The Nonaligned Summit: Behind the Rhetoric

by Gillian Gunn

The easy story to file from Zimbabwe on the September 1-7 summit marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Nonaligned Movement was that it was a gathering “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” But viewed in historical perspective, and measured in terms of what might have happened that didn’t, the 1986 heads-of-state gathering emerges as a more noteworthy event.

Such an assessment is based on a critical judgemental assumption — that the interminable speeches, the squabbling, and the Washington-bashing were traditional rites only marginally related to the meeting’s bottom-line substance.

On several important matters, including southern Africa and disarmament, the summit hammered out a common approach. Divisive issues that had stalled previous summits (especially Afghanistan and Kampuchea), while not resolved, were set aside on an “agree-to-disagree” basis, leaving time for those issues on which accord was possible. A perceived drift by the Nonaligned Movement toward the Soviet Union, already partially reversed at the last summit in 1983 in New Delhi, was further arrested under Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s chairmanship. And if American officials observing the proceedings went away unhappy with the large number of denunciations of U.S. policy in the summit declarations, Moscow must also have been disappointed by its poor record in getting wording praising Soviet policy adopted, issues it disliked avoided, and its favored candidates named as sites for upcoming Nonaligned Movement events.

Harare in Historical Context

The term “nonalignment” was first used by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in the early 1950s. Westerners interpreted it as meaning equally distant from both superpowers, but Nehru defined the concept as a separate identity for developing states rather than a fixed position in relation to outside blocs. In 1961, Egypt’s President Gamal Abd al-Nasser said that nonalignment “means that we ought to decide what we believe in and not according to what might satisfy any particular country. It means that our policy is not attached to the policy of any other country or the big powers.”

Institutionally, the Nonaligned Movement (in recent years often referred to simply as the NAM) traces its roots back to an agreement signed between China and India in 1954 based on principles derived from Indian traditions of nonviolence. The treaty pledged respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. These principles formed the basis for discussion when 29 Third World countries gathered in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. Yugoslavia’s President Josip Broz Tito, Nasser, and Nehru then built on the Bandung momentum to organize the first summit of the Nonaligned Movement in Belgrade in 1961. Twenty-five heads of state participated.

Each of the three personalities behind the Belgrade summit was isolated in his region and sought strength through collective resistance to the superpowers. Tito was seeking a middle ground after breaking with Moscow over a decade earlier. Nehru was worried about his powerful northern neighbors and about U.S. military alliances in his region. Nasser was playing East off against West, and nonalignment was a useful tool in that strategy.

At this first NAM summit and in all that followed over the organization’s quarter century history, there has been (1) a discernible disjunction between moderates and radicals; (2) a failure to agree on the most controversial issues; (3) a general absence of criticism of the Soviet Union by name; and (4) manipulation of the final “consensus” decision-making process by the larger and better prepared delegations.

The first summit focused on disarmament, decolonization, unequal terms of trade between the developed and
developing worlds, Palestinian rights, and apartheid. Those issues remain the backbone of the NAM agenda in the late 1980s, except that (with the independence process virtually complete) the issue of decolonization has largely been replaced by that of "interference" in the "sovereign affairs" of member states.

In the context of more recent NAM history, the Harare summit came at a point when the movement was moving back to the center after a vigorous lurch leftward seven years ago. In the view of most NAM states, Cuba's Fidel Castro sought to orient the movement more closely toward Moscow when he held the chairmanship from 1979 to 1983. At the 1979 Havana summit, Castro described the Soviet Union as the NAM's "natural ally," gave his radical friends precedence in the order of speakers, and pressed for denunciations of "imperialists and neocolonialists"—mainly the United States. It is also clear that Castro hoped to use the prestige associated with the Nonaligned chairmanship to win a place for Cuba on the UN Security Council for the two years beginning January 1, 1980. But, as one veteran NAM observer phrased it, Cuba "overplayed its hand" at the Havana summit. Other members' resentment of Castro's manipulative tactics, combined with his failure to condemn the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, damaged his prestige in the Third World, and the Security Council seat went to Mexico instead.

The next summit was to have been held in Baghdad in 1982, but Iraq's escalating war with Iran (and the associated deterioration of the security situation) forced a year's delay and a site shift to New Delhi. The chairman at the 1983 summit, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, was praised by Western observers for her attempt to get the organization "back on a less Soviet-aligned path." But the NAM's decision-by-consensus rules force a chairman to pay particular attention to those delegations which lobby hardest, and the final 1983 declaration was still far more anti-Western than the moderates thought appropriate.

