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Chad's Third Republic: Strengths, Problems, and Prospects

by William J. Foltz

By any reasonable standard of comparison or expectation, Chad's Third Republic has been a political success. Proclaimed five years ago by Hissène Habré amidst the rubble of the devastated capital of a fractured state, the Third Republic seemed fated to be no more than another transient episode in Chad's painful history. Although Habré's regime is marked by numerous deficiencies and its long-term prospects are uncertain, the Third Republic has turned out to be a more effective governmental order than any longtime observer of Chad had a right to expect.

The Historical Backdrop

The sequence of woes that led to the birth-by-fire of the Third Republic was rooted in Chad's geographical and ethnic makeup, and in decisions made during France's colonial rule of the country (for details, see "Why Chad?" by Alex Rondos and "Chad's Political History in Brief" in *CSIS Africa Notes* no. 18, August 31, 1983). The French administrators invested little in the arid Moslem-inhabited north, while focusing on the cotton-producing south ("le Tchad utile"), populated mainly by Christians and animists. It was in the south that Paris concentrated its educational efforts and groomed the elite to which it eventually transferred power. François (later Ngarta) Tombalbaye became the country's first president following independence in 1960. In 1966, as Tombalbaye's rule was becoming increasingly authoritarian and oppressive, disgruntled northerners formed FROLINAT, a loosely structured armed guerrilla movement. This was the start of two decades of civil war.

In 1973, Libya seized the Aouzou Strip (believed, on scant evidence, to be rich in uranium and manganese) on Chad's northern border on the basis of a controversial historical claim to the area. (For an analysis of Libyan claims, see "The Aouzou Strip," *CSIS Africa Notes* no. 18, *op. cit.*, page 7.) Two years later, after subjecting the country to a harsh "cultural revolution," Tombalbaye was killed in a southern-led military coup and was succeeded by General Félix Malloum.



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In January 1978, following several months of negotiations, Habré, then head of one of the main FROLINAT factions called the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN), joined President Malloum's government as prime minister; this uneasy alliance fell apart in a blaze of interfaction warfare early the following year. Malloum fled and his government was replaced by a kaleidoscopic succession of fragile titular regimes. By this point, more than a dozen armed factions were vying for power.

In late 1979, a series of Organization of African Unity efforts to hammer out a negotiated settlement finally brought into being the so-called Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition (GUNT), which was supposed to represent both north and south, with FROLINAT head Goukouni Oueddei as president and Habré as minister of defense. Goukouni and Habré come from different branches of the far-north, saharan peoples known commonly as Goranes. This ethnic similarity does not by itself entail solidarity: early the following year, fighting broke out between the two men's factions and Habré was dismissed from the GUNT.

The August 1979 OAU-orchestrated agreement that had paved the way for the establishment of the GUNT had called the presence of 1,200 French troops "an impediment to a peaceful reconciliation and solution to the Chadian problem." Under pressure from the OAU, Goukouni officially requested their withdrawal in April 1980. Hammered by Habré's forces, Goukouni entered a "mutual defense" arrangement with Libya on June 15. Four months later, at Goukouni's request, Libya dispatched 2,000 to 3,000 troops to the capital city of N'Djamena while others occupied key points in the northern two-thirds of Chad. Unable to match Libyan artillery and armor, Habré was forced to flee N'Djamena in December 1980 and to regroup his forces across the border in Sudan.

By late 1981, on-the-ground relations between Libyans and Chadians were souring, Goukouni was wondering whether the Libyan military had backed yet another GUNT faction (the Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire [CDR], then led by the late Ahmat Acyl) in a serious clash earlier in the year, and the OAU (which was seeking to put together an African peacekeeping force to supervise a hoped-for cease-fire in Chad) was exerting pressure for an end to the Libyan presence. In late October, Goukouni officially requested withdrawal of the Libyan expeditionary force, and Qaddafi, with an eye to polishing his image as a candidate for the OAU presidency, promptly ordered his forces out of all Chadian territory except the Aouzou Strip.

