

## To Demystify and Unsimplify

With the publication of this first issue of *CSIS Africa Notes*, a new dimension is added to the Center's African Studies Program. Not all articles we publish over the next year will be as irreverent as Gerald A. Funk's tour of five countries of East Africa featured in this issue (See "Some Observations on Strategic Realities and Ideological Red Herrings on the Horn of Africa," page 2), but all will be concerned in one way or another with destereotyping. The problem with boxing and labeling African leaders and states as "good guys" and "bad guys," as Mr. Funk demonstrates, is that boxes and labels devised in either Moscow or Washington tend to disintegrate in the African sun. Thus, we will be looking through a variety of prisms at African political configurations, personalities, conflicts, economic pressures, relationships with the industrial nations, and policy options for the United States.

This first issue of *Notes* also provides a timely opportunity to inform old and new friends about the activities and priorities of the African Studies Program since I joined the Center as Director of African Studies in May 1981—succeeding Dr. Chester A. Crocker, now Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. The program as now constituted has three broad purposes:

(1) We engage in and support original research on African issues, giving special priority to future-oriented projects and to analytical consideration of American private and public sector interests and U.S. policy options. Availability of funding is a key factor in determining the scope and range of research. Among studies now in progress are *United States Interests in Africa in the 1980s and Beyond* by Helen Kitchen, to be published in the Center's Washington Papers paperback series; "Africa in the 1990s," to be published in part in the Fall 1982 issue of *The Washington Quarterly*; and an exploration and evaluation of the growing and increasingly controversial body of literature on the role that African minerals should play in determining U.S. policy toward the continent.

(2) The planning, hosting, and moderating of issue-oriented conferences that may draw participants from throughout the United States, Africa, and Europe has become a major program focus. Three recent conferences demonstrate our current emphasis on bringing together for constructive dialogue individuals and groups whose paths would be unlikely to cross in the ordinary course of events:

- "Furthering Higher Education of Black South Africans: How Can the United States Best Help?" was the subject explored at a December 17-18, 1981 colloquium attended by 52 representatives of U.S. government departments and agencies, officials from a spectrum of foundations with educational programs in

southern Africa, senior corporate executives, university presidents and other academicians, congressional staff working on relevant legislation, and others having particular insight and experience in the field. The keynote address setting forth the Reagan Administration's commitments, concerns, and questions was delivered by Assistant Secretary of State Crocker. One of the two major substantive presentations (by Dr. John A. Marcum, academic vice chancellor of the University of California at Santa Cruz, in collaboration with five other senior-level American educators who accompanied him on an August-September 1981 study tour of South African educational institutions organized under the auspices of the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program) will be published as a book later this year by the University of California Press under the title *Education, Race, and Social Change in South Africa*.

- "Angola's Economic Prospects" were the focus of a lively off-the-record conference (March 24, 1982) that brought together 120 participants, including 65 representatives of American corporations, banks, and consulting firms currently operating in Angola or interested in exploring opportunities and operational conditions; officials of various U.S. government departments and agencies; representatives of the World Bank and the IMF; staff of the Africa subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees; and other specialists in southern African affairs. The Angolan delegation was headed by Dr. José Victor de Carvalho, Governor of the Central Bank, and also included senior economists and analysts from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, and Ministry of Petroleum. Assistant Secretary Crocker hosted a reception at the Department of State at the close of the CSIS deliberations.

- "Africa: Continuity and Change in the 1980s" was the topic explored at a May 1-2, 1982 conference in Monterey, California, co-hosted with the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Gerald A. Funk's article in this issue of *Africa Notes* is adapted from his presentation at the session on the Horn. Other sessions focused on North Africa, West Africa and Zaire, Southern Africa, and Africa's role in global politics. Conference coordinators were Michael Clough, assistant professor of National Security Affairs at the NPGS, and Lieutenant Commander William A. Nurthen, USN, who has been a 1981-82 Visiting Fellow in African Studies at CSIS. A book based on the major conference exchanges is probable.