Zimbabwe was selected as the site of the eighth summit only a year ago, at the September 1985 ministerial-level meeting held in Luanda, Angola. Indonesia, traditionally a NAM moderate, wanted to host, but was persuaded to withdraw in favor of an African candidate as a signal of concern about the mounting crises in southern Africa. Zimbabwe was reportedly first proposed by Cuba. Mugabe was initially reluctant to accept, but agreed after the African states, tired at Cuban usurping leadership on their turf, took up the issue and sent a lobbying mission to Harare.

**Summit Logistics**

Hosting any NAM summit (and its associated preparatory and ministerial meetings) presents a monumental logistical challenge in terms of housing, transporting, entertaining, feeding, providing printed material for, and translating among the 101 delegations, assorted journalists, and other hangers-on.

An estimated 10,000 people descended on Zimbabwe's capital for the presummit and summit meetings, and, all things considered, the city coped well. Unlike Luanda, the streets, sewage systems, and food supplies of Harare are maintained in fairly good order, so the capital needed only a bit of painting and freshening up by way of preparation.

Zimbabwe's capital already had a modern, if rather garish, conference center in the form of the Harare Sheraton. There was, however, the problem of providing "appropriate caliber" housing for the visiting heads of state. To cope with this requirement, 32 (South African-designed) villas were built, and the government offered the owners of some 70 well-appointed homes Z$3,000-5,000 in rent (US$1 = Z$1.66), as well as permission to convert Z$8,000 into foreign exchange to finance a holiday while their residence was in use. Since the normal holiday conversion allowance is Z$360 per year, there was no shortage of takers.

The private sector, initially annoyed that Mugabe had taken on this costly operation, gradually succumbed to nationalistic pride, adopting the position: "If we have to do it, we might as well do it right." In the end, most of the cars, stationery, secretarial services, and computers in use during the summit came from corporate sources. This led to some ironies. Journalists opening their press packets found stationery and pens printed with the logo of the Delta Corporation, a South African-owned concern. Flights arrived daily from South Africa carrying food and other supplies. A heavily laden Aeroflot transport, cargo unidentified, arrived at the beginning of the gathering.

The summit was estimated to have cost Zimbabwe some US$24 million—amount well below the US$100 million that Angola reportedly expended in hosting the 1985 ministerial conference. Approximately half of this outlay has been covered by donations from NAM members and other governments.

Aside from some disgruntlement among the citizenry of Harare at the sight of crates of imported whiskey being unloaded outside delegates' hotels at a time when local manufacturers are having difficulty getting foreign exchange allocations to import spare parts, the summit did not provoke as much resentment as might have been expected. The city's racy magazines ran stories on how prostitutes were preparing for a bonanza; downtown traffic was disrupted by street being blocked off for speeding motorcades; and the major hotels were closed to the public for security reasons. But, in the words of one local merchant, "It really hasn't affected us too much. We've sold a few extra post cards, that's about all."

The opinions of some of the visitors were not quite so benign. The press corps in particular was annoyed at being housed in University of Zimbabwe dormitories located several miles out of town, leaving the journalists dependent upon commuter buses and on two pay telephones (one broken). The Zimbabwean organizers seemed to have forgotten that journalists come in two sexes, and their failure to establish separate toilet facilities meant that several middle-aged newsmen were surprised in their underwear by equally startled women in nightgowns. Journalists were excluded from the delegates' hotels and from all but the press section of the conference center, making it extremely difficult to
set up interviews. And just before the summit proper began, the press section was suddenly evacuated for a three-hour security check, resulting in one Chinese journalist having to cut her satellite communication to Beijing in mid-transmission.

The throwing of all journalists together at the university had its positive side, however. Information-sharing was more extensive than is usual in this competitive profession, and some unusual cross-cultural friendships were formed. The sight of a male South African journalist chatting with a female Cuban writer is a case in point.

And what the Zimbabweans most feared, South African sabotage, did not occur. It was generally assumed, however, that concern about South Africa's proximity (and the close relations between Pretoria and Israel in the field of military technology) was a factor in the low turnout of heads of state from the Middle East.

Mugabe's Balancing Act
Prior to the summit, Western observers were divided on how they expected Mugabe to handle the meeting. U.S. diplomats feared that he would be manipulated by the Cubans, who planned to send a large delegation and had offered assistance with security matters, technical services, and translation facilities. European diplomats placed more faith in Mugabe's ability to steer an independent course.

The initial draft declaration on political affairs, prepared by Zimbabwe's United Nations delegation, appeared to confirm Washington's fears. By the State Department's count, it contained over 50 anti-U.S. statements, in comparison with 23 at Havana and 13 at New Delhi. European diplomats were amused by the sight of the Americans counting up criticisms. Said one: "This declaration actually is not any more anti-U.S. than the Delhi version. It is just that the Americans have done more things recently that hit the Third World's sensitivities." To put this argument metaphorically, one could say that the United States thought the compass was turning while Washington stood still, when in reality the United States was moving while the compass remained fixed.