1982 marked a major turn in Habré's fortunes. After the Libyan withdrawal, the GUNT became distracted by arguments over the appropriate role of the OAU-sponsored peacekeeping force. Its leaders seemed more interested in maneuvering for factional advantage than in organizing a coherent government. Habré took advantage of this situation, carrying out an offensive that by mid-January had established a firm FAN base in

eastern Chad. Skillfully maneuvering around the OAU force, he succeeded in driving the GUNT out of N'Djamena on June 7, and then proceeded to set up a new government. Goukouni's GUNT became a northern-based Libyan-supported coalition of factions fighting against the new N'Djamena leadership.

Following renewed Libyan military intervention against Habré's forces in 1983, France established a military defense line at the sixteenth parallel to protect the principal population centers and, in effect, Habré's regime from Libyan attack. (See "The Enduring French Connection" by J. Coleman Kitchen, Jr. in *CSIS Africa Notes* no. 68, January 26, 1987). French forces withdrew in late 1984 as part of a mutual withdrawal agreement with Libya, which, as it turned out, the Libyans completely ignored. After the Libyan-supported GUNT attacked government positions north of the capital in February 1986, French air units returned to Chad to protect the area south of the sixteenth parallel from Libyan air power. On the ground, Habré's forces decisively repulsed the GUNT attack, and in 1987 mounted an offensive that humiliated Qaddafi's army and by September had driven Libyan forces from all of Chad except their major redoubt in the Aouzou Strip.

The effectiveness of Habré's recent military efforts to roll back the Libyan presence in the country's north has largely dissipated the status of the GUNT's remnants as a meaningful threat to the national regime. Goukouni is in exile in Algiers and is no longer accepted as leader of the GUNT. Although he has not reached a formal accommodation with the central government, the forces of his faction cooperated with those of Habré in late 1986 following a split between Goukouni and the Libyans. For now, at least, Habré has breathing room, and his Third Republic appears solidly in place.

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Components of Success

The components of the Third Republic's success can be simply enumerated. First, of course, is the *reunification* of the country, i.e. the "reconquest" of the national territory from other factions, dissident groups, and Libyan occupiers. Reunification has been followed by *reconciliation*, which is a polite word for the opposition's rallying to the new order following its military defeat and/or the successful repression of its followers. Aside from truly isolated incidents, and from the continuing threat of Libyan bombing of towns and villages north of the sixteenth parallel, reunification and reconciliation have been followed by *peace*, no negligible achievement after a two-decade-long civil war.

At the center and in the principal outlying areas, the Third Republic has set up a *functioning governmental order*. While far from efficient, it nonetheless provides an institutional base for economic recovery. It also provides a focus for something approximating *national identity*. The state exists, and its existence is acknowledged and accepted by the great majority of the population it touches. Ancillary political institutions like the Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance et la Révolution (UNIR) provide a forum for some limited forms of political participation.

Not least in importance, Habré's government has succeeded in winning near-universal *international recognition*, however grudging that recognition may be on the part of some, and tangible support from some Western and African countries. The relationship between internal success and external recognition and support is a reciprocal one: external support has been essential to Habré's consolidation of power, and his military prowess and eventual mastery of the Chadian system have brought external support.

The Six Bases of Success:

(1) The first base of Hissène Habré's success is the *military prowess* of his fighting forces. Until five years ago, Habré could have been adequately described as a modern African warlord, and as recently as 1983 he operated as a front-line commander. He is in power today first and foremost because he came out on top after a long period of complex factional warfare. Following his seizure of the capital, the south was brought back under N'Djamena's control through a classic "hearts and minds" campaign that pre-supposed and relied on the extensive use of pre-potent military force.

Habré has held on to power because the Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes (FANT) rebuffed the attacks across the sixteenth parallel launched by Goukouni Oueddei's GUNT forces in February 1986. The Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) desert province, accounting for some 40 percent of Chad's land area, has been reintegrated into the state solely thanks to the military defeat of a major Libyan expeditionary force.

