cause 80% of civilian casualties\*



\*according to ISAF report procedures / investigations

# Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

- Note: Data from 4 May Farah incident not included (final report not yet released as of 8 Jun)
- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same time period in 2008, civilian deaths were down 27%
- Since Jan 07, insurgents have caused 80% of civilian deaths known by ISAF



ISAF Responsible	
Jan 07 - May 09	20%
Jan 07 - Dec 07	19%
Jan 08 - Dec 08	21%
Jul 08 - May 09	29%
Sep 08 - May 09	22%
Jan 09 - May 09	21%


Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell Formed in CJOC  
Standardized process to investigate incidents of reported civilian casualties

- Among events that have caused civilian casualties attributed to ISAF/OEF Forces, Escalation of Force incidents have been the most frequent cause of civilian casualties, but Close Air Support events have caused the greatest proportion of civilian deaths.

NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

Source: ISAF CJOC, CIVCAS Tracking Cell, As of 1 Jun 09

## Deaths from Terrorism: 2007 vs. 2008




Data from the National Counterterrorism Center.

"Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan", Andrew M. Exum, Nathaniel C. Fick, Ahmed A. Humayun, David J. Kilcullen", June 2009, Page 11

# ANA, ANP, ISAF Military Deaths

- Overall Trend **up 12%**
  - ISAF/OEF: **up 35%**
  - ANA: **up 16%**
  - ANP: **up 9%**
- ANP - over 60% of total since Jan 2007




UNCLASS // REL USA ISAF NATO

\*Attributed to "Big 8"

# Military Deaths

- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same time period in 2008:
  - Total military deaths were up 37%
  - ANSF deaths were up 33%
  - ISAF deaths were up 62%



*\*Attributed to insurgent initiated attacks (direct fire, indirect fire, IEDs, and surface-to-air fire)*



***One War in Two Countries:***

***Afghanistan versus  
“Pashtunistan”***

## **Looking Beyond the Borders**

- **Fight against Taliban and Other Islamist extremists in Afghanistan.**
- **Fighting against Taliban and other Islamist extremists in Eastern Pakistan (Waziristan and Tribal Agencies.**
- **Greater Pashtun and Ethnic/Sectarian struggles.**
- **Al Qa'ida, Bin Laden and Neo-Salafi extremist Elements; sanctuary in Pakistan.**
- **Broader instability in Pakistan; Islamist struggle for control.**
- **Outside interests and influence: Iran, Russia, China, Central Asia, Narco-trafficking**

## **One War in Two Countries: Afghanistan versus “Pashtunistan”**

**It is clear that the war would have a radically different character if Pashtun and Baluchi areas in Pakistan did not act as de facto sanctuaries and support areas for the Taliban, HiG, and HQN. (p. 70-78) US experts estimate that the areas under such influence in Pakistan grew significantly in 2006 and 2007.**

**Pakistan also provides an important sanctuary for Al Qa’ida, which has steadily closer links to the Taliban in eastern Afghanistan and to the Hi, and HQN. (pp. 78-82). As a result, all of these movements are having a destabilizing impact on Pakistan and creating steadily greater instability in both the largely Pashtun Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in the East and the Baluchi areas in the south.**

**Pakistani public opinion does not favor the government carrying out a major campaign to deal with these threats or any form of US or NATO intervention. It is also deeply divided on the impact of Al Qa’ida, the Taliban, and local Jihadis and relatively hostile to the Bush Administration.**

## Pakistan in Early 2009: UK Assessment -I

Pakistan's economic situation deteriorated sharply in 2008. Insecurity, political transition and global oil and food inflation contributed to a sharp fall in growth forecasts, 25% inflation, ballooning budget and trade deficits and dwindling foreign exchange reserves. In November 2008 the Pakistani government signed a \$7.6 billion loan agreement with the IMF. Since then, foreign exchange reserves have started to recover, inflation has fallen and the Government has initiated a number of structural economic reforms. But the economic situation remains fragile and potentially vulnerable to further external shocks. Growth in GDP is expected to have reduced from 6.8% in 2006-07 to 2.5% in 2008-09.

Pakistan's economic difficulties mean it is unlikely to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. At least 36 million people (out of a population of 160 million) live in poverty. Half the adult population is illiterate, including two thirds of women; and one in ten children die before their fifth birthday.

In November 2008 terrorists attacked Mumbai, leaving 170 dead (including three British nationals). Evidence that the attack was carried out by militants based in Pakistan gave rise to a rapid escalation in tension between India and Pakistan. The UK played a leading role in an intensive international diplomatic effort to reverse this escalation and urge the Pakistani government to bring those responsible for the attacks to justice and to dismantle terrorist groups operating from Pakistan's territory. In February 2009 the Pakistani government announced its intention to prosecute those suspected of involvement in the attacks.

This shocking event reflected the wider problems Pakistan faces with violent extremism and terrorism. Al Qaida continues to operate in the FATA, from where it recruits and trains terrorists (including vulnerable people from the UK), and plans attacks against Western targets. Three quarters of the most serious plots investigated in the UK have links back to Pakistan. In some cases, terrorist cells received tasking, direction and training from Pakistan-based groups; and in attempted operations in the UK, some of the conspirators travelled to Pakistan during their preparations. Afghan groups also train and plan attacks on international and Afghan targets in Afghanistan from the FATA.