On a smaller scale, the Center's African Discussion Group series brings together, on a "target of opportunity" schedule, a mix of officials from various U.S. government civilian and military depart-

ments and agencies, congressional staff, and Africa-watchers from corporations, the media, academia, churches, and think tanks for meetings with visiting political figures and scholars. Featured speakers in recent months have included Colin Legum, dean of Britain's Africa press corps, speaking on "The End of Apartheid Now In Sight?"; four officials of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement, speaking on "Inkatha's Political Future"; former Zairian Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond for an informal Q and A session; and Chief S.O. Adebo, chairman of the Board of Governors of Nigeria's National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, on "Nigeria's Foreign Policy Priorities." Discussion Group sessions may be luncheons or morning or late afternoon coffees, and are divided between formal opening remarks and off-the-record exchanges.

(3) The African Studies Program contributes to or advises on the African component for Center-wide studies of worldwide scope. We participate in many ongoing working groups and dialogues outside the Center concerned with Africa policy issues and the in-

terpretation of events and trends in the continent. In addition, we speak, write, and brief on general and specific situations and issues when time permits and when we believe these activities will serve a constructive purpose.

In sum, we think it is not an exaggeration to say that the range of nonpartisan roles relating to the policymaking process available to the Center's African Studies Program is found in no other single institution in the United States. We believe that *CSIS Africa Notes* will enhance the program's service to Africa and to the U.S. national interest by simultaneously demystifying and unsimplifying the African scene for what we hope will be a growing family of subscribers.



Helen Kitchen  
Director of African Studies

## Some Observations On Strategic Realities And Ideological Red Herrings On the Horn of Africa

By Gerald A. Funk

At the risk of creating some discomfort among the present keepers of the President's briefing book on Africa, I would suggest that the broad outlines of current U.S. policies on the Horn are quite similar to those of the Carter years. The Reagan Administration has demonstrated an unexpected appreciation of the complexity of politics in this region of Africa by its continued hesitancy to rush to the full embrace of the Siad Barre government in Somalia, its respect for the wishes of Kenya's president, Daniel Arap Moi, not to be overwhelmed with American gestures of friendship, its conditional support of a moderate Numeri in Sudan, and its surprisingly long-view willingness to keep the lines open to Mengistu's Ethiopia.

These nuances reflect an appreciation that the underlying importance of the Horn to the United States remains strategic rather than ideological. The importance of the region is basically a function of its proximity to the oil fields of the Gulf, to the Indian Ocean shipping lanes, and to the site of the United States' long-running attempt to ride with Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia simultaneously. It is a long-term and not a passing U.S. interest to keep the Red Sea trade route open and unthreatened through the strait of Bab el Mandeb; to maintain access to port and air facilities in the region; to allow for a credible projection of conventional military strength into the region (be it the growing Rapid Deployment Force, or strategic naval power in the Indian Ocean) sufficient to insure respect for our positions, both regionally and globally. At the same time, it is in our interest that this projection of power be exercised with due appreciation for regional concerns and sensitivities.

### The Two Regional Constants

There are two basic problems on the Horn which keep everything stirred up: the Ogaden and Eritrea. The Somali-Ethiopian dispute over the Ogaden is one of the longest-running and most intense blood feuds in Africa. The Somali claims to the Ogaden (and to

one-third of Kenya and all of Djibouti) go back to the colonial days of the 1890s when the British and the Italians undertook (in cooperation with imperial Ethiopia) to carve up the traditional territory of the nomadic Somalis. At the time it all happened, the Somalis were preoccupied with following their camels and goats and so unaccustomed to the peculiar territorial concepts of the infidel Europeans that protests were minimal and easily put down by a biff from Her Majesty's finest. But by 1960, when independent Somalia came into being through the merger of (northern) British Somaliland and (southern) Italian Somaliland, it was an axiom of Somali nationalism that the other three Somali groups—in Ethiopia's Ogaden, in Djibouti, and in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya—should be reunited in one Greater Somalia. The five-pointed star of the Somali flag is a constant reminder of this assumption.

