China under Xi Jinping: Alternative Futures for U.S.-China Relations

A series of three addresses on American and Chinese values, perceptions, interests, and strategic intentions, and their impact on the possibility of developing a common narrative for U.S.-China relations for the future

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with a Foreword by John J. Hamre
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On October 1, 2014, Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of Australia, gave a remarkable speech on U.S.-China relations at the launch of the Zbigniew Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy at CSIS. The Institute was established to examine the unique interaction of history, geography, and strategy, with a goal of developing policy-relevant analysis and recommendations. This is what Mr. Rudd did in his speech, tackling the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world. Combining academic knowledge with a real understanding of political dynamics, he proposed an original framework called “constructive realism for a common future” as a guiding mechanism for overcoming misperceptions and building political capital in U.S.-China relations.

Following this speech in Washington, D.C., Mr. Rudd gave two companion speeches, one at Fudan University in Shanghai, China, and the other at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. You will find all three speeches in the following pages. Together they represent important scholarship on the mutual perceptions of the United States and China, as well as a framework for their peaceful relations. Mr. Rudd’s fluency in Mandarin allows him to deliver speeches in both languages, as published here—an advantage he has in understanding the mindsets of American and Chinese policymakers alike.

America is the land of tomorrow. So it is often challenging for Americans to understand how history and geography shape consciousness in other countries. Mr. Rudd paints images of America and China as seen through each other’s eyes. The Chinese perceive American policies through the prism of their historical experience and cultural values. Some question the motives behind U.S. policy stances and dismiss the sincerity of American principle-based reasoning and liberal-democratic ideals. In turn, some in America view China’s rise as threatening and its economic expansion as a zero-sum game. When the two countries’ images of each other are distorted, it is difficult to build the trust required for managing differences in national interests and cultural values.

The United States and China face a formidable agenda of regional and global issues, as well as many shared objectives. Mr. Rudd has given us a framework for the two countries to establish a common narrative, which is essential for them to pursue future relations based on cooperation, security, and prosperity. We are honored to share with you here the contributions of Mr. Rudd, a distinguished statesman at CSIS, to the work of the Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy.
EDITOR’S NOTE

These speeches were delivered prior to President Barack Obama's successful summit meeting with President Xi Jinping in Beijing in November 2014.

Mr. Rudd’s speech delivered at CSIS to launch the Brzezinski Institute is printed in full. The speeches delivered subsequently at Fudan University and at Harvard University have been edited for publication purposes.
I am honored to have been invited to speak at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington this evening. I am doubly honored to have been invited to launch the Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy here at CSIS. Zbigniew Brzezinski has become a legendary name in the practice of international relations and national security policy. And over the decades his contribution to public literature on these important disciplines of state has been outstanding. So ladies and gentlemen, I wish formally to acknowledge Zbigniew Brzezinski’s contribution to public policy and his presence with us this evening.

INTRODUCTION

In the analysis and practice of international relations, it is during turbulent times such as these we can often confuse that which is topical for that which is important. That which is in the news for that which should be in the news. That which is immediate for that which is strategic.

But the business of foreign policy, as everybody in this room is well familiar, is a harder business than that. Particularly foreign policy in a period of unprecedented globalization—when the classical divide between the foreign and domestic, the internal and the external, and the national and the international crumbles before our eyes.
Such that in this increasingly interconnected terrain, policymakers feel increasingly overwhelmed by the density and complexity of the global foreign policy agenda. Overwhelmed, also, by the limitations of the classical foreign policy tool kit, as well as the limitations of the institutions that have traditionally been the custodians of the field, to deal effectively with the genuinely global agenda of our times.

**The Future Strategic and Economic Shape of the Indo-Pacific Region and the Wider Global Order Will Be Determined by the Future Dynamics of the U.S.-China Relationship.**

Foreign policy remains, however, like all public policy domains, a matter of national priorities. And against all national interest criteria, my argument tonight is that there is no greater strategic issue at stake for the world today than the future relationship between the United States and China. It is not just significant to the largest and second-largest economies in the world for themselves. Nor simply significant for the two largest militaries in the world.

The reality is that the future strategic and economic shape of the Indo-Pacific region and the wider global order will be determined by the future dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship. And this in turn will increasingly impact the rest of the global agenda, including most of the issues that currently dominate the international headlines today.

That is why I have been spending this year at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, researching a policy paper on “alternative futures for U.S.-China relations.”

**China’s Rise**

The economic metrics speak for themselves:

- According to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), China will become a bigger economy than the United States using GDP at market exchange rates within a decade.
- According to the World Bank, China will become the world’s biggest economy using GDP at purchasing parity pricing (PPP) sometime between the end of this year and 2019.
- According to OECD projections, China’s GDP in PPP terms by 2030 will be about the same size as either the United States and Europe combined, or the United States and India combined.
- In 2009, China became the world’s largest exporter.
- In 2013, China became the world’s second-largest importer.
- In 2013, China became the world’s largest trading nation.
- According to the CIA World Fact Book, China is now the number-one trading partner of 128 countries, compared with 76 for the United States.
- In 2013, according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) data, China was the second-largest global destination of global foreign direct investment (FDI) after the United States.
In the same year, China was the third-largest source of FDI after the United States and Japan.

The World Bank projects that by 2030, China will account for 40 percent of total global capital outflows, more than the United States and Europe combined.

Beyond these aggregate economic metrics, we should also note that China, since 2010, has been the world’s largest energy consumer:

- According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China will consume twice as much energy as the United States by 2030.
- According to BP, China’s total external energy dependency will rise from 16 percent now to 20 percent by 2034.
- As of 2014, China will pass the United States as the biggest oil importer in the world.

The climate change metrics, of course, follow in sequence with China passing the United States as the world’s largest emitter in 2007 and, according to the IEA, equaling the United States, EU, and Japan in combined greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2028.

Militarily, China has long had the second-largest military budget after the United States, although according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), total Chinese military outlays equal less than 30 percent of U.S. expenditure in 2013, and as a proportion of GDP represent 2.1 percent of Chinese GDP compared with 3.8 percent of GDP for the United States.

Finally, on the size of diplomatic footprint, China has the second-largest number of diplomatic missions abroad after the United States—258 missions versus 307—while China has two-thirds more missions around the world than Japan.

There are, therefore, few if any international policy domains that will not be significantly impacted by the China factor: from security to the economy to climate change.

I am acutely conscious of the usual accusations of dangers of linear projections concerning China’s national performance against any range of metrics, although none of the metrics I have listed make any such linear assumptions. Just as I am acutely conscious of what could go wrong for China that could radically disrupt its future: from political reaction to the current anticorruption campaign; a failure to effectively implement China’s new economic development model; large-scale popular unrest from environmental pollution; or a major regional security crisis, conflict, or even war.

But over the last 35 years, since the beginning of China’s reform process, the challenges have also been formidable. Yet China’s leadership has consistently found a policy and political pathway through. Nor, therefore, should the Chinese leadership be underestimated for the future.

Moreover, any U.S.-China policy for the future that has as its implicit or explicit assumption that China will simply implode (politically, economically, or socially)—because we in the West
cannot compute how a Chinese state capitalist model could possibly survive its own internal contradictions—constitutes a profoundly unwise basis for policy indeed.

For the purposes of my remarks this evening, my assumption is that over the decade ahead, progress against the goals that China has set for itself will be sufficient to make China significantly more powerful and influential on most policy measures than it is today.

I may well be wrong, in which case little is lost. Other than to say if China were to fail against its various national objectives, the negative consequences for the region and the world would be considerably worse than any fear of China’s success. Particularly if we reflect on the possible impact on regional security, global employment, and uncontrollable global warming—not to mention mass people movements in response to domestic or regional political instability.

Based, therefore, on an assumption that China is, on balance, likely to have relative success against the goals it has set for itself over the period of President Xi Jinping’s rule, and based also on the assumption that it is prudent for the United States to assume the same, there are three basic questions I intend to address this evening:

- First, if China continues to rise, what judgments can we make about China’s longer-term intentions for its role in the region and the world?
- Second, what strategy could the United States embrace with China, and China with the United States, that does not result in long-term conflict but that preserves the peace in a manner that also sufficiently accommodates each other’s interests?
- Third, if so, does this bear any relationship with President Xi Jinping’s concept of “A New Type of Great Power Relationship?”

**CHINESE INTENTIONS**

Diplomatic history is replete with examples of states not only miscalculating one another’s capabilities, but even more problematically, miscalculating one another’s intentions. This year’s centenary of the war to end all wars is a profound case in point. Capabilities analysis can have some basis in quantitative determinants. But on the question of intentions, we are left with a morass of qualitative judgments, always compromised by subjective assessments as to what another state’s decisionmakers actually believe, in contrast to what they might say.

When we look at China it is even more complex, as its intentionality is shaped by a vast array of factors, not least the perceptions and actions of the other party—in this case the United States.

China’s world view is shaped by an amalgam of:

- Chinese national values;
- China’s historical experience;
- Powerful, subjective perceptions of the region and the world;
- What we might call “objective” national interests; and
- A rapidly growing strategic distrust of the United States.
Despite the hazards, it is nonetheless worthwhile trying to understand the world today through Chinese eyes, rather than simply mirror-imaging what we in the West may regard as the sort of world view the Chinese “ought” to have, if we were them. The beginning of wisdom in diplomacy is to understand the world as viewed through the lens of the other—irrespective of whether we happen to agree with it or not.

**CHINESE VALUES**

There is often a view in the West that the extent to which there is a “values debate” in China, it only relates to the repudiation of Western values as representing a model to which the West argues that China should also aspire. The Chinese reality is more complex than that.

In classical times, Confucianism represented China’s ideational orthodoxy for 2,000 years. The Confucian virtues are almost exclusively hierarchical, emphasizing a series of reciprocal relationships between heaven and the emperor, between the emperor and subject, between father and son, between older brother and younger brother. A further virtue, ren, usually translated as “benevolence”, was still nonetheless hierarchical, describing how an emperor might temper his absolutism toward his subjects, rather than challenging that absolutism in itself.

Confucian scholar officials were also required to temper imperial excess through fearless advice derived from the eternal virtues contained in the Confucian classics—although an emperor was perfectly within his rights to ignore such advice and to then have the official executed!

Other prominent philosophical and religious schools including Daoism and Buddhism never successfully challenged the official Confucian orthodoxy, and by and large remained within the realm of private contemplative reflection, rather than providing a basis for public policy and behavior.

However, for our purposes here, the core point in all of the above is that none of these philosophical traditions, including Confucianism, formed the basis of a worldview beyond the Middle Kingdom itself. Those beyond the Middle Kingdom were generally regarded as barbarians. And the limited extent to which barbarians were to be engaged at all within the Middle Kingdom was on the basis that they were tributary states, whose principal obligation was to pay homage to the emperor, and then preferably return home.

There is therefore nothing from the Chinese philosophical tradition that forms a basis of what might be called a “Chinese school” of international relations. Efforts to do so have been relatively recent, forced, and thus far unpersuasive within the contemporary Chinese political and foreign policy.
Of course, during the high period of China’s Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, there was a Chinese communist worldview concerning the emancipation of the working peoples of the world—although this did not find resonance within Chinese tradition. And it certainly did not survive the repudiation of Maoism after the Cultural Revolution, let alone the arrival of price theory as a replacement for a planned economy. Nonetheless, the Leninism of the Communist Party itself did find resonance with the authoritarian culture of classical Confucianism. The underlying reality, however, is that the values inherent within the Chinese tradition were by and large seen to be almost exclusively applicable to China itself.

They were never seen as values for the world at large, other than perhaps neighboring “states,” where the luminous appeal of the Son of Heaven was intended to be transparent even to them. The Chinese had no interest in colonizing the world, propelled by some sort of missionary zeal for the propagation of Confucianism, and so China did not establish overseas colonies, for either ideational or mercantile interests.

This puts the Chinese tradition at complete variance with the universalist claims of Christianity in their first missionary contact. And more recently with the universalist claims of Western Liberal democracy, particularly as articulated through what they perceive as the political evangelization of American exceptionalism, and the notion of a “city on a hill”.

In summary, not only do Chinese leaders see their traditional hierarchical values as being in deep contrast with those of the liberal democratic West, they also see their own tradition as one which does not make universalist claims beyond China. Which once again they hold in contrast to what they perceive to be an arrogantly, irresspressibly, evangelizing West.

And underpinning all this is a deep Chinese philosophical reflection on a profound philosophical and historiographical preference for “order” in their own tradition. In radical contrast to what they define as the apparent “chaos” of Western Democratic processes. This, then, is part of the broad ideational software that informs President Xi Jinping’s world view as he seeks to fashion “A New Type of Great Power Relationship”. It also shapes China’s self-perception through its orthodox foreign policy framework called “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”:
• Mutual respect for political sovereignty and territorial integrity;
• Mutual nonaggression;
• Mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs;
• Equality and mutual benefit; and
• Peaceful coexistence.

CHINA’S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
A further factor shaping analyses of long-term Chinese strategic intentionalities is Chinese historical experience. Many in this room will be familiar with China’s historical grievances against the United States, the West, and the rest. To the point that an Indian colleague said to me recently that there is only one thing worse than 100 years of foreign humiliation of an ancient, sophisticated, and proud civilization like China. And that is 200 years of foreign humiliation of an ancient, sophisticated, and proud civilization like India.

Of course, the British were the principal colonialist culprits in both countries, and the resonances continue to this day in the contemporary politics of Hong Kong. Nonetheless, the impact of the foreign humiliation narrative in contemporary China is real.

It is not fabricated. And in China’s case, turbo-charged by the Japanese brutal invasion and continued recalcitrance on symbolic matters such as Yasukuni. It also bred over time a deep distrust across generations of Chinese leaders toward foreigners in general, and Westerners in particular, given what is perceived as a long history of exploitation.

This view is reinforced by China’s national historiography in which China, despite having significant maritime power in the past, was only interested in trade, and never in the business of establishing foreign colonies. To this is added a deep view that the Chinese tradition was seen as sufficient in itself, and that foreign civilizations, while of some general interest, are only seriously engaged when direct Chinese interests are at stake.

This in turn leads to a familiar and continuing historical narrative that Chinese preoccupations have almost always primarily been domestic: that the task of feeding, housing, and governing nearly a quarter of humanity was of itself all-consuming and has been so throughout Chinese history.

Parallel to this is the deeply held view that the primary responsibility of all Chinese leaders throughout history is to maintain national unity at all costs and “prevent chaos under heaven.” This also governs Chinese political attitudes to Taiwan. To “lose” Taiwan would mean political delegitimization and a form of civilizational sacrilege.
Finally, as with all nations, there is a profound sense of national (and sometimes “nationalist”) pride in China’s civilizational achievements, and the fact that China is now returning to a position of global prominence and respect.

For those who criticize modern forms of Chinese nationalism, the Chinese would think, although they are unlikely to say, that given their historical experience, they have much to be nationalist about, particularly given how far they have traveled in the last generation alone.

**CHINESE PERCEPTIONS**

China’s philosophical tradition and its historical experience also shape China’s current perceptions of the United States, as well as the U.S.-based post-war international order. Chinese perceptions of the United States have undergone multiple evolutions since Deng Xiaoping first donned a cowboy hat in 1979.

These perceptions are changing again under Xi Jinping, and not necessarily in a positive direction, notwithstanding the fact that the fundamentals of the U.S.-China relationship are in no state of crisis. In fact, they are in reasonable shape. Setting aside the now familiar, while still dangerous, games of push and shove in and around the maritime and air spaces in the broad vicinity of China.

There is emerging evidence to suggest that President Xi, now two years into his term, has begun to conclude that the long-term strategic divergences between U.S. and Chinese interests make it impossible to bring about any fundamental change in the relationship.

This is not to blame either one party or the other. It is, however, to describe an emerging reality. Chinese leaders now talk about five aspects of what they conclude to be deep U.S. strategic behavior:

1. To isolate China;
2. To contain China;
3. To diminish China;
4. To internally divide China; and
5. To sabotage China’s leadership.

Again, I am not in the business of seeking to defend Chinese perceptions. I am here in part, however, to describe them, before making some broad suggestions for the future.

The Chinese leadership bases these perceptions on a cocktail of factors:
From “the pivot”;
- To the intensity and proximity of U.S. spy flights to the Chinese coast;
- To the indictment by the U.S. Department of Justice of Chinese officials for cybercrime against U.S. firms;
- To the perceived reenforcement and expanding scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance;
- To the perceived emerging strategic partnership between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia;
- To the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Beijing concludes is a geopolitical counterweight against China;
- To the recent terrorist attacks across China by Xinjiang separatists, where China believes the United States has been relatively silent; and
- To the anti-Chinese protests in Taiwan and prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong, where China has accused the United States and the United Kingdom of complicity.

