Exploring New Ways to Provide Enduring Strategic Effects for the Department of Defense

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Executive Summary

A CSIS study team led by senior adviser Clark Murdock and senior fellow Sam Brannen undertook an eight-month study to explore new “ways” of using U.S. military power to achieve enduring strategic effects. As the defense budget decreases over the coming decade, and with defense strategic priorities of the United States taken as a constant, the CSIS study team sought to identify new approaches, reflect on U.S. lessons learned from historical cases, consider international defense best practices, and examine potentially transferrable approaches from the private sector to achieve defense strategic ends. Insights from the study were shared throughout the process with the sponsoring OSD Strategy Office in support of its role in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Informed by independent research and vetting through defense expert interviews and a Core Working Group (including former senior defense officials, nongovernmental organization experts, and private-sector experts), the CSIS study team identified “New Ways” that could prove most beneficial for the United States in years to come in achieving high-priority defense strategic objectives, as derived from the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The ways considered were designed to be immediately executable by the Department of Defense. They were based on approaches that would not mean radical adjustments to roles and missions of the military services, would not entail legislation, and would not rely upon any fundamental change or expectation of greater output from non-DoD U.S. government departments and agencies.

The following New Ways are detailed in this study, with examples, recommended implementation actions, and analysis of strategy and policy implications of each.

1. Regional Security Task Forces

U.S. security cooperation should focus on identifying and building “active agents” willing and able to tackle regional challenges, and then move to support them. This requires foresight, but also the ability to seize the opportunity of the moment by ensuring availability of critical enablers and standing concepts of operation (CONOPS) to effectively support partners. Instead of leading (or not leading) every response, the United States should be prepared to encourage and enable others wherever opportunity exists and interests align. This approach is not weak; it is smart. Such emphasis on greater selectivity in regional engagements and investment in critical partners is widely reflected in the 2014 QDR.

2. Federated Defense Architectures

Federated Defense Architectures take into account declining defense budgets of the United States and its strongest traditional allies and blends the 2010 QDR’s regional defense architectures and CSIS’s ongoing examination of “federated defense” for the global industrial base. The approach moves beyond simple roles and missions or co-development discussions between the United States and its allies and partners, and recommends common platforms, greater joint use of facilities, and emphasis on
interoperable architectures where joint acquisition creates greater net capability for key regional challenges. This approach is immediately applicable to East Asia, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and among NATO allies and other partners (as part of a response to growing Russian aggression).

3. Recalibration [Formerly “Reversibility”] Actions

The concept for “reversibility” of certain DoD decisions first entered strategic guidance in the 2012 DSG. However, there is broad agreement that DoD is “talking the reversibility talk,” but not “walking the walk.” The CSIS study team recommended instead the New Way of “recalibration”—a concept that entails systemic application, rigor, and dedicated funds. Recalibration as a planning concept suggests both a process and an analytic methodology. From a process perspective, senior leadership needs to take ownership of the concept and to empower a small analytic cell to run the process. Analytically, the strategic priorities and vectors that might need to be recalibrated/reversed have to be identified, as well as the events or conditions that would “trigger” the recalibration. In addition, action plans needed for the recalibration would have to be formulated, including the near-term steps needed to ensure future capability for strategy recalibration. “Walking the [recalibration] walk” involves more than refining the concept (from reversibility to recalibration); it also requires a process for senior-level engagement, and an office responsible for the function and the resources needed to execute the function.


Defense planning during an age of austerity and in a context of strategic uncertainty requires both tough decisions (in setting priorities) and smart decisions (in finding new ways to counter adversary strategies and capabilities). When potential adversaries develop asymmetric ways to offset U.S. conventional power, DoD needs to think asymmetrically itself on smart, new ways to counter, negate, or distract their strategies. The goal of any good strategy is to impose high costs on one’s adversary at relatively low cost to oneself. The focus of this New Way is on the exploration of U.S. asymmetric strategies, not on how the U.S. military copes with adversary asymmetric strategies. Countering existing and evolving threats by developing cost-imposing U.S. asymmetric strategies and capabilities takes the initiative by forcing adversaries to respond to U.S. asymmetric attacks as opposed to pursuing their main lines of operation. In many cases, the best U.S. response to an adversary’s asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. military power may be an asymmetric strategy of its own.

The release of the 2014 QDR offers an excellent opportunity for implementing the New Ways methodological approach, which begins by identifying the high-priority ends that the QDR implementation process should focus on. The 2014 QDR will need a prioritization phase to ensure that the implementation efforts are properly focused on high-priority ends. Once these have been established, QDR implementation should be focused on immediate and near-term actions.
The Budget Control Act (BCA) caps on the defense topline, which will be exacerbated by the continued hollowing out of the defense budget by internal cost inflation, will create unrelenting pressure on DoD to do “more with less.” Formulating a plan of coherent 2014 QDR implementation actions—*and then actually taking them*—is by far the best counter. DoD may have less in the way of resources, but that does not mean it has to do less.
Introduction

Over the next decade, the U.S. defense budget could effectively decrease by as much as 40 percent.\(^1\) In even a best-case, nonsequester scenario, the cuts to the defense budget enacted under the Budget Control Act of 2011 will continue to challenge the ability of the Department of Defense (DoD) to achieve the key missions and priorities identified in the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG).\(^2\) In addition to major decisions on tradeoffs between force capacity and capability and between modernization and readiness, over the next decade DoD will have to choose between decreasing its global security objectives or determining how to change and innovate and continue to uphold and implement its current strategic ends despite a decrease in means.

The choice is clear: DoD must find new ways to achieve enduring strategic effects. In his assessment of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey wrote:

> Strategy is about balancing ends, ways, and means; that is, our national objectives, our operational concepts, and the resources available to us. Clearly this QDR addresses the fact that for the foreseeable future the Department of Defense will have fewer means to apply to defending our national security interests. Not surprisingly, given our responsibilities as a global power, the strategy articulated in the QDR preserves the “ends” articulated in the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 as they are considered necessary to protect the core interests of the United States. With our “ends” fixed and our “means” declining, it is therefore imperative that we innovate within the “ways” we defend the Nation.\(^3\)

Experts in the broader defense policy community have suggested that DoD should view the decade ahead as the beginning of an “interwar period” and focus on planning and preparing for the future.\(^4\) These observers urge the type of strategic thought exercises undertaken after the First World War at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, that resulted in the Rainbow (or Color) Plans that provided the foundation for the

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\(^1\) This figure is based on analysis conducted by Clark Murdock and Angela Weaver under the auspices of the Affordable Military Working Group. Murdock and Weaver found that, “Though the budget deal of October 2013 provides modest relief (about $30 billion less in defense cuts in FY14 and FY25), the Budget Control Act will still result in a 21 percent reduction in the defense budget topline through 2021. In addition, internal cost growth (i.e., personnel pay and benefits; acquisition; operations and management) is reducing defense dollar purchasing power by 18 percent over the same time frame, making what is a 20 percent reduction feel like a 40 percent reduction.” See Angela Weaver, “Reality Check: Shaping an Effective, Affordable Military for 2021,” FYSA: For Your Situational Awareness (February 2014), http://csis.org/publication/fysa-your-situational-awareness-i-issue-4.


victorious U.S. campaigns against the Axis powers in the Second World War.\(^5\) While the interwar analogy tracks in identifying the present as a strategic inflection point, U.S. defense resources and overall capacity will draw down only incrementally as compared to the demobilization following World War I (including the all-volunteer, professional nature of the current U.S. military), and overall global commitments and operational requirements for the U.S. military will remain high for the foreseeable future, with a range of potential contingencies from the Korean Peninsula to the Sahel. Other key strategic trends, including the ongoing information technology revolution and global political unrest, have established a highly complex environment in which events move more rapidly than ever before.

With that recognition of what is new and different about this period of history, the purpose of this study is to systematically accelerate Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s broad theme of innovation as he articulated it in a June 2013 speech in Singapore in the context of DoD’s Asia strategy:

> The United States military is not only shifting more of its assets to the Pacific—we are using these assets in new ways . . . to enhance our posture and partnerships . . . Combined with new concepts, doctrine, and plans that integrate . . . technologies and other game changing capabilities, we will ensure freedom of action throughout the region well into the future.\(^6\)

That same approach applies to regions around the world, albeit with a potentially proportionally reduced U.S. defense posture. As the 2014 QDR report observes, “Regional and global trends in the security environment, coupled with increasing fiscal austerity, will make it imperative that the United States adapt more quickly than it has in the past and pursue more innovative approaches and partnerships in order to sustain its global leadership role.”\(^7\)

Under contract from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy, a CSIS study team led by senior adviser Clark Murdock and senior fellow Sam Brannen undertook an eight-month study to explore new ways of using U.S. military power to achieve enduring strategic effects. The CSIS team sought to identify new approaches, reflect on U.S. lessons learned from historical cases, consider international defense best practices, and examine potentially transferrable approaches from the private sector. Insights from the study were shared throughout the process with the OSD Strategy Office in support of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

In the following chapters, report authors Murdock and Brannen explain the project’s methodology and then examine in depth four “New Ways” highlighted for attention by DoD in the context of the QDR and follow-on implementation. The report concludes with actionable proposals for organizational change to continue to generate and explore highest-priority New Ways, along with recommendations for next steps to build on the 2014 QDR report.

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\(^7\) DoD, *QDR 2014*, 3.
Methodology

The CSIS study team conducted the project at an unclassified level through a combination of internal research, careful review of top-level DoD strategy documents and public statements by DoD senior leaders, a core working group of selected experts (described in greater detail below), and targeted expert interviews conducted over the course of eight months (July 2013–February 2014). Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Daniel Chiu and his staff pressed the study team to offer independent, objective perspectives. Indeed, the opinions in this report reflect only those of the authors, which comprised the CSIS study team.

