The most recent report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (April 1987) shows that Africa's, exclusive of Egypt's, share of worldwide arms imports rose from 11.7 percent to 13.8 percent between 1975 and 1984. The average annual growth rate over this period was 5.0 percent, and total imports of arms from 1975 to 1985 exceeded $52.0 billion, with the sub-Saharan region accounting for approximately 41.1 percent of the total. The Soviet Union has been the single largest supplier (primarily to Ethiopia, Libya, Angola, Mozambique, Congo, Benin, Mali, Algeria, and Tanzania), followed by France and Italy.

The magnitude of expenditures on local military establishments has serious implications for the social and economic well-being of many African nations. Ethiopia, for example, allocated between 8.4 and 9.6 percent of its gross national product to the military in the years from 1979 to 1984, and owes the Soviet Union a barter and paper debt of some $4 billion for military assistance over the past decade. Mauritania, concerned over again becoming embroiled in the war in the neighboring Western (formerly Spanish) Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario movement, earmarked 25 percent of its budget for the military in 1980 and 1981. Mali's allocation for its 8,000-man army exceeded 20 percent in recent years. Libya has purchased huge quantities of Soviet, French, and other Western military equipment. Recent U.S. State Department estimates place Libyan military purchases over the past decade on the order of magnitude of $15 billion.

The Scope of U.S. Defense Collaboration

U.S. defense collaboration with other nations takes several forms and, like all aid, moves through diverse channels. (See “U.S. Aid to Africa: Who Gets What, When, and How” by Carol Lancaster in CSIS Africa Notes no. 25, March 31, 1984.) The overall framework for transfers of military equipment, advisory services, and offers of military education and training is referred to as the United States Security Assistance Program. The program has the following basic components:
Grant Military Assistance (MAP), the oldest and most venerable segment of the program, was launched as a temporary expedient in the late 1940s to meet the perceived Soviet threat to Western Europe and the eastern Mediterranean region.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) provides direct and guaranteed loans to foreign governments purchasing U.S. arms, equipment, and support services. FMS loans may be direct (i.e. government-to-government) or guaranteed. The latter are guaranteed by the Department of Defense and are financed by the Federal Financing Bank with funds that the Treasury Department borrows from the financial markets.

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) provides grants and loans to "proven friends" that do not meet criteria for economic development assistance but seek and receive U.S. aid to meet pressing budgetary or security needs.

Military Education and Training (IMET) provides instructional opportunities to foreign military personnel at service schools in the United States, underwrites mobile U.S. training teams for selected countries, and provides specialized training aids and equipment for foreign military training centers.

Peacekeeping Operations (PK) is a channel through which the United States contributes to the financing of international peacekeeping forces such as United Nations forces in Lebanon and Cyprus.

In addition to these five categories, several other instrumentalities can be utilized for the provision of military aid to friends and allies. In Africa, the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, is providing "covert" arms assistance to the UNITA movement in Angola and was instrumental in placing President Hissène Habré in power in Chad during the Reagan administration's first term. Along more traditional lines, the U.S. Air Force has been called upon to transport the military forces of other nations to crisis points in Africa (e.g., during the 1977 and 1978 Shaba crisis in Zaire, in 1983 in Chad, and to rescue various refugee populations). Other ad hoc cooperative ventures with selected African nations include the sharing of intelligence information (e.g., with Morocco), exchanges of views through joint military committees (e.g., Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt), and joint training exercises (e.g., in Zaire, Morocco, Somalia, and for a time Sudan).

The Underlying Rationale
For more than three decades, the U.S. program of arms transfers has been viewed with remarkable consistency by successive presidents. The basic tenet has been that such programs, designed "to strengthen allied and friendly nations" and "to contribute to a common defense posture," significantly enhance the security of the United States and the prospects for world peace. Although the scope and character of U.S. arms-transfer programs have changed since their inception to reflect shifts in the international environment, the central rationale has remained the national interest — as perceived by each resident of the White House.

During the period 1977 through 1979, the United States pursued a policy of unilateral restraint. Under guidelines set forth by President Carter in May 1977, arms transfers were to be viewed as an "exceptional foreign policy instrument," one whose use would be carefully and rigorously constrained. Associated with the policy of unilateral constraint was an effort to gain the cooperation of the Soviet Union and Western European countries in reducing the level of arms trade to Third World areas. The results of this effort were disappointing and the policy was ultimately abandoned by the Carter administration.