Of course, the United States, the West, and the rest will readily offer counter-narratives for all the above. But the supposition in the West that these perceptions are largely manufactured by the Chinese leadership for bargaining purposes, rather than being at least in part genuinely held, is, I believe, deeply flawed.

The challenge for the future is to construct alternative narratives for the future of the U.S.-China relationship, rather than to allow these perceptions to solidify into reality, causing the relationship to become the subject of strategic drift and inertia, allowing the worst assumptions about one another not only to take hold, but also to drive policy.

This is not a challenge just for the United States, as if the United States is somehow uniquely responsible for current challenges in the relationship. Or that virtue by definition attaches to every Chinese foreign policy position, because it doesn’t. But nor is it a challenge just for China on the familiar grounds heard often in this country that “if only the Chinese would accept the fact that the United States is not doing anything of the sort . . . .”

Political statesmanship and creative diplomacy are needed from both sides of this relationship now more than ever.

**CHINESE INTERESTS**

Chinese traditions, and historical and current perceptions, are all elements in shaping China’s national interests today. This is true of all nations, whether we are conscious of it or not.

But the weight of history, given civilizational continuity, weighs particularly heavily on China. For the current Chinese leadership, I would argue there are 10 core national interests that lie at the
heart of the leadership agenda. Others will dispute this, in part or even in whole. But I believe there is a reasonable evidence base for the following:

- Stay in power, with a much less corrupt Communist Party of China remaining in control.
- Develop, maintain, and defend a state capitalist system (the “China Model”) while explicitly rejecting the Liberal Capitalist model of the West;
- Transform the Chinese economy from the post-1978 growth model to the new economic model of post-2013 by boosting private consumption, boosting the services sector in China’s second-tier cities, and reducing the role of State-owned enterprises.
- Maintain and secure national unity, including Taiwan.
- Obtain maximum energy security.
- Bring environmental pollution under control and, in time, climate change.
- Expand regional and global economic influence to become economically indispensable to the economies and states of the region, while also becoming economically significant to the other regions of the world.
- Pursue a new, more proactive foreign policy in the region and globally, in active pursuit of Chinese national interests, commensurate with China’s growing power, and formally dispensing with the Deng doctrine of “hide your strength, bide your time”.
- Maintain the doctrine of “Peaceful Development,” recognizing that strategic stability is essential for China to complete the next phase of domestic economic reform, while continuing to expand, modernize, and professionalize its military, fully recognizing the fact that the United States maintains overwhelming strategic preponderance both regionally and globally, and for the foreseeable future.
- Leverage other important bilateral relationships (e.g., Russia) and multilateral institutions (BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the UN) to advance the cause of “multipolarity,” seeking where possible to amend both policy and technical aspects of existing international agreements as they come up for formal review, while commissioning its think tanks to analyze the future shape of the global rules-based and regional orders.

This represents a formidable agenda of work. The important thing to note from it is that for the foreseeable future it is overwhelmingly domestic in its orientation. And, further, that the international agenda is also seen primarily through the prism of domestic imperatives. And, further, again, an insight that when China says it is feeling unprecedented stress around its borders, that
this is also seen in large part as impacting on its domestic policy and politics (e.g., the incomplete economic reform agenda) rather than simply reflecting future Chinese ambitions abroad.

At the same time, this should not diminish the growing international policy impact of contemporary China on the global stage, which necessitates engagement in its own right, in the absence of too much theorizing on the internal dynamics of the Chinese political economy.

INITIAL REFLECTIONS ON U.S. POLICY RESPONSE

These remarks have primarily concentrated on the world, the region, and the United States as seen through Chinese eyes. In other words, how the Chinese leadership sees international realities, rather than how we believe they ought to see international realities. The uncomfortable truth is that they don’t, and for the foreseeable future they probably won’t.

That does not mean that China is right. What it does mean is that China under its current leadership is different. And the more powerful China becomes, the sharper these differences are likely to become.

Absent conflict and war, the only way to manage these differences is by diplomacy. And diplomacy can never be, as the great teachers of the Buddhist sutra might say, “the simple sound of one hand clapping.” Or as one of the great names of Western philosophy, Mae West, would perhaps have said, “It takes two to tango.”

The beginning of wisdom is to understand what the other party thinks and believes, and why. It is just as important for our Chinese friends to do so with the United States. Chinese understandings of America in my experience are often a long way from the reality.

Nonetheless, I do not believe there is a mystical center-point at which both these worldviews will one day mysteriously coincide. I am too much of a realist for that. Although at the same time I am sufficient of a liberal internationalist not to allow hyperrealism to overwhelm the possibilities of evolving a common approach for both the United States and China, at least on some common challenges.

As I have written for most of this year that I have been at the Belfer Center at Harvard, I believe what is useful is for the two presidents to develop a common narrative for the future that allows sufficient space for real differences to be acknowledged. At present, each side has a narrative, usually private rather than public, about the other. Instead, I argue for a narrative that contains an overall framework, a mechanism for managing differences, as well as a longer-term goal of substantive positive improvement in the areas of fundamental disagreement.

One possible framework might be called constructive realism, or even constructive realism for a common future. What do I mean by that?

First, the realist part. Both the Chinese and the Americans come from a deeply realist approach to international relations. And within that frame, there are defined areas where a lack of common
values or common interests will deny any ready resolution. Areas such as the outstanding territorial disputes in East Asia. These cannot be solved. They can only be acknowledged and managed so that conflict does not erupt, thereby destroying the relationship altogether.

**I ARGUE FOR A NARRATIVE THAT CONTAINS AN OVERALL FRAMEWORK, A MECHANISM FOR MANAGING DIFFERENCES, AND A LONGER-TERM GOAL OF SUBSTANTIVE POSITIVE IMPROVEMENT IN THE AREAS OF FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT.**

Second, the constructive part. Namely, those areas of the relationship (bilateral, regional, or multilateral) where China and the United States, because of overlapping values and interests, can cooperate to build new “public goods” together. In areas such as the bilateral investment treaty; new approaches to regional architecture in the Asia Pacific that help construct some basic confidence and security-building measures over time in a region where there are none; climate change; cyber security; the Korean Peninsula; and, in time, militant Islamism.

Third, the future part. Which if strategic trust is built incrementally over time by achieving success in the part two above—that is, the “constructive” part—to deploy the political and diplomatic capital from these successes to tackling the thus far “too difficult to solve” issues in part one above.

It is important to have a long-term ambition for the relationship beyond an exercise in temporary utilitarianism. Of itself, such a long-term ambition can also become transformative. Of course, such a concept of constructive realism, with or without a common future, would provide a framework for gradual progress, and ideally less regress, over time.

The good news is that these concepts may well translate reasonably into Chinese. Realism is as sound a word in Chinese as it is in English. Constructive is an overwhelmingly positive phrase in Chinese. And it is difficult, but not impossible, to reject the idea of a long-term common future in either language, albeit through a process of gradual transformation.

Finally, Deng Xiaoping even has a phrase that, while traditionally used to describe the arduous task of Chinese domestic economic reform, may well be more broadly applicable. Deng said that to cross the river, it is important to feel the stones step by step with your feet. So, too, might we be able to breach the widening gap between China and the United States over time. It requires a realistic understanding of the values, perceptions, and interests of the other. It requires an equal amount of creative diplomatic imagination about what can be done constructively together. It also requires the political will to dream of a different future other than what history has shown us, often horrifically, from the past.

Perhaps this is what Xi Jinping had in mind when he floated the idea of “A New Type of Great Power Relationship”. President Xi has talked much about the China Dream. In this country, the American dream is embedded within the culture. Maybe it is time for us all to start dreaming more broadly of a common dream for all our futures.
习近平治下中美关系的可能未来
陆克文于2014年10月1日在华盛顿特区美国国际战略研究中心兹比格涅夫•布热津斯基学会成立仪式上的演讲

我很荣幸今晚受邀到华盛顿，在美国战略与国际问题研究中心发表演讲。更荣幸的是，我将参与见证美国战略与国际问题研究中心布热津斯基地缘战略研究所的成立。兹比格涅夫•布热津斯基在国际关系和国家安全政策领域是一个具有传奇色彩的名号。多年来，他对国际关系和国家安全领域的公共政策研究的贡献更是不胜枚举。女士们、先生们，兹比格涅夫•布热津斯基先生今晚也来到现场，请允许我正式地感谢他对国际关系和国家安全公共政策作出的杰出贡献。

开篇
在当前动荡的国际关系背景下，我们分析和实践相关政策时，常常容易舍本逐末，混淆什么是昙花一现的话题，什么才是真正重要的议题。什么是新闻媒体正在追逐的，什么才是他们真正应该关注的。什么是有如过眼烟云的，什么是具有长久战略性的。但正如在座诸位所了解的，处理外交政策时要区分本末主次、轻重缓急，其难度更是有天渊之别。特别是在前所未有的全球化背景下的外交政策处理，难度尤甚！过去我们理解的外国的和本土的，内部的和外部的，国家的和国际的之间的界限正在土崩瓦解并亟待重新定义。在愈加紧密相连的全球化世界里，政策制定者难免在面对制定全球外交策略的密集程度和复杂性时感受到越来越大的压力。同样让政策制定者倍感压力的，还有在实现真正的全球策略的高效处理过程中时常受制于经典外交政策所运用的工具和这个领域内传统领军机构的发展局限。然而，外交政策，对于国家公共政策而言，依然是重中之重。

而我的判断，如今晚所述，即：全球范围内战略问题的重中之重，就是中美关系的未来。这并非仅仅因为美中是世界最大的两个经济体，也非因为美中的军事规模在世界范围内数一数二。关键在于，未来整个印度洋——太平洋地区的战略与经济格局，以及在更广阔范围的世界秩序，都将由中美关系未来的变数所决定，而这也将从根本上持续地影响其他重要的全球事务。
中国的崛起
若以经济数据计，中国的崛起不言自明：

- 据经合组织数据，若以市场汇率计，中国的国内生产总值（GDP）将在未来十年内，超越美国成为世界第一大经济体；
- 据世界银行数据，若以购买力平价计，中国的国内生产总值（GDP）将在2014至2019年间，超越美国成为世界第一大经济体；
- 据经合组织预测，以购买力平价计，中国国内生产总值（GDP）总量在2030年将达到美国与欧盟或者印度的总和。
- 2009年，中国成为世界上最大的出口国；
- 2013年，中国成为世界第二进口国；
- 2013年，中国成为世界第一贸易大国；
- 据中情局世界资料库，如今中国是128个国家的最大贸易伙伴范围，远超美国的76个。
- 2013年，据联合国贸发会议数据，中国是仅次于美国的全球第二大大直接投资目的地；
- 2013年，来自中国的直接投资总量排名世界第三，仅次于美国和日本。
- 世界银行预测，2030年中国对外资本流出总量将占全球的40%，超过美国和欧洲的总和。

除了如上经济数据之外，我们也应注意，中国自2010年来，已经是全球最大的能耗国。

- 据国际能源署预测，2030年中国能耗将达到美国的两倍；
- 据英国石油公司预测，中国在能源方面的对外依存度将从当前的16%上升到2034年的20%；
- 而且，2014年数据显示，中国已经超越美国成为世界第一大石油进口国。

与能耗息息相关的，中国的温室气体排放量自2007年已超越美国排在世界第一；根据国际能源署数据，2028年中国温室气体排放量将达到美国、欧盟和日本的总和。

从军事实力而言，中国军费预算长久以来紧随美国居世界第二——尽管斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所数据显示，2013年中国军费支出总量不到美国的30%；相对美国的3.8%，中国军费支出占国内生产总值比例为2.1%。

就外交影响力而言：中国驻外外交使团数量（258）仅次于美国（307），这比日本多出近三分之二。
所以可以说，从安全、到经济、再到气候变化，很少有国际政策领域可以忽略中国因素。

当然，我深知基于任何指标范围做出的关于中国实力的线性预测的危险性；但以上引述的所有指标均非依据该等线性假设而得出。

我也深知，有众多因素可能导致中国未来预期发展的突然中止：从当下反腐运动的政治反应，到中国进一步经济改革的可能失败；从大规模的基于环保诉求的社会运动，再到地缘安全的种种隐患——可以说，变数很多。

然而，若我们回顾历史，不难发现，改革开放以来的35年中国所面临的挑战一贯艰险万状，而中国领导层总能在政策和政治上找到解决问题的出路。以史为鉴，我们不能忽视当今中国领导层也具备同样的应变突围能力。此外，西方既有对于中国体制的悲观预期，认为中国的国家资本主义模式可能无法克服自身的矛盾和冲突，并终将崩盘（在政治上、经济上或社会上），也实为不明智的政策决定预设立场。

我的判断，如今将述，认为中国未来十年的持续发展应该问题不大；也就是说，未来十年中国的持续走强，并在区域和世界范围在如上所述的诸多政策领域更具影响力，应是大概率事件。我的判断或许有误；但即便如此，两相对权当取其轻。认定中国模式将崩盘，并预设在区域及全球范围内随之而来的各项后果，其严重性或许远超对于中国成功崛起的畏惧所带来的后果。尤其当我们仔细考虑其在区域安全、全球就业率、以及难以控制的全球气候变化等方面将产生的影响；更不必说由于中国内或区域不稳定所带来的大规模人员流动的影响。所以，基于对中国未来（至少在习近平任期内）成功按其设定目标发展 的理性乐观的基本假设，并假设美国也应持如此预期，我今晚主要希望就如下三个问题略作叙述：

• 其一、如果中国持续发展与崛起，那么如何判断中国在区域和全球范围内自我定位的长期意图？
• 其二、在中美实力相对变化，区域及全球秩序逐渐调整的过程当中，中美如何理性设计战略，容纳彼此利益诉求，以避免冲突，保持和平？
• 其三、为达成上述目标，习近平主席所提的“新型大国关系”可以扮演什么样的角色？

中国的意图
外交历史充斥着国家之间“实力误判”和更严重的“意图误判”。今年一战100周年纪念正是如此例证的典型。国家实力的分析可以是定量的但关于国家意图的分析则难免是定性的；其中还牵扯到他国领导人真实意图，而非表面言语的判断。

中国的情况尤为复杂，因为其国家意图的形成取决于诸多因素，而非仅仅是与美国国家意图和国家行为的博弈。我认为，中国世界观与国家意图的形成主要取决于如下五个方面：
• 其一、中国的国家价值；其二、中国的历史经历；其三、中国对于区域及世界的主观判断;其四、中国的所谓“客观”国家利益；其五、中国对于美国愈发加深的战略不信任。
• 尽管困难重重，我们依然应当试图从中国自己的视角去认知中国所理解的世界，而非以西方的视
外交的智慧始于从他国的角度来理解他们如何认知这个世界，无论他们的世界观我们赞同与否。

中国的价值

西方所理解的中国“价值”之争，往往被置于西方价值范式的预设之下。但其实中国的现实要复杂得多。传统中国，儒家的经典教义主导了2000多年。儒家的美德几乎完全是阶层化互利的：天子，君臣，父子，兄弟——各有各位，彼此尊重。哪怕是“仁”，也从根本上带有强烈的阶层性：“仁”是君主对臣民的仁慈和专制主义的缓和，而不可能挑战专制主义之本身。在儒家的教义里，“仕”以直谏为己任——可以跪谏、可以泪谏、还可以死谏；但君王同样可以，依儒家教义，不纳谏，反斩谏臣。如此阶层格局体现儒家价值的本来。

其他中国传统文化的派别，诸如道家和佛教，从未在根本上挑战儒家正统的地位。其二者更多为人们提供心灵与内在的宁静归宿，而非建构公共政策与政治行为的基本框架。之所以在此提及如上中国传统，意在说明几上述中国哲学传统，甚至包括儒教，都未能成为中央大国之外其他国家的世界观。试想，曾几何时，中国之外，统统被认为是尚未开化之“蛮夷”。“蛮夷”小邦与天朝大国的关系也仅仅局限于“万国来朝”般的进贡纳岁——觐见天子，敬献贡品之后，小邦便重返“蛮夷”之地了。

可以说，中国传统哲学里没有关于国际关系的成型学派的。当下中国在外交和国际关系上的所做努力多属于相对晚近，或被时局所迫，因此在国际舞台上也并无甚说服力。当然，在马列主义的经典教义里，中国共产主义所持世界观的核心内涵之一就是要解放全世界的无产阶级，尽管这种世界观在中国的传统文化里找不到任何共鸣并且在文化大革命之后对民主主义进行批判之后，也已近将其清理得所剩无几。而今，更有价值机制取代计划经济，以示如此的共产主义理想在中国已经烟消云散。故而说，虽然马列主义在威权主义方面与儒家教义的政治构建颇有呼应，但是必须意识到这里的根本现实在于，中国传统文化的内在价值观，在相当意义上仅仅是适用于中国自身的。这并非是面向世界的价值体系——仅有的一点对于中国之外的关照也都是以天朝上国，恩顾邻国的心态。