The CSIS study team began its examination of new ways with in-depth study of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The DSG was the result of a defense strategy review ordered in 2011 by President Barack Obama and then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (transitioning to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta) to ensure that current defense guidance was, in the words of the president, a “smart, strategic set of priorities” compatible with budget cuts mandated by the 2010 Budget Control Act. At the time the review was conducted, it accounted for only the $487 billion cut over 10 years (out to FY2021). The DSG was not designed to mitigate the additional $500 billion in cuts enacted under sequestration. During the rollout of the Strategic Choices and Management Review—an additional, internal strategic review to account for the potential impact of sequestration—Secretary of Defense Hagel said, “[T]he ‘in-between’ budget scenario we evaluated would ‘bend’ our defense strategy in important ways, and sequester-level cuts would ‘break’ some parts of the strategy, no matter how the cuts were made.”

Pentagon and White House officials involved in the review have emphasized that the DSG is in fact not a strategy but guidance to prioritize and adjust as necessary the implementation of existing defense strategy in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. These ends include, in particular, the so-called “4 Ps”:

- Prevail in today’s wars.
- Prevent and deter conflict.
- Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.
- Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.

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Perhaps the most significant strategic vector taken in the 2012 DSG is the Asia-Pacific rebalance: “[W]hile the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region [original italics].”

Yet neither the “4 Ps” nor the Asia-Pacific rebalance appears in the 10 “key mission areas” of the DSG, which seems surprising given consistent senior-leader emphasis on these points. Moreover, the insistence of DoD and White House officials involved in the final drafting of the DSG that the 10 mission areas are not listed in priority order is perplexing. Although viewed by many defense experts (including the CSIS study team) as a coherent and well-done strategy-level document, the 2012 DSG is often criticized inside and outside of DoD for having failed to establish clear priorities for these reasons.

In its own detailed review of the document, the CSIS study team identified 25 distinct priorities or ends. These areas of emphasis are listed below.

### 25x DSG Priority Areas (“Ends”)

#### 10x Key Mission Areas

1. Counter terrorism and irregular warfare (retain focus on countering violent extremists globally: direct action and security force assistance)
2. Deter and defeat aggression (maintain 2-war capability/capacity)
3. Project power despite A2/AD Challenges.
4. Counter weapons of mass destruction
5. Operate effectively in cyberspace and space.
6. Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
7. Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities.
8. Provide a stabilizing presence (global presence/exercises)
9. Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations
10. Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations

#### 7x Geographic Priorities

1. Rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region and work in the region to promote a rules-based international order
2. Continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in and support of partner nations in and around the Middle East (esp. Israel, GCC)
3. Evolve posture in Europe (maintain commitment to NATO Allies under Article 5 with focus on future capabilities)
4. Maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula
5. Invest in partnering with India
6. Develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives (exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities, esp. in Africa and Latin America)
7. Assure access to and use of the global commons (strengthen international norms and maintain interoperable and relevant capabilities)

#### 8x Force Priorities

1. Maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of missions
2. Manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities (also: reversibility)
3. Do not sacrifice readiness (capability) for force structure (capacity)
4. Examine effect of limited resources on existing campaign and contingency plans
5. Determine appropriate AC/RC mix and RC readiness levels
6. Build on key advancements in networked warfare
7. Encourage innovation in concepts of operation
8. Reduce costs of doing business

The CSIS study team recognized the need to prioritize among the 25 DSG strategic priorities in order to focus the exploration of new ways to achieve these. At its first

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meeting of the Core Working Group (see list of outside experts at appendix 1) on August 15, 2013, the CSIS study team reviewed several approaches to identifying the highest-priority ends from which to develop New Ways. The Core Working Group agreed with CSIS scholars that, in the current resource-constrained environment, it is important to identify specific threats of greatest concern and not just needed capabilities. While “portfolios” of capabilities are a sound approach when resources are relatively plentiful, resource scarcity makes it necessary to focus on the highest-probability and highest-consequence identifiable threats. A more “threat-based approach,” one that focused on specific threats and specific adversaries, seems prudent. Following discussion at the Core Working Group meeting and in private follow-up with specific members of the group on particular concerns or points raised, CSIS offered the below list of high-priority ends.

1. Defend U.S. territory and citizens, including countering al Qaeda and violent nonstate extremists globally.

2. Overcome challenges to U.S. power projection, including anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), focusing first on the challenges in East Asia and the Persian Gulf.

3. Counter asymmetric threats to U.S. warfare dominance, including disruptive adversary capabilities in space, cyber, and through the use of proxies and irregular warfare.

4. Continue to encourage the peaceful rise of China while deterring and if necessary defeating Chinese aggression in East Asia.

5. Maintain nuclear parity with Russia and nuclear superiority versus China.

6. Deter and defend against provocations from a nuclear North Korea and a nuclear-aspirant Iran.

7. Counter proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD, including nuclear weapons from a collapsing regime.

8. Promote stability in regions around the world through pre-conflict defense engagement (security cooperation activities such as military-to-military exchanges, exercises, presence, etc.).

The proposed list of high-priority ends was reviewed at a second session of the Core Working Group on September 26, 2013. As discussed extensively below, high-priority end #8 was added to the CSIS-proposed list. However, it was readily apparent that the group could not reach a consensus on the priority ordering of the CSIS list of high-priority ends. While the Core Working Group believed that the high-priority ends themselves should be rank-ordered, they were unable to do so (at an acceptable cost of time and effort), so the ordinal values given to each end are those assigned by the CSIS study team.

During the next phase of the study, the CSIS study team identified, through a series of internal CSIS-wide meetings, literature search and interviews with selected subject-matter experts, the current ways for pursuing each of the high-priority ends, and then
generated new ways of pursuing these same ends. The summary list was reviewed at the September 26, 2013, meeting of the Core Working Group, whose feedback and additional suggestions were incorporated into the document attached at appendix 2.

The CSIS study team divided the proposed ways (both current and new) into three bins: (1) recommended for further study; (2) put on hold; and (3) not worth further investigation. The summary chart is attached at appendix 3. After consulting with OSD-Policy (Strategy), the remainder of the study effort focused on the following New Ways:

1. Regional Security Task Forces
2. Federated Defense Architectures
3. Reversibility Actions
4. U.S. Cost-Imposing Asymmetric Strategies

The CSIS study team had originally envisioned convening working groups on each of these topics. However, after initial trial and error, it proved more effective for the CSIS study team to frequently meet internally to discuss the New Ways, and then to engage with the right subject-matter experts and defense thought-leaders to stress-test the New Ways being explored. This allowed for continued iteration and refinement, as well as more in-depth conversations with former senior officials to capture their views. After several months of study through this approach, a final Core Working Group session was convened on January 30, 2014, to discuss findings. Based upon extensive feedback received at this session, a final vetting brief was prepared and reviewed with OSD-Strategy on February 10, 2014. This report expands on the vetting brief and incorporates feedback from that meeting.
New Way 1: Regional Security Task Forces

Security Cooperation with Focused Objectives

During the first Core Working Group meeting, there was spirited exchange regarding the exclusion of any building partnership capacity (BPC) or security cooperation ends from the CSIS-developed list of high-priority ends. The CSIS study team felt that the inclusion of BPC in defense strategy was often too ambiguous, and thus would not be high priority enough for the purposes of this study. The CSIS study team also wanted to avoid providing opportunity for military services to justify force structure and combatant commanders to request force structure based solely on “presence.” The CSIS study team noted past experiences with just that tactic of inflated demand without compelling evidence for what presence really achieved in support of U.S. defense objectives. Core Working Group members pushed back, highlighting that security cooperation activities are demonstrably linked to overall defense objectives of promoting stability in regions around the world through preventative activities and engagement. As the defense budget draws down, they argued, the United States will need to find new ways to encourage other nations to take on more regional responsibility and to deal with issues that may not be on a U.S. top ten security priorities list, but which are nonetheless extremely important. Thus, security cooperation activities can be a force multiplier—and not a net drain—for the United States.

Newly convinced of the utility of these activities, the CSIS study team ultimately proposed numerous New Ways that fell in the category of improving U.S. ability to leverage partners to achieve regional security objectives. Most promising of these was a general approach originally described as follows: “Establish a Regional Security Partnership Approach to do X with Y in Z, where X=a specific threat that the United States will support partner countries to prevail against, Y=the willing country or coalition, and Z=the region(s) in which the threat exists.” Through conversations, including with the OSD client, this New Way was refined to its current formulation.

Current Way

Security cooperation is a broad mission set widely regarded as important to stability in regions around the world, but often yielding ambiguous outcomes from significant inputs. U.S. forces engage foreign counterparts primarily to (1) build interoperability for future contingencies; and/or (2) build foreign capacity to uphold regional security or address a particular issue with minimal or no U.S. assistance. Even with special operations forces (SOF), security cooperation is often done in a “peanut butter-spread” fashion that does not concentrate effort. As DoD plans for a range of potential contingencies (particularly at the geographic Combatant Commands, or COCOMs), the proclivity of U.S. regional planners is to engage as many countries as possible. Effective use of joint funding authorities (section 1206, 1208, and the Global Security
Contingency Fund) between the Department of State (DOS) and DoD can be uneven, with particular disagreement between country embassies and regional bureaus within DOS. Such disagreements require frequent, high-level intervention from both departments (at the under secretary level and above), consuming decision-maker time that would be better spent on strategic-level issues.

New Way

U.S. security cooperation should focus on identifying and building “active agents” willing and able to tackle regional challenges, and then move to support them. This requires foresight, but also the ability to seize the opportunity of the moment by ensuring availability of critical enablers and standing concept of operations (CONOPS) to effectively support partners. Instead of leading every response, the United States should be prepared to encourage and enable others wherever opportunity exists and interests align. The 2014 QDR correctly emphasizes greater selectivity in regional engagement activities and investment in critical partners is reflected in.14

Examples

The model foremost on the minds of the CSIS study team, the Core Working Group, and other interlocutors was ongoing U.S. support to French operations in Mali (Operation SERVAL)—and more recently, the Central African Republic (Operation SANGARIS)—widely judged as successes in dislodging al Qaeda–linked groups and returning stability to the region. U.S. support has primarily consisted of provision of unique enablers including lift, air refueling, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) including joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Notably, assistance has excluded U.S. boots on the ground. In contrast, France currently has some 1,600 ground forces in Mali15 (down from a high of approximately 4,500) and 1,600 troops to the Central African Republic.16 The United States was in fact part of a broader French-led coalition for its operations that included regional forces such as the African Union, Chad, Uganda, and use of regional airfields including in Niger. Operations have been closely coordinated between U.S. and French forces, including through liaison officers and embassies in Paris, Washington, Stuttgart, and elsewhere.