All of this is evident to Chad-watchers, but it bears prominent mention because military force remains at

the base of a political order that, indeed, recognizes no clear delimitation between the civil and military realms. Military expenditures make up the largest formal budget item (35 percent), and, counting nonbudgeted transfer payments, they make up the vast majority of all expenditures made on behalf of the Chadian government. The size, structure, leadership, and composition of military forces must be a major — perhaps the major — political question.

(2) An element contributing to military prowess, but broader in its application, is the *distinctive FAN style of operations and decision making*. Developed as a successful response to guerrilla-war conditions, FAN-style operations decentralize responsibility and decision authority to the local operative level within the framework of generally-understood goals. This is most obvious in the military, where the true commanders have no formal rank and are deferred to without question by high-ranking officers. On the civil side, it means that persons will be chosen for missions outside their formal field of competence and authorized to coordinate the actions of bureaucrats on an ad hoc basis. While such personalized ad hocery obviously has its limits as a way of doing business and potentially entails a host of problems, it does enable trusted senior civil authorities on the spot (*préfets* in particular) to cut through red tape and get things done without bureaucratic niceties. On a continent where implementation often leaves so much to be desired, that is a great advantage.

This management style relies on a high level of common understanding and trust among a core group, the product of years of comradeship in combat and of less easily traceable ties of personal loyalty. These latter rest sometimes, but far from always, on a kinship basis. In the absence of any discernible binding ideology, these ties of personal loyalty and common understanding take on even more significance. If that trust is lost, the fall from grace is abrupt and absolute. The other side of the coin is that central authority will provide support and cover for its agents' actions, so long as they are successful. Financial irregularities and a few bodies here or there will be quietly buried, in the name of the higher good and of group solidarity.

(3) *Hissène Habré himself* must be counted a prime element of his regime's success. For all the formal popular adulation that the *animation politique* troops whip up, Habré is no remote autocrat or one-man band. Unlike Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko (inspiration for Chad's *animation politique*), Habré does have a coterie of longtime comrades-in-arms whom he respects and to whom he will listen. Habré is far more than first among equals in government councils, however; he is able to intervene and to prevail where he will, but appears to be conscious that such power can be worn down if overused. Intelligent, decisive, and tough, Habré is a thoroughgoing pragmatist who has kept his eye on the central goal: seizing and then ruling Chad. Although he came to power as a factional leader with a narrow

(primarily northern and eastern) ethnic base of support, he has accomplished the political feat of incarnating the drive for national unity.

In this, Habré is a throwback to a generation of African nationalist leaders of the late 1950s and early 1960s who succeeded in finding a common language that could capture the concerns of otherwise highly divided peoples and focus them on a single goal. Like the most capable leaders of that generation, Habré has understood the importance of spreading some of the benefits of rule widely, and of spreading himself symbolically to encompass representation of a broad national sentiment. (His public gestures toward the Catholic Church, such as contributing to rebuilding the N'Djamena cathedral, provide a good example.) By making himself the primary spokesman for "reconciliation" among Chad's peoples and factions, he makes sure that groups are brought into the system through, and most certainly *under*, Hissène Habré.

(4) Habré has benefited from more than a little *help from his friends*, and that ability to attract aid constitutes a fourth base for the Third Republic's success. On the military side alone, this aid would amount to something close to half a billion dollars since the beginning of 1981, most of it spent to support the French military's Operation Manta and Operation Epervier. Perhaps \$175 million of the total represents aid to the FAN and the FANT. Though of minor significance quantitatively, provision of light military equipment and transport by the United States and other friends during the difficult days of 1981 made it possible for the FAN to survive and begin to fight its way back into power. Habré could not possibly have returned to power or held onto power against Libyan forces without this outside help.

At the same time, Habré and his military forces have been extraordinarily skillful in putting that aid to good use in the service of their own cause. The tactics used in the reconquest of the north are Chadian, as are the men involved in the actual fighting and in the decisions to launch the attacks. It is highly unlikely that any other Chadian faction or combination of factions would have employed outside assistance so effectively to their clear advantage — or, for that matter, that either the French or Americans, with even better equipment, could have fought so effectively under Chadian conditions.

