



Transatlantic Forum: Rebalancing and Reinforcing the Transatlantic Bond

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BACKGROUND

In January 2014, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), with sponsorship from NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), hosted a Transatlantic Forum to advance solutions to critical issues facing the alliance. Entitled “Rebalancing and Reinforcing the Transatlantic Bond,” the Forum solicited candid perspectives and generated innovative ideas to assist NATO in preparing for the September 2014 Wales Summit. This CSIS report outlines the key findings from this event.

The two-day conference kicked off with a public, bipartisan keynote discussion on the challenges that lie ahead for the transatlantic security relationship. The January 27 discussion featured U.S. Senators Christopher Murphy (D-CT) and John McCain (R-AZ) and was moderated by Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks, Senior Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and Director of the International Security Program at CSIS, and Heather Conley, Senior Fellow and Director of the CSIS Europe Program. The senators highlighted the importance of a strong and vibrant NATO.

CSIS and ACT then convened an in-depth, not-for attribution workshop on January 28. The day-long workshop was co-chaired by Dr. Hicks and General Jean-Paul Paloméros, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, and included 35 experts from the United States, Canada, and Europe representing a diverse range of viewpoints. Discussions revolved primarily around four topics:

- Implications for Europe of the U.S. Rebalance to the Pacific
- Washington Perceptions of European Security Contributions
- 21st Century Challenges and Associated NATO Capabilities
- The Future of NATO in an Age of Austerity

Each topic was framed in a panel discussion led by a CSIS-affiliated moderator and featuring both an American and European presenter.

General Paloméros concluded the Transatlantic Forum by reflecting on how its findings will shape the agenda of the April 2014 SACT Seminar and, ultimately, the September NATO Summit. The Wales Summit comes at a critical inflection point as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan winds down and allies prepare to meet the many internal and external challenges that NATO member states must be ready to meet now and into the future.

KEYNOTE DISCUSSION

The keynote discussion opened with Senator Murphy and Senator McCain outlining their greatest hopes as well as their most significant concerns for the alliance. Both stated that NATO remains a viable alliance that provides security to its members and serves as a model of success for other alliances to emulate. However, they noted significant concern about its long-term sustainability given current funding levels as well as the reluctance of many of its member states to undertake crisis management operations going forward.

In response to a question regarding their recent trip to the Ukraine, the current political environment there, and the broader issue of NATO enlargement, Senator Murphy responded that he had never seen anything like the protests that were taking place, which were largely non-political gatherings among people who just wanted a government free of corruption. While Senator Murphy referenced limited U.S. diplomatic tools to impact the situation, he agreed with Senator McCain that the U.S. could speak with a clear voice. Senator McCain highlighted the impact words can have by referencing President Reagan's "Tear down this wall," speech, and also called for the EU and the IMF to commit to a more robust path of action. On the broader enlargement question, Senator Murphy described it as a bigger issue than any one country joining an institution, but a symbol to the world. In echoing his colleague's sentiment, Senator McCain highlighted his special feelings for Georgia. He commented that he had watched a revolution take place that had fundamentally changed that country, but that it is now essentially occupied by Russia. He opined that one of the strongest actions the alliance could undertake would be to allow Georgia into NATO.

In response to a question about NATO's role in the Middle East and North Africa, Senator Murphy said the U.S. and Europe ignore regional conflicts and ungoverned spaces at their peril and noted that training missions require only minimal investments that produce the largest returns. He cited Africa as a place where the EU and NATO need to determine who leads on specific contingencies. Senator McCain referenced the French long-term commitment to operations in Mali as remarkable, given the tough terrain. He also advocated for more NATO involvement in training and equipping regional forces, especially for counterterrorism and border patrol missions.

