

## Select Upcoming Events

### PONI CAPSTONE CONFERENCE

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

7:00 a.m.–8:00 p.m.

Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, NE

### MILITARY STRATEGY FORUM: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE

Featuring Chief of Staff of the  
Air Force General Mark Welsh

Thursday, March 27, 2014

9:00 a.m.–10:00 a.m.

CSIS, 1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW

### CREATING A LEGACY FOR THE NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

Wednesday, April 2, 2014

12:00 p.m.–1:30 p.m.

CSIS, 1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW

## Select Recent Events

### MILITARY STRATEGY FORUM: THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TODAY—PRESENCE MATTERS

Featured a discussion with the Honorable  
Ray Mabus, moderated by Dr. John  
Hamre.

### NON-KINETIC POWER AND THE 2014 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

This conference, hosted by the CSIS Project  
on Prosperity and Development, featured  
framing remarks by Kathleen Hicks.

## FROM THE DIRECTOR'S CHAIR

KATHLEEN H. HICKS

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Rapid political change inside weak states became commonplace during the Arab awakening. Until this month, Ukraine's trajectory seemed to be following this same trend line: a state undergoing a dramatic change due to domestic stress. The March 2014 events in Ukraine, however, are now most notable for reminding us that opportunism is alive and well across state borders.

Russia's lightning-fast occupation and annexation of Crimea is an object lesson in the enduring interests of major states in their peripheries. While the United States had been learning that lesson incrementally in East Asia, where China is slowly eroding international norms in freedom of the air and seas, Russia's bold, duplicitous, and unapologetic annexation of Crimea came as a surprise. Could such land grabs be duplicated elsewhere in the world? Instability in northern Iraq and Syria could drive Turkish action to intervene. A collapsed North Korea could tempt China to absorb further territory as a buffer. And Kashmir and Nagorno-Karabakh exemplify the many other long-standing territorial disputes that we should be considering.

The United States will often have less direct interest in matters far from its shores than a neighboring state for which the issue is of immediate concern. We cannot and should not militarily intervene in many cases, for chasing the chimera of "credibility" can be dangerous. In addition to rapid and unintended escalation, it can quickly lead to the justification for action everywhere and overextension beyond our means.

Yet in great power moves, the costs of miscalculation are dangerously high. We are not always a predictable international actor, given how context-dependent our public and leadership appetite is for action. Actors will cross our threshold for action unknowingly, or at least with a willingness to gamble that an unacceptable response is not forthcoming. Saddam Hussein did just this when he invaded neighboring Kuwait in 1990.

Russia's action has brought it once again to the doorstep of our most important alliance, an echo of its 2008 conflict with Georgia. The long game for NATO is to set the conditions for leverage with a post-Putin Russia. The short game is to take visible steps now to protect NATO allies' citizens and territories from the threat of Russian coercion, a goal achievable even with the sorry state of alliance defense investment and the rightful rebalance of U.S. forces to the Pacific. But the United States should also look beyond Ukraine now to identify selective and convincing displays of U.S. commitment and interest around the world that might deter adventurism and prevent costly conflicts. ■

## WHAT EXACTLY IS THE “BUDGET”? A SHORT EXPLANATION OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS

DAVID J. BERTEAU

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On March 4, the president submitted to Congress his administration’s proposed **budget** for Fiscal Year 2015. Now the House and the Senate are each required to pass their **budget** by April 15. Eventually, Congress passes one or more appropriations bills called “budgets,” or they pass temporary **budgets** (a “continuing resolution” to keep the government running). What are all these “budgets”? Each one has a different meaning, and politicians deliberately misuse the terms. Let’s look at each in turn and how they can be misused.

The *President’s Budget* submission to Congress is technically only a formal budget request for the entire federal government, but the president’s request forms a large part of what Congress eventually passes. Members of Congress have attacked it as too low in one area (like defense) or too high in others (say, education funding), as if they have no say in final spending.

First, though, the House and the Senate each have to pass a *Budget Resolution*. These bills do not change the president’s budget but instead set baselines for Congress to appropriate funds for each government agency. Republicans criticized the Senate for not passing a “budget” for four years, but that had no impact because there are alternate ways to reach the same results. The Senate is likely to use last December’s Bipartisan Budget Act instead. The House may pass a budget resolution that defies its own Budget Control Act caps. Each of these approaches serves the political goals of the Senate and House leadership.

What matters to federal agencies, though, are appropriations, the only part of the entire budget process that is in the Constitution. These bills actually change the president’s budget, raising or lowering requests, adding or deleting programs and line items. That’s the third “budget,” and without it, the government shuts down (as happened last October). With it, each agency releases funds for spending. In wartime Iraq, for example, the Army often released funds just one week at a time. For the soldiers at the end of that process, that was the only “budget” they cared about! ■

## INTERNAL ARMY TENSIONS PUT NATIONAL SECURITY AT RISK

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The releases of the president’s fiscal year 2015 budget request and the Defense Department’s latest Quadrennial Defense Review have reignited a hotly contested debate regarding the “right” balance between the Army Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC). With a

## Multimedia



**WATCH** “Discussion on the 2014 QDR and FY15 Defense Budget,” featuring a keynote speech by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Christine Wormuth and a panel discussion with ISP experts.