This approach of the United States supporting others rather than taking the lead itself has derisively been called “leading from behind”—an unfortunate phrase attributed to an unnamed White House staffer.17 However, it is important to note that supporting others in ongoing operations rather than always taking the lead is nothing new in the U.S. approach, particularly in countries and regions where stability is desirable but the interests of other U.S. allies and partners are more pronounced. For example, the 1999–2000 International Force for East Timor (INTERFET or Operation WARDEN) was

14 DoD, QDR 2014, 39.
a 23-nation peacekeeping force led by Australia and bridged the gap before the arrival of UN Peacekeepers. The United States quietly provided support to the Australians, including onshore command and control (C2) and intelligence elements, and amphibious forces support, including the USS Mobile Bay (CG-53), USNS Kilauea (T-AE26), USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3), USS Peleliu (LHA-5), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and 31st MEU.

Beyond these broad coalitions exist other cases of focused U.S. security assistance in the form of what could best be described as security force assistance (SFA) or train, advise, and assist missions to Colombia and the Philippines in combating terrorism and insurgency. These missions differ starkly from the large-scale assistance missions to Afghan National Security Forces or Iraqi Security Forces in that the assistance to Colombia and the Philippines was meant as an alternative to U.S. intervention and combat missions. These instances of assistance were led by Special Operations Forces (in particular, Army Special Forces Green Berets), but driven at the country team level, and involved significant interagency contributions and various authorities and funding streams.

Actions for Implementation

1. Ensure development and implementation of high-level strategic guidance that prioritizes COCOM theater engagement to achieve operational objectives when they arise (even on an enduring basis) and ensure from force providers the rapid availability of unique enablers to support emerging opportunities with partners.

   - Traditionally, force providers (the military services) have not sized and shaped force structure to take into account demand for joint multinational or coalition operations in which the United States will contribute unique enablers, particularly on an enduring basis.

   - Strategy and force allocation decisions should encourage services to keep “fenced” more unique enablers on a Global Response Force-like basis.

2. Think opportunistically but strategically and plan ahead: Encourage COCOMs to work with Embassy Country Teams (keeping OSD Policy, Joint Staff, State Department, and other appropriate U.S. government interagency entities informed) to identify and encourage allies and partners who are able to lead responses to regional security challenges but may need U.S. political and military


support to achieve the mission (active agents). COCOM training and exercise schedules will need to be adjusted (and carefully reviewed by OSD) to support this prioritization.

- Be wise with resources and wary of engagement for its own sake; be realistic about the absorptive capacity of partners.

- Consider how best to leverage existing investment streams, such as U.S. contributions and investment in UN Peacekeeping.

- Focus on increasing investment in the development of capable regional multilateral response forces (e.g., the African Union African Standby Force).

- Continue to focus on improving strategic-level coordination between the National Security Council (NSC) staff, DOS, and DoD on prioritization and nesting DoD strategy within broader country and regional strategy.

3. Develop standing CONOPS to quickly provide critical U.S. enablers such as regional access, logistics, C2 (including quiet standup of joint task forces and combined task forces), lift, ISR, SOF, senior advisers at the ministry level (including in some cases U.S. general and flag officers), and unique cultural skills.

4. When opportunity does arise, ensure that U.S. commitment is predicated upon understanding the end-goal of partners and assessment of their will to stay with the fight, not just start the fight.

**Strategy and Policy Implications**

Secretary Hagel endorsed this approach in his February 1, 2014, speech in Munich:

> We’re looking at promising new initiatives, including Germany’s framework nations concept, which could help NATO plan and invest more efficiently and more effectively. In Africa, the U.S. military and our European allies are already partners in combating violent extremism and working alongside our diplomats to avert humanitarian catastrophes. . . . In Mali, in the Central African Republic, the U.S. and European partners are providing specialized enablers, such as air transport and refueling. We’re there to support a leading operational role for French forces. The U.S. has supported France’s leadership and efforts, and we also welcome the German Defense Minister von der Leyen’s recent proposal to increase German participation in both countries.²¹

Secretary Hagel references the evolving understanding among European allies that the United States will not always be out front in leadership on every single security issue, and that consensus at 28 within NATO also will be unlikely.

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For the United States, this New Way is best cast in the context of comparative advantage—not some kind of “burden sharing.” This can be painted by critics of current U.S. policy as retrenchment, but only to the extent that the United States does not continue to demonstrate strong leadership on the issues most vital to it, and does not both articulate and enact the use of force when appropriate. This is a New Way meant to reinforce the United States’ unique role as a guarantor of stability and security in all geographic regions, and not as a means to step back in any of them.

This approach can yield significant benefits in political-military relations between the United States and partners by expanding bilateral and regional defense ties to new avenues of military-to-military cooperation and trust. This ultimately can afford the United States more influence when regional crises erupt, as well as growing U.S. understanding of regional dynamics and interests, and potentially having assets in place and lines of communication available that would not otherwise exist. Recent examples abound as to the positive outcomes of this mode of engagement, including the aforementioned closeness between the United States and Colombia, and the strengthened U.S.-France relationship, underscored during President Francois Hollande’s February 2014 visit to the United States.

Finally, the 2011 Libya intervention (Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR) is a warning. It demonstrates what happens when others lead and do not have a clear plan or the political will to finish what they started. Pressed both by the actions of Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi in threatening a civilian massacre in Benghazi, and by the political chutzpah of French President Nicolas Sarkozy to demonstrate a muscular and decisive French foreign policy (followed a close second by a determined Britain), the United States—and eventually NATO—moved to swiftly intervene. However, there was no clear strategy for what would come next to stabilize the situation, and a lack of political will (or respective legislative/parliamentary authority) among all participants to remain engaged in the country. Having won the air war and removed Qaddafi from power (the second outcome not in the original plans), there was no follow-on ground presence. Libya remains a fragile state, exporting instability in the region. It is a fair question to ask whether Syria may have played out differently in terms of European and other partner support if Libya had not happened the way it did.

The Core Working Group and several interviewees voiced concern that adopting this New Way could lead to a slippery slope of U.S. global over-commitment or commitment to causes without clear end objectives. The CSIS study team argues that these outcomes can be avoided through greater up-front consultation and realistic assessment of whether the “lead” nation(s) have both a plan in line with U.S. interests and the will to see through the action.
Interoperability and Shared Regional Responsibility through Joint Acquisition

Multilateral cooperation is increasingly important to the United States and its allies and partners worldwide. Nearly all face shrinking defense budgets while confronting an array of transnational threats—including in cyberspace—and growing regional challenges to preserve stability and prevent conflict. Cooperation to forge common solutions to these challenges relies upon complementary military capabilities, and best succeeds with high degrees of interoperability. Interoperability through cooperation on acquisition and closer knitting together of defense industry is a New Way of political-military engagement.

Security cooperation, or increasing partner/partnership capabilities, has been a foundational element of every QDR strategy. The 2010 QDR, Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), and Nuclear Posture Review built on preceding defense strategic reviews in introducing the concept of “regional architectures . . . that combine our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued commitment to extend our nuclear deterrent.” This concept harks back to Cold War joint multinational force planning and posture through NATO and bilaterally, including in co-development and co-fielding of platforms and systems to a common standard. The concept has been at the heart of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense and the less mature effort to create a missile defense architecture for the Persian/Arabian Gulf region. The concept has struggled more in execution in East Asia, despite strong respective U.S. bilateral ties to the Republic of Korea and to Japan.

Federated Defense Architectures take into account declining defense budgets of the United States and its strongest traditional allies and blends the 2010 QDR and BMDR regional missile defense architecture concept with CSIS’s ongoing elucidation of a concept of “federated defense.” As a December 2013 concept overview of CSIS’s ongoing work on the topic put it:

It is time to shift our paradigm with key partners from building capacity to federated defense. A federated approach, including forward-thinking strategies for how to develop and share capabilities and even facilities, can knit together

22 DoD, QDR 2010, 14.
a community that understands each other and works more closely and professionally every day. It can build on existing alliances to deepen defense ties. . . . It is also distinct from an integrated approach because it does not seek to create interdependencies that would impair autonomous action. By sharing ownership of a larger federated fleet of assets, federated partner countries can be drawn closer to the United States in their training, logistics support, tactics development, and potentially, operational missions. By better leveraging select host nation facilities, the United States can maintain the “low cost, small footprint” approach that is both affordable and suited to the dynamics of particular regions. This is a strategy that leans forward in a cost-effective way, building on the natural interest of allies and partners to have closer working ties to the United States, while managing the various challenges that the economic and geostrategic environment present.23

The purchasing of common equipment lends itself to a common architecture with significant positive externalities. And if the market is truly open to competition and cooperation between companies, market forces can improve equipment fielded.24

This was a New Way that Secretary of Defense Hagel also endorsed during his February 1, 2014, speech to the Munich Security Conference:

The United States will engage European allies to collaborate more closely, especially in helping build the capabilities of other global partners. We’re developing strategies to address global threats as we build more joint capacity . . . with European militaries. In the face of budget constraints here on this continent [Europe], as well as in the United States, we must all invest more strategically to protect military capability and readiness. The question is not just how much we spend, but how we spend together. . . . [T]he United States is helping the U.K. regenerate its aircraft carrier capability, which will enable more integrated operation of our advanced F-35 fighters and, more broadly, enhance our shared ability to project power.”25

The approach has even greater immediate relevance in light of Russian aggression in February and March 2014 against Ukraine. Actions to shore up regional deterrence will need to take place both in a NATO context, and in a broader regional context, working with partners including Finland, Sweden, Georgia, and even Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries.