The Reagan administration, reacting in part to the experience of its predecessor, decided at the outset that a unilateral policy of arms-export restraint would not be viewed by the Soviet Union or most other arms-exporting nations as a model to be followed; rather, a self-denying ordinance on the part of the United States was more likely to be seen by arms-exporting rivals as an opportunity to enter new markets, acquire new customers, and expand political influence. Accordingly, in May 1981, a basic change in United States arms-transfer policy was formally announced. Proceeding from a fundamental precept that arms transfers, "judiciously applied," can complement and supplement the defense efforts of the United States and can serve "as a vital and constructive instrument of American foreign policy," the administration set forth a four-point rationale for its policy: enhancement of the state of preparedness of friends and allies; revitalization of U.S. alliances; development of more coherent strategies in all areas affecting East-West relations; buttressing of U.S. defense production capabilities.

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Beyond this generalized rationale, a far-ranging compendium of specific purposes was enunciated. These fell into three categories:

1. Predominantly Military
   - offsetting the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces;
   - acquisition of facilities, base, or transit rights for U.S. armed forces;
   - promoting standardization of equipment and doctrine;
   - influencing the character, combat capabilities, and future role of recipient nations' armed forces.

2. Predominantly Political
   - providing a symbol of U.S. commitment;
   - promoting a pro-U.S. orientation in politically or strategically important nations;
   - maintaining access to key leaders in recipient countries and denying influence to adversary nations;
   - supporting a stable balance of power in volatile regions;
   - gaining support for the U.S. negotiating posture on international issues;
   - discouraging the proliferation of indigenous arms-production capabilities.

3. Predominantly Economic
   - improving the U.S. balance-of-payments position;
   - enhancing employment opportunities in the United States;
   - providing tax revenues;
   - promoting access to critical resources;
   - promoting associated commercial sales;
   - reducing the unit costs of U.S. military equipment.

In applying this overall rationale to Africa, emphasis has been placed on specific areas of the continent. In North Africa ("the northern littoral"), stated policy is to counter Libyan "adventurism." A less explicit set of objectives has been to maintain close relations with Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt while seeking to improve ties with Algeria. While the officially stated position on the contentious Western Sahara dispute has been encouragement of mediation of the conflict, the commitment to support Morocco's "legitimate self-defense requirements" clearly extends into the contested area.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the rationale for arms transfers is to enable friendly nations to improve their border-patrol and self-defense capabilities. Examples of "stabilization" military assistance include emergency support to Chad in order to check Libyan-sponsored efforts at annexation, support for Sudan and Somalia re Libyan and Ethiopian destabilization threats, and civic action programs for selected nations.

Immediate U.S. Priorities
For the northern third of Africa, the primary purpose of U.S. arms transfers in current administration policy is to serve geostrategic ends. Such ends include continued U.S. overflight rights and/or access to ports, harbors, airfields, and other transit facilities in Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya — as well as "negative denial" with respect to similar Soviet ambitions. In addition, such assistance underwrites other objectives: (1) linkage of the region to other U.S. and NATO security interests; (2) continued adherence by Egypt to the 1979 Camp David peace accord with Israel; (3) symbolic linkage with the United States as a counterpoise to Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi; and (4) maintenance of internal stability for "moderate" governments confronting a combination of difficult economic and security problems.

The fact that strategic considerations are overriding is underscored in the Department of State's Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs: Fiscal Year 1988:

The United States has a key interest in keeping the choke points in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf open to international traffic. To do so, the United States has relied on periodic naval deployments, combined exercises and a complex arrangement of interlocking political-military bilateral relationships. Military aid, economic assistance and key arms sales together have played a central role in this process.

In contrast to the emphasis on the linkage of the Horn of Africa to security concerns in Southwest Asia, most of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa is downgraded as a region of significant strategic U.S. interest in formal presentations before the legislative branch. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs James Woods, testifying before the House Appropriations Committee on April 2, 1987, noted that his position was originally established as a "part-time" function in July 1982, and was upgraded to a full-time responsibility only in December 1986. His presentation gave a muted assessment of the "importance" of sub-Saharan Africa in the hierarchy of U.S. security concerns:

Let me begin by emphasizing that the Department of Defense has no major military goals in Africa. We do have an interest in access to some African facilities, particularly in East Africa. We are keenly aware of the need for continued access to Africa's strategic minerals and for keeping the sea lines of communications about Africa open to commercial traffic, including, of course, oil tankers proceeding from the Middle East to Europe and the Americas. We are also mindful of the very substantial Soviet bloc military involvement in Africa, an involvement that includes around 40,000 Cuban troops, over 6,500 Soviet and East European military advisors, and military supply programs which have amounted to more than $1 billion since 1980.