中国并无殖民世界的兴趣，也不曾热衷在世界范围内传播儒家的教义。所以纵观历史，中国并不曾以意识形态或商业利益为由在海外殖民。这与传统的普世的基督教传教教义在价值取向上有根本的区别。与当下对于西方式自由民主的普适要求，尤其是把西方的自由民主美化为“美国例外论”的政治福音书，自称为“岭上之都”，形成鲜明对比。

总而言之，中国领导人不仅认为中国传统阶层价值与自由民主西方价值有根本的不同。他们也认为中国的传统价值只适用于华夏大地而非普世通用。他们将此种价值用来抗衡他们所认为的傲慢、失控的和说教的西方世界。最为关键的是中国哲学和历史传统中对于“秩序”的根深蒂固的偏好。与之
相对的是中国定义下的西方式的“混乱”的民主过程。我想，这些都是构成习近平主席世界观，并帮助其“新型大国关系”之提法的意识形态基础。这些也是构成中国的自我认知和外交指导方针——“和平共处五项原则”的意识形态基础：

- 互相尊重主权和领土完整、
- 互不侵犯、
- 互不干涉内政、
- 平等互利、
- 和平共处。

中国的长期战略意图的因素是中国的历史经历。

中国对于美国、西方以及整个世界的历史性抱怨，想必诸位是熟悉的。最近一位印度的同事告诉我，作为古老、世故而自豪的中华文明的中心，中国受外强欺辱逾百年的历史沉重感，唯有其右。那就是同样古老、世故而自豪的印度文明，受外强欺辱两百余年。在如上两例中，大英帝国无疑是罪魁祸首，且如我们所知，其影响一直蔓延到今天香港的政治生活当中。

无疑如此外强欺辱的历史叙事在当下中国是有现实影响的。这并非是无中生有。日本的侵华，包括日本领导人冥顽不灵地持续参拜靖国神社，都加剧了中国在如此屈辱历史叙事下的民族心态。这也催生了几代中国领导人对于外国人（尤其是西方人）的根本不信任——毕竟西方列强曾在中国掠夺多年。

而且，根据中国自己的历史叙事：中国曾系海上霸权，但只热衷于贸易，而从未设立海外殖民地。这一反差加剧了中国对西方殖民者的厌恶。同时，这也显示了中国深层次的心理需求：中华文明一直被认为是自足自洽的；对于那些具有某些共性的外国文明，只有当中国的直接利益受到外部挑战时，才会作为一种解决方案被中国郑重引入。

譬如我们熟悉的且现在仍然继续适用的历史描述，中国的当务之急始终专注于国内事务——养活并治理好全球近四分之一的人口在历史上且目前仍是占据中国主要精力的任务。相应的，不惜一切代价保持国家统一、“天下太平”，成为了中国历史上所有领导人根深蒂固的首要政治责任。这也直接形成中国领导人对台湾的政治态度——在台湾问题上的退让意味着合法性的丧失，甚至是对中华文明之神圣的亵渎。

最后，中华文明的历史成就也造就了强烈的民族自豪感（有时甚至也催生民族主义情绪）：当下中国在世界范围内的持续强盛，更加深了如此的民族心态。对于那些批判当下中国民族主义情绪的人来说，中国人的心态（尽管他们不会言明）或许是：

中国的当务之急始终专注于国内事务——养活并治理好全球近四分之一的人口在历史上、且目前仍是占据中国主要精力的任务。
鉴于他们所经历的历史，尤其考虑到他们仅在上一代人所经历的漫长历史历程，他们的民族主义情绪是有缘由和根据的。

中国对世界的理解
中国的哲学传统和历史经验也影响和塑造着中国对于美国，以及二战后美国主导的国际秩序的理解。中国对于美国的理解，自邓小平1979年在美国带上牛仔帽以来，已几经变化。虽然当下中美关系的根本并未面临危机，但是中国对于美国的认知和理解在习近平的任期似乎在往并不积极的方向转变。

事实上如此转变已是直观明显的。这不仅反映在近来中国近海与空域发生的一系列危险的冲击事件。更重要的是，习近平在领导中国两年之后所形成的观念是，中美之间的长期战略分歧已经使得中美关系的根本变化变得极为困难甚至丧失可能。这并非是要归咎于任何一方。只是在陈述一个正在形成的现实。中国领导层把美国的战略行为描述为如下五个方面：

- 孤立中国
- 遏制中国
- 削弱中国
- 从内部分化中国
- 破坏中国的领导层

请注意，我无意为中国对美国和世界的理解辩护。

在此，我仅以我的理解来叙述中国对美国和世界的理解，并希望以此为未来的政策走向提出宏观建议。中国领导人得出上述理解大致基于如下因素的综合，其中包括：

- 美国的“重返亚洲（亚洲再平衡）”战略；
- 美国侦察机在中国边境的频繁活动；
- 美国司法部最近指控中国军官对美国公司的网络犯罪；
- 中国所认为的不断深入和加强的美日同盟关系；
- 中国所认为的美国、日本、印度、以及澳大利亚的四方战略合作；
- 中国所认为的跨太平洋伙伴关系协议在地缘政治上对中国的排挤；
- 以及在最近新疆发生恐怖主义袭击事件上美国的沉默；
- 还有在最近台湾的“太阳花”运动和香港的“占中”运动中，中国认为的美国和英国的参与和共谋。

当然，美国和西方及世界其他地区对如上事件都有不同的解读。但认为如上中国对美国和世界的理解仅仅是中国领导人用来谈判的借口，是有失偏颇的；中国领导人或许是真心这样认为的。所以，我认为中美关系未来的真正的挑战在于，如何构建双方的共同叙事，而不能让如上所述中国对美国
和世界的理解变成现实，从而导致中美关系的战略漂移，并随着惯性，使得互相之间的最坏预设成为主导，并影响最终政策的形成。如此挑战的形成不能仅仅归咎于美国。同样也不能仅仅责怪中国。也不能仅仅停留在“如果中国可以理解美国的意图并非如此……”这样的简单的误解消除上。我们比任何时候都更需要卓越的政治领导力和。

中国的利益
中国的传统，历史和当下对世界的理解都帮助构成了中国现在的国家利益。这些因素对于每个国家的国家利益形成都是同样适用的。当然，历史的因素在中国延绵文明的背景下，显得尤为重要。对于当下的中国领导层而言，我认为其核心国家利益主要包括十个方面。其他人或许有不同意见，但不限于所述的各个方面都有相关证据支持：

• 其一，维持共产党统治——而且是由一个相对更少腐败也更为清廉的共产党的统治；
• 其二，维持中国模式（国家资本主义）——并旗帜鲜明地反对西方自由资本主义模式；
• 其三，促进经济转型——从改革开放版经济发展模式到十八届三中全会版经济发展模式的转型——促进消费，提升二线城市服务业，以及进一步削弱国有企业在市场中的作用；
• 其四，维持国家统一，包括台湾在内；
• 其五，最大化确保能源安全；
• 其六，控制环境污染，并进一步应对气候变化；
• 其七，扩大中国在区域和全球的经济影响力，以期在区域内成为不可或缺，在全球范围内成为举足轻重的经济势力；
• 其八，从“韬光养晦”到“奋发有为”的外交政策导向转变，以保障中国在区域和全球范围内越来越重要的国家利益；
• 其九，保持“和平发展”与战略稳定，以确保中国进一步经济改革的顺利进行；同时，基于对中美军力差距这一事实的理性认识，进一步发展、现代化、并职业化解放军军力。
• 其十，依靠既有的重要双边关系（譬如中俄关系）以及多边机制（譬如金砖集团，上合组织及联合国体系）来推进“世界多极化”；并在可能范围内修订现有的国际条约及更大范围内的世界秩序，并培养智库分析未来全球规则和地区秩序的构架。

这其中的工作量是令人惊叹的。
其中必须指出的一点是，在可预见的未来，中国所有国家利益的根本导向还是国内事务。任何的国际动作从根本上都是为国内事务的解决而服务。更进一步观察到，当中国声称她对边界问题感受到前所未有的压力时，中国主要考虑这将影响其国内政策和政治（例如尚未完成的经济改革蓝图）而非仅仅体现中国国际野心。同时，中国期望不会降低当代中国在国际舞台上对于国际政策制定日益上升的影响力，这要求他们拥有自己的发言权，即便他们还没有太多关于中国政治经济内部变量的理论准备。

关于美国政策回应的初略想法
今天主要讲了中国对于美国，对于区域内，和全球范围内的相关认知和理解。换言之，我所谈的是中国领导人如何看待国际现实，而非我们相信他们应该如何看待国际现实。令人不安的现实是，中国的领导人并不以（在可预见的未来也不会）我们的意愿来认知和理解这个世界。

这并不意味着中国的认知和理解是正确的。可以解读的是，中国目前的领导阶层，与以往大不相同。随着中国的进一步强盛，这些不同与分歧会与日俱增。为了避免冲突和战争，外交是解决这些分歧的唯一途径。

正如佛家有云，“一个巴掌拍不响。也如西谚所道：‘须两人方能探戈’。智慧的外交始于理解彼此的意图和其背后的原因。这对美国是如此；对中国也是如此。中国对于美国的理解也常常与现实相去甚远。尽管如此，我并不认为两种世界观之间存在某个神奇的中点，能让两端神秘的相遇。对此，我还是秉持现实主义的态度。

尽管作为一个自由主义国际关系者，我也时时警惕超现实主义，防止它对于中美在面对共同挑战时共同探索前路的可能性造成打击。无论如何，基于今年以来我在哈佛贝尔福中心研究所得，我相信中美双方领导人共同构建未来中美关系的宏大叙事，并在其中留足分歧的空间，是大有裨益的。

我相信中美双方领导人共同构建未来中美关系的宏大叙事，并在其中留足分歧的空间，是大有裨益的。

现在，中美各有一个关于彼此的表述，而且这些表述常常是私下而非公开的。而我所倡导的是，中美共同构建一个包含全面指导框架、具体分歧管控、以及长远积极发展的宏大叙事。可以称其为“建设性的现实主义”，或者说以“建设性的现实主义”构建一个中美共同的未来。

何解？
第一，现实主义的部分。

中美双方对于当下国际关系的理解都基于根深蒂固的现实主义。在这样的背景框架下，缺乏共同价值或共同利益会导致任何解决方案的不可能。譬如东亚的领土争端。这些争端很难解决。只能认可
分歧，管控危机，以免全面破坏现有的关系。

第二，建设性的部分。

即，无论双边，区域或多边关系，只要在中美有价值相通或利益重合的地方，就可以由中美共同构建区域及全球“公共产品”。这些“公共产品”可以包括：双边投资协定、气候变化、网络安全、朝核问题、伊斯兰激进主义问题以及亚太共同体的构建以促进从来未有的区域互信和战略合作的形成。

第三，未来的部分。

中美共同建设区域及全球公共产品可以促进中美之间战略互信的逐渐形成；而由这些公共产品构建成功所带来的政治和外交资源也可以逐渐弱化原先现实主义视角下不可能解决的问题，并最终将其解决。如此中美关系的构建须基于长远的愿景，而非短期的功利。

如此长远的愿景本身，也可以是变革性的。建设性现实主义，无论是否导向一个共同的未来，都可以随着长期的互动，逐步减少逆行的可能，并渐进改良互相之间的关系。令人高兴的是，这些概念可以在中英文之间翻译无阻。现实主义在中英文里都是一个好词。建设性则更是极具积极意味的。通过渐进变革导向一个长期的共同未来，在中英双语里也都是难以拒绝的良好期许。

邓小平以中国国内改革为背景，所提出的一个概念，对于中国的进一步国际化和中美关系构建的未来，也极具参考意义，那就是“摸着石头过河”。以此为导向，我们可以逐步消弭中美之间理解与价值的鸿沟。这需要对彼此价值，认知和利益的现实理解。

这需要等的富有创造力的外交想象力，来绘制中美可以共同建设的宏伟蓝图。这需要政治意志和决心来梦想和开创一个有别于可惧的历史轨迹的新的共同未来。或许这也是习近平提出“新型大国关系”的初心本愿。

习主席常常谈论“中国梦”。同样的，美国梦也是美国文化所不可缺少的核心价值。或者，已经到时候，让我们一起梦想并开创一个属于我们共同的未来之梦。
It’s good to be back in China. It’s good to be back in Shanghai, where nearly 30 years ago I once served as Acting Australian Counsul-General in the days when there were only a handful of countries with consular missions in China’s commercial capital. It is good to be back at Fudan University, a celebrated member of China’s Ivy League, where I sent my own son Nicholas to study Chinese just a decade ago.

All these years later, I am now affiliated with the American Ivy League, having taken up a position as Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. My policy research project at the Belfer Center is “Alternative Futures for U.S.-China Relations, 2014 to 2023”. I undertook this project because of President Xi Jinping’s advocacy of the concept of “A New Type of Great Power Relationship” as a means of avoiding long-term conflict between an emerging great power and an established great power. I wanted to explore what such a concept could mean for the future of the U.S.-China relationship, given that this relationship will shape much of the future of the Asian hemisphere we all share.

I have also become progressively more concerned at the increasingly negative trajectory of the relationship over much of the last 12 months. Which is why I have decided to dedicate much of my time this year to analyzing China’s and America’s national capabilities and intentions for the decade ahead. And to think about whether there is sufficient commonality of Chinese and American values and interests to craft a common narrative for a shared future.

Or whether such commonality simply does not exist. In which case both the relationship’s, and the region’s, future is more likely to be shaped by events
and by reactions to those events. And in an environment increasingly charged with strategic competition, crisis, and possible conflict.

Within this framework, last week in Washington I delivered an address launching the Brzezinski Institute at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I entitled the address “Alternative Futures for U.S.-China Relations: Chinese Perspectives and American Responses.” Its purpose was to describe to the best extent I could the world and the region as seen through Chinese eyes.

Of course I cannot pretend to be objective on these matters. I am not Chinese. I am a Westerner, although one who has dedicated a large part of his life to the study of China. And the country of which I was until recently, Prime Minister, remains of course a long-standing ally of the United States.

Nonetheless, I believe it is important for our friends in Washington to understand something of the reality that is seen through the prism of the perceptions and priorities of the Chinese leadership, rather than simply taking as a given a world seen only through American eyes.

Today in Shanghai, I propose to do the reverse—to describe China as currently seen from America. And to do so as frankly as possible. Once again I am obviously not an American. I therefore speak with no authority. I simply seek to describe my observations of the deep views of the U.S. foreign policy elite, without necessarily seeking to defend them.

And I do all this with a view to helping provide something of a third-party reality check on how each side actually views the aspirations and the policies of the other. Because I also believe it is impossible to craft any common narrative for the future unless it is firmly based on the realpolitik of current perceptions of one another. And perceptions, of course, ultimately shape policy.

**AMERICAN VALUES**

China, among other states, invariably bristles against the repeated assertion of the universality of American values, an assertion that runs fundamentally against the Chinese belief that each country has its own values. And further, China’s belief that it is a matter of political sovereignty for that country to choose whatever political system best reflects those values, irrespective of whether they happen to conform with one’s own.

This view is reflected in the most basic doctrinal statements of Chinese foreign policy, the most important of which is the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”. These include principles of “mutual respect” and “non-interference in the domestic affairs of another country”.

It is therefore impossible to understand American attitudes to China, the region, and the world without understanding the
long-standing centrality of Liberal Democratic values of opportunity, freedom, and democracy to the American political tradition. Critically, these values have been seen from the beginning of the American republic as not just American values, but values for all of humankind. They were grounded in the sentiments of 150 years of settlement from the early 17th Century. Generations of dissenters traveled to America in pursuit of political and religious freedoms they did not enjoy in a Europe wracked by the wars of religion and the princely autocracies that fought them. These freedoms were finally and formally secured by the definitive political act that was the American revolution.

They have constituted the central narrative of American politics and the American nation in the 240 years since. They have also become the animating force of the American identity. In the American tradition, these freedoms are seen as the “city on the hill.” They constitute what the Americans see as the moral basis of what would later be called “American exceptionalism.”

For the 19th Century this would, in the American perception, become the magnetic force that would attract tens of millions of migrants from the Old World to this “city on the hill” in the new. These freedoms also became a galvanizing force in the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery. In other words, democratic freedoms were for America itself, not for political or military export to the rest of the world, other than as the exemplar state.

It was not until the 20th Century that a reluctant America would be drawn into foreign entanglements and European wars, but not so much at the defence of a political ideal but rather the defense of its national interests in its freedom of navigation. Woodrow Wilson’s attempts to entrench American ideals in a liberal internationalist order for the world in a League of Nations were shunned by an isolationist American congress.