This New Way is well reflected in the 2014 QDR, including its discussion of “strategically complementary approaches to deepen cooperation with close allies and partners, including more collaboratively planning our roles and missions and investments in future capabilities.”26 The QDR further states that DoD is working “to

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25 Hagel (speech at the Munich Security Conference).
26 DoD, QDR 2014, 24.
better align our investments and ensure that our activities complement one another’s mutual priorities.”

Examples

In addition to numerous historical examples of this approach, particularly among NATO countries, and with Japan and Korea, many recent examples exist as well, including in specific technology-driven industries such as space and cyber.

One of the more enduring examples is the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) operated jointly by the United States and Canada. Since 1958, NORAD has provided joint air and missile warning, and since 2006 has also shared maritime domain awareness. That shared awareness has relied upon interoperable systems and aircraft weaving U.S. and Canadian militaries and defense industry close together, adapting over time to new threats.

The Aegis Combat System is another example of a shared system, which is particularly interesting because, while a U.S. system, it can be installed into another nation’s indigenously produced ships. Each Aegis-equipped ship becomes a network node easily tied together in joint operations. Aegis is currently integrated into the navies of the United States, Japan, Norway, Korea, and soon Australia. It is also the backbone of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense, the U.S. contribution to NATO ballistic missile defense.

There are other more recent examples on a smaller scale, including the British decision to purchase Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft as a replacement electronic warfare platform for its Nimrod fleet. This created immediate interoperability with the United States’ own Rivet Joint fleet. As an offset to British defense industry—and proportional to the three aircraft it operates compared to the United States’ 15—it will be guaranteed 15 percent of all future upgrades (which are frequent given the nature of the platform). Not unrelated has been the United Kingdom’s acquisition of armed MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial systems (UAS), which it has jointly operated from Creech Air Force Base in Nevada. UAS are uniquely interoperable in a multinational environment, including the ability to swap crews in mid-flight through common control systems (crews need not be geographically collocated with the UAS or with one another to control the same UAS). Another future example—entirely outside of U.S. direct involvement—could be cooperation between Australia and Japan on a Collins-class replacement diesel-electric submarine that could be attractive to others in the region.

Within NATO, the concept of common equipment has long been an area of emphasis, and it is reemerging both as a decade of the International Security Assistance Force to Afghanistan (ISAF) concludes and amid long-term cuts in defense spending. The first NATO concept to emerge is that of Smart Defense, “a concept that encourages Allies to

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27 Ibid., 25.
cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities to meet current security problems in accordance with the new NATO strategic concept.”

This is nearly a direct fit with federated defense and is in an early phase. Second, NATO will pursue a range of activities to keep its forces interoperable after drawdown in Afghanistan in 2014 through the Connected Forces Initiative, which focuses on shared training, exercises, and technology. Third is the Framework Nations Concept, which acknowledges that it may be possible to build coalitions akin to the New Way described in the last section (Regional Security Task Forces) that exist outside the “consensus at 28” construct of NATO. The Framework Nations Concept instead encourages one or several “core” nations to lead and let others follow and contribute what they can. As referenced above, Secretary of Defense Hagel has suggested that, “Germany’s framework nations concept . . . could help NATO plan and invest more efficiently and more effectively.”

### Actions for Implementation

1. **Identify Opportunity:** Initially OSD Policy and OSD Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), Joint Staff, and the military departments work closely with COCOMs and embassy country teams to map out the requirements and acquisition plans of major allies and partners in each region. Next, Policy, AT&L, and Joint Staff determine potential U.S. systems to meet those requirements, as well as thinking about overlapping U.S. or other ally or partner requirements.

   - Use this approach to address in particular countries that are moving away from compatible architectures (e.g., Turkey’s recent choice of a Chinese air and missile defense system) or being “Finlandized” (e.g., Georgia or Southeast Asian nations).

   - Review posture in key regions with a view to rotational colocation of like assets where appropriate.

      - This approach is particularly important to implement in Europe because of reductions in U.S. posture and equipment in the region, which previously encouraged adoption to a common “gold standard.”

      - An excellent example is the U.S. aviation detachment that rotates U.S. F-16s and C-130s at Lask Air Base in Poland.

   - Identify capabilities where interoperability is most important or desirable from a U.S. military department perspective.

   - Mitigate risk in contingency plans through greater allied and partner contributions in those cases where others are likely to be willing to provide material support.

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32 Hagel (speech at the Munich Security Conference).
• Strengthen connections between U.S. allies and partners (e.g., Japan with Australia; Japan with Southeast Asian countries).

2. Engage Partners: Make discussion of these issues central to U.S. political-military strategy through bilateral engagements, all the way to Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings with counterparts.

• This currently happens to an uneven degree across allies and partners and across regions.

• Identifying an appropriate role for industry is important; they can play a key role both in providing technical information and in supporting national objectives.

• Counter perception that this is a “buy American” initiative. The United States will need to demonstrate a willingness to allow foreign firms to compete in U.S. markets.

• So too, the United States will need to find ways to assure its partners in joint development of systems that it will not ultimately back away from them. The experience of Italy and Germany with the United States backing away on the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) left a particularly bad impression.

3. Remove Obstacles to Trade: DoD will need to continue efforts to streamline the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, including convening regular high-level meetings of OSD Policy and the State Department, with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the services, and the Defense Technology Security Agency (DTSA), to identify and eliminate obstacles.

• Even the closest U.S. allies continue to express frustration with U.S. decisions related to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) when co-developed items cannot in turn be exported to third countries.

• Emerging technologies—such as larger, more capable UAS—are also politically sensitive and run into export restrictions not based on the U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Process, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), or ITAR, but based on political sensitivities.

• This all remains subject to the State Department’s lead in arms exports, and to consultation and approval from Congress.

Strategy and Policy Implications

Despite the compelling logic of this approach, it faces political and technical headwinds. Joint acquisition means joint vulnerability to issues such as cost or development setbacks, which ultimately are what eroded U.S. support for MEADS and have become an increasingly sensitive political issue regarding the Joint Strike Fighter. Picking less complex weapons systems or ones based upon already-fielded
capabilities could be a better area of emphasis to build broad support behind this approach.

This concept is disruptive to business as usual and it will be met with resistance on several counts. First, in other countries, there will be some tendency to see this as a “buy American” initiative. Second, defense industry is a political and protectionist issue in every country. Defense industry does not neatly follow free-trade and market forces. Resistance in all countries can be mitigated to some degree by advocacy for the concept from defense industry itself and from ministries of defense and militaries in stating the defense advantage and requirement for such cooperation. Success of this concept will ultimately likely necessitate the personal commitment and advocacy of the Secretary of Defense, to overcome remaining internal DoD stovepipes on the issue, to overcome these at the State Department, and to win over skeptics in Congress.
Reconceptualizing the Concept

Throughout much of the study, the CSIS study team made the following assertion in its working brief: “As a force planning principle, operational concept or policy objective, ‘reversibility’ is well understood and frequently used, but rarely implemented or executed because it involves expending resources to hedge against the failure of a chosen strategy or policy.” However, it became increasingly clear that the concept of reversibility, while frequently used, did not have a widely shared definition among DoD strategists and was applied differently depending on the context. In addition, “reversibility” was too limiting because it implied a binary, uni-dimensional view of strategy or policy—that is, adopt a new vector and if it proves unsatisfactory, go back to the preexisting vector. That may be the right course of action, but more often adapting to new circumstances brought on by the failure of a “strategic bet” requires recalibrating or adjusting the strategy.

Reversibility formally entered the Pentagon lexicon in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG):

[W]e have sought to differentiate between the investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred. This includes an accounting of our ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic and technological spheres. Accordingly, the concept of reversibility, including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis is a key part of our decision calculus.

Shortly after the rollout of the 2012 DSG, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey provided additional context on the use of the term:

I’m not sure where [the term “reversibility”] came from. Sometimes, you know, words get loose on you . . . sometimes you’ll overburden words, you know? And so they lose their meaning over time. . . . We’ve got a phrase and doctrine called mobilization. We’ve got other ways of describing our ability to use the total force. I think that when this all started, the idea of reversibility was more expressed by way of a concern. What if we don’t get it right? You know, what if—what if we build a force at a certain size, at a certain readiness level and then three, four, five years from now we find out that it—we’ve got it wrong?

The question was, can you reverse that? So I don’t think reversibility is a new piece of doctrine, because I think we do know how to reverse it.\textsuperscript{35}

From a common sense perspective, the concept of reversibility has a lot of traction in different arenas because it shares some characteristics: uncertainty about the outcome (that is, about whether Plan A will work), a need to take action (in part, because “no decision” is not a good option), and an acknowledged need to “reverse course” if circumstances warrant.

In certain situations, the concept of reversibility can be applied exactly. For example, in the negotiations leading to a temporary freeze in the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for limited relief from sanctions, a “senior U.S. official said the freeze proposal would include a suspension of nuclear activities and other restrictions in return for ‘limited, targeted and reversible’ easing of some financial sanctions.”\textsuperscript{36} In this instance, the limited lifting of sanctions is literally reversed and the previous sanctions regime is reimposed. However, most DoD strategy and guidance documents consist of broader vector or direction changes, which should be adjusted to new circumstances by an adaptable Defense Department. Moving away from the generality of the term reversibility, the CSIS study team used the term “recalibration” because it connotes the deliberate and purposeful readjustment of one’s strategy, policy, or plan to adapt to unforeseen circumstances.

Current Way

While effective organizations, such as Southwest Airlines or IKEA, often adhere to a basic strategy or business model, they change strategies constantly as market conditions change. In addition, effective strategies often emerge as organizations try different strategies (sometimes called “test marketing”) to see what works. An organization’s actual strategy—how it really seeks to achieve its ends—is only revealed by its behavior over time. Like any long-standing organization, the Defense Department changes strategies as it adapts to new circumstances, usually more slowly than most would like and often through informal processes and \textit{ad hoc} decisions, despite its predilection for formal strategy documents.