The Somali view of the reunification of Greater Somalia collides with a key principle of the Organization of African Unity—blanket, unwavering acceptance of the often ludicrous borders drawn by the Europeans. The OAU's founders concluded in 1963 that moving even one border on the basis of ethnic affinity would lead to chaos across the continent. Therefore, when the Somalis tried to push the Ethiopians from the Ogaden in 1961, in 1964, in 1977-78, and again in 1979-80, they got absolutely no support of any kind from within Africa. And the rest of the world, not wanting to get on the wrong side of a solid OAU, concentrated its attention in the apolitical area of refugee relief. Given the dynamics of Somali domestic politics, however, incorporation of the Ogaden must be regarded as an unsettled agenda item. Other efforts will be made, probably with the same results, but not in the near future.

It was this Somali-Ethiopian fractiousness that opened the doors through which the Soviet Union has moved to a central role on the Horn. First, the Soviets came to Somalia in the early 1970s at the request of President Siad Barre to provide the otherwise unavailable arms needed for his campaign to take the Ogaden. The Soviets subsequently "traded up" by moving to Ethiopia, the center of power on the Horn, when in 1977 the Ethiopian Dergue needed arms (and couldn't get them from the United States) to counter the Somali military threat, which the Soviets themselves had created.

The second, and for Ethiopia the more significant, constant dynamic on the Horn is Eritrea. Eritrea is Ethiopia's only opening to the sea, and in the past 20 years its retention by Addis Ababa has become an emotional political issue which leaves little room for compromise in the near term, though a "federated" status may ultimately be acceptable. The issue of Eritrean independence is

complex and cannot be equated with Biafra, southern Sudan, or Shaba. While most OAU states are inclined to think of the Eritrean liberation movements in terms of secession, the fact is that Eritrea had a long separate identity (as an Ottoman enclave, then an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941, and a de facto British-ruled area from 1941 to 1952). It was only federated with Ethiopia in 1952 by the United Nations, as a result of Haile Selassie's international standing and no small amount of pressure from the United States—in political payment for the monarch's support in Korea and for his continued acceptance of the U.S. communication facilities established at Asmara in 1942.

Although only about half of the people of Eritrea are Moslem, and though the principal liberation movement, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), was originally closely identified with the Christian population, much of the external support has come from Moslem states, notably Saudi Arabia and neighboring Sudan. The Soviet Union and Cuba, which were supportive of both Eritrean movements—the original Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), and its now-dominant offspring, the EPLF, both of which call themselves Marxist—now find themselves aligned against their former clients. The Soviets are not embarrassed. The Cubans seem to be, at least to the point of not taking an active role in the Ethiopian military's Eritrean campaigns.

### What Are the Soviets Up To?

The blatant cynicism of the Soviets in their death-defying leap from the Somali camel to the back of the wild Abyssinian ass in 1977 is perhaps instructive concerning Soviet policy planning, strategy, and tactics. This exercise in opportunism demonstrates both the strengths and the weaknesses of Moscow's policy in Africa.

The Soviets do have a long-term strategic plan, but it is rather disappointingly simple: take advantage of tactical opportunities that come along. Their strength is that when they recognize their own interests clearly—as in "trading up" from Somalia to Ethiopia—they have the political will (unrestrained by domestic politics) to act accordingly. The basic weakness is two-fold: (1) They have a tendency to be somewhat clumsy in their relationships with Africans, and in spite of their attempt to appeal to Third World socialists on ideological grounds, they often come off as what they basically are—somewhat racist neo-imperialists. (2) Since the Soviets have no major immediate economic interests in Africa, they consistently fail to develop trade relationships, downplay developmental assistance, and rely primarily on building a military relationship, with a rather thin (and often cynical) application of Marxist ideology.

This pattern is graphically exemplified in the Horn. In Sudan, Colonel Jafar al-Numeri seized power in 1969 and proceeded to govern with the aid of the Soviet-oriented Sudanese Communist

Party. The same Numeri threw the Soviets out of Sudan in 1971 following an abortive Soviet-encouraged coup led by a Communist Party member previously dismissed from Numeri's government. This was an instance in which opportunism failed, driving Sudan from the pro-East to the pro-West camp in one fell swoop. The subsequent Soviet abandonment of Somalia, while a net gain on balance, did nothing to enhance Moscow's reputation as a reliable partner. The Soviets have never made serious inroads in Kenya or Djibouti. Their relationship with the Ethiopian Dergue is strained by the unwillingness of the Ethiopian army to accept uncritically Soviet advice, and by the Dergue's canny ability to confuse and delay Soviet plans for the creation of a vanguard party through which Moscow could more effectively control the ideological development of socialist Ethiopia. The Ethiopians generally have a marvelous contempt for most Europeans and their ideas on how to run Ethiopia—obviously preferring the tried-and-true personal authoritarian way that has served them so well for 3,000 years—but they see the Soviets as an especially obtuse lot. It is my prediction that there will be no communist party running Ethiopia anytime soon.