And then a generation later, again a reluctant America finally committed to another global war, again because its interests were attacked in the Pacific, while Hitler declared war from across the Atlantic. It was only during the course of the Second World War that the defense of American values was finally elevated to a global cause in the American mind in a global war against German and Japanese fascism. The American people bought war bonds to finance the American war
effort in defense of Roosevelt’s “four freedoms”: “freedom of speech”, “freedom of worship”, “freedom from want,” and “freedom from fear”.

The United States, emerging from a deep tradition of isolationism that had by and large dominated American politics since the Revolution, then sought to construct a post-war order which incorporated these values. And through a combination of the United Nations, international law, and American power, the United States saw its mission as the global articulation and defense of these liberal democratic values as central to its core mission.

This mission became immediately animated by the challenge of Soviet Communism and American conclusions about the rise of Communist China. With the Sino-Soviet split, the abandonment of a global ideological mission on the part of the Communist Party of China, and a decade later the collapse of the Soviet Union, many in America prematurely concluded “the end of history” and the final triumph of a liberal democratic capitalist model.

In fact, it was not the end of history. Militant Islamism had a different view of history. The return of Russian nationalism as a counter-force to American and European liberalism represents a different response again. As does China’s advocacy of its own “China Model” or the “Beijing Consensus”. Nonetheless, America’s sense of its own liberal democratic exceptionalism continues as a strong, unifying narrative of America’s role in the world today.

America’s critics will legitimately point to the copious examples of American hypocrisy from the Monroe Doctrine, where democratically elected governments were often removed by force, to the unilateral removal of the Iraqi regime in defiance of the UN Security Council as incompatible with both American idealism, and the post-war multilateral order it created. But it is equally legitimate to argue that for much of its history as a global great power, and then superpower, the United States has been the most benign such power in history, compared with every other great power since the rise of the Persian Empire 2,500 years ago. America could have chosen to occupy large parts of the rest of the world, as most empires had sought to do throughout history. America chose not to.

By and large, with the exception of Teddy Roosevelt’s brief taste for adventurism, America never sought a colonial empire, despite its undisputed power to have obtained one. In fact, against this measure, the only comparable great power in history to the United States was China, which also, at varying times in its long history, had the capacity to establish a vast overseas colonial empire, but also chose not to.

Of course, both countries have been involved in extensive border wars in their history. But neither sought to subjugate distant foreign lands for the purposes of national self-aggrandizement or economic exploitation. This commonality in the American and Chinese experience is rarely discussed. It should be.

But we cannot ignore the core difference that the United States today, by reason of the range of historical circumstances that have shaped its political consciousness, continues to exhibit
not just a set of liberal democratic ideals for itself, but also for the world at large. Although the vigor with which these ideals may be prosecuted abroad will always vary, depending on the continuing tussle between the contending forces of isolationism and retrenchment on the one hand, and the moral purpose and strategic responsibilities of global leadership on the other.

The core point concerning this exceptionalist, liberal democratic tradition of American domestic politics and foreign policy cannot simply be written away through some form of polite diplomatic agreement, irrespective of how much this may be deemed to be desirable, either by realists at home, or a raft of irritated governments abroad. Rather it is a fundamental part of the American identity. To seek to do so would be the equivalent of trying to purge Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism from modern Chinese political consciousness or national identity. In both cases it is indelible.

Yet the core difference remains that Confucianism is not designed as a value for export to the world. Whereas, American liberal democracy, either by way of active political evangelization or simply by passive example, is precisely that.

The truth, therefore, is that any common narrative between a rising China and a still-powerful United States will need to intelligently negotiate these complex ideational shoals, grounded in turn in deep questions of national identity. It is a recurring, deep problem in the relationship. And it can’t simply be wished away.

**AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF CHINA**

If, then, these are American values, what then of American historical experiences of China that have shaped current American perceptions?

The United States was signatory to the infamous unequal treaties with the China of the late Qing. The United States was also party to the Eight-Power Alliance that marched on Beijing in 1900 following the Boxer Rising, although the United States did not insist on the full payment of reparations by the Qing Government as demanded by the other imperial powers under the so-called Boxer Protocol. Instead, it contributed funds to the building of Tsinghua University, Yenching University, and the Peking Union Medical College, which has caused Chinese elites
over the last century to view the Americans as imperialists of a different and generally more favorable hue.

China also became, in the American mind of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, a rich field of Christian mission as American and European missionaries dedicated themselves to the “saving of millions of Chinese souls”. As the Japanese invasion of China unfolded during the 1930s, the United States increasingly identified with Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Government in Nanking. Chiang’s later much-publicized conversion to Christianity also helped consolidate American public support for the Nationalist cause.

Once the United States declared war on Japan in 1941, the United States maintained air supplies to Chiang’s wartime capital in Chongqing across “the Hump”. Chiang, through his attendance at the Cairo Conference in 1943, also came to be seen both by the Americans and by the British as an important part of the global alliance against Fascism.

During the second civil war between 1945 and 1949, the United States provided significant material support for the Kuomintang (KMT) against what was then a numerically vastly inferior Red Army. Although a small number of American volunteers sided with the Communist forces under Mao, the United States unequivocally backed Chiang through to his flight to Taiwan in 1949.

For the next 30 years, the debate raged across the U.S. foreign policy establishment as to who had “lost China”. U.S. and Chinese forces engaged each other directly in the Korean War, and, in the following decades, indirectly in Vietnam. In the meantime, the United States dug in with the defense of Taiwan at all costs, right through until Nixon’s opening to Communist China in 1972, although the Taiwan factor remains alive to this day.

FROM AMERICA’S PERSPECTIVE, CHINA DURING THE 1990S SLOWLY EMERGED FROM BEING SEEN AS A HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM TO BEING SEEN AS A MAJOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY.

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From Soviet ally and ideological foe, the U.S. view of China changed radically to de facto strategic partner in common cause against the Soviet Union in the final decades of the Cold War. After 1989, U.S. concerns about human rights in Communist China rose to the fore, as the Soviet threat receded and then collapsed.

From America’s perspective, China during the 1990s slowly emerged from being seen as a human rights problem to being seen as a major economic opportunity. America’s support for China’s prosecution of a policy of domestic economic reform and opening to the outside world during this period, culminated in U.S. support for China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, sustaining this pattern of engagement with China, which placed economic cooperation at the center of the relationship.
During the last decade, the rapidly escalating growth and size of the Chinese economy began to place new strains on the relationship in critical areas of intellectual property protection, anti-dumping, and accusations of currency manipulation. In other words, the economic dynamic of the relationship, while mutually beneficial, was also beginning to generate its own tensions.

At the same time, the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a strategic threat to China, followed by China’s gradual normalization of its relationship with post–Soviet Russia, underlined the absence of any new compelling strategic rationale to underpin the U.S.-China relationship capable of replacing the anti-Soviet logic of 1972.

Furthermore, since the Global Financial Crisis, China has continued to evolve in the American perception, from being seen as a responsible economic partner in the critical days of the deliberations of the G20 to avoid global financial and economic collapse, to one increasingly seen as a global economic competitor as China’s economy begins to replace the U.S. as the largest economy in the world.

Americans also see China now as beginning to deliberately challenge the established patterns of the post-1945 security order in Asia, in addition to broader global institutional norms (most recently reflected in the current debate on the international status of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank).

China, therefore, in America’s experience over the last 150 years has evolved from being seen as a field of missionary endeavor, to a country that America lost to communism, to one that they joined in common cause against the Soviet Union, to one that in turn is now seen to be challenging American uni-polar supremacy across a range of fronts—while all along representing a set of ideational norms in large part at variance with the universal claims of American Liberal Democratic values.

**AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS**

So what of current U.S. perceptions of China?

Again, I emphasize I do not speak for anybody in America. Just as my speech last week in Washington did not seek in any way to reflect official Chinese views.

These are simply my observations, where I seek to describe the zeitgeist of the foreign policy community in both countries. And while I am professionally trained as a diplomat, I sometimes fear that insufficient strategic candor in both directions in the past may inhibit the ability to craft a common strategic narrative for the future—assuming, of course, that such a narrative is possible for the future given the complexities of a shared historical experience, conflicting national historiographies, different philosophical traditions, the significant gap that currently exists between the two countries’ values and interests, and what I fear to be a widening gap in perceptions of each other’s longer-term intentionalities.
At the core of U.S. perceptions is a deep admiration for what China has achieved over the last 35 years. U.S. elite opinion was by and large skeptical that China could pull off the economic transformation you have since Deng Xiaoping changed the nation’s strategic course. The fact that the market is now anchored as a core principle of Chinese economic policy for a country under Communist Party control has staggered most Americans for its sheer audacity. The fact that hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty commands great respect.

But there is also an American view that China does not appreciate the fact that the United States has welcomed, rather than blocked, China’s full participation in the international community and the institutional arrangements of the global economy. The United States, for ideological reasons, could have vetoed the PRC occupying China’s seat on the United Nations Security Council and in the wider UN system. It did not, despite the fact that at the time, China only a few years before had been at the ideological zenith of the Cultural Revolution.

The United States could have blocked Chinese accession to the WTO. It did not. Although many criticized China’s market-economy status at the time. In fact, rather than blocking Chinese WTO accession, in American eyes they did all they could to advance it, despite the difficulties of the decade in which it was negotiated. And it is an empirical fact that Chinese net exports and rapid increases in foreign direct investment have been major drivers of China’s rapid economic growth.

The United States could also have avoided creating the G20 summit, including China at the top table of global economic governance. It did not. It welcomed China. Just as all G20 members have welcomed China’s constructive contribution to this process both during and following the global crisis.

U.S. foreign policy elites feel that they have done everything possible to welcome China into every domain of the global order and its governance. Of course, my Chinese friends respond by saying that the United States, in doing all the above, has only been doing so for its own national interests, rather than acting altruistically for China.

Having observed some of these U.S. decisionmaking processes over time, and the internally contested nature of them, I am not sure these U.S. decisions were clinically one or the other. Nonetheless, whatever the motivation, the fact remains that these decisions were taken, decisions that over time have benefited China, when other decisions could have been taken.
Chinese friends then argue that a further motivation behind U.S. policy was, and is, to use Chinese global engagement as a means of turning China into a full participant, supporter, and contributor to a global order designed by the United States and the West, for the benefit of the United States and the West, and at a time when the PRC was not involved in any way in its formation. Or as others have observed, gratuitously offering China the opportunity to become an honorary member of the West, as with Japan several decades before.

Of course, my good friend and Harvard Kennedy School colleague, Bob Zoellick, encapsulated this thesis in his “global stakeholder theory” of 2005. While many Chinese found this to be condescending, in part because of the difficulties of translation of the concept of “stakeholder”, and in part for the reasons given above, it should be borne in mind that Zoellick was also directing his remarks at a skeptical American public back in 2005 when many were beginning to react badly to the loss of American jobs through what was perceived to be unfair Chinese competition and currency manipulation. In significant part, what Zoellick was doing was defending a U.S. policy of consistent support for Chinese global economic engagement.

Other Chinese friends argue that the real hidden agenda behind U.S. policy in support of absorbing China into the current liberal internationalist, rules-based order is also to subvert Chinese values with Western values over time. This in turn takes us back to my earlier arguments concerning the values divide between the two countries and the two systems, and the need for this divergence to be addressed in any common narrative for the future.

Americans would argue that China has successfully resisted foreign attempts to “subvert” its domestic philosophical traditions for over 2,000 years. Starting with Christianity, which after 400 years, made limited progress, continuing with the failure of political liberalism to take root during the Nationalist period, and most recently with another foreign import, China’s rejection of Marxism as an economic theory. In other words, China has consistently proven itself to be sufficiently robust as a civilization to evolve its own values over time, and to chart with confidence its own national future.

More fundamentally, however, our American friends would argue that the current rules-based order has overwhelmingly suited and served China’s interests over the last 35 years. It has been the global economic framework within which Chinese prosperity has been achieved. As for the security policy dimensions of the order, including overwhelming U.S. military power,
the Americans would argue that their strong and continuing strategic presence in Asia has preserved the peace and stability of the wider region, creating the post-1975 strategic environment in which all regional economies have prospered—not least China. The alternative, the Americans would argue, could have been a rolling series of regional conflicts, in the strategic vacuum arising from U.S. withdrawal, including over time the radical rearmament of Japan.

This brings us to U.S. perceptions of more recent Chinese conclusions concerning whether or not the United States is pursuing a policy of containment. The Americans argue that if China has seriously concluded that it is now the object of a U.S. policy of containment, then this represents a fundamental miscalculation. They argue that U.S. policies toward China across the last 35 years have been the actual antithesis of containment. Containment against the Soviet Union during the Cold War was designed to diplomatically isolate, economically undermine, and militarily confront Moscow, overtly and covertly, at every corner of the globe. The Americans would further ask China the question: if the United States is seriously containing China, then what is China currently being prevented from doing in the region and the world that it would otherwise want to do, were it not for U.S. policy?

This brings us to the related charge from my Chinese friends that the United States is seeking to isolate China. For this, Chinese commentators point to a policy of encirclement by U.S. allies, and the strengthening of these alliances in recent years.

America would argue that every one of these alliances predate the rise of China by decades and in Australia’s case by half a century. They further argue that many of these alliances had their original rationale in providing security guarantees against the long-term reemergence of Japan. Then as part of a worldwide network of alliances against the Soviet Union in a period of profound ideological, political, diplomatic, and military confrontation with Moscow. And following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these alliances have performed a range of functions against multiple and changing contingencies, not least contending with the rise of militant Islamism over the last decade and a half.

As for the strengthening of these alliances in recent years, the Americans may argue that this has nothing to do with the rise of China. I personally do not think that is the case. It is more likely to have been the case that this strengthening was in part in response to U.S. and regional perceptions of a more assertive Chinese policy in the South China Sea and elsewhere. Of course, our Chinese friends provide a different account of both this and the East China Sea, where they see their actions as responding to the efforts of others to unilaterally change the status quo.
On the broader question of alliances, however, the Americans argue that none of these arrangements have been forced on regional states, nor has their recent strengthening, but rather they have been the subject of voluntary requests arising from the internal democratic deliberations of sovereign states. Indeed the Americans point to the example of the Philippines in the 1980s, when the government requested the United States to leave Subic Bay and Clarke Field, which they then did.

As for the rebalance itself, and its implications here in the region, when the United States says in the future it will have 60 percent of its global fleet here in the Pacific, compared with 50 percent in the past, against a shrinking U.S. Navy, that will in all probability result in the same overall naval presence, if not smaller than what we have today.

The United States is also puzzled by other apparent Chinese conclusions that the United States in engaged in an operational strategy to diminish and divide China and ultimately “sabotage” the Chinese political system from within. These deep questions of domestic Chinese politics require further deliberation. They also return us to the core question as to whether the United States ultimately accepts the legitimacy of the Chinese political system given the radically different values system on which it is constructed, and continued Chinese objections to the universalist claims of U.S. and Western values systems over all others. But the baseline U.S. response, still disbelieved by many in Beijing, is that the development of China’s future political arrangements is a matter for the Chinese people themselves.

There is one final set of American perceptions I wish to address today concerning China’s long-term aspirations. And they relate to the simple question of what China will seek to do in the region and the world once it has realized its dream of national wealth and power.

Put simply, a widely-held American view is that China’s self-declared policy of its “peaceful rise” is temporary, in order to convince Americans and others that there is nothing to worry about for the foreseeable future. Whereas the reality, according to this view, is that once Chinese power—economically, and then militarily—begins, to achieve parity or pass that of the United States, China will begin rapidly to push the United States out of Asia, expand its sphere of influence in the region, and, in time, begin challenging some of the fundamentals of the current rules-based order.

Proponents of this view argue that this strategy is consistent with millennia of Chinese strategic thinking, such as Sun Tzu’s “Art of War,” that the best way to prevail is to become sufficiently powerful so that armed conflict is rendered redundant, and one’s objectives can be achieved by peaceful means. It is also seen as consistent with Deng Xiaoping’s longstanding dictum of “hide your strength and bide your time”.

**SOME AMERICANS VIEW CHINA’S OPERATIONAL STRATEGY AS SIMPLY TO BUY TIME UNTIL IT CAN ALTER THE OVERALL CORRELATION OF FORCES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES.**
For these reasons, it is argued, China wishes to avoid the possibility of armed conflict with the United States for the foreseeable future because China fears, legitimately, that it would lose. Similarly with Japan where the argument is that premature conflict could also result in China losing, or at least not winning, in a limited conflict in the East China Sea. In either case, such an outcome would be deeply domestically delegitimizing for the Chinese Government and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.