What differentiates reversibility or recalibration as a planning concept, however, is twofold: it should be a formal process, and it involves expediting resources today as a hedge against the failure of a chosen strategy or policy at some point in the future. Currently, DoD embraces reversibility as a “key part” of its adaptability, which is a widely endorsed trait for any organization coping with a complex, changing, and uncertain strategic environment. What it has largely failed to do is to set aside resources (including the time of planners) to actually prepare for current policy failure or changed circumstances. Despite the inevitability that “mistakes will be


made” in choosing strategies in the context of strategic uncertainty, it is always easier to justify using available resources to ensure policy success than to hedge against policy failure. “Planning for failure” is not part of the Pentagon’s “can-do” culture. And planning for failure is even harder to do during a defense drawdown, when fewer defense dollars are causing cuts in end strength, readiness, and modernization. In this increasingly constrained budgetary environment, the opportunity costs of setting aside resources for recalibration are high. As a consequence, DoD is “talking the [reversibility/recalibration] talk,” but not “walking the walk.”

New Way

What differentiates New Way recalibration is systematic application, rigor, and dedicated funds for recalibration preparations. Recalibration as a planning concept suggests both a process and an analytic methodology. From a process perspective, senior leadership needs to take ownership of the concept and to empower a small cross-departmental analytic cell to run the process. Analytically, the strategic priorities and vectors that might need to be recalibrated/reversed have to be identified, as well as the events or conditions that would “trigger” the recalibration. In addition, action plans needed for the recalibration would have to be formulated, including the near-term steps needed to ensure future capability for strategy recalibration. “Walking the reversibility walk” involves more than refining the reversibility concept to one of recalibration; it also requires a process for senior-level engagement, and an office responsible for the function and the resources needed to execute the function.

Examples

One of the most noteworthy decisions made during the 2012 DSG process was DoD’s decision to no longer size the force for large-scale, long-duration stability operations. However, the 2012 DSG did state that the Department would preserve the ability to conduct stability operations on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces. As part of ensuring reversibility in force management, the 2012 DSG said it would maintain the intellectual capital and leadership for large-scale stability operations by retaining expertise at mid-level officer and senior enlisted ranks as the Army draws down the number of its brigade combat teams (BCTs). This intent was repeated in the 2014 QDR: “Although our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations, we will preserve the expertise gained during the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will protect the ability to regenerate capability that might be needed to meet future demands.”

As noted above, the 2012 DSG explicitly endorses the recalibration principle: “we have sought to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred...includ[ing] an accounting of our ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres.” Nevertheless, the CSIS study team was unable during its many interviews to identify specific instances of successful recalibration actions.

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37 DoD, QDR 2014, 19.
Actions for Implementation

As stated previously, what differentiates New Way recalibration from Current Way reversibility is systematic application, rigor, and dedicated funds:

1. Define concept of recalibration and the components of a “recalibration action plan,” or RAP. Establish the role of senior-level officials (e.g., quarterly half-day sessions of the Defense Senior Leadership Committee or Deputies’ Management Action Group). Designate a small planning cell as the driver of the process.

   - RAP components could include the following:
     - Defined end-states and associated performance metrics (e.g., how much capacity regenerated in how much time);
     - Preparatory actions needed in short term;
     - Trigger events for implementing RAP;
     - Projected costs.

   - Strong leadership commitment essential (at the level of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

2. Review key strategy/guidance documents to identify candidates for roster of RAPs.

   - 2012 DSG: “Maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of missions”; “Do not sacrifice readiness (capability) for force structure (capacity).”

     - However, resource constraints imposed by almost $1 trillion in BCA cuts over 2012–21 will lead to significant force structure reductions, which will cause violations of both of these 2012 force priorities via “strategic triage” (that is, abandoning lower-priority ends) and “tiered readiness” (that is, maintaining lower-readiness units).

   - 2014 QDR: In his February 24, 2014, remarks on the FY 2015 Budget Review, Secretary Hagel seemed to refine further (beyond the 2012 DSG) DoD’s force planning construct, when he stated that “the military must be ready and capable to respond quickly to all contingencies and decisively defeat any opponent should deterrence fail.” The 2014 QDR’s language on its force planning construct is quite clear:

     - “With the President’s Budget, our military will be able to defeat or deny any aggressor. Budget reductions inevitably reduce the military’s margin of error in dealing with risks, and a smaller force strains our ability to simultaneously respond to more than one major contingency at a time. The Department can manage these risks under the President’s FY2015 budget plan, but the risks would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, if proposed
reforms are not accepted, or if uncertainty over budget levels continues.”38

- As detailed below in the “Next Steps” section, applying the logic of recalibration to the 2014 QDR seems critical as part of the Department’s risk management approach.

3. Build a roster of recalibration action plans (RAPs) for senior-level approval.

- Emphasis given to performance metrics for outcomes, actions needed in the short term for RAP implementation, trigger events for executing RAPs, and implementation costs.

Study team interviews suggest that the logic of reversibility and our proposed alternative, recalibration, is already widely accepted both inside and outside the Pentagon. No one disputes that DoD is planning in a complex, changing, and uncertain security environment. Everyone agrees that adaptability is a key attribute for any organization operating in such an environment. In making strategic choices about sizing and shaping the force in an era of defense austerity, DoD should make recalibration a key planning imperative, thus formalizing a process that, by default, is done informally and in an *ad hoc* fashion. As it considers whether to do this, the Department should address the challenges enumerated below.

Strategy and Policy Implications

At the broad level of first principles, our framing of reversibility and recalibration was the most popular of the New Ways with Core Working Group participants and other interviewees. The U.S. military in 2021 will be smaller, perhaps by as much as a third, and tough decisions will be needed to establish priorities—priorities in the threats that it focuses upon, in the missions it emphasizes, and in the capabilities it must have for these high-priority threats and missions. Since indecision or no decision is rarely the right answer, choices have to be made and some of those decisions will be wrong. As a consequence, it makes sense to prepare for strategy adjustments to unforeseen circumstances, but there are significant political and budgetary reasons for why this is hard to do:

- Recalibration planning could become another forum for relitigating the issue, which makes achieving closure even tougher.

- Recalibration planning itself consumes resources; preparatory actions for switching course cost even more.

- This is even harder to do during a defense drawdown, because the opportunity costs include less force structure, less readiness, and slower modernization.

Nevertheless, most of those consulted by the study team argued that it was even more important to engage in recalibration planning during a defense drawdown because

DoD, as it copes with a more stringent fiscal environment, will make more “strategic bets” and, as a result, will make more wrong choices. From a risk management perspective, it is prudent for the Department to formally adopt a recalibration planning process. Success, however, requires a strong commitment from the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials, as well as the establishment of a small cell of planners that report directly to the Secretary and (perhaps) the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Offense-defense competitions are as old as warfare. During the Cold War, when the “Red Threat” drove U.S. military planning, DoD countered with high-tech “offset strategies” (e.g., employing stealth and precision-guided munitions to target second-echelon forces) to cope with the massive conventional power of the Warsaw Pact. In addition, the United States responded “asymmetrically” (to use current terminology) to Warsaw Pact armies by deploying as many as 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in NATO Europe to convince Moscow that a large Central Front war in Europe would rapidly “go nuclear.” Symmetrical (direct) and asymmetrical (indirect) reactions to an adversary’s force deployments have always been a part of military competition.

In the post–Cold War era, the United States is the world’s strongest conventional power by a huge margin and other nations have pursued asymmetric strategies (such as insurgency warfare and anti-access/area denial, or A2/AD) and capabilities (weapons of mass destruction at the higher end, and improvised explosive devices at the lower end) to cope with a dominant “Blue Threat.” In his remarks on the FY2015 budget release, Secretary Hagel foot-stomped DoD’s awareness of the asymmetric challenge: “The forces we prioritized can project power over great distances and carry out a variety of missions most relevant to the President’s defense strategy, such as homeland defense, strategic deterrence, building partnership capacity and defeating asymmetric threats.” While DoD clearly understands that it must address an adversary’s asymmetrical responses to U.S. military power, it needs to reinvigorate its own ability to think asymmetrically.

Current Way

The CSIS study team met broad agreement in its assertion that, when challenged asymmetrically, the U.S. military has too often responded in a “dumb Blue” fashion by “doubling down” on existing strengths, rather than taking the “smart Blue” approach of seeking cost-imposing asymmetric ways of countering adversary actions.

Those at the top of any organization, particularly military ones, got to the top by being very good at the way the organization operates today. The difficulty of taking ownership of the need to change increases with age and experience, and is particularly difficult in the world’s most powerful military. Gary Hamel, the noted business strategist and organizational guru, has stressed the inhibiting effect of the “tyranny of experience”:

Where are you likely to find people with the least diversity of experience, the largest investment in the past, and the greatest reverence for industrial dogma?

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At the top. And where will you find the people responsible for strategy? Again, at the top.

The organizational pyramid is a pyramid of experience. But experience is valuable only to the extent that the future is like the past.40

**New Way**

When potential adversaries develop asymmetric ways to offset U.S. conventional power, DoD needs to think asymmetrically itself on smart, new ways to counter, negate, or distract their strategies. Defense planning during an age of austerity and in a context of strategic uncertainty requires both tough decisions (in setting priorities) and smart decisions (in finding new ways to counter adversary strategies and capabilities). The goal of any good strategy is to impose high costs on one’s adversary at relatively low cost to oneself.41 The focus of this New Way is on the exploration of U.S. asymmetric strategies, not on how the U.S. military copes with adversary asymmetric strategies. Countering existing and evolving threats by developing cost-imposing U.S. asymmetric strategies and capabilities takes the initiative by forcing adversaries to respond to U.S. asymmetric attacks as opposed to pursuing their main lines of operation. In many cases, the best U.S. response to an adversary’s asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. military power may be an asymmetric strategy of its own.

