

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE END OF 2012

THE UNCERTAIN COURSE OF THE WAR AND TRANSITION

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History has made it all too clear that there is no easy way to assess progress in counterinsurgency, or to distinguish victory from defeat until the outcome of a conflict is final. Time and again, “defeated” insurgent movements have emerged as the victors in spite of repeated tactical defeats. The Chinese Communist victory over the Kuomintang, the Cuban revolution, the Vietnam War, and Nepal are all cases in point. Insurgencies do not have to defeat government forces in the field; they have to defeat the regime at the political and military level.

Tactical Encounters Do Not Measure Overall Progress or Success

This makes it difficult to judge the level of progress using any quantitative indicators or metrics. The insurgents can lose virtually every formal battle or tactical encounter and still win at the end of a struggle and emerge as the political victors. They do not have to fight tactical wars or conventional wars; they can fight battles of political attrition – often winning against unpopular and incompetent regimes.

In some cases, the insurgents have to make the transition to becoming regular forces and defeat the regime’s forces in tactical combat. This, however, is only one route to victory. They can win if the regime loses sufficient popular support, if it fails to govern properly and control space – particularly in heavily populated areas. They can win if major factions desert the regime without joining the insurgents, if the government cannot afford to sustain the conflict, or if it loses a critical source of outside support.

The test of victory or relative progress is rarely, therefore, which side wins tactical encounters, or the current outcome clashes with regular regime forces or conventional armies. It is rather the overall ability to take control of populations and areas over time, to defeat the ability of the regime to govern and hold given amount of space, to deny the regime popular support and income, to exploit local tensions and internal divisions within the population, and to deprive the regime of outside funds and military support.

Afghan Government, Allied, and Insurgent Weaknesses and Challenges

This is how the Taliban came to power in the first place, and the basic situation has not changed in the decade since 9/11. NATO/ISAF and ANSF tactical victories are scarcely irrelevant, but they are not substitute for a net assessment of the relative political and military strength of the Taliban and other insurgent networks relative to the Afghan central government. The many weaknesses in the Karzai government, and in the structure of the Afghan government, are critical liabilities that aid the insurgents. So are the insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan and the ambiguous role that Pakistan has played throughout the war.

These liabilities are reinforced by the fact the insurgents know that most US forces and almost all allied forces will be gone by the end of 2014, and that outside popular support for the war and continue aid is now negative in every major ISAF country and dropping. Their prospects of a political-military victory are reinforced by ongoing cuts in US forces

and those of many key allies, by the widespread corruption and abuses of many elements of the Afghan government – including most of the police.

They are reinforced by the weaknesses in the Afghan military forces and an increasing effort to simultaneously expand the ANA and reduce the level of funding, trainers and partners in the field. They are reinforced by an uncoordinated, corrupt, and ineffective outside civil and aid program that has waste much of the money countries have donated, and they will soon be reinforced by significant cuts in the number of aid workers in the field.

This does not mean the Taliban and other insurgents will win. They too have many weaknesses and divisions, and problems in winning public support. A fractured Afghanistan that divides along ethnic, sectarian, and tribal lines may severely weaken the authority of the Central government, but still be able to contain the Taliban and other insurgents. Current Transition plans seem vague, largely conceptual, and based more on hope than experience, but some mixture of a new form of Northern Alliance, the remnants of “Kabulstan,” other Pashtun elements, and outside aid may be able to replace the current regime without ceding power to the insurgents.

Spin, Missing Data, and a Return to the “Follies”

Unfortunately, there are too few data to make a broad net assessment. Far too much of current official reporting is a repetition of the Vietnam follies: unsubstantiated claims of progress, success, and victory that ignore the real problems in the field, and are contradicted by most unclassified media reporting.

As in Vietnam, less and less is being said about the real world prospects to sustain the ANSF and civil development effort, the lack of effective Afghan leadership and governance, and speed with which the US and its allies are likely cut their presence and aid before and after 2014. Far too often, what is officially described as a Transition Strategy has become a cover for an exit strategy: The Afghan equivalent of P.T. Barnum’s famous sign, “This way to the egress,” which used to keep crowds moving through exhibits.

The US had not announced its future troop levels and Transition plans as of the end of December 2012 – with two years to go before most Transition efforts are to be completed. Allied troop levels continued to drop with limited warning. Key agencies charged with economic and aid planning like UNAMA, USAID and the State Department remained unable to issue any meaningful or trustworthy reporting on either the impact of the current aid program or future plans.

The World Bank – which had done some substantive planning before the Tokyo Conference in the spring of 2012—never updated its estimates which had ignored key factors like the effectiveness of aid, waste, corruption, the role of narcotics in the Afghan economy, capital flight, welfare and relief costs, worst case assumptions, major uncertainties in the data, and the probable impact of continuing power struggles and conflict – omissions which cast every aspect of its work into doubt.

As a result, the December 2012 semi-annual report to the US Congress by the Department of Defense—the “1230 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” – said little more about that future of future Transition than repeating the

largely vacuous content of the press releases issued during two major international conferences in the spring and summer of 2012.