Aside from a need for occasional use of air and naval facilities (particularly in East Africa), Mr. Woods perceived no strategic priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa. (See also "Some Observations on U.S. Security interests in Africa" by Woods's predecessor, Noel C. Koch, in CSIS Africa Notes no. 49, November 19, 1985.)
Recent congressionally mandated budgetary reductions for security assistance programs are generally reflective of this low-key assessment of sub-Saharan Africa. On the purely military side — MAP, FMS, and IMET — U.S. aid totaled $169 million for the region in fiscal year 1985, approximately 3 percent of the global program. The following year it fell to $103 million, or less than 2 percent. In fiscal year 1986, the allocation declined again, this time to $52.5 million, or 1 percent of the global total. ESF funds for Africa followed a similar pattern. A comparison of the African cuts with other areas of the world is instructive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>FY 1986 (in millions of $)</th>
<th>FY 1987 (in millions of $)</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt and Israel</td>
<td>1,936.1</td>
<td>2,015.0</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Near East</td>
<td>350.4</td>
<td>332.3</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>272.0</td>
<td>219.8</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Republics</td>
<td>659.0</td>
<td>558.9</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>297.8</td>
<td>260.2</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>244.8</td>
<td>162.8</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To compensate in part for the cuts sustained under congressional budgetary strictures, the administration is requesting $10.235 million in IMET, $5 million in FMS credits (Gabon and Cameroon), and $98 million in MAP (largely to be distributed among 15 sub-Saharan nations) for fiscal year 1988. Of the latter group, the administration has requested $3 million or less in MAP funding for nine nations. Chad and Zaire are proposed as the principal beneficiaries:

- **Chad**: MAP and IMET, $9.2 million for surface mobility (trucks, jeeps, and armored vehicles), air defense system maintenance (Redeye), firepower (light weapons and ammunition), and a U.S. logistics military training team. ESF, $21 million, earmarked to alleviate the Chadian government's severe budget crisis. (The overt U.S. military aid program to Chad was initiated in fiscal year 1983. The United States has since provided $83 million in military aid — $1 million in IMET, $17 million in grant military assistance [MAP], and $65 million directly from Department of Defense stocks under emergency provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act.)

- **Zaire**: MAP and IMET, $11.3 million for support of C-130 aircraft, trucks, jeeps, and spare parts for previously purchased transport and communications equipment. (Annual U.S. aid since fiscal year 1983 has been between $6.5-$1.3 million for IMET, and $4-$7 million in MAP.)

In justifying its funding requests to the legislative branch, the administration presents a strategic objectives list. For MAP, the listed objectives are:

1. To promote Middle East peace
   (No African countries listed)
2. To enhance cooperative defense and security
   (Djibouti, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Somalia, and Sudan)
3. To deter and combat aggression
   (Chad and Tunisia)

4. To promote regional stability
   (Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles, Zaire, and "African Civic Action").

The African Civic Action Program was reintroduced by the Reagan administration to enhance the capabilities of local military commanders to undertake community development projects such as school construction, road maintenance, and hospital expansion. The stated purpose is to encourage and buttress nation-building efforts by African military establishments.

**Anomalies in the Arms Transfer Program**

Part of the difficulty encountered by impartial observers in comparing arms exports is definitional. For purposes of definition, a "major supplier" is a nation that follows a vigorous arms-export policy, produces a wide range of advanced weapons systems, and whose arms agreements have exceeded $1 billion annually over the past several years. Only six nations fall into this category (the Soviet Union, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy). A second common misconception relates to the term "arms transfer," which can include new or refurbished conventional lethal weapons, nonlethal military support equipment (such as radar, military uniforms, and accoutrements), military training, arms production or assembly facilities, and military base or fortification construction.

Several anomalies in the U.S. arms transfer program for Africa warrant attention. Despite the official designation "arms transfers," much of the U.S. program does not include "big ticket" items, which are costly in terms of initial acquisition, follow-on operations and maintenance, and technical training. The U.S. government, as a matter of policy, generally resists appeals from African friends for complex state-of-the-art equipment, urging that they accord serious consideration to the financial consequences likely to flow from such acquisitions.

Second, the bulk of U.S. "arms transfers" to Africa actually consists of nonlethal "end-items." The primary categories have been air transport, communications equipment, trucks and jeeps, training and technical manuals, uniforms, and related accoutrements. Where lethal equipment has been provided, it has usually involved light arms, gun-mounted personnel carriers, helicopters, and aircraft of the Northrop F-5 genre. In most instances, heavy artillery, tanks, and surface-to-surface weapons systems have been deemed unnecessary and inadvisable by U.S. military advisory groups.