The Senators also addressed the Afghan mission and what they hoped to hear about it in President Obama's State of the Union address, scheduled for the following evening. Senator Murphy discussed his stance on expediting the ISAF troop withdrawal, while citing the need for the U.S. to maintain a counterterrorism mission and a 10,000-troop force. He allowed that the residual force would be a hard sell to the American people, who are tired of war, but insisted that Obama needed to sell it to the public because of its importance over the medium term. On counterterrorism operations more generally, Murphy referenced the need to better integrate U.S. efforts with its NATO allies or risk eroding U.S. defense cooperation. Senator McCain implored President Obama to talk about his vision for America's role in the world and how we are going to meet the threats we face, which need not always involve U.S. military action.

The featured speakers also advocated for engaging the American people to explain why we have continued to contribute to NATO since the end of the Cold War, discussed the emerging

isolationist tendencies in some parts of the Republican Party, and praised the great strengths that NATO showed in the Libya operation despite some key capability shortfalls. They highlighted shortfalls such as aerial refueling, precision guided munitions, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Senators also addressed the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece, criticized the acquisition process on the F-35, and disagreed about the effectiveness of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton.

WORKSHOP

General Paloméros opened the expert workshop expressing his gratitude to the participants who were joining for the day to share their thoughts on the key issues that are shaping NATO today. He expressed his openness to hearing their viewpoints and his aspiration that the Transatlantic Forum would serve as an early building block in the development of the September 2014 NATO Summit agenda. He also stressed that we should speak of “responsibility sharing” rather than “burden sharing.”

PANEL I: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE OF THE U.S. REBALANCE TO THE PACIFIC

The workshop kicked off with a discussion of how the U.S. effort to rebalance toward the Pacific is affecting and could affect transatlantic relations. The first panel moderator described this as a somewhat unconventional, but highly relevant, launching point for a NATO conference. The moderator asked an American presenter to provide an overview of the strategic environment and U.S. policy in the Pacific and a European speaker to focus on how this shift is impacting the transatlantic relationship.

The American speaker opened his remarks with an overview of some of the strategic dynamics in Asia, noting that all of the major U.S. allies in the region trade more with China than the U.S., creating an unprecedented level of interdependence. The presenter also cited the increasing popularity of democratic institutions, good governance, rule of law, and human rights despite a few notable exceptions. These trend lines are compatible with Western norms that NATO allies care about. However, the speaker also referenced the rise in nationalism in Asia and the potential it poses for conflict and the proliferation of nuclear capabilities.

In terms of U.S. policy, the American expert noted that Asia has traditionally been a secondary theater of interest, but that could be changing with U.S. polls showing Asia becoming more important to the American people. The rebalance reflects this change, but the attendant U.S. strategy for Asia is still inchoate and the resourcing is unclear. The 2011 Defense Strategic Guidance emphasized China and balance of power dimensions to a greater degree than had past U.S. strategic documents. In practice, this has led to a greater networking of forces with our Asian allies, but the American expert noted that this networking likely has limits. The formation of a collective security organization like NATO is unlikely in Asia, he stated, because China is not viewed in the region the same way as the Soviet Union was for the West. Our Asian allies are also less likely to put their trust into international institutions in times of crisis.

The U.S. expert also assessed that while the rebalance has produced more engagement with Southeast Asia, it has not helped with some of the hard security problems in Northeast Asia. He

deemed military planning and exercises for Northeast Asian contingencies as falling behind the challenges of that region. Moreover, he expressed his view that the U.S. has not established a robust requirements dialogue with its Asian partners like he believes it has with NATO allies. The U.S. expert noted that CSIS is undertaking a study on federated capabilities for Asia to help with this dialogue. He also pointed to a few recent developments that he deemed positive, including Japan's decision to take part in the Joint Strike Fighter consortium, with Korea and Singapore also considering joining. He pointed to the potential for such developments to make U.S. and Asian capabilities more interoperable over time.

