

## The Cultural Revolution in Intelligence: Interim Report

The United States confronts serious and deadly challenges for which reliable intelligence analysis and information gathering are crucial. The recently released National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) judgment that Iran halted work on the design of nuclear weapons in 2003, for instance, shattered assumptions about Iran's capabilities and intentions. Critics immediately attacked the conclusions and the authors, while others celebrated the reduced risks of a new war in the Middle East. This startling reassessment of conclusions reached in 2005 resulted from more than a reported surge in intelligence collection; it also reflected the application of fresh approaches and practices to intelligence analysis.

The necessity for change in intelligence analysis became apparent after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the fruitless search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. These events indicated multiple intelligence community shortfalls, among them inadequate consultation and cooperation among the various intelligence agencies. The situation required bold action rather than incremental modification to bring about a revolution in community culture.<sup>1</sup> Yet, the precincts of intelligence reform are under siege and fraught with peril.

To address these shortcomings, Congress created an intensely contentious vehicle for reform, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), through legislation passed in 2004.<sup>2</sup> Elements within the intelligence community, other government agencies, and the informed public all objected to this institutional restructuring. It upended both traditional lines of authority and

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established practices with the new director of national intelligence (DNI) assuming a significant portion of the leadership portfolio that the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had exercised as director of central intelligence (DCI).

The ideals and tools behind the current reforms are fitting, but what may be lacking is the will of the intelligence community to succeed. Studies of government make clear that the potential for success is modest. Organizations are reluctant to change, burdened by inertia, confronted with internal resistance, caught in tradition and habit, and lacking incentives, resources, and freedom of choice.<sup>3</sup> Several years after the September 11 attacks, moreover, fatigue has set in as intelligence officers have endured continuous criticism and self-flagellation along with lengthy discussion of potential reforms. If restructuring is to be the leading edge of transformation, it cannot be the totality of change nor can it be allowed to fail. Success will come only if there is a fundamental revolution in the culture of the intelligence community.

## **Early Battles**

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The creation of the ODNI originated with demands that the work of the intelligence community be improved rapidly to avoid new crises. Yet, the White House in 2004 initially rejected the notion that a DNI should be named. As David Ignatius of the *Washington Post* noted, a part of Bush's team had a "mistrust, bordering on outright hatred, of the CIA as a supposed obstacle to the president's goals."<sup>4</sup> The White House did not want an even more powerful intelligence voice.

This resistance has historical roots. Many administrations rebuffed the idea of a centralized intelligence director after it first surfaced in 1955. Bureaucratic and political resistance thwarted proposals from prominent advocates including former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford in 1976, former DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner in 1985, and General Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President George H. W. Bush and chairman of George W. Bush's President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), in 2002. Intelligence scholar Amy Zegart has noted that "the Bay of Pigs, the congressional investigations into CIA abuses ... the Iran-Contra scandal, and the Aldrich Ames spy case all triggered major investigations, but none produced fundamental change in the intelligence community."<sup>5</sup> The collapse of the Soviet Union generated suggestions for reforms as well, including Senate advocacy of a DNI, but major change did not follow.<sup>6</sup> Between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the September 11 attacks, a dozen reports by Congress, special study groups, and think tanks urged as many as 340 reforms with repeated emphasis on appointing a national intelligence director.<sup>7</sup> Yet, at no point did the

intelligence community unite behind centralization, which threatened budgets and autonomy. Neither Congress nor the White House insisted on centralization either.

Only after the September 11 attacks did momentum grow sufficiently to make the concept reality. Public interest in inquiries by the 9/11 Commission and the WMD Commission ensured that legislation languishing in Congress would be approved and gain presidential support. Even then, however, opposition primarily from the Department of Defense guaranteed that the ability of the DNI to manage the military intelligence and combat support agencies—the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency (NSA), and the service intelligence centers—would be circumscribed. The administration and Congress failed to endorse a Scowcroft proposal to move intelligence activities and the associated budget out of the Defense Department.