Foreign assistance has been equally essential on the civilian side, though the connection between assistance and results is less immediately apparent. As a June 1987 World Bank report on the country phrases it, "foreign aid is the most important 'sector' of the Chadian economy, since it represents more than two and a half times the quantity of receipts from exports." Civilian aid disbursements for development projects in 1987 are expected to total \$204 million, to which should be added \$36 million in direct transfer payments (budgetary support, food aid, and the like) for a total of \$240 million.

These aid disbursements are not particularly large in

absolute or per capita terms. The projected 1987 disbursements work out to approximately \$48 per Chadian, while in 1984 international assistance amounted to \$52 per Senegalese, \$70 per Somali, and \$80 per Gambian. In Chad, however, the weakness of the national economy — particularly of that part of the economy from which the government might hope to derive some resources — amplifies the impact of foreign aid. The \$240 million Chad has been slated to receive in 1987 is equivalent to nearly one-third of the projected gross domestic product.

As the donor community has often noted, the very weakness of the official Chadian economy does have some advantages: there are comparatively few heavy and inefficient economic structures that must be dismantled or radically restructured to permit economic growth to take place. Also, donor agencies and private voluntary agencies are routinely given unusually wide freedom of action in carrying out development and relief activities in Chad. While the absence of close government control leads to a certain amount of incoherence and duplication of effort, it also cuts down on the bureaucratic red tape and opportunities for corruption. Relief efforts during the 1983-1984 Sahelian drought encountered many fewer man-made obstacles in Chad than did comparable efforts in better-equipped neighboring countries.

A further source of outside help must be noted: support from a few African countries, mostly conservative francophone states. These have contributed in four ways. First, they have provided diplomatic support in African affairs — countering, in effect, the resources Libya has deployed in favor of its GUNT clients and of its own occupation of Chadian territory. Second, a few of these states, most notably Gabon, have played useful roles in facilitating reconciliation of political opponents. Third, these conservative francophone states have maintained pressure on France to continue to support the Habré government. Gabon's President Bongo and Côte d'Ivoire's Houphouët-Boigny are said to have made it clear to Paris that they regard France's defense of Chad against Libyan aggression as a gauge of France's willingness to defend their own regimes. While not in itself determinant, this diplomatic pressure reduces France's freedom of maneuver and limits the credibility of threats to withdraw its support of Habré's regime.

Finally, a few African states have directly contributed to the Chadian government's support. In a class by itself is Cameroon, which, despite some inevitable frictions, has been a most helpful neighbor, not least in facilitating the overland transport of military equipment. Not surprisingly, Cameroon's President Paul Biya has earned particularly sharp Libyan denunciation as an agent of imperialism and Zionism. Gabon's Bongo has directly contributed economic support (at one point paying key Chadian civil servants out of his own personal funds) and Mobutu's Zaire has provided military training and logistic support for the army.

Such external support cannot be treated entirely separately from Chad's domestic affairs. The Chadian economy is too weak and too penetrated by outside donors and operating agencies, just as the military effort is too dependent on outside arms, money, and logistic support, for internal affairs to be completely autonomous. Chad's foreign policies will to a very large degree be determined, utterly pragmatically, by short-run domestic needs. (The foreign ministry's full title, after all, is the *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et de la Coopération*, and *coopération* is the French euphemism for foreign aid.) Conversely, outside of core domains affecting security and political survival, domestic policies will be calculated with equal pragmatism with an eye to what external supporters and others will demand and tolerate.

(5) A fifth element of the Third Republic's success is the cumulation of *mistakes and displays of ineptitude by its principal opponents*. Goukouni Oueddei's GUNT convincingly demonstrated its inability to govern, or even to keep a minimum of order among its component factions, during the 18 months it held power in N'Djamena (December 1980 to June 1982). During that time, Goukouni failed to undertake any serious attempt at reconstructing the state apparatus, or even at producing an integrated military command. When Habré's forces returned in 1982, the GUNT was unable to mount a coherent defense of the capital.