The American expert concluded his remarks by returning to the question of whether the U.S. really has a grand strategy for Asia. He made the further point that if the U.S. is struggling with grand strategy there, Europe is even further away from a vision of its approach to the Pacific. If Europeans can align their thinking on Asia, NATO can play a positive security role by fostering partnership and capability development in the region.

The European speaker opened by referencing former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's proposal to "pivot to Asia together," which though compelling as rhetoric, had yet to be detailed as a strategy. The presenter opined that the rebalance is going to bring about a new phase in the transatlantic relationship. While Europe has built economic ties with Asia, trade has been mostly conducted on a bilateral basis and has been commercially driven as opposed to a more strategic approach up to this point. On the military side, the speaker expressed his view that European capabilities cannot realistically contribute much to the region.

According to this European analyst, if a new grand strategy toward the region does not emerge, a gradual fraying of the alliance is likely. Most European leaders today came of age during the Cold War, but the new generation of politicians has been living in a "post-American world," and they do not fundamentally think of the transatlantic relationship in the same way. It is already progressively becoming less central to leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. With some of the major problems emerging in the region, Asia has the potential to be more divisive to the alliance than the Middle East. The European speaker emphasized that the Obama administration needs to do a better job of communicating what the rebalance is and how Europe might play a role. He posited that one way Europe might help is by taking more responsibility for its own backyard, freeing up American resources for the Pacific. He cautioned, however, that NATO operations in Libya provided a stark example of the limitations on European defense capabilities. He concluded that Europeans are not currently in a position to contribute more, nor is there much ambition to do so in the near term in an alliance context, as U.S. and European policy interests in the region do not necessarily align.

During the discussion, there was some disagreement among the participants as to whether the U.S. has effectively communicated the rebalance to Europeans in terms of goals and objectives and what it means for U.S. security commitments to Europe. One American participant insisted that U.S. officials have tried over and over using a number of different approaches to explain the rebalance to our European allies and have communicated clearly what the U.S. would like Europe to contribute to global security. On the other hand, one European insisted that American rhetoric did not always correspond with U.S. actions.

In terms of the Pacific Theater, most agreed that Europe did not have the capabilities or ambition to contribute much in the security sphere. However, a few participants outlined some suggestions on what they could bring to the table. One participant thought Europe could contribute a frigate to help patrol Pacific waters. Other participants referenced that Europe could clearly play a role in counter-piracy operations in the Indo-Pacific. One American participant thought the Asian theater provided a ripe opportunity for NATO involvement and insisted that if Europe did not contribute to the rebalance, America's underwriting of European security would certainly decline. This participant recommended that Europe contribute some forces to the next RIMPAC exercise in order to demonstrate alliance unity and commitment to Asian security. One European stated that the pivot could be considered a common project for the transatlantic community with the Europeans concentrating on their periphery and possibly on the Indian Ocean, utilizing the EU's governance capabilities, while the U.S. could focus on Asia. Another participant concurred with this idea and offered that European choices have an impact on U.S. strategy and thus, by taking responsibility for their periphery, the Europeans would help the U.S. avoid overstretch.

PANEL II: WASHINGTON PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS

The second panel focused on perceptions of allied burden sharing as well as U.S. leadership in NATO, which many Americans and Europeans alike felt had been lacking in recent years. The American moderator framed the discussion by citing former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' speech on European disarmament during his valedictory speech in June 2011 as an exceptionally candid example of Washington's perception that Europe is failing to pull its own weight.

The American panelist concurred with the moderator, while adding that Gates' comments, echoed by other U.S. officials since, were motivated by concern for an alliance that these officials hope to reinvigorate. The U.S. panelist did, however, question the value of the United States focusing so narrowly on the failure of most NATO members to meet a 2 percent of GDP threshold for defense spending. He concluded that Washington might be better served by exerting the necessary leadership to develop and communicate a convincing narrative about the role of NATO, which could help European allies justify sustained defense investment in their capitals.