This long-term American view that China’s operational strategy is simply to buy time until it can alter the overall “correlation of forces” against the United States and its allies has a growing constituency in America. And its effect is to encourage a deeply “hawkish” view on China’s future, and importantly on how to respond to China in the interim, “before it is all too late”. It is reflected in part in the recent strengthening of U.S. alliances across Asia. It is also reflected in requests from a number of other regional states to strengthen their strategic partnership with the U.S. in order to offset their concerns about this longer-term Chinese contingency.

Of course, China has many responses to this particular American view—grounded in China’s historical behavior, its long-term domestic preoccupations and the well-defined contours of its current policy settings, which are set in deeply held views of the Chinese leadership in a multipolar rather than hegemonic, world. Nonetheless, dealing with this emerging American view of China’s long-term intentions will be a critical factor in developing any common narrative for the relationship’s future.

CONCLUSION
These remarks have primarily concentrated on China as seen through a range of American eyes. I recently concluded my remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, on Chinese strategic perceptions of the United States by saying that the fact these Chinese perceptions exist does not by definition, make them accurate.

What is important, however, is that these perceptions do exist, and to some extent they shape Chinese policy behavior. Similarly, with my address today here in Shanghai, what I have sought to do is describe a range of U.S. strategic perceptions concerning China’s rise. Again, that does not necessarily mean these perceptions are correct. Nonetheless, they do exist, and they too contribute to the shaping of U.S. policy. And the more powerful China becomes, the sharper these differences in perceptions are likely to become.

In foreign policy, the beginning of wisdom is to understand what the other party thinks and believes, and why. And this is just as important for our Chinese friends as for the United States.
很高兴能够再次造访中国。

很高兴能够再次造访上海。近三十年前我曾代理澳大利亚驻上海总领事。那时，还没几个国家在这个中国的商业中心设立总领事馆。

很高兴能够再次造访复旦大学 —— 这所著名的“中国常春藤盟校”（九校联盟之一）。十年前，我的儿子尼古拉斯就在此学习中文。十年后的今天，我则在大洋彼岸，成为了美国常春藤盟校 ——哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院的高级研究员。我在哈佛肯尼迪政府学院贝尔福中心的政策研究项目题为“未来十年中美关系的可能未来”。我研究此项目缘起习近平主席所提“新型大国关系”之概念，意指如何避免守成大国与新兴大国之间的长期矛盾。

有鉴于中美关系对于我们亚太地区的共同未来有决定性的影响，深入了解“新型大国关系”的概念对于中美关系的未来意味着什么显得至关重要。同时，我对过去十二个月来中美关系的持续降温愈加感到担忧。也正因如此，我将今年的工作重心放在了分析未来十年中美两国的国家实力与国家意图上，并在此基础上，思考中美两国是否在价值与利益方面有充分的共通性来为彼此共同的未来构建双方的共同叙事，抑或这一共通性根本不存在。这意味着无论是两国关系还是亚太地区的未来都将会是事件应对为导向，而缺乏宏观制度设计。那么，会有越来越多的战略竞争，危机隐患，还有可能的冲突。

在此框架下，上周我在位于华盛顿的美国战略与国际问题研究中心的兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基地缘战略研究所成立仪式上发表了演讲，演讲题为“中美关系的可能未来：中国视角和美国应对”，目的在于尽我所能阐释中国对于地区和世界的相关认知和理解。我自然无法在如此阐释上保持客观，也正因如此，我将今年的工作重心放在了分析未来十年中美两国的国家实力与国家意图上，并在此基础上，思考中美两国是否在价值与利益方面有充分的共通性来为彼此共同的未来构建双方的共同叙事，抑或这一共通性根本不存在。这意味着无论是两国关系还是亚太地区的未来都将会是以事件应对为导向，而缺乏宏观制度设计。那么，会有越来越多的战略竞争，危机隐患，还有可能的冲突。

今天，在上海，我将反其道而行之，试图从美国的角度来阐释中国，并希冀以最大限度来开诚布公。然而我也不是老美。我的发言并不代表任何官方立场。我仅希望深入阐明我所观察到的美国外交政策精英阶层的看法，并无意为他们的立场辩护。我所秉持的理念是能够在中美双方提供相对客观现实的第三方观察，并就双方对彼此的愿景和政策实际上持有什么样的态度进行阐述。我认为，若缺乏对彼此现实政治认知，则双方的共同叙事难以构建。如是认知，终将影响政策。
美国的价值

中国与很多国家一样，对美国不断强调其普世价值观一贯不满。中国认为，每个国家都有其本土价值；而美国所强调的普世价值，在相当程度上与中国的信仰相悖。一国选择最能体现该国价值的政治体制是其政治主权，无论该政治体制是否完全契合该国的价值体系。这个观点也反映在了中国最基本的外交政策方针，即“和平共处五项原则”上。其中包括“互相尊重”，以及“互不干涉内政”。因此，不去理解自由主义民主价值中的机遇、自由与民主在美国政治传统中长久的核心地位的话，也就无法理解美国对中国、区域，以及世界的态度。值得注意的是，这些价值在美利坚合众国初创之时就被视作全人类的，而非美国独有的，共同价值。

因此，不去理解自由主义民主价值中的机遇、自由与民主在美国政治传统中长久的核心地位的话，也就无法理解美国对中国、区域，以及世界的态度。

在美国传统中，这些自由被视作“岭上之都”的神谕。这些自由也构成了被美国人民视为“美国例外主义”的道德基准。在美国的理解看来，19世纪，对“岭上之都”的向往像一块磁铁一样吸引了数以千万计的移民离开了旧世界的故乡，踏上了前往新世界的旅程。这些自由也成为了美国南北战争和废奴运动中激励人心的自由。换言之，那时的民主自由是美利坚的民主自由。美国并没有向世界输出政治理念或派遣军事力量的意愿——其意愿至多只是希望成为一个典范国家罢了。

直至二十世纪，美国被迫陷入国际事务与欧洲战事的泥沼中——但那也更多是出于在航运自由方面对国家利益的保护，而非出于对政治信仰的守卫。一战后，伍德罗.威尔逊希望将美国价值植入彼时的自由主义国际秩序的意图，被当时奉行孤立主义的美国国会否决了。

三十年之后，历史重演，美国依然不情愿参战，直至其国家利益在太平洋地区受到损害，且同时希特勒在大西洋向美国宣战。实际上，直到二战联合抗争德日法西斯主义的时候，美国人才把捍卫美国价值的范围扩大到全世界。美国人民在罗斯福的号召下，在二战期间购买军事公债应援战事，为捍卫“四个自由”，即“言论自由”，“宗教信仰自由”，“不虞匮乏的自由”，以及“免除恐惧的自由”。那时开始，美利坚合众国从自美国革命以来便在美国政坛扎根的孤立主义传统中走了出来，进而建立了二战后世界秩序的努力中整合了上述美国价值。而在联合国，国际法和美国强权的共同作用下，美国开始将国际协作视作其使命，继而将捍卫自由民主的价值视作这一使命核心内容。

这一使命在二战后美国面对苏联的挑战，以及对一个共产主义中国崛起时，马上被激活。随着中苏
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交恶，中共放弃意识形态输出，以及十年后的苏联解体，许多美国人过早地做出了“历史终结”的结论，并认为这是自由民主资本主义最终胜利。然而，历史并未终结。激进伊斯兰主义对历史有着不同的看法，俄罗斯民族主义的回归对欧洲自由主义的抵制也是一个对历史终结论断的不同反应。中国模式或者“北京共识”也有着同样的。

即便如此，自由民主的美国例外主义依然继续着美国在国际社会中强大而具有凝聚力的叙事。美国的批评者有理有据地指出，从门罗主义—往往是民选政府依然可被以非民主的方式强行更替到无视联合国安理会单方面推翻伊拉克政府不难看出美国的伪善，诸如此类的例证与美国价值及其战后创立的多边秩序无疑是相悖的。但同样有理有据的是，过去150年里，美国作为超级大国，可说是从2500年前波斯帝国以来最温和的。

总体而言，除了泰迪.罗斯福浅尝辄止的冒险主义之外，美国从未有过建立殖民主义帝国的诉求，即便美国拥有毋庸置疑的能力去这么做。纵观历史，在这方面唯一能与美国相媲美的国家，只有中国——在几个朝代都有能力建立巨大的殖民帝国的情况下，中国没有选择这么做。当然历史上两国都经历过数次边境战争，但两国都没有为了寻求国家扩张或经济掠夺而去吞并外国领土。这一中美历史中展现出的共同性很少被讨论，然而这是十分值得关注的。

但我们不能忽视一个核心差异在于，因上述自欧洲殖民时期至今所形成的历史原因，美国在今天仍持续对内对外宣扬着自由民主的理念。然而美国国内持续不断的孤立主义和削减开支的主张，以及对于美国作为全球领导者的责任归属与道德目的的争论，直接导致了对这些美国理想在美国本土之外推广过程中出现的起伏。无论美国国内的现实主义或国外众多不合理的政府认为那是多么合乎需要，美国例外主义和自由民主传统在美国国内与外交政策的核心地位，无法由一纸外交协定抹去。这是美国身份构成的根本之一。试图抹去美国自由民主的理念就如同希望在现代中国政治观念或国家特性中抹去儒、释、道的影响，这都是不可能的。

但此中区别在于，儒家理念并不具有向世界输出价值的特性。而美国的自由民主，无论是经主动传道他国，抑或被动展示自我，实际上是极具输出性的。因此，事实上，一个崛起的中国和一个仍然强大的美国之间想要构建任何共同叙事，就需要双方运用各自的智慧，在深入探讨国家特性的基础上，就这些繁复的观念进行磋商合意。这是两国关系中一个反复出现的深层问题。而且不会因我们希望它不存在而自动消失。
美国的中国经历
如上简述美国的价值之后，我们不禁要问：什么样的历史经历（尤其与中国的交互）助构了美国如今的国家意图。美国曾是与晚清政府签订臭名昭著不平等条约的国家之一，也曾是在1900年前后义和团运动兴起时入侵北京的八国联军一份子。然而，美国没有依据所谓的《辛丑条约》向清政府要求全额赔偿。反之，美国以庚子赔款助建了清华大学、燕京大学以及北京协和医学院。可以说，在20世纪中国精英的眼中，美国并非与其他帝国主义国家为一丘之貉。中国在19世纪末和20世纪初的美国人眼中亦被视作是基督教传教的沃土。彼时来自美国和欧洲的传教士纷纷投身于“救赎千百万中国人的灵魂”的事业中。上世纪三十年代，随着日军侵华的行动日渐猖獗，美国对由蒋介石领导的南京国民政府的认同感也愈加增强。蒋介石基督教信仰的公开化也进一步巩固了美国民众对国民政府的支持。

自1941年对日宣战起，美国便持续通过“驼峰航线”为战时陪都重庆输送物资。而1943年蒋介石出席开罗会议之后，美英两国就把中国视为抗击法西斯主义的重要盟国之一。在1945-49年的第二次国共内战期间，美国为国民党提供了巨量物资用以对抗其在人数上极不占优的红军。直到1949年蒋介石迁台之前，美国都一直旗帜鲜明地支持着国民党，即便这期间有过少数美国志愿者站到了毛泽东领导的红军一边。

此后三十余年，有关谁“失去了中国”的争论在美国外交政策讨论中持续不断。中美两军在朝鲜战争期间直接冲突，之后在越南战争中亦间接碰撞。与此同时，直到尼克松1972年访华之前，美国一直在不遗余力地投身台湾防卫，尽管台湾问题直到今日仍悬而未决。

而美国对中国的态度的重心，从90年代起，又逐渐从对人权问题的担忧，转向了对巨大的市场机遇的垂涎。美国对华态度在冷战的最后十年剧变——从曾经的苏联盟国和意识形态的敌对方，迅速转变为事实上共同针对苏联的战略伙伴。1989年后，随着苏联威胁式微，直至后来苏联解体，美国对于中共的人权问题的担忧被重新提上日程。而美国对中国的态度的重心，从90年代起，又逐渐从对人权问题的担忧，转向了对巨大的市场机遇的垂涎。

在这一时期，美国一直对中国改革开放和融入全球市场表现出欢迎态度。随着2001年美国支持中国加入世界贸易组织，中美关系一度保持以经济合作为核心。过去十年，随着中国经济体量的飞速增长，两国关系在诸如保护知识产权、反倾销，以及关于操纵汇率的指控等敏感问题上呈现紧张态
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势。换句话说，推动两国关系向良好态势发展的互利互惠的经济纽带也呈现一定程度的紧张。

与此同时，当作为中美两国的共同威胁的苏联解体，以及中俄关系正常化之后，中美两国曾经的共同战略基础便不复存在。在美国看来，全球金融危机之后，中国有了长足的进步。这是从二十国集团商议如何在全球金融危机的大环境下避免全面的经济崩盘议题时，中国所展现出的一个负责任的经济伙伴的形象中所得出的结论。鉴于中国将有可能取代美国成为世界第一大经济体，其逐渐被视作为美国全球范围内最大的经济竞争对手。制度规范的国家。一个最近的例证便是关于亚洲基础设施投资银行国际地位的讨论。

同时对美国而言，中国也成为了挑战亚洲地区战后安全秩序，乃至全球制度规范的国家。至此，中国在美国过去150年的经验中的转变呈现出了这样一个脉络：从一个传教士眼中的传教沃土，到美国败给共产主义的典型国家，从曾经对抗苏联的同伴，到今天成为在世界秩序的诸多层面挑战美国单极，在意识形态领域的诸多方面冲击美国的自由民主价值的崛起力量。

美国对世界的理解
那么当下美国对中国的理解又是怎样的呢？

如前所述，我的如下言论并不代表任何美国人。
正如此前我在华盛顿的演讲并没有试图代表中国的官方立场一样，我所表达的，仅仅是我观察到的两国在外交政策方面的思潮。作为一个受过职业训练的外交官，我时常对过去两国间在战略上不够坦诚的现状可能会阻碍未来两国建构战略共同叙事感到担忧。

鉴于中美复杂的共同历史经验、相斥的国家历史背景、不同的哲学传统源流，巨大的价值利益分歧，以及我所担心的两国之间持续扩大的对彼此长期国家意图的误判，我依然相信，中美对于双方和全球未来的共同叙事可以建立。实际上，在美国对中国认知的核心，其对中国在过去35年间取得的成绩是高度赞赏的。总体来讲，过去美国各界精英，对邓小平领导下的中国经济转型能够成功持怀疑态度。而事实上，现而今市场已经成为了中国共产党经济政策的稳定核心——这令诸多美国精英大跌眼镜。

诚然，让数以亿记中国人摆脱贫困是值得尊敬的壮举。但与此同时，美国也认为对于美国全面欢迎（而非阻隔）中国参与国际事务和全球经济，中国没有表现出应有的感激与承认。事实上，美国完全可以出于意识形态上的考量，在由中华人民共和国政府于联合国安理会，及更广泛的联合国系统中，代表中国事务的议题上投反对票。美国并未这样做。即便在这样短短几年之前，中国的意识形态狂热在文化大革命里达到了顶峰。美国同样可以阻碍中国加入世
世界贸易组织。美国也未这样做，尽管当时存在大量对中国市场经济状况的不满意意见。

事实上，在美国人看来，尽管在中国入世的十年谈判里显得困难重重，但美国没有意图阻碍中国入世——相反地，美国为中国入世竭尽全力给予帮助。而实证表明，中国的净出口和迅猛增加的外资投入的确是中国经济快速增长的主要驱动力。美国也可以选择不创建二十国峰会来吸纳中国成为全球经济事务的核心政策制定者之一。美国还是没有这样做。

美国欢迎中国。

一如所有二十国集团成员欢迎中国在全球金融危机之中以及之后的建设性贡献，美国外交政策的精英阶层认为，美国已经做了所有他们能做的事情，来欢迎中国在各个方面融入全球秩序和参与其实质管与运作。

当然，我的中国朋友的回答是，美国所做的一切仅仅是为了美国自己的国家利益，而非为了中国所做的利他主义无私行为。尽管我对美国的政策决策过程及其内部竞争传统有过一些观察，我却无法肯定地说美国之决策出于利己或是利他的考量。先搁下美国动机不表，且看美国在可以选择其他政策方向的时候，事实上还是做出了如今所见的有利于中国的决策。

中国的朋友们会继续质疑：美国一以贯之的对华政策的背后动机乃是希望基于美国和西方的利益，将中国纳入美国和西方所构建的国际秩序中，使中国完全成为其参与者，支持者和贡献者——但中国并非这个国际秩序的初期形成与制定的一份子。这意在吸纳中国成为西方社会的“荣誉会员”——正如西方在几十年前如此对待日本。