## Pakistan in Early 2009: UK Assessment -II

**Terrorism deeply affects Pakistan: over 2,000 civilians and security force personnel were killed in 2008 in terrorist attacks; and levels of violence remain high in 2009. Suicide attacks are increasing, from 7 in 2006 to 63 in 2008. The threat is not confined to Pakistan's border areas; increasingly terrorist networks are carrying out attacks elsewhere in the country. Moreover, the attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, led by Pakistani-based militant group Lashkar-e-Toyiba, underlined the wider threat to the international community from violent extremism in Pakistan, and put the stability of the region at risk.**

**A number of localised, tribally based militant groups in the FATA either tolerate or support Al Qaida, as well as supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan. Levels of violence and challenge to the rule of law are increasing. Militant groups control a growing area, and often impose their own interpretation of Sharia law. Deals between the Pakistani state and militant groups in the FATA have proved unenforceable, have prevented serious action to tackle violent extremists and represent a risk to lasting peace. The Pakistani government has insufficient means to impose the terms of those deals when the militants violate them.**

**There is also a separatist insurgency continuing in the province of Baluchistan, based on demands that the region should keep a greater share of its own resources. Although that insurgency is less potent than in the FATA, the region borders Helmand province in Afghanistan and is a vital supply route for international forces in southern Afghanistan. It is also a primary route for opiates smuggled to the UK. Insurgent groups in Baluchistan are carrying out systematic attacks against state institutions and infrastructure there, and tolerating or supporting Afghan groups training and planning attacks on international and Afghan targets in Afghanistan.**


# "Pashtunistan" and Pakistan's Federal Administrative Divisions

SEN LIS AFGHANISTAN





# Pakistan's Strategic Position



Source: HM Government, *UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward*, April 2009, p. 29.



# The “Af-Pak” Border Area




# Khyber: The Challenge to US and NATO/ISAF Supply Routes






# Helmand: The Key Area of Cross Border Operations



## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Ratings of Neighboring Countries 2009/2




## **Al Qa'ida's Role in Pakistan**

- **Major recovery and sanctuary in Pakistan.**
- **Supports, but does not control Taliban.**
- **Source of funding and foreign volunteers.**
- **Significant ideological force.**
- **May help coordinate Taliban and other insurgents groups.**
- **Narcotics source of financing.**

# Insurgent Activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2007)

SEN LIS AFGHANISTAN




# Insurgency in the FATA


- **2007-2009 Insurgent Gains / Pakistan Military's Operation AL-MIZAN losses:**
  - 2007-2009 has seen an unprecedented number of offensive actions taken by insurgent elements against the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and security forces within the FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).
  - To date, Pakistani security forces have been unsuccessful in mitigating insurgent presence, have sustained record losses, and have raised serious questions on the Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) and Frontier Corps's capacity and capability to conduct effective military operations in the FATA and the NWFP against militants and extremists.
- **Pakistani Security Force Reorganization within the FATA/NWFP:**
  - GoP plans to reduce PAKMIL presence within the FATA and increase reliance on the less capable Frontier Corps. Under the plan, PAKMIL assumes a greater role in the border security mission while the Frontier Corps will have greater focus on security and stability missions within the general populace of FATA/NWFP.
  - This has the potential to allow for further insurgent gains in the FATA and the NWFP and embolden a stronger more viable insurgency.
- **Spread of "Talibanization" within the FATA and the NWFP:**
  - Due to the GoP's failed policies and security initiatives within the FATA, insurgent elements have been able to expand their influence in the settled areas of NWFP and further solidify greater portions of the FATA as insurgent safe-havens.



## Trends in Person-borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) vs. Suicide Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) Attacks in Pakistan: 2005-2008



# Cross Border Raids from Pakistan to Eastern Afghanistan: First Six Months of 2007 vs. 2008



# Insurgency's Strategic Objectives in Pakistan

- **Defend the Federally Administered Tribal Area:** To retain sanctuary, enabling the insurgency's ability to reconstitute fighters, plan and stage operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and internationally.
- **Destabilize the Government of Pakistan:** To prevent the Government of Pakistan from focusing effective military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Area.
- **Defeat the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF):** To remove GIROA, force an ISAF withdrawal, and return the Taliban to power.

# Pakistan's Internal Concerns

## **Political / Civil Climate**

- Pakistan contends with political turmoil following Bhutto's assassination

## **Pakistan Military and Frontier Corps**

- PAKMIL and Frontier Corps (FC) realignment ongoing; concern is effectiveness of FC in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)

## **Federally Administered Tribal Area**


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
# Ethnic & Linguistic Diversity

## Percent of Population and Language Speakers






## Taliban Influence in NWFP & FATA by District



**Source: The Long War Journal, “Al Qaeda's paramilitary 'Shadow Army’,” February 9, 2009.**

# Pakistan conflict map: Spread of Taliban



Source: BBC, "Map shows Pakistan Taliban spread" and "Pakistan conflict map", May 13, 2009.



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# Pakistan Striking Back at the Taliban


The Pakistani military intensified its campaign last week to turn back the Taliban from further encroaching on Islamabad, Pakistan's capital. The militants have taken control of many parts of the mountainous districts overlooking the capital. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has vowed to "eliminate" the Taliban.

**LOWER DIR** Pakistani paramilitary troops assisted by helicopter gunships are fighting the infiltration of militants from the Bajaur Agency and Swat.

**SWAT** The Pakistani military estimates that it is fighting some 4,000 militants here. The contest to reclaim Mingora, the district's capital, from the Taliban raged on Saturday. Pakistani officials accused militants of firing from private homes.

**BUNER** Pakistani forces say they have regained control of the roads into the district from the west and the south. They continue to battle militants in the northern part of the district. Taliban fighters pushed into Buner from Swat in early April and took control of the district in less than two weeks, setting up checkpoints in villages and intimidating the local police.