While Europeans feel safer than ever, the American panelist offered, they still have major security concerns to the East and South and have major question marks to the North in the Arctic. When coupled with the fact that Asia will be passing North America and Europe in every power dimension by 2030, he stated that NATO is going to need to maintain its flexibility and dependability. The allies need to recognize that the alliance is in a time of transition, with the Afghan drawdown and the rapidly evolving security environment on Europe's periphery. They now have to adapt to the new geopolitical situation. The panelist stated that Europeans would do well to convince Washington that they are truly invested in remaining America's most trusted security partner.

The European speaker agreed with much of what his American colleague outlined, but added that the hectoring on European burden sharing by U.S. officials had some value. He believed that Europeans are motivated to respond to the criticism, even while wary of being lectured to by

Americans. The European speaker pointed out that the commonly-cited metric of ensuring NATO members are spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense is a technical approach to solving a political problem. Like his American counterpart, he viewed a convincing narrative on how improved capabilities would benefit European security to be the more effective means by which to induce greater defense investment.

Absent a compelling narrative to drive up the overall level of NATO defense spending, the European panelist assessed that Europeans could best focus on spending their limited dollars more effectively. He stated that recent approaches to achieving more efficient capability development through Smart Defence, the Connected Forces Initiative, and the Framework Nation Concept are good ideas with the right goals, but each required better implementation. Rather than coming up with a new concept at the September summit, NATO should demonstrate the promise of one of its current initiatives. The European speaker insisted that the transatlantic community should stop talking about a competition between the EU and NATO. We should rather focus on their complementarity as both organizations have comparative advantages.

During the ensuing discussion, there was some debate about the role the United States could play in inducing higher levels of European burden sharing. One European participant posited that American leadership actually encourages European free riding. If the U.S. continues to provide security for the continent and the capabilities that European powers lack, he noted, Europe will not have the necessary incentives to develop them on their own. The key questions under this scenario are whether the Americans are ready to share or even transfer their leadership, and if so, are the Europeans ready to accept it? The American panelist answered that there was a strong willingness in Washington for Europe to assume a greater leadership role in the alliance and expressed his hope that the discussion would evolve from how Europe could assume more of the burden to how the alliance could better serve as a force multiplier. Another European thought that the so-called “leading from behind” approach used in Libya and Mali might be the best method for getting Europeans to pull their own weight. On the other hand, an American participant pointed out that many Europeans doubt U.S. commitment to European security, referencing the recent Steadfast Jazz exercises, in which Ukraine provided more troops than did the United States. This participant advocated for conducting another exercise before the summit, utilizing the NATO Response Force to demonstrate real capabilities for a high end expeditionary contingency as a way to prove allied seriousness.

On the question of whether 2 percent of GDP is an effective gauge of allied commitment, a Canadian participant postulated that a better measure of burden sharing might be the percentage of deployable forces available in each country. She felt the development of a new political narrative referenced by the American presenter must include a discussion on the varied threat perceptions by allies on opposite sides of the Atlantic. Another participant felt that perhaps NATO should just stop publishing defense spending figures altogether, while most agreed that getting better value out of current spending levels might be the most effective solution for many allies.

PANEL III: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES AND ASSOCIATED NATO CAPABILITIES

The moderator of panel three suggested a focus on three areas:

- 1) What is the potential impact of today's technological revolution, which has lowered barriers of entry to state and non-state actors?
- 2) What opportunities and vulnerabilities do these technologies present now and into the future?
- 3) What does it all mean for the alliance? The United States and its allies and partners are individually struggling with how to adapt to the changing technological landscape. It is even harder to think through its implications in an alliance context.