**The Iran NIE demonstrates what can be accomplished using these standards.**

Accordingly, the DNI acquired only partial authority over these units and their budgets, creating uncertainties, constraints, and clashing cultural and practical priorities.<sup>8</sup> Robert Gates, former DCI and future secretary of defense, argued that centralization was meaningless unless the DNI had authority over the 80 percent of the annual intelligence budget allocated to the Pentagon; if not, the new DNI would be an “intelligence eunuch.”<sup>9</sup>

Others have feared that Congress and the public might be rushing the wrong kind of reform, relying too much on organizational diagrams. Former senator Warren Rudman (R-N.H.), who had served for many years as chairman of the PFIAB, believed that application of new policies without sufficient preparation had already left the intelligence community “worse than [it was] in the first place.”<sup>10</sup> Intelligence analysts in particular protested that “intelligence capabilities can be significantly improved by adjusting policies and practices rather than institutions and structures.”<sup>11</sup> In other words, the authors of the new system had gotten it wrong; simpler and more effective answers existed.

## **Beginning the Experiment**

Despite the misgivings of some, ODNI management of the nation’s 16 intelligence agencies since 2004 has provided an unprecedented opportunity to see issues broadly, imposing equity among agencies and determining appropriate sources of intelligence support. However diligent, dedicated, and all-embrac-

ing DCIs may have been in the past, they invariably and predictably put CIA interests first because they also headed the CIA. The unsurprising result was inequality in resources, access, and ultimately performance. By creating an integrated community in which individuals identify with the overall enterprise of intelligence rather than just with separate stovepiped organizations, the DNI can, in theory, position money and manpower most effectively to address national challenges.

**A revolution in the prevailing culture of the intelligence community is urgently needed.**

The ODNI has tackled reform in some cases by reinvigorating projects previously unable to gain community-wide support. The Analyst Resource Catalog (ARC), for instance, allows specialists to find one another among the 17,000 names listed and permits managers to find the right individuals to solve specific problems.<sup>12</sup> The CIA had trouble enrolling participants when it launched the project, but the ODNI has managed to overcome resistance. The ARC is reversing the astonish-

ing fact that prior to the creation of this directory, no one knew how many analysts across the community worked on Afghanistan, Iraq, terrorism, or any other topic. Similarly, existing systems in individual agencies do not currently facilitate locating all analytic products on a subject. The new National Intelligence Library will collect all assessments from across the community with the goal of becoming a platform for information sharing.

Other programs to advance cooperation remain under development. Data sharing is the key to “A-Space,” which allows analysts to collaborate online.<sup>13</sup> The President’s Daily Brief (PDB) is being transformed from a CIA product into a multiagency compilation. A Long Range Analysis Unit supports sustained research by analysts from all agencies, freeing them from the pressure of crisis-driven analysis and daily intelligence production, making them more than “action junkies” as it deepens their expertise on critical, neglected problems.<sup>14</sup> An Open Source Center has reconceived intelligence translation services, expanding evaluation and coverage to more genres of unclassified materials. New ODNI programs evaluate and improve analysis, promulgate IC Analytic Standards, and introduce joint, entry-level training.

These analysis and training programs illustrate the achievements of and obstacles for the ODNI to date. In inaugurating an effort to evaluate the analytic products of the entire intelligence community, the ODNI, working through its Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS), which I headed as assistant deputy director of national intelligence for the first year and a half of its existence, sought to meet the injunction of Congress and the public to galvanize change among analysts. It began by formulating IC Analytic Standards to

guide analytic writing and measure the quality of analytic work. The AIS adopted recommendations from the WMD Commission report and consulted representatives of all of the intelligence agencies. It drew on existing assessment criteria, codified community best practices, and added some new ideas. The resulting indicators of performance quality include objectivity, timeliness, relevance, and logic. Analysts must properly source evidence, avoid politicization, acknowledge uncertainty and assumptions, use alternative analysis, explain consistency or deviation, and strive for accuracy. The AIS subsequently applied these standards to analysis of functional and regional issues, including terrorism, China, and Iran, reporting results periodically to agencies and annually to Congress.

The Iran NIE demonstrates what can be accomplished using these standards. Prior to publication, the AIS evaluated the NIE, paying particular attention to its use of alternative analyses, its identification of assumptions and information gaps, and the transparency of the sources relied on not only for the judgments but also the confidence levels it assigned to those judgments. “The careful review of the tradecraft in the NIE gave me greater confidence in the quality of the product,” said Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and National Intelligence Council chairman Thomasingar, “as well as the assurance that all who read it carefully would understand why we said what we did in the way that we did.”<sup>15</sup>

Although the standards reflect what analysts have always aimed to do and what had been vetted with their organizations, requiring compliance aroused pockets of hostility. Perceived as an assault on agency integrity, the standards incited efforts to protect secrecy and custom. Dissemination and enforcement faced unanticipated obstacles. Fortunately, allies at all levels and in most agencies embraced the standards and the intent behind them, acting as proponents of change or using the ODNI effort to boost the visibility of their existing programs.