**MANSEHRA** In late April, Taliban militants were sighted in this district which is close to Tarbela Dam, a vital source of electricity.



Source: *Striking Back at the Taliban*, The New York Times, May 10, 2009, available in online article: *From Air and Ground, Pakistan Strikes Back at Taliban*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/world/asia/10pstan.html>.

# Sahria Law in NWFP



# US Drone Attacks in Pakistan (Jan 2008-Jan 2009)

The US has carried out about 40 drone air strikes since the beginning of 2008, most since September, killing more than 330 people, including many foreign militants, according to a tally of reports from Pakistani intelligence agents, district government officials and residents. There have been 18 attacks this year.

## MILITANTS REPORTED KILLED IN STRIKES SINCE JANUARY 2008

**January 28, 2008** - A senior al Qaeda member, Abu Laith al-Libi, was killed in a strike in North Waziristan.

**July 28, 2008** - An al Qaeda chemical and biological weapons expert, Abu Khabab al-Masri, was killed in South Waziristan.

**October 31, 2008** - A mid-level al Qaeda leader, Abu Akash, was killed in an attack in North Waziristan.


**November 19, 2008** - An Arab al Qaeda operative identified as Abdullah Azam al-Saudi was killed in Bannu district.

**November 22, 2008** - Rashid Rauf, a Briton with al Qaeda links and the suspected ringleader of a 2006 plot to blow up airliners over the Atlantic, was killed in an attack in North Waziristan. An Egyptian named as Abu Zubair al-Masri was said to be among the dead in the same attack.

**January 1, 2009** - A U.S. drone killed three foreign fighters in South Waziristan, Pakistani agents said. A week later, a U.S. counterterrorism official said al Qaeda's operational chief Usama al-Kini and an aide had been killed in South Waziristan.


# ***Developments in NATO/ISAF and US Forces***

## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Biggest Danger to Afghanistan : 2-2009





# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Support in your Area for US/NATO/ISAF Forces: 2006 to 2009-2




...more Afghans now blame the country's strife on the United States and its allies than on the Taliban. Thirty-six percent mostly blame U.S., Afghan or NATO forces or the U.S. or Afghan governments for the violence that is occurring, up by 10 points from 2007. Fewer, 27 percent, now mainly blame the Taliban, down by 9 points.

Afghanistan's central and provincial governments have a stronger presence and greater public confidence than Western forces -- but they, too, have suffered. In 2005, still celebrating the Taliban's ouster in November 2001, 83 percent of Afghans approved of the work of President Karzai and 80 percent approved of the national government overall. Today those have slid to 52 and 49 percent respectively.

Crucially, the Kabul government and its Western allies do better where they are seen as having a strong presence and as being effective in providing security, as well as in areas where reported conflict is lower. Where security is weaker or these groups have less presence, their ratings decline sharply. For example, among people who say the central government, the provincial government or Western forces have a strong local presence, 58, 57 and 46 percent, respectively, approve of their performance. Where the presence of these entities is seen as weak, however, their respective approval ratings drop to just 31, 22 and 25 percent.

# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: The War in Afghanistan: Worth Fighting or Not Worth Fighting?

Source: Gary Langer, ABC News/Washington Post Polls, March 31, 2009




—◆— Worth fighting	56%	51%	55%	50%	56%
—■— Not worth fighting	41%	45%	39%	47%	41%




# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: The War in Afghanistan Progress, Taliban, and National Priorities

Source: Gary Langer, ABC News/ Washington Post Polls, March 31, 2009




# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Views of NATO ISAF Forces :2006 to 2009/2



Among people who report bombing or shelling by U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces in their area, support for the presence of U.S. forces drops to 46 percent, vs. 70 percent among those who report no such activity. There's a similar pattern in support for retribution against U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces. While 25 percent of all Afghans now say violence against such forces can be justified, that jumps to 44 percent among those who report air strikes or shelling in their area. It's a similar 45 percent in the South and East, where the fighting has been most intense. By contrast, support for attacks on Western forces drops to 18 percent where no bombing or shelling has occurred, and to 15 percent in the provinces where conflict has been lowest, roughly the northern half of the country. All told, one in six Afghans report coalition bombardment in their area within the past year, but with huge variation; it soars to nearly half in the Southwest and nearly four in 10 in the East.

## Increase in ISAF troop levels




# NATO/ISAF Forces: April 2009 - I

## Key Facts:

- Commander: General (USA) David D. McKiernan
- 42 Troop Contributing Nations
- ISAF Total Strength: approx 58,390
- ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km<sup>2</sup>
- 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Note on numbers: Totals are approximations and actual numbers change daily. Number of troops will never be exact and should be taken as indicatives.



# NATO/ISAF Forces: April 2009 - II

## Regional Command Capital: (appx ISAF strength 5,830)

- HQ ISAF in Kabul (Composite)
- HQ RC(C) in Kabul (FRA)
- KAIA (POL)

## Regional Command South: (appx ISAF strength 22,830)

- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NLD) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
- Forward Support Base Kandahar (multinational)
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

## Regional Command West: (appx ISAF strength 2,940)

- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

## Regional Command North: (appx ISAF strength 4,730)




























- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

## Regional Command East: (appx ISAF strength 22,060)

- |                                     |                        |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| • HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM                |                        |
| • Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA) |                        |
| • PRT LOGAR (CZE)                   | • PRT GHAZNI (POL,USA) |
| • PRT SHARANA (USA)                 | • PRT ASADABAD (USA)   |
| • PRT KHOST (USA)                   | • PRT BAGRAM (USA)     |
| • PRT METHER LAM (USA)              | • PRT NURISTAN (USA)   |
| • PRT BAMYAN (NZL)                  | • PRT WARDAK (TUR)     |
| • PRT PANJSHIR (USA)                | • PRT GARDEZ (USA)     |
| • PRT JALALABAD (USA)               |                        |

# NATO/ISAF Forces: April 2009 - III


**Troop Contributing Nations (TCN):** The ISAF mission consists of the following 42 nations (the troop numbers are based on broad contribution and do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time).