Third, the United States is not the (or even a) major purveyor of military equipment to Africa. An examination of administration presentations to Congress for African nations regarded as important to U.S. interests bears this out. Morocco, Zaire, and Chad are cases in point:
On occasion, both the Carter and Reagan administrations have been faced with painful policy decisions when U.S. security interests are placed at risk. The bloody 1980 overthrow of the Tolbert regime in Liberia by a group of young noncommissioned officers and enlisted men led by the obscure Master Sergeant Samuel Doe (see "Liberia: Return to Civilian Rule?" by J. Gus Liebenow in CSIS Africa Notes no. 21, November 30, 1983) confronted Washington with a classic policy dilemma. The human rights record of the "coupists," beginning with the assassination of President Tolbert and key members of his government, was ample justification for termination of military supply relationships. Yet, despite the fact that the record of the Doe regime since the 1980 takeover has been one of repeated human rights abuses, the United States has continued to be Liberia's principal source of military assistance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-U.S.</td>
<td>less than 0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The U.S. aid program for Liberia focuses on basic military training, transportation equipment, small arms, and uniforms, plus a special component dedicated to military housing. The cost of military construction alone has been in excess of $40 million since the program's inception in fiscal year 1981. An additional $10 million has been proposed for fiscal year 1988, together with $17 million in ESF balance of payments support, and $3 million in MAP and $900,000 in military education.

It has been stated that U.S. policy seeks to alleviate "the hardships of military life that were one of the causes of the coup," as well as to build "a professional military force with an improved command structure and higher morale." Among the other U.S. goals not yet realized is that of getting the soldiers back into the barracks; most are still living in private houses and buildings appropriated without compensation to the owners.

The rationale for this anomaly is a tapestry of economic interests ($400 million in U.S. private investments in Liberia), historic ties between the two countries, the key importance of Liberia for U.S. communications in West and Central Africa, the availability of the country's principal airfield for contingency planning, and, perhaps most crucial, the desire to block efforts by Libya's Qaddafi to gain influence among the Liberian military.

The Planning Cycle
Forty years have now elapsed since Secretary of State George C. Marshall delivered his 12-minute speech at Harvard University embarking the United States on a long-term economic recovery program for European nations. In the intervening period, military-related aid has become a major component of U.S. assistance abroad. In fiscal year 1986, security assistance
accounted for $9.6 billion out of a total foreign aid level of $14.8 billion; for fiscal year 1988, the administration's request is for $9.46 billion, as against $5.75 billion for economic aid. In arriving at these funding levels, the executive branch has fashioned a reasonably rational and balanced planning and budgeting approach:

Before beginning or expanding a security assistance relationship, the United States carefully considers its own arms control and transfer policies, available resources, and domestic concerns as reflected in congressional views. It also weighs such factors as the recipient country's objectives, and its ability to absorb equipment and to finance both original acquisitions and continuing logistics support. (1988 Congressional Presentation, op. cit.)

The Reagan administration strongly endorses joint planning with prospective aid recipients, addressing such issues as the nature of needs (including threat analysis), the economic and financial problems confronting the recipient, life-cycle costs associated with equipment acquisitions, the structure and professional capabilities of the recipient's military establishment, training and education requirements, logistics support facilities, and a multiplicity of related factors. Within the Africa region, close joint defense planning (in the limited sense that we have sent teams over to survey capabilities and helped plan the future of military programs) has been conducted on an ongoing basis with Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, Kenya, Egypt, and Zaire.

The actual planning cycle extends over several years. Once formal negotiations are concluded with African clients, the internal executive-legislative branch processes begin and extend over a period of two-plus years. The following flow chart outlines the more significant steps in the security assistance budget cycle for a given year's appropriation:

**Year 1**
- U.S. country teams in the field (spring)
- executive branch review (spring-summer)
- State Department recommendation to Office of Management and Budget (fall)
- OMB passback to State Department (late fall)
- State Department justification ("reclama") of request to administration (late fall)
- presidential approval (Christmas) to Congress (winter)

**Year 2**
- Congressional hearings (spring)
- congressional committee markups (summer)
- bill passage (fall)
- president's signature (late fall)
- allocation of funds (late fall)
- notify country (winter)

**Year 3**
- Apportion funds (winter)
- obligate funds (spring)

Under circumstances of budgeting stringency requiring reprogramming of appropriated funds, African claimants for U.S. largesse are almost certain to be on the low-priority list. The accounts for Israel and Egypt claim 50 percent or more of MAP worldwide. In descending order of priority are the traditional base-rights countries — e.g., Spain, Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines — together with Pakistan and El Salvador (Reagan Doctrine designees). "New" access-rights nations, such as Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya, are invariably accorded third-priority ranking, with the remainder of African recipients in the disenfranchised ranks when major reprogrammings of available funds occur.

