Celebrate or Separate?
The Japan-US Security Treaty at 50

A Conference Report

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Rapporteur

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The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the US or Japanese governments, the co-sponsoring institutes, or the group of workshop participants as a whole.
Foreword

The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and the Pacific Forum CSIS were pleased and honored to again co-host the 16th annual Japan-U.S. Security Seminar on January 15-16, 2010. It was a timely and important discussion; our meeting was originally intended to launch celebrations that would mark the 50th anniversary of the Japan-US security alliance. Instead, historical political changes in Tokyo upended those plans and ushered in a period of confusion and uncertainty. Concerns surrounding the alliance were magnified by the extraordinary economic circumstances triggered by “the Great Recession.” Politicians and policy makers in Japan, the US, and elsewhere have been trying to assess the impact of events of the last two years and to discern whether they signal a fundamental shift in the balance of power in Asia and worldwide. The challenges posed by North Korea, Iran, and Myanmar add to the sense of urgency and the need to find answers.

Nonetheless, our participants remain committed to the bilateral alliance, while pressing for renovation of the security partnership to keep it relevant and resilient. Japan and the U.S. should reach out to other security partners – China and South Korea in particular – to diminish suspicions about our bilateral security alliance and to build a stronger foundation for multilateral security cooperation. Japan must forge a national consensus on its place in the world, the role of the alliance in its foreign policy, and its role within the alliance. Integral to this process is rethinking the definition of security. By focusing on nontraditional challenges, Japan can develop ways to contribute to peace, security, and stability that do not conflict with its constitutional constraints. Not only does this afford Japan more options, but it better aligns with the new U.S. administration’s agenda and thinking.

Our annual meetings continue to assist government officials in both countries to gain a greater appreciation of the changes and challenges – and the opportunities for cooperation – that lie ahead. While the hurdles are formidable, the unprecedented cooperation of recent years, and our shared values and interests, give us reason to be optimistic.

We are grateful to all the participants and keynote speakers for taking time from their busy schedules to join us and share their thoughts. Their commitment, insights, and ideas for the future of the alliance made this conference a success. We also would like to thank Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Japanese Embassy, and the Tokyo Foundation for their generous support for this project.

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Executive Summary

The year 2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the Japan-US security treaty. Yet rather than celebrate this milestone, attention has focused on the turbulence that buffets this vital partnership. Such tensions are not new: the two governments have struggled to create “a more equal partnership” since the treaty was signed and there have been numerous internal crises during its half century. According to one interpretation, current problems have been created by the historic change in government in Tokyo. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) wasn’t fully informed about security thinking and alliance discussions prior to taking office. It aims to reduce bureaucrat influence on decision making, a project that cuts out the individuals most knowledgeable about such issues. Most analysts expect the party to move closer to traditional security policies as it acquires experience. Yet another school argues that DPJ policy divergences represent a structural shift in how the Japanese see themselves and their country’s international role. There is no fully developed view of Japanese identity and purpose in today’s world, however.

Either way, the US must prepare to work with a “new Japan.” Fortunately, the alliance is the overwhelming preference of most Japanese when they consider national security options. Change is needed, however. Alliance decision-making procedures should be modified and the security community in both countries needs to expand. The DPJ, like much of the Japanese public, defines security more broadly than its predecessors. This obliges alliance managers to think differently about their work. It also offers new opportunities for cooperation.

There has been more continuity than change in US foreign policy toward Asia in general and toward the Japan-US alliance in particular. The traditional US focus on power and the balance of power continues, even though an expansive definition of national security requires more partners to deal with threats. At home, a pressing domestic agenda and debate over health care reform have distracted the president and forced him to spend precious political capital. The Great Recession has undercut the constituency for trade agreements, which hampers US opportunities for engaging Asia.

Challenges for the alliance include increasingly confident China that plays a growing role in both countries’ economic calculations. How Beijing tries to use its rising power and influence, and how Tokyo and Washington respond, will have profound implications for the alliance. Iran is another looming trouble spot. It is a chief US foreign policy concern, and Japanese policy sometimes appears to diverge from the international consensus. Dealing with Myanmar is another possible source of friction. Fortunately, North Korea is no longer a source of friction between Tokyo and Washington. The Obama administration seems to have learned the lessons of its predecessor when it comes to handling this problem.

A central task for the two countries is managing the transition of the international system as new powers emerge. The rise of countries such as China and India will bring about a new distribution of power; a relative decline of Japanese and US influence is
inevitable. The key is ensuring that the transition is stable and that key elements of the existing order are preserved. This obliges Japanese to recognize that military security is the basis for international order and that allies must cooperate on military and nonmilitary issues. For its part, the US needs to maintain Japan’s status as a status quo power, not take Japan for granted, and show more sensitivity to Japanese concerns, in particular its fear of being marginalized within the region. Both allies must work to build mutual trust.

The Japan-US alliance can be the cornerstone of broader engagement with other countries. That requires Tokyo and Washington to first establish a bilateral consensus among themselves. Despite previous declarations and statements, common ground seems to be missing. To fix this, the two governments should launch a wide-ranging discussion of security issues that would take up such topics as regional security architectures, protection of the global commons – the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains – along with more traditional issues such as threat assessment and immediate security concerns.

A prerequisite for alliance success is a healthy economy in both countries. This will bolster the credibility of the Western economic model and the legitimacy of the countries that have “administered” the global economic order; failure to get their own houses in order will undermine their international authority. A prolonged downturn will reduce the resources Japan and the US have to deploy in the pursuit of respective national interests and to devote to their alliance.

Japanese demographic trends are troubling and they will constrain its capacity to contribute to the alliance and regional security. The US has a stake in the economic revival of Japan, which means it has a stake in the success of the DPJ government. Japan needs a real two-party system so that the competition of ideas and personalities mobilizes and energizes the country.

More immediately, Japan and the US need to surmount obstacles that hinder progress on substantive cooperation. The Futenma situation must be resolved. Debate over the relocation plan is keeping the two nations from moving forward.

First, the new government in Japan needs to articulate a national security strategy that explains to the Japanese public and the US how it sees the security environment in which it operates, Japan’s role in promoting regional security, and the role of the alliance in achieving those objectives. Second, the two countries need to produce a bilateral declaration that spells out their shared vision, objectives, and concerns. Then both governments need to sell that vision to both publics: there needs to be an aggressive effort to convince the partner’s citizens of the value of the alliance and each partners’ commitment to the other. Finally, the hard work of implementing those visions must take place. This will not be easy and will require the use of political capital by both governments. Making those hard choices is the best proof of the genuine commitment of each government to this alliance. It is the only way to ensure that the next half century of the Japan-US security treaty is as successful as the first 50 years.
Conference Summary
Brad Glosserman, Rapporteur

For 15 years, security officials and experts have met at the Japan-US Security Seminar to assess the state of their bilateral relationship and chart a course for the alliance. The 16th meeting was moved up from its usual time and place (San Francisco in the spring) to January in Washington, DC to serve as the kick-off event for the 50th anniversary of the bilateral security treaty. Instead of celebrating, however, discussion at this year’s meeting focused on the tensions that dominate relations between Japan and the United States and ways to overcome them. Officials and experts are trying to understand the forces at work in both Japan and the US and their influence on what each government considers a pillar of its foreign and security policies. While most remain optimistic regarding the long-term viability of the alliance, opinions were divided on whether the alliance is currently in “a crisis”; there is no missing the turbulence that buffets this vital partnership or the doubts that have descended over its immediate future.

Tokyo Foundation Public Panel

In another break with the past, this year’s meeting began with a public panel discussion that explored the first half century of the security treaty and its future prospects. The overflow turnout – more than 270 people – should allay fears that interest in the alliance is diminishing.

Professor Shinichi Kitaoka (University of Tokyo) began the proceedings with a review of the security treaty and the historical context that produced it. He explained that the two governments have struggled to create “a more equal partnership” since the treaty was signed and applauded their efforts to do so within the constraints created by Japan’s constitution. He highlighted the “statesmanship” of politicians such as Japanese Prime Ministers Nobosuke Kishi and Eisaku Sato. He concluded by emphasizing the new challenges the two countries face within the region and the need for them to support not just regional security but the promotion of values that their two societies embrace.

Dr. William Perry explained the troubles the alliance encountered during his tenure as US secretary of defense. During his term, US Marines raped an Okinawa schoolgirl, an act that created perhaps the greatest crisis in the history of the alliance. That unfortunate incident forced the two governments to focus on their relationship, which, ironically, ultimately strengthened the alliance. It yielded the 1996 declaration by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) which proposed the relocation of US military facilities on the island.

Dr. Perry was also intimately involved in a review of North Korea policy and from that he drew two key lessons. First, the success of any policy toward North Korean requires Japan and the US (and South Korea) to have a common perception of the problem and a common negotiating strategy. Second, any successful strategy “must be based on a diplomatic approach that includes a serious element of coercion.”
The panel moved on to focus on problems that trouble the alliance today. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage acknowledged the relationship was going through a rough patch and that there was blame enough to go around. Part of the problem was the fact that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) wasn’t fully informed about security thinking and alliance discussions prior to assuming office. To some degree, that was the result of complacency – a failure of alliance supporters in both countries to reach out to others who might not share their views but needed to be better acquainted with the issues. He also blamed the previous US administration for shifting policy on key Japanese concerns without ensuring that Tokyo was informed. A gulf in language also contributes to tensions. When the new government in Tokyo talks about “equality” it means more input into decision making; when Americans hear talk of “equality” they think of burden sharing and a partner that is prepared to spend more on defense.

Armitage underscored the need for both sides, and the US in particular, to respect the Japanese political process. Washington needs a better understanding of how the DPJ thinks about security and foreign policy. It must respect whatever Tokyo decides to do about Futenma – “we’re going to have an alliance after whatever decision is made.” He urged the two governments to prepare a “Plan B” to ensure that alliance needs and security commitments are protected. Regional partners also need to be reassured. Armitage suggested that the two governments explore other ways they can cooperate to promote regional peace and security – and signal all governments in the region that the foundation of the alliance remains strong.

Yukio Okamoto, former special advisor to the prime minister of Japan, focused on the continuity in the alliance despite the remarkable changes in international affairs since the treaty was signed. He highlighted both the national interests and the human connections that maintain and preserve the alliance. While he too worries about the friction created by the dispute over the relocation of Marine Air Station at Futenma, he doesn’t believe it is an alliance breaker. Okamoto sees DPJ decision-makers moving closer to more traditional security policies – he is especially heartened by the prospect of a left-leaning government “struggling to solve this issue with a minimal impact on the alliance.”

Okamoto urged the partners to explore cooperation also in “soft issues” such as the fight against poverty, climate change, disaster relief, and energy security. All the while, Tokyo must find “a new framework for peaceful deployment of the Self-Defense Forces somewhere between battlefields and money.” Critically, Japan must increase its own defense capabilities and maintain close mil-mil cooperation with the US. China’s rise, and the potential military threat it poses, should facilitate that effort.

The question and answer session that followed explored a variety of topics. But as most of them were fleshed out in more detail and substance in the closed-door discussion on the following day, a recap is not included here to keep this report from being overly long or repetitive.
Dinner Remarks

In keeping with the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the alliance, the opening day concluded with an invitation-only dinner that featured two keynote speeches.

The first, by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, looked at “The Future of the US-Japan Alliance.”1 His remarks underscored the importance the current administration attaches to the region, noting that Secretary of State Clinton’s first trip in that job was to Asia, that President Obama is the first “Pacific president,” and that the US has embraced a range of initiatives, from Seoul to Singapore, that more tightly bind the US to Asia. The alliance with Japan tops the US list of priorities and understandably so: the alliance “not only helped secure peace and prosperity for the people of Japan and the United States, but it also helped create the conditions that have led to the remarkable emergence of Asia as the cockpit of the global economy that has helped lift billions out of poverty and gradually spread the blessings of democratic governance to more and more countries of that region.”

Significantly, despite its many successes, the alliance continues to modernize and adapt to new challenges. Indeed, it must do so if it is to survive. Steinberg highlighted Japan’s growing security role in the region and its various efforts to promote stability around the world as proof.

But change is not always easy and the consequences can be mixed. While applauding Japan’s vibrant democracy, Steinberg acknowledged the winds buffeting the relationship. He noted that the US “welcome(s) the opportunity to conduct an open dialogue on shaping the future of the alliance.” The key to the future of the alliance depends on the shared recognition that “the US-Japan alliance is not a historic relic from a bygone era, but an abiding commitment to each other that is fundamental to our shared security.” If both countries agree with that initial premise, then the future of the relationship can be secured.

Those remarks were followed by remarks by Japan’s Ambassador to the US, Ichiro Fujisaki. Like Steinberg, Fujisaki noted that evolution of the alliance during its existence; while applauding Japan’s growing security role, he also called on the two nations to deepen their partnership and extend cooperation across a range of fields, such as fortifying intelligence sharing, cooperation in space, and joint activities for disaster relief.

The ambassador also noted the constant necessity of alleviating impacts on people residing near the US bases in Japan. Noise, accidents, and other problems have long created concerns in the bilateral relationship. At present, the Futenma issue receives much attention. But Fujisaki is confident that the situation will be resolved to the satisfaction of both parties “because there is no alternative for either of us than to maintain our important relations.” As he explained, the two countries have common security interests, common values, and common perspectives on how the international system should work. And the two publics respect, trust, and like each other.

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1 The text of the speech is available at http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/135270.htm
Fujisaki closed by reminding the group of the three “no’s” that are critical to the success of any partnership: no surprises, no over-politicization of issues, and no taking the other partner for granted. If both countries abide by those principles, the alliance will survive for another 50 years.

Closed Session: Domestic Developments – Japan

In the second day, the conference returned to the traditional closed-door format. We began with an assessment of domestic developments in each country. Dr. Toshihiro Nakayama (Tsuda College) began by noting that the new government in Tokyo seems to have a different perspective on Japan’s role, its relationship to Asia, and its alliance with the US. This sense of a departure from the norm is just that – a sensation, as nothing yet is clear. Nakayama acknowledged that he had “real difficulty” identifying the core ideas guiding Prime Minister Hatoyama. He seems to be avoiding bureaucrats and people surrounding him are not the traditional foreign policy establishment-types. Many of them seem to hold hostile feelings toward the country’s traditional foreign policy framework and are suspicious of the alliance managers who have handled the relationship with the US to date: alliance managers are often referred to as a “mafia.” It is only a small exaggeration, suggested Nakayama, to say that “we don’t have clue as to who Hatoyama is.”

Difficulties in trying to understand the new government’s thinking are compounded by the vague language the prime minister uses when trying to describe his foreign policy – reference to “fraternity” being the typical case. Many see the frictions in the Japan-US alliance as stemming from the failure of the new Japanese government to appreciate the complexities of issues in the security arena; as it becomes more informed of those nuances, foreign and security policies will revert to the norm of its Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) predecessors. This logic is based on the thinking that the national interest of a nation does not change according to the change in the governing party.

There is an alternative explanation for the alliances’ current troubles: the policy divergences of the DPJ represent a structural shift in the way that the Japanese see themselves and their country’s international role. Nakayama argued that there is insufficient proof to make this case, noting that the election was not about foreign policy and that soul-searching is something of a constant in Japan. Still, he is inclined to believe that the new government’s inexperience doesn’t offer a complete explanation for current difficulties. He believes that the country lacks a consensus on its identity and its role.