	Albania	140		Finland	110		Lithuania	200		Spain	780
	Australia	1090		France	2780		Luxembourg	9		Sweden	290
	Austria	2		Georgia	1		Netherlands	1770		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	170
	Azerbaijan	90		Germany	3465		New Zealand	150		Turkey	660
	Belgium	450		Greece	140		Norway	490		Ukraine	10
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2		Hungary	370		Poland	1590		United Arab Emirates	25
	Bulgaria	820		Iceland	8		Portugal	30		United Kingdom	8300
	Canada	2830		Ireland	7		Romania	860		United States	26215
	Croatia	280		Italy	2350		Singapore	20			
	Czech Republic	580		Jordan	7		Slovakia	230			
	Denmark	700		Latvia	160		Slovenia	70			
	Estonia	140								<b>Total (rounded)</b>	<b>58390</b>

\* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name




# US/NATO/ISAF/ Killed by Year: 2001-2008



Source: <http://www.icasualties.org/oef/default.aspx>.

# NATO/ISAF Military Deaths in 2008


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- ANP - over 60% of total since Jan 2007




UNCLASS // REL USA ISAF NATO

\*Attributed to "Big 8"


# Total NATO/ISAF/OEF Killed Through January, 2009






Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; February 9, 2009

# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Views of the US: 2005-2009-2




# US Strategies and Plans for Iraq and Afghanistan




Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and USAID data.



# Total US Casualties: Patterns in Total KIA and WIA in Iraq and Afghanistan Wars from 2001-2008



# Total US Casualties By Month, 2001-2008



Note: Killed in action includes died of wounds, Accidents includes other deaths


Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division

# ***Scale and Impact of NATO Air Strikes***

# Munitions Dropped in Afghanistan versus Iraq:


## First Six Months of 2008

### (Bombs and Missiles)




# Rising Use of Fixed Wing Airpower: 2006-2008


(Human rights Watch Estimate)



Close Air Support Flights in Afghanistan, 2006-2008



Pounds of Bombs Deployed in Afghanistan, 2006-2008




Graph created from data from Human Rights Watch Website, *TROOPS IN CONTACT: Airstrikes & Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan*, 9 October 2008, data available at: [http://www.hrw.org/features/afghanistan\\_tic/index.html](http://www.hrw.org/features/afghanistan_tic/index.html)




# Wing Airpower and Civilian Casualties: 2006-2008


(Human rights Watch Estimate)



Close Air Support Flights in Afghanistan, 2006-2008




Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan from US Airstrikes, 2006-2008




Graph created from data from Human Rights Watch Website, *TROOPS IN CONTACT: Airstrikes & Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan*, 9 October 2008, data available at: [http://www.hrw.org/features/afghanistan\\_tic/index.html](http://www.hrw.org/features/afghanistan_tic/index.html)


## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with US/NATO/ISAF Air Attacks in Past Year: 2009




# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: US/NATO/ISAF Air Strikes: Acceptability & Blame



## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghans Who Feel Attacks on Coalition Forces are Justified : 2-2009



## Pakistanis More Concerned by Missile Strikes Than by al Qaeda or Taliban – October 2008



Source: IRI Index, Pakistan Public Opinion Survey, October, 2008


"Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan", Andrew M. Exum, Nathaniel C. Fick, Ahmed A. Humayun, David J. Kilcullen", June 2009, Page 19

# ***Developments in Afghan Army (ANA) and Police (ANP) Forces***



# Public Perception: Confidence in the ANA

*"Do you think the National Army will be able to defeat the AGE\* in the next few years?"\*\**



\* Question rephrased for ANQAR;  
Previously: Overall "defend Afghanistan from AGE"  
July '08 34%  
April '08 30%


Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

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\* Anti-Government Elements

# Public Perception: Who Provides Security

The Afghan National Police leads as the local provider of security for Afghans.




Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

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# Public Perception of the ISAF

Overall, nearly one third of the population hold a positive opinion of ISAF, one third hold a fair opinion, and nearly one third hold a negative opinion.

*"What is your opinion of ISAF?"*




Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

# Public Perception of the ISAF


Overall, nearly one third of the population hold a positive opinion of ISAF, one third hold a fair opinion, and nearly one third hold a negative opinion.

*“What is your opinion of ISAF?”*




*Percent within Province  
Responding Very Good or  
Good*


## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Confidence in Security Forces and Local Support for Them: 2009-2



## Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014 (Authorized Personnel)



## Growth of the Afghan National Army: 2007-2008 (Trained and Assigned Personnel)



Trained and assigned ANSF stand at 145,000 and will reach the current objective of 216,000 by the beginning of 2014.

In November 2008, the ANA stood at 79,068 (including 5,420 absent without leave- AWOL), composed of 78 kandaks (battalions) and five Commando (CDO) kandaks.

In summer 2008, the GIRoA sought agreement to further increase the ANA from 80,000 to 122,000 soldiers with an additional 12,000 trainee, transient, hospitalized, and student (TTHS) account (for a total authorized end strength of 134,000). On September 10th 2008, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved.

The GIRoA will reach its objective of 134,000 ANA personnel by the beginning of 2014.