On July 8, 2012, representatives from the Afghan government, international community, and civil society met in Tokyo to discuss the future development of Afghanistan. The Tokyo Conference was held to define the international community's commitment to a Transformation Decade and for the government of Afghanistan to establish a clear reform plan. Participants issued a communiqué announcing the intent of the international community to provide \$16B for Afghanistan's development through 2015 and included a Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) setting specific, measurable reform goals to improve Afghan governance and development performance. The United States pledged to request from Congress assistance levels at or near the levels of the last decade. Over the long term, Afghanistan and the international community pledged to increase the country's self-reliance and gradually reduce assistance levels. (p. 104)

The Tokyo MAF established the mutual commitments and responsibilities for both the Afghan government and the international community (IC) to help sustain Afghanistan's development gains of the last decade, improve the effectiveness of international assistance, steadily reduce Afghanistan's reliance on international aid, and improve governance to maintain stability. Afghanistan's performance in the five following major areas will be monitored: a) Representational Democracy and Equitable Elections; b) Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights; c) Integrity of Public Finance and Commercial Banking; d) Government Revenues, Budget Execution and Sub-National Governance; and e) Inclusive and Sustained Growth and Development. For its part, the international community committed to sustain financial support for Afghanistan's economic development through the Transformation Decade, and reaffirmed its Kabul Conference Commitments to align 80 percent of aid with NPPs and channel 50 percent of 105 aid through the Afghan national budget.³² In addition, the international community agreed to work with the government of Afghanistan to improve the mechanisms for assistance delivery to better align with international principles of effective development. (p. 104)

Later in July, the Afghan government prepared a draft Tokyo Framework implementation plan to present to the international community. The paper was a positive step towards establishing the themes, goals, indicators, milestones, and responsible agencies necessary for implementing the commitments of the Tokyo Framework. After receiving input from international donors, the government of Afghanistan approved the implementation plan in late September and plans to present the final process, including specific milestones for each framework goal, at the October meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. (p. 104)

The participants agreed to follow-up meetings, which will take place at the ministerial level every two years and at the senior official level in alternate years. The level of progress will be monitored at more frequent intervals by the Afghan-UN-led Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). The first ministerial review of Tokyo Commitments will take place in London in 2014. (p. 104)

The United States, as well as NTM-A, continues to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage Allies and partners to continue providing assistance for the sustainment of the ANSF. At the May 2012 Chicago NATO Summit, NATO and ISAF Partner Nations made a political commitment to provide funding for ANSF sustainment after ISAF's mandate ends in 2014. An enduring ANSF, as envisaged by the international community and the Afghan government, requires an estimated annual budget of approximately \$4.1B. The Afghan government has agreed to provide roughly \$500 million annually of the total cost, progressively increasing its share of financial responsibility for maintaining its security forces over time. Given Afghanistan's current economic and fiscal constraints, the international community pledged to contribute the remaining amount for three years beginning in 2015. (p. 99)

The reporting and data are better, however, in the military domain than in the civil domain. There are several US and ISAF official sources that provide useful declassified metrics and narratives on the course of both the fighting and Afghan Development. In some cases – like “Enemy Initiated Attacks,” they are closer to the “Follies” than they

should be. In others, however, they provide a balancing picture of the military complexity of the fighting and in other they at least hint at the political dimensions of the war.

Analyzing the Security Metrics and Supporting Narratives

The lack of credible reporting on current plans and funding for the development of the Afghan forces, the war-long lack of credible reporting on progress and plans for civil programs and aid, the lack of effective Afghan leadership and ability to win broad public support, and the challenges posed by insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan are each at least as important as reporting on the course of the fighting, and cumulatively far more important.

Unfortunately, the US State Department and UNAMA has never issued a meaningful public report on the course of the war or aid, and USAID's only reporting is little more than self-serving statistical nonsense.

There are more official data available on the military metrics of the war – some supported by useful narratives. These data are analyzed individually in the analysis that follows, and draw on a range of different unclassified official reports by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, NATO/ISAF, and the UN. It focuses on reporting on the course of the conflict – which is only one dimension of the war.

It is important to note that the analysis of security metrics and supporting narratives that follows is necessarily limited by the fact the official data are unclassified, and any effort to tie metrics to supporting narratives has to be in summary form and cannot provide the same perspective as the original documents from which the material is drawn. In general, however, these problem is not driven by any need for security, but rather by political decisions to omit data that are not favorable to the present conduct of the war and focus on data that appear to make a case that it is moving towards success – often in ways that are not analytic valid or credible.

Transition and Forces on Each Side

The first three sets of metrics set the stage. They summarize the current Transition plan to give Afghan forces responsibility for security by the end of 2014, the current size of the NATO/ISAF forces and how they are distributed by command and the size and deployment of the Afghan army at the end of 2012.

It is important to note that no official declassified data exist on the size of the Taliban and other insurgent threats on a national, regional or local level. Claims that insurgent networks have taken serious losses are almost certainly true, but no official effort is made to show the net impact on the opposing force or to assess the impact of combat except for broad propaganda generalizations that the threat is less aggressive or did not achieve its publically stated goals – real or propaganda.

Similarly, no official source now makes any attempt at net assessment. Breakouts of ANSF readiness and capability are not tied to combat performance. No public reporting is now made on progress in providing clear, hold, or build, by critical district. No assessment is now mapped showing quality of governance, policing, or rule of law by district. Virtually all past unclassified reporting that provided transparency on these areas in the past has been deleted from unclassified reporting over the last two years.

Figure 1: OSD Assessment of Transitioning Provinces and Districts (as of May 13, 2012)

Figure 1 summarizes the current Transition plan to give the ANSF responsibility for security, and provides a rough summary of the relative security of given districts. As was the case in Iraq, however, the map shows transfers that do not reflect the presence of hostile elements or insurgent influence and control, and effectively calls for transfers regardless of the real-world level of security that exists on the ground. It grossly understates the risks in such transitions, and exaggerates the current and near term capability of the Afghan government and ANSF to accept such transfers. It is transfer to meet an end-2014 schedule, not transfer according to ANSF and GOIA capability.

Figure 2: ISAF Troop Estimate as of December 3, 2012

Figure 2 provides a critical perspective in understanding the data on combat trends. It shows the force levels after most US and allied withdrawals in 2012, but also shows the zones of responsibility of given national forces. This is a key perspective in understanding the regional data that follow.

It is important to understand, however, that US withdrawals from some 91,000 US troops and 40,313 allied troops in 2012 to some 68,000 US troops, and 36,905 allied in October 2012 have already made it impossible to sustain the US troop presence in the south and to implement the US/ISAF campaign plans in the East and for all critical districts that were issued in 2010 and 2011.¹

Moreover, further serious withdrawals are planned or may occur well before the end of 2014, and plans to cut the number of US positions in Afghanistan from roughly 90 to 4-5 during 2013-2014 not only will steadily cut US capabilities but are almost certain to be matched or exceeded by other ISAF forces.