### Uncertainty in Sudan

Sudan's Jafar al-Numeri is an intelligent and skillful politician who saved the country from political ruin by negotiating an end to the long north-south civil war in 1972, and who over the past decade has kept his nation from being torn apart by its many ethnic, religious, ideological, cultural, and economic divisions. Unfortunately, he may have become the "indispensable man," without whom the whole house of cards could collapse.

During the past few years, the bottom has dropped out of a very promising economy, as mismanagement of agricultural schemes cut back export production, and ambitious development projects seemed mainly to use precious foreign exchange to put infrastructure in all the wrong places at all the wrong times. With exports running at something around \$800 million per year and imports at about \$1.7 billion per year (with few invisibles), foreign debt has risen to between \$5 and \$6 billion, necessitating massive rescheduling early in 1982. Sudan's 20 million people are largely dependent on agriculture, and struggle along on a per capita income of about \$320 per year. The IMF agreed to help out with \$300 million or so, first insisting on an end to sugar subsidies, thereby triggering "IMF riots" in January 1982.

Numeri has survived the IMF for now, and is frenetically engaged in trying to head off a political crisis in the autonomous Southern Region (postponing a referendum on the division of the south into two regions—a bitterly debated proposal, seen by the dominant Dinkahs in the south as a northern-Arab attempt to undermine the autonomy guaranteed as a part of the civil war settlement). He felt compelled in January to take apart the single party, the Sudanese Socialist Union, to reassemble it to his satisfaction. He decided to retire 22 senior army officers early and dismissed General Abdel-Majid Khalil, who held the posts of minister of defense, first vice president, and armed forces commander-in-chief, and was generally viewed as Numeri's chosen heir-apparent. The university was closed, and there were riots in virtually all cities.

Numeri's problems are basically economic, and he is trying to hang on until the promise of oil development in the south saves the day. In time, Sudan will almost certainly be a major oil exporter, but quite possibly not soon enough to save the Numeri government. The instability of post-Numeri Sudan would raise new questions about the increasingly close relationship that is now developing between Khartoum and Washington, a relationship that places Sudan second only to Egypt as a major recipient of US military and economic assistance in Africa in 1982 and in projections for 1983.

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### Improbable Djibouti

Djibouti appears to be surprisingly at peace with itself these days, despite the fact that the tiny country has virtually no resources, depending exclusively on French, Arab, and EEC largesse, and rail and port earnings from the goods trundled down from Addis Ababa on the Franco-Ethiopian Railway. Some 4,000 French Foreign Legionnaires contribute to the general economy, and to the stability of the regime, which gained independence in 1977, an event encouraged by Somalia's Siad Barre during his 1974-75 rotation as chairman of the OAU. Some cynics suggested at the time that Siad was only preparing the way for annexation. Probably somewhat more than half of the population are Somalis of the Issa clan (the others are Afars, with ethnic ties to Ethiopia). The Issa control the government, but are in no hurry to join Somalia.

Djibouti is a banker's paradise, with absolutely no exchange controls, accounts being denominated in the hard currency of one's choice. The Djibouti franc is completely convertible; it is tied to the U.S. dollar and backed up by reserves held in New York City. President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, who doesn't object to reasonable use of his port and airport facilities by the United States, was reelected in June 1981. With the continued support of France, and given his recent round of successful goodwill visits to all his Horn neighbors, he seems to be presiding over a stable realm. He would, however, be vulnerable to agitation stirred up by either Ethiopia or Somalia, or both, for their own purposes.

