

**IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE WEAPON SYSTEMS
ACQUISITION REFORM ACT
Of 2009**

A Progress Report

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Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 – A Progress Report

By David J. Berteau, Joachim Hofbauer, and Stephanie Sanok

The primary challenge for today's defense acquisition system is to execute acquisition programs without major schedule delays and cost overruns. Meeting that challenge has been the goal of acquisition reform improvements for decades. Today, all parties agree that the time is right for renewed efforts to improve the performance of the defense acquisition system.

In 2009, Congress unanimously passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), and President Obama signed it into Public Law 111-23 on May 22, 2009. All the players hailed it as an important step toward addressing many of the problematic issues facing the defense acquisition process. During the signing ceremony, President Obama summarized the key goals in developing WSARA, stating that the act will: "limit cost overruns before they spiral out of control. It will strengthen oversight and accountability by appointing officials who will be charged with closely monitoring the weapons systems we're purchasing to ensure that costs are controlled... This law will also enhance competition and end conflicts of interest in the weapons acquisitions process so that American taxpayers and the American military can get the best weapons at the lowest cost."¹ Many in the White House and the Congress relied on reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which had studied 96 major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and identified aggregate cost overruns of \$296 billion and an average delay in delivering initial capabilities of 22 months.²

One year has passed since WSARA was enacted. It is time to examine and report on progress to date. As with any reform, the actual success of WSARA depends on a clear understanding of the goals and on effective implementation of the spirit of the legislation. Ultimately, the objective is not simply to increase the ability of the Department of Defense (DoD) to curtail cost and schedule growth in the acquisition process; it is to produce and operate systems that meet warfighter needs. Any reliable assessment of whether this objective has been achieved – i.e. the spirit of WSARA has been implemented – is going to take at least three to four years, given that cost and schedule performance data are lagging indicators and are unlikely to provide useful measures of effectiveness in the interim.

Therefore, this progress report on WSARA implementation focuses on evaluating the direct or literal implementation of WSARA's provisions and on identifying key areas to monitor for trends in the coming years. It is intended as an initial report, to be followed by periodic updates and additional assessments.

Key provisions

Expectations ran high for WSARA. Introduced in early 2009, separate versions were marked up in committee and passed the floor of the Senate and the House of Representatives without a single dissenting vote. Following conference, the final bill was enacted less than four months after its introduction. The widespread enthusiasm in supporting the legislation was expressed best by Senator

¹ "Remarks by the President at Signing of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act", May 22, 2009.

² "Assessments of Selected Weapon Systems", GAO report, March 30, 2009, summary page.

Carl Levin (D-MI), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who stated that “if these changes are successfully implemented, they should help our acquisition programs avoid future cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance problems.”³ Representative Rob Andrews (D-NJ), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform, called WSARA “landmark legislation, which will reform Defense spending and limit Pentagon cost overruns before they spiral out of control.”⁴ President Obama echoed these expectations at the WSARA signing ceremony, noting that the legislation should make the government more efficient, accountable, and responsible.⁵ Let’s look at the provisions that generated that enthusiasm.

At its core, WSARA encompassed organizational and structural changes to the DOD acquisition bureaucracy as well as process and oversight modifications to achieve better outcomes. On the organizational side, WSARA created key new positions:

- Director of Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (DCAPE)
- Director, Development Test & Evaluation (DT&E)
- Director, Systems Engineering (SE)
- Director for Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA)

For these positions, equivalent organizations are supported in each of the Military Departments.

On the acquisition process side, WSARA promoted a number of process changes:

- Increased competition throughout the acquisition process
- Improved requirements formulation processes
- Improved cost estimation processes
- A more stringent set of regulations on organizational conflicts of interest
- Revised Milestone A and B certification processes
- Revised processes for reporting critical cost growth
- Increased Congressional oversight through heightened reporting requirements

However, proponents knew that WSARA alone would not solve acquisition problems. Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, noted that WSARA primarily focused on what the beginning and middle phase of the acquisition process,⁶ and even for these phases, WSARA does not address all relevant issues. Congress has not finished its efforts, either, as evidenced by the requirements for a new acquisition process for information technology systems, in the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and the recent introduction of the Implementing Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain Value in Every (IMPROVE) Acquisition Act of 2010 – to

³ DAU presentation, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System Statutory and Regulatory Changes”, Bradford Brown, Director for Acquisition & Program Management, February 2010, slide 5.

⁴ Press statement, “Skelton, McHugh Announce Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act Conference Agreement”, May 19, 2009.