**WATCH** Kathleen Hicks’s interview with *Defense News* on the 2014 QDR.

## Recent Publications

**READ** *The 2014 QDR and FY15 Defense Budget: What Are We Watching For*, featuring short analyses by ISP scholars on the recently released QDR and FY15 DoD budget.

**READ** *Sustaining the U.S. Lead in Unmanned Systems: Military and Homeland Considerations through 2025*, by Sam Brannen, for an analysis of key risks and opportunities for the technology, as well as specific recommendations for policymakers.

looming fiscal crisis and evolving security challenges, each military service is looking to protect force gains made since 2001 and to maintain structure necessary to meet threats to U.S. national security.

Traditionally bubbling beneath the surface, the AC/RC debate hinges on identifying and resourcing the appropriate roles and missions for each component. The active Army and the Guard (which together with reserves constitutes the RC), for example, each typically questions the other's cost figures, and the AC and RC frequently challenge each other's perspective and engage in robust discussions about the readiness and capability levels needed to achieve Total Force objectives.

This time, however, the AC/RC discussion is not playing out behind closed doors. Earlier this year, [one media outlet](#) noted that a lack of resolution between the Guard and Active Army would lead to “open, brutal conflict on Capitol Hill.” Indeed, in 2012, the Air Force experienced a meltdown in AC/RC relations over its proposal to reduce reserve force structure and the ensuing debate over whether the reserves, governors, or Congress had been properly consulted. Despite its intention to avoid repeating the Air Force's experience, bitter Army divisions are **now blowing up in the public domain**, revealing the deep distrust that exists between the Army's AC and the Guard.

Lost in the noise is the long-term impact this warfare will have on the health of the Army, detracting attention from the fundamental issues that Congress and the administration should discuss regarding the Total Army's roles, priorities, and requirements in the future security environment. In the coming weeks, the CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program will release a report that attempts to refocus attention on these key issues, providing policymakers and practitioners with independent insights and recommendations to shape the Army and advance U.S. national defense objectives. ■

## REVISITING MEDICAL SERVICE DELIVERY IN CONFLICT ZONES

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Medical service delivery to the front lines of conflict is one of many competing priorities for the international community in war zones. The reemergence of polio in Syria, for example, underscores the importance, but also the difficulty, of providing medical services to populations affected by conflict.

Violent and persistent conflict compromises health care infrastructure, as facilities and medical personnel are targeted by both rebel and government forces and hospitals see dwindling supplies. Nearly two-

**READ** *Governing Uranium in the United States*, coauthored by Sharon Squassoni, Stephanie Cooke, Robert Kim, and Jacob Greenberg, for an analysis of U.S. experiences with the security of its “front-end” uranium industry.

**READ** a conference report from “Transatlantic Forum: Rebalancing and Reinforcing the Transatlantic Bond,” by T.J. Cipoletti and Kathleen Hicks, for thoughts on how the alliance should frame the Wales summit this September.

**READ** *Colombia: Peace and Stability in the Post-Conflict Era*, coauthored by Robert Lamb, on how the Colombian government can move forward in consolidating gains in its countryside—and how the United States can help.

**READ** *Resurgence of al Qaeda in Iraq: Effect on Security and Political Stability*, by Stephanie Sanok Kostro and Garrett Riba, on how the recent siege of Iraqi cities and surge in bombings depicts a reinvigorated and fully operational group.

thirds of hospitals have been destroyed or abandoned in Syria. The current state of the Syrian health care system, like the recent polio outbreak, is typical of prolonged civil wars in fragile states. The Syrian Ministry of Health is understaffed, overburdened, and lacks sustained access to children living on the front lines. The Syrian government continues to block access for many humanitarian workers, and the ones who have made it in are threatened with targeted attacks and kidnapping.

International health actors moved swiftly to implement an emergency outbreak response in Syria and in the surrounding countries, and the Syrian government agreed to send health care workers into rebel-held territory in an attempt to reach all 3 million Syrian children under the age of five. Polio, however, remains one small part of a serious and growing public health crisis—one that could have been prevented or mitigated had international organizations had safe access to conduct surveillance and disease programming.

Many international health organizations, especially those that traditionally operate through official channels, have struggled to find solutions for service delivery during conflicts like the one in Syria, a multisided, complex, and sustained crisis. As the international community tackles future complex crises around the world, navigating unofficial channels and working with unconventional partners, like civil society organizations or local councils, will be key to ensuring that medical services are not compromised in times of war. ■

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## In the News

“We have to make more hard choices about what we’re going to do and what we’re not going to do, and not prepare for the things we’re not going to do.”

—Clark Murdock on the QDR’s underlying strategy attempting to take on too much, as quoted in *Politico Morning Defense*

“We really could use that additional \$26 billion. You can’t live in a mansion if you’re working on a middle class salary.”

—Christine Wormuth, speaking at CSIS, on the Obama administration’s “Opportunity, Growth, & Security Initiative,” as quoted in *Breaking Defense*

“Congress always modifies the president’s budget request. They will again. The question is will they do it in small ways or large ways.”

—Kathleen Hicks to Reuters on the president’s budget request and what to expect from Congress

## Congressional Testimony

**READ** David Berteau’s testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, on “Capabilities to Support the Asia-Pacific Rebalance.”