And, once the summit actually got under way, it became clear that the dire predictions were not entirely justified. Cuban technical services were politely declined, and arriving Cuban security personnel were required to leave their weapons behind before they were allowed to disembark at the airport. Libyan and Iraqi security forces were similarly separated from their arms, though in the Iraqi case only after a scuffle at airport customs.

Mugabe set the tone for his chairmanship in a press conference held August 29. Asked by a Soviet journalist to comment on the USSR's unilateral extension of its test ban policy, and on the U.S. arms control position, Mugabe chose his words carefully. The world needs peace, he said, and therefore "when there are indications by either the United States or the USSR that they would like to confer, or there is a unilateral moratorium offered, this is a step in the right direction." When a West German journalist asked if, due to its small size,
Gorbachev and Reagan, urging both to make progress on disarmament.)

Mugabe's keynote address directly criticized the United States only on two issues. He noted that the "reactionary forces of UNITA" now enjoy "full support of both apartheid South Africa and the Reagan administration," and criticized the United States for "openly financing" the contras in Nicaragua. He condemned the bombing of Libya, but did not mention the United States by name in this context.

On Afghanistan and Kampuchea, he followed the format adopted in New Delhi of urging that "foreign intervention...be speedily terminated." While the United States and the NAM moderates criticized the absence of any direct mention of the Soviet and Vietnamese roles in these states, Moscow and the radical NAM members were displeased that the subject of intervention was brought up even indirectly. Corridor conversations with members of moderate delegations elicited explanations that a deal had in fact been worked out before the summit to use the New Delhi formula and not let the proceedings founder because of acrimony concerning these two issues, in the interest of keeping the spotlight on the designated main issue of 1986, apartheid and southern Africa.

Both NAM moderates and U.S. diplomats in Harare were pleasantly surprised by Mugabe's "statesmanlike" position on the subject of Nicaragua's assuming the chairmanship of the movement at the end of Mugabe's term (see "Mugabe's Successor?" below), a move the USSR favored and the United States opposed.

There was some hardening of language critical of the United States in the political and economic declarations as finally adopted. Washington was more vigorously urged to reconsider its suspension of the SALT II treaty; anti-Star Wars language was strengthened; U.S. hesitancy on arms control negotiations came in for more criticism; denunciation of U.S. support for Israel became harsher; the Reagan administration's military actions against Libya received more attention; and U.S. economic sanctions against Nicaragua and Libya were lambasted.

Equally significant, though, was the number of proposed anti-American and pro-Soviet proposals that were not accepted. Specifically, Libya sought unsuccessfully to have the United States denounced as the main force seeking to undermine the Nonaligned Movement. The USSR lobbied unsuccessfully to be officially congratulated for its "support of the movement," and its candidates, Nicaragua and North Korea, did not receive approval as sites for the 1989 summit and 1988 ministerial meeting respectively.

Perhaps the best summation of Mugabe's handling of the East-West issue at the summit was made to me by Singapore's Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan: "I am now less pessimistic about the future of the Nonaligned Movement than I was before the Harare summit. It is definitely an improvement on Delhi." This assessment is in sharp contrast to another Singapore foreign ministry official's prediction at the 1983 summit that the NAM seemed to be headed for "shameful oblivion."

Questioned about the issue of East-West balance at the closing press conference, in the wee hours of September 7, Mugabe replied that criticism can be balanced only if both sides have equal blame for actions against the nonaligned world: "There has been an invasion of Grenada, Libya, support for UNITA, the contras in Nicaragua, and El Salvador. The Soviet Union is in Afghanistan, yes, but how do you balance that?"

Southern Africa — Look Before Leaping

Caution was also evident in the summit's declarations on southern African issues, the main focus of the proceedings. In the end, it was the relatively pragmatic position of the Front Line states (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Botswana) that was endorsed. Many observers dismissed the final language adopted as a "loss of nerve." But a careful examination of the corridor exchanges leads equally convincingly to the conclusion that the position that carried the day reflects a new appreciation of the real situation on the ground in southern Africa and in the halls of the United Nations, with a "let's do the doable" tactic replacing the previous "let's fight for the impossible" rhetoric.

The Harare discussions on southern Africa fell at a crucial moment in the process of international diplomacy. The leaders of Zimbabwe and Zambia had recently participated in a Commonwealth "mini-summit" in London at which seven heads of government or state discussed the implications of the collapse of the Commonwealth "Eminent Persons Group" initiative aimed at promoting negotiations between the South African government and credible black leaders. The meeting concluded that negotiations were unlikely, and six of the seven leaders endorsed a list of sanctions, while the seventh, Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, would agree only to a milder set. Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda threatened to withdraw from the Commonwealth in protest at Britain's intransigence, and Mugabe announced that he would implement the sanctions package by the end of the year whether the Commonwealth as a whole moved by that date or not.