⁵ “Remarks by the President at Signing of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act”, May 22, 2009.

⁶ Carter, “Submitted Statement House Armed Services Committee Panel on Acquisition Reform, March 11, 2010, p.4

“reform the remaining eighty percent of the defense acquisition system not addressed by” WSARA. This bill has already passed the House.⁷

The Executive Branch has also undertaken actions to affect reform across departments and agencies. Throughout 2009 and into this year, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and its Office for Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) promulgated several memoranda focused on improving acquisition, contracting, and management for all federal civilian departments and agencies. Key issues addressed within these memoranda complement or reinforce reform efforts highlighted by WSARA, such as:

- Improving the use of contractor performance information
- Improving government acquisition by reducing overall contract spending and “high risk” contracting
- Providing better management of the multi-sector workforce
- Increasing competition and structuring contracts for better results

The parallel efforts of legislation and Executive Branch action has been a rare combination in the history of acquisition reform and seems to offer promise. Subsequent progress reports will provide a more detailed assessment of the OMB and OFPP actions.

Implementation Progress

One method of evaluating progress on implementation is to list each provision of WSARA and report on known actions to comply with those provisions. The appendix to this report provides a detailed status for each provision, including the requirements of the provisions, any deadline, and the current known status of implementation.

Notably, DoD has already implemented all the organizational changes required by WSARA Sections 101, 102, 103, and 104. The key positions in those new organizations have also been filled.

Many of the process-driven modifications called for in WSARA were addressed in a December 4, 2009, Directive Type Memorandum by Under Secretary Carter (DTM 09-027).⁸ However, some implementation gaps remain. For instance, the due dates for a number of reporting requirements – such as the report on MDAPs’ technology maturity & integration risk – have already passed. Reports have been drafted, but some reports remain in coordination or await signature.

While DoD has made considerable progress since the President signed WSARA into law one year ago, implementation is not yet complete. Aside from delays in submitting congressionally-required reports, it remains questionable whether implementation of some provisions has been adequate. Generally speaking, DoD’s efforts have followed the WSARA stipulations. Yet for some provisions, the implementation strategy has not directly met the requirements as formulated in the act.

⁷ Press statement, “Skelton, McKeon, Andrews, Conaway Introduce Bill to Overhaul DOD Acquisition”, April 14, 2010.

⁸ “Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027 – Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.” December 4, 2009. <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-09-027.pdf>

Section 105, for example, called for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to seek and consider greater input from Combatant Commanders.⁹ Initial DoD actions indicated that the July 2009 revision of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) manual implemented Section 105 regarding the role of the Combatant Commanders in identifying joint military requirements in response to WSARA.¹⁰ However, one could argue that the manual does not sufficiently strengthen the Combatant Commanders' role to the extent envisioned. More recent actions indicate that DoD has started to update the JCIDS manual to comply more fully with section 105.¹¹

Incorporating provisions into Directive-Type Memoranda does not guarantee that the execution of some acquisition programs will be consistent with the provisions of WSARA. For instance, competition requirements have long been part of DoD's regulations. WSARA only reinforced the requirement for acquisition strategies to ensure competition throughout the life-cycle for MDAPs.¹² However, DoD continues to find it preferable to bypass competition when the near-term cost is deemed too great, independent of the long term savings.

The difficulty faced by DoD in ensuring competition throughout the life-cycle for MDAPs leads to the recognition that any evaluation of DoD's efforts to implement WSARA must not only address the letter of the law but also its spirit. Measuring implementation against that standard is more difficult than the appendix table can indicate.

For example, assessing the Department's efforts to include Combatant Commanders' input in requirements identification will be somewhat subjective. Equally, the value and benefits of sustaining competition throughout the life-cycle of every MDAP can be – and has been frequently – debated. For CSIS, the most objective and therefore most relevant benchmark for the adequate implementation of WSARA provisions remains the extent to which the Department of Defense will be able to cut cost and schedule growth in the acquisition process. Results matter. As discussed earlier, this determination will not be possible until reliable data become available – i.e., in a few years.

In addition, acquisition reform has to be evaluated based on the ability not only to respond to existing shortfalls but also to address emerging problems.

Emerging Challenges for the Acquisition System

The acquisition system is likely to encounter a number of challenges in the upcoming years, including but not limited to the following:

- increasing expenditures on single source contracts as sources diminish
- a likely real decline in the defense budget
- increased frequency of Nunn-McCurdy breaches
- requirements to diversify acquisition processes
- a continued need for building and maintaining an effective acquisition workforce.