Figure 3: ISAF Estimate of ANA Forces: December 2012

Figure 3 shows the deployment and unit strength of Afghan Army forces, providing a broad perspective on the relative strength of the ANSF in key areas. A close look at this map shows that many of these ANA forces are not deployed in high risk or high combat areas, and can cover only part of the rest of the country. It is a warning that Transition may affect combat and overall security performance sharply as ISAF forces withdraw regardless of the current readiness ratings of the ANSF.

The Real World Effective Manning of the ANSF is Closer to 210,000 than 352,000

Figure 3 is, however, a far more realistic picture of actual ANSF capability than any total based on *all* Afghan forces including a largely corrupt and incapable police forces with far more limits than the Afghan army. The latest 1230 report (pp. 45-46) notes that,

The ANSF met its goal of recruiting a force of approximately 352,000 Soldiers and Police by October 1, 2012. The current recruited strength of the Army is 195,000. The Police force stands at more than 157,000 recruited. The Army and Police personnel not currently in training or fielded units are recruited and awaiting induction at the training centers. The ANA is scheduled to achieve its surge-level end-strength of 187,000 soldiers inducted by December 2012, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The ANP is expected to reach its

surge-level end-strength of 157,000 personnel inducted by February 2013, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The AAF is expected to reach its goal of 8,000 airmen inducted in December 2014, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2017. As a result of the significant increase in the size of the ANSF, Afghans now constitute more than two-thirds of all those in uniform in Afghanistan.

***The ANA is Unlikely to Be Ready Before 2016 Even with
Substantial Increases in Outside Advisors, Partners, and
Funding***

The 1230 report does identify many areas of progress in the MoD and ANA progress, and provides a summary overview of the statistic involved on p. 95, but such progressive needs to be kept in perspective. There are only two years left to “Transition” and the report also identifies so many areas of continuing challenges that that current transfer plans seem more cosmetic than real and it is unlikely that the ANA will be able to standing it its own before 2016 without more funding and advisory/partnering supporting than it now receives and will then need more outside aid until the insurgency is over than the pledges made during the Chicago Conference could hope to provide:

Despite progress, corruption remains a critical issue, especially in the MoI, Afghan Border Police, and the Afghan Air Force – a condition that threatens to undermine public perception of the security ministries and ANSF as capable and legitimate security providers for Afghanistan. (pp. 46-47)

The Afghan Parliament’s vote of “no confidence” in the MoI and MoD ministers in mid-August 2012 and President Karzai’s subsequent replacement of the head of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) have further stressed the security ministries, slowing progress in some areas. All ministries, however, exhibited sufficient institutional cohesion to withstand these changes at the minister level. ANSF will continue to face significant challenges to its growth and development; including attrition, leadership deficits (including Non-Commissioned Officer shortages in both the ANA and ANP), and limited capabilities in staff planning, management, logistics, and procurement. (pp. 46-47)

The ANSF also continues to require enabling support from Coalition resources, including air (both transport and close air support), logistics, ISR17, counter-IED, and medical evacuation support. (pp. 46-47).

The MoD and GS have made impressive progress in their ability to plan operations, which is an exceptionally difficult task even in Western defense ministries. However, the ability of these ministries to actually implement operational plans is still developing. The MoD, like many Afghan government institutions, lacks sufficient trained, educated, and professional staff in order to plan and execute operations at a requisite pace. (p. 48)

The MoD is capable of deploying forces, but is deficient in its ability to ensure that those fielded forces are physically issued with equipment that has been provided by NTM-A. In many cases the equipment is in depots and not in the hands of the soldiers who require it. The ability to collect, share, and act on intelligence at the ministerial level is being developed; an assessment of this ability is not possible at this time, however. As a general rule, the various departments within MoD and the GS function well internally (although some departments, such as Counter-IED operations, continue to face challenges); however, their interaction and coordination with other departments requires improvement. Reflective of a problem common to many ministries of defense, internal stovepiping of information and a lack of staff interaction between departments hampers the maturing of the MoD and GS. (p. 48)

Due to the high pace of ANA expansion, the MoD and GS often do not have sufficient time to examine issues and develop coordinated, cross-functional solutions. Structurally, the Afghan military is not a mirror image of Coalition militaries, and the Afghans are, with ISAF support,

developing their own strategies, policies, and procedures to address these issues. Afghan solutions to these issues will not replicate NATO or other Coalition's procedures, and western standards should not be used as benchmarks to gauge Afghan progress. (p. 48)

The total NTM-A (CJSOR 12.0) number of required trainers is 2,612. Although the requirement for ANP instructors by the end of the reporting period is 1,504, the ANP had only 1,126 personnel assigned to instructor positions. The ANP has consistently trained more instructors than required; however, it has been unable to assign enough of them to schools, resulting in a shortfall. (p. 52).

Although attrition levels exceeded the monthly goal of 1.4 percent each month during the reporting period, strong recruiting and retention efforts, which both exceeded their goals every month, contributed to the solid overall end-strength figures. (p.57)

The main causes of attrition and low retention are poor leadership and accountability, separation from family, denial of leave or poor leave management, high operational tempo, and ineffective deterrence against soldiers going absent without leave (AWOL). The Attrition Working Group, made up of ANA, NTM-A, and IJC officials, continues to monitor and assess these trends in order to determine causes and potential solutions to reduce the overall attrition rate. Should the attrition rates consistently fail to meet target levels, there is a risk that training costs will compromise the Afghan government's ability to maintain the 195,000 force. Consistently high attrition may also negatively affect ANSF capabilities, as a high number of soldiers will have to be recruited and trained each year, resulting in a force composed of many inexperienced soldiers. (p. 57)