The American presenter on this panel opened the conversation by taking a step back to ask how we identify threats and risks. Many countries focus on capabilities and adversarial intent, but the American panelist stressed the importance of calculating how likely the occurrence of an attack might be based on whether specific actors have a desire or even the ability to use some of these new capabilities. There are a very small number of actors at the intersection of capability and intent for nuclear weapons. He posited, however, that chemical and biological weapons are now easier for non-state actors to assemble than one might think and some actors have the intent to use them against NATO countries. Some newer capabilities are also becoming easier to acquire and utilize, the panelist argued. He cited the demonstration on YouTube of people assembling relatively capable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles through 3D printing technology in about three days at a cost of about \$14,000. With these capabilities becoming more and more diffuse, the American panelist emphasized that NATO will need to think about how this might increase the likelihood of an attack and also how NATO can defend against these threats.

On cyber, the American panelist stressed that NATO is in good company: no one has effective defensive capabilities. He emphasized that Europe is particularly vulnerable because of its many seams in cyberdefense, with overlapping NATO, EU, and national-level responsibilities. Opponents will look to exploit these seams. The U.S. speaker stated that Russia is perhaps as skilled as any offensive cyber actor. Russia will likely have prepositioned technology with the ability to wreck critical infrastructure and military command and control systems, which could pose major issues should a conflict emerge. He concluded that it would be worthwhile to think through how we affect Russia's cyber calculations from an alliance standpoint.

The European presenter opened with the premise that the alliance is still struggling with 20th century threats and agreed with his American colleague that we are at the threshold of a revolution in military affairs. He cited three major challenges posed by these modern threats: 1) a technology gap where few allies are able to acquire and develop new technologies to keep pace; 2) a related solidarity gap between the U.S. and Europe, as the United States has made major defense investments that no other ally can match, as well as a significant gap within Europe, with the fear of smaller allies free riding rather than making national investments; and, 3) a leadership gap that could exacerbate the struggle between political leaders' desire for quick, clean wars with the need for accepting more risk to be more operationally effective.

The European panelist then turned to some approaches the alliance could take to help mitigate these gaps. First was the importance of maintaining adaptability by learning some of the major lessons from Afghanistan, such as combining the capabilities of our ISR platforms, Special Forces, and traditional ground forces. Second, he highlighted the need for training and exercises through the Connected Forces Initiative to help allied armed forces adapt their skills for new challenges by utilizing existing equipment. Of note, he cited the point recently made by U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, that 80 percent of capabilities that the United States will use in 15 years have already been procured. Third, the European panelist called for promoting an environment of creativity and innovation through collaboration with the private sector. Fourth, the panelist stated that the alliance needs to maintain a credible posture to deter our adversaries and make clear that they would pay a certain price if they were to attack.

On cyber in particular, this European speaker asked whether we could establish a cyber planning group similar to NATO's Nuclear Planning Group. While admitting that cyber issues are still particularly sensitive to the nations, he noted that nuclear issues remain just as sensitive. A planning group would provide political and strategic oversight to NATO committees and help coordinate planning between member states. Another idea he expressed was to establish a cyber training headquarters similar to the NATO Special Operations Headquarters recently established in Mons, Belgium.

During the discussion, there was brief reference to the recent Snowden revelations, which may have the effect of bringing cyber policies on both sides of the Atlantic more into the open. On the topic of developing a capable cyber posture and the proposal to establish a cyber planning group, one American participant pointed out that while a Nuclear Planning Group had been established, it did cause a divide in the alliance for several decades. Another U.S. participant agreed and added that he thought it understandable that cyber was still a sensitive topic for nations as the technology is still too new.

After some debate and disagreement on whether cyber issues should be considered in either an Article IV or Article V context, one European attendee pointed out that what is important is the Defense Ministers had recently agreed that cyber was a full part of collective defense and that those kinds of political decisions should be made by the North Atlantic Council on a case by case basis. One American participant pondered what a proportional response to a cyber attack might be. Would an attack justify a cruise missile in response? What qualifies as the use of force? Would a cyber attack that costs American lives or significant economic harm constitute a lethal response?