我的好友，也是在哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院的同事，罗伯特.佐利克，曾在 2005 年将此论题归纳概括为其著名的“全球利益相关者理论”。由于“利益相关者”这个概念的晦涩翻译以及上述的原因，很多中国人认为这个理论有居高临下之意。但应该注意的是，在 2005 年佐利克提出该理论的时候，正值诸多美国人认为他们失业的主因在于中国的不当竞争和操纵汇率——佐利克此理论的受众是对此表示怀疑和过激反应的美国公众。实际上，佐利克所做的努力意在维护美国政府继续支持中国参与国际经济事务的政策。

另一些中国朋友主张，美国对华政策背后的阴谋是通过渐渐将中国纳入当下基于规则的自由主义国际秩序，以逐渐用西方价值颠覆中国价值。
China under Xi Jinping: Alternative Futures for U.S.-China Relations

说到这里，就需要再次说明我之前提及的关于两国和两个政治体系所持有的价值会使两国渐行渐远的问题，以及为解决这一问题，为未来建构任何共同叙事所需要付出努力的必要性。对此，美方会主张，中国有成功抵御任何外来势力“颠覆”其存在两千余年的哲学传统的历史经验。从 400 多年前基督教进入中国所取得的相当有限的进展到国民政府期间自由主义政治理念试图扎根于中国的失败再到最近几十年中国摈弃马克思主义经济理论。

从另一个角度来看，中国文明一贯展现着价值自我进化的强大生命力，以及国家未来规划的强大自信心。从根本上来看，我们的美国朋友认为，过去的 35 年来，现行的基于规则的国际秩序毫无争议地符合并满足了中国的发展利益。

中国成就的繁荣是在现有全球经济框架内取得的。从国际秩序中的安全政策角度看，美方会声称，是以美国强大的军事力量为基础的安全政策自1975 年起保障了广大区域的和平与稳定，为包括中国在内的整体区域繁荣创造了稳定的战略环境。美方会进一步认为，如果没有这一安全政策，区域冲突会持续不断发生，甚至有可能日本在某个时间节点上再度出现的军国主义化。

美国认为，如果中国真的认为美国对华奉行遏制政策，那么这表明中国对此有根本性的误判。美国同时认为，过去的 35 年间美国对华政策恰恰与遏制政策相反。回顾冷战期间美国对苏联的遏制，其表现为：在全球每一个角落，无论明处还是暗处，对苏联实施外交孤立，经济颠覆以及军事对抗。进而美国会问中国这样的一个问题：如果美国确实在遏制中国，那么美国究竟在哪些区域和全球事务上对中国进行了哪些遏制呢？而且，如果没如前假设的美国对华遏制政策，中国又会有哪些不同作为呢？

这个问题让我想到中国朋友们对于美国正在寻求孤立中国的指控。不少中国的评论员指，美国的盟友正在包围中国，而美国与这些盟国的关系在近年不断巩固。美方则会辩称，美国在亚太地区的盟国关系都是在中美关系的盟国关系都是在中国崛起之前就已建立的。以澳大利亚为例，澳美同盟关系早在半个世纪前已经建立。他们会继而表明，美国在亚太的盟国关系之初衷是为了长期防范日本军国主义的再度崛起而向其盟国提供的安全保障。

这同时也是美国在与苏联在意识形态、政治、外交以及军事等方面的全面对峙时期所形成的全球范围的盟国关系网的一部分。这些同盟关系，在苏联解体后，在应对多个偶发性事件中起到了多方面的作用——尤其是在过去十年间与激进伊斯兰主义的对抗中。而说到美国与盟国关系的强化，美方会强调这同中国的崛起毫无关系。

我个人认为这种说法不符合实情。
更贴近实际的情况是，美国与其盟国关系的强化是美国及区域内对中国在南海及其他地区之独断作为的意图判断与政策反应。当然我们的中国朋友会对此给出不同的看法，他们会认为无论是南海还是东海，中国的行动完全是对对方单方面改变现状做出的回应。然而，从一个更广泛的角度来看盟国问题时，美国人宣称无论是缔结盟国关系还是强化盟国关系都不是美国强加给这一地区的国家的；与之相反，美国是这些主权国家在经过国内自主民主商议之后的安全保障受托方。

的确，他们所指的美国仅仅作为受托方的例证之一，就是 80 年代菲律宾政府要求美军撤离苏比克湾和克拉克空军基地时，美军确实撤走了。至于美国的再平衡以及再平衡概念在亚太地区的意涵，也值得思量。其实，当美国宣称未来全球美军60%的舰队将部署在太平洋地区时，实际上美国海军部署在亚太地区的规模如果大致仅会基本维持现今的规模（因为虽然这一数字将从 50% 上升至60%，但美国海军的整体规模正在缩减。）

美国对其他的武断的中方结论，譬如认为美国正在在筹划削弱、分裂中国，并最终从内部“预谋破坏”中国政治制度的战略运作等等，同样感到疑惑。这些深层次的关于中国国内政治的问题需要更审慎的考量。中方继而回到了一个核心的问题上：在中美政治体制建立在极为不同的价值基础之上的情况之下，美国是否能够最终认可中国政治体制和合法性，以及容纳中国对美国和西方价值体系中的普世主张的一贯反对。对此，纵然北京长期怀疑，但美国的底线在于，中国未来的政治筹划取决于中国人民自己。

最后，我想探讨的美国国家意图之中关乎中国的长期愿景的议题。这关系到一个简单的问题：在实现了繁荣富强的中国梦之后，中国对于区域和世界秩序会有怎样的诉求？

简而言之，在美国普遍存在的看法是，中国宣称的“和平崛起”只是暂时的，用来说服美国及其他国家不必担心中国现在的发展。由此看法所演化出的认定现实将是：当中国实现经济和军事上的强大之后，会寻求与美国达到权力均衡甚至超越美国；那么，到了那时，中国会迅速把美国赶出亚洲，以扩大中国在亚太地区的影响力，继而撼动现行的基于规则的全球秩序的基础。

这个关于中国“买时间”的战略运作，在美国长期存在且得到了越来越多的支持。这一看法的支持者认为上述战略与中国数千年来的战略思想是一致的，正如“孙子兵法”所云：“不战而屈人之兵，善之善也” (《孙子兵法·谋攻篇》)。与此同时，上述战略与邓小平的经久不衰的名言“韬光养晦”也有不谋而合之效果。

出于上述原因，美国认为，中国希望避免在可以预见的未来与美国发生军事冲突。基于中国的理性判断，若中美当下开战，中国难以取胜。与此相似，若在时机不成熟的时候与日本开战，中国一样有可能失败，或者说难以取得全面胜利。但无论如何，这样的结果会从根本上撼动中国共产党的执政合法性。

这个关于中国“买时间”的战略运作，在美国长期存在且得到了越来越多的支持。其影响在于强化鹰
派视角 —— 要在“一切为时已晚之前”应对中国崛起。这一点也反映在近期美国与亚太地区盟国关系的强化上，尤其反映在亚太国家为避免长期来看可能与中国发生的意外，而主动要求与美国强化盟国关系上。

当然，中国对美国的上述看法在各个方面都可以进行回应：无论是从中国在历史上的角色，或是出于中国长期专注国内事务的事实，以及中国现行政策上所反映出构建多极世界而非建立霸权主义的中国希望。尽管如此，如何智性处理正在持续升温的美国对于中国长远意图的猜疑与揣测，将会成为两国构建关于地区和全球未来共同宏大叙事的重要考量。

结语
上述评议主要集中在美是如何看待中国的这个主题上。

前日我在位于华盛顿的美国战略与国际问题研究中心所发表的演讲以中国的战略意图作为结束语，结束语中我提到，中国国家战略意图的存在并不等同于这些意图是精确无误的。

重要的是，这些意图是存在的，而且在某种程度上他们影响了中国的政策制定，这与我今天在上海的演讲是一致的。

我期望能够阐述一系列与中国崛起相关的美国战略意图。需要重申的是，这并不代表美国的战略意图是正确的。然而，这些战略意图是存在的，同样地，他们也影响了美国的政策制定。随着中国的强盛，这些不同与分歧会与日俱增。

智慧的外交始于理解彼此的意图和其背后的原因。这对中国是如此，对美国也是如此。
Is a common narrative for the future of U.S.-China relations possible? This week I return from my 10th visit to Beijing this year alone. And last week from my fifth to Washington. All focused on this single, core question, namely: is there sufficient commonality of values, interests, and capabilities between these two great countries, despite the vastly different civilizational and ideational traditions from which they come, to craft a common future together?

Or are we faced once again with the bleak, repetitive refrains from history that caution us that it is much more probable that rising powers will inevitably confront established powers, or the reverse, in pursuit of the elusive status of great-power supremacy, and that China and the United States will constitute no exception?

I believe this to be the central question of our time, because whether we are conscious of it or not, the future shape of the current regional and global orders—politically, economically, diplomatically, militarily, environmentally, societally, and legally—will be determined by the resolution of this question, one way or the other.

That is why I have come to the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center this year to look at this question through the eyes of a third party, as someone nonetheless with long-standing professional engagement with Beijing and Washington, as well as someone who has a deep, abiding affection, for different reasons, for both of these countries.

Yet, as I come toward the conclusion of this project, I find my natural optimism—as a committed member of the much broader project called progressive politics, anchored in the outlandish proposition that we can in fact build a future better than the past, and to do so for all, and not just for some—is being deeply challenged by the new, changing dynamics of U.S.-China relations. It is not that there is no rational way through. I believe there is. It is because there seems to be little political way through, if we can accept the common definition that politics is the art of the possible. And further I fear that the political window may be beginning to close, particularly in Beijing.
My argument in this lecture is as follows:

- First, that the core gap in U.S.-China relations is a gap in political values that cannot readily be breached.
- Second, that the strategic perceptions that each political elite has of each other is increasingly negative.
- Third, that the common interests that both systems share are at this stage insufficient to create enough strategic ballast to fundamentally alter the inherently competitive and conflictual nature of the relationship.
- Fourth, that the inherent dynamics of the relationship are likely to create an increasing sense, and, in time, reality, of strategic drift, which can only be arrested if the leadership of the two countries consciously and deliberately embark on a common strategic narrative for a common rather than divided future.
- Finally, that such a shared narrative for the long-term future of the relationship must be simultaneously realist about what fundamental differences exist and cannot for the foreseeable future be overcome; constructive about where common agreement can be reached and where common institutions can be built; and committed to building strategic trust, step by step, with the possibility that this can gradually transform the relationship over time.

Recognizing all along that the latter represents a hard challenge for the political leadership of both countries, when most, but by no means all, of the natural counterforces in the relationship are working in the reverse direction.

Absent such a common narrative—and one that’s both conceptualized and driven at the highest political level—I fear where strategic drift will take us, as drift turns into a current, which overtime become almost irresistible. And so my deepest fear is that, because of our many seemingly more pressing domestic and foreign policy preoccupations, we—by which I mean both the United States and China—may miss the historical tipping point, during a time when the capabilities gap between the two countries begins to close, and when there is still sufficient political space for statesmen to make different strategic choices for the future.

**Chinese and American Values**

It is perhaps the understatement of our time that Chinese and American political values are different: different in their content, different in the scope of their desired application, and different in the passion of their exposition. Here in the United States, and across the wider West, we are deeply familiar with the liberal democratic values that constitute the lodestone on which our contemporary political institutions are constructed.
We are also familiar with the fact that across the cumulative and collective history of what we loosely call “the West,” this has been a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to the American and French revolutions—which occurred at the approximate midpoint of China’s last dynasty, the Qing, during the long reign of Emperor Qianlong—the political history of Europe was largely monarchical, authoritarian, and in some cases absolute, with limited roles for parliaments that were in turn elected with limited franchises. For the American Republic, all this changed fundamentally as the “city on the hill”—built on the dual foundations of political and religious freedom—became the leitmotif of the American example to the world. The early republic did not seek to propagate its message to the world, but rather to be a moral exemplar to the world, drawing the peoples of the Old World to the shores of the new to share the fruits of its revolution and the new Jerusalem.

It was not until after the Second World War, where America together with the Soviet Union became the decisive factor in the defeat of fascism in both Europe and the Pacific, that the active, global propagation of American values became an inextricable part of what came to be known as American exceptionalism. And in fact it was the unfolding Cold War with the Soviet Union in which Washington embarked upon a policy of containment against Moscow that reinforced a deliberate ideological confrontation between the competing value systems of liberal democracy on one hand and Marxist-Leninism on the other. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there may have been some abatement of American enthusiasm for the global evangelization of the liberal democratic project. But the project itself continues nonetheless and has become an indelible part of the American global political identity.

This tradition stands in contrast to that of classical and contemporary China. It does so in three core respects: First, the value system of classical Confucianism and the Marxist-Leninism of the current period, albeit with Chinese characteristics, are fundamentally hierarchical. There is little evidence readily identifiable of political liberalism in either the ancient or modern Chinese political tradition. In the continuing Chinese philosophical tradition, the individual is not in possession of inalienable human rights, but rather only of those rights bestowed by the Emperor or the State. Importantly, these bestowed rights in turn are made conditional on the appropriate exercise of reciprocal responsibilities by the same individuals.

Second, whereas the American liberal democratic system was determined by the Founding Fathers of the republic as universal rather than particular to any culture, Chinese Confucianism was traditionally seen as applying to the Middle Kingdom alone. The Chinese view was that foreigners were from time to time welcome to come to China to observe, understand, and imbibe the inherent virtue of the Chinese philosophical system. The Chinese had no particular interest in either actively evangelizing its tradition to the rest of the world, let alone seeking to impose it, whether ideologically, politically, or militarily.

The third difference between the two traditions grows naturally from the second; namely the degree of passion attached to the globalization of the liberal democratic cause, as opposed to the relative indifference of successive generations of Chinese Emperors on the question of active propagation beyond China’s borders. After 1949, Chinese Communism did, through various
ebbs and flows, go through a period of seeking to export the Chinese revolution around the world—from which the Maoists in Nepal and the Shining Path guerillas in Peru continue as isolated and somewhat embarrassing legacies from a limited period of “universalist” Chinese ideological zeal. All this, however, came to an abrupt halt after Deng Xiaoping’s return to politics 35 years ago, when this Chinese variant of communist internationalism was quietly, but nonetheless abruptly, confined to history.

Which brings us to the present. Over the subsequent 35 years, China has actively sought to appropriate the capitalist dimension of the liberal capitalist project, culminating in the 2013 Party Plenum’s decision to place the market as the central principle of the Chinese economic model. While Marxism is now officially dead, the Leninist structure of the original Marxist-Leninist state has been retained with a continued concentration of political power in that of a one-party state. For these reasons, a growing number of commentators have described the “China Model” as a state capitalist model, although Nick Lardy, among others, disputes this.

Importantly, China has also in recent years moved from a passive defensivist response against the claimed universalism of the democratic liberalist ideal of the collective West, to an ideological posture of now routinely attacking the failures of the liberal democratic model and an increasing advocacy of the “China Model” to the developing world. In particular, China highlights the dysfunctionality of Western and Indian democratic models as incapable of concentrating the political resolve of the state on the core continuing task of economic development. Whether it is gridlock on Capitol Hill, the political inertia of Western Europe, or the failure of the Indian political system to build modern infrastructure to underpin its development, the Chinese critique, targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences, is becoming louder and louder.

The core question for the future of U.S.-China relations, however, is the extent to which the values divide renders broader cooperation between Washington and Beijing ultimately futile. Specifically, the core question from the American perspective is whether or not China, because of its successful economic development program, will ultimately transition and therefore become an active supporter and participant in the international liberal rules-based order. Or alternatively, whether China will succeed in defying Fukuyama’s “end of history” and produce an entirely different, sustainable model of political economy for China’s long-term future which, in turn,
will also deeply shape China’s view of the world. The answer to these questions lies primarily in the internal deliberations of the Chinese Government, because international pressure, however executed, is unlikely to succeed in bringing about liberal democratic reforms in China. Such pressure arguably produces the reverse effect, as it reinforces a politically nationalist response.

For China, the related core question is whether the United States fundamentally accepts the legitimacy of their current political system, or whether China concludes that the United States is either directly or indirectly working to subvert that system. While this may seem an obscure and unsubstantiated point from the perspective of most Western analysts, the same analysts may be surprised to learn how profoundly this question of perceived political legitimacy underpins the rest of the U.S.-China relationship. In other words, from the Chinese perspective, this is seen as a foundational matter for the future of the relationship, whereas from an American perspective, it is seen at best as tangential.

The question for the future is whether a common landing point is possible between these different value systems. Or at least a landing point that does not prevent the stable development of other critical dimensions of the U.S.-China relationship. Or impede U.S.-China cooperation in strengthening the existing international rules-based order.