Nakayama argued that no politician in Japan could make a speech like President Obama’s Nobel Peace prize address, in which he explained the rationale behind his willingness to put US troops in harm’s way. Japan’s silence doesn’t reflect the absence of a moral core; rather, it stems from the failure of the Japanese political class to directly address the role of the military in the postwar world. This void also distorts discussion of the relationship with the US, the role its troops play in defending national interests (those of Japan and the US), and the presence of foreign troops on Japanese soil. The starting point for this discussion is Japanese identity and purpose in today’s world – once that is agreed, the nation can then take up the role and meaning of its alliance with the US. There
is always a danger that this could result in the opening of a Pandora’s box. However
difficult though, this process has to be initiated. In order for Japan to play an assertive role
in the security arena, ideological partisanship has to be avoided. Nakayama stressed that
Japan needs to formulate a vital center consensus on the issue.

In her comments, Sheila Smith (Council on Foreign Relations) conceded that the
advent of a DPJ government had stirred things up, and while noting that “constructive
chaos” can be useful, she pointedly noted that the emphasis belongs on the first word, not
the second. Like Nakayama, she has difficulty identifying key advisors to the new
government. She agreed with Nakayama that this signals the need to expand the Japan-US
community to bring more people into alliance discussions.

Smith struck a cautious note when trying to explain DPJ policy, noting that there
isn’t a single DPJ view on many policies. Moreover, as a relatively young and
inexperienced party, its decision-making processes are evolving. Greater transparency is
likely to follow and the emergence of new party officials and leaders will add diversity and
make it easier to understand the evolution of policy positions.

For now, Smith urged observers to watch party leaders to understand DPJ
intentions. Prime Minister Hatoyama has put forward an aggressive foreign policy agenda,
making speeches and traveling extensively. Moreover, the DPJ telegraphed issues that
were important to it in the run-up to the election; in many cases, alliance specialists merely
dismissed those statements. Smith explained that while the party’s national security vision
may be unclear, it does outline goals and priorities.

In recent months, alliance managers have not paid sufficient attention to those
statements. That is a partial explanation for the problems rattling the alliance. But Smith
tesed out several lessons to be gleaned from this experience. The US must prepare to
work with a “new Japan.” Procedures should be modified and the security community in
both countries needs to expand. A country that lacks a tradition of alternation of
governments is unlikely to have an informed opposition. There should be outreach to a
wider group of individuals. Information needs to better distributed. There needs to be a
better understanding of the role the alliance plays in securing Japan and the role of the
Marines in accomplishing that objective. Japan’s opposition – whoever it is – needs to
learn to think in terms of the national interest rather than scoring political points. Opposition to existing government policies – “anything but the LDP” – is not a strategy. In
fact, such an approach is dangerous because it reduces the alliance to a mere instrument of
the ruling party rather than a tool for the realization of Japan’s own security.

Smith – like most other participants – is confident this situation will be resolved.
Election politics dominate decisions about Okinawa, but elections will be held this summer
and Prime Minister Hatoyama has promised a decision on Futenma by May. Ultimately,
however, both Japan and the US must recognize that their alliance is bigger than Futenma,
no matter how large and intractable that issue may seem. The two governments need to
focus on bigger issues and larger concerns.
Discussion began with the rueful observation by one American – echoed by others around the table – that the experience with the DPJ government resembles the tumult that characterized US relations with South Korea when Roh Moo-hyun was president. Ironically, several participants took heart from that idea. They noted that relations with Roh were better than is generally understood: the alliance was modernized and Seoul proved to be a good partner when it counted. Moreover, that government was as inexperienced as the one in Japan. This instills hope that a similar learning curve will shape DPJ thinking.

This view contrasted with those who see the DPJ as representing a fundamental shift in Japanese politics. As one participant explained, “the alliance is not in the party’s DNA and relations with the US don’t take priority over everything else.” For this long-time US observer of the alliance, the DPJ’s rise to power heralds the beginning of a new era in Japanese politics and the country’s relationship with the US. The party is the leading edge of a shift in Japanese thinking about themselves, their country, its place in the world, and its relationship with the US. Most important, for him, “we won’t go back to where we are.” A Japanese participant agreed, arguing that “a new Japan is being revealed.” He attributed part of the shift to the global economic downturn and the damage that “a crisis made in America” did to US credibility and its image. This buttressed DPJ criticism of LDP policy and its close relationship to the US.

Those two positions marked the endpoints of a spectrum of views that attempted to assess the meaning of the DPJ victory last year. In the middle was the view, voiced by one Japanese expert, that the new government welcomes security cooperation with the US, but it defines security more broadly that its predecessors. In this context, the DPJ focuses on “softer” issues such as development or antipiracy, rather than “hard” military matters. Cooperation with the US is possible but the modalities of cooperation should be defined more broadly. Not surprisingly, this approach is less sympathetic to the need for US bases in Japan. Worryingly, this participant believes this thinking is “representative of the Japanese public.”

Another interpretation attributes current woes to political calculations by the DPJ. One participant argued that party strategists are focused on the Upper House election in July; as a result the government will not make any decision that might jeopardize its chances in that vote. In the meantime, the party’s pledge “to practice people-centered politics” requires the government to distance itself from bureaucrats, even though they are best informed on most alliance-related issues. Finally, the DPJ has adopted an “anything but the LDP” line, which obliges it to challenge any policy supported by its predecessors: the alliance is one casualty of this thinking. (Participants from both countries expressed some sympathy for the DPJ: they acknowledged that the government was forced to make difficult decisions on the alliance, and expend political capital defending those decisions, precisely because its LDP predecessor had failed to do so.)

All participants took heart from the strong support the Japanese public shows for the alliance. According to opinion polls, the alliance is overwhelmingly preferred by Japanese when they think about national security options. As one Japanese participant put
it, “the ship – the Japan-US relationship – is drifting, but the anchor – public support for the alliance – is still strong.”

The new government and the public need to be better informed about how the alliance contributes to Japanese security and the role that US bases play in that effort. As a former US diplomat explained, “we need to have a conversation about fundamental assumptions, roles and missions, and common strategic objectives.” But this might be more difficult than anticipated. Those making the case for the alliance have to be careful that they don’t come off as patronizing or condescending. Moreover, they have to recognize that they may be “tainted” in the eyes of their interlocutors as part of a “mafia” that has long managed the relationship without regard to the desires of the Japanese public. One way to overcome those obstacles is to have other governments in the region help make the case for the alliance and to explain its value to them. Another Japanese participant suggested that holdouts will come around to the more traditional view of the alliance as they become better acquainted with China and recognize it as a potential threat to Japan.

This process should be part of a reassessment of how the alliance is managed. This cannot be a mere change in style, but rather should be one of substance. As one US participant explained, “there needs to be persuasion. There must be real dialogue.”

This view contrasted with that of participants who insisted that the alliance is in real crisis. For this group, the two governments have to accept that the base relocation plan must be redesigned. Yet, curiously, even proponents of this approach counsel the same policy: a real dialogue between the two governments that identifies the external security context in which the alliance must operate and then responds accordingly.

**Domestic changes in the US**

In the second session, attention turned to the impact of domestic change in the US. Michael Green (CSIS) provided his assessment of one year of foreign policy in the Democratic administration of President Barack Obama. For Green, and most US participants, there has been more continuity than change in US foreign policy toward Asia in general and toward the Japan-US alliance in particular. More significant than the change of administration has been the sheer volume of issues that it must deal with: it is, said Green, “the most complicated national security agenda since the Cold War.”

While the new administration’s “Grand Strategy” is still a work in progress – or at least, has yet to be outlined in detail – the practice of foreign policy demonstrates the traditional US focus on power and the balance of power: exhibit one in this case is continuing emphasis on the alliance with Japan. This realist perspective clashes with what Green calls “a second instinct” of this administration, namely an expansive definition of national security that requires more partners to effectively deal with threats. From this view, a focus on strategic equilibrium interferes with efforts to build broad coalitions of forces.
But no world view insulates an administration from domestic pressures. Powerful coalitions shape policy on key concerns, especially economic and trade issues. Moreover, Green discerns the periodic surfacing of an “anything but Bush” mentality that is designed to appeal to liberal and progressive constituencies backing the Obama administration.

The Obama team’s Asia policy gets high marks from Green. It exhibits the strongest continuity of all areas of US foreign policy, has the strongest team, and is the least partisan. Japan policy is especially stable. Green credits the team for handling a difficult transition in Tokyo especially well. He also backs its China policy: the failure to make China an issue in the 2008 campaign has made continuity easier to pursue. He expects the Obama view of China will harden as expectations adjust to Chinese behavior. Policy toward North Korea already demonstrates this administration’s tough side: Green applauded the end of unconditional engagement with Pyongyang, a policy that seemed to take root in the waning years of the Bush administration. And the new team has taken up its predecessor’s approach to Asian regional architecture, embracing Asian efforts to forge a sense of community while stressing the US role as a Pacific power. Economic issues, manifest in the growing complexity of the “noodle bowl” of trade agreements, are extremely important – as well as sometimes nettlesome. Resistance to ratification of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement – generally considered to be a strategic tool to strengthen ties to a vital US partner, but held up by domestic political considerations – is proof of the contradictory tugs in US foreign policy.

Green concluded by identifying future flashpoints for US foreign policy. They include Iran, where the US position is hardening, along with that of other key players; Japan is, says Green, “the least like-minded of this group.” The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is another potential problem. The administration is struggling to balance the twin imperatives of cutting US nuclear weapons stockpiles as the president proposed and maintaining a secure defense and deterrent. Finally, helping Afghanistan fight the Taliban and build a secure and stable nation promises to absorb US policy makers – and their allies – for some time to come.

In his commentary, Professor Fumiaki Kubo (University of Tokyo) noted that the Obama administration is traveling a learning curve of its own. An administration that promised change and a fresh approach to foreign policy has discovered that circumstances defy the best of intentions. Kubo noted that the president’s call for engagement – to reach out to adversaries – had been frustrated and he has been forced to take a harder line to deal with governments in Iran and North Korea. At the same time, a pressing domestic agenda and the debate over health care reform in particular have distracted the president and forced him to spend precious political capital. As a result, his ratings have fallen and his room for maneuver on other issues has been restricted.

When it comes to the alliance, Kubo remains cautiously optimistic. The alliance has proven to be resilient and he is confident it will survive this test, especially since this crisis hasn’t reached the level of previous ones such as those in 1960, in the early 1970s, and in the late 1980s through early 1990s.
A central theme in the discussion was the impact of the economic downturn on US policy and priorities. The Great Recession has distracted US policy makers, reduced the resources available for use in the exercise of foreign policy, and tarnished the US image. It has undercut the domestic constituency for trade agreements, which, as several participants noted, has hampered US opportunities for engaging Asia. At a time when trade agreements are spreading throughout the region, the US is unable to compete. This puts a premium on US activity in APEC, which is entering a critical period: the economic grouping will be hosted by Japan in 2010 and the US in 2011, providing the two countries a chance to coordinate to exploit an institution that has underperformed in recent years. APEC’s prospects are part of the larger debate surrounding the future of Asian regional architecture. One US participant noted that the Obama administration’s embrace of the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) is one way the US can revitalize its trade diplomacy and urged both governments to seize that opportunity.

US restraint was contrasted with burgeoning Chinese confidence. Participants debated the mindset in Beijing, how it should be characterized – some say confidence, others say arrogance – and its implications for regional relations. One US participant forecast growing impatience in China as Beijing’s outreach to Taiwan has not shown satisfactory results. Several participants anticipated a downturn in relations between the US and China resulting from the shifting balance of power in the region – or at least a Chinese perception of such – and other developments. There was widespread concern that a chill in that relationship could affect all of East Asia. One US participant worried that a downturn might cause troubles in the Japan-US alliance if Washington worries about Tokyo’s readiness to use the rift in US-China relations to build better relations with Beijing and/or Beijing tries to exploit tensions in the Japan-US relationship by offering a new relationship with Tokyo. The visit of hundreds of Japanese politicians and businessman to Beijing, as part of the entourage of DPJ leader Ozawa Ichiro, fuels these fears.

China is not the only nation that poses challenges for the alliance. Iran is an especially troubling issue. There is rising impatience with Tehran’s prevarications and obfuscations regarding its nuclear intentions. US participants highlighted the importance of Iran in the US foreign policy agenda. It is imperative that the two governments work closely together to ensure that their policies do not conflict. In US eyes, Japanese policy has sometimes appeared to diverge from the international consensus.

Myanmar is another problem. All participants applauded the shift in US policy and the readiness of the administration to at least try to engage the junta in Myanmar. But there was evidence of a divergence in Japanese and US positions. A Japanese participant noted that the shift moved the US closer to Japan’s longstanding policy toward the regime. While he approved of the move, he also noted that it raised questions about consistency and previous US complaints about Japanese policy. A US participant countered that while Washington may have changed tactics, its policy objectives remain the same. The Obama administration has not reconciled itself to the perpetuation of nondemocratic rule in Myanmar; rather, the shift is intended to reduce obstacles that prevent other countries from working with Washington to bring about change in that country.
It is worth noting that there was little mention of North Korea in this session. During the last two years of the Bush administration, policy toward Pyongyang has divided rather than united Japan and the US. That is no longer the case. The two governments are closely consulting when it comes to dealing with North Korea and trying to get that government back to the Six-Party Talks and to honor its denuclearization pledges. In a marked departure from meetings of the last three years, there was little discussion of the credibility of the US commitment to Japan’s defense, questions that had been raised because of the seeming divergence in the two countries’ positions on North Korea.

In these and other cases, US participants stressed that the Obama administration’s desire for broad-based engagement does not mean that Washington no longer values its allies and long-term relations. As it attempts to forge partnerships to tackle problems, the US will continue to begin those efforts with allies.

The upswing in Japanese views of the US contrasted with concern expressed by several US participants that tensions in the alliance could erode US confidence in Japan. As in the case of South Korea under President Roh, frictions in the relationship may trigger a backlash in the US if policy makers and the public see their ally as unwilling to honor agreements. At a time of growing concern in the US about government finances and excessive overseas commitments, a sense that Japan is not pulling its weight could undermine support for the alliance.

Future Visions of the Alliance

As Professor Matake Kamiya (National Defense Academy of Japan) attempted to forecast the future of the alliance, the past reappeared as prologue. Although Japan and the US have preferred to search for shared visions as they attempt to modernize their alliance, instead “since the fall, the alliance has returned to an era of housekeeping.” For the causes of this turn of events, he pointed to the DPJ government and the transformation of the international system. As evidence of the latter, he cited the demise of the G8 and the rise of the G20, China’s rise and its passing of Japan as an economic power, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and the damage that has been done to the US image and its ability to lead the international system.

For Kamiya, this evolution should alter the purpose and focus of the Japan-US alliance. Today, the alliance should be seen as a tool to stabilize and maintain the existing international order. According to his words, “the U.S.-Japan alliance 50 years after its launch should be redefined as an alliance of the two leading status quo powers in the world. That does not mean that today’s balance of power must be maintained. The rise of countries such as China and India will bring about a new distribution of power; a relative decline of Japanese and US influence is inevitable. The key is ensuring that the transition is stable and that key elements of the existing order are preserved.