### Kenya: Handle With Care

Kenya is every European's idea of the place to live in East Africa without seeming to leave home. The aura of stability may be just a little deceptive, for there are long-term economic problems brewing. The basic weakness is that while the economy is based on agriculture, the limited arable land (20 to 30 percent) is already fully utilized, and the population (now 16 million) is growing rapidly (at four percent a year). Per capita income is only about \$350 per year, with a disparity between urban and rural workers that is large, but not large enough to make the urban workers very happy. Exports are running at about \$1 billion a year, while imports are at \$1.8 billion. Much of the shortfall is made up by the tourist trade and other service earnings, but aid and borrowing in substantial measure is required.

President Daniel Arap Moi has deftly consolidated his political control since he succeeded the founding father, Jomo Kenyatta, in 1978. He has (1) skillfully outmaneuvered and controlled a gaggle of ambitious politicians within his party (KANU) and cabinet, most of whom used to regard him as a not-overly-bright minor impediment to be overcome on their way to the presidency; (2) managed to keep the potentially divisive ethnic rivalries in Kenya in hand; (3) gained the respect of the police and army, something he did not inherit with his accession to the office; (4) managed several economic mini-crises of the past year reasonably well; (5) proven to be an understanding and responsible strategic partner of the United States while at the same time gaining the respect of fellow African heads of state for the manner in which he has carried out his role as OAU chairman during the past year; and (6) worked out an acceptably good relationship with Somalia's Siad Barre.

In sum, unless there is a massive drought, assassination, or some other comparable disaster, Kenya should remain on track for some time to come. Moi will continue to be somewhat vulnerable to charges of being an "American puppet" and "giving Kenyan bases away," but he should be able to deflect these thrusts if the U.S. military maintains a reasonably low profile.

### Trouble Ahead in Somalia?

Somalia presents a more somber picture. President Mohammed Siad Barre is not just in economic trouble; he is in deep political trouble as well. Three and a half million Somalis manage to scrape up a per capita income of about \$100 or so per year, mostly by

herding goats and camels, petty trading, and growing bananas on the very scarce river-bottom land. Some 75,000 Somali workers in the Gulf help out by sending home hefty remittances. There is a bit of oil, and maybe a little uranium, but little prospect of the kind of investment in infrastructure required to exploit these resources. To make matters worse, there seem to be about 750,000 refugees from the Ogaden in camps in Somalia, though Siad Barre claims 1.2 million when asking for aid. Annual GNP runs at about \$400 million, and refugee aid from abroad has added another \$130-150 million, although some cynics estimate that half of the latter is diverted into the economy several miles short of the refugee camps.

The Somalis are consummate politicians, and the fact that Siad Barre has been able to remain in power since 1969 through an adroit manipulation of very complex clan politics is impressive evidence of his skill. Some of his current problems involve "face," and are directly linked to his relations with Washington. When the United States indicated some interest in air and naval access in early 1980, Siad began talks with a shopping list running to \$1-2 billion, depending on optional and extra equipment. When he finally settled, in August of the same year, for \$40 million and change (contingent upon the certified absence of Somali armed forces from the Ogaden), he found himself in difficulty at home. Hopes were falsely raised again in January 1981, when, just before President Reagan's inauguration, Henry Kissinger dropped by Mogadiscio on what was seen there as a signal that the new Republican Administration would be more "understanding" than its predecessor. The way was cleared for the long-promised shipment of arms to begin when the Carter Administration despatched the necessary certification to Congress that Somali forces were out of the Ogaden just before the president's term expired.

In May 1981, Siad came to Washington with high hopes, only to discover that no one in the Reagan Administration was paying much attention to Somalia. Meanwhile, the tempo of opposition had begun to pick up at home. After dismissing several long-standing allies, including Minister of Defense Mohammed Ali Samater, Siad was ruling by decree, through a resurrected (in October 1980) Supreme Revolutionary Council. He seemed to be growing increasingly dependent upon the narrow base of his own southern Merrehan clan and the closely related Ogadeni clan of his mother. In exile, the Somali National Movement (based in London, largely northern Issa, and receiving support from the Gulf), the Somali Salvation Front (based in Addis Ababa, associated with the large and important Majerteyn clan which had been displaced by Siad's 1969 coup), and the Somali Workers' Party (based in Aden) all began to get busy. In October 1981, the SSF, the SWP, and others formed a new united Democratic Front for Somali Salvation (DFSS) and, by early 1982, the other large movement, SNM, was talking of joining DFSS to unite all opposition.