Another "imponderable" in the planning cycle has been the cash-flow problem of nations that are increasingly burdened by debt. The Reagan administration has felt constrained to deal with the difficulty by reducing cash and credit sales (FMS) to most sub-Saharan nations, turning instead to grant military aid (MAP). As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Koch observed in 1985 in the previously cited CSIS Africa Notes no. 49:

As the Department of Defense looked at Africa and the security concerns of our friends there, we calculated that most of these nations faced limited or no external threats and, except in a few rare cases, none comparable to those internal threats exacerbated by economic instability. The damages incurred in the purchase of expensive weaponry. So in the past two plus years we have cut all but three African nations off from [FMS] credits, and shifted them into MAP. In this fashion, they are forestalled from subsidizing their own destruction. The financial burdens and liabilities associated with FMS funding have become so worrisome that the Reagan administration has presented Congress with new refinancing options. The first, called prepayment at par, would allow countries to prepay high-interest-rate loans without penalty. The second, interest capitalization, is a balloon plan allowing FMS recipients to defer payment of part of the interest due on loans. The United States government, for its part, would be permitted to reduce high-interest loans to existing market rates. The difference between the old and new rates would be "capitalized" — i.e. the corresponding payments would be deferred and repaid "with interest" at the time of original loan maturity.

To date, key members of Congress have been highly critical of the administration strategy. Barring compromise, several past and present recipients of FMS credit financing face serious risk of defaulting on interest payments, a denouement that could lead to termination of security assistance, as stipulated under existing legislation.

**The Outlook**

The harsh reality of security assistance program retrenchment looms close on the horizon. Given pressures to reduce budget deficits, cuts in foreign aid are inevitable. While administration spokesmen will launch public appeals for special consideration, the congressional constituency for security assistance is narrowly based and primarily dedicated to protecting funding levels for only a handful of aid recipients (in particular Egypt and Israel). All others are compelled to face prospects for diminished resource availability.
Concerns have been expressed that U.S. leverage and access abroad may be compromised, especially in Africa, which faces the brunt of the cuts. As one frustrated Defense Department official observed: "If we could take just $1 billion from Israel-Egypt, we would have enough to do a credible job in the remainder of the world. One can also make the argument that giving special treatment to Israel and Egypt will be dysfunctional to their long-term interests in relation to the international community and may reinforce the opinion held by some that Israel is a pariah state and Egypt is a sellout."

The pressure on foreign aid should dictate closer cooperation and integrated planning than heretofore among interested U.S. government agencies. In particular, the State and Defense Departments, Treasury, Commerce, ACDA, and the Agency for International Development might well be encouraged to set aside their policy and turf battles in favor of rational determination of national interests and strategic goals ahead. Experience over the past decade suggests, however, that such expectations are not likely to be met.

Within the State Department alone, the geographic bureaus perpetually compete for budgetary resources. Secretaries of State have evinced little capacity over the years to control such bureaucratic guerrilla warfare, which not infrequently involves outreach for bureaucratic and congressional allies and special appeals to political action committees, media pundits, and other potential "influentials." The Bureau of African Affairs is at a special disadvantage when competition moves to this level.

A possible compensatory trade-off for the Africa Bureau would be to de-emphasize MAP and FMS, turning instead to traditional economic aid vehicles — bilateral development assistance and multilateral institutions. Such an approach, however, involves substantial and significant risks: (1) current recipients of U.S. military aid would regard the approach as a denigration of U.S. understandings and "commitments"; (2) congressional support for economic assistance to Africa is as narrowly based as for military aid; (3) Department of Defense colleagues would be likely to resist on the grounds that military-facilities access rights in Somalia, Kenya, Morocco, and elsewhere are geostrategic essentials.

At best, the immediate outlook for U.S. arms transfers to Africa — both in the northern littoral and below the Sahara — is cloudy. This would be an appropriate moment (there is not much to lose) for the present administration to attempt in its waning months to develop a fresh approach to all official U.S. resource transfers abroad. A collaborative effort with key members of Congress and carefully selected (informed) staff would be the logical way to approach a move toward multiyear integrated budgeting involving different combinations and levels of assistance.

William H. Lewis is director of Security Policy Studies, School of Public and International Affairs, George Washington University. Over the past 30 years, he served in various capacities in the Department of State, including deputy to the under secretary for security assistance and as a senior office director in the Bureau of African Affairs.
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