Particular irritation, anger, and confusion have also arisen over sourcing. The sourcing policy seeks to provide details regarding information used in analysis, similar to footnotes for a book or article, without identifying informants or endangering operatives. Proper sourcing might warn a consumer such as Secretary of State Colin Powell against misrepresenting Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction in the United Nations with a picture culled from one, not multiple, informants. The AIS has insisted that even if the case of the Iraqi defector “Curveball,” who claimed he had worked at an Iraqi WMD facility, was unusual, the problem of not having citations for follow-up on critical information was widespread. Nevertheless, critics warned that sourcing would slow analysis, cut productivity, and risk revealing identities and sensitive practices.

## Culture Shock

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To replace a 'need to know' culture, the 'responsibility to provide' is being demanded.

The fight over decades-old standards illustrates the urgency of a revolution in the prevailing culture of the intelligence community. Change remains anathema to too many in critical agencies and crucial positions. Although thousands of re-

recruits have entered the intelligence world in recent years, they have been quickly indoctrinated into the conservative mind-sets that exist across the intelligence community. They might be more open to innovative technologies because they grew up in a computer-driven world, but they are also enthralled by the mystery of intelligence. They eagerly read classified information—the more guarded and rarefied the better—overlooking open sources. They would agree with President John F. Kennedy, who declared after the Bay

of Pigs disaster that “[y]ou always assume that the military and intelligence people have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals.”<sup>16</sup> It is not difficult to rally mythmakers and believers in defense of tradition.

To revolutionize this culture, the DNI has emphasized community and information sharing, demanding that prohibitions against sharing information on a “need to know” basis be replaced by an individual’s “responsibility to provide.” Before thorough change can follow, however, the ODNI will have to undertake extensive education.

Analysis 101, a course in rigorous critical thinking established in 2006, captures new analysts preferably within the first six months of their careers. Its most innovative characteristic is “jointness.” Analysts from all 16 agencies sit in classrooms together building trust, learning about the activities and approaches of other units, and creating networks to facilitate future work. The students discuss, dissect, and use the IC Analytic Standards in hands-on exercises. Graduates from the very first class have already consulted one another to solve problems, a small but real step in advancing community integration.

Nevertheless, this reform measure has encountered resistance. Rather than being seen as an asset freeing resources for other types of training, its substance and intentions have been questioned. Because it is a community endeavor under the auspices of the ODNI, it is perceived as undermining separate agency “branding.” Some also worry about analysts developing groupthink, the propensity to minimize conflict and reach consensus without critically evaluating ideas. The students could seek unanimity because they had formed a cohesive group that would “override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”<sup>17</sup>

Surely groupthink would reduce variation in perspectives among intelligence agencies, undermining precisely the outspokenness that should have been more prevalent before the Iraq war. John Hamre, a former deputy defense secretary, lamented in 2004 that there is “already ... too much groupthink in a fractured intelligence community. I fear bringing it all under one chief would seriously threaten what little competition for ideas [there is].”<sup>18</sup> Yet, creating a community of interacting and networking analysts as Analysis 101 would *broaden* and *enliven* rather than circumscribe debate. As in think tanks and academic circles, it encourages consultation, provides new information, and introduces fresh perspectives unobtainable in a homogenized, single-agency discussion. Small or inexperienced organizations have particularly welcomed the accessible, varied, and challenging experience.

Initiatives to further integration and bridge gaps uncovered by the 9/11 Commission and WMD Commission reports remain unfinished and unproven after more than two years of effort. Frustrating both to critics and exponents, this fact must be considered in the context of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reorganization of the U.S. military that took more than a decade to mature. Restructuring and reconceptualizing the intelligence community will not entail less effort than the services required to accept operational and intellectual jointness under a strengthened chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated.