The 134,000 force structure calls for 20 brigades, a new division headquarters in the capital, Corps-level artillery, engineer and Quick Reaction Force assets, as well as an increase in institutional support.



# ANA Unit CM Readiness Levels, June 2006 - December 2008 with Progress Goals for 2009-2014

As of November 2008, the ANA had seven battalions and one brigade and one corps headquarters rated at Capability Milestone (CM)1: capable of operating independently.

Twenty- nine battalions/squadrons, six brigade headquarters, and three corps headquarters were reported at the CM2 level: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support.

Twenty-five battalions/squadrons, four brigade headquarters, one corps headquarters, and the ANAAC headquarters were reported at the CM3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces.

Six battalions/squadrons and one brigade headquarters are reported at

CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. Finally, there are eighteen battalions/squadrons and two brigade headquarters that are still not formed or reporting.

Currently, two of the five corps can field nearly all of their subordinate units and join their international partners in some of the most contentious areas of RC East and South




Table 4 - ANA Unit CM levels, December 2008

CM1	CM2	CM3	CM4
18	26	26	2

# ANSF Deliberate Operations


- ANSF is demonstrating increased capacity and capability to lead Deliberate Operations.
- Increases in ANSF capability and end-strength should lead to further increases in ANSF led Deliberate Operations.
- A sharp increase in the number of coalition led operations beginning in the summer of 2008 led to a reduction in the percentage of operations the ANSF led.
- In spite of ANSF increased capacity and capabilities, any increase in Coalition Forces and their operations will result in the continued percentage decline of ANSF led operations.

## Summary of 2009 Deliberate Operations

- ANSF has led an average of **51** Deliberate Operations per week.
- Average of **90** total deliberate operations conducted per week.
- On average, the ANSF has led 56% of Deliberate Operations conducted during a given week in 2009.

## Summary of 2008 Deliberate Operations

- ANSF led an average of **22** Deliberate Operations per week.
- Average of **37** total Deliberate Operations conducted per week.
- On average, the ANSF led 61% of Deliberate Operations conducted during a given week in 2008.




as of 31 May 2009

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# ANA Size and Capability

- ANA Increasingly Conducting and Leading Operations (56% in 2009)
  - 114 of 179 units fielded; 89,521 assigned (will grow to 134,000 by Dec 2011)
- ANA Air Corps have over tripled monthly troop and cargo capacity since Feb 08
  - Air Corps flying 90% of all Afghan missions



<sup>1</sup>CM = Capability Milestone Rating  
<sup>2</sup>IF = International Forces

CM <sup>1</sup> Level	Description
CM 1	BN Level Ops, IF <sup>2</sup> Enables
CM 2	BN Level Ops with IF Spt
CM 3	Co Level Ops with IF Spt
CM 4	Unit Formed, No Capability


Source: CSTC-A, as of 29 May 09.

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# ANA Land and Air Forces: April 2009


In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of April 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 82,780 personnel. This represents 62% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by the end of 2011.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Now, over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA.



## ANA PROGRESS FROM JAN 08 TO DEC 08

### Battalion / Kandak Level Capabilities



#### Key Points:

**ANA fielding:** From Jan 08 to Dec 08, 13 new Battalions were fielded (Include Infantry, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Commando Bns)

**ANA manning:** ANA personnel assigned to ANA land combat forces increased from 31,342 in Jan08 to 44,051 in Dec08

ANA total personnel assigned increased from 49,452 in Jan08 to 67,263 in Dec08

#### ANA capabilities:

- 21 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 1, being able to plan and execute operations at Battalion level with no external support for organic functions
- 23 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 2, being able to plan and execute operations at Battalion level with external support
- 22 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 3, being able to plan and execute operations at Coy level with external support
- 2 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 4, fielded but not capable to plan and lead operations
- ANA led operations increased from 49% in Jan08 to 62% in Dec08



## NATO/ISAF: ANSF Response to Attack on Kabul 11 Feb 2009

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- The ANSF responded quickly and decisively to attacks at the Ministries of Justice, Education, and Foreign Affairs.
- ANSF efforts demonstrate both increased capacity within the ANA, ANP and NDS, and also increased coordination between the forces.
- The quick and independent response and actions on the scenes are further indication that the Afghans are capable of lead security responsibility in Kabul (assumed in 2008).
- The ANSF swiftly rescued hostages and thwarted further attacks on the Independent Election Commission and other possible targets.
- Security was restored in Kabul within three hours in a well coordinated and proportionate response.
- Ten insurgents attacked; four had suicide vests (of which two detonated); seven insurgents were killed and two detained. Friendly casualties: 19 killed, 52 wounded.

# Shortages in US and NATO Afghan Army Trainers: 2007-2013

Figure 13 – U.S. ETT Personnel Required and Assigned, August 2007 – 2013






Figure 14 – ISAF OMLTs, June 2007 – 2013





## Growth of the Afghan Police Force: 2007-2008 (Trained and Assigned Personnel)




The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police with responsibilities that include criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs.

The roles of the various police services span a wide spectrum of policing, law enforcement, and security functions.

The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of 82,000 personnel that is capable of operating countrywide. At the end of November 2008 there were 75,954 assigned ANP.