In February 1982, riots in Hargeisa in the north required imposition of martial law. In March (just before going off to see President Reagan for a second time), Siad saw fit to amnesty ex-Prime Minister Mohammed Haji Ibrahim Egal, who had been in jail since the 1969 coup. Siad was well received in Washington, but apparently got no new offers of aid.

The combination of economic problems (mostly growing out of the Ogaden adventures) and Siad's political/personal failure to win U.S. support for his face-off against Ethiopia, has increased the chances that he may fall victim to the active clan politics of combined exile and internal forces. A new army coup and a scramble for power is the most likely scenario. The international orientation of any successor government is hard to predict, but it is unlikely that it would leap into the Soviet embrace. The SNM and the SSF are not noticeably anti-American; rather, they are Somali nationalist in outlook, and their position would probably depend largely upon Washington's signals.

### Meanwhile, in Ethiopia

Ethiopia's 32 million people are nearly all engaged in agriculture, or in fighting the Somalis, or the Eritreans, or each other from time to time, and they manage to earn a rather disappointing per capita income of \$100 per year for all their trouble. Their major export remains coffee, which accounts for three-fourths of foreign exchange. After eight years of slow-motion revolution and violent internal terrorism, and two major wars and a half dozen incipient ethnic insurrections, it is not surprising that the economy is in disastrous condition. Ethiopia is well-endowed with good land and reasonable amounts of other resources, but an effective end to the Eritrean revolt and a massive infusion of new development capital over a number of years will be required to get the country back on its feet. Since neither of these is about to happen, and since Ethiopia keeps the lid on economically induced problems through forceful political action, let's look at the politics.

The Ethiopian revolution has come a long way since the confusion of 1974, which started out with the army and urban workers striking over economic issues left untended by an obviously weakened Emperor. The course of the revolution was firmly set on the night of November 23/24, 1974, when Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, then one of two vice chairmen of the new Provisional Military Administrative Committee (the Dergue), went to the house of General Aman Andom (an Eritrean), the Dergue's chairman, to "question" him about rumors of a "sellout" to Eritrea, i.e. a negotiated federation. Aman and a few loyal soldiers fought it out against a tank-led company, but the clash was over before midnight. Mengistu, who had reason to believe that the popular Aman would be avenged by a counterattack, decided to kill 60 of the old regime prisoners being held at the Palace so that the efforts of the revolution would not be a total loss. Sometime after midnight, he trucked them down to the outside walls of Alem Baka ("End of the World") prison on the south side, shot them all by headlight, and buried them by bulldozer in a mass grave on the spot. Much to Mengistu's surprise, morning found him still alive, and the new strong man of the revolution.

In December 1974, a policy of socialism was announced. In January 1975, businesses were nationalized. In March, land reform (no private ownership, no tenancy) was instituted. In August, housing was nationalized. And in September, the final remnants of the last civilian structure, the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions, was eliminated. By the end of 1975, the urban workers were in armed underground revolt in the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP); the conservative Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) was in revolt in Gondar; the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were rebelling. The Dergue controlled Addis Ababa and Asmara (mostly through the new revolutionary neighborhood groups called kebeles), and not a great deal in between.

In all the confusion of 1975, there were some fundamental changes. The feudal land system had been destroyed, the urban population was politicized by the kebele system, the previous dominance of the Amhara ethnic group had been shattered (although Amhara-like political structures remain), and the notion of redistribution of wealth was established.

The years 1976-77 were a time of Red Terror vs. White Terror, with perhaps 30-50,000 people dying in the cities and towns as the EPRP battled the Dergue, and the kebeles fought the shadows of "counterrevolution"—and everyone settled a lot of old scores. In February 1977, Mengistu confirmed himself as the unchallenged leader by killing the Dergue's current chairman and his other rivals in a dramatic shoot-out at the Palace.