### **An Agenda for a Cultural Revolution**

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In spite of practical new initiatives, the cultural revolution required to produce effective community performance has barely begun. Successful ODNI reform remains contingent on the intelligence community, the administration, and Congress considering how community culture arrests growth and how that culture can be altered.

First, the relationship between intelligence agencies and members of Congress needs to be rectified. The ODNI would not exist without the actions that Congress took to meet popular demands for radical repair of the community. It compelled the Bush administration to approve legislation and a reorganization it did not want. Although it launched a vehicle for change, Congress, particularly the oversight committees in the Senate and House, has since adopted an adversarial stance that makes progress difficult. Partisanship in the oversight committees has grown even though Congress directed the ODNI to guard against politicization of analysis. More than 450 Congressionally Directed Actions, including more than 200 annual and quarterly routine reports, require time-consuming, detailed responses but rarely initiate a dialogue or inspire constructive collaboration. Congress must be congratulated for taking over-

sight more seriously since the September 11 attacks, but there are too many committees requiring testimony from intelligence leaders who thus spend too much time appearing on Capitol Hill. As they and their staffs prepare for repeated encounters, other critical tasks are not being accomplished.

Furthermore, oversight must be constructive as well as assertive. The ODNI and the wider intelligence community surely share responsibility for the antagonism that colors their interaction with Congress. The community does only as much as is absolutely necessary to comply with legislation and reassure Congress, treating members as enemies with whom contact must be carefully monitored and constrained. That said, congressional staffers and members ought to read the reports they are given before insisting on more. They have to dispense with a gotcha mentality, rooted in partisanship and friction between the legislative and executive branches that makes congressional inquiries and reviews so objectionable to agencies.<sup>19</sup>

In my experience testifying before an oversight committee, although I went eager to share my work, members of Congress paid attention only when they could upbraid us or hurl accusations. Neither they nor their aides sought or welcomed new information from anyone in my delegation. Each side has reasons to be wary. Congress can cut off funding, and the intelligence community is proficient at secrecy. Wariness, however, renders oversight a hurdle for, not a facilitator of, reform.

Second, there should be an independent bricks-and-mortar National Intelligence University (NIU) to ensure that members of the intelligence community have the opportunity to learn best practices. Existing institutions can provide good training, but being housed and sponsored by particular agencies, they can never achieve true impartiality. Analysts from small units or those new to the trade acutely feel that they are guests in someone else's house rather than equal partners in the enterprise.

Moreover, agency-specific training imbues employees with narrow cultural, methodological, and cognitive biases that do not serve the national interest. The resulting stovepipes make cooperation and information sharing much more difficult. Failure to exchange data among the CIA, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the months before the September 11 attacks is only the most notorious moment in a long history of resistance to sharing information. A bricks-and-mortar NIU with a core curriculum would permit new recruits to become members of the intelligence community more broadly, not just employees of the CIA, DIA, or NSA. Not all training need be done in a joint environment, but a core curriculum featuring courses such as Analysis 101 would share new critical-thinking approaches and provide networking opportunities to managers, mid-level analysts, and collectors as well as new recruits. Unless the principles and practices being taught in Analysis

101 are understood across the community, it will be difficult to ensure that they are tolerated and promoted.

Third, success in intelligence reform demands an evidence-based approach. Analysts cannot be expected to accept on faith that a new analytic tool will yield greater knowledge or accuracy. Instead, there must be research on what concepts are most productive in intelligence environments and frequent scientific testing of intelligence community practices. Change cannot be promoted haphazardly. To alter mind-sets, community members must be convinced that new ideas work. The evidence-based movement has been sweeping the medical profession and catching on in the business world. Researchers writing in the *Harvard Business Review* were talking about doctors but could as easily be describing analysts and operators in the intelligence community: “[D]octors rely on ... obsolete knowledge gained in school, long-standing but never proven traditions, patterns gleaned from experience, the methods they believe in and are most skilled in applying, and information from hordes of vendors with products and services to sell.”<sup>20</sup> Years of experience doing analysis will remain a crucial tool, but the community must amass data about best practices through a vigorous research program to protect national security.

