

Select Upcoming Events

PONI BREAKFAST WITH GREG WEAVER

Tuesday, February 25, 2014

9:00 a.m.–10:30 a.m.

CSIS, 1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW

MILITARY STRATEGY FORUM: PRESENCE MATTERS

Featuring Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus

Friday, February 28, 2014

10:00 a.m.–11:00 a.m.

CSIS, 1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW

Select Recent Events

JOINT THINK TANK EVENT: ALTERNATIVES TO THE QDR AND FY15 DEFENSE BUDGET

Featured presentations by experts
from four prominent think tanks on
alternatives to the QDR and DoD budget.

MILITARY STRATEGY FORUM: A DISCUSSION ON THE AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

Featured a discussion with Secretary
Deborah Lee James and Lt Gen Stephen
W. Wilson, moderated by Kathleen Hicks.

LEVERAGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFGHANISTAN

Featured a discussion with General John
R. Allen and the report's authors, hosted
by Robert Lamb.

WAR FRONT TO STORE FRONT: AMERICANS REBUILDING TRUST AND HOPE IN NATIONS UNDER FIRE

Featured a discussion with author
Paul Brinkley, moderated by David Berteau.

FROM THE DIRECTOR'S CHAIR

KATHLEEN H. HICKS

@kath_hicks



Almost every day, we see an article or hear a discussion on U.S. security policy toward China. Some of what we hear is alarmist, and some is overly optimistic. Although I have many thoughts on this topic, I want to share the top three touchstones to which I continually return when sorting through the morass of incoming information and analysis.

First, U.S. security strategy and policy toward China need to be much better interwoven horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, the trade, diplomacy, and military tracks need to move together with greater evenness and harmony. Vertically, within the military track, concepts, capabilities, and posture need to be tied better to the stated policy of assuring our allies and deterring aggression in the Pacific. More pointedly, those in the defense sphere who want to wish away the potential for conflict between the United States and China are wrong to do so. I suspect they are motivated in part by the seeming inconceivability of such a great power conflict but also by the cost-saving incentive to avoid countering the most difficult aspects of Chinese military capability growth. We must *overcome* the cost-imposition problem, not *assume away* our alliance commitments.

Second, war between the United States and China is not inevitable. Even to this realist-trained political scientist, there is no a priori reason to think that the Chinese believe it to be in their self-interest to upend the existing international system and replace it with an alternative model. The U.S.-built system provides value to the Chinese, from America's policing of the Persian Gulf, which protects Chinese energy supplies, to its promotion of global trade. We should remind them of that.

This relates directly to my third and most important touchstone: being effective at foreign policy matters. This is not about being liked; this is about being persuasive. The United States may be experiencing a hollowing out of its unipolar power, but nowhere in the world are its traditional strengths more valuable than in the Pacific. Clear and credible demonstrations of U.S. interest will generally be more helpful than empty admonitions. If we fail to shape East Asia's understanding of our interests, then small incident by small incident, our credibility and power will erode. ■

MANAGING TURKEY TIES IN TOUGH TIMES

SAMUEL J. BRANNEN

@RealSamBrannen



Only a few years ago, Turkey was viewed as a model for newly free nations in the Middle East and North Africa to move beyond the turmoil of the Arab Spring to a democratic and prosperous future. But over the past year, democracy within Turkey has collapsed at an alarming rate. Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sought to eliminate all checks on his power, attacked freedom of assembly and speech (including a new Internet law that would make Russian president Vladimir Putin envious), and sought to reduce the press to an agitprop echo chamber. In recent months a major corruption scandal linked to the top echelons of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) broke, leading to the sacking of key ministers and a systematic counterattack on the judiciary and police carrying out the investigation. With no viable political opposition, the AKP and Erdogan are likely to remain in power until at least the next national elections scheduled for 2015.

As it turns increasingly inward, Turkey's foreign policy has become reflexive, emotional, and often at odds with its own long-term interests. The most egregious examples have included support for extremist opposition groups in Syria and Turkey's selection last fall of a U.S.-sanctioned Chinese defense company in the competition for a new integrated air and missile defense system.

And yet, Turkey remains intimately linked to key strategic matters in the year ahead for the United States, from addressing the horror in Syria to charting a course for NATO at the September summit in Wales. Washington can neither ignore Ankara's break with shared values nor turn its back on Turkey's continued importance in the region.

Erdogan respects strength. Washington has struggled to deliver a consistent, hard message to Ankara. Contrary to conventional thinking and the approach taken over past months, the surest way to lose Turkey is to remain silent regarding its internal politics. President Obama, Secretary of State Kerry, and other senior U.S. officials must be very clear in coming months regarding their deep concern with Turkey's direction and recent policy choices. There will be fallout, but also the chance for real conversation between allies. Or it will become even clearer to the Turkish electorate that the time has come for Erdogan to go. ■

Multimedia



WATCH Kathleen Hicks and Heather Conley moderate a bipartisan discussion with Senators John McCain and Chris Murphy on the challenges that lie ahead for the transatlantic security relationship.



WATCH Stephanie Sanok Kostro moderate an interagency panel discussion on export control reform. This event, hosted by the CSIS Strategic Technologies Program, also featured a keynote speech by White House Adviser Caroline Atkinson.

LISTEN to Rob Wise interview Stewart Verdery, founding partner at the Monument Policy Group, on the homeland security appropriations bill as part of the Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program's latest podcast.