In other words, the alliance should be reconceptualized as the provider of an international public good rather than an instrument that merely protects the two countries’ interests. Success in this venture necessitates a concordance of interests, but it requires
much more than that. Kamiya believes the two countries should share basic values and ideas – but that does not mean he endorses “a values-based alliance” since he does not believe that the allies should promote values per se. (And he doesn’t believe that they can impose them on China or India.)

Success in this venture depends on three factors. First, Japan must overcome the widespread public reluctance to accept the necessity and desirability of military cooperation between the two countries. A pernicious strain of pacifism means that Japanese have seen peace and the military as antitheses and they refuse to recognize that military action has a role to play in the pursuit of peace. As a result, cooperation with the US is viewed as a necessary evil that should be kept at the lowest level possible. Instead, Japanese need to recognize that military security is the basis for international order and that allies must cooperate on military and nonmilitary issues.

Second, the US must make efforts to maintain Japan’s status as a status quo power. Crudely put, this means the US should not take Japan’s nonnuclear status for granted. This in turn demands US sensitivity to Japanese concerns, in particular Tokyo’s fear of being marginalized within the region. If Japan senses that it is being displaced in Washington’s eyes, it could reassess its security policy.

Finally, both allies must build mutual trust. The US in particular must do more. Kamiya points to a growing Japanese sentiment that its efforts are not appreciated by the US. He warned that US unilateralism could fuel the sense that the US doesn’t respect Japan’s vital interests.

Ezra Vogel (Harvard University) outlined four scenarios for the future. In the first, Japan and China develop closer ties as the US-Japan alliance weakens. This outcome is driven by opportunistic policies in Beijing that aim to drive a wedge between Japan and the US and a simultaneous desire to prevent a Japanese defense buildup. Chinese interest in Japan is reciprocated by a growing belief that Japan’s economic future is more tightly linked to that of China than the US.

In the second scenario, both Japan and the US lose confidence in each other and the alliance is fatally damaged. The US worries about Japan’s long-term international presence and questions the Japanese commitment to a security partnership. Tokyo is alienated by US arrogance and Washington’s search for a more reliable security partner causes Japan to question the US commitment to its defense. Ultimately, the US finds China to be a better partner to deal with global issues.

In the third scenario, the alliance survives but in a much weakened state. As both economies grapple with adverse economic developments the alliance is a victim of new priorities. Japan becomes more introspective and loses interest in the world beyond its borders; meanwhile, US interest in Japan declines to dangerous levels.

In the fourth scenario, the two countries build a robust and constructive relationship. Japan’s interest in the world increases and it takes a higher profile solving
global issues. An emphasis on common attitudes and interests and shared values and
concerns promotes cooperation on a wide range of political and security issues.

Vogel was reluctant to pick which scenario would prevail. Instead, he envisions
elements of each will surface and some hybrid will emerge.

One discussant insisted that there should be a fifth scenario, one in which the
Japan-US alliance is strong and both countries have good relations with China. In fact,
there was a consensus view that a strong Japan-US relationship is a prerequisite for strong
trilateral relations. Tokyo and Washington have to push trilateralism: Beijing is unlikely to
take the initiative. While a US participant noted that China’s access denial strategy aims at
undermining the credibility of the US commitment to Asia’s defense, several participants
cautionsed against using China to solidify Japan-US relations: Beijing cannot be the glue
for the alliance.

While most speakers were suspicious of zero-sum thinking, few had much hope for
a China-Japan honeymoon, despite the overtures by the two governments to each other.
The end of the Cold War has affected Asia least of all regions in the world and the issues
that have divided Japan and China remain as formidable as ever.

Several speakers cautioned against reducing regional relations to a Japan-US-China
triangle. Alliance managers should also be engaging other partners in the region, such as
South Korea, India, and Australia. Those meetings can also send a message to China about
its need to engage constructively.

Before Tokyo and Washington can engage other nations, they must establish a
bilateral consensus among themselves. Despite previous declarations and statements,
common ground seems to be missing today. Thus, one Japanese participant urged the two
governments to immediately inaugurate a wide-ranging discussion of security issues that
would yield a second Japan-US security declaration by the end of the year. This project
would take up such topics as regional security architectures, protection of the global
commons – the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains – along with more traditional
issues such as threat assessment and immediate security concerns. One Japanese
participant suggested that a focus on functional issues rather than particular nations could
win DPJ support. A US participant noted that the Japanese government’s thinking – at
least as characterized at this meeting – implied that the two countries need to focus on the
degree to which military cooperation defines alliance collaboration. If the new government
in Tokyo prefers an expansive definition of security, then the key instruments of bilateral
security cooperation need to be expanded as well.

A prerequisite for the success of the alliance is a healthy economy in both
countries. A strong recovery will bolster the credibility of the Western economic model
and the legitimacy of the countries that have “administered” the global economic order;
failure to get their own houses in order will undermine their international authority.
Crudely put, there is an ideological competition between the US and China and the winner
will be the country that produces the more durable recovery. Moreover, a prolonged
economic downturn will reduce the resources Japan and the US have to deploy in the pursuit of their respective national interests and to devote to their alliance.

For Japan, the stakes are higher still. Demographic trends are troubling and they will impose considerable constraints on Japan’s capacity to contribute to the alliance and regional security. As one US participant pointed out, Japan cannot have political stability without greater prosperity and it can’t have prosperity without economic reform. He insisted that the US has a stake in the economic revival of Japan, which means it has a stake in the success of the DPJ government. If the DPJ does not prove capable of running the country, then Japan reverts to the old order and its record in recent years is troubling. By his logic, Japan needs a real two-party system so that the competition of ideas and personalities mobilizes and energizes the country.

In sharp contrast to meetings of the last few years, there was little discussion of US nuclear policy and the credibility of the extended deterrent. Doubts about the US commitment to Japan’s defense had surfaced in recent years and there have been calls for US reassurance of Japan. This year, however, the discussion was muted. This could reflect a convergence of views between the DPJ government and President Obama’s Prague speech endorsing a nuclear-free world, a view that is backed by Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Okada. Japanese participants noted that there continues to be tension in Japan as the country tries to reconcile longstanding diplomatic support for disarmament with a security posture that nestles the country under the US nuclear umbrella. One Japanese participant noted that officials recognize the need to balance the twin imperatives of deterrence and disarmament. Indeed, as another Japanese participant pointed out, a credible nuclear deterrent is a precondition of force reductions. They, along with US participants, are awaiting the US Nuclear Posture Review to see how the balance is struck. It is clear, however, that the extended deterrent remains a critical part of the alliance and will need to be incorporated into any future vision statement. A Japanese participant noted that the two countries were looking for the appropriate vehicle to address this issue.

More immediately, Japan and the US need to surmount obstacles that hinder progress on substantive cooperation. The Futenma situation must be resolved. Ongoing debate over the relocation plan is sucking air out of the room and keeping the two nations from moving forward. (That view was challenged by a Japanese participant who insisted that the two countries are working on many action items and are not being sidetracked by the Futenma debate.) One Japanese participant called for official discussions of a Plan B – what to do if current plans are not realized. That proposal met considerable resistance from US participants, who insisted that all other plans have been examined and the current plan is the only workable option. A US participant suggested that the DPJ government could diminish doubts in the US about its thinking by making an unequivocal commitment to the facilities in Kadena and Yokosuka. That Americans would feel that such a statement is needed is a troubling indication of the doubts that beset the alliance.

All in all, the 16th Japan-US security seminar did not unfold as anticipated. A meeting that was supposed to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty focused more on technical issues than on outlining a vision that would direct
bilateral cooperation in years to come. In this respect, our meeting reflected the tensions that dominate official bilateral discussions. Nonetheless, several lessons could be gleaned from the discussion. First, the new government in Japan needs to articulate a national security strategy that explains to the Japanese public and the US how it sees the security environment in which it operates, Japan’s role in promoting regional security, and the role of the alliance in achieving those objectives. That vision should include a forthright and unambiguous statement of support for the alliance. Second, the two countries need to produce a bilateral declaration that spells out their shared vision, objectives, and concerns. Apparently, previous Security Consultative Committee (SCC, or “2+2”) statements must be repeated or updated. Then both governments need to sell that vision to both publics: there needs to be an aggressive effort to convince the partner’s citizens of the value of the alliance and each partners’ commitment to the other. Finally, the hard work of implementing those visions must take place. This will not be easy and will require the use of political capital by both governments. Making those hard choices is the best proof of the genuine commitment of each government to this alliance. It is the only way to ensure that the next half century of the Japan-US security treaty is as successful as the first 50 years.
The Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance
By James B. Steinberg

It is a great pleasure to be here. I am appreciative of the thoughtful note about the situation in Haiti. It is a real terrible human tragedy, and we feel it very profoundly in the State Department, as I know many of you do. We’ve lost one of our Foreign Service officers and the UN has lost a number of personnel. This is a tragedy of enormous proportion. Many here and around the world have been incredibly open and generous in their hearts in helping to support this effort. We have an incredibly daunting task ahead of us, but the people of Haiti have had to suffer a lot in recent years and we are confident that we can work with them to try to recover from this.

I’m really pleased to be here. I want to thank the Pacific Forum CSIS, the Japanese Embassy, Chairman Kato and his Tokyo Foundation, and Yoshiji Nogami and the Japan Institute of International Affairs for organizing this important and timely event. As many of you know, Yoshiji was a fellow Sherpa with me back in the Clinton administration, and we did a lot of good work together, including preparing for the Okinawa G8 summit. So, it is kind of ironic as the issues around Okinawa have preoccupied us to remember how important that time was.

There are so many people in this room who’ve contributed so much to the U.S.-Japan relationship. I’m looking now at Danny Russel, who warned me not to single anybody out, because he said, if you single some people out, others will be offended. And so I’m going to be careful about that. But I do want to pay tribute to all the current and former officials who’ve played a role. I am particularly honored as I look at this rogues gallery of current and former ambassadors, both U.S. and Japanese, in front of me, and the critical role that you all have played, and so many senior officials, including people like Bill Perry, from whom we’ve all learned so much over the years, and so many other people – Jim Kelly and others – and my colleagues in the current Obama administration who are here. There are many people to thank.

Also there are our serving and former military officers, who have been at the heart of this relationship. Ed Rice and I go back to an earlier life, when Ed was preoccupied with the day-to-day of the NSC. There are so many others here who have served in such an important role that I’m grateful, and I know all of you are grateful, for everyone’s service. So thank you all.

It’s fitting that we gather here at the Willard for this event commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security since, in 1860, this hotel welcomed the first group of Japanese ambassadors to visit the United States. As we dine here and share food and wine, it’s a way to recall the extraordinary history of our relationship. It’s an important sense of reminder that we have traveled a long way together and we are going to travel much further together in the future.
I hope that as we reflect on both achievements of the past and the challenges of the future that we are successful in making clear to all of you the incredible importance that we in the Obama administration, beginning with the president and the secretary of state, attach to this critical relationship between the United States and Japan as part of our deeper engagement in Asia.

As all of you know, Secretary Clinton’s first trip as secretary of state, just almost exactly a year ago, was to Asia. She’s now traveled to the region three times since she took office a year ago. Just looking back over the events of the last year, you can see that this was not just a travel log but a period filled with very important achievements, ranging from our early and effective work together to fashion a strong and common regional response to North Korea’s provocative missile and nuclear tests, the efforts that we’ve made to deepen and broaden our engagement with China through the enhanced Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the effort that has deepened our relationship with ASEAN through our decision to accede to the Treaty on Amity and Cooperation, our on-the-ground engagement in Southeast Asia through the Lower Mekong Initiative, our efforts to try to find a new way forward with the government in Burma, and the development of new relationships and stronger relationships throughout the region with critical partners like Indonesia and Vietnam.

And in her most recent visit, which unfortunately was cut short by the events in Haiti, the secretary unveiled her comprehensive vision for an inclusive and solution-oriented approach to multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

President Obama, too, has placed central importance on our role. He is, after all, our first true “Pacific” president and he underscored his own personal commitment to the region by his trip to Asia last November. I don’t need to remind this audience he began his visit in Tokyo, returning the visit of Prime Minister Aso, who was the first foreign leader to come to Washington following President Obama’s inauguration. He deliberately chose Tokyo as the venue for his important speech outlining the United States stake in East Asia and the importance of deepening our role and our engagement.

During that trip, he traveled to Singapore, where he participated in the APEC Summit and attended the first ever U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting. During that time, he highlighted our commitment to free and open trade and investment by announcing our intention to pursue the discussions on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He then traveled to China where, in Shanghai and Beijing, he reinforced our commitment to a positive, cooperative relationship with China in meetings with President Hu and other senior Chinese leaders while reiterating our belief that an open, rule-of-law society is crucial to China’s own future.

And he concluded his trip with a visit to our treaty ally in Seoul, reaffirming that alliance with the Republic of Korea and paying tribute to Korea’s growing role in the global economy and security, symbolized by the upcoming hosting of the G-20 in Seoul this coming year.
Now, it is no accident of geography that the trip began in Tokyo, because our alliance with Japan has been, and will continue to be, the cornerstone of U.S. engagement in the region and a foundation of U.S. foreign policy.

Now, I see you all slightly wincing when I utter the word “cornerstone.” The idea that Japan is the cornerstone of our engagement in East Asia is a phrase oft-repeated by U.S. officials, but I think it’s important and perhaps timely to step back and consider what that means. This fulcrum role began and grew out of the farsighted vision of American leaders at the end of World War II, a vision that recognized the importance of building strong partnerships with democratic market economies to meet the challenges of the second half of the 20th century, not just with our wartime allies, but equally with those who had been our adversaries. This vision was predicated on an idea, validated by the time that has passed, that U.S. interests are best served by the emergence of strong, prosperous and independent democracies across the Pacific, as well as the Atlantic. Those leaders built an alliance with Japan based both on interests and values, an alliance formally consecrated 50 years ago, and an alliance that we celebrate today.

That alliance not only helped secure peace and prosperity for the people of Japan and the United States, but it also helped create the conditions that have led to the remarkable emergence of Asia as the cockpit of the global economy that has helped lift billions out of poverty and gradually spread the blessings of democratic governance to more and more countries of that region.

Now that alliance, of course, had its roots in the Cold War. And with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the movement toward a more market-oriented government in China, some began to question the relevance of what President Eisenhower had called our “indestructible partnership.” Against the backdrop of serious trade disputes and the threat of punitive tariffs on automobiles, newspapers at the time warned us of a “crisis in the bilateral relationship.” Yet under the leadership of President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, the United States and Japan set out to demonstrate that our partnership should and could adapt to the evolving dynamics of the post-Cold War Asia.

In the 14 years since the Clinton-Hashimoto declaration, the relationship has grown stronger even as it has evolved, thanks in no small measure to the people who are here tonight. We’ve worked together to update our alliance, through efforts ranging from the force posture realignment to the review of roles, missions, and capabilities.

The alliance has grown in scope, with cooperation on everything from developing a joint missile defense system to reducing the impact of our military footprint in Japan. And we have expanded the scope of our work together from Iraq to Afghanistan, to economic development and combating climate change. We’ve demonstrated an understanding that our alliance, like all good partnerships, cannot thrive if it remains static – or in the words of the Roman poet Claudian, we need to “change or die.”