**The relationship between intelligence agencies and Congress needs to be rectified.**

Fourth, widespread agreement exists that outreach beyond the intelligence community by its members ought to be dynamic, tapping external sources of expertise and information. Despite general enthusiasm, reality departs from the ideal. Outreach to facilitate cross-fertilization predates the ODNI but has remained limited because community members approach U.S. citizens with almost as much distrust as foreigner interlocutors. Some checks arise from opposition on the outside to contact with intelligence officers. Nevertheless, a sizable community of scholars and think tank analysts are willing to assist the community in understanding the world. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) has long had success in recruiting outside specialists to fill some of its posts, and the NIC Associates program provides geographic and functional expertise when requested.<sup>21</sup>

More serious are the constraints from within, particularly excessive security regulations. Although the benefits of seeking intellectual exchange are unpredictable, the incentives against reaching out are clear and formidable, especially among those required to take routine polygraph examinations. Individuals who do fraternize do it nervously, so wary they frustrate and discourage their interlocutors. Furthermore, care must be taken not to create a special

cadre of trusted fraternizers who are dispatched to create an image of forthrightness while the rest of the community remains isolated.

Outreach requires a culture of openness and transparency unfamiliar to the intelligence world. Protecting sources and methods demands secrecy, but secrecy can be overdone. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed after leaving the CIA, "In today's environment, the community has to be able to explain more effectively to the public, to the press, to Congress and others what it does for a living, what the realities are, and where there are efforts being made to change."<sup>22</sup>

Fifth, declassification of records should be a priority, commanding adequate resources and personnel. The intelligence community must facilitate access to historical and current information so that intelligence analysts and policymakers can avoid repetition of past mistakes. Moreover, national defense necessitates an educated public aware of past successes and failures.

That classification decisions can be self-defeating emerges clearly from history. Around the world, people are often more aware of past events than Americans and utilize that fact to their advantage in dealing with Washington. It is logical, for instance, that Iranians know more about the 1953 overthrow of their prime minister, Muhammad Mosaddeq, than Americans do. It is less reasonable that so few Americans know about the coup at all or U.S. complicity in it. The resulting imposition of an autocratic regime by Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi colors all relations with Washington. The intelligence community's decades-long unwillingness to declassify the relevant documents, even after the head of the CIA mission that facilitated the overthrow wrote openly about his involvement, made little sense and did not serve Washington well.<sup>23</sup>

Classification can be unreasonable. The treatment meted out to national security analyst Roberta Wohlstetter when she sought to publish her detailed review of the 1941 intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor illustrates the problem. Honored in 1985 by President Ronald Reagan and hailed by the 9/11 Commission, Wohlstetter initially had to fight to liberate her investigation of how analysts overlooked crucial information in the welter of data received prior to Japan's attack. Despite the fact that she conducted all her research in open sources, the NSA "not only ordered the book classified but demanded that all copies of the manuscript be destroyed" and then notified Wohlstetter that "she did not hold the proper clearances to read her book." Fortunately, wiser officials subsequently released her study so that generations of government and private analysts learned from the mistakes she uncovered.<sup>24</sup>

It took five years to release the Wohlstetter manuscript, but it required 36 years to release the unflattering portrait of the CIA's actions surrounding the Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba. Not until 1998 did the agency declassify "The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," which pointed out "bad

planning,” inadequate staffing, faulty intelligence, “fragmentation of authority,” and “failure to advise the President that success had become dubious.”<sup>25</sup> The CIA destroyed all but one copy and secreted that one. “In unfriendly hands,” warned the deputy director, “it can become a weapon unjustifiably to attack the entire mission, organization, and functions of the agency.” Thus the CIA compounded its original misjudgment by hiding important lessons from the public, statesmen, and analysts.<sup>26</sup>

Lessons of the past are critical for the intelligence community. Although the ODNI created a Lessons Learned Center in response to legislative requirements, it has been a slow moving project without a clear agenda. What should be happening is energetic pursuit of focused studies that relate past experience to future strategy and planning. These studies should be oriented toward substance and

process. For instance, the intelligence community could learn a lot from a review of why North Korea has not collapsed despite predictions that it would. It might also draw valuable information from studying the impact of the WMD Commission’s findings on interagency cooperation and agency differentiation. The Lessons Learned Center should do and assist with studies as well as collect and disseminate them. It should look at successes and failures and do so routinely despite potential embarrassment.