Apparently in retaliation for the positions taken by Kaunda and Mugabe in the London talks, South Africa promptly imposed a 125 percent bond requirement, payable in foreign exchange, on goods crossing South Africa in transit for Zambia, and introduced lengthy customs searches for the purpose of "gathering statistics" on all Zimbabwe- and Zambia-bound goods crossing the South Africa-Zimbabwe border. These moves were potentially disastrous for both landlocked countries, which receive a large portion of their imports through South Africa. (See "Southern African Interdependence" by Stephen R. Lewis, Jr. in CSIS Africa Notes no. 56, March 27, 1986.)

Pretoria lifted border searches just before the summit, but kept the Zambian surcharge in place. This muscle-flexing — coming as it did on the heels of Pretoria's May 1986 raids on the capital of Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana for the alleged purpose of countering African
National Congress guerrilla operations aimed at the Republic — was a factor in the attention focused on South Africa’s economic and military retaliatory capacity as the summit began.

The deliberations in Harare were also affected by two meetings held in Luanda just before the summit — one of the leaders of the Front Line states and one of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). SADCC, founded in 1980 to promote efforts by the southern African states to diversify their economic links and gradually reduce their dependence on South Africa, encompasses the Front Line states as well as Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi (see “SADCC: A Progress Report” by Bryan Silbermann in CSIS Africa Notes no. 11, April 5, 1983). Journalists who were on the scene describe both meetings as acrimonious. Those states particularly dependent on South African transport links (Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana), while supportive of sanctions in principle, were deeply concerned about the effect of possible retaliatory border closures by South Africa. On August 22, Swaziland’s prime minister, Prince Bhekimpis Alpheus Dlamini, told a group of visiting West German MPs that his country would be committing suicide if it supported international sanctions against South Africa. Mozambique’s President Samora Machel has made similar remarks over the last few years, and recently told a press conference in Maputo that “Mozambique does not... have the capacity to apply sanctions.” Thus, instead of presenting new sanctions proposals, or firmly endorsing the Commonwealth sanctions package, the Front Line communiqué of August 21 simply hailed “the stand of the six [Commonwealth] leaders” and “noted that the Commonwealth sanctions mini-summit had given fresh impetus to the campaign against apartheid.” The SADCC communiqué was even weaker, and urging member states to cooperate to reduce the impact that the application of sanctions would have on their economies.

Another element conditioning the NAM’s approach to southern Africa was the state of play on sanctions in Western Europe and the United States. The Harare summit came after the U.S. House and Senate had passed sanctions bills, but before the bills had been reconciled and submitted to President Reagan for signature. Similarly, the European Community was preparing to decide on its own sanctions package. The southern African leaders realized that they were no longer dealing in hypotheticals. The rising anti-apartheid mood in the United States and Europe meant that new sanctions were actually possible.

Mugabe took a fairly tough stance at the beginning of the summit. He reconfirmed at a September 2 press conference his previous announcement that Zimbabwe would impose the Commonwealth package by the end of the year, and added that his government would apply any additional sanctions adopted by the NAM summit, even if this meant canceling Zimbabwe’s existing (and recently renegotiated) trade agreement with South Africa. His keynote speech urged the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, asked the NAM summit to consider sending a team of foreign ministers to canvass for adoption of such sanctions, and urged an increase in NAM material assistance to South African and Namibian liberation movements.

The draft “Special Declaration on Southern Africa” hammered out in pre-ministerial and subsequent ministerial-level deliberations in the week preceding the summit called for UN mandatory sanctions, but, pending their adoption, endorsed a list of 13 measures and commended them to the “wider international community for urgent adoption and implementation.” (See “Sanctions Endorsed in the Special Declaration on Southern Africa,” page 6.)

The Special Declaration on Southern Africa further proposed establishment of a Solidarity Fund for Southern Africa to be used “to provide emergency assistance as well as long-term assistance for infrastructural development in order to lessen their [the southern African states’] dependence on South Africa.” Summit observers intimate with the details of the sanctions debate were surprised by the mildness of the declaration. Many had expected the ministerial draft to establish a system to monitor NAM members’ compliance with a list of sanctions or at least to set a date by which members were to adopt a portion of the recommended sanctions, and anticipated that the heads of state would strengthen the draft.

This did not happen. The draft declaration was passed nearly intact. The only noteworthy change was that the Solidarity Fund was renamed the Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism, and Apartheid Fund and the purposes for which its monies would be spent were more precisely identified. India was designated as chairman of the fund, and Zambia vice-chairman. The remaining seven members of the fund committee are Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Algeria, Congo, Yugoslavia, Peru, and Argentina. (Some NAM members argued against the fund, claiming that the Nonaligned Movement lacks the structural mechanisms needed to manage a program of aid for the Front Line states and that the Organization of African Unity is a more appropriate body for this purpose, but their criticisms were overridden.)