That change can be seen in the evolution of Japan’s foreign and security policy toward increased impact and effectiveness on the world stage. The Japan Defense Agency
has formally become the Ministry of Defense. Japan is working closely with us to build the
capacity to address North Korea’s evolving ballistic missile threat while Japan’s Self-
Defense Forces have donned blue helmets to promote peace in Africa and the Middle East.
And Japanese development programs have helped millions of people from Sub-Saharan
Africa to Southeast Asia become active and invested contributors in their own nations’
development.

Indeed, Japan today is playing an increasingly active role on the world stage, aiding
in reconstruction efforts in Iraq and anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. In
Afghanistan, its $5 billion in assistance will help train police officers, rehabilitate
demobilized fighters, and build schools and roads – major contributions toward our shared
interest in a stable and peaceful Afghanistan as well as our partnership to support progress
and hope in Pakistan. While Japanese refueling support has just ended, we share the hope
on the part of the international community that there will be other Japanese nonmonetary
contributions to stability in this crucial region.

Japan has also been a strong supporter of the global nonproliferation regime,
reflected recently in the installation of a respected Japanese public servant as the new
director of the IAEA.

And last month in Copenhagen, Japanese leadership played a vital role in helping
the international community take a meaningful step towards addressing the global
challenge of climate change.

Thus you can see that on a range of global issues facing our time, Japan today plays
a central leadership role.

Now under the banner of change, both the United States and Japan last year elected
new leadership, an expression in both societies of the desire for fresh, forward-looking
approaches to the challenges of the 21st century. I don’t need to tell this audience that the
impact of that change has been particularly profound for Japan, bringing with it a new
generation of leaders who have challenged their government and their people to think
afresh about Japan’s approach to its own governance and to its relations with the broader
international community.

We in the United States welcome this expression of Japan’s vibrant democracy.
But more importantly, we welcome the opportunity to conduct an open dialogue on
shaping the future of the alliance. As President Obama said in his Tokyo speech, the U.S.-
Japan alliance is not a historic relic from a bygone era, but an abiding commitment to each
other that is fundamental to our shared security. That means it’s essential that we work
together to make sure that the alliance retains the support and understanding of both the
Japanese and the American people, support that is crucial for the alliance to thrive.

So this is a particularly important time for us to reflect on the need both for
continuity and for change in our relationship, to reflect again on why the relationship
remains the cornerstone of our engagement despite the remarkable changes that have taken place in the region.

This junction of continuity and change can be seen clearly in the continued centrality of our security partnership. It’s reflected in the United States formal commitment to Japan’s security, embedded in Article V of our security treaty, which reflects our shared belief that Japan can be more secure, and the region more stable if Japan does not have to face potential threats on its own. At the same time, change is reflected in the new security environment that our partnership must address, with the existential threat of the Soviet Union gone but a North Korea pursuing an ongoing missile and nuclear weapons program, and the need to make sure that the major powers of the region, none of whom today see each other as an adversary, can develop and grow in ways that sustain the peace and prosperity of this crucial region.

The proposals developed by the United States and Japan for realigning our military presence in Japan similarly reflect this junction of continuity and change – continuity, because military cooperation between the United States and Japan remains critical to sustaining a peaceful, stable environment and our military presence remains essential to the dual mission of helping to preserve Japan’s security while providing stability throughout the region. Change because we recognize the need to be sensitive to the impact of our operations on the people of Japan, and because the role of our forces – both U.S. and Japanese – is constantly adjusting to the evolving security environment. We appreciate the importance of the new Japanese government assuring itself that the proposed realignment serves these twin goals of continuity and change and look forward to being able to move forward in a timely way with crucial adjustments to anchor our presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

A strong U.S.-Japan alliance is also fully compatible with Japan’s own efforts to strengthen its bilateral relationships with its neighbors, and we welcome and encourage steps in that direction. Similarly, the U.S.-Japan alliance is enhanced by our deepening bilateral ties in the region, not only with our traditional allies – South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines – but also with India, China, and the countries of ASEAN. These relationships are not zero-sum but additive. And they are increasingly buttressed by both of our countries’ engagement in the evolving multilateral arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, in which our Administration intends to play an increasingly active role. For this reason, Secretary Clinton this week laid out our approach to multilateral cooperation in the region, with the goal of strengthening our common capacity to meet the security and economic challenges of our time, as well as emerging issues such as climate change and public health. Our goal, as the secretary made clear, is institutions that, in her words, “produce results, rather than simply produce new organizations.”

Of course, our partnership goes far beyond our security cooperation, from the continued importance of our trade and investment relationship, a bond which will be further strengthened by the recent U.S.-Japan Open Skies agreement, which will make it easier for both business people and tourists to travel between the United States and Japan. And as both Japan and the United States prepare to host APEC summits in the next two
years, we have a unique window of opportunity to strengthen regional economic cooperation and to increase regional prosperity through an ambitious program of economic integration, energy efficiency, and stimulating growth.

Nor is this relationship simply based on shared interests. Our common values underpin both our bilateral relationship and our common commitment to support the spread of those values in Asia and around the world, an indisputable proof that when it comes to democracy and human rights, there are not Asian or American values, but universal values.

And the relationship is rooted in the strong ties between our two peoples, reflected in recent polls showing that over 85 percent of the Japanese public strongly values Japan’s relationship with the United States.

When Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Okada met in Honolulu this past Tuesday, they reaffirmed both the health of our alliance and our commitment to advancing it together. They reaffirmed their determination to cooperate to bring the Japanese government’s review of the Futenma relocation plan to a conclusion soon and move forward on our twin goals of strengthening alliance operations and reducing base impact on Okinawan communities.

We recognize like all good relationships, we will have our differences. After all, I, like some of you here, are veterans of the Clinton administration, and my memory has not completely faded from some of the more contentious disputes of the not-too-distant past. But our 50 years of continuity and change convince me that working through these differences in a constructive and candid and respectful way will only strengthen our ties in the long run.

Over the years, as many of you know, I’ve had the privilege of spending a lot of time in Japan. And it’s a special place in my heart, and not just for the early-morning visits to the Tsukiji fish market and the chance to catch a prized Iwana in the Japan mountain streams.

As deputy secretary of state, I’ve been privileged to work closely with my Japanese counterparts for consultations on any number of important strategic issues, from North Korea to Afghanistan to Iran to climate change and Asia-Pacific multilateralism. So it’s an honor to spend this evening with so many who have done so much to build a strong foundation for our relationship. We are here to celebrate these accomplishments. But as President Obama said in Tokyo last year, this anniversary, in his words, “represents an important opportunity to step back and reflect on what we’ve achieved, celebrate our friendship, but also find ways to renew this alliance to refresh it for the 21st century.” So let us together look forward to the next 50 years of an alliance that will continue to be indispensable to the peace and prosperity of the United States, of Japan, and of the Asia-Pacific region.
Thank you all for listening, and thanks again to the Pacific Forum and our Japanese co-hosts for arranging such an important and timely commemoration.
Dealing with Change in Japan
By Toshihiro Nakayama

Something totally new occurred in Japan, and President Nogami must have decided that a Japanese specialist on American politics since in America change is constant and is always, to a certain degree, in a “constructive chaotic mode,” might be an interesting choice as speaker on Japanese domestic politics. I hope to prove him right.

When I was at the Brookings Institution a couple of years ago as a CNAPS fellow, my research proposal was to study the China lobby in DC. I ended up talking almost all the time about Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the perceived rise of nationalism in Japan. That was a difficult task. But today’s task may prove to be much more challenging because it is difficult to understand the intention of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio.

I’ve been with JIIA, as an in-house fellow since 1998 but never had the chance to attend this “clubby” meeting, as Ambassador Nogami described it yesterday. I am honored and feel like I’ve finally made the major league all-stars. But I also realize that I am far from being one of you, because I have contributed nothing to the alliance itself. If I can use a basketball analogy, which I think is quite appropriate because it is President Obama’s favorite game, I am not in the all-star game itself, but in a slam dunk contest right before the all-star game. Since I know I can’t make a slam dunk that would impress everybody, so I will just try to make a decent short-range jump shot.

Having said this, it is important to realize that not everyone is impressed with what some call the “alliance mafia,” and what the “mafia” has been doing. These skeptics are not the typical pacifists and peacenik types who are against the alliance itself, nor are they the “paleoconservative types” who always felt humiliated by a foreign military presence in a sovereign state.

Most well-known among these people are Mr. Jitsuro Terashima, who is Dean of Tama University, chairman of Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute, and was the head of the Mitsui Washington office for some time. I believe he was here recently, and whether true or not, seen as a private envoy for Prime Minister Hatoyama.

One of the problems with our prime minister is that we don’t know who advises him on foreign and security policy. He avoids expert advice from bureaucrats. I have never heard of someone in our field (international relations, security studies, regional studies academics) advising him. In organizing this conference, I thought it was important for someone to participate who could defend from one’s heart what this administration is doing in foreign policy, and could elaborate on DPJ foreign and security. If parliamentarians could participate that would be great but experts would be good enough. But I’ve heard it was extremely difficult to locate such a person.
I’ve been asked by one group to form a “watch group” on how issues in U.S.-Japan alliance would proceed. I’m trying to locate an expert who has sympathy for DPJ foreign policy but I’ve been unsuccessful thus far.

In yesterday’s morning session, Prime Minister Hatoyama was compared with President Roh Moo-Hyun and it was said that at least Hatoyama is not a committed anti-American politician like President Roh. But you can also make the argument that at least you could tell who President Roh was. He was a populist grassroots politician and a committed anti-American. We don’t have a clue as to who Prime Minister Hatoyama is.

The only person whose name always appears in this context is Mr. Terashima. He is said to be a close friend of Mr. Hatoyama and he seems to be enjoying the status of an informal adviser.

To be fair to him, I’m going to quote from a recent article, published this month in Sekai, a left-leaning but respected monthly journal. In this article he calls the “alliance managers” and scholars like us a person with the “expression of a slave.” We are intellectually dead. You can tell him that you are not “nerdy intellectuals” but “policy makers.” Being intellectually sophisticated for the sake of being sophisticated is not what policy makers do. Hatoyama-san seems to like “sophistication” as well.

Mr. Terashima faults the “mafia” for letting Japan turn into a forward operating base for America’s war on terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. At the end of his article he cites Tom Paine – yes that Tom Paine – and advocates that Japan needs “common sense,” which of course led to your independence, in determining our relations with the United States.

Mr. Terashima also identifies the Hatoyama administration as being the administration of the “Zenkyoto” generation. “Zenkyoto” is the equivalent to the Students of the Democratic Society (SDS) in the U.S. Yukio Okamoto yesterday said we were once all young. And I might add that some wish to return to their youth. This is quite contrary to what President Obama has been saying. Whether he is succeeding or not is difficult to judge, but he explicitly rejects the partisanship that has its roots in the 1960s.

I don’t know how much influence Mr. Terashima actually has on the Prime Minister, but the Japanese media reports that he does.

I also have the impression that Japanese media is inexperienced in reporting the change in government. It is literally the first time for all of us.

One thing in common between Prime Minister Hatoyama and Mr. Terashima is that they use very vague words to describe their approach to foreign policy such as “common sense,” “flexible thought,” “appropriate space,” and so forth. In his policy speech at the 173rd session of the Diet, he talks of Japan as a “bridge.” He also talks about Japan being a “maritime state situated in the Asia-Pacific region,” which is no doubt true, but does not go
into detail about the implications of this and jumps right into the “equal” relationship between the United States.

Gen. Yamaguchi yesterday welcomed the DPJ proposal to make the US-Japan relationship more or less “equal,” but he knows that what they mean by “equal” may be quite different from his notion of “equal.”

But the important question here is not what Mr. Terashima is saying. Rather he or is the Prime Minister demonstrating a sign of structural shift in the way we see ourselves? In other words, is Japan experiencing, in Dr. Brezinski’s term, an “awakening” of its identity?

Mr. Hitoshi Tanaka stressed yesterday again and again that the “world is changing.” Are the Japanese people or the DPJ reevaluating Japan’s role in international affairs and is the emphasis on “equal relationship,” the notion of an “East Asian Community,” and the conception of an equilateral triangle vis-à-vis Japan, US, China, a manifestation of a structural shift? As of now, I don’t think this is the case.

The last election was not about foreign or security policy. That issue was almost non-existent. However, we have been in a “soul searching” mode for some time, but in vain. There have been many such efforts. The notion elaborated by Dr. Funabashi or a “global civilian power” was a brave effort to define our role in a new perspective. Professor Yoshihide Soeya of Keio University came out with the notion of a “middle power.”

Some LDP politicians engaged in this effort themselves. There was Prime Minister Shizo Abe’s call to “value-oriented diplomacy,” Mr. Aso’s notion of an “arc of prosperity and freedom” was such an effort as well. But those never stuck. So I don’t think it is simply inexperience that is resulting in an “alliance adrift redux.” I think the prime minister is definitely in a soul-searching mode. He has yet to fully elaborate on the topic, and I doubt whether he can fully elaborate, but I have this feeling that he is quite determined to do so. How that would affect the alliance remains to be seen.

So yes, the direct cause of the “drift” is the prime minister’s indecisiveness. There is no doubt about it.

But the deeper structural issue is that Japan hasn’t found a national consensus on its role, or in a more vague term, its “identity” in a changing world. Why is this so? The answer may partly lie in the fact that Japanese leaders almost never have to decide whether to put young soldiers in harm’s way.

President Obama, in his Nobel speech in Oslo, said, referring to his decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, that “some will kill, and some will be killed.” This is a serious, heavy statement. You definitely need a value system, a core identity, and a well-determined notion of national interest to reach such a decision.

One of the key points of postwar Japanese politics was to avoid the identity
question, at least in public discourse. We were always a “pacifist nation.” For many Japanese, it literally meant that we don’t have to think about difficult security issues.

But today, as a result of changing circumstances, which include the “rise of others” as Fareed Zakaria would say, and which also includes the rise of China, the relative decline of Japan and so forth, identity questions can no longer be avoided. So there is a vacuum of identity where the US-Japan alliance could be exploited. Not because anti-American sentiment is lingering just below the surface waiting to explode, but simply because if you are having a debate about your core national identity in Japan, you obviously have to start by looking at the fact that there is a foreign military presence in a sovereign state.

The most important thing we have to do in this context is to establish a broad and firm foundation for the alliance within Japan.

Ralph Cossa said yesterday, that on the U.S. side there is bipartisan support for the alliance. On the Japanese side, it is fair to say that it is tilting toward one side however.

We on the Japanese side have to keep this from becoming a partisan issue and instead put our effort in building a vital support base, a coalition of realist-bent conservatives and hard-power liberals, for the alliance.

One good news is that there are no signs that parties like the Social Democratic Party are increasing their support base. More and more, people are skeptical of the rigid understanding of the constitution.