In late 1975 and early 1976, the Dergue (and the Soviets) observed the reluctance of a U.S. Congress traumatized by Vietnam to permit any American military involvement in Angola. In November of that year, President-elect Carter noted his discouragement with the human rights record of the Dergue. In

December, Mengistu went to Moscow; in April 1977, he threw out the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), and Soviet and Cuban advisors began to arrive. In July 1977, the Somalis, believing that post-imperial Ethiopia was ripe for disintegration, invaded the Ogaden. The Soviets thereupon changed horses, delivered to Ethiopia massive installments of what became a \$2 billion arms deal, and 12-15,000 Cuban troops arrived. By February 1978, Ethiopia had defeated the Somalis and the Soviets had a new client state.

Meanwhile, many political flowers bloomed in 1977-78—MEISON, Malared, Ethchat, and others, in addition to the outlawed EPRP and EDU. By mid-1979, however, Mengistu had engineered the destruction of all save Seded (Revolutionary Flame), which he had set up to counter the believably socialist MEISON. In September 1979, Soviet head of government Alexei Kosygin dropped by for a visit, and Mengistu responded to repeated Soviet nudges toward creation of a vanguard party by announcing COPWE—the Commission for the Organization of the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia. In December 1979, COPWE was reannounced. In June 1980, it finally held its first meeting, at which nothing happened. In February 1981, COPWE held its second meeting, still with no real results. In November 1981, COPWE held its third meeting. The membership list seems to have grown to 90 or so, with 79 from the military and all hand-picked by Mengistu. Once the commission is fully established, it will probably be some time before it begins to discuss seriously the possibility of actually organizing a party. These things take time in Ethiopia, especially when you have foreigners looking over your shoulder.

On the Eritrean front, the situation has recently become somewhat more promising from the Dergue's point of view. In early January 1975, Ethiopian forces went all out to crush the ELF/EPLF militarily. By mid-1976, the offensive was reduced to a massive "peasants' march" on Eritrea, which ended in disaster and left the ELF/EPLF in near-total command of Eritrea except for Asmara and Massawa, held by 25,000 troops facing perhaps 20,000 ELF and 15,000 EPLF. After the defeat of the Somalis in the south in early 1978, and with the help of their new Soviet friends, the Dergue got serious about control of Eritrea. By mid-1979, with Soviet advisors, T-54 tanks, MiG-23s, and helicopter gunships, and 50,000 Ethiopian troops, the Dergue had pushed the EPLF back to the northeastern town of Nafka and laid siege. In the large, set-piece battles that followed, the Ethiopians took a beating. They tried again at the end of 1979, with the same result. During the first half of 1980, the military had to turn its attention back to the latest Somali incursion into the Ogaden. The Eritreans took advantage of the relative lull in pressure to engage in their own civil war within a civil war, between the ELF and the EPLF. By the end of 1981, the ELF had effectively been destroyed. Meanwhile, the new-found rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Khartoum—with exchange visits by Mengistu and Numeri in May and November 1980—had cut the aid to the EPLF dramatically.

In 1981 and early 1982, Mengistu has been increasingly governing Ethiopia in the style and manner of a new emperor. Life in Addis Ababa is not too different than in the old days. The Soviets and Cubans are in low profile; the army is well-organized, well-housed, and well-paid. The rains have been good, and plenty of teff grain is available on the black market. Ethiopia has joined a military pact with South Yemen and Libya; the Italian Foreign Minister has stopped by; Mitterrand's France has begun to be friendly; 600 political prisoners have been freed; an impossibly ambitious new 10-year economic plan has been floated by the United Nations (with a demand for a more equitable share of total Third World aid from all sources); it has been made clear that more Western aid and trade is desired (on Ethiopian terms, as always).

In January 1982, Mengistu went personally to Asmara to launch a new kind of Eritrean offensive—Operation Red Star. This am-

bitious economic campaign to rebuild Eritrea was designed to get under way just as soon as Ethiopia's now swollen northern army of 150,000 (including three fresh divisions) crushed the final 20,000 or so EPLF forces at Nafka in the northeast and in the Barka valley in the northwest. As of the end of April, however, there was still no victory to announce. Indeed, the EPLF was claiming that it had inflicted "enormous" casualties. Even assuming a fairly substantial Dergue victory in Eritrea, the basic problem of how to fund the huge Red Star program remains to be solved.