As it became evident that the Special Declaration on Southern Africa would not be strengthened, Zambia’s President Kaunda held a somewhat baffling press conference on September 5. Having made an impassioned, almost tearful, appeal for imposition of mandatory UN sanctions against South Africa in his September 2 address to the summit, Kaunda now told journalists: “Sanctions against South Africa without the major trading partners of the racist regime...would not be effective at all. They would be sanctions applied against us. We are ready to join in this if and when the rest of the international community participates... That is why there must be cooperation and coordination between the Congress of the United States, various organizations in Britain, West Germany, and Japan. If all these come together, then of course sanctions will be very meaningful... Without the major trading partners participating, there are no sanctions at all.... When we say we want...
sanctions applied against South Africa, we want effective sanctions. If Zambia and Zimbabwe tomorrow applied sanctions on their own, without the major trading partners of the racist regime doing so, [it] would be suicide on our part and would be meaningless.” The journalists went back to their quarters and replayed their tapes in an effort to interpret the seeming contradictions between Kaunda’s two anguished position statements.

Meanwhile, observers with access to the closed-door discussions at the summit were reporting that some African states well out of reach of South African retaliation, as well as India, were pushing for a firmer line on sanctions and a strengthening of the Special Declaration on Southern Africa. While there was at first disagreement among the Front Line states – with Zambia taking a firm line, Mozambique and Botswana urging great caution, and Zambia somewhere in the middle — in the end the Front Line leaders were united in their recommendation that the declaration remain essentially unchanged.

But this is not necessarily the “sanctions defeat” that some Western diplomats, and particularly the British, labeled it. Much of the plan worked out behind closed doors was purposefully kept out of the declaration. According to Zimbabwean and Commonwealth sources, the NAM agreed on a three-phase strategy for the upcoming UN session. First, the NAM and the OAU would propose mandatory comprehensive sanctions, forcing the United States or Britain to veto the measure in the Security Council. This move would be aimed at embarrassing Western opponents of sanctions and obtaining greater publicity for the issue. The summit’s publicly stated decision to send a team of foreign ministers from Algeria, Argentina, Congo, India, Nigeria, Peru, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe to canvass support for comprehensive sanctions among four major trading partners of South Africa (Britain, the United States, West Germany, and Japan) appeared to be part of this strategy.

Second, the plan called for the NAM members to coordinate with the OAU and the Commonwealth in presenting a more moderate package of sanctions, which would include elements from the European Community, Commonwealth, and U.S. congressional measures. The package was envisaged as being mild enough to make it difficult for the Western powers to veto. “How can Reagan or Thatcher instruct their representatives to veto a measure which contains little more than what Reagan’s own Congress has already suggested, and what Thatcher is already going along with in the EEC?” said one observer. Most important, the mild sanctions package would be made mandatory, getting the principle of obligatory worldwide sanctions accepted.

This would set the stage for the third phase, the slow ratcheting up of sanctions pressure at future UN sessions, with the gradual addition of measures to the mandatory list.

This strategy had several advantages from the point of view of the NAM delegates. First, it would permit the vulnerable southern African states to agree with those better prepared to cope with sanctions. Second, it would ensure a delay before the Front Line states would be called upon to impose sanctions, giving them time to prepare alternative transport routes, stockpile crucial commodities, and prepare their defenses against South African military retaliation. Third, it was designed to capitalize on what the West is willing to do, rather than to continue to concentrate on what it is unwilling to do. So, did the NAM “lose its nerve” on sanctions? This is partly a matter of semantics, but there is room to argue that the sanctions strategy worked out in Harare actually has more potential than a decision by the NAM to impose its own sanctions would have had. Attempts to impose sanctions unilaterally without the support of Europe and the United States would have increased the divisions in the Nonaligned Movement and, given the limited commercial contacts of most NAM states with South Africa, such sanctions have been largely symbolic. By concentrating more on gathering support for the fund that will help the Front Line states cope with sanctions than on the imposition of those sanctions, the

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**Sanctions Endorsed in the Special Declaration on Southern Africa**

- Prohibition of transfer of technology to South Africa;
- Cessation of export, sale, or transport of oil and oil products to South Africa, and of any cooperation with South Africa’s oil industry;
- Cessation of further investments in and financial loans to South Africa or Namibia and of any governmental insurance guarantees of credits to the racist regime;
- An end to all promotion of or support for trade with South Africa, including governmental assistance to trade missions;
- Prohibition of the sale of krugerrands and any other coins minted in South Africa;
- Prohibition of imports from South Africa of agricultural products, coal, uranium, iron and steel, etc.;
- Enactment of legislation or adoption of other measures to comply with United Nations Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia in 1974;
- Termination of any visa-free entry privileges and the promotion of tourism to South Africa;
- Termination of air and shipping links with South Africa;
- Cessation of all academic, cultural, scientific, and sports relations with South Africa, and of relations with individuals, institutions, and other bodies endorsing or based on apartheid;
- Suspension or abrogation of agreements with South Africa, such as agreements on cultural and scientific cooperation;
- The termination of Double Taxation Agreements with South Africa;
- A ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies.