So whatever happens in the July Upper House election, in the long term, there actually might be a chance where a vibrant atmosphere may arise in which discussions of security issues between the two parties would focus on important policy issues rather than the “equal-or-not” question. It is the job of academics like us to help institutionalize the culture of change in government so that the next time this happens – and we are quite sure it will happen again – it won’t be as chaotic as this time.
Moving Forward with Japan
By Sheila Smith

Let me try to give you a sense of what I have learned from where I sit in Washington not as a policy maker, nor as somebody inside trying to work with the new government, but as an observer watching the government interactions. In preparation for this morning, I went back to our meeting last year in San Francisco when I was asked to be the presenter on Japanese politics. I talked about the structural shift in Japanese politics, what it meant to come from a single-party dominant political system but also the policy implications and transformations that needed to happen. How does Japan move forward and how does policy get created in Japan at this transformational moment?

Let me start off by saying that if you have to take away anything from my presentation is that Nakayama-san’s term “constructive chaos” is useful here. Academics tend to use it, but I want to put emphasis not on the “chaos” part but on the “constructive” part. There’s an obligation to make sure that the transition in the discussion and the policy-making dialogue on the alliance is a good and healthy and constructive one. That is our responsibility and I think we have to be careful not to fall into the “us vs. them” kind of thinking about how we treat the Japanese political leadership, either in the short term or the long term.

Another take away is the term “alliance mafia.” Anybody who reads the Japanese press understands that Terashima Jitsuro has put forward many of the critiques that Nakayama-san introduced earlier. It is all over the Japanese media and this community, the U.S.-Japan alliance community, needs to be an open community – it’s time for us to start thinking constructively about ways of engaging more broadly within Japan and among the Japanese public.

Finally, I would say that it is in Japan’s interest and the DPJ’s that we analytically sort this out as we walk through our policy conversation. The identity questions that Nakayama-san introduced are very important and sitting on this side of the Pacific we tend to collapse everything into categories such as “we have a new government in Japan,” “they’re inexperienced,” “we don’t know how to work with them.” Instead, as we go forward I would like us to pay particular attention to the context within which the DPJ is coming into power and what kinds of interest may be shifting internally and in the region.

Let me go back to what I have learned. We talk about the DPJ as if it’s monolithic; of course it is not. The leadership at the top, the people that we have seen come into power – Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, Ozawa Ichiro, and I think one generation removed from this leadership troika is Okada Katsuya and Maehara Seiji – represent the people who began the party a decade or so ago. This leadership has a deeply vested interest in the success of the DPJ. Coming up in the next generation of party leadership is Okada, Maehara and also others currently in the Cabinet like Mr. Ozawa, the head of the Environmental Ministry; and Mr. Haraguchi at the Internal Affairs Ministry. We should be actively trying to seek out this next group of leaders to talk to them about their ideas.
about the US-Japan alliance and how to move forward. Next, we ought to invest time in getting to know their policy teams, the individuals who are populating the vice ministerial or the parliamentary secretarial level of the DPJ government today. We need to know them. They’re younger and they may be less experienced, but they will be responsible for decisions that affect us in the future.

One of the things I brought forward last year was this idea of the redesign of governance in Japan and how it affects the policy-making process. That’s very important. In the Diet session that’s about to start next week, you will see some legislation put forward that will begin to create the underpinnings of the idea that there will more politicians in the Diet, the idea that the National Strategy Council will assume a greater role in the longer-term articulation of a national vision in Japan, and the reconstruction of local-center relations in governance in Japan, which is something we don’t really talk about here in terms of security relations, but I think is very important.

We have already begun to see some of the new practices that they have suggested that need to be implemented in Japan. There are the very narrow kinds of ideas such as bureaucrats shouldn’t be testifying in the Diet. Many of us watched the open budget hearings, and some of our Japanese colleagues had to participate in them. They’re trying to develop these practices. Also there’s no policy deliberations in the party which is something none of us really thought about before. But if we went to Tokyo in October looking to talk to somebody about Northeast Asia inside the DPJ they very clearly said there will not be separate parallel policy discussions – only policy discussions in the government itself. Some of the patterns for those of us who go to Tokyo have shifted considerably and that’s important to recognize.

In the foreign policy realm Mr. Hatoyama has been very active. Yesterday’s characterization of him was very specific to the national security realm but if you take a step back and look at his foreign policy agenda, his first public speech was in New York at the UN Security Council, where he made two significant speeches during that trip before traveling on to the G20. He has traveled extensively throughout the world to talk to Japan’s bilateral partners. He has articulated new priorities in climate change and nonproliferation and as fuzzy as it may seem, he has reemphasized Japan’s interest in an East Asian community.

I don’t think we should take lightly the fact that this government has not been in power before or may not know exactly what it wants to do in the alliance. They clearly have articulated their priorities in the foreign policy realm. Looking at it very narrowly from the U.S. perspective, they were pretty straight-forward in telegraphing the issues that mattered to them. We didn’t want to think about that because there is not much interest in reviewing the policies associated with our military presence in Japan. But I think we should not be surprised that the new government does want to review these issues.

I’ll talk a little about Futenma. The DPJ was pretty clear about its priorities here but what I think they were not clear about, and they continue not to be clear about, is their national security vision. What it is that they conceive of as Japan’s defense and security
needs and how does the military component of that fit in, as well as the alliance component? They may not have had the reins of government before but they clearly have to develop goals for their security planning and for the US-Japan alliance.

The long-term point here is that we need to learn how to work with this new Japan even as this new Japan tries to figure out how it wants to try to work with us. My impression is that they do want to work with us but I don’t know that they have their priorities straight in terms of where the emphasis in the policy-making processes should be. The inability of the DPJ team to articulate where it wants to go on the Futenma issue has been terribly conspicuous, but our policy initially was rather rigid. There were some misfires in terms of public statements but I’m not here to criticize; I’m simply here to say we didn’t know how to respond at the very beginning and information on their side was coming from all directions.

We went at the more sophisticated level from the seemingly random statements to a moment where a working group led by Ambassador Roos became the focal point of trying to get traction with them into a cabinet-level group that is trying to come to grips with what are we really going to be able to do.

The learning curve on how we got to the decision on Henoko, and how the policy was formed has been pretty steep. Recently in Washington Mr. Shimoji, from the People’s New Party, and Ms. Abe, from the Social Democrats, came to visit us to try to learn what the options are and where to get information. Ironically they want to be able to make a decision and they want it to be informed. So for those of us in the think tank community, that’s an opportunity to engage in a conversation which is different from those in government. But clearly they’re feeling the pressure. They feel like it’s their responsibility to come up with a response that makes sense. It’s very clear to me that they have not had access to information and that’s a key limitation. But what’s also a limitation is that these are people who were in the opposition and were not used to thinking in terms of national interest, strategic goals, or how to implement those goals once they had them. So again I think we have an obligation in this community to reach out as much as we can to help that process.

The collapse of the LDP policies and our alliance difficulties converge here. I see the DPJ using its critique of the LDP as a critique of the alliance. And I can see nowhere a clear distinction in their minds between past policies and practices that seems to me an LDP critique vs. the critique of Washington. As we go forward we’re going to need to articulate that separation just a little bit to help that happen.

If you were sitting in Okinawa the statements would seem as indecisive and confusing as they have been to Washington. None of this is designed to confuse us. It is simply because there is a lack of clarity in their goals. Many of us in Washington have been cautioned about not being too soft on the DPJ or not being too rigid, or not being too harsh. There’s a lot of concern about how the U.S. policy community responds to the DPJ from people both sympathetic and unsympathetic to the party across the board in Japan.
It’s important to reregister that there’s a deep concern inside Japan, inside Tokyo about how we proceed.

First, on Futenma, we’ve been able to see for some time the elections and political choices in Okinawa. Clearly what happens in Okinawa in the next several weeks will be critical. I think 2010 is a year of decision. We talked about this last in exactly the same way. This is a moment for resolution and the pressure is on both sides. The fall gubernatorial election in Okinawa is a deciding moment. And last year at our seminar I suggested that the fall of 2010 should be considered as our end point for wrapping up Futenma relocation. But as I watch politics in Tokyo today I wonder if we have not come to that point earlier.

We don’t still yet have a clear focused understanding of the mission of the Marine Corps in Okinawa, and it is not part of our policy delivery at the moment. As we look outward it sounds like we have a deal but without a policy. Many, such as former DOD Assistant Secretary Jim Shinn in his recent Asahi Shimbun article, argue that this deal will come apart if you start to take pieces of it out. And I understand that negotiating this “package” during the DIPRI was hard. But the problem today is that the US government cannot seem to articulate the operational rationale for the Marines in Okinawa, nor can they rationalize the pieces of the “package” independent of each other. Thus in this new political environment in Tokyo, the US looks too much like it is unwilling to be flexible.

Finally, in conclusion, the US-Japan alliance agenda is broader than Futenma relocation. This year a critical item on the agenda is nonproliferation. Iran and our ability to work together on Iran is going to be very crucial as we move toward a UN sanctions conversation. The situation in North Korea continues to be vital. The nonproliferation treaty review is very significant. I hope we keep our eye on that when we talk about the broader alliance agenda.

We need to be careful when we discuss this anniversary and the built-up expectations of some sort of master statement. We’re not going to tie everything up by November but there is an expectation that we’re going to able to come forward in a constructive manner with a rearticulation of the value of this partnership. I think we can do it but we have a lot of work to do. Thank you very much.
An Obama Strategy Emerges
By Michael Green

I’m going to talk about the political change in the United States and the first year of the Obama Administration security policy. The impact on the alliance, compared to the political change in Japan, obviously has been minimal, but there are some important areas of continuity and some very important areas of new direction in this administration’s security policy that we should think about. It’s not as if President Obama or National Security Advisor Jim Jones, or Secretary of State Clinton and her colleagues are spending all their time in the situation room talking about Japanese politics. There’s a larger strategic context within which they are viewing U.S.-Japan relations and there’s an awful lot of pressure. I think this may be the largest and most complicated national security agenda that an American president has faced since the beginning of the Cold War and we need to remember that.

I’ll give one American’s perspective. I consider myself a member of the loyal opposition. I will perhaps provoke some of my American colleagues to weigh in. I briefly want to mention or try to capture what appears to be the grand strategy of the Obama administration and then talk about Asia, and then talk about some of the issues on the calendar this year that we should be thinking about because they will test the US-Japan Alliance. I’m not talking about Futenma or host nation support; I’m talking about things in the world of security more broadly.

First, on grand strategy, John Lewis Gaddis, the famous historian, author of “Strategies of Containment,” argues that administrations come in with a geopolitical code and that often you would see new grand strategies begin as new administrations come in. I think there’s a somewhat different dynamic at play, particularly with respect to Asia strategy. Very frequently, grand strategies don’t emerge for a year or more because as administrations begin a variety of different instincts or biases collide, and are eventually sorted out depending on who within the administration is talented and depending on what real security challenges the administration confronts. This was true for the Bush administration at the beginning and it’s true of the Obama administration. So I think we would be hard pressed to say a grand strategy the Obama administration right now is “XY, or Z.” Nevertheless, there are clearly some priorities and instincts that exist often in contradiction to each other, and these will have to sort themselves out.

The first instinct I think is a continuation of the traditional American focus on balance of power, on the strategic equilibrium. The physics of international relations don’t just change just because there is an election in the United States, and that is evident in the importance the administration is placing on the alliance with Japan. The alliance is not just about common values, which are important, or just about creating a long list of cooperative policies. There is a more fundamental purpose to this or any alliance and that is maintaining a strategic equilibrium in Asia and globally. That Obama administration’s understanding of the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in maintaining a favorable strategic equilibrium represents a strong element of continuity from Bush and Clinton.
However, that worldview collides somewhat with the second instinct in the administration, which is that this is a new era where national security needs to be defined much more broadly and we need to build partnerships to tackle transnational challenges like climate change or nuclear armament proliferation. Many of the advocates of this world view will argue, some rhetorically, that the balance of power doesn’t matter anymore – that the traditional focus on strategic equilibrium is an obstacle to cooperation with countries like China or Russia which we need to tackle these new transnational challenges of the 21st century.

A third instinct colliding with these first two worldviews is one that any new administration has, and that is the natural political desire to show change and thus “anything but Bush,” or in our case, “anything but Clinton.” It is the campaign rhetoric, the world view, the narrative that an administration comes in with because of the effort to say they’re going to be different from the previous guy, and very often those things have to sort themselves out. For the Obama administration, it’s evident in rhetoric about engagement, about restoring our reputation, and in some of the initial reticence about talking on issues of democracy and human rights.

And finally, it is important to remember that the president comes in with a coalition. Hatoyama is not the only leader in this alliance who has a coalition that’s extremely difficult to manage. President Obama won a big victory with dependence on a traditional liberal democratic base that turned out for him, and with a much more moderate centrist democratic base. That combination has been very hard for him to manage in the health care debate and it’s very hard for him to manage in the national security debate as well. The best example is Afghanistan, where the President is supported by Republicans, conservative independents, and moderate Democrats, and very strongly opposed by the highly motivated liberal base that helped him get elected.

All these elements are now colliding in the first year of actual governance by the Obama administration, and this is not uncommon. Remember that the Truman administration did not articulate the strategy of containment for two full years. The Bush administration also started with some conflicting priorities and arguably did not develop a coherent grand strategy until Sept. 11.

So this is all my excuse to say I don’t know what the grand strategy of the Obama administration is. You can see some clear trend lines and we’ll see how they come out.

On Asia: Secretary Clinton’s frequent rhetorical device that “we are back in Asia,” aside, I don’t know when we left. I would argue that there is in Asia policy perhaps the strongest continuity of all the areas of foreign policy for the Obama administration. I think the Asia team is one of the strongest teams that the administration has put together. It is also in some ways the least partisan area of foreign policy and that’s partly because the administration inherited a pretty strong hand in Asia, the best relations with Japan, India, and China, ever and all at the same time.
Various polls like the Chicago Council poll showed that Asians think US influence in the region increased over the past decade. I will acknowledge that President Obama is much more popular than President Bush but this is not a 180-degree turn. This is building on a growing appreciation of the United States that I think has something to do with the rise of China and something to do with democratization across the region over the last 10-15 years.

Within Asia policy, the area where I see the strongest continuity is on Japan. People should give enormous credit to Secretary Clinton for making her first stop in Japan. That has not happened before. The first secretary of state to stop first in Asia was Dean Rusk, but he went to Thailand. And Secretary Clinton is the first secretary of state to make her first stop in Japan and that is not easy to do given the diplomatic calendar she faces more broadly. I also see very strong continuity in the Japan-focused strategy articulated in the 2000 and 2007 Nye/Armitage reports and believe that Tokyo is happy to welcome into the Obama administration some of the familiar “Alliance mafia.”

I may be a minority among Japan experts and, but I think the administration has handled this difficult transition of government in Japan quite well. There have been some very good suggestions about thinking about domestic politics and being sensitive to public opinion in Japan in today’s discussion, but I also think the Obama administration has spent a lot of time thinking about exactly those factors and has endeavored to keep a balance between immutable national security priorities and the need to develop a strong working relationship with the new DPJ government. On the one hand, national security matters, capabilities matter, the signals that are sent to our adversaries and our allies matter, Futenma is not an a la carte optional issue that can be shelved because it is politically inconvenient right now. But at the same time the administration has done a pretty good job trying to keep that focus on resolving the Futenma issue while also signaling confidence in the alliance as a whole and remaining as “strategically patient” as possible.