**CHINA’S STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS**

It could also be argued that, apart from the values divide, another central organizing principle for the future of the U.S.-China relationship is what one astute Chinese observer has called “mutually assured misperception.” Strategic perceptions are, of course, notoriously difficult to decipher and define. Perceptions, nonetheless, whether accurate or otherwise, fundamentally shape international behavior. They embrace a vast array of subjective occupations and conclusions concerning the other party. They impact the complex domain of “diplomatic signaling”. They also impact many of the assumptions contained within the vast social science literature on “game theory”.

Specifically, strategic perceptions embrace one party’s calculations of the capabilities of another; of the intentionalities of another; calculations as to how to most effectively communicate a foreign or security policy message in relation to the other party; assumptions as to how the other party will most likely respond to given initiatives on the part of the originating party; as well as assumptions as to how additional sequences of action and reaction are likely to unfold.

There have been many reports in recent times concerning deep Chinese perceptions of what constitutes the substantive elements of U.S. strategy toward China. These have been reflected in

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**THE CORE QUESTION FROM THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE IS WHETHER OR NOT CHINA, BECAUSE OF ITS SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WILL ULTIMATELY TRANSITION INTO AN ACTIVE SUPPORTER AND PARTICIPANT IN THE INTERNATIONAL LIBERAL RULES-BASED ORDER.**
a five-point formulation that reportedly concludes that U.S. strategy now seeks to:

- Divide China;
- Contain China;
- Isolate China;
- Diminish China; and ultimately
- Sabotage the Chinese leadership.

Some may contest the accuracy of this standardized five-point formulation. Nonetheless, few analysts can dispute that in recent years each of these individual claims has been leveled against the United States in various media and at various times. These conclusions, if genuinely held by core facets of the Chinese leadership, are not just of passing, academic interest.

If genuinely held, they represent significant conclusions about the long-term trajectory of the relationship that are inherently conflictual.

On dividing China, the argument goes that the United States, by various overt and covert means, directly and indirectly, is actively seeking to ferment separatism within the People’s Republic. Arguments are made concerning U.S.-funded NGOs supporting separatist movements both in Xinjiang and Tibet. Arguments are also made concerning the U.S. attitude to the Dalai Lama particularly, and that by embracing the Dalai in various meetings with U.S. presidents, the United States is inherently legitimizing Tibetan separatism.

To this is added the more recent accusation that the United States and the United Kingdom are at present actively fermenting street protests in Hong Kong that, so the accusation goes, are designed to prevent the final and effective reunification of Hong Kong with the People’s Republic. And to this already formidable list is added the long-standing problem of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, in addition to the continuing opaque security assurances provided to Taiwan by the United States in the event of China resorting to military means to ultimately reunite towns.

Furthermore, and as a natural expression of the differing traditions of Chinese and American values, there are further accusations that the United States, through its funding of a broad network of NGOs, is actively pushing the fragmentation of Communist Party rule by supporting the expansion of Christianity in China; extending the role of NGOs from environmental causes to labor rights; as well as the “seditious” effect of Western values on Chinese youth through a potent cocktail of social media, Western movies and entertainment, and the influence of Western values on Chinese students returning from America and elsewhere in the collective West.

Within China, this pastiche of perceptions is taking hold among political elites with the common denominator that the United States, by these various means, is seeking to divide and weaken the country.

This in turn is predicated on a Chinese assumption that the United States can never entertain the possibility of surrendering its dominant standing in the global order voluntarily to China.
China, therefore, according to the calculus, reinforced by a high-level dose of “hyperrealism,” and strategic “mirror-imaging,” concludes that the United States will inevitably resort to other measures to impede China’s rise. Against this logic, the argument concludes that the U.S. would naturally be supporting efforts to divide China internally in order to weaken its rise.

As for diminishing, isolating, and containing China, Chinese official commentaries have for decades pointed to the continuation of a U.S. alliance structure in Asia. China argues that these military alliances are hangovers from the Cold War and that in the absence of a further Cold War, they have no legitimacy or relevance. The Chinese further argue against the legitimacy of the “pivot” or “rebalance” of three years ago, and that it is transparently the case that these alliances are targeted against a rising China. Furthermore, these originally bilateral security arrangements with the United States have been compounded in Chinese eyes by the rapid development of trans-alliance defense exercises, intelligence sharing, and strategic planning that are again seen as almost exclusively targeting China. Finally, China points to enhanced U.S. strategic relationships with India, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

These Chinese perceptions are further reinforced by China’s own sense of strategic vulnerability at multiple levels: unresolved land-border questions with India; outstanding maritime disputes with each of its maritime neighbors; as well as the growing external Chinese energy dependency, including in uncertain political and military theaters in the world such as the Gulf.

More broadly, China sees itself now in wider East Asia and the West Pacific as being strategically isolated, with few natural friends or allies in the region, and instead “penned in” by 14 neighboring states—the largest number of neighboring states for a single country in the world except for Russia. China, therefore, from time to time expresses a certain level of desire to break out of the strategic straight jacket in which both history and nature have constrained it.

**AMERICA’S STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS**

As for American strategic perceptions of China, these fall into broad accusations and perceptions of a more activist Chinese foreign policy in diplomatic fora around the world; new forms of military behavior in the military zones of the East and South China Seas; together with relatively rapid increases in Chinese defense expenditure. The American perception is that China, certainly within the region, is no longer a “status quo” power. There is also a belief that China is seeking to expand its natural “sphere of influence”, and that it is seeking to do so through a strategy of economically overwhelming the region rather than bringing on premature military conflict.

Furthermore, Americans reject the Chinese contention concerning containment. They argue that the United States encouraged, facilitated, and embraced China’s engagement with the global economy over the last 25 years, which was the basis to China’s rise to great economic power status. By contrast, “containment” in the U.S. view meant isolating Moscow politically, while ultimately strangling the Soviet economy. Americans argue that U.S. policy has been the absolute reverse with China: welcoming China into the international system, and facilitating the globalization of the Chinese economy by opening its markets to Chinese exports and supporting China’s accession to the WTO.
Moreover, America argues that not only has it refused to follow China’s rapidly increasing investment in its military in recent decades, but in fact has begun a process of retrenchment in order to address the overarching fiscal constraints of the U.S. governments. Americans also ask a core strategic question about Beijing: what is China currently being contained from doing as a consequence of U.S. policy, which China would otherwise want to do?

Americans, by contrast, identify what they regard as the beginnings of a global push by China to either significantly reshape existing global institutions to better suit Chinese interests; or to begin to grow new global institutions of its own—the most recent examples of which include China’s proposal for an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS Bank, and its New Silk Road Investment Fund.

So what path can we find to navigate conflicting strategic perceptions wherein China concludes that it is being threatened from within, strategically encircled by its neighbors, and contained by the United States? And is any such pathway possible given the United States concludes that it is China seeking to change the regional status quo, expand its sphere of influence, and incrementally change its posture towards the global order, with no public explanation as to what China’s strategic objective is for doing so?

Once again, this plays directly into the present and future trajectory of the U.S.-China relationship. Not only is the values divide between the two significant; so too is the perceptions divide. Which in turn leads to the question of how any reformulation of the underlying narrative of the relationship’s future, if mutually agreed, could assist in managing, reducing, if not eliminating, the widening divide between the two.

**CHINA ARGUES THAT THE U.S. MILITARY ALLIANCE STRUCTURE IN ASIA IS A HANGOVER FROM THE COLD WAR AND THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A FURTHER COLD WAR, IT HAS NO LEGITIMACY OR RELEVANCE.**

**CHINA’S STRATEGIC INTENTIONALITIES**

These deep divides between Chinese and American values and perceptions are reinforced further by the differences between the two sides’ assessments of each other’s long-term intentionalities toward each other.

The Chinese argue that they have long committed to a strategic policy direction called “peaceful development.” (It is worth emphasizing that if China were to have embarked upon a contrary policy, as others have done in history, we would have most likely seen evidence of this some time ago.)

China also argues that within this framework, their concern for the foreseeable future is the transformation of the current Chinese economic growth model. This is a task of enormous complexity in itself and one, if it is to be successful, that requires continual regional and
global peace and stability. The Chinese further argue that the implementation of their new growth model, including a rapid adjustment to sustainable development models, rather than perpetuating the environmentally destructive growth models of the past, reflects the overriding importance of China’s domestic policy agenda.

Once China’s longer-term strategic intentions of Chinese national wealth and power have been achieved, China has indicated that it will play a more active role in the global order as well as reform the order over time to reflect the realities of a more multipolar distribution of power in the future. Regionally, China has indicated that it intends to pursue a more proactive role in order to make the region, in particular the neighboring states, more conducive to China’s long term interests.

On the United States, China’s public formulation is that it welcomes America’s long-term strategic presence in the region. On the other hand, China continues to attack the continuing U.S. alliance structure and seeks to pry certain American allies away from their long-term security dependency on the United States. Recent Chinese references to “Asian security for the Asians” and of “an Asian Security Concept” have also raised eyebrows in Washington and in various regional capitals.

Finally, as noted earlier, China deeply believes the United States would not readily yield its current position of global and regional preeminence, and therefore China anticipates deep and continuing strategic competition between the two as well as the deployment of U.S. political, economic, diplomatic, and military power where necessary to preserve its current status as number one.

**AMERICA’S STRATEGIC INTENTIONALITIES**

The United States, by contrast, has no substantive public narrative of China’s long-term strategic intentionality. The United States views current Chinese policies in the East and South China Seas as attempts to arbitrarily alter the status quo through an inferred predisposition to deploy force. There are, of course, problems with this U.S. perception. China argues its recent maritime actions have been in response to actions by other governments that themselves unilaterally changed the status quo in these contested maritime areas.

The United States also has a view of China’s operational strategy across Asia to economically overwhelm its neighbors and then, in turn, the wider region. Under such a strategy, it is argued that China would render itself so economically indispensable to each economy in the region that it renders impossible or improbable long-term resistance by regional governments to China’s growing economic and foreign policy influence. Under this argument, it is further contended that the utility of such a long-term sphere of influence would be to constrain future foreign and security actions by regional governments that fundamentally conflict with Chinese national interests at that time, and by extension to constrain the United States by splintering its solidarity with its allies.

Americans also see a pattern of a similar Chinese strategy of economically overwhelming other parts of the world. This argument points to China’s emerging economic dominance in Africa,
Latin America, Europe, and, in time, the Middle East. In the case of Europe, this strategy of rendering China economically indispensable to countries in the European Union is also specifically designed to soften and, in time, silence European human rights objections in China. And against that objective, the Chinese also hold out Norway as a European example of what happens to a country when it fundamentally crosses China’s human rights policy and reputation as it freezes further economic engagement with Norway in response to Norway awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident.

Finally, Americans also argue that whereas China for the foreseeable future will seek to advance its strategic regional and global influence primarily by economic means, at the same time China will continue its military modernization over the decades ahead. Americans readily acknowledge the vast gap that continues to exist between the two sides in practically all categories of military capability, including those that apply to scenarios in the Western Pacific, where the conflict with China would be most likely to arise. Nonetheless, American analysts point to a narrowing in the overall capabilities gap. And they see China’s overall strategic intention to be of economic and strategic dominance over the United States in the Asia Pacific region through China’s combined economic and military advancement over time.

Americans therefore calculate that China, because it will not wish to take any such risk, will do everything possible to avoid confrontation until it concludes the overall correlation of forces in the region is decisively in China’s favor.

For these reasons, there is fundamentally divergent long-term thinking—both in Beijing and in Washington—about where the other’s strategic intentionalities ultimately lie. This long-term divergence also reinforces the differences identified above in terms of more immediate strategic perceptions of one another. As well as the underlying differences in the values inherent in Chinese and American worldviews, which are anchored in vastly divergent civilizational traditions.

In other words, whatever common interests we may be able to identify between China and the United States will nonetheless be located within this wider strategic framework of conflicting values, perceptions, and intentionalities that are beginning to become deeply embedded in the relationship.

Thus, the core challenge of finding a common narrative or common future to be shared between China and the United States is fraught with complexity. At the same time, the need for finding such a shared long-term narrative is of greater urgency and necessity, if we are to minimize the risks of long-term conflict between the two. Unless of course the preference in both Washington and Beijing is to simply wait and see what happens as strategic drift sets in. Personally, I do
not believe this to be the mindset of leaders in either capital.

CONCLUSION
These remarks have primarily concentrated on China and America as seen through each other’s eyes in terms of their values, their current strategic perceptions of each other, as well as their conclusions concerning long-term strategic intentionality.

I recently presented a more detailed version of China’s strategic perceptions of the United States at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, at the beginning of the month. I did the reverse to the Institute of International Studies of Fudan University in Shanghai, on that occasion concentrating on American strategic perceptions of China.

I bring these analyses together in this address in the hope that by doing so we can shed light on what fundamentally divides the two countries on the one hand and what might be described as a series of more superficial differences on the other, which often capture the media attention of the moment. This lecture is not focused on current foreign, economic or security policy “issues.” These tend to come and go. Rather, I am seeking to articulate the deeper, fundamental animating forces at work in the relationship which can only be dealt with at the highest levels of leadership. That is why exploring the basis for a common public narrative for the relationship is important. Some level of common script between the two is needed to actively shape the future of their engagement in a realistic but nonetheless positive direction, rather than simply default to the more atavistic forces that are already busy at work.

As I said at the outset of my remarks, differences in values, perceptions, and understandings of long-term intentionalities do fundamentally shape the conceptual and operational dimensions of the U.S.-China relationship.
东亚的战略与经济未来：未来中美关系的共同叙事是否可能？这周刚从北京回来。这已是今年的第十趟了。上周则在华盛顿访问。算起来也是今年里的第五次了。

所有访问都关注一个核心问题：尽管中美之间存在迥异的文明渊源与思想传统，但是两个大国是否在价值、利益和国家能力方面有充分的共通性来构建一个共同的未来？抑或是，我们将再次面对来自历史的悲观告诫：崛起大国将不可避免地对抗守成大国，或者反之——总之为争取大国霸权之对抗难以避免，当下的中美也不例外？

我相信这是我们时代的中心问题。因为无论我们意识与否，当下区域与全球秩序的未来走向，包括在政治，经济，外交，军事，环境，社会和法律各个层面，都将取决于对这个问题的解决，不管以什么方式解决。

我今年来到哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院贝尔福中心就是为了从第三方的视角来研究这个问题。自然我与北京和华盛顿因职业有长期的接触，且我对这两个国家都怀有深久的感情。然而，当我将为此研究项目结论时，我的乐观主义倾向受到中美关系中新变数的巨大挑战——我的乐观源于我政治理念的开明进步取向——以史为鉴，继往开来，我总相信我们能够为全人类构建一个更好的未来。

巨大挑战，并不意味着没有理性的解决办法。我相信路在脚下。巨大挑战，来自通过政治途径解决问题的可能日渐式微，如果我们都认可政治是一种关乎“可能性”的艺术。而且我愈加担心，通过政治解决的窗口，特别是从北京方面看来，可能已经开始渐渐关闭。

本次演讲我要陈述的判断如下：
首先，中美关系中的核心分歧在于政治价值的不同，这一鸿沟暂时难以消弭。
其次，两国政治精英对对方的战略认知日益消极。
第三，现阶段两个政治体系的共同利益不足以建立足够的战略稳定因素以从根本上改变双方关系内在的竞争性和冲突性。
首先，中美关系中的核心分歧在于政治价值的不同，这一鸿沟。

第四，这一关系的内在变数可能会引发日益增强的战略漂移，而这一趋势只有在两国领导人有意识地，审慎地开始为彼此共同的未来构建共同叙事的前提下才可能得到抑制。

最后，为两国关系的长期未来构建的共同叙事必须满足几个条件：第一，对现存的，可预见的未来不能克服的根本性分歧秉持现实性的理解；第二，对可能达成共同协议和建立共同机构的情况保持建设性的态度；第三，致力于逐步地建立战略互信，从而使中美关系迈向渐进性变革成为可能。

当双方关系中大多数负面因素在反向施效时，建立战略互信对各国政治领导人则极具挑战。如果没有一个由最高政治领导层概念化并一起推进的共同叙事，我担心战略漂移将演变为在未来几乎无法抗拒的夹带大量冲突的湍流。我忧之甚在于，因两国当下过于专注看似更紧迫的内政和外交政策事务，而将可能错失当前这个变革中美关系的历史性转折点——这个两国间实力的差距开始缩小，且政治家们仍有足够的政治空间为中美双方的共同未来作出不同的战略性选择的时候。

中国和美国的价值

中国和美国的政治价值在内容、实践范围预期、展示阐释热情等都有所不同，可能是我们时代最保守的陈述。在美国乃至整个西方，我们对于构建我们当代政治体制基石的自由民主价值非常熟悉。在我们泛泛地称为“西方”的积累的集体历史中，这是一个相对亲近的现象。我们也熟悉这一事实。