The key mistakes, however, have been those of the Libyans. The performance of the Libyan military against the FANT has revealed deep-seated flaws in command, tactics, weapons mix, and motivation; these weaknesses are traceable to basic political choices of Qaddafi himself. Equally important has been Libya's political inability, or unwillingness, to help its Chadian clients build a strong and stable power base. Part of this inability has derived from Libya's near-exclusive concentration of aid on the military side. Libya gave the GUNT virtually no assistance in rebuilding the administrative structures or the economy in the regions under its control; indeed, Libya has virtually no ability to administer such aid.

Less understandably, Libya made no serious attempt to develop the areas of Chad under direct Libyan occupation. Libyan forces remained separate from the local population and limited their interventions in local life to security duty, the introduction of Libyan currency, and the liberal distribution of the Green Book and the splashing of green paint over public buildings and monuments.

Even more fundamental than Libya's economic failure is the political failure to strengthen its Chadian clients, a failure rooted in the pursuit of a divide-and-rule strategy designed above all to prevent any client from acquiring the strength to dispense with Libyan tutelage. In the best of times, Goukouni Oueddei never enjoyed the clear support of his outside patrons that Hissène Habré has been able to elicit, however grudgingly, from his Western backers since he came to power. Libya has

typically tried to run three horses in the same race, one Toubou (Goukouni), one Arab (once Ahmat Acyl, now Acheikh Ibn Oumar) and one southern (once Wadal Abd al-Kader Kamougué, now perhaps Facho Balaam), never letting one get so far ahead that he might gallop off the prescribed course.

The net effect has been to exacerbate factionalism among the components of the GUNT, and when, in mid-1986, the Libyans shifted military support from Goukouni's Forces Armées Populaires (FAP) GUNT faction to Acheikh's CDR, they opened the door for the FAP to defect and join with their erstwhile enemies, the FANT, and to turn their arms against the CDR and the Libyans.

(6) The sixth element contributing to the Third Republic's success is impossible to measure, yet palpable throughout the country: *a general societal fatigue* after two decades of civil war. The social divisions that have sustained rebellion in the past still exist, but they can no longer easily be manipulated to produce political action. Informal organization has retreated to the most local (indeed familial) level, a level too small in scale to permit effective political mobilization. Elites that might aspire to unite and articulate grievances across a broad range of local groups have for the most part been co-opted, intimidated, discredited, or eliminated. In such a divided and privatized environment, distrust inhibits action outside official channels even at the clan level, and sterilizes much action within official channels.

While Hissène Habré is not necessarily loved by large sections of the Chadian people, in such a weary environment his reconciliation policy and commitment to national unity have brought him general respect. His personal troops, the Sécurité Présidentielle (SP), may be detested and feared, but most ordinary people still consider their presence preferable to a return to factional civil war. Confronted by a determined government and army, and with no promising alternatives at hand, most are ready to submit, and even, when formally required, to display enthusiasm.

Also contributing to popular political passivity is the fact that a very large proportion of the Chadian people have learned to survive with minimal recourse to government. They cannily structure their lives to have as little to do with government and its agents as possible. Chad provides one of the great African reserves of the "uncaptured peasantry." Perhaps a third of the population lives on subsistence production or on trade outside of official circuits. Expecting and needing little from government, such Chadians are unlikely to risk their lives by seeking confrontation with that which common sense tells them to avoid.

In time, societal passivity and fatigue will wear off; new elites will rise in the interstices of the system and begin to gather followers. Peace and a modicum of prosperity will bring new aspirations. One test of the Third Republic will be its ability to adjust to a more normal environment.

These strengths of Chad's Third Republic, with all the weaknesses that they imply, must be pitted against truly formidable problems of economic reconstruction and the maintenance of at least the present level of domestic political order.