MOVING FROM SQUABBLING TO DEBATE: THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE FY15 BUDGET REQUEST

RYAN A. CROTTY
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On March 4, President Obama will submit his budget request for fiscal year 2015 to Congress. For the first time since 2010, significant policy issues such as military compensation, the active/reserve component mix, and ground forces sizing have a chance to be the focus of the debate rather than the arcane budgetary issues, like the debt ceiling, sequestration, furloughs, and government shutdown that have dominated the discussion for the last three years.

And this is a crucial time to have these policy debates. Since the enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), defense analysts have focused on this FY15 budget and associated Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) as the best hope for building a roadmap to stability. As the budget request to Congress is concurrent with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and nearly so with the National Security Strategy, it presents a singular opportunity to articulate an alignment of strategy and resources centered on an executable defense program for manpower, force structure, equipment, and costs for the next five years.

Unfortunately, the fragile peace brokered in last December's budget agreement can still be derailed. The requests coming out of both the House Armed Services Committee and the administration for unfunded priorities lists from the services and the combatant commanders are one likely source of such derailment. And while all the signs point to a FY15 request that complies with the Bipartisan Budget Act, there are no guarantees that the rest of the FYDP (2016–2019) will comply with the current law baseline set by the BCA. Without an FYDP consistent with these levels, the plans for strategy and resources will again be misaligned, obfuscating the real trade-offs that need to be addressed in the defense budget and setting up for another three years of uncertain and unpredictable defense plans. ■

REALITY CHECK: SHAPING AN EFFECTIVE, AFFORDABLE MILITARY FOR 2021

ANGELA WEAVER
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As it finalizes its FY2015 budget request, the Department of Defense (DoD) is focused on cutting spending, as mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011, and continuing to build a military capable of executing the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and ensuring national security. Though the budget deal of October 2013 provides modest relief (about

In the News

“To cut this much money, you have to do a lot of things that are dumb.”

—David Berteau on how damaging the deep cuts from sequestration could be, as quoted in *SEAPOWER Magazine*

“Like many exiled leaders, his influence has grown while he was away.”

—Sam Brannen to *Agence France-Presse* on Fethullah Gulen's enduring influence in Turkish politics despite his self-imposed exile in the United States

“The Defense Department's one-size-fits-all budget cut appears to draw on erroneous assumptions to resourcing that have plagued the military for several years.”

—Robert Ogden in a *Defense One* op-ed on Secretary of Defense Hagel implementing an across-the-board 20 percent budget cut at all military staff headquarters commands.

Congressional Testimony

READ Sharon Squassoni's testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 30, 2014, “Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreements: Enhancing Our Nonproliferation Standards”

\$30 billion less in defense cuts in FY14 and FY25), the Budget Control Act will still result in a 21 percent reduction in the defense budget topline through 2021. In addition, internal cost growth (i.e., personnel pay and benefits; acquisition; operations and management) is reducing defense dollar purchasing power by 18 percent over the same time frame, making what is a 20 percent reduction feel like a 40 percent reduction. Budgetary pressure this severe should produce defense reform and may require adjusting the strategy.

The CSIS Defense and National Security Group's Affordable Military Working Group has worked over the past year to analyze this challenge and inform those making tough decisions on what a 2021 affordable military might look like and what capabilities are needed in order to meet the strategic challenges of the future.

The 2021 affordable military will look drastically different than today's, however some of its priorities should remain the same. Maintaining pre-drawdown standards of readiness and largely retaining the intent of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance would give the force the ability to sustain critical U.S. competencies. However, it must also be able to adapt to the 2021 security environment and evolve with changes in the nature of warfare (e.g., in cyberspace and space).

The work done by the Affordable Military Working Group has resulted in the profile of a 2021 affordable military that meets the requirements above. In addition, the CSIS study team cut the 2021 budget by 5 percent, to create a wedge that a future secretary of defense can use to explore several strategic refinements, all of which reflect challenges the United States will face in coming decades. Budget realities force hard choices. Though it may be politically and bureaucratically attractive to "spread the pain" by making across-the-board cuts to the defense budget, doing so creates the wrong military for 2021. Moving forward, DoD must start making these hard choices, lest the United States be unprepared for even our basic security requirements. ■

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Please contact Mr. T.J. Cipoletti, Research Associate, ISP, at TCIPOLETTI@CSIS.ORG with any comments, suggestions, or questions about FYSA content or ongoing ISP activities.

Recent Publications

READ *South Asia Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns: A Framework for U.S. Policy and Strategy in South Asia, 2014–2026*, by Robert Lamb, Sadika Hameed, and Kathryn Mixon, for an analysis of U.S. policy priorities, contingencies, and regional dynamics in South Asia.

READ "CSIS European Trilateral Track II Nuclear Dialogue: 2013 Consensus Statement," by Clark Murdock and Franklin Miller, for an overview of this group's collective thoughts on NATO and the elimination of nuclear weapons, the NPT regime, red lines, ultimatums and other forms of coercive diplomacy, and multidimensional deterrence.

READ "Is Revised COIN Manual Backed by Political Will?," a CSIS Commentary by Robert Lamb and Brooke Shawn on the U.S. military's recent publication of a long-awaited revision to its counterinsurgency manual.

CSIS Critical Questions

READ "French Counterterrorism in the Sahel: Implications for U.S. Policy," by Stephanie Sanok Kostro and Meredith Boyle.

READ "2014 Olympics Terror Threat: The Hunt for Black Widows," by Stephanie Sanok Kostro and Garrett Riba.

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