In its commitment to innovation as a key theme of 2014 QDR, the Defense Department does endorse asymmetric strategies as one of its elements:

> Across the three pillars of the defense strategy, the Department is committed to finding creative, effective, and efficient ways to achieve our goals and in making hard strategic choices. Innovation—within our own Department and in our interagency and international partnerships—is a central line of effort. Infusing a culture of innovation and adaptability that yields tangible results into an organization as large as the Department of Defense is by necessity a long-term, incremental undertaking. We will actively seek innovative approaches to how we fight, how we posture our force, and how we leverage our asymmetric strengths and technological advantages. Innovation is paramount given the increasingly complex warfighting environment we expect to encounter.42

**Examples**

The U.S. military is known for its ability to innovate on the battlefield. Capabilities designed for the Central Front war during the Cold War were married with new CONOPS to brilliant effect in the first Gulf War. For example, fighter aircraft equipped

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41 For some participants in the New Way project, it was cost-imposition that was most important, not the asymmetric or indirect approach. Since no one endorses strategies that impose higher costs on the United States than on its adversaries, the study team concluded that it was the asymmetric nature of the strategy that was the differentiator, not cost-imposition, which was common to all good strategies. Hence, the deletion of “cost imposition” forms “U.S. cost-imposing asymmetric strategies.”
with laser-guided bombs engaged in “tank-plinking” and decimated Iraqi tanks buried in the Kuwaiti desert. In a more recent example, the explosion of unmanned aerial systems (UAS)—the United States now fields nearly 11,000 UAS since it conducted its first significant UAS mission of a handful of such aircraft over the Balkans in 1995—reflects the strong operational pull from the battlespaces in Afghanistan and Iraq. But these are examples of direct or symmetrical responses to adversary tactics, not asymmetric ones.

Examples of U.S. asymmetric responses to adversary strategies and capabilities include the following:

- Al Qaeda and its associates: Using UAS to decapitate the leadership of nonstate actors engaging in terrorism—the so-called “drone strikes” or campaign of “targeted killings”—is a high-tech, asymmetric U.S. response to terrorism.
  - Direct responses would include campaigns to deny sanctuaries to terrorists (e.g., removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan) or blocking terrorists (perhaps by using “smart fences”) from access to the U.S. homeland.

- Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): using dogs to sniff out IEDs is a more asymmetric response than either using minesweepers or building Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. It’s still one of the least expensive and most effective approaches to date.

As the world’s strongest conventional power by far, the United States tends to respond to challenges, both direct and asymmetric, by exploiting its conventional superiority and innovating in that realm. In an era of austerity, rapid change (including the evolution of warfare into cyberspace) and strategic uncertainty, the Defense Department needs to bring an asymmetric style of strategizing to its force development.

**Actions for Implementation**

As was the case with recalibration planning, implementing asymmetric planning involves both a process and an analytic methodology:

1. Senior leadership empowers a small cell composed of operators and analysts to identify high-impact asymmetric U.S. strategies and capabilities.
2. This close-hold mapping exercise would identify threats and adversary capabilities and develop asymmetric strategies to counter them.

- Adversary-specific:
  - Identify the universe of potential adversaries (e.g., al Qaeda–inspired terrorists, an expansionist China, a revanchist Russia); assess strengths and weaknesses at the strategic, operational, and tactical level; develop asymmetric U.S. strategies for countering or negating
adversary strengths; identify the capability investments needed to implement the strategy.

- This also supports an adversary-specific deterrence strategy.

- Capability-specific:
  - Identify the universe of adversary capabilities (e.g., A2/AD capabilities, catastrophic terrorist attacks, nuclear weapons, biological weapons, cyberattacks, etc.); assess strengths and weaknesses at the operational and tactical level; develop asymmetric strategies for countering, disrupting, or distracting; identify necessary investments.

3. In a manner similar to this study’s methodological approach, the Asymmetric Strategies cell would group initiatives into three categories—(1) recommended for further study; (2) put on hold; and (3) not worth further investigation—and then seek senior-level approval for a closer investigation of initiatives in group #1.

4. For those initiatives endorsed by the senior leadership, develop detailed capability investment plans for high-leverage options, including designated OPRs, cost estimates and projected outcomes, and then seek senior-level approval for implementation.

In much the same way as the Navy (and the Naval War College) did during the interwar period, the military services should be incentivized to engage in asymmetric strategizing for their respective domains of warfare. Despite the existence of offices such as the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and small planning cells in the military services that engage in some operational planning of this type, the Core Working Group agreed that the Pentagon needs significantly more intellectual space for asymmetric strategizing.

Strategy and Policy Implications

As with recalibration planning, the planning concept of U.S. asymmetric strategies was strongly endorsed by New Ways participants, both Core Working Group members and interviewed officials. In fact, some believed that asymmetric strategizing was simply good strategizing. At the same time, others endorsed the utility of symmetric thinking because that leveraged Blue strengths. However, few endorsed simply “doubling down” on existing Blue strengths because that was rarely the right response to adversary asymmetric capabilities.

Several former DoD officials noted that it was important to think asymmetrically at the strategic level. For example, the current U.S. rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is a symmetric response to an increasingly assertive China, in part because it reassures U.S. allies in China’s immediate neighborhood. Another way is to compete with China on the periphery of its global range (that is, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America) to contest China’s pursuit of sources of raw material. A peripheral strategy for countering an aggressively rising China could also incentivize more self-reliance by those states in China’s “near-abroad.”
Empowering a small cell of asymmetric strategists, consisting of both operators and analysts, would have similar start-up costs (leadership commitment, access to senior leadership, assigned personnel, etc.) as recalibration planning, but would not require dedicated funds for taking near-term actions to prepare for possible recalibration initiatives in the future. However, the near-term costs of implementing a proposed U.S. asymmetric strategy could be quite significant. U.S. commitment to a nuclear navy and undersea warfare is just one example of that expense but also of the high-reward payoff.
The release of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review offers an excellent opportunity for implementing not only the New Ways detailed in this report, but the New Ways methodological approach broadly, which begins by identifying the high-priority ends that the 2014 QDR implementation process should focus on. This study was grounded in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, but a next phase of New Ways analysis should take the 2014 QDR as its point of departure. As was the case with the 2012 DSG, which had 25 identifiable strategic priorities that were winnowed down to eight high-priority ends by the CSIS study team, the 2014 QDR will need a prioritization phase to ensure that the implementation efforts are properly focused on high-priority ends. Once these have been established, QDR implementation efforts should be focused on immediate and near-term actions:

- Immediate (March 2014 to the FY2016 budget request):
  - Taking immediate actions to implement 2014 QDR priorities and initiatives is critical to counter the “Where’s the beef?” criticisms that inevitably follow the issue of any strategic guidance document, particularly during a defense drawdown. For example, much of the post-2012 DSG commentary on the Asia-Pacific rebalance has been of this variety. The natural tendency of any large organization after an extended period of strategic reexamination (in this case, the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), 2013–14 QDR, FY2015 budget request, and 2014 National Security Strategy) is to take a pause, if only to catch its breath. DoD should resist this inclination and go on the offensive by taking concrete implementation actions in the April–July timeframe on its 2015 QDR implementation agenda and focusing in August–October on its FY2016 budget priorities. The best tactic for coping with the “Where’s the beef?” critique is to preempt by taking visible actions.
    - The CSIS study team believes that effective implementation of formal guidance documents involve both words (e.g., a coherent public outreach campaign) and deeds (that is, significant follow-on actions that reflect the new priorities established in the planning document).

- Near term (FY2016 budget request to the end of the Obama administration):
  - Near-term 2014 QDR implementation initiatives are launched in the FY2016 budget request, which is the last real opportunity for the current administration to take significant policy initiatives before succumbing to lame duck status. The goal is to establish a coherent, multi-initiative campaign of concrete actions that will result in tangible, measurable advancement of 2014 QDR high-priority ends. In a very real sense, this will constitute much of the current Secretary of Defense’s legacy.
The BCA caps on the defense topline, which will be exacerbated by the continued hollowing out of the defense budget by internal cost inflation, will create unrelenting pressure on DoD to do “more with less.” Formulating a plan of coherent 2014 QDR implementation actions—and then actually taking them—is by far the best counter. DoD may have less in the way of resources, but that does not mean it has to do less.

In addition to “making the 2014 QDR count” by an aggressive implementation campaign, both immediate and near term, DoD could also use the 2015 QDR as an opportunity to first experiment with the competitive strategies approach to defense strategy and planning, and then, if the demonstration pilot is successful, to institutionalize it by establishing a dedicated office. In parallel with a near-term QDR implementation campaign, OSD Policy (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy) could initiate a Recalibration Planning initiative. Unlike the New Ways approach, which begins by defining the high-priority ends, Recalibration Planning begins by identifying the explicit and implicit strategic assumptions, for the external environment (e.g., the nature of the terrorist threat or the behavior of major power competitors), the domestic and fiscal context, and U.S. strategies. A representative array of these “strategic bets” could be selected for a full-up demonstration—trigger events, recalibration action plans (RAPs), and projected costs—of the recalibration planning methodology. Similar experiments could be done with Competitive Strategies and Red Team Analysis. The substantive results of these demonstrations would be brought to the senior leadership for action.
Appendix 1. Experts Consulted

Core Working Group Participants
Nora Bensahel, Center for a New American Security
Richard Berthon, British Embassy
Shawn Brimley, Center for a New American Security
Paul Gebhard, Cohen Group
Vice Admiral (ret.) Kevin Green, IBM
Major General Buster Howes, British Embassy
Sheridan Kearnan, Australian Embassy
Hardin Lang, Center for American Progress
Mike McNerney, RAND Corporation
Major General Tim McOwan, Australian Embassy
Erik Peterson, A.T. Kearney
Julianne Smith, Center for a New American Security/Beacon Global Strategies
Brigadier General (ret.) Paula Thornhill, RAND Corporation

Other Experts Consulted
Zack Cooper, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Brigadier General Tom Cosentino, National War College
Janine Davidson, Council on Foreign Relations
Richard Downey, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Kathleen Hicks, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Andrew Hoehn, RAND Corporation
William Jessett, British Embassy
Stephanie Sanok Kostro, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Aram Nerguizian, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Jim Thomas, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Robert Work, Center for a New American Security

Note: Pentagon officials consulted are not listed here.
Listed beneath the high-priority ends, which appear in order of priority, are: (1) current ways we achieve those ends; and (2) proposed new ways to achieve those ends. In identifying new ways, we are not examining roles and missions, division of labor, defense efficiencies as they pertain to bureaucratic structure or business practices, nor rebalancing the capabilities portfolio (although adoption of some new ways would have implications for this). Our ways are meant to be immediately actionable without significant DoD reform or buy-in from U.S. government interagency or Congress (except in some limited cases, where explicitly noted and where we believe the effort unavoidable). We want to find cheaper, smarter ways for DoD to conduct military operations; but we don’t hinge that outcome on a more efficient and rational DoD.