⁹ WSARA, P.L. 111-23, section 105.

¹⁰ DAU presentation, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System Statutory and Regulatory Changes", Bradford Brown, Director for Acquisition & Program Management, February 2010, slide 30.

¹¹ "COCOM cooperation emphasized Joint Staff Revises JROC Charter, JCIDS Manual To Heed Acquisition Law (Updated)", Inside the Pentagon, November 19, 2009.

¹² WSARA, P.L. 111-23, section 202.

Since 2001, the share of overall defense dollars awarded to single source contracts has stayed fairly constant at around 50 percent. However, for MDAPs, spending on single source contracts has increased considerably, rising from 76 percent in 2004 to 87 percent in 2008. CSIS believes that this significant growth in single source contracting, at least for MDAPs, creates some unique challenges for the Department of Defense, both for contract award and administration and for program management. WSARA may reflect the intent to minimize reliance on single source contracting, but it does not reflect the fact that competition is only possible when the industrial base is there to support it. Thus, WSARA – with its focus on fostering increased competition – does not address the challenges of diminishing sources and the resulting reliance on single source contracting.

Over the last decade, the significant increases in defense budgets in real terms may have masked program and acquisition problems – e.g., by permitting the allocation of additional resources to compensate for problems in development. However, CSIS believes that the growing U.S. deficit and competing fiscal requirements are likely to put downward pressure on the defense budget in the near future. CSIS notes that FY 2009 marked the first time in 70 years that the deficit was larger than the defense budget. It is difficult to see how the U.S. government can address the long-term challenge of the deficit without reductions in defense spending. This will be exacerbated by the plans to eliminate supplemental budget requests for overseas contingency operations. Increased demand for defense investment might therefore coincide with a decline in overall resources.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called on the Department of Defense to operate more efficiently and effectively within an increasingly resource constrained environment.¹³ WSARA provisions focusing on constraining cost growth in acquisition programs could help to improve the Department's management of reduced resources. However, many of these provisions can only be applied to their full extent if other circumstances (such as the existence of competition) remains in place.

Another important issue for the acquisition landscape is the trend toward more Nunn-McCurdy breaches. The average number of annual Nunn-McCurdy breaches has increased considerably, following the more stringent reporting requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. While this increase in breaches is likely to continue, CSIS believes that it is important to understand that the increased number is not the actual problem. Instead, these breaches result mainly from changes in reporting and not necessarily from deteriorating program performance. Efforts to control cost and time overruns of acquisition programs need to be aimed at fixing the underlying problems, for which Nunn-McCurdy breaches are just the symptoms.

A further critical challenge for the acquisition process is the increasing variety of requirements. Defense acquisition is still primarily perceived as a uniform process. Examples such as the increased use of ad hoc rapid acquisition procedures since the start of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and repeated program failures in other acquisition areas (such as information technology systems) raise the question of whether a standardized acquisition process might be inadequate. Instead, a diversification of processes, tailored toward specific acquisition objectives might prove more suitable. WSARA focuses on improving the performance of the standard acquisition path for MDAPs; more assessment is needed regarding the creation of a more diverse acquisition approach.

¹³ Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Abilene, KS, Saturday, May 08, 2010. <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1467>

Finally, the task of rebuilding and sustaining a quantitatively and qualitatively adequate acquisition workforce probably constitutes the single most daunting challenge for U.S. defense acquisition. Between FY 2001 and FY 2008, Department of Defense spending on goods and services has almost doubled, while the acquisition workforce has continued to decline (slightly) over the same timeframe.¹⁴ These trends highlight the urgent need for more focus on proper workforce development strategies. Recent initiatives hold promise, but the results have not yet been delivered.

Further Need for Acquisition Reform

The discussion about emerging challenges for the acquisition system illustrate that legislation such as WSARA and Executive Branch actions like the complementary OMB memoranda are certainly necessary, yet they are far from sufficient to fix the defense acquisition system. Additional actions remain necessary to ensure better acquisition results in the future, including a greater focus on the acquisition workforce as a critical enabler and the backbone for successful acquisition outcomes.

Yet any real improvements in this area will require long term commitments, and results might not be visible for a significant amount of time. At this point the Department of Defense still lacks sufficient metrics to understand the exact needs of its acquisition workforce. Equally, the problem is too complex to be fixed by the issuance of new guidance alone. CSIS will continue to assess actions needed in this area as we update and report on overall progress in defense acquisition reform efforts, both by the Congress and the Executive Branch.