The MoD continued to improve and increase leadership development by focusing on increasing both the quality and capacity of officer and NCO training programs. During the reporting period 29,180 trainees graduated from Basic Warrior Training (BWT), 423 soldiers from Officer Candidates' School (OCS), and 3,765 from 1 Uniform Course (1U – an NCO direct accessions course). BWT and 1U courses have been operating at or above capacity throughout the entire reporting period. (p. 60)

Nevertheless, growing the required number of NCOs for the ANA remains challenging. The SY 1391 Tashkil authorizes the ANA 64,132 NCO positions. In order to address current NCO shortfall, an additional 7,093 are required. The plan to address the NCO shortfall emphasizes developing an experienced NCO corps by promoting from within the ranks. The shortage of NCOs will gradually be reduced through 2014, as experienced, qualified soldiers are identified, trained, and promoted. (p. 60)

CSTC-A procured and delivered a high percentage of ANA-required equipment to Afghan depots during the reporting period. Of the three main categories of equipment required by the ANA (shoot, move, and communicate), CSTC-A delivered 102 percent of "shoot" equipment, 89 percent of "move" equipment, and 93 percent of "communicate" equipment. The re-opening of the Pakistan GLOC on July 4 enabled increased delivery of equipment to Afghanistan. However, delivering equipment to the national and regional depots does not mean that this equipment has reached personnel in the field. The ANA's main challenge in equipping its units continues to be the delivery of equipment from depots to the units deployed in the field. (p. 62)

Each individual ANA unit is slated to receive equipment that has been released from the national depots, shipped through the ANA Central Movement Agency, and delivered to ANA Regional Logistic Support Commands (RLSC). RLSCs subsequently issue the equipment to the field units. Ensuring that the requisitioned equipment makes it through this chain to the units in the field has been challenging, however. Some RLSCs have warehoused equipment waiting to be issued, while nearby units in the field are forced to operate in an under-equipped state. CSTC-A has limited ability to track equipment once it is delivered to the depots, although the equipment levels of partnered units in the field are tracked under the Commanders Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) system. (p. 62)

Despite this focus, NTM-A anticipates that the ANA will continue to require assistance with logistics and acquisition processes beyond December 2014. The ANA logistics enterprise is in the early stages of development, and capabilities are widely variable, with some hubs functioning at a high level and others struggling to establish a basic level of self-sufficiency. Overall, the various

Afghan logistical processes and organizations, regardless of proficiency level, do not operate as one national logistics system in an integrated and cohesive manner. (p. 62)

...many challenges remain. Although capabilities are demonstrated in some areas (local contracting for food, spare parts, and services), additional focus and attention is needed at a national/strategic level for requirements planning, budget integration, supply planning, quality assurance, contracting, distribution, material accountability, and performance measurements. In some process areas, a minimum core capability set does not yet exist, and in other more advanced processes such as contracting, a viable basic capability has been demonstrated since 2011. The lack of trained logistics staff officers throughout the ANSF is a concern, however, and is likely to become increasingly problematic as ISAF reduces its advisor and mentoring positions. The low numbers of qualified logisticians at both soldier and leader levels continue to be a concern. NTM-A has addressed this challenge through application of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) focused on maintenance, supply, distribution, and mid-level logistics management. In addition to formal, classroom-based training, ANSF logisticians are being trained through On-the-Job Training (OJT). NTM-A anticipates that the number of school-trained logisticians will increase by more than 10 percent (from 9,900 to 11,000) over the next few months, and that training executed by MTTs will produce an additional 2,500 trained logisticians. (p. 62)

Currently, the ANSF is dependent on CSTC-A for all bulk fuel ordering, delivery, and acquisition. The lack of technical capacity to solicit and manage contracts for logistics contributes to this problem. However, CSTC-A intends to conduct a phased transfer of all fuel funding and acquisition responsibilities for the ANA and ANP to the MoD and MoI. By January 2013, MoD will gradually begin taking over management of bulk fuel acquisition and distribution. Transition of these responsibilities will be completed by December 2014. The plan will be developed jointly with the MoD and MoI through an executive-level Fuel Committee and a Fuel Working Group. The executive Fuel Committee will also involve the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of Finance. (p. 62)

The Afghan Air Force's (AAF) long-term development strategy includes the creation of an air force that can support the basic needs of the ANSF and Afghan government by 2017....AAF plans, however, are ambitious, and indicative of the conflict of aspirations, affordability, and necessity within the Afghan government.. (p. 64)

...At present, AAF capacity and capability remains limited, but with a clear path to meet the demand of both the AAF and SMW pilot requirements. AAF development obstacles include inadequate education and literacy levels. The pilot training program is a two-year program, inclusive of English language training. Corruption and infiltration by criminal patronage networks (CPN) also remain significant problems in the AAF. ISAF and the Afghan government continue to work together to combat corruption in the AAF, and as of the end of the reporting period, numerous investigations into allegations of corruption and other illegal activities were ongoing. As in other areas of governance, however, the Afghan government has yet to demonstrate the political will to address corruption and remove and prosecute corrupt officials on a consistent basis. (p. 65)

These problems will be even more critical if ISAF and NTMA-A cannot correct the shortfalls in the numbers of qualified trainers. The 1230 Report states that,

“The United States provides the majority of required advisory teams for the ANSF. For this reporting period, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) established 466 Security Force Assistance Teams (SFAT) requirements, of which 13 percent (60 teams) were not filled as of the end of the reporting period. The SFAT requirement for the next reporting period is 460 SFATs for which SHAPE is currently generating forces. The near-term challenge for NATO is how to enlist the support of troop-contributing nations that have specific and readily usable and transferable skill sets for SFA teams, many of which will operate in the field. The number of requirements will decrease through 2013, as the ANSF improve their ability to conduct independent operations.”