# Readiness of Afghan Police Units: Current and Projected by Readiness Category: 2008-2013

(District AUP and Specialized Unit CM levels, February-December 2008, with Projections for 2009-2013)




**Table 6 - CM levels for ANP Units, December 2008**

CM1	CM2	CM3	CM4
18	16	22	317

# Impact of Afghan Police Reform: Casualties and Pay


Figure 17 Local Afghan Casualties, Pre- and Post-FDD by District, November 2008\*\*



RANK	GRADE	Pre-Pay Reform	Pay Reform	ANP/ANA Pay Parity
LTG	O-9	\$107	\$750	\$780
MG	O-8	\$103	\$650	\$680
BG	O-7	\$95	\$550	\$580
COL	O-6	\$92	\$400	\$430
LTC	O-5	\$88	\$350	\$380
MAJ	O-4	\$83	\$300	\$330
CPT	O-3	\$78	\$250	\$280
1LT	O-2	\$69	\$200	\$230
2LT	O-1	\$66	\$180	\$210
1st SGT		\$62	\$160	\$190
2nd SGT		\$62	\$140	\$170
3rd SGT		\$62	\$115	\$145
1st PTRLMN		\$70	\$80	\$110
2nd PTRLMN		\$70	\$70	\$100

## Shortfall in Police Mentoring Teams: 2008

(U.S. Personnel Required and Assigned, June 2007 -November 2008)



# NATO/ISAF: Afghan Public Protection Program

## AP3 Overview

- District community councils select local protection forces
- Special Forces "train the trainers" for the Afghan Police
- Afghan Police train the Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF);
- Ministry of Interior provides oversight
- Amplified by Wardak Governor's information and media campaign
- Deployment of AP3 assets is coordinated between the ANP and the district community council

**Key Takeaway:** AP3 is a pilot community engagement program that relies on civil participation to enhance local security, deny insurgent support, and extend government legitimacy to the district level

**Class 1 – Jalreyz District**  
243 pax / 47 villages


- 46% Tajik
- 38% Pashtun
- 16% Hazara

## AP3 Pilot Program Methodology (Wardak Province)

Ph 0: Prepare	Ph 1: Shape	Ph 2: Clear	Ph 3: Hold	Ph 4: Build
IDLG / Community Selects APPF	ANA District Security Ops APPF Training		APPF Deployment	Development Projects



Unclassified//FOUO



• **Class 1: Jalreyz**

- Graduated 26 Mar
- Successfully deployed and integrated with ANP in Jalreyz

• **Class 2: Maydan Shahr/Jalreyz/Nerkh:**

- Training began 25 Apr
- Graduated on 14 May
- 81 students from 14 villages (30% Tajik, 70% Pashtun)


• Continuing to conduct shape and clear operations in Nerkh, Chak-e Vardak, and Sayed Abad

• **Class 3: Nerkh / Sayed Abad**

- District councils in process of nominating and vetting candidates

# ***Counternarcotics or Aid and Comfort to the Enemy?***





- In the country as a whole, 63 percent of Afghans call raising opium poppy “unacceptable in all cases.”
- But in the six top-producing provinces that dives to 31 percent – and in Helmand, source of two-thirds of Afghanistan’s opium poppy, to just 12 percent.
- Instead, 66 percent in the top-producing provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Nimroz and Zabul in the Southwest, and Farah in the West), call it acceptable to cultivate the crop. That peaks at 88 percent in Helmand.
- Most who say it’s acceptable say that’s the case only if there’s no other way to earn a living, suggesting openness to alternatives. But the high prices for opium poppy may make alternatives a hard sell.
- Another challenge: Even nationally, few Afghans, just 13 percent, support spraying pesticides as a way to eradicate the crop.



Figure 1 Reasons for opium cultivation in 2009 in opium growing villages





Figure 2 Reasons for not cultivating opium in 2009 (southern and western region)



Note: 98 per cent of the total poppy of Afghanistan was cultivated in this region in 2008

The survey indicates that approximately 60 per cent of villages with 'poor' security and 51 per cent of those with 'very poor' security are involved in poppy cultivation, as compared to only 12% and 4% of villages with 'good' and 'very good' security.

Table 5 Security situation vis-à-vis opium cultivation

Security situation	No. of villages surveyed		% of villages cultivating opium poppy
	No opium poppy cultivation	Opium poppy cultivation	
Very poor	43	44	51%
Poor	40	60	60%
Good	166	22	12%
Very good	105	4	4%

# The Economics of Opium: 2004-2009

Graph 2: Average farm-gate prices for dry opium (USD/kg) (Source: UNODC Monthly Opium Price Report for Afghanistan, December 2008)





Table 9 Prices of opium and food grains in 2009 and 2008

Crop name	Prices (USD per Kg)		% difference
	ORA 2009	ORA 2008	
Dry opium	85.16	112.87	-25%
Fresh opium	61.74	80.44	-23%
Wheat	0.60	0.40	49%
Rice	1.12	0.89	26%
Maize	0.42	0.28	48%


# Market Saturation Does Limit Growth

## Decline in Farm Gate Price




## But, Far Too Little To Matter

UN estimate  
production down  
6% in 2008, but  
farm gate prices  
down 19-22%




# The Rising Opium Threat in the South: 2006-2008




Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

# Counternarcotics Keeps Pushing Growth South in 2008











# Opium Trade: Drugs and Security: Jan 09




Source security map: UNISD  
Source: MON - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, 2009 (<http://www.unodc.org/afghanistan/monitoring.html>)  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

# Intensity of Drug Production By Province: Jan 09



Source: UNODC - UNACDC Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, 2009 ([http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop\\_monitoring.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html))  
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


# Expected Drug Production in 2009 By Province



Source: UNODC - UNODC Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, 2008 (<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/press/docs/2008/afghanistan.html>)  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.