1. **Defend U.S. territory and citizens.**

   **Current Ways**
   - Force structure sufficient to defend the homeland against state and nonstate actors.
     - Second-to-none nuclear forces (see #6)
     - Air and missile defense;
   - Defense support to civil authorities;
   - “New Normal” quick reaction forces (post-Benghazi).

   **New Ways**
   - *Strengthen Department of Homeland Security readiness and capability by implementing integrated strategic planning.*
     - Under this construct, DoD would be the “supporting command” and DHS the “supported command.”

2. **Counter al Qaeda and violent nonstate extremists globally.**

   **Current Ways**
   - Global manhunting kill/capture operations (ISR, direct action, drone strikes, fixed wing airstrikes);
• Security forces assistance (SFA)/foreign internal defense (FID);
• Irregular warfare (IW);
• Interagency-coordinated approach to CT (including JSOC/CIA integration).

**New Ways**

• *More disciplined policy with respect to use of SOF; more focus on Phase 0.*
  
  o Answer the question Rumsfeld posed in October 2003: “Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?”
  
  o No “killing people who don’t matter in places that don’t matter.” This is an expensive asset to reserve for pressing national security interests. Focus should be on top leadership, external operations leadership, special technical experts (financiers, bombmakers).
  
  o Revisit Phase 0/1 authorities (prevention, shaping of local forces).

• *More use of General Purpose Forces in substitute for SOF achieving security cooperation ends.*

• *Continue to focus on what activities are best under Title 10 and which under Title 50, which uses more permissive rules of engagement, particularly with regard to drone strikes.*
  
  o Build legitimacy into an important tool; self-limit so partners are more comfortable and it is sustainable.
  
  o Operations that are covert or clandestine should stay secret; they should not be in the newspapers with no active public affairs messaging to counter half-truths.
  
  o End signature strikes and increase public transparency regarding targeting criteria and oversight.
  
  o Look to international and interagency partners to share burden as moving away from kinetic solutions (counter-radicalization, counter-threat finance, European partners for Ministry of Interior reform).
  
  o Recognize that while drones may not drive al Qaeda recruitment, the deals cut for overflight and other cooperation with authoritarian, poorly governing regimes do.

3. **Overcome challenges to U.S. power projection, including anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), focusing first on the challenges in East Asia and the Persian Gulf.**
Current Ways

- Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), which includes Air-Sea Battle;
- Resilience across domains (including air, ground, maritime, cyber, space);
- Increase and diversify access by realigning global defense posture;
- Increased investment in capabilities less vulnerable to A2/AD (e.g., long-range precision strike) and better able to counter them (e.g., electronic warfare, cyber, etc.).

New Ways

- *Share defense burden with allies to fill gaps in U.S. posture by encouraging investment in a regional deterrence architecture including conventional strike and missile defense.*
  - ROK and Japanese independent conventional strike forces supported by U.S. C2 and ISR.
  - Less escalatory in a crisis for those capabilities to be resident in the theater.
  - Extreme example: see Paul Bracken on the virtues of a nuclear-armed Japan.
- Establish *better access/basing in Central Asia* to complicate Chinese war plans, posture.
  - Bonus: creates leverage/trade space with Russia, crisis surge for South Asia post-2014.
- *Track 2 discussion with China and Iran* on conflict de-escalation/U.S. red lines for escalation in A2/AD environment

4. **Counter asymmetric threats to U.S. warfare dominance, including disruptive adversary capabilities in space, cyber, and through the use of proxies and irregular warfare.**

Current Ways

- Cyber deterrence (including offensive cyber declaratory policy, forensics);
- Space norms and resilience;
- Security forces assistance (SFA)/foreign internal defense (FID);
- Counter irregular warfare (IW) operations.
New Ways

- Establish an independent (from STRATCOM) U.S. Cyber Command with Title 10 authorities to ensure that the United States maintains its lead in cyber warfare, both offense and defense.
  
  o Use U.S. Special Operations Command as a model (Title 10 authorities).
  
  o While it can be argued that the domain of space does not require its own force provider (in part, because space lift is so expensive), the United States will need a military service (with an ability to “organize, train and equip”) for cyber. The newest domain of warfare is simply growing too fast not to.
  
  o Develop explicit declaratory policy for cyber and consider how to test/demonstrate cyber capability to establish fact/credibility of threat.
  
  o Develop new oversight rules for the dual-hatted CYBERCOM commander and NSA director that are grounded in Title 10 processes.
    - Cost of building a CYBERCOM independent of NSA is prohibitive and fraught with future interagency conflict.

- Field advanced capabilities (e.g., conventional prompt global strike, railgun, directed energy, etc.) that impose costs on potential adversaries investing in asymmetrical (to U.S.) capabilities.
  
  o Although declining defense budgets raise the opportunity costs of this strategy, it should be remembered that the United States did not “defeat” the Soviet Union by combat, but by outpacing it in an arms race.

- Using the high-priority strategic ends identified in this study as the analytic framework and RAND’s assumptions-based warning strategy, build a roster of “reversibility actions” and the associated “trigger events” needed to address the trends and shocks, wild cards and “unknown unknowns” characteristic of the 21st-century security environment.
  
  o A systematic and comprehensive list of the reversibility options needed to ensure the high-priority strategic ends is the planning foundation of an adaptive and flexibility force.
  
  o Reversibility as a concept was first introduced in the 2010 QDR, but was not implemented in a systematic matter.43

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• Implement Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (May 2012) recommendation that the “Joint Staff and OSD should form two to three red teams that can independently assess [service and COCOM] requirements, programs, and operational plans to provide an unvarnished, objective perspective to DoD’s senior civilian and military leadership.”

  o Similar to an approach first proposed by Murdock in 1993 and the Defense Science Board in 2009, using “external groups” composed of “internal participants” supported by contractors to “red team” CONOPS, both operational and strategic, and the requirements based on them, could cut through the overly bureaucratic and self-interested nature of DoD strategic planning.

• Demonstrate U.S. commitment to resilience through low-cost mitigation and procurement options (e.g., air-breathing ISR capable of replacing expensive space-based).

• Revised declaratory policy regarding use of nonstate proxy forces: reserve the right to preemptively strike if they threaten U.S. interests; will hold states responsible for their actions if they sponsor them or provide sanctuary.

5. Continue to encourage the peaceful rise of China while deterring and if necessary defeating Chinese aggression in East Asia.

Current Ways

• Encourage Chinese military transparency;

• Conventional deterrence;

• Strategic reconnaissance operations (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance/SRO);

• Freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS);

• Posture (basing including hardening and dispersal, access, agreements);

• Regional engagement and exercises;

• Updated war plans;

• Assure regional allies and partners and seek to deescalate third-party conflicts that could inadvertently draw in the United States.

documents/publications/CNAS_SustainablePreeminence_BarnoBensahelIrvineSharp_0.pdf. “Reversibility requires that the U.S. military must be deliberately designed to expand rapidly if required to deal with the unexpected. Reversibility is a highly response way to institute threat-based planning in a world of unknown threats; it prioritizes forces that are rapidly expansible and adaptable in the face of unanticipated contingencies.”
New Ways

- Develop an integrated “hard” (military and economic) and “soft” (diplomacy, reputational, etc.) U.S. government interagency strategy for shaping China’s evolution as a “responsible stakeholder” while coping with China’s economic mercantilism and increasingly assertive pursuit of its “core interests.”
  - The United States should avoid the tendency to separate the military (the province of government) and the economic (the province of the private sector) to deal with the integrated Chinese pol-mil-econ strategy for its rise as a great power and possibly its ambition to supplant the United States as the “systems integrator” of the global security system.
  - The United States should operationalize a deterrence/cost-imposing strategy that emphasizes U.S. low-cost asymmetric capabilities and China’s asymmetric vulnerabilities (e.g., the United States could unblock Chinese domestic Internet censorship in a crisis).
  - Work with others in the region and in regions elsewhere globally to push back on China’s assumed “nine-dashed line,” and to keep tabs on its growing influence in Africa and Latin America.

- Establish a new approach to multilateral Asia-Pacific security cooperation (coalition of the willing).
  - Recognize the limits to Japan-ROK cooperation and cast a wider net.
  - Think about how to leverage the ASEAN Regional Forum.

6. Maintain nuclear parity with Russia and nuclear superiority versus China.

Current Ways

- Second-to-none strategic nuclear capabilities vs. Russia

New Ways

- Formulate and adopt a new NATO declaratory policy to counter Russia’s increased reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security strategy
  - Most effective counter to Russia’s increasingly bellicose nuclear diplomacy is the revitalization of NATO as a nuclear alliance.

- Develop, with Japan and South Korea, a collective statement of how the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to U.S. nonnuclear allies and partners is maintained and the possible implications (including
“independent nuclear forces” for its major allies) if U.S. assurances lose credibility.

- Spelling out the consequences of China’s following the Russian example could persuade Beijing of the benefits of Chinese restraint and moderation.