On China policy, I also see continuity but I think the administration has struggled more than the Bush administration did or than the Obama team expected. This last election was somewhat unique because in contrast to the Bush/Gore or Clinton/Bush or Carter/Reagan elections there was not a debilitating debate about China policy during the campaign. The usual pattern is to have a contentious debate about China and the China threat during the campaign, followed by a year or two learning curve as a new administration comes to power and realizes that it cannot frame our complex relationship with China round simpler political slogans about China being a strategic competitor charging that the previous administration “coddled the butchers of Beijing.” There is usually some crisis or some event – for us it was EP-3 – that galvanizes strategic thinking and gets China policy back on track. President Obama really lucked out in that sense.

When I was on the McCain campaign, I participated in a series of proxy debates on Asia policy with Jeff Bader and others now in the administration. There was not this huge fight about China. Candidate Clinton briefly made a run at using China in the primary campaign to brandish her trade and national security credentials, but it didn’t play that well. The administration came in with a pretty free hand to build on a pretty strong
relationship with China and start expanding it to areas like climate change. And the irony is that after a year they’re going have to adjust in some ways because there was no real debate. Some people probably thought it was unfair but President Obama got a lot of very bad press when he went to China. And it wasn’t just the Wall Street Journal and the Weekly Standard; it was The LA Times, and The New York Times. In some ways The LA Times and The New York Times were his harshest critics. It coincided with a real drop in his polls; there was a domestic political context that mattered, but I think, it was a bit of a wake-up call.

The narrative going in from a lot of senior people in the administration was that China is indispensable, that “we cannot solve problems from climate change to North Korea without China.” Intended or not, that in some ways is code for saying China has a veto and that we’re the demandeur in the relationship. I think it reflected a view that collided with US politics and also with Chinese views of their position in the world. While I do not expect a fundamental change in China strategy, over the coming year we’re going to see an adjustment in tone and approach.

There is not going to be G-2; and there never really was prospect of one either. The Dalai Lama will visit in February, the arms sales package for Taiwan will soon be announced. You can see very clearly in Secretary Clinton’s speech that the administration is starting to play up India in a way that they didn’t before the trip. And this Google thing I think is huge because it represents the perfect storm. It’s human rights, technology, trade friction, and it’s national security. And take it from a guy who has frequent unwelcomed visits from Chinese hackers because I work on Asia. The Chinese have forced the think tank industry and US government to make common cause on a major threat and I think it’s going to have a profound effect on the relationship.

On North Korea, there was a lot of rhetoric during the campaign about unconditional engagement with our adversaries and so forth. That is largely gone. The North Korean nuclear test in my view during the administration’s review of the negotiations in 2008 were a real bucket of cold water regarding North Korea’s motives and about the danger of appearing too eager to get a “breakthrough.” In my view the administration has been quite sober and tough on this North Korea question. It’s worth reading Secretary Clinton’s July statement on North Korea. It didn’t get much play, but it was comprehensive and it was tough but it was hopeful or open to engagement. It mentioned human rights and nuclear proliferation; from my perspective it was the best comprehensive statement on North Korea strategy in 15 years. Will that remain the policy? I don’t know. I certainly hope so. I would bet that the administration will resist temptations to lift sanctions or play with sanction in order to get North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks or will play with peace treaties to get the process going. My sense is that the administration will resist those temptations because so many people have been burned and because the politics of it are so bad. My guess is people like Rahm Emanuel knows that the North Koreans will make this administration look bad just in time for either the mid-term elections or the presidential elections if the administration goes down the same path that previous ones have and have tried to get an agreement that North Korea won’t
cheat on. So I expect this to be an area where we don’t have much disagreement with Japan as we did in 2008 or previous periods.

Architecture is a very important issue: the future of Asian integration and East Asia Community and all the rest. Secretary Clinton gave a pretty good speech on this at the East-West Center. I would point out in a self-serving way that, this was the first comprehensive statement on architecture by a secretary of state and she is to be commended. I would point out that she gave the US should approach architecture in a speech saying “we’re back,” were things done during the Bush administration, like the Six-Party Talks, regular attendance at APEC, tsunami relief, and so forth. But she’s doing some new things that are important, like signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, going to the ASEAN Summit. The real test in architecture and on this broader engagement, is going to be trade, and the transpacific partnership negotiations with New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and Brunei are a good symbolic move. But if the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement does not get passed in the Senate nobody in Asia is going to negotiate seriously with us. Trade promotion authority means that the US negotiators have about 5-8 percent flexibility on these trade agreements, and nobody is going to go through that pain.

Trade is the real test of how serious the administration is about architecture. This is also an area where we should not be at odds with Japan. Discussions of East Asia Community aside, there are some very common interests that the US and Japan have. This really ought to be a core part of our bilateral dialogue.

Flashpoints or things in the coming year to watch out for, Iran. You can see the administration’s position hardening. They’ve had one deadline, and they’ve now hit January which is the second deadline. I’m not sure there’s going to be another deadline. Part of the reason is there are several clocks moving. One clock is Israel’s. When the Iranians get the Russian air defenses that make an Israeli strike impossible, then the Israelis won’t have that option. So their timeline is pretty short.

Another deadline or ticking clock is in Saudi Arabia, which has been quite clear to the administration according to press reports that they will pursue a nuclear deterrent if Iran does. So this is not an area for a lot of patience. I’m concerned in the US-Japan context because I noted at the press conference with the president, Prime Minister Hatoyama, when this came up said Japan has a “special relationship” with Iran. Japan has divested from Azedegan but I believe Japan is still the largest provider of export credits to Iran. And I hear rumors that there’s a sense in the like-minded group that Japan right now is the least like-minded on this question. Maybe that’s not fair but this is going to be a much harder problem than people realize and a much bigger deal for the US than perhaps is recognized in Japan.

Second, the Nuclear Posture Review. There is supposed to be a public report, unlike the Bush administration which instead used the leak in The New York Times, which was most unhelpful and counterproductive. There is a split personality in the administration about this. There are people who are really keen to quickly implement the
president’s Prague speech, bring down the number of nuclear weapons, talk about strategic reassurance with China on nuclear issues, things that others in the administration I think have real concern about because they think, and I’m in agreement, that the credibility of our extended deterrent is especially wobbly right now. It shouldn’t be but in many it is because of the nuclear proliferation problems in Iran and North Korea. This is not the time to send signals or reduce capabilities.

Part of the challenge we’ll have with Japan is that the Hatoyama administration at least at the top is quite enamored of the Prague speech and is sending signals about denuclearization and moving ahead with Article 6 of the NPT. But in a year or two or three, that may not be the case in Japan and there may be really serious questions about whether the US attended to our extended deterrent properly. So the Nuclear Posture Review and the whole question of extended nuclear deterrence are very complicated because of both countries’ political transitions. These issues should be on the agenda for people like us.

Third, there is Afghanistan. Within days of the president announcing the troop increase and the adjusted strategy and a timeline, the secretary of defense and others were walking back that timeline. We’re going to be in Afghanistan I think at a significant level for some time. Friends in Japan need to recognize that this stresses our force structure, our national security establishment, and it’s a pressure that matters. I’m not saying that because Japan has to send troops or send back ships but it’s going to take a lot of time and effort.

There are a lot of other things that are going to come up, such as climate change, the Six-Party Talks, but those are the three I would end with to open the discussion. Thank you.
It is a tremendous honor to be in this room and to be lead discussant for this session. I will make a few prepared comments. Since I am a senior research fellow both at the JIIA at the Tokyo Foundation, co-hosts of this meeting, it was hard for me to decline the request to be a discussant.

First, a little bit on the Obama administration, as the title for this session is “Domestic Changes in the US and Impact on Alliance Management.”

As everyone knows, the approval ratings of Mr. Obama at the end of the first year are as low as those of Reagan and Clinton, which is about 50 percent. Clinton and Reagan faced as bad economy as Obama does and both had miserable and embarrassing defeats at mid-term elections, and an overwhelming reelection victory afterward.

Therefore, speaking a bit sarcastically, as far as his first year is concerned, Mr. Obama is successfully following the paths of Clinton and Reagan. But in polls that ask about admiration for Obama or support for him as a leader, Mr. Obama gets higher points, which indicates that some people are very critical of his politics but more supportive of him as a leader.

His focus on health case is one of the reasons for the decline in his approval ratings, besides the economy. Without expressing a clear set of principles, Obama just wanted early passage of legislation through Congress, which is still achievable though at a huge political cost. Many voters want the president to focus more on jobs, and probably the White House now gets it.

Every president tends to pursue a “First Hundred Days” strategy, which is, in a sense, an “achieve everything in the first-year strategy.” Now, however, Mr. Obama needs a different strategy. FDR is famous for his “First Hundred Days,” but he also scored impressive victories in his third year. Reagan got the Tax Reform Act, and Clinton, the Welfare Reform Act, in their sixth and fourth years, respectively.

So, Obama and his White House advisers might think that they have to shift from a “pass everything as early as possible” mentality to a three-year strategy in which they take more time and just don’t delegate almost all important principles to Congressional leaders. I think they are now in the stage of transformation of their policy.

My second comment is on Osama’s foreign policy in general. His foreign policy started with a call for negotiation even with what Bush called “rogue states” or with a strong will to listen to the other side. This might be a legacy of campaign rhetoric. He looked soft, and many commentators criticized him for being too soft.
As many Japanese know, Secretary Clinton was very respectful of tradition in Japan when she came to Tokyo, paying a formal visit to the Meiji Shrine. President Obama’s deep bow to the Emperor of Japan is now famous – and even controversial in the US.

But it would not be enough to describe Obama’s foreign policy as just soft. We already saw the US applying various sanctions to North Korea last year. Obama decided to send more troops to Afghanistan. In Iran, the Obama administration is now thinking about initiating its own financial sanctions.

In China, Obama was not tough or demanding in his first year. He was even conceding. For example, he didn’t meet the Dalai Lama when he visited D.C. last year, which was almost unprecedented for the US president.

But he has decided to sell Patriot missiles to Taiwan. There were a couple of trade initiatives last year. And I’m sure he will be pretty tough with the Chinese government regarding the problems with Google.

Even now, however, Obama may not be tough enough with China, judging from certain standards. But he is getting tough. The question is how tough he will get in the coming year not just on China and Iran, but on many other issues.

This shift is caused partly by new developments outside the US, but is also based on a friendly interpretation – or it may have been part of a long-term strategy. Or, he might be learning.

So, the Obama administration is in the stage of a major shift in its foreign policy approach now.

Third, let me look at US-Japan relations from a historical perspective. For the last 50 years under the revised US-Japan Security Treaty, we have had a couple of crises in our bilateral relations.

The first major crisis took place in 1960. The planned visit to Japan by President Eisenhower was cancelled. Edwin Reischauer published an article entitled “Broken Dialogue with Japan.” In 1961, he was appointed Ambassador to Japan. He tried to convince Americans in government as well as in the military that Japan was an equal partner. To broaden and deepen the relationship, new committees, such as the US-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (Culcon), were established.

The second crisis came during the Nixon years, caused by two “Nixon Shocks” in dealing with China and exchange rate. Nixon was angry at Japan for not delivering a deal on textiles. And Nixon’s most important priority agenda was improving relations with China. Some of the documents are still classified, but it is likely that Nixon told Chinese leaders that they didn’t have to worry about the US-Japan Security Treaty. This was really a serious crisis for the alliance.
The third crisis occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s over trade. Japan was regarded as the most serious threat to the US. The Clinton White House spokesperson Mike McCurry once said that if Japan didn’t make concessions on trade, there might be a negative effect on security relations, which angered many officials in Japan.

After briefly surveying these crises in our bilateral relations since 1960, we can make a couple of points.

First, the US-Japan alliance has survived all these crises, although we need to admit that each crisis left negative legacies and memories.

Second, compared to past crises, the current situation is not so serious, at least at this moment. But it is obvious that there is no trust between President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama, which is fairly serious.

If Japan cannot come up with a concrete and workable plan by the end of May, the situation could get worse. If something unpredictable happens in Japan’s security, the treaty might not work in a predictable way.

But in a longer term, I mean, in the time span of a year or two, both sides might want to back off and pursue a more compromising path. In Japan, the controversy over Futenma has cost the Hatoyama Cabinet a great deal politically. Any US administration would like to keep Japan as an ally and hate to be criticized for the so-called “loss of Japan.” In this vein, both sides, including the US government, will eventually have to make further compromise.

This is my third point. After the three crises I mentioned, there were earnest efforts and hard work by Japanese and Americans to improve relations. J. F. Kennedy had a plan to visit Japan early in 1964. Ford came to Japan. In 1996, there was a Joint Declaration on Security.

We may see a disappointing outcome this May, but what is important is what both governments come up with afterward. Thank you for listening.
Future Visions of the Alliance
By Matake Kamiya

Last fall, when I received an invitation to this seminar to speak at the session on “future visions of the alliance,” I felt honored. Since then, I have been excited about having an opportunity to present my view on the most important bilateral relationship for my country before the most authoritative experts and practitioners on the issue.

At the same time, however, I have been quite nervous about this presentation. As all of you would probably agree, this is the worst time, particularly from a Japanese point of view, to talk about the future of our alliance. The Hatoyama administration has maintained that it would like to deepen the US-Japan alliance, but we still do not know what deepening the alliance means for Prime Minister Hatoyama and other DPJ leaders. And the Futenma issue has become increasingly messy. Since around 2003, thanks to efforts made by some people in this room, it once seemed that the era in which the US-Japan alliance would deal mainly with housekeeping matters was finally ending, and a new era in which the two allies can conduct talks and policy coordination on substantive strategic and security issues was finally beginning. Since last fall, however, the alliance has seemed to return to the era of housekeeping. The future of the alliance seems quite unpredictable.

But we have to recognize that the future of the US-Japan alliance looks unpredictable, not only because of the indecisive behavior of DPJ leaders regarding Futenmna. The future of the alliance looks unpredictable also because we are in an era of a drastic transformation of the international system. Today, I would like to focus on this aspect of alliance unpredictability, leaving the Futenma issue aside.

Yes, we are at a moment of historical change and transitions. In the field of economics, the G20 has been rapidly overtaking the G7 and that change has been supported here in Washington. Fred Bergsten, head of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, has reportedly said that, “the G20 should be the new steering committee of the world economy.”

In politics, there has been the rise of China. China is expected to surpass Japan’s gross GDP this year, and will become the second largest economy in the world. Observing this trend, some important figures in Washington, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, have advocated that the US and China should create the Group of Two (G2), suggesting that the two countries, without Japan, should be co-leaders of international society who coordinate policies on global issues ranging from the economy to security.

Militarily, there has also been the rise of China. Throughout the last two decades, China’s military budget has shown uninterrupted double-digit increase, thanks to its rapidly growing economy. China has rapidly advanced modernization as well as expansion of its nuclear, missile, naval, and air capabilities. So in the not too distant future,
the country may be able to resolve disputes with its neighbors, such as territorial disputes, in its favor.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the main delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, has continued. Despite US President Obama’s advocacy of a “world free of nuclear weapons” (and I would dare say this despite the fact that I have recently been invited to become a signatory to the Global Zero proposal), there is no prospect that we will be able to stop the proliferation of nukes in the foreseeable future.