In sum, while Ethiopia's economic prospects run from bad to dismal for the next several years, Mengistu appears to be firmly in control politically, with internal stability at least comparable to that enjoyed by Haile Selassie in the late 1960s, before the decline set in. The "Somali threat" is under control for now. The Eritrean insurgency is certainly not ended but is being brought down to manageable levels, and travel to Asmara is once again possible. The TPLF in Tigre remains a problem, but not a serious threat, especially if Eritrea is essentially tamed. The EPRP and EDU are unlikely to pose a significant challenge to Mengistu, unless he is seriously weakened by some catastrophe. There is no political agitation going on, other than the usual (albeit sometimes deadly) politics of the Palace—not even in COPWE or, more to the point, especially not in COPWE.

### Enter Libya, Stage Left

Is Libya really, after all, a part of the Greater Horn? Or is Qaddafi just confused? Or confusing? And wouldn't it be better if American policymakers ignored him? Well . . . no . . . no . . . yes . . . and maybe a little, but not too much.

It should be kept in mind that the nature of Qaddafi's role on the Horn is largely ideological rather than strategic, or even military, and that he is much more irritating than truly threatening. Qaddafi is not highly regarded as a reliable political friend and ally anywhere in Africa, and his attempts to influence events in the Horn and adjoining countries have not been exactly dazzling. His intervention with regular Libyan troops in opposition to the Tanzanian-aided exile invasion that finally ended Idi Amin's role in Uganda was a model of military ineptitude. His crude political operations in Kenya have served no purpose other than to keep that country on guard. He has won no friends in Somalia, even among the exiles he supports from time to time, because they fear and distrust his erratic behavior. His comic-opera attempt to win over Djibouti's President Gouled by sending a planeload of arms, unordered and virtually unannounced, did not enhance his political-military leverage there.

He has managed to increase instability in Sudan, through talk of hit squads and funding for elements within the dissident Ansar sect (and probably for parts of the Moslem Brotherhood), and through some measure of real military pressure during the Libyan presence in Chad. But the basic and major elements of Sudan's instability are internal, and are not greatly exacerbated by Qaddafi's shenanigans—at least not nearly as much as Numeri claims. It is, after all, convenient, in the face of truly destabilizing internal political problems, to be able to rally good nationalists and foreign allies by pointing to an evil foreign threat. One could in fact argue that Qaddafi is strengthening Numeri in certain respects, just as Siad Barre's threat to the Ogaden served to pull anti-Mengistu Ethiopian forces back to the fold to defend Mother Ethiopia.

A new worry among Qaddafi-watchers is what role he might be able to play on the Horn as a result of the pact with South Yemen and Ethiopia that was his answer to the 1981 Gulf of Sidra incident and the anti-Libyan rhetoric emanating from Washington in connection with the launching of the Rapid Deployment Force. Qaddafi's past track record suggests that Libyan "pacts" and "mergers" are more rhetorical than real. The United States should not expend time, energy, and political capital in engaging in battle with Qaddafi's exaggerated claims to leverage he does not possess. The real U.S. concern on the Horn should be strategic and military. American policies should be shaped to reflect that primary concern, tempered by awareness of regional issues and sensitivities. Ideology is not the name of the game in this corner of the world.

### How Strong Is the Soviet-Ethiopian Tie?

Some scenario writers envisage that one day the Ethiopians may decide that the Soviets have served their purpose (i.e. maintaining the integrity of Mother Ethiopia in time of peril) and ask the Soviets to go home. The more cynical note that this may appeal to the Ethiopian mind as an excellent procedure for avoiding the payment of a \$2 billion debt.

Will it happen? It could, but not until Eritrea is firmly in hand (or clearly lost), and not while Somalia is engaged in one of its periodic bouts of active irredentism, and only when some other patron (the United States, for instance) seems prepared to offer a better deal.

What should the United States do about this? Nothing much, for now, except to remain flexible, await events, and be prepared to recognize and accept opportunity should it appear.

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