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summit put the horse before the cart.

Another proposal addressed in the southern Africa debate was the creation of a special defense force to protect South Africa's neighbors against hostile acts carried out or orchestrated by Pretoria. Mugabe had proposed such a force at the most recent OAU summit, but the idea had not received much support. (See "OAU Assembly XXII" by J. Coleman Kitchen, Jr. in CSIS Africa Notes no. 61, August 28, 1986.) When a NAM force for the same purpose was mooted at the Harare summit, India was rumored to be considering providing planes and troops, but Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi told a press conference that he had not been asked to provide military support and that he had not considered the idea. In the end, the proposal of a NAM force was not pursued.

The issue of Namibia was the subject of a separate document, which predictably condemned linkage of Cuban withdrawal from Angola with the Namibian independence process, called for immediate implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, and urged "the international community to render all-round material, political, and diplomatic support" for the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

The Qaddafi Tirade

The summit's measured and fairly unified approach to southern Africa did not extend to all issues. Like every NAM summit before it, the Harare meeting had its fair share of headline-grabbing squabbles.

The nastiest involved Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, who upon arrival at Harare Airport said that he would try to "abolish" the NAM and do his best to "divide this world into two camps only — the liberation camp and the imperialist camp." In his subsequent speech to the summit, he accused the movement of harboring spies, puppets, and traitors; attacked Egypt, Zaire, Cameroon, and Côte d'Ivoire by name for having diplomatic relations with Israel; ridiculed the Commonwealth as the "property of Britain"; said that the Nonaligned Movement was helpless in defending members against the United States and its allies; and announced that he would put a proposal to the people's committees in Libya that his country leave the NAM. "I want," he said in conclusion, "to say goodbye, farewell to this funny movement — farewell to this utter falsehood."

Several African leaders laughed openly during Qaddafi's presentation, and Mugabe issued a sharp rebuke from the chair: "Not all of us agree that the movement is useless." The countries cited by Qaddafi called his attacks "immature" and expressed "nothing but contempt and scorn" for his criticism. An African journalist asked: "Why does the United States consider Libya an enemy? I would think Washington would consider him an ally. He is against everything they are against — the Nonaligned Movement, the Commonwealth, Third World unity."

Other Clashes

The Iran-Iraq squabble was handled a little differently. Iran's President Sayyed Ali Khamenei launched a long attack against Iraq in his address to the summit. As the language escalated, Mugabe looked more and more uncomfortable, eventually putting his head in his hands. Suddenly the television coverage conveying the speech to the journalists' gallery was cut. Cameramen later reported that they had been instructed by Zimbabwean officials to cease operations, but the Zimbabwean official position was that the cut was due to a technical fault. While the cameras were off, according to the written text of Khamenei's speech released later, he called for the expulsion of Iraq from the movement and "punishment" of the Iraqi government.

A third incident of name-calling involved the recent aircraft hijacking in Karachi. In a press conference, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi said that Pakistan's president, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, had handled the rescue attempt incompetently, and accused Pakistan of inviting the incident by treating previous hijackers leniently. At the same conference, Gandhi spoke disparagingly of Sri Lanka's handling of the Tamil problem, and of that neighbor's attitude toward negotiations with India on the subject.

There were inevitably the usual complaints from the "moderates" about decisions being "sneaked through" in the dead of night when the majority of delegates had given up and gone to their quarters to get some sleep. The decisions to give the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS), a group fighting for the independence of New Caledonia, observer status rather than the expected (and less influential) guest status, and to place the issue of New Caledonian independence on the 1986 rather than the 1987 UN agenda, were apparently obtained in this way. This disturbed Australian diplomats (who had guest status at the meeting) because of the islands' proximity to their territory.

Castro as Statesman

One source of tension in previous summits, Cuba's Castro, was surprisingly mild-mannered at Harare. He limited his remarks to one hour, in contrast with his usual two-hours-plus performances. Possibly recalling lessons learned during his chairmanship about the penalties of overplaying one's hand, he attacked no member states by name. His restraint may also have been motivated by the desire to appear statesmanlike in order to reassure delegates that giving the chairmanship of the next summit to Nicaragua would not lead to the same divisiveness that had occurred at the Havana summit.