Politically, damaged US international leadership needs to be repaired, but we are not sure if US leadership will be reinvigorated in the foreseeable future, despite President Obama’s global popularity and his efforts to shift the style of US external behavior from the unilateralism of recent years to the traditional so-called strategic restraint. As Steve Clemons of the New America Foundation recently said, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s opposition to Obama’s economic policy at the G20 meeting in London in March last year, and Prime Minister Hatoyama’s resistance to pressure from Washington to accept the agreement between Japan and the United States about the relocation of the Futenma, may be two major examples of weakening US leadership in the world.

In such an era, the most important question for Japan and the United States is whether the two countries can control the international situation so that the essential elements of the existing international order will be preserved despite changes in many aspects of international relations. If our answer to this question is not a cynical and resigned no, then the next question has to be: by what means can we do that?

The answer is: the US-Japan alliance. This alliance should be the prime tool for our efforts to maintain the essential elements of the current international order.

By “essential elements of the current international order,” I mean the basic rules, norms, and principles, that have governed day-to-day relationships among international actors, both state and nonstate, and without which the nature of an international order will not be able to remain as it is today. Such rules and principles include: prohibition of use of force and violence except for self-defense and promotion of international peace and security; prohibition of private use of force and violence, such as terrorism; non-nuclear norms; freedom of high seas; the principle of free trade; and the rules, norms, and principles of major international regimes that exist in various fields of international interactions, such as international assistance regime, and so on.

It is impossible to deny the reality of changes in the world. The rise of China is a reality. So is the rise of India. So are the relative decline of Japan and the United States. The international distribution of power has been changing to a considerable degree and quite rapidly.

Accepting such realities, however, we have to make every effort to preserve the basic nature of the existing international order. Since the end of World War II and particularly after the end of the Cold War, the international order has been built and
maintained by the collective efforts of countries including Japan that share liberal values and principles, and such efforts have been made under the leadership of the United States. We have not only built and maintained the order, but we have also been the major beneficiaries of that order. Nor have we been the only beneficiaries of the order. Other countries, as long as they have abided by its basic rules, norms, and principles, have been able to enjoy the advantages that have been brought about by the order. In this sense, the alliance between the United States and Japan, as well as the one between the United States and the North Atlantic countries, have served as international public goods since they were established shortly after the end of World War II.

Facing the tremendous changes that have been taking place in international society, we are still the major beneficiaries of the international order led by the United States. And we share the belief that the maintenance of the current international order represents the best way to ensure peace and prosperity for the entire world, not just ourselves.

In this sense, I strongly believe that the US-Japan alliance 50 years after the creation of our bilateral treaty should be redefined as an alliance of the two leading status quo powers in the world. Washington and Tokyo should declare to the Asia-Pacific region and to the entire world that their alliance will serve as an international public good in the sense that the two allies will seek the maintenance of essential elements of the current international order, both in the Asia Pacific and globally.

The concept of an alliance of status quo powers is closely related to the often-talked-about concept of an alliance among countries who share basic values and ideals, because any order has to be built and maintained on the basis of a certain set of basic values and ideals. The preamble of the US-Japan Security Treaty stipulates that the two allies desire “to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” To maintain the essential elements of the existing international order, Japan and the United States must maintain their commitment to shared values and ideals.

The concept of an alliance of status quo powers, however, is not the same as the concept of a value-based alliance. For the US-Japan alliance as an alliance of status quo powers, promotion of their values per se should not be the goal. We have to uphold the basic values and ideals shared by us to the extent necessary to maintain the basic rules, norms, and principles of the international order. For example, we will surely want China to abide by the rules and principles accepted widely by the international community. For that purpose, we will have to keep demanding that Beijing should pay sufficient respect to liberal democratic values, because most of the rules and principles accepted widely by the international community today reflect such values (at least to some extent). But we have to always keep in mind that this is different from urging China to democratize or to promote freedom of speech domestically and so on. We have to accept the undeniable reality that nobody can impose its values or principles on a big country such as China and India.

Now, what do the two allies have to do to make the alliance between them an effective tool to maintain the international order in the Asia-Pacific and globally?
With regard to Japan, the biggest problem to be overcome is, as I mentioned in the first session this morning, the widespread reluctance of the Japanese public to accept the necessity and the desirability of military cooperation with the United States.

Since the end of World War II, the Japanese have come to believe strongly that peace and military matters are antithetical concepts. The devastation Japan experienced as a result of its reckless war planted a lasting dread of military power as a peace-destroying agent. The Japanese almost completely lost sight of the fact that military power is also an essential implement for protecting peace. Under the mindset that gained currency, the use of military force in pursuit of peace was seen as wrong, and even discussion of that possibility came to be considered wicked.

Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after Japan’s disastrous experience in the Gulf Crisis and the Gulf War, the Japanese attitude toward security issues has become increasingly realistic, and security debate in Japan has been infused with fresh vitality. However, the largest taboo of the postwar era remains firmly in place in the Japanese security dialogue: namely, the refusal to recognize that military action has a role to play in the pursuit of peace. In this sense, Japan’s postwar pacifism is extremely resilient among the Japanese people. They have tended to believe that the dependence of Japan’s diplomatic and security policy on the military should be minimized even for the sake of defending their own country. They have also tended to believe that Japan’s military cooperation with the United States is a kind of “necessary evil” and should be limited to the minimum level possible.

In order to make the US-Japan alliance an effective tool to maintain the status quo in the Asia-Pacific and globally, the mindset of the Japanese people must be adjusted. They need to understand the reality that efforts to maintain any international order include military efforts, and even in an era of increasing salience of nontraditional, nonmilitary types of security, military security represents the very basis of any international order.

This belief is common sense for us in this room, but not for the majority in Japan. Here, as was emphasized by some participants this morning, efforts to get those people better informed and better educated will be extremely important.

In his speech at today’s lunch, Gen. Gregson pointed out various nonmilitary areas in which he expects the US-Japan alliance will play a role in the foreseeable future. I, however, believe that the two allies should be able to cooperate on military issues, too. Japan should utilize the US-Japan alliance for itself, for the region, and for the world. To realize that, however, the Japanese public needs more education and information.

Next, what will the United States have to do?

One thing I would like to emphasize is the importance of US efforts to maintain Japan as a status quo power. For example, the United States should not take Japan’s nonnuclear stance for granted when it makes decisions on nuclear policy or on nuclear nonproliferation policy. Despite the extremely strong desire of Japan to remain nonnuclear,
Japan will have to do cost-benefit calculations when it makes important foreign and security policy decisions, and the decision with regard to nuclear weaponry is not an exception. In other words, Japan’s decision to remain nonnuclear will not be an automatic one, but will be affected by the international environment, and particularly by US policy. If Washington moves to accept North Korea’s keeping a limited number of nuclear weapons, even tacitly, it will possibly have serious influence on the prospects for Japan’s maintenance of its traditional nonnuclear policy.

Another thing that the United States should avoid doing is the move to a so-called G2. From the Japanese point of view, if the US starts to treat China as a more important politico-strategic partner than Japan in East Asia and globally, that move will represent a serious change in the international order in a direction undesirable for Japan.

Finally, for both allies, what is most crucial for the vitality of the alliance as a tool to maintain international status quo is mutual trust. In this sense, how the Futenma issue will be handled by the two governments will be of great significance. The same is true for the DPJ’s handling of the idea of the East Asian community and its policy toward China.

Having said that, I would like to emphasize that US efforts to maintain the mutual trust between the two allies are also important. In recent years, despite the widespread perception among the Japanese that the United States is “contributing” to peace and security of Japan, a sense of distrust of the United States has been growing in Japanese opinion. According to the annual “Japan-U.S. Joint Public Opinion Polls,” conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup Inc., in November 2002, 49 percent of the respondents trusted the United States, while 39 percent did not. Six years later, in November 2008, these figures had changed greatly: only 32 percent trusted the United States, while nearly 60 percent did not. One major reason for this change in Japanese perceptions was, of course, US unilateralism during the Bush administration and the Iraq War.

There is, however, another important reason for declining trust in the United States: There is a widespread sentiment among the Japanese that the United States has failed to give them satisfactory reciprocation for their efforts to help the US after the 9/11 terrorist attack and during the Iraq War, with the latter being particularly important. Although many countries, even close allies, condemned the United States for starting an illegitimate war against Iraq, the Japanese government not only refrained from criticizing its ally, but tried to screen it from international blame. Although the majority of the Japanese public was critical of the Iraq War, Tokyo dispatched SDF troops to Iraq to help US reconstruction efforts.

What is noteworthy was the reaction of the Japanese public to this deployment. Despite the fact that a majority in Japan did not support the US-led war against Iraq, the SDF deployment to Iraq won acceptance among the Japanese people.

The Japanese government, as well as its people, expected that such a show of goodwill, friendship, and partnership would ensure the US reciprocated by supporting Japan against North Korea. Immediately after Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in
October 2006, however, the Bush administration replaced its original policy of not rewarding North Korea’s bad behavior, and adopted a new, conciliatory policy line, including direct bilateral talks with Pyongyang and reopening of the Six-Party Talks. Although this policy change was received favorably by the majority of the international community as a sign of a shift from unilateralism to multilateralism, it was a profound shock to Japan. The Japanese were particularly deeply disappointed to see the United States make such a fundamental policy shift on the most vital issue for Japan’s security unilaterally, without sufficient consultations with Japan on it.

Such unilateral policy changes by the United States have created among the Japanese a sense that the US does not pay sufficient respect even to Japan’s most vital security interests. If Washington repeats such neglect of Japan’s vital interests, which could evoke questioning in Japan about Washington’s sense of solidarity with Tokyo, and such voices could undermine the security alliance. If, on the other hand, this political nightmare is avoided by closer consultations between the two allies, there will not be much reason to worry about Japan’s loss of faith in its alliance with the US.

Although Japan and the United States have been close allies for nearly 60 years, our interests have never been identical. Although many of our interests overlap today, there are some elements of divergence. But we share an interest in maintaining the current international order, in the face of big changes taking place in the world. Thank you very much.
Four Scenarios for the Future
By Ezra Vogel

It’s a great privilege for me to take part in this. The 50th anniversary of the alliance has a special personal meaning. I was in Japan from 1958-1960 and had the opportunity before I returned in June 1960 to see all the student demonstrations and to talk with people about the alliance. I had the opportunity to go to Haneda airport with my wife and little kid to return on exactly the day the James Hagerty arrived and was trying to get into the middle of Tokyo and wasn’t able to. We were getting calls from my family in the United States saying, “isn’t it dangerous? Shouldn’t you come home right away?” We arrived at the airport and it was about a thousand yards blocked by demonstrations. We had to get over a fence and the demonstrators were all there. They knew we were obviously Americans, and we got to the fence and the Japanese helped us lift the suit cases over the fence. As soon as my wife and son got over the fence they clapped and cheered and that just reinforced my feeling of solidarity with the Japanese people; it wasn’t anything personal.

I’m also very happy to take pride in this because I think Jim Kelly and Ralph Cossa and all the “mafia” who are here assembled have done a wonderful job and I think this session is annually one of the most important sites for maintaining this kind of relationship.

I thought I could be most useful to advance the discussion by trying to think in the long range. What are the big structural factors that are likely to happen in the next 5-10 years? From 1993-1995 my Harvard colleague Joe Nye asked me to come with him to Washington; he was going to head the National Intelligence Council and he asked me to come down with him to handle Asia for him as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia. There were a couple of years when we were working on relations with Asia.

Now, I prepared four scenarios that I thought are plausible as a way of trying to answer or at least address how we maintain levels of cooperation, and what are future challenges.

The first is a sort of Japanese honeymoon and it leads to weaker US-Japanese ties. In my view of Asia, Korea problems, Southeast Asia problems and the like, there’s nothing really to compare them to China. The scope and scale of what China has done, the economic power, the military power that it’s going to have, the fact that they have integrated think tank institutions which can think of overall national strategy and they have a united leadership at the top that’s able to get national strategy will pose much more of a challenge and have much more of an impact than anything in the East Asian environment.

My scenario supposes China continues to strengthen relations with Japan. My perception is that after the Tiananmen incident in 1989 they were very worried about losing the student generation. To try to keep the students they resorted to patriotism. And the great patriotism campaign was originally intended specifically to be anti-Japanese. At
the local level, the propaganda people who were trying to make the case for patriotism realized nothing quite matched World War II.

So I think the hostility in China toward Japan about World War II was not primarily a remembrance of the older people who remembered the war. The intensity really came from that campaign and followed the Tiananmen incident. But I think when they started trashing the ambassador’s residence in Beijing I think that Beijing realized they had gone too far and they needed to ease off. I think we had a new era in Chinese reaction where they decided they wanted to improve relationships with Japan, and therefore they began to let up on some things.

Those of you who have come in contact with Chinese at a local level know there is still a lot of feelings left from this campaign from 1990-91 until about 2007 when they started changing.

Now they’re trying to appeal to Japan and my perception is the Japanese desire to be forgiven for World War II or at least to put that behind them is very powerful. The Chinese can manipulate and use that sentiment as a way to try to pull the Japanese closer to them. And there’s a natural and very strong desire on the part of Japanese to have close and good relations with their neighbor. There’s another thing and that is that China is now the most promising market. So if you are a Japanese business person and looking at the future it seems like the promising markets or growth of markets is going to be in China, and we have a to have good relationship for our business by having good relations with China. So there’s a natural desire to strengthen those relations.

As part of that the Chinese are encouraging all kinds of regional exchanges, local communities with local communities, business groups and business groups. Last I heard there were about 1,500 members in the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai and about 5,000 Japanese members. The Japanese trading companies with places all over China, all major cities, have kind of an access and entry point for Japanese businesses of all kinds. Student exchanges are increasing, students studying Chinese are increasing, and tourism is increasing. The Chinese are sometimes subtle in the way they relate to other countries and I think there will be plenty of opportunities when they can say, “well, if you just didn’t support America and didn’t have so many troops and this and that, that relationships could go much more smoothly.”

I think that basic framework will be used by the Chinese over the next few years and so I could see that the strengthening of Sino-Japanese relations could lead to a weakening of US-Japanese ties. That’s scenario number 1.

Scenario two looks at things that might aggravate the US-Japanese relationship regardless of what happens with China and external environment. One is that the United States, no matter how patient we try to be, sees the Japanese government as weak and wavering, making one decision one time and then changing the next time there’s another Japanese government or yet another prime minister. There is a lack of clarity and an inability to resolve issues that just gets frustrating. And regardless of well-meaning people
who know Japan and say we have to be patient, there are always people who want to accomplish things and get tired of being patient. I may be more polite to Japanese guests but I think one can understand how Americans would feel that way.

Then the Japanese see the United States as too haughty and rely too much on *gaiatsu*. In my perception this is greatly exaggerated by the Japanese press. Even when US officials go to Japan and try to say things modestly, quietly, and privately there’s a temptation – apologies to my Japanese press friends here – on some people in the Japanese press, to see *gaiatsu* and to exaggerate it and to see pressure and haughty Americans. That also can contribute to the problems in the US-Japanese relationship. Japanese who think about the long run, will look at the US budget and say, “The US military is going to have to cut its arrangements over the next 5-10 years. America has been very firm in supporting the alliance and backing us up, but now China is going to be stronger in 5-10 years and the US economy is not going to be strong, so how much can we really trust the American commitment? And what will they really do for us in the face of a stronger China that’s trying to deny access? Can we really count on the Americans?”