Much of the discussion also focused on how the alliance could prepare for and coordinate on cyber contingencies. One European acknowledged that the alliance still had work to do on contingency planning and that this would require the ability and willingness to share data. The trend line is somewhat positive as there were many more North Atlantic Council meetings on cyber over the past year than were held the previous year. A couple of participants referenced the recently established Cyber Center of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia and questioned its contributions up to this point. In debating what success on cyber might look like at the summit, one participant thought the nations could go further than network protection and be more specific

on what the alliance means by cyber being part of collective defense. Some strong, forward looking language on training, capabilities, and coordination could be achieved in Wales.

One participant referenced the lack of a common doctrine on either armed or unarmed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as a major issue as NATO is about to receive Global Hawks in the next few years. If allies do not figure out how they are going to use them, adversaries could use gray areas to go after us. On missile defense, one participant advocated for leveraging existing sensors in Europe and to link them to U.S. Strategic Command that could provide a net deliverable to U.S. homeland defense at the summit. With more systems emerging, it is going to become even harder for NATO to integrate them and it might be worthwhile for the alliance to consider establishing an Air Defense Center of Excellence in a country like Poland. Finally, there was some discussion on counterterrorism tools as a priority that some member states needed to take more seriously. The integration of a whole range of tools like Special Forces, intelligence, and law enforcement requires a whole of government approach and greater jointness provided through NATO's Emerging Security Challenges Division.

PANEL IV: THE FUTURE OF NATO IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY

In the final panel of the workshop, the moderator opined that the West was currently experiencing its greatest crisis of confidence in quite a while, with both sides of the Atlantic facing isolationist tendencies due to a host of factors. If we treat the Wales Summit as a “business as usual” summit, the moderator stated, NATO will fail to meet its objectives.

The European speaker presented a series of slides that should serve as a “wake-up call” to the alliance. The speaker presented data on the changing economic power balance showing the rise of Asian economies and the declining economic power of the West. Likewise, he documented the changing military power balance with heavy Russian and Chinese investment and declining European defense spending. These trend lines on the fundamental details, he argued, are not working in NATO's favor. The alliance still has massive influence on the world stage and NATO's challenge is to start thinking about its role in 2020, 2030, and 2040. The European speaker stated that the West has a responsibility to shape this century and we do tend to exaggerate power of emerging nations and diminish our own. He referred to the Wales Summit as NATO's first strategic summit in some time, and he called on the alliance to lay out a meaningful agenda.

The American presenter asked how we were going to define this era, which has been marked by inflection and reflection for all of the reasons his European colleague laid out. The speaker stated that he was more optimistic about NATO than he was 6-8 months ago when the fissures were more evident. He cited the significant increase in transatlantic military operational tempo, with Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic all happening in rapid succession. Europeans' capability shortfalls have been difficult to address, the American presenter stated, as we have been in reaction mode and unable to think strategically. Moreover, he noted that we have also seen a recent trend of the U.S. and European nations failing to turn to NATO as a first resort in responding to crises. A coalition within NATO is doing most of the work, the American argued, with Libya serving as a great example of three nations undertaking an operation before handing it off. The result, he stated, is fissures within the alliance, as groupings

of nations become the more prominent and likely framework for action. At this stage, one American participant recognized that the U.S. must also be able to work with the EU. Some wondered whether there might be a need for a U.S.-NATO-EU forum, or even a U.S.-EU forum, to deal with European defense and security issues.

In terms of the summit, the American panelist emphasized the need for NATO to communicate that there is a responsibility associated with being in the alliance and a price to be paid if we cannot live up to those responsibilities. He concurred with the moderator and the European panelist that it will be critical to not allow this to be a business as usual summit. He also urged allies to fight the political tendency to label the summit a big success without any follow-through, warning in particular against issuing an “indecipherable communique” and agreeing to initiatives that nations have no intention of pursuing. Instead, the American panelist argued for a short, straightforward summit declaration wherein allies take the first steps toward reasserting the political will to meet NATO objectives. This should be a brutally realistic summit, he stated, and the next Secretary General must be willing to “break some bones” to march NATO into a new age.