The Castro statement that attracted the most attention was his commentary on the issue of Cuban withdrawal from Angola: "Let UN Resolution 435 on Namibia be implemented, let the threats of aggression against Angola cease, let the dirty war and support for mercenary bands cease, and the gradual and progressive withdrawal of the 20,000 Cuban combatants defending strategic lines in southern Angola will begin. The rest of the Cuban military personnel would be withdrawn only when the sovereign governments of Angola and Cuba consider it convenient, with no conditions whatsoever.... The true key to the issue is that as long as apartheid exists in South Africa...there
will be no security for Angola nor for any other country in southern Africa, and the independence of Namibia will be no more than a myth.”

Many observers viewed this as a startling policy shift, but in fact Castro was only repeating language Cuba has been using since a South African commando unit made an abortive raid on a Cabinda oil installation in Angola in May 1985. What was more remarkable, but attracted little press notice, was the softer language on Cuban withdrawal used by Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, and the absence from his speech of any reference to U.S. aid to UNITA.

The Harare-Washington Dimension
The squabbles also crossed the Atlantic and produced a heated exchange involving the Zimbabwean and U.S. governments and media.

First, perhaps reflecting some differences within the higher echelons of the ruling ZANU party on the appropriate relationship with the United States, the Zimbabwean press agency ZIANA issued a series of stories based on interviews with some dubious New York sources asserting that the CIA had sent operatives to assist the embassy in Harare in covering the meeting.

Washington took a counter-swat at a State Department press briefing on September 2. Asked about the Nonaligned meeting, Charles Redman, a Department spokesman, replied: “...The litany of arbitrary and unfounded charges is both highly offensive and counter-productive. It also raises a basic question as to the objectivity or political bias of the organization.” Asked if Mugabe’s role in the conference would affect aid to Zimbabwe, Redman replied: “...The United States government has decided that there will be no new agreements committing additional funds for bilateral programs in Zimbabwe...” Redman added that this decision had been taken in July.

Many summit delegates found Redman’s characterization of the summit both inappropriate and inaccurate. A representative of a member state with close ties to the United States told this writer: “It was wrong of Redman to attack Mugabe’s handling of the summit. Mugabe is the chairman. He cannot say just what he wants to say. He has to reflect the consensus of the NAM members, and currently the consensus is anti-American. In our view, Mugabe is handling the summit very skillfully and should not have been criticized.”

It was then the turn of the Zimbabwean press to turn up the heat with another dose of disinformation. The Herald’s response to the Redman briefing was to report that the United States had cut Zimbabwe’s aid in retaliation for the anti-American language coming out of the summit. This was not the case. As Redman indicated in his offhand concluding remark, Washington had put a hold on any new aid in July, shortly after the widely reported speech made by a Zimbabwean junior minister at the U.S. embassy’s Fourth of July reception. The speech, delivered in the presence of former President Jimmy Carter, condemned U.S. policy in southern Africa (in violation of an agreement worked out between the embassy and Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the protocol for the event). Zimbabwe was informed of the aid decision within days of the contretemps but only The Financial Gazette, a highbrow Harare weekly, reported the cutoff. Neither the Zimbabwean government, the state radio, nor any other newspaper commented. Washington was surprised by the muted response, but decided, in the words of a U.S. diplomat, “not to make a big deal” about the decision “to avoid rubbing salt in the wound.” This discretion, which appeared wise at the time, backfired by permitting the mischievous to distort and the uninformed to misunderstand Redman’s remarks.

Mugabe’s Successor?
As at the New Delhi summit in 1983, no agreement was reached at Harare on a successor to Mugabe when his term as chairman expires in 1989. Although this indecision is cited by some as evidence of increasing disunity in the organization, the details of the debate support our assessment that delay may have been the most sensible course.

Two nations put their names forward for the chairmanship — Nicaragua and (some say at Washington’s urging) Indonesia. By tradition, the chairmanship rotates among the various regions of the world represented in the Nonaligned Movement. The fact that sub-Saharan Africa had not hosted a summit since the Lusaka meeting of 1970 was a significant factor in the selection of Zimbabwe as the site for the 1986 summit, and ruled out the possibility of an African host in 1989. Similarly, India’s hosting of the 1983 summit militated against Indonesia’s candidacy at this time. The general NAM consensus is that Latin America, which has not held the chair since Castro’s term began with the 1979 meeting in Havana, should host the next summit.

In order to win the chairmanship, a candidate usually needs the backing of its region. Cuba strongly endorsed Nicaragua’s claim, and there is no evidence that Castro withdrew his support toward the end of the summit despite some press reports to the contrary. Other Latin American countries are uneasy, however. They doubt that Nicaragua has the security, financial, or organizational capacity to host the summit, and fear that a Managua meeting would be a rerun of Havana, with the radicals “hijacking” the proceedings.