Rushing reductions in outside trainers/advisors is likely to make the shortfall problem worse, not better. (p. 84). The 1230 report on operational effectiveness rating indicate that there still are no ANA units that are effective without advisors, and only 27 out of 267 rated units (10%) that are “independent with advisors” – a category that has no clear definition. (p. 93)

It shows elsewhere that there are 295 units in the field ANA force. A total of 209 have advisors or partners rating the units effectiveness. A total of 58 are autonomous or not assessed and 28 more are not covered. This is a total of 70% of 295 ANA units. (p.87). It then states – drawing heavily on the work of Franz Kafka –that, “OCCs had an increase in top-third units with 22 (71 percent) of the 31 reported/required having achieved this milestone. This is an increase of four (18 percent) from the 18 reported as top-third units in the previous cycle, which shows improvement over a three-month period. Of those 18, (11 percent) were not reported this cycle.

In summary, out of the 267 ANA and OCC required units, 165 (62 percent) are top-third units. This is a six percent increase from the 157 units reported in the top two RDLs in Cycle 14 while 16 (10 percent) of the 157 top-third units from that cycle were not reported in Cycle 15.” (p. 91.)

The 1230 Report also raises serious question about the CUAT reporting on the ability of ANA units to stand on their own – made further questionable by the fact the entire system is being revised to cover operational performance for the first time (p. 85) and needs to be further revised to establish separate rating systems for the ANA and ANP at some unspecified point in the future (p. 85). It also indicates that it will go from having ISAF trainer/advisors rate their own performance to having Afghan rate their own performance – a shift whose consequences are too predictable to require further analysis. (p. 91)

***The ANP is Too Unready, Too Corrupt, and Too Lacking
in Supporting Elements of the Justice System and
Governance to Meet Transition Needs at Any Predictable
Point in the***

The analysis in the December 2012 1230 report---and earlier in the October 30, 2012 report by SIGAR (pp. 76-100) -- strongly suggest that much of the police force lags far behind the Army in overall development, is far more corrupt and tied to power brokers, and lacks the mix of courts, adequate detention facilities, and civil governance necessary to be effective in many areas.² The end result is that much of the police are unlikely to meet a meaningful level of sustainable transition at any predictable point in the future – almost regardless of the outside level of aid and training.

The December 2012 1230 report warns that:

MoI leadership has taken on a more active role in managing end-strength, recruitment, and force balancing. Much like the MoD, the MoI already has an effective training and force generation foundation in place, and as it approaches its fielded force goals, more efforts are being applied to the professionalization of the force. The MoI will also concentrate on areas that needed improvement over the past quarter to include: fielding vehicles/equipment, recruitment, gender issues, transition from private security companies to the Afghan Police Protection Force (APPF), and building a more capable Counter Intelligence force. (pp. 48-49)

A notable milestone during this reporting period was the advancement of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) to CM-2A, marking the advancement of all four Major Deputy Ministerial Security Pillars (AUP, ABP, ANCOP, and AACP) to CM-2B and above. (pp. 48-49)

Shortfalls in logistics, facilities maintenance, office space, and technical capacity to solicit and manage contracts continue to be major impediments toward progress. NTM-A and Coalition police advisors will continue to work in close coordination with their Afghan counterparts to ensure deficiencies are addressed, and that the enablers and ANP units are afforded the resources necessary for continued development and progress toward autonomy. Although the MoI demonstrated measured progress during the reporting period, the ministry faces multiple challenges that risk impeding further development. The MoI faces persistent difficulties in creating and maintaining a sustainable force, particularly in creating a logistics capacity within the ANP pillars. Similar to the MoD, the MoI lacks sufficient trained, educated and professional staff. (pp. 48-49)

Furthermore, the MoI remains significantly susceptible to penetration by Criminal Patronage Networks (CPNs) in the fielded force, far more so than the ANA. Due to the nature of its mission, the dispersed deployment of its forces, and the span of control, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) is particularly vulnerable to potential influence by CPNs. The Afghan government, in partnership with ISAF, has made only limited progress toward removing corrupt officials. ISAF and the Afghan government are accelerating efforts to develop internal accountability systems and sustainable processes through ministerial development and reform initiatives within the MoI that will further enable prevention and detection of internal criminal activity, thereby reducing the influence of CPNs. (p. 50)

...some units, such as the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), are now highly effective, frequently partnering with ISAF forces in successful operations. Progress has been less rapid in other areas, such as the development of ANP logistics capabilities, and the development of the Afghan Border Police. The ANP remain significantly behind their ANA counterparts in developing the capabilities necessary to transfer to full Afghan lead by the end of 2014.... The ANP did not meet its end-strength growth targets this reporting period, finishing 8,548 below the target goal of 155,706. Earlier this year, the ANP were recruiting at a pace to achieve the October objective ahead of schedule. However, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) ceased recruiting during April 2012 to focus on rebalancing ANP assets. The ANP had more low-level recruits than necessary at the time, but was facing a shortage of officers and NCOs. They opted to pause input of new (and mostly low-level) recruits to focus on ensuring that officers and NCOs were serving in actual officer and NCO billets, as well as to effect the reassignment of personnel from over-strength units to under-strength units... (pp. 66-80),

The ANP remains under-equipped as a result of fielding challenges, including battle loss replacement needs and the closure of Pakistani GLOCs earlier this year. Distribution of vehicles... The biggest logistics challenges include the recruitment of specialized policemen and the retention of trained logisticians, while ensuring fielded equipment is operational. Additionally, logistics continues to challenge the operational readiness of the ALP in particular was slowed by the GLOC closures.... Development of an ANP maintenance capability is underway, as poorly maintained equipment affects unit performance in the field. Currently, the ANP is entirely reliant on contracted maintenance provided through an NTM-A-managed contract... (p. 70),