The Economic Reconstruction Plan

Chad's official short- and mid-term economic goals are clearly laid out, not so much in Chadian government documents as in materials recently produced by the international consortium of donors led by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These documents were prepared in formal consultation with the Chadian authorities, but throughout bear the characteristic stamp of Bank and Fund staff work. There is probably no other African country in which the international institutions have taken so clear and unambiguous a lead in designing and overseeing the implementation of a recovery program. This reflects Chad's desperate economic situation, its lack of what an IMF report delicately calls "adequate administrative capacity," and the wisdom of Chadian leaders willing to recognize the realities of their situation and to stay out of the international institutions' way. The collapse of Chad's hopelessly unrealistic, and largely homegrown, 1983-1984 "Priority Program" no doubt has helped foster this wisdom.

As one would expect, the overall planning framework is that of an orthodox economic rescue and reconstruction plan, differing little in fundamental assumptions from those applied to other African countries in serious economic trouble. There are two principal differences. First, a much larger proportion of aid than is usual (over 50 percent) must go into reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed or decayed into unusable condition, rather than into new construction. Another 25 percent is spent for routine running costs. The aim of reconstruction over the next five years is to get Chad back to the situation that prevailed between 1975 and 1977, before the civil war disrupted the whole economy. A more positive difference is that Chad is spared preoccupation with a substantial international debt (the projected 1987 debt service ratio is only 6.4 with payments of about \$5 million annually) — the one useful legacy of years of a manifest lack of creditworthiness.

Key elements of the rescue plan include restructuring/cost reduction in the cotton industry; control of government expenditures; stepped-up tax collection efforts; and upgrading the efficiency and effectiveness of state and parastatal services. Two of the plan's assumptions are noteworthy.

First, it is assumed that donor contributions to Chadian development will increase over the record aid provided in 1986 during the next three years at an annual rate of 18 percent. Aid is expected to total \$950 million — equal in each year to 30 percent of Chadian GDP — with more than two-thirds of that amount being outright grants. Achieving this aid flow will require not only evidence of serious developmental efforts, but also

an overall set of domestic and foreign policies that encourage donor support.

Second, it is expected that, if all goes according to plan and if all projections of international market behavior are borne out, the Chadian GDP should increase in real terms at an annual rate of 2 percent until 1991. Since this rate is below that of population increase, per capita income even under the most optimistic scenario should actually fall. While such movements at the margin, even should they be correctly forecast, will be imperceptible to the average Chadian, the overall message is clear: the government can expect no economic surplus for at least the next five years that it can redeploy for political purposes.

Major Political Challenges

Under such unpromising economic circumstances, what must Chad's Third Republic do to mobilize the political resources needed to survive and develop during the next half-decade? The most basic task is to prevent the core of the regime's power from falling apart; given the nature of Habré's regime, this is as much a military as a political task. To put it bluntly, if the military holds together, the politicians will behave themselves.

By Chadian standards, the military wing of Habré's power has been as remarkable for its political cohesion as for its fighting prowess. It has kept together a core force of *combattants* drawn from the Gorane, Zaghawa, Bideyat, Hadjerai, Arab, Moundang, and Kim, with a sprinkling of individuals from most other major groups of the north and middle of the country. Nevertheless, the military's recent expansion (its numbers may have doubled in the last three years) has generated new tensions.

The response of the regime has been to strengthen the mechanisms of internal surveillance and control, notably through the creation of a special statute for the military police in 1986, the reputed proliferation of irregular intelligence networks within the military, and above all the increasingly overt use of the *Sécurité Présidentielle* to keep effective transport and other means of rapid action out of the hands of the FANT regulars. The increased sophistication of equipment available to the SP has increased the distinction between that 90 percent Gorane unit and the rest of the military. This proliferation of control structures, and in particular the discrimination in pay between the SP and the ordinary FANT (the SP is paid regularly while ordinary soldiers are lucky to be paid 50 percent of the time), appears to be as much a part of the regime's security problem as of that problem's solution.