# Expected Opium Harvest By Province in 2009




Source: UNODC Afghanistan Opium Field Assessment Survey 2008. Data were collected and analyzed by UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

## Drug Seizures and Eradication: 2003-2008

**Figure 26 – Illegal Narcotics Seizures (kg), 2001-2008**




**Figure 27 – Poppy Eradication 2005-2008 (ha)**




# NATO/ISAF: Counternarcotics

## Interdictions




## Eradications



Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Periodic Report on Poppy Eradication Survey, 25 May 2009.

## Seizures and Destructations



Denied the Insurgency:

**\$US 4.6M**

(Farm-Gate Value, excludes chemicals)


Source: ISAF CNOC, as of 31 May 09.

NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

# NATO/ISAF: Counternarcotics - 1Q 2009

## Interdiction

- Drug seizures/destructions up 118% year-to-date
- 26 CN ops conducted through 18 Apr
- Denied Insurgency \$US 1.65M (farm gate value)




As of 18 Apr 09

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## Eradication

- Total eradications are down 10% year to date relative to last year



As of 13 Apr 09



# NATO/ISAF: Counternarcotics - 1Q 2009 - II

## ISAF / NATO Authorities

- Received updated guidance from SACEUR (4 Feb 09)
  - Narcotic facilities / facilitators legitimate targets if intelligence links to insurgency
  - Poppy eradication not an ISAF task (GIROA leads)
  - Example ISAF tasks: share information, provide logistics, enhanced operational support (i.e. cordon, post-interdiction destruction)
- ISAF conducting complementary operations and providing specific support to GIROA-led CN-Interdiction activity (Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force & Narcotics Interdiction Unit)

## USA Authorities


- Assist in post interdiction destruction by air assets
- OEF ROE allow targeting of uncleared labs
- Direct support to Afghan CN forces

## United Kingdom Authorities

- Support to Afghan CN forces
- Assist in post interdiction destruction
- No ordinance dropping on uncleared labs


## Denmark / Estonia

- Will support ISAF CN efforts
- Unofficial commitments from Canada and Lithuania





***Afghan Governance: Going in  
the Right Direction?  
Corruption?***

## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghanistan's Direction: 2005 to 2009-2




## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Government Going in Right Direction? 2008-12 to 2009-2





Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country's provinces

# NATO/ISAF: Public Perceptions of National Government 12/08-3/09




Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

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
# NATO/ISAF: Public Perceptions of Provincial Councils 12/08-3/09

*Do you agree/disagree that the Provincial Council makes a difference for the province?*



*Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09*

# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceptions of Corruption: 2007-2009-2




# ***Afghan Economics and Conditions of Life***

# Afghan Conditions of Life

- While 62 percent of Afghans rate their overall living conditions positively, that's declined steadily from 83 percent in 2005.
- There has been significant progress in some areas.
  - Seventy-two percent of Afghans say schools have been rebuilt or reopened in their area in the past five years (up 7 points from 2007); 53 percent, mosques; 47 percent, roads (up 12 points); 45 percent, health clinics (up 8 points); and 44 percent, police stations.
  - While fewer than half, 42 percent, say they have good roads, bridges and other infrastructure in their area, that's up sharply from 24 percent in 2005.
  - Seventy-seven percent rate their local schools positively; 65 percent say they have clean water, up 12 points compared with 2007 and a new high.
  - And 73 percent support the presence of foreign aid organizations in Afghanistan.
- In other areas,
  - barely over half rate their access to medical care positively.


Fifty-nine percent have no formal education. Forty-eight percent cannot read.

- Just under half positively rate their protection from the Taliban and other armed groups.
- While 61 percent say they can move about safely, that's down 10 points from 2007, and leaves four in 10 without such freedom of movement. And beyond food and fuel, in terms of prices overall, 58 percent report difficulty being able to afford things they want and need.
- (Only) 51 percent, say foreign aid groups are making progress in providing a better life for Afghans. And fewer still, 30 percent of Afghans, say foreign development aid has benefited them personally. There's also concern about its future: Nearly three-quarters are worried about the impact of the global financial crisis on aid to their country.



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country's provinces; February 9, 2009

## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Conditions in Your Area - Good? 2009-2






## Afghan Economic Realities


- More than half report incomes less than the equivalent of \$100 a month; 93 percent, under \$300.
- Fifty-nine percent have no formal education. Forty-eight percent cannot read.
- The affordability of food is worsening: Sixty-three percent of Afghans say they cannot afford to buy all or even some but not all of the food they need, up 9 points from late 2007. And while 63 percent report adequate availability of food (regardless of affordability), that's down from 82 percent in 2006.
- Fuel prices, likewise, are a major problem; 68 percent say they can't afford the fuel they need for cooking or heat, a serious issue in the cold Afghan winter.
- Just 29 percent say there's a good supply of jobs or economic opportunities in their area.
- And the number who characterize their economic opportunities as "very bad" has doubled since 2006 -- from 17 percent then to 33 percent now, one in three Afghans.
- Electricity supply is steadily the single biggest complaint, along with economic opportunity and prices.
- Fifty-five percent have no electricity whatsoever in their homes; just one in 20 has power all day.
- Another poorly rated area is support for agriculture, such as the availability of seed, fertilizer and farm equipment, a central concern in a country that's three-quarters rural, with food prices so problematic.

## Afghan GNP: 2002-2008




Source: Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181)*, January 2009, p.91.


**Table 1: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
Nominal GDP. FY 2002-2007**



**Table 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
GDP per capita. FY 2002-2007**




Data provided by IMF and Afghan Authorities.