...much like the situation with ANA equipment, problems arise when delivering the equipment from national (and largely ISAF-run) depots to smaller regional depots and to the units themselves. When equipment is fielded to the ANP, either staged by local pickup in Kabul or a convoy, CSTC-A has little oversight over the ultimate destination and unit receiving the equipment. Diversion of equipment from its intended unit as stated on the CSTC-A issuing order has occurred, although the exact rate of equipment diversion remains unknown. Often, far more equipment than necessary is delivered to one unit at the expense of others, giving rise to a situation in which some units are over-equipped while others are under equipped. In addition to diverted equipment, damaged equipment is often not reported by the units. This causes lower "on-hand" numbers at the unit level than what is documented as the quantity fielded. (p. 70)

... As a result of a deliberate decision to place initial focus of force generation on ANP policing units, the development of enablers – in particular logistics capabilities – was delayed, and ANP logistics capabilities are not expected to be self-sufficient until late 2014. NTM-A began to shift its efforts to logistics development in mid-2011, and this is now the main focus of NTM-A. Logistics will remain the main focus area for the training mission throughout 2012 and 2013. NTM-A initiated a detailed planning process to review the current logistics system, and in conjunction with IJC and MoI, to develop a more sustainable system to meet ANP requirements beyond 2014. (p. 71)

ANP logistics nodes at the regional level and below continue to require Coalition assistance in order to effectively provide sustainment. The biggest logistics challenges include the recruitment of specialized policemen and the retention of trained logisticians, while ensuring fielded equipment is operational. Additionally, logistics continues to challenge the operational readiness of the ALP. Each District Chief of Police is authorized three AUP personnel to assist in ALP management and supply; however, the level of support varies from district to district. NTM-A is working with available ALP logisticians to establish better accountability of issued equipment, better coordination of services, and improved knowledge of the logistics system. (p. 71)

Development of an ANP maintenance capability is underway, as poorly maintained equipment affects unit performance in the field. Currently, the ANP is entirely reliant on contracted maintenance provided through an NTM-A-managed contract. NTM-A and maintenance experts from the MoI are focusing on the establishment of ANP mobile response maintenance teams, with recovery capability within the current manning and equipment levels. In order to improve the ANP's maintenance capability and increase the level of confidence across the ANSF, several projects are ongoing. Expanding current NTM-A-provided maintenance training will address the necessary human capital investment to enable a basic maintenance capability within the ANP. NTM-A will pursue improvement in the ANP maintenance program and the use of recovery assets. Furthermore, NTM-A expects to refine sustainment requirements for eight MoI Supply Points (MSPs) and seven Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs). In conjunction with MoI, NTM-A plans to simplify the requirements and requisition process and develop infrastructure and contract management capabilities. (p. 71)

A number of other issues hinder ABP development. Correctly accounting for personnel remains a major issue, especially with “ghost soldiers” (soldiers who are no longer assigned but for whom the unit continues to collect pay). Pay and promotion issues also negatively impact ABP development. The lack of banking facilities in some regions, along with the security situation along routes used for the movement of bulk funds, have prevented personnel from getting paid in a timely manner. ABP training is currently not as extensive as the training most other ANP receive. Training shortfalls include communications, driving, maintenance, counter-IED, computers, and literacy. More NCO training is needed. Many ABP outposts remain static, and rarely conduct border security missions beyond the vicinity of their outposts. (p. 72)

... The AUP made steady progress during this reporting period, although major challenges remain. As part of a deliberate decision made when the AUP was still in the early stages of development, initial focus was on force generation and support to the COIN campaign. As increasing areas of Afghanistan transition to ANSF lead and the ANA is better able to handle the military aspects of the security mission, increased consideration is being given to AUP reform as part of security sector reform. This includes the further professionalization of the AUP to create a police service that can actively deal with criminality and has a sense of integrity, a code of ethics, an ability to engage with the community, and respects the rule of law.... (p. 73)

Currently, roughly 17,552 (20 percent) of the AUP are untrained and approximately 12,800 (15percent) are un-vetted. Full vetting for new AUP recruits occurs when they arrive at their first training center. Many instances have occurred in which Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCoPs) place newly recruited patrolmen directly into local units from the recruiting centers, bypassing the training centers.

One major impediment to AUP development in this area is the low capabilities of the Afghan justice sector. The AUP's capabilities, both geographically and functionally, have far surpassed

those of the Afghan judiciary and justice sector. The AUP have the authorization to hold suspects for up to 72 hours, but beyond that judicial intervention is required. AUP do not act as investigators of crime as police forces do in many Western nations. The Afghan judiciary is in charge of criminal investigations and prosecution. In many areas, AUP personnel may arrest a suspect but are forced to release them after 72 hours due to a lack of support from the justice sector. Increasing the capabilities of the Afghan justice sector and judiciary, as well as the coordination between them and the AUP, will be a priority through 2013.

Rushing reductions of outside trainers/advisors is also likely to be a far more serious problem for the ANP than the ANA. The 1230 report shows elsewhere that there are 609 units in the fielded ANP force. A total of 265 have advisors or partners rating the unit's effectiveness. A total of 143 are autonomous or not assessed and 201 more are not covered. This is a total of 44% of 295 ANA units that are not rated by trainers or advisors. (p. 87).

The 1230 Report again raises serious question about the CUAT and other effectiveness reporting on the ability of ANP units to stand on their own. The report describes the readiness of police units as follows:

The ABP had 22 units (43 percent of the total required) reported as "Independent with Advisors" or "Effective with Advisors", which is down 29 percent from the 31 reported in Cycle 14. Of the 31 reported in the top two categories in Cycle 14, seven (23 percent) were not reported in Cycle 15. The ANCOP did have a measured increase in units reported as having achieved "Independent with Advisors" or "Effective with Advisors" status. Sixteen units reported as having achieved top-third status, which is an increase of 23 percent from the 13 reported in Cycle 14. Of the 13 reported in the previous cycle, four (31 percent) did not report in Cycle 15. There has been a significant decrease in reporting on police units, and for this reason it has been difficult to make an accurate assessment of progress. Of the 408 required police units, 179 (44 percent) have achieved ratings of "Independent with Advisors" or "Effective with Advisors" this cycle." (p. 93)

This lack of coverage indicates such ratings have little real meaning and these problems again are even more questionable by the fact the entire CUAT system is being revised to cover operational performance for the first time (p. 85) and needs to be further revised to establish separate rating systems for the ANA and ANP at some unspecified point in the future (p. 85).