For US officials who are trying to resolve issues on climate and so forth, for a lot complicated issues, the Chinese seem to have their act together and have done their homework. If you want a quick agreement or a quick fix on a number of kinds of issues, it may be easier to talk to people in Beijing. Why would Obama spend more time with Chinese leaders than Japan? There’s business to be done, and issues to be resolved and I think a lot of practical-minded people in the US administration who want to get issues settled and international problems solved will find it easier to work with Beijing, which can again create doubts in Japan about the American alliance.

Scenario number three, is that we have weak positive relations in the future. Somehow we hold the relationship and by educating prime ministers and so forth we get reasonable responses out of leaders and we manage to hold things together. The economies of both countries are in trouble and we can’t keep up our investments and when it comes to aid and some crisis, the Japanese find it a little harder to come up with a budget and the United States needs more help with its bases and those expenses and this puts more pressure on Japan.

Another reason why ties might get weaker is that a lot of the basic institutions we developed like the Japan Society in United States, the International House, and the JCIE are not as strong as they once were. A similar kind of thing is true when it comes to student interest in the United States. It hasn’t fallen off nearly as much as people working on Japan and think tanks in Washington but it is not quite what it was at the peak in the 1980s.

Of course, US public interest in Japan has fallen off, and Japanese interest in international relations has fallen off. In Harvard, just to give an example, in 1996 we had 179 students from Japan enrolled in various courses. We also had a lot of post-docs and other things that were not counted. Last year there were 101. Maybe we weren’t doing the right things and there’s a lot of soul searching on what we can do to strengthen that at Harvard. But that’s just one institution I’m sure there are a lot of other US institutions
maybe not as bad as we were, but where there’s been a big fall-off in the number of
Japanese going abroad. There are a lot of reasons why Japanese aren’t going abroad:
companies that send people to American business schools find that US companies pick
them off and a lot of them feel it’s getting too expensive, or they’re cutting the budgets and
they don’t want to send as many people abroad. Some Japanese students wonder how they
can compete with all those people from China and Korea who know better English and
speak from an earlier age.

So one can imagine a third scenario where we hold things together, people work
hard and the government makes great efforts, but it’s not as robust as it was.

The number four scenario is that somehow we keep robust positive relations.
Somehow Japanese interest in the world begins to pick up again. More people study
English, more students go abroad again, think tanks gets strengthened, and Japan begins to
take broader initiatives in areas like climate change, and environment and new basis of
cooperation greatly increase. It’s quite possible that people in Japan who first think well
they have to be a little closer to China begin to look at it carefully and discover there are a
lot of things they need to worry about with China. They then come to the same conclusion
that the leaders in Southeast Asia had come to, which is you have to have the US alliance.
Korea has come to that, the Japanese public in general and I think even the leaders could
say look we’ve got to contribute more to make these things happen. And so it becomes
stronger.

I’ve been somewhat cynical about all the talk about common values because I think
it was misused and mishandled and a lot of the talk has been cheapened. But I do think
that the thing that we have here and I see a lot of other places – is a kind of openness and
trust and free speech that the Japanese and Americans have back and forth – is important
and can be an important base. Occasionally China will do things like Google which shows
that the US-Japanese relationship really is quite strong and special. If we can have bright
good leaders in our two governments who continue to grasp broad political issues as well
as security issues, then we can keep a robust relationship.

My personal opinion is that parts of all four of these are true. That’s why I took the
time to try to spell them out. But my hope is that even though our economies are not doing
as well as they were relative to the rest of the world, that we will make this commitment
and go ahead in the new age and come closer to scenario number four than a lot of people
might have suspected. Thank you.
About the Contributors

Brad Glosserman is Executive Director for the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, co-editor of Comparative Connections, and a contributing editor to The Japan Times, writing extensively on policy issues and international affairs. Mr. Glosserman holds a J.D. from The George Washington University and an M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, both in Washington, D.C.

Matake Kamiya is professor of International Relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan and a leading security expert in Japan. He is also a member of the board of directors of the Japan Association for International Security, and a member of the board of trustees as well as a member of the policy council of the Japan Forum on International Relations. He has published extensively on international relations, international security, Japan’s postwar pacifism, US-Japan security relations, and nuclear topics including Japan’s (non-)nuclear policy. His English-language publications include “Realistic Proactivism: Japanese Attitudes toward Global Zero,” chapters in edited volumes, and articles in The Washington Quarterly and Arms Control Today, among others.

Fumiaki Kubo is a professor at the University of Tokyo. He is a former visiting scholar at Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University, Georgetown University and the University of Maryland. Awarded the Sakurada-kai Prize for Political Research as well as Keio University's Gijuku-sho Prize in 1990 for his book, Nyudiiru to Amerika Minshu-sei (The New Deal and American Democracy). An editor/author for the recent work, Amerika Gaiko no Sho-choryu (Various Currents of American Foreign Policy). Comptroller of the International House of Japan, since 2007.

Toshihiro Nakayama is a Professor of American Politics and Foreign Policy at the School of International Politics, Economy and Communication (SIPEC), Aoyama Gakuin University. He is also an Adjunct Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). He was a Special Correspondent for the Washington Post at the Far Eastern Bureau (1993-94), Special Assistant at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations in New York (1996-98), Senior Research Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs (2004-06), and Associate Professor at the Department of International & Cultural Studies at Tsuda College (2006-10). He was also a CNAPS Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution (2005-06). He received his M.A. (1993) and Ph.D.(2001) from School of International Politics, Economy and Business (SIPEB), Aoyama Gakuin University. He has written numerous articles on American politics and foreign policy.

Yukio Okamoto is a Managing Director of Pacific Fund. He is also a Co-Founder of the firm. Mr. Okamoto has more than 30 years of high-level business and government service. Well-versed in economic and government policy debates, he is a familiar figure both within Japan and within the United States government. He is the President of Okamoto Associates, Inc. (OAI). Mr. Okamoto sits on a number of corporate Boards, including Asahi Breweries, Mitsubishi Materials Corporation, and Tokai-Tokyo Securities. He also serves on the external advisory commissions of NTT DoCoMo and Toshiba. In late
September 2001, he was named the Special Advisor to the Cabinet and the Chairman of the Prime Minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations. As a frequent contributor to leading Japanese newspapers and magazines, Mr. Okamoto is an oft-quoted source for U.S. media. He is a graduate of Hitotsubashi University.

Sheila A. Smith, an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy, is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Dr. Smith is directing the CFR’s New Regional Security Architecture for Asia Program. Dr. Smith joined CFR from the East-West Center in 2007, where she specialized on Asia-Pacific international relations and U.S. policy toward Asia. She was also recently affiliated with Keio University in Tokyo, where she researched and wrote on Japan’s foreign policy toward China and the Northeast Asian region on an Abe Fellowship. From 2004 to 2007, she directed a multinational research team in a cross-national study of the domestic politics of the U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Prior to joining the East-West Center, Dr. Smith was on the faculty of the Department of International Relations at Boston University (1994-2000), and on the staff of the Social Science Research Council (1992-1993). She has been a visiting researcher at two leading Japanese foreign and security policy think tanks, the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, and at the University of Tokyo and the University of the Ryukyus. Dr. Smith earned her PhD and MA degrees from the Department of Political Science at Columbia University.

James B. Steinberg is the Deputy Secretary of State, serving as the principal Deputy to Secretary Clinton. Appointed by President Obama, he was confirmed by the Senate on January 28, 2009 and sworn in by the Secretary the next day. Prior to his appointment in the Obama Administration, Mr. Steinberg served as dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, a position he assumed on January 1, 2006. He is currently on leave from the LBJ School. He had previously served as the vice president and director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. (2001-2005), where he supervised a wide-ranging research program on U.S. foreign policy.

Ezra F. Vogel is Henry Ford II Research Professor of the Social Sciences, Emeritus at The Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University. Professor Vogel succeeded John Fairbank as second Director (1972-1977) of Harvard's East Asian Research Center and second Chairman of the Council for East Asian Studies (1977-1980). He was Director of the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at the Center for International Affairs (1980-1987) and, since 1987, Honorary Director. He was director of the Undergraduate Concentration in East Asian Studies from its inception in 1972 until 1989. In 1993 he took a two-year leave of absence, serving as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council. He returned to Harvard in September 1995 to direct the Fairbank Center until 1999 and was head of the Asia Center from 1997 to 1999. He taught courses on communist Chinese society, Japanese society, and industrial East Asia. The Japanese edition of Professor Vogel's book Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (1979) remains the all-time best-seller in Japan of non-fiction by a Western author. He officially retired in 2000 but remains active in research and East Asia related activities.
APPENDIX A

16TH ANNUAL
JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY SEMINAR
AND ASSOCIATED EVENTS

Jointly sponsored by
The Embassy of Japan
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
and the Pacific Forum CSIS

January 15-16, 2010
Willard Intercontinental Hotel • Washington, D.C.

AGENDA

Friday, January 15
10:00AM-Noon   Tokyo Foundation Seminar:
Challenges Facing the New DPJ Government

Security seminar participants are invited and encouraged to attend this separate Tokyo
Foundation seminar examining the domestic challenges and impacts associated with the
coming to power in Tokyo of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Featured speakers will
include Tokyo Foundation Chairman Hideki Kato, Lt. Gen. Noburo Yamaguchi from the
National Defense Academy of Japan and Tokyo Foundation Director of Foreign and

12:15-1:45PM   By Invitation Only Seminar Lunch
      (hosted by The Tokyo Foundation)
      Speaker: Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State

2:00-5:00 PM:   Public Seminar:
The Japan-U.S. Alliance at Fifty –
Where We Have Been; Where We Are Heading

This public seminar is an integral part of this year’s Japan-U.S. security seminar. Sponsored
by the Tokyo Foundation, it will be both reflective and forward-thinking and
will be open to the general public. A section of reserved seats will be set aside for seminar
participants and Pacific Forum Young Leaders. The first set of speakers will focus on how
the alliance has evolved over the years; the second set of speakers will look toward the
future. An extended Q&A session will follow the formal presentations.

Opening Comments:  Yoshiji Nogami, President, JIIA
                  Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS

Opening Remarks:  Hideki Kato, Chairman, The Tokyo Foundation
Where We Have Been? Shinichi Kitaoka, University of Tokyo
William Perry, Stanford University

Where We Are Heading? Richard Armitage, Armitage International
Yukio Okamoto, Former Special Advisor to the Prime Minister

5:00-5:30PM Speakers Press Conference
6:00-7:00PM Opening Reception
7:00-9:30PM Opening Dinner
Keynote Speaker: The Honorable James B. Steinberg,
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State;
The Honorable Ichiro Fujisaki,
Ambassador of Japan to the US

Saturday, January 16
7:30-9:00AM Government Officials’ Breakfast Meeting
8:00-9:00AM Continental Breakfast

The Japan-U.S. Alliance at Fifty: Where We Have Been; Where We Are Heading

9:00AM Welcoming Remarks

9:15AM Session 1: Domestic Changes in Japan and their Impact on Alliance Management
Japanese presenter: Toshihiro Nakayama, Tsuda College
U.S. lead discussant: Sheila Smith, Council on Foreign Relations

This session focuses on changes in Japan’s security policy and outlook under the new DPJ government. What is the meaning of the Aug. 30 election result? What explains the DPJ victory? What are the government’s priorities? Do they differ from those of its predecessors? What is the significance of DPJ lack of experience in governing? How does the Hatoyama government’s national security policy differ from that of its predecessor? How does this government view its role and that of the Self Defense Forces in regional and global security challenges? What is the status of and prospects for constitutional reform? What are the key issues in the national debates on Japanese security planning and how might they be resolved? What is the significance of changed time lines for the development of Japanese security documents (such as the National Defense Program Guidelines)? How have Japanese policies toward North Korea and toward trilateral (U.S.-Japan-China) and broader multilateral cooperation changed and what are the implications for alliance management?

10:45AM break
Session 2: Domestic Changes in the U.S. and Impact on Alliance Management
U.S. presenter: Michael Green, CSIS
Japanese lead discussant: Fumiaki Kubo, The University of Tokyo

This session examines U.S. security strategy one year into the Obama administration. How can we characterize U.S. foreign and security policy and its national security strategy? What are the contents and implications of the new Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear Posture Review (and National Security Strategy)? How have U.S. policies toward North Korea and toward trilateral (U.S.-Japan-China) and broader multilateral cooperation changed and what are the implications for alliance management? What is the impact of evolving strategies toward Iraq and Afghanistan on U.S. Asia policy and alliance management? How do force posture changes in Asia, and especially in South Korea and Guam, affect the U.S.-Japan alliance and basing issues?

Lunch
Speaker: Lt. Gen. W.C. “Chip” Gregson, USMC (Ret.)
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense

Session 3: Future Visions of the Alliance
Japanese presenter: Matake Kamiya, National Defense Academy of Japan
U.S. presenter: Ezra Vogel, Harvard University

How do the U.S. and Japan see their alliance evolving? What are key factors shaping cooperation and how can current levels of cooperation be sustained? What do the U.S. and Japan expect of each other? How significant are Japanese concerns about the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent? What future challenges affect the alliance? What are the political/security-related areas in which future cooperation will be most important? How do the Six-Party Talks and regional security architectures fit into the alliance? Is more cooperation with South Korea desirable? If so, what can be done to facilitate such cooperation? How can the U.S. and Japan work together to encourage China’s peaceful development? Do we have a common vision regarding future security challenges and preferred responses? How can multilateral mechanisms and initiatives enhance future bilateral cooperation? How can we best use the 50th anniversary year to strengthen the alliance?

Break

Session 3 (continued)

Wrap-Up Session

Reception/Dinner
Venue: Embassy of Japan
APPENDIX B

16th Annual
JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY SEMINAR

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The Embassy of Japan
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
and the Pacific Forum CSIS

January 15-16, 2010
Willard Intercontinental Hotel • Washington, D.C.

Participant List

Japan
Mr. Takeo Akiba
Minister, Political Affairs
Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C.

Prof. Shinichi Kitaoka
Professor of Political Science
The University of Tokyo

Ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki
Ambassador of Japan to the U.S.
Embassy of Japan, Washington D.C.

Prof. Fumiaki Kubo
Faculty of Law, The University of Tokyo

Dr. Yoichi Funabashi
Editor-in-Chief, The Asahi Shimbun

Dr. Toshihiro Nakayama
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Amb. Yoshiji Nogami
President, The Japan Institute of
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Mr. Hisayoshi Ina
Columnist/Vice Chair of the Editorial
Board, Nikkei Shimbun

Mr. Yukio Okamoto
Former Special Advisor to the Prime
Minister

Major General Koichi Isobe
Director
Defense Plans and Policy Department
Joint Staff, Ministry of Defense

Vice Admiral Fumio Ota, JMSDF (Ret.)
Director, Center for Security & Crisis
Management Education
National Defense Academy of Japan

Prof. Matake Kamiya
Professor
National Defense Academy of Japan

Mr. Kiyoshi Serizawa
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Bureau of Defense Policy
Ministry of Defense

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Dr. Sheila A. Smith  
Senior Fellow for Japan Studies  
The Council on Foreign Relations

The Honorable James B. Steinberg  
Deputy Secretary of State  
U.S. Department of State

BG William “Bronco” Uhle  
Deputy Director for Operations, J30  
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