Data provided by IMF and Afghan Authorities

# Economy & Essential Services


*Has your family's economic situation gotten better, stayed the same or gotten worse compared to 12 months ago?*




Gross Licit Domestic Product



*Are you satisfied/dissatisfied with the provision of services in the area?*  
(Percent responding 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied')




# ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Ability to Afford Food: 2007 vs. 2009-2




# Afghan Agriculture: Output By Crop and Value of Exports

**Figure 21 – Major Agricultural Products, Afghanistan, 2000/2001-2008/2009 (1,000 metric tons)**




**Figure 22 – Value of Exported Afghan Agricultural Produce, 2001-2007**



# National Solidarity Program


- Provides one-time block grants of \$5,000 to \$60,000 to local communities
- Reaches 68% of Afghanistan's 31,000+ communities
- Forms democratically elected Community Development Council (CDC)
- CDC conducts a reconstruction and development assessment for its village and identifies projects and activities (46k projects approved; 25k completed)

**NSP Coverage, By District (Mar 09)**



Source: ISAF; MRRD; as of 30 Mar 09.

**Kinetic Event Density**



- Adapts to Afghan local cultural and political environments
- Provides broad coverage and good performance with low-leakage rates
- Engenders local buy-in (requires 10% community contribution); highly popular program
- Serves as a front-line mechanism for the Hold and Build phases of the overall COIN strategy



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# NATO/ISAF Health Care Map in 2008

Major issues related to healthcare assessment arise from the lack of a basic acceptable standard of “healthcare.” Many Afghans deem simple items such as vaccination as “healthcare.”

## % with access to a clinic or Hospital



Uruzgon not sampled due to extremely poor security & high risk  
Population approx. 300k; 1% of Afghanistan


Source: MRA, ANDP 6, July 2008

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# Healthcare in 2009


## Community Health Workers



	Under five Mortality rate	Children % not growing normally
Afghanistan	19.1	48
Algeria	4.9	6
Ghana	10	25
Kenya	12.2	23
Malaysia	0.8	18
Morocco	4.4	9
Peru	3.9	8
Sudan	10.7	17
Uzbekistan	6.9	19


Source: WSSCC WASH

## Nationwide Results






*How would you rate the quality of the healthcare available in your area?"*

## Results by Province



# NATO/ISAF Education Map in 2008

**Access\* to schools for both girls and boys varies across the country and is tightly linked to security. Degree of access to girls schools is also an ethno-geographic factor.**




Uruzgon not sampled due to extremely poor security & high risk  
Population approx. 300k; 1% of the Afghanistan's population

Source: ANDP 6, July 2008

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# Education 2009

**Number of Students in School**




## MINISTRY OF EDUCATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS


- 9062 Schools in 2007; 10,998 in 2008
- 147,641 Teachers in 2007; 157,244 in 2008
- 26 million textbooks printed in 2008
- Adult literacy program will serve 1,300 communities 2008 – 2013
- Adult literacy rate is ~ 28%  
(women ~ 12%; men ~ 43%)

*Are 6 to 14 year old children in your household going to school?*


**Access to Schools (Boys)**



**Access to Schools (Girls)**




Percent  
responding "Yes"



Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

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
# NATO/ISAF Ring Road Map in 2008



- Completed
- To be complete by Mar 09 (benchmark)
- To be complete by Mar 10
- To be complete after Mar 10
- Unknown

154 kilometers constructed in 2008

75% of RING Road and 44% of  
International Links Completed



Source: USAID 30 Nov 08


UNCLASS // REL USA ISAF N/...



# Freedom of Movement

**Public Perception: "How safe do you feel driving outside your Mantaqa during the day?"**


Overall, nearly 7 in 10 Afghans feel at least a little safe using the roads in their districts.



Source: ANQAR Survey, Mar 09

## Attacks within 500m of ISAF Routes


- Comparing Jan-Mar '09 to the same time period in 2008, attacks within 500 meters of ISAF routes were up 51%
- Results of increased security measures (implemented Sep 08):
  - Fewer attacks on bridges
  - Less effective attacks



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# Impact of Road Programs as of March 2009

## *Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the provision of roads?*



## *Roads Impact Assessment Report*


- 943 kms of Regional, National and Provincial Roads assessed
- Traffic volumes up 58%
- Travel times decreased 74%
- No. of businesses increased 56%; Gross sales increased 400%
- Household Income up 39%
- Irrigated land increased 47%
- School attendance up 8%
- Health Clinic visits up 7%

*Source: USAID, Roads Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, May 6 – August 8, 2008; compares information collected from Summer 2008 against baseline data collected in 2003.*


Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009



## RING ROAD AND INTERNATIONAL LINKS TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES



# NEPS Status




IRP Afghan Energy Information Center (AEIC)

Not to scale or necessarily relative position.  
Updated based on January 20, 2009 SLD  
and information from ICE Secretariat.

***“Hold and Build:”  
Aid and PRTs***

## ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Reconstruction: Rebuilt or Reopened in Past Five Years



# Funding of the Afghan National Development Strategy by Budget Year (US Millions)

	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	Total
<b>Total funding</b>	<b>7,400</b>	<b>6,064</b>	<b>6,165</b>	<b>6,009</b>	<b>5,819</b>	<b>31,457</b>
Domestic revenue	887	1,104	1,351	1,611	1,911	6,864
Total donor assistance	6,513	4,960	4,814	4,398	3,908	24,593
<b>Total expenditures</b>	<b>7,903</b>	<b>9,286</b>	<b>10,236</b>	<b>11,038</b>	<b>11,637</b>	<b>50,100</b>
<b>Total shortfall</b>	<b>503</b>	<b>3,222</b>	<b>4,071</b>	<b>5,029</b>	<b>5,818</b>	<b>18,643</b>

# NATO/ISAF PRTs and RCs

(April 2009)