Summarizing Combat Trends

The Figures that follow provide a mix of different indicators as to the trends in the fighting, and some indications of the trends in the relative strength of the Taliban and other insurgent elements in the field. It should be stressed, however, that no mix of indicators directed towards the fighting can avoid an emphasis on tactical encounters in a war where the Taliban and insurgents do not have to win at the military level, do not have to engage US and ISAF forces when almost all will be gone at the end of 2014, and can concentrate on winning political influence and control in given areas, undermining the Afghan government in terms of both domestic support and international support, and fight a war of political attrition from de facto sanctuaries in Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan.

Figure 4: OSD Assessment of Security Metrics 2011 – 2012, Year-over-Year change April 1 – September 30

Figure 4 summarizes many of the key trend in combat present in the December 1230 Report. It effectively does not reflect any meaningful overall trend for the year, the shifts between 2011 and 2012 are generally too small to be statistically significant, although the rise in direct fire may be a warning that the Taliban and other insurgents are refocusing their operations away from areas where they know they would lose in tactical encounters with better ISAF forces and are focusing on attacks against less capable ANSF forces.

At the same time, such data are warning that any form of nationwide reporting – that provide metric that do not focus on key areas of insurgent operations – have little real meaning. Such data are only meaningful when tied to an analysis of their tactical impact on the source of the fighting.

Figure 5: OSD Assessment of Monthly Nationwide Security Incidents (April 2009 – September 2012)

Figure 5 provides a more useful metric largely because this is the same metric which should dramatic Coalition progress during the Iraq War. In this case, however, there is no indication of any meaningful form of ISAF progress. The fact that the cycles of security incidents is somewhat lower in 2011 and 2012 than during the peak period of the US surge and direct ISAF tactical engagement with the Taliban and other insurgents does not provide any indication that that ISAF and the ANSF are now winning, and may well simply reflect the fact the insurgents adapted to reduce the number of tactical engagements against superior ISAF forces, moving to other areas, and keeping their forces intact.

Figure 6: OSD Assessment of Monthly Nationwide Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – September 2012) and Figure 7: ISAF Assessment of Monthly Nationwide Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – October 2012)

Figure 6 and **Figure 7** are the focus of a great deal of OSD and ISAF reporting on the war. It is unclear why. They are not meaningless, but scarcely are a more useful indicator than any other indicator presented in **Figure 4**. They required the enemy to attack greatly superior US and allied forces in 2010 through 2012, rather than move away from the key area of US/ISAF operations, focus on weaker ANSF forces or government targets, or focus on intimidating and influencing the Afghan population and waiting out Transition in Afghan and Pakistani sanctuaries.

The attention they get now seems to be a vestige of US and ISAF propaganda efforts that focused on the metric which seemed to provide the greatest level of progress during 2010 and 2011, regardless of its limited value. As **Figure 6** and **Figure 7** show, the end result is not far less favorable to the US and ISAF, but this is not necessarily any more meaningful than the trend between 2010 and 2011.

EIA may be more meaningful if it shows a sharp rise as US and allied troops drop in 2013 and 2014, but the insurgents may well choose to avoid such action as long as US and ISAF airpower and land forces are present in some strength. Waiting out US and ISAF withdrawal, and being very selective in initiating attacks on the ANSF, would probably be a better insurgent strategy.

Figure 8: OSD Assessment of Count of EIAs by number of people living within 1 KM.

Figure 8 makes these points indirectly. It shows a shift in insurgent EIAs away from the heavily populated areas that the US and its allies have done most to defend. The US and ISAF report this as progress, but it is more likely to simply reflect insurgent common sense. The Taliban and other insurgents have no reason to fight where they may lose if they only have to wait.

Figure 9: OSD Assessment of Nationwide Year-Over-Year (YoY) Change for Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – September 2012); Figure 10: ISAF Assessment of Nationwide Year-Over-Year (YoY) Change for Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – October 2012); and Figure 11: Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIA) Monthly Year-Over-Year Change by RC (Jan 08 – Oct 12)

For all the reasons cited earlier, the metrics in **Figure 9**, **Figure 10**, and **Figure 11** are little more than statistical rubbish. The national trends in Figure 9 and Figure 10 may be colorful, but say nothing about the real course of the fighting. The regional breaks out in Figure 11 have meaning put in the context of the fight in given districts and some meaning when a given region has been the center of operations, but are simply a colorful statistical morass lumped together in one chart – particularly because the levels of intensity in conflict in low conflict areas make the trends appear to be in the statistical noise level. These three figures are nothing but hollow public affairs propaganda.

Figure 12: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-South (April 2009-September 2012). And Figure 13: SIGAR: Assessment of Progress in the South: October 2012

Figure 12 and **Figure 13** have more meaning, but would be much more useful if broken down by critical district – as was done in past ISAF campaign plans. If the ISAF metrics in Figure 12 are combined with the narrative in Figure 13 they do to some extent reflect the key focus of the fighting during 2009-2012. They still lump together far too broad an area and do not deal with the political character of the war and the reasons insurgents could have to cut EIAs other than sacrificing force pointlessly against their most effective and temporary opponents.

Figure 14: OSD Assessment of Northern Helmand River Valley Area EIA Location Changes, YoY Change, June– September, 2011 vs 2012 and Figure 15: OSD Assessment of Kandahar EIA Location Changes, YoY Change, June – September, 2011 vs 2012

Figure 14 and **Figure 15** make these points all too clearly. They are taken from the appendix to the December 1230 report, and were provided without any supporting narrative. They do, however, reflect a strong continuing Taliban presence in the areas where the US and UK concentrated most of their combat activity in 2009-2012.

As such, they call the value of any national or regional assessment of EIA trends that is not supported by other metrics and full net assessment of insurgent and Afghan government civil and military capabilities into extremely serious question.