美国和法国的革命发生于大约中国最后一个朝代清朝的中期，乾隆皇帝执政期间。在此之前，欧洲的政治历史大多为君主制的，威权主义的，或是绝对威权主义的。议会则仅仅通过有限的特许选举产生并承担的有限的功能。对于美利坚共和国，当建立在政治自由和宗教自由双重基础上的“岭上之城”成为其做为世界榜样的主题时，所有这些产生了根本的变化。

早期的美国没有试图向全世界传播它的理念，而是作为世界的道义楷模吸引旧世界的人民到新世界来共享其革命的成果。

第二次世界大战期间美国连同苏联成为在欧洲和太平洋打败法西斯的决定性因素。直到二战后，在全球积极传播美国价值才成为“美国例外主义”不可分割的一部分。
事实上，直到与苏联冷战期间华盛顿开始奉行遏制莫斯科的政策，由此强化了自由民主和马列主义两种相互竞争的价值体系之间的有意的意识形态对抗。苏联解体后，美国在全球主动传道自由民主的热情按理可以有所减退。但此项目却从此延续下来并已成为美国全球政治身份不可或缺的一部分。

这一传统显然与中国的经典与当代理念格格不入。这体现在三个方面。首先，经典的儒家教义与当代有中国特色的马列主义的价值体系从根本上都是阶层化的。在古代或现代中国的政治传统中几乎没有存在过自由主义的政治理念。在现在仍继续适用的中国哲学传统中，个人不享有不可剥夺的权利，只拥有由君主或国家赋予的权利。重要的是，这些被赋予的权力又是以这些个人就其位，尽其责为条件的。

其次，美国的自由民主制度被其国父们确定为普世通用而非只适合特定文化，而中国的儒家思想传统上则被认为只适用于中央大国华夏文明。中国的理念是欢迎外族人来华夏大地观察，了解和吸收中国哲学的内在价值，但无特别的兴趣将自己的传统主动传道到世界各地，更不用说试图通过意识形态，政治方略或军事途径将其强加于他人。

这第二个区别衍生出两种传统间的第三个差异，那就是，美国对自由民主事业全球化的热忱与历代中国皇帝对在华夏疆域之外主动传播中国政治文化的不感兴趣之间的反差。1949年以后，中国共产主义在起起落落的历史进程中曾试图向世界输出中国式革命。尼泊尔的毛主义者和秘鲁的光辉道路游击队作为短暂存在的热衷“普世”意识形态的孤立产物至今有些令人尴尬。然而，所有这些在35年前邓小平复出后戛然而止，中国的国际共运突然悄无声息地成为历史。

由此我们再来看当今。

在接下来的35年中，中国一直积极寻求对自由资本主义的资本主义层面的酌情实施。2013年中共十八届三中全会决定将市场作为中国经济模式的中心原则。尽管马克思主义已被正式摒弃，但是马列主义国家学说中的列宁主义国家结构依然被保留——国家政治权力继续集中于一党制下。

基于这些原因，迪克•戴尔最近称“中国模式”为国家资本主义模式的评论是有一定道理的。值得注意的，近年来存在一个趋势：中国开始从对西方式自由民主的普世主张采取消极守势，开始转为时常用意识形态招式批驳自由民主模式的失败，并越来越多地在发展中国家推广所谓“中国模式”。

中国尤其强调西方和印度的民主模式功能失调，无力将国家政治意志集中在持续发展经济的核心任务上。不论是美国国会的僵局，西欧的政治惰性，还是印度政体在建立现代基础设施方面的无效，来自中国的同时针对国内和国外受众的对自由民主体制的批评声越来越大。

具体来说，在美国看来核心问题是中国能否随着经济发展的成功最终转变为基于规则的自由国际秩序的积极支持和参与者。

中美关系未来的核心问题在于，双方价值的差异在多大程度上使两国渐行渐远，以使得华盛顿和北京之间更广泛的合作最终不能实现。
Specifically, in the US view, the core issue is whether China can, with economic success, become a positive supporter and active participant in the rules-based international order of freedom. Another possibility is whether China will challenge Fukuyama’s “end of history” and build a sustainable political model for its long-term future, thereby deeply influencing China’s world view. The answers to these questions lie in China’s internal negotiations, as international pressure, regardless of its implementation, is unlikely to lead to a successful democratic reform in China. And such pressure could backfire, as it would reinforce political nationalism.

For China, the core question is whether the US fundamentally accepts the legitimacy of its current political system, or whether China will insist that the US is either directly or indirectly attempting to subvert its system.

In the view of most Western analysts, it seems obvious and lacks factual basis. They would be surprised by the extent to which this perceived political legitimacy issue affects other aspects of Sino-US relations.

In other words, in China’s view, this is a fundamental issue for the future of their relationship; whereas in the US view, it is at most a margin issue. The question of the future concerns finding a foothold in the political stability between different types of political systems and relationships that can be better resolved in the future, while not affecting their substantial cooperation in other areas.

**China’s Strategic Perception**

It can be said that, beyond the value conflicts, another central organizing principle is a perceptive Chinese observer’s “mutual assurance of intentions”. As is well known, strategic perception is particularly difficult to understand and define. Yet, whether accurate or not, strategic perception fundamentally affects international behavior—through subjective understanding and interpretation of the other’s immediate needs, combined with complex diplomatic signal cues, and influencing many assumptions of “game theory” in social science literature.

Specifically, strategic perception includes an analysis of the other’s power, prediction of their intentions, the design of the most effective means of transmitting diplomatic or security policy information, the most likely reaction as well as the possible further actions and responses they may assume.

Recent reports have involved China’s deep perception of US strategic substance. According to the following five points, the US strategy currently targets:

- Degrade China
- Contain China
- Isolate China
- Weaken China
- Finally destroy China’s leadership.

Some may question the accuracy of these five points. However, few analysts deny that each has been used at some point in many media and different times to criticize the US.

If these conclusions truly reflect China’s core leaders’ thinking, they are not just academic. If true, these conclusions have implications for the long-term development trajectory of the controversial Sino-US relationship.
在分化中国这一点上，中方认为美国一直以公开或隐蔽的方式直接或间接地积极寻求滋长中国内部的分裂势力。中方认为美国资助的非政府组织在支持新疆和西藏的分裂运动。认为美国总统多次会见达赖，实质上是美国对西藏分裂主义合法化的认可。加之近期对美英等势力助长香港的街头示威的指责，认为其意在阻止香港最终有效地与大陆统一。更有甚者，是美国对台军售的长期问题，以及若大陆诉诸武力寻求统一美国将继续为台湾提供不公开的安全保障——这都被视为是美国蓄意阻碍两岸统一的动作。

此外，基于中美价值传统的差异，中方对美国的其他指责亦是不胜枚举。其中较为典型的就是认为美国通过资助广泛的非政府组织积极推动共产党统治的瓦解，其中包括：通过支持基督教在中国的传播，将非政府组织的影响从环境事业扩展到劳工权利，还有利用社交媒体，西方电影和其他娱乐方式，以及从美国等留学归国的中国学生所带有的西方影响等等，向中国年轻人煽动性地灌输西方价值观。

在中国内部，这些混杂的认知使政治精英们逐渐形成同一观点，即美国正通过以上各种方式试图分化和削弱中国。这些认知又是基于美国不可能向中国拱手让出自己在国际秩序中的领导地位的假设。

所以，基于这一包含了较多“超现实主义”和“战略镜像”元素的分析，中国得出的结论是美国将不可避免地采取措施以应对中国的崛起。依据这一逻辑，该观点认为美国自然会支持从内部分裂中国的努力以削弱它的崛起。

中国认为美国在亚洲的军事联盟是冷战的遗留物。在冷战不复存在的今天，这些遗留物并不具备合法性或相关性。

在削弱，孤立和遏制中国方面，中国官方的评论几十年来一直指向美国在亚洲联盟结构的持续。中国认为这些军事联盟是冷战的遗留物；而在冷战不复存在的今天，他们不具合法性或相关性。

另外，中国不承认多年前的“重返亚洲”或“亚洲再平衡”战略的合法性；认为有公开的证据表明联盟的存在和发展是针对崛起的中国的。而且，这些原先与美国的双边安全协定由于跨联盟防务演习，情报共享和战略筹划的快速进展在中国眼中复杂化，并被看作是几乎完全针对中国的。最后，中国指向美国与印度，新加坡，马来西亚和越南的联盟关系的加强以证明这一点。

这些认知由于中国对自身战略弱点的感知得到进一步强化。这包括：与印度亟待解决的陆地边界问题，与海上邻国悬而未决的海事纠纷，以及中国对境外，包括海湾地区在内的政治军事不稳定区域，能源的日趋增强的依赖性。

从一个更广的视角，中国看到自己在东亚和西太平洋正受到战略上的孤立；在这些地区很少有朋友或同盟，而是被多达14个（在全球仅次于俄罗斯）邻国所“围堵”。因此，中国不时表达希望挣脱历史与自然施加于己的战略紧身衣的意愿。

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美国总统的战略认知

美国对于中国的战略认知可归结为在全球外交场合对中国更活跃的外交政策的宽泛的指责和判断，包括在东海和南海军事区的新的军事行为，以及中国军费的相对快速增长。美国的理解是中国在其所在地区已不再是致力于维持现状的大国。也有一种观点相信中国自然会试图扩展其“势力范围”——通过寻求在本地区经济取得绝对主导地位而非时机不成熟时引发军事冲突的战略来实现这一目标。

美国拒绝接受关于“遏制中国”的论点。他们认为美国在过去25年中鼓励、支持并欢迎中国融入全球经济。也正因如此，中国才崛起为全球经济大国。相反，在美国看来，“遏制”政策意味着政治上孤立莫斯科并最终压制苏联的经济。美国认为其对于中国的政策与之完全相反：即欢迎中国加入世界经济体系，并通过向中国的出口产品开放自己的市场和支持中国加入世界贸易组织来促进中国经济的国际化。

“如果美国当真在“遏制”中国，那么当前中国在哪些方面受到了美国的遏制呢？有什么事是中国希望做而因美国的“遏制”而不能如愿的？”美国人可以对北京直陈如是核心战略问题。相反，美国认为中国开始在全球范围或者重塑现有国际机构使其更符合自己的利益，或者着手形成反映自己意志的新国际机构，例如最近中国就成立地区性基础设施投资银行的提议。

综上可见：一方面，中国认为自己受到内部的威胁，邻国的战略性包围，和美国的遏制。另一方面，美国认为是中国在没有公开解释自己战略目标的情况下在试图改变亚太地区现状。那么，我们应该通过什么途径来平衡双方相抵触的战略认知？在这种情况下，寻找这么一种途径是否可能？

这又一次直接联系到中美关系的现状和未来走向。不仅双方的价值迥异，认知的分歧也很大。接下来的问题是：任何对这一关系未来的基础叙事的重新计划——如果能达到共识的话——如何才能协助管控，减少（尽管可能无望消除）两者间的认知分歧。

中国的战略意图

中美之间价值和认知的巨大差异又因对彼此长期意图的判断的分歧得到进一步强化。中国指出它长期致力于“和平发展”的战略政策。（值得强调的是如果中国象历史上其他国家那样奉行与之相反的政策，我们理应在一段时间之前就看到证据了。）

中国深信美国不会轻易拱手让出它现在的全球领导地位。

中国表示，一旦实现了国家富强的长期战略意图，将会在国际秩序中扮演更积极的角色，并改革当
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前国际秩序以体现未来权力分配更加多极化的现实。在地区事务方面，中国表示将寻求更主动的角色使该地区，特别是邻国，助益于中国的外交政策利益。

对于美国，中国的公开阐述为：它欢迎美国在本地区的长期战略存在。另一方面，中国继续攻击美国持续存在的联盟结构，试图使某些美国的盟国脱离其对美国的长期安全依赖。最近中国提出的“亚洲人实现亚洲安全”和“亚洲安全观”在华盛顿和其他地区性首都引起了担忧和不满。

最后，如前所述，中国深信美国不会轻易拱手让出它现在的全球和地区性领导地位。所以预期中美之间会有深层，持续的战略竞争，且美国将在必要时部署政治、经济、外交和军事力量以维护其目前的霸主地位。

美国的战略意图

相反，美国没有对于中国长期战略意图的实质性公共叙事。美国认为中国在东海和南海的政策是试图通过臆测先发部署军力进而武断地改变现状。当然美国的这一判断也存在问题。中国认为其最近的海上行动是对在这些有争议的海事领域单方面改变现状的其他政府的行为作出的回应。

美国对中国在整个亚洲寻求经济上绝对主导地位的运作战略也有自己的看法。其认为，中国这一战略，意在是中国经济成为对该地区每个经济体而言都不可或缺，由此使得该地区各政府不可能对中国经济和外交政策影响的扩展做出长期抵制。由此，美国认为这一长期势力范围的作用是限制该地区的政府未来采取从根本上不符合中国国家利益的外交和军事行动，亦即通过分裂美国与盟国的团结来限制美国。

美国在世界其他地区也看到了相似的以经济实力施压的中国战略。这一评议指向中国在非洲、拉美、欧洲，甚至中东正在形成的经济主导地位。在欧洲，这一使中国经济对欧盟变得不可或缺的战略被具体地用来弱化欧洲对中国人权的异议，甚至使其失声。针对这一目标，中国还以挪威作为警示欧洲的例子来表明一个国家从根本上挑战中国的人权政策和声誉时将会面临的后果：当挪威授予中国的一位持不同政见者诺贝尔和平奖时，中国则以冻结与挪威的经济接触来应对。

构建一个长期的共同叙事的必要性则是日趋紧迫。
最后，美国认为尽管中国在可预见的未来将主要以经济方式来增强其在区域和全球范围内的战略影响，其也会在接下来的几十年里继续寻求军事现代化。美国承认中美之间在各项军事实力方面继续存在巨大差距（包括在最有可能引发双方冲突的西太平洋的军军事实）。但是美国分析家指出中美整体军军事实的鸿沟在缩小。他们认为中国的整体战略意图是通过提升经济和军事实力在亚太地区在经济和战略上超越美国取得主导。正因如此，美国对中国预测是：因为中国不希望冒这样的险，所以会采取所有可能措施来避免冲突，直到确定自己在该地区的整体实力关系中决定性地胜出为止。

基于以上原因，北京和华盛顿就对方的最终战略意图的长期看法从根本上充满歧异。这一长期的歧异，以及基于双方迥异的文化传统的中美世界观的内在价值的根本差异，也强化了以谈到的双方对彼此更近期的战略认知的分歧。

基于上述原因，中美之间任何可识别的共同利益须被置于双方相斥的价值，认知和意图的大框架之下。该框架对研究这一关系变得不可或缺。因此，要实质性而非纸上谈兵地来构建中美的共同叙事或共同未来所面临的核心挑战充满复杂性。与此同时，构建一个长期的共同叙事的必要性则是日趋紧迫。

结语

这些评议主要集中在中美两国对对方价值的理解，当前战略的相互认知，以及双方就区域内长期战略意图的结论。

本月初，我在位于华盛顿的美国战略与国际问题研究中心演讲时更详细地讲到了中国对美国战略的认知。我在上海复旦大学国际问题研究院的演讲则重点讲了美国对中国战略的认知。

我在此汇总两方面的分析是希望说明哪些是两个国家之间客观存在的根本性分歧，哪些是通常得到媒体一时的关注的更表面化的分歧。

我今天的演讲不侧重于当下的外交，经济或安全政策“问题”。此类问题往往是一时的。我试图阐述的是那些只能通过最高层领导人解决的深层的驱动和影响中美关系的因素。正因如此，探讨这一关系的一个共同的公共叙事的基础具有重要意义。双方需要某种程度的共同的叙事语言来积极地影响他们相互接触的未来使其向一个现实的，积极的方向发展，而非只是被动地诉诸于已在充分使用且有陈旧之嫌的影响因素。

如我在演讲开始时提到的，价值的区别，对长期意图的认知和理解的分歧，从根本上影响着中美关系的理性概念和现实运作。
ABOUT KEVIN RUDD

Mr. Rudd served as Australia’s 26th Prime Minister (2007-2010, 2013) and as Foreign Minister (2010-2012). He led Australia’s response during the global financial crisis—the only major developed economy not to go into recession—and helped found the G20. A Senior Fellow with Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, he is undertaking a major research project on U.S.-China Relations. Mr. Rudd is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Chatham House. He is a Distinguished Statesman with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and was recently appointed to the Concordia Leadership Council. Mr. Rudd is proficient in Mandarin Chinese and a Visiting Professor at Tsinghua University. He co-authored a report of the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Global Sustainability and chairs the WEF’s Global Agenda Council on Fragile States.
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