Some of the participants pondered whether the alliance should revisit the Washington Treaty in some way. While some contributors thought it was important to review the structure of the alliance and what missions it should undertake, many did not believe that NATO should follow the EU’s example of agreeing to a lengthy, incomprehensible document like the Lisbon Treaty. Additionally, one American participant pointed out that the U.S. Senate would likely be unwilling to ratify any new treaty. Alternatively, one European participant recommended the alliance consider commissioning a radical non-paper that could be presented and discussed at the summit as another approach to promote strategic thinking.

Experts discussed several other summit-relevant topics. One issue raised was the prospect for further NATO enlargement. A European participant proclaimed the era of big enlargement as over, with the alliance now entering the era of big engagement. Another participant expressed hope for the NATO Response Force as an effective vehicle to help capture lessons learned and stay sharp post-ISAF. There was optimism that the Connected Forces Initiative could also be a valuable resource for the alliance and there has been great progress made on establishing an extensive exercise program. A U.S. participant stated that the State Department is working hard to develop new ideas for how to enhance the partnership tools available for operationally capable and willing partners.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Upon the conclusion of the final workshop panel, a few participants reflected on some of their key takeaways from the Forum:

- NATO could benefit from a comprehensive horizon scan to better assess what challenges allies are most likely to face in the future. Such a scan is a prerequisite for developing the kind of strategic vision participants argued was necessary if political leaders in Canada, the United States, and Europe are to be persuaded to reinvigorate the alliance.

- American leadership is still vital to a strong alliance and the U.S. needs to better articulate how NATO fits into its global security strategy. The United States will need to balance between encouraging European allies to assume greater responsibility for their region's security and maintaining the level of U.S. investment and engagement required to credibly deter threats to Europe and assure partners and allies on NATO's southern and eastern borders.
- There were mixed feelings among participants on whether the next summit is critical to the future of NATO or not. If the agenda looks toward the past, Wales will be a business as usual summit. If our political leaders look forward in a serious way, Wales could be viewed as a seminal moment for the alliance. NATO needs to recognize that we have enough slogans and that allies need to commit and sustain the political will to implement ongoing initiatives over the long term if we are to preserve key capabilities.
- ACT needs to continue to encourage member states to transform force structures, capabilities, and doctrine to be better prepared for 21st century challenges. Interoperability is critical to the alliance's capacity to meet tomorrow's challenges.
- There is a minor role for NATO in the Pacific, but it is likely to be limited to training and exercises. The West should view the alliance's niche role as part of a whole range of regional engagement through multilateral institutions. The transatlantic community needs a more effective mechanism that speaks to all of that.

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Kathleen H. Hicks is the Henry A. Kissinger Chair, the director of the International Security Program, and a senior vice president at CSIS. Dr. Hicks joined CSIS from the Department of Defense, where she served as principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy and deputy under secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and forces. As principal deputy under secretary for policy, Dr. Hicks was responsible for advising the under secretary of defense for policy and the secretary of defense on all matters pertaining to the development and execution of U.S. national defense policy and strategy. As deputy under secretary for strategy, plans, and forces, she led the development of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and oversaw the strategic guidance development, review, and assessment for military contingency plans and plans for the day-to-day military activities of combatant commanders. Prior to her service at the Department of Defense, Dr. Hicks was a senior fellow at CSIS, where she directed projects related to the future of U.S. defense policy and forces. She also codirected the CSIS Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance; led strategy, planning, and process assessments for the Project on National Security Reform; and assessed the national security community's role in improving global health. From 1993 to August 2006, Dr. Hicks held a variety of career civil service positions within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, beginning as a presidential management intern and rising to the Senior Executive Service. Dr. Hicks holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a master's degree from the University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs, and an A.B. magna cum laude from Mount Holyoke College.

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