¹⁴ “Additional Actions and Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee DOD’s Acquisition Workforce”, GAO report, March 25, 2009, pp. 1 and 4.

Appendix 1: Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act Implementation

<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>Implementation</u>
Section 101:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creates Director of Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (DCAPE) • Creates Deputy Director, Cost Assessment • Creates Deputy Director, Program Evaluation 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Position was filled with Christine Fox on November 3, 2009 ➤ Leads and approves Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) study guidance ➤ Provides policies and procedures for all Department of Defense (DOD) cost estimates ➤ Reviews DOD Component cost estimates and analyses conducted for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) ➤ Conducts ICE and cost analyses for MDAPs and MAIS for which Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) is Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) ➤ Position was filled with Richard Burke on June 9, 2009 ➤ Position was filled with Dr. Scott Comes as Acting Deputy Director
Section 102:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creates Director, Development Test & Evaluation (DT&E) • Creates Director, Systems Engineering (SE) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Position was filled with Edward Greer on March 15, 2010 ➤ Reviews and approves DT&E plan in the Test and Evaluation Strategy (TES) and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) for MDAPs and all programs on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) DT&E Oversight List ➤ Position was filled with Stephen Welby on August 17, 2010 ➤ Reviews and approves the System Engineering Plan (SEP) for MDAPs
Section 103:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appoints a Senior Official in OSD as responsible for conducting and overseeing performance assessments and root cause analysis for cost and schedule overruns 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Gary Bliss was appointed director for Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses on January 4, 2010 ➤ Conduct performance assessments and root cause analysis for MDAPs as required by 10 USC 2433a or when requested

<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>Implementation</u>
Section 104:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires Director, Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E) to periodically review and assess the technology maturity and integration risk of critical technologies of MDAPs. Requires DDR&E to develop knowledge-based standards against which to measure technology maturity and integration risk 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No later than (NLT) 180 days after enactment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DDR&E shall independently review, assess, and report on the technological maturity of MDAP technologies in support of Milestone B reviews, associated statutory certifications, and at other times designated by the USD (AT&L) DDR&E shall develop knowledge-based standards against which to measure the technological maturity and integration risk of critical technologies at key stages in the acquisition process for the purposes of conducting the required reviews and assessments of MDAPs.
Section 105:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to seek and consider greater input from the Commanders of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The role of the Commanders of the COCOMs in identifying joint military requirements was implemented in the 31 July 2009 version of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System manual
Section 201:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires mechanisms to consider cost, schedule and performance trade-offs during development of MDAPs 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DCAPE leads development of study guidance for AoA and ensures: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Full consideration of possible trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives for each alternative An assessment whether the joint military requirement can be met in a manner consistent with the cost and schedule objectives recommended by the JROC
Section 202:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires acquisition strategies to ensure competition throughout the life-cycle for MDAPs Requires adequate documentation for rationale for selection of subcontract tier or tiers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Begins to apply 60 to 180 days after enactment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Program Acquisition Strategies for MDAPs shall describe the measures taken to ensure competition, or the option of competition throughout the program life cycle Acquisition strategies shall document the rationale for the selection of the planned subcontract tiers and indicate that the prime contractors are to give full and fair consideration to

<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>Implementation</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contracts for maintenance and sustainment should be awarded on competitive basis to the maximum extent practicable 		<p>qualified sources other than the prime contractor</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Acquisition strategies shall describe the plan for identifying and/or selecting the source of repair. MDA will ensure that the award of a maintenance and sustainment contract is competitively awarded and gives full consideration to all sources.
Section 203:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires competitive prototyping of systems or critical subsystems before Milestone B approval, unless waived by MDA A prototype must be produced before Milestone B even if competitive prototyping is waived 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Begins to apply NLT 90 days after enactment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Technology development strategy for MDAPs shall provide for prototypes of the system or, if not feasible, for prototypes of critical subsystems before Milestone B approval ➤ IT initiatives shall prototype subsets of overall functionality ➤ MDA may waive prototyping ➤ If the competitive prototyping requirement is waived, the MDA shall require the program to produce a prototype before Milestone B approval
Section 204:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revises Milestone A Certification Requires MDA to determine “root cause” of cost or schedule growth as reported by PM and identify appropriate performance measures for remainder of development program, and report such to Congress Each ongoing and not yet certified MDAP shall be certified in accordance with the requirements of 10 United States Code (USC) 2366a 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ NLT one year after enactment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Requirements for MDA program certification at Milestone A (10 USC 2366a) were amended ➤ Ongoing MDAPs initiated prior to 22 May 2009 and will not have received a Milestone A certification or Milestone B certification prior to May 22, 2010, must receive a Milestone A certification NLT May 22, 2010
Section 205:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revises Milestone B Certification Requires semi-annual reviews of 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Requirements for MDA program certification at Milestone B (10 USC 2366b) were amended