Sixth, the ODNI should secure a remedy to its staffing problem. On one hand, it has been faulted for becoming another large bureaucracy rather than the agile workforce Congress intended. On the other hand, it lacks a sufficient cadre of people to accomplish its roles and missions. The problem stems from several developments: the hybrid nature of the institution, the “contractorization” of the intelligence world, and the inadequate support structure of the ODNI.

The ODNI’s responsibilities are divided between two types of coordination and leadership. It has a command and control function, but its mission simultaneously involves operations and analysis. Because it operates at the pinnacle of the community, it can connect personnel across agency lines and develop technology that increasingly spans and links the intelligence world. At the same time, it acts as an integrator of information through the centers on counterterrorism and counterproliferation, as well as mission managers for Cuba-Venezuela, Iran, and North Korea. It also produces the highest-level coordinated products through the NIC and the PDB. Many see it as a superfluous new layer of bureaucracy that would complicate instead of simplifying communication. The ODNI workforce, some said, started out as bloated and

**P**rotecting sources and methods demands secrecy, but secrecy can be overdone.

grew from there, draining resources and getting in the way. When critics talk about the ODNI, however, they conflate these two activities and ascribe the larger staffs needed for the operations and analysis with the small cadre seeking to exercise oversight and encourage cooperation.

Currently, the ODNI lacks a sufficient workforce for many of the coordination and evaluation jobs it has been mandated to perform. Like the rest of the U.S. government, it has turned to contractors to fill the gaps. Report-

edly, almost 70 percent of the U.S. intelligence budget pays for private contractors.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, when the Senate recently directed the ODNI to prepare annual personnel studies of every intelligence agency, clarifying the roles of staff and contractors, it doubtless initiated another project that will be done by contractors.

Contracting firms often provide excellent service, and individual contractors can be

stellar. Nevertheless, problems are inherent in the process. Each temporary hire costs roughly twice what a permanent federal employee would earn. It interferes with control over how tasks are performed and who does them, ignoring such intangibles as dedication to the mission. It drains energy in the time-consuming and complicated effort to negotiate and approve contracts. It can disrupt the flow of business when contracts end. Congress should cautiously authorize the ODNI to hire essential personnel, guarding against overcompensation for existing gaps. It also should insist that the ODNI do more to train and retain qualified people and assist in this task.

Seventh, difficulties getting contracts signed follow not just from the intricacy of the jobs being filled, but also because the support systems for the ODNI, at the end of its third year, have still not been fully rationalized. The ODNI remains too dependent on the CIA for its rules, regulations, and technical manpower. The rules are often too harsh and inappropriate. One need only look at stringent prepublication review practices, remembering that the ODNI has staffed many positions with non-intelligence community specialists who deliver public lectures, are interviewed by the press, and write routinely. At the same time, the burden of providing for the ODNI in the area of contracting and Internet activities, for instance, strains CIA capacity, dropping ODNI needs to the bottom of the pile. Rather than overhauling procedures, the ODNI has become a prisoner of ineffective and rigid requirements. It is past time that the ODNI become its own master, building an efficient support structure as well as adopting new regulations that do not default to CIA practices.

**This is the moment for transformation, and there may never be another quite like it.**

## A Transformational Moment

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Even if these and hundreds of other recommendations are implemented, there will be future intelligence failures. As Robert Jervis, among the most incisive and constructive critics of the intelligence community, has observed, “Much of the history of international politics can be written in terms of intelligence failures, starting with the report in the Bible that the spies that Moses sent to the Land of Israel overestimated the strength of the enemies to be found there.”<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, the ODNI has the opportunity to implement communal changes that, although not guarantees of national security, can assure richer intelligence gathering, sharper analysis, and better coordination.

The first and most critical step must be a bold effort to alter the culture of the intelligence community. A difficult proposition even if everyone chose to cooperate, the initiative will encounter resistance from a conservative population skilled at denial and deception. It will be further constrained if the Defense Department elects to block change and retains the power to undermine reform. Yet, the DNI will not struggle alone to realize the revolution. He can expect assistance not just from a determined staff in the ODNI, but also from individuals scattered throughout and at all levels of the 16 agencies who are dedicated to improving the institutions they serve. This is the moment—and there may never be another quite like it—for fundamental and thorough transformation. The ODNI has to act while it is still new, its horizon is not yet obscured by tradition, and experimentation remains possible. Carrying out a cultural revolution requires big changes that will not come quickly or easily, but time is running out.

## Notes

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