On the civilian side, the core political coalition around Habré, held over from the command council of the FAN, remains essentially intact. While many of the rumors of inner-circle intrigue likely have some foundation, it is hard to imagine the circumstances under which a serious defection directed against Habré would take place from within this group. What its members increasingly lack, however, is direct access to

the instruments of bureaucratic action, as newer actors brought into the government by the reconciliation policy move into ministerial and directional positions, often obliging the old guard to act through parallel channels, including those of the military.

The key to the political stability of the Habré regime is Habré himself. The system is built for and around him. His routine constitutional powers are so extensive that, under the Fundamental Law governing the Third Republic, the president would actually find himself legally hindered were he to invoke the provisions for governing under a state of emergency. The Fundamental Law provides neither for a Number Two in the regime, nor for a workable way to choose a successor. Were Habré to disappear abruptly, the armed services would most likely decide the matter of succession, with or without open violent confrontations. Short of Habré's disappearance, the core should hold.

The next most urgent task is to prevent or contain the defection of groups outside the core. The past year has produced one potentially significant attempt at defection, that by members of the Hadjerai group in Guera prefecture. The affair has revealed that the ethnic bias of the Habré regime remains a liability. To the degree that the revolt has been directed against something, it has been against Gorane hegemony rather than against Habré. Habré was initially slow to move against an old Gorane comrade in the military leadership when the latter ordered the torture of a senior Hadjerai officer following some minor incidents between Hadjerai and Gorane soldiers, a step that sparked the formation of a Hadjerai underground organization and a round of serious violence.

The immediate lesson may now have sunk in. Habré eventually removed the above-mentioned Gorane commander from his post (following another egregious incident) and appointed more Hadjerai to significant positions. But so far the regime has in general exhibited little preparation for effective interest representation of population groups, as opposed to negotiated symbolic representation through the distribution of government posts and portfolios.

The logical next political task is that of reaching out to bring new groups and strata into the political system. At one level, that of agreements with faction leaders still outside the fold, only two leaders of substance have not yet entered into "reconciliation" — the rival claimants to leadership of the GUNT, Goukouni Oueddei and Acheikh Ibn Oumar.

It seems very unlikely that Habré will waste much energy on Acheikh, who does not enjoy great international credibility. What is left of the CDR does not represent much of a fighting force, nor are its core supporters, Ouled Slimane and Missiriyé Arabs, large populations within Chad. Above all, even if Acheikh were to turn on his Libyan patrons, they likely would respond by elevating yet another dissatisfied Chadian to leadership of something that still could be called the GUNT.

Goukouni is a different matter. While he controls even fewer troops than Acheikh for the moment, he retains a status as *chef historique* that would give his formal reconciliation with the regime considerable weight. In particular, it would reinforce the Third Republic's hand in its international dealings; it would put paid to the argument that war in Chad is still in significant part an intra-Chadian factional affair and help Habré refute accusations that he has sold Chad out to French and/or U.S. imperialism.

Goukouni's price is high. His demands fall into two categories, which pose contradictory but equally severe problems. The first are straightforward patronage demands — positions for his followers and subsidies for his branch of the Toubou people. The net effect of providing such patronage, however, would be to increase the dominance within the system as a whole of those perceived by most of the country as Goranes. In the present resource-poor environment, this would threaten the already shaky balance of relations between the Goranes and everyone else, and particularly envenom those groups whose leaders would lose posts to Goukouni's Goranes.

Hissène Habré has a refined talent for ethnic arithmetic and probably could settle this problem if it were the only one. But Goukouni's other demands go to the heart of the Third Republic's limitations: he insists on some semblance of open political debate and representation of group interests within Chad's state and party structures. He wants a system in which power would be shared outside the present FAN core group.

Two existing structures have an outward representational form: the National Consultative Council, which from a distance looks vaguely like a legislature, and UNIR, which from an equally great distance bears some resemblance to a political party. The Council, set up by the Fundamental Law of October 18, 1982, has very limited representational functions. It is much more a presidentially controlled reporting structure parallel to the prefectural structure of the Ministry of the Interior. Indeed, prefectural appointments are frequently made from the ranks of the Council, and its members regularly accompany prefects on informational and propaganda tours of their respective hinterlands. As the Fundamental Law makes clear, the Council's power is limited to consulting on particular issues when called to do so by the president, who retains absolute power to name and dismiss councillors.