<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>Implementation</u>
<p>programs that experience critical cost growth under Nunn-McCurdy provisions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extends Milestone certification requirements to programs that received Milestone B approval prior to enactment of the requirement and have not yet reached Milestone C 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Determination of programs satisfying certification requirements NLT 270 days after enactment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ For any MDAP that received Milestone B approval prior to January 6, 2006, and has not yet received a Milestone C approval, the MDA, not later than February 16, 2010, shall determine whether such program satisfies the revised Milestone B certification requirements
Section 206:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adds new section 2433a to 10 USC 2433 covering actions following critical cost growth 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Requirements for certification following critical cost growth (10 USC 2433a) were amended
Section 207:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For MDAPs, requires revisions to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to provide uniform guidance and tighten existing requirements for organizational conflicts of interest by contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ NLT 270 days after enactment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ DOD released a proposed rule on April 20, 2010
Section 301:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secretary of Defense shall establish award program for individuals and teams, civilian and military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ NLT 90 days after enactment 	
Section 302:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modifies the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, Section 887, report by the Secretary of Defense to Congress on Implementation of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ October 14, 2009, modified deadline from NDAA FY 2009 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Report was delivered in November 2009

<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>Implementation</u>
Earned Value Management (EVM) in DOD		
Section 303:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adds objective of “Maintaining critical design skills to ensure that the armed forces are provided with systems capable of ensuring technological superiority over potential adversaries” to list of national security objectives (10 USC 2501) • Adds requirement to assess effect of termination of MDAPs to annual defense capability assessment (conducted in consultation with Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Energy (10 USC 2505) 		
Section 304:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires Comptroller General to submit two reports on MDAPS 		

Appendix 2: Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act Report Requirements

<u>Report</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Due Date</u>
Report on assessment of previous years cost estimation and analysis activities	101	Director of Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation	Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)	<i>Annually within 10 days of President's budget submission</i>
Report on Operations and Support (O&S) Costs for MDAPs, including advisability of establishing O&S cost baselines	101	Director of Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation	Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Defense shall transmit the report to Congress	<i>NLT one year after enactment; NLT 30 days after receiving the report</i>
Report on DT&E and system engineering activities	102	Director, Development Test & Evaluation and Director, Systems Engineering	Congressional defense committees	<i>Annually NLT March 31 (delivered March 31, 2010)</i>
Report on implementation of resource planning for DT&E and system engineering activities	102	Service Acquisition Executives	Director, Development Test & Evaluation and Director, Systems Engineering	<i>NLT 180 days after enactment</i>
Report on performance assessments and root cause analysis activities	103	Director for Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses	Congressional defense committees	<i>Annually NLT March 1 (delivered March 1, 2010)</i>
Report on technology maturity & integration risk of MDAPs	104	Director, Defense Research & Engineering	Secretary of Defense and Congressional defense committees	<i>Annually NLT March 1</i>
Report on resources needed to implement technology maturity and integration risk assessments	104	Director, Defense Research & Engineering	Congressional defense committees	<i>NLT 120 days after enactment (delivered April 6, 2010)</i>
Report on the role of the Commanders of the COCOMs in the Joint Requirements Process	105	Comptroller General	Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives	<i>NLT two years after enactment</i>
Report recommending measures to eliminate or mitigate organizational conflicts of	207	Panel on Contracting Integrity	Secretary of Defense	<i>NLT 90 days after enactment (delivery assumed based on DOD release of proposed rule)</i>

<u>Report</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Due Date</u>
interest				<i>on OCI)</i>
Report on Implementation of EVM in DOD	302	Secretary of Defense	Congress	<i>October 14, 2009 (delivered in November 2009)</i>
Report on growth and support costs for major weapon systems	304	Comptroller General	Congressional defense committees	<i>NLT one year after enactment</i>
Review of weaknesses in operations relating to financial information for MDAPs	304	Comptroller General	Congressional defense committees	<i>NLT one year after enactment</i>