Peru, put forward as an alternative, is politically more acceptable to the Latin American membership as a whole than Nicaragua, but security problems posed by guerrilla activity count against it. Reports, possibly alarmist, that the present government might soon be ousted by a coup also damaged Peru’s chances.

Argentina was mentioned as another possibility, but has doubts about the expense and inconvenience such a meeting would pose. It is not averse, however, to hosting the ministerial conference that usually precedes each summit by one year.

Indonesia’s candidacy has problems beyond the previously mentioned regional-rotation issue. President Suharto prefers a low profile, and does not relish the
publicity and distraction from domestic concerns NAM chairmanship entails. He seems to have been persuaded by his foreign ministry to allow his name to be put forward, and this appearance of reluctance does not inspire support among other member states. An additional factor militating against an Indonesian chairmanship is the country’s controversial annexation of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. African states that were once Portuguese colonies have long been sympathetic to Fretilin, the movement fighting for East Timor’s independence, and Mozambique’s President Machel spoke out against Indonesia’s candidacy both in press interviews and in his speech to the summit. Although sources close to the Indonesian delegation say that the government withdrew in favor of Zimbabwe for the 1986 summit on the basis of what it perceived as an understanding that it would be awarded the 1989 chairmanship, Indonesia is not entirely unhappy with the postponing of the decision. It believes that Fretilin’s popular support has eroded and expects an upcoming UN-monitored plebiscite in East Timor to uphold the legitimacy of Indonesian rule there, thus eliminating the issue as an obstacle to the NAM chairmanship.

Mugabe’s handling of the chairmanship debate was interesting. Asked his opinion in a press conference, he said that Zimbabwe supported the Nicaraguan government in its conflict with the United States, and condemned U.S. aid to the contras. On the candidacy question, however, he merely said that Zimbabwe would make its views known to the Nicaraguan delegation. Zimbabwean sources later reported that Mugabe was unenthusiastic about Nicaragua’s candidacy because it would divide the movement.

Until the last moment it appeared that agreement on the site for the 1988 ministerial meeting would also be impossible. However, the delegates remained in session until 4:30 a.m. on the night of September 6/7 and finally agreed upon Cyprus. Libya and North Korea had been the original candidates for this meeting. Libya withdrew its candidacy (possibly as a prelude to leaving the movement) and North Korea was strongly opposed by a variety of delegations. Cyprus was nearly ruled out by opposition from Arab states on security grounds, but squeaked through.

Miscellaneous Decisions
Many of the other NAM decisions and declarations were predictable. The PLO was supported, British designs on the Falklands were condemned, Israeli occupation of Arab territories was attacked, the North’s reduction of aid to the South was criticized, and so was the growth of protectionism.

The summit called for action to remedy the Third World’s debt crisis, which Castro called “the Third World’s AIDS” because it “reproduces itself.” The net outflow of resources from the South to the North was attributed to depressed commodity prices and high interest payments.

A new South-South organization was established during the summit. Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere will head the organization, established in cooperation with Malaysia. The body is to work for cooperation among Third World states, and to produce joint strategies to combat poverty, hunger, illiteracy, and economic stagnation.

Finally, the political declaration and many speeches dwelt at length on the need to protect “multilateralism.” This reflects NAM concern that the UN’s financial crisis will reduce that organization’s power.

A Balance Sheet
Overall, the Harare summit left the impression that the Nonaligned Movement — while still divided, still hard put to define the very term “nonalignment” precisely, suffering from an excess of sympathy for Soviet concerns, prone to meaningless rhetoric in public sessions, and given to nasty fights behind the scenes — is slowly getting somewhere. Though the Harare meeting produced less than some of its members had hoped and anticipated, it accomplished more than its critics had predicted. Mugabe proved a competent, reasonably evenhanded chairman, and seemed comfortable in the role. A sanctions strategy acceptable to all was worked out and action was initiated to develop support for the Front Line states.

Mugabe’s remarks at the summit indicated that he now intends to press for an overhaul of NAM procedures that would enable the organization to become more action-oriented. He told journalists that he envisaged fundamental changes in the conference decision-making process, noting that the lengthy deadlock over future meeting sites had arisen because of the custom of trying to obtain consensus. This tradition, while feasible when the organization was first established in 1961 when only 25 heads of state met, had become unworkable with the quadrupling of membership. Mugabe said that he would seek to add a parliamentary body empowered to implement summit decisions on an ongoing basis. An apparatus for decision making between summits would, it was suggested, make it possible to undertake new initiatives such as the mobilization of a defense force for world hot spots along the lines of the one proposed but not approved for southern Africa at Harare.

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