7. **Deter and defend against provocations from a nuclear North Korea and a nuclear-aspirant Iran.**

**Current Ways**

- Sustain extended nuclear deterrence and assurance to key allies and partners as context:
  - See U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee and U.S.-Japanese Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC);
  - Increased bilateral cooperation on how to counter provocations (U.S.-Israeli, U.S.-ROK, U.S-Japanese, etc.), including formal bilateral contingency planning (e.g., U.S.-ROK Counter Provocation Plan);
  - Strategic reconnaissance operations (SRO);
  - Freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS);
  - Posture (basing, access, agreements);
  - Regional deterrence architecture including missile defense, investment in regional partner capabilities;
  - Updated war plans.

**New Ways**

- Develop and propagate a coercive diplomacy/“compellence” strategy for how the United States and its allies and partners use red lines, deadlines, and ultimatums to prevent regional rogues from taking provocative and destabilizing actions.

  - Coercive diplomacy in the 21st century requires red lines for effective deterrence of specific actions, but using red lines raises the stakes for the deterrer and requires disciplined forethought (e.g., on what to do if red lines are crossed) and preparation (e.g., preparing to do what you said you would).
    - Part of this discussion would include new ways of signaling resolve, including the rapid deployment of force (“human red lines”) to provide trip wires and horizontal escalation (e.g., intimidating an adversary by punishing his weaker ally).
• In a “Back to the Future” initiative, develop a strategy statement for how the United States will sustain its credibility as “responsible stakeholder” to provide global stability and promote regional stability.
  o The characterization of the United States as a “global hegemon” with imperial ambitions but declining resources is due, in part, to the lack of a self-characterization of how the United States sees itself and uses its power (for example, its “reputation for action”) to serve the interests of global and regional stability.

• More calculated risk-taking to establish credibility: prevent long-range missile tests through overt (destroy through conventional strike) or covert (sabotage via SOF) preemptive operations

• On Iran: reinvigorate NATO nuclear sharing; emphasize Turkey’s role.

• On Korea: routinely exercise capability to preemptively strike Pyongyang (not B-52s, B-2s; possibly tactical nukes with associated system?)

8. Counter proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD, including nuclear weapons from a collapsing regime.

Current Ways
  • Missile defense inclusive of allies’ territory
  • Attribution
  • Resilience
  • Declaratory policy
  • Coercive diplomacy

New Ways
  • Build a Global Alliance to Counter Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation that would develop and deploy an integrated (from Iron Dome through theater and national missile defense) layered and robust anti-missile system from multiple nations.
    o A global alliance, based upon self-reliance and a technology-driven division of labor, is needed to address the common threat of less reliable deterrence of new missile and WMD powers.
  • Press NATO to adopt countering loose-WMD as a core mission.
    o Encourage others to apply, also, but leverage the NATO command structure.
Mission set is significantly more manpower intensive (boots on the ground) than the United States has come to grips with and preparations must be made before a crisis to have a coalition in hand for operations.

9. **Promote stability in regions around the world through pre-conflict defense engagement (security cooperation activities such as military-to-military exchanges, exercises, etc.).**

**Current Ways**

- Defense diplomacy
- Exercises
- Security forces assistance (SFA)/foreign internal defense (FID)
- Presence including FONOPs, rotational deployments
- ISR and intelligence exchange/sharing

**New Ways**

- *Establish a Global Partnership to do XXX with YYY in ZZZ*, where XXX=a specific threat that the United States will support partner countries to prevail against, YYY=the willing country or coalition, and ZZZ=the region(s) in which the threat exists.

  o U.S. support to France in Mali is a model of this approach.

  o Identifies “real partners” who will take on leadership responsibilities for local efforts and back their play with real-time operational and logistical support.
    - It's not BPC but helping partners to prevail.
    - One ISR orbit with associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination can be a game-changer.

  o Integrate senior U.S. senior officers (O6s–O8s) into foreign militaries for advise and assist missions more regularly (as in Iraq and Afghanistan).

  o Establishes the United States as the security partner of choice and builds ties for a host of contingencies; provides new access; can bring interoperability.

  o Experimentation: possible to test many different approaches simultaneously and share best practices across efforts; field new equipment.
Emphasize the use of key U.S. enablers such as ISR, lift, etc. (must preserve overstrength of enablers in Army force structure during drawdown).

Serve as the connective tissue for tailored regional security architectures worldwide, including through adopting the “federated defenses” approach, first proposed by John Hamre.

- Under this approach, U.S., allied, and partnered militaries would buy and operate high-end military equipment that the United States itself uses (in some cases they would buy American; in others, the United States would buy foreign—but it would be very good kit).
- By buying and operating the same high standard of equipment, countries in regions worldwide can effectively substitute for U.S. capability in peacetime and augment it in wartime, requiring fewer permanently or rotationally deployed U.S. forces.
- Think about U.S.-UK nuclear sharing as what's possible at the highest end; continue to seek efficiencies with JSF. Look also at cyber, space, unmanned systems.

Strengthen Europe’s contribution to global stability by revitalizing NATO one mission at a time.

- See the specific examples under #6 of formulating and adopting a new NATO declaratory policy to counter Russia’s increased reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security strategy; and under #8 of pressing NATO to adopt loose-WMD as a core mission.
Appendix 3. New Strategic Ways Organized by Level of Interest for Further Study

The table below organizes the new ways identified in the Strategic Ways project into four groups based on the study team’s assessment of which ways merit further study through sub-working groups. Tiers 1+ and 1- (subjects for additional working groups) are listed by priority order; other tiers are not prioritized.

**Tier 1(+): For Immediate Study**

1. Build a roster of “reversibility actions” (e.g., Army force structure drawdown) and associated trigger events (use an assumptions-based warning strategy).
2. Press allies to invest in regional defense architecture (e.g., conventional strike; ballistic missile defense, BMD; and cruise missile defense, CMD) along the lines of John Hamre’s Federated Defense approach.
3. Invest in research and development and science and technology to field more U.S. asymmetric capabilities (e.g., “cheap,” disposable swarming U.S. unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for BMD).
4. [Think “1,000-ship Navy”; the recent “Mali model” with France, African nations, the UN and regional organizations; or the East Timor example with the United States playing an offshore role with a MEU while Australia, Portugal, and Malaysia teamed up for onshore ops; more robust multilateral security framework for Asia].

**Tier 1(-): For Study by January 2014**

1. Revitalize NATO one mission at a time (e.g., global counter-WMD ready coalition for in-country operations; not to duplicate Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI).

**Tier 2: Hold**

- Develop an integrated “hard” and “soft” U.S. government interagency strategy for shaping China’s evolution.
- Establish Joint Staff and OSD red teams to independently assess service and COCOM requirements, programs, and operational plans.
- Enact more disciplined policy on use of special operations forces (SOF); emphasize phase 0; continue to sort out Title 10 vs. Title 50 missions.
- Press allies to invest in regional defense architecture (conventional strike, BMD, and CMD).
- Revise declaratory policy regarding adversary use of nonstate proxy forces.
- Develop, with Japan and Republic of Korea, a statement of how the United States will maintain the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.
- Develop and propagate a coercive diplomacy strategy for how the United States uses red lines, deadlines, and ultimatums.

**Tier 3: Not Worthy of Further Investigation**

- Implement integrated strategic planning to strengthen Department of Homeland Security readiness and capability.
- Engage in Track 2 discussions with China and Iran on conflict de-escalation.
- Develop a strategy for how the United States will sustain its credibility as a responsible stakeholder to provide global stability and promote regional stability.
- Build a global alliance with deployable integrated air and missile defense assets.
| About the Authors |


Before joining CSIS, Murdock taught military strategy, the national security process, and military innovation at the National War College. Prior to that, from 1995 to 2000, he served in the Office of the Air Force Chief of Staff, where, as deputy special assistant to the chief for long range planning, he helped develop a strategic vision for the 2020 Air Force. Then, as deputy director for strategic planning, he institutionalized the Air Force's strategic planning process and spearheaded the development of new planning products. Before joining the Air Force Chief of Staff’s Office, he was special assistant to the under secretary of the Air Force, providing analytic support to the secretary and under secretary on broad issues of concern, including the future of air power and Air Force missions. Before joining the Air Force, Murdock served in the Department of Defense, where he headed the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and held responsibility for mid- to long-range analysis and planning on strategy and defense policy issues. Prior to joining the Department of Defense, he served for several years on the House Armed Services Committee as a professional staff member and as a senior policy adviser to then-Chairman Les Aspin. Murdock’s experience in defense planning and policy also includes service on the National Security Council as senior director for Africa affairs and in multiple roles in the Central Intelligence Agency. Before turning to government service, Murdock taught for 10 years at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He is an honors graduate of Swarthmore College and holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

**Samuel J. Brannen** is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where his research focuses on U.S. defense and national security strategy and policy, Turkey, and unmanned systems. Prior to rejoining CSIS in May 2013, he served at the Pentagon as special assistant to the principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy. In that position,
he advised and supported the second-ranking U.S. defense policy official on a range of defense and national security matters. From July 2010 to September 2012, Brannen was country director for Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta in the Office of Secretary of Defense. He advised senior Pentagon officials on adapting the U.S.-Turkey defense relationship to changing internal and regional dynamics. Prior to that, he was special assistant to the deputy under secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and forces and assisted in the process and drafting of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Before rejoining government at the start of the Obama administration, Brannen held various positions at CSIS from 2002 to 2009, including as a fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program and as assistant director of the Global Strategy Institute. From 2006 to 2007, he served as a loaned employee to the U.S. government, working as a strategist in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he concentrated on maritime security and U.S.-European cooperation. He also served as a staff member for the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, chaired by General (Ret.) James L. Jones. Brannen holds a B.A. in political science from Trinity University (San Antonio, TX) and an M.A. in international affairs from the George Washington University. He has been awarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service four times and has received the Department of State Superior Service Award and Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence.
Exploring New Ways to Provide Enduring Strategic Effects for the Department of Defense

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