UNIR's creation in June 1984 was a major symbolic step in creating a structure formally independent of the FAN that had carried Hissène Habré to power, and many FAN leaders were not at all pleased that the FAN's command council (CCFAN) was to be dissolved into a larger body representing those who had not made the long march at Habré's side. (As it is, a clear majority of UNIR's executive bureau is made up of former members of the CCFAN). Its principal function has been to extend governmental contacts down to the local level and to provide positions through which educated or influential

members of a variety of population groups could be symbolically brought into the system. Its purpose is clearly mobilizational and inspirational, carrying the message of Chadian nationalism and Chadian unity. The *animateurs politiques*, with their songs, unison chants, and manufactured enthusiasm, provide the principal outward manifestation of UNIR, and much of its internal spirit as well.

UNIR is not formally a political party. As its statute proclaims, it is a symbolic "crucible of national unity" in which the ideas of ordinary Chadians are to be melted down into a homogeneous substance capable of providing a base for the state structure. It has little patronage — except its own posts — to hand out, and no direct influence on governmental decisions. It is probably, then, the safest structure into which some interest representation could be explicitly admitted. Up to now, however, such a thought has remained anathema to the regime's inner core, and it raises concerns in the minds of other thoughtful Chadians that such representation could lead to a return to the factional politics that have been Chad's historic bane. Any real opening of the system is unlikely in the near future, whatever happens to the Goukouni negotiations. The core will jealously guard its monopoly of power, relying on its own judgments, ad hoc decisions, and, where those fail, intimidation to sustain national unity. If imperfectly, that system has worked to keep Habré in power for five years.

In Sum

The prospects for Chad's next five years are not brilliant. While continued military success in the north will build popular support, severe economic stringency, and the intrusive tutelage of the World Bank and the IMF, will set strict limits to what government can do. It will not have even the largesse it has had up to now to buy off dissidents and other claimants with jobs or immediately beneficial redistributive policies. This leaves three basic options: (1) give greater participation in decision making; (2) increase repression; (3) conserve resources by letting some areas and populations quietly drift out of the system.

As previously indicated, there are few grounds for expecting a major opening of the system through political reform or institutional development. Increased participation in decision making is more likely to take place through co-optation of individual peripheral elites into the core, which in time could slowly diversify the group and the perspectives at the center of government. Hissène Habré will have to be the person setting the pace if this is to happen at all.

Repression — use of the stick during a carrot shortage — will be an ever-present option. As the Hadjerai affair suggests, however, the blind recourse to repression is likely to be as much a part of the problem as of a solution. Better information about tensions in the Guera and elsewhere, and better control over the SP and FANT Goranes, could likely have prevented the

affair from escalating as it has. Again, any future corrective action will require sustained presidential attention and leadership. Such a stance might be encouraged by a recognition that continued complaints from Amnesty International are not helpful to an African country's efforts to increase aid flows — from the United States and also several of the important European aid donors. While the French are not so squeamish, it does Chad no good, in times when relations are strained for other reasons, for Habré's actions to recall his guerrilla movement's kidnapping of French citizens during the 1970s.

Finally, prudent Chadian policy should not discourage truly peripheral populations from dropping out of the system for a while, thus saving on sticks as well as carrots. Historically, Chadians have done just this in difficult times and have not posed a security threat to central authorities, so long as outside money was not stirring up factional entrepreneurship — something N'Djamena ought to be able to prevent from a distance. This is likely to be a real issue in those parts of the south which are to be squeezed out of intense participation in cotton production, now as previously the most consistent link between the peasantry and the governmental system. It will be a quiet test of Chadian governmental confidence to let this happen and to let people take refuge undisturbed in semiautonomous community-level organizations until government again has something to offer.

This is not a heroic perspective, but it is one that might help the Third Republic to survive another five years.

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