Moreover, the value of such EIA data are made even more question given the later reporting on narcotics activity in **Figure 32** and **Figure 33** that indicate that the Taliban still has major influence in the Helmand area and that the are of cultivation has actually sharply increased.

Figure 16: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Southwest (April 2009– September 2012)

The trends in **Figure 16** might or might not mean something, but since there is no meaningful supporting analysis in the report of the seriousness of the military activity involved, and its impact on either side, the data are essentially meaningless.

Figure 17: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-East (April 2009 -September 2012)

Figure 17 is worse than useless. Combat activity in the East is a key issue, and the east is an area where ISAF has had to cut back significantly on the campaign plans it issued in 2010 and 2011. Providing unsupported trend data ignores a key part of the battlefield and one presenting serious risks during after after Transition in 2014.

It is also questionable wehter OSD and ISAF reporting that does not attempt to provide metrics on the importance of sanctuaries in Eastern Afhanistan and Pakistan is addressing key aspects of the threat and real world capability to transfer security responsibility. The equivlanet would have been post-Tet reporting on Vietnam that ignored the role of North Vietnam, or only reporting on Sunni inusrgents and not Shi'ite insurgents in the Iraq War.

Figure 18: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Capital (April 2009 -September 2012)

Figure 18 is useless statistical noise, disguising considerable insurgent capability to make political gains through token attacks in the capital.

Figure 19: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-North (April 2009-September 2012) versus Figure 20: SIGAR Report on Security in the North, October 2012

The contrasts between **Figure 19** and **Figure 20** show how the EIA data compare with other reporting on the expansion of the insurgent presence in the North. Like **Figures 14** and **Figure 15**, they show just how misleading EIAs can be in measuring insurgent progress or remaining strength in a political-military struggle where the insurgents do not need to win by initiating large numbers of attacks.

Figure 21: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-West (April 2009 -September 2012)

Figure 21 is yet another example of meaningless EIA reporting that only show noise level trends and is not supported by any form of net assessment or analysis of the politico-military tactics of the insurgents.

It also presents the same problem as the reporting on the North in that it does not focus on separatism on an ethnic level, or divisions within the Afghan forces and government. Threat-oriented risk analysis is not a meaningful way to assess progress in counterinsurgency.

Figure 22: OSD Estimate of Monthly IED and Mine Explosions (April 2009 – September 2012) and Figure 23: ISAF Estimate of Monthly IED and Mine Explosions (April 2009 – September 2012)

The supporting data are far too limited to be sure, but **Figure 22** and **Figure 23** provide what is probably a substantially better indication of Taliban and insurgent activity than EIAs. There are serious limits to the quality of reporting on IEDs, particularly IEDs affecting civilians and forward deployed ANSF units without an advisor or partner. The US, its allies, and ANSF units with advisor do, however, keep reasonably accurate records.

It is interesting, therefore, do not show a decline between 2010 and 2011, but rather show an increase in 2011 and then show a slight decline during 2012. This mix of trends seems to reflect the fact insurgent changed tactics in 2011 to avoid direct clashes with reinforced US troops but began to focus on expanding their influence and control in other areas during 2011.

One would expect insurgents to increase methods of attack that did not force serious losses in engaging US troops in 2011, but a shift to more political forms of warfare in 2012.

Figure 24: OSD Assessment of Caches Found (April 2009 – September 2012)

Figure 24 may reflect a similar insurgent learning curve of a different kind. Again, insufficient data are available to put the trends in context, but it seems logical that insurgents learned not to create large fixed caches in 2010-2011, and this accounts for at least some of the decline in 2011-2012.

Figure 25: Monthly Civilian Deaths and Injuries Caused by Insurgents and ISAF (April 2009 – September 2012) and Figure 26: ISAF Estimate of Monthly Civilian Deaths and Injuries Caused by Insurgents and ISAF (April 2009 – September 2012)

Figure 25 and **Figure 26** are again interesting in that they do not show any of the surge in peaks and valleys between 2009 and 2010, and decline between 2010 and 2011. The peak instead occurred early in 2009, when Taliban and insurgent forces were most active in the field.

There are, however, key problems with such data. They may provide a rough measure of the human and collateral damage cost of the war, but it is highly questionable that anyone has a credible data base on civilian injuries, given the level of combat in areas where no reliable observer or source of data is present. The end result is to understate insurgent activity and casualty effects.

These casualty data also again ignore the political-military nature of the insurgencies. Movements like the Taliban rely heavily on violent intimidation, kidnappings, and extortion. Some of the measures are counted in the NCTC database on terrorism, but not in US or ISAF estimates, and there are no breakouts by region and district. This makes it impossible to track key levels of insurgent activity. The same is true of the lack of survey data on regional attitudes towards the insurgents vs. the government, and displacement of populations. Such metrics are tied to tactical warfighting, not counterinsurgency.

Figure 27: OSD Assessment of Insider Attacks, and Figure 28: SIGAR Assessment of Insider Attacks on ISAF Personnel: October 2012

Figure 27 and **Figure 28** provide a key measure of insurgent activity and one with a major political impact on US and allied willingness to stay in Afghanistan. They are ALSO an example of the kind of metric and supporting analysis that reflects a key new trend in the fighting. They also show that very low levels of casualties can have a massive political impact and be a critical form of “strategic communications.”

Political Versus Tactical Warfighting Impact

First, green on blue killings need to be put in perspective. On the one hand, the numbers involved are still limited and seem to have only totally 44 incidents by the end of 2012..Green on blue deaths in August 2012 – when they got the most media and political

attention so far in the course of the war -- were only 15 out of 53, or 28% of the total. They also occurred when the trend in total Coalition deaths is dropping: The total of 53 casualties for August 2012 was ten the highest in 2012 -- but was typical of the past patterns during the campaign season and compares with 82 in 2011 and 79 in 2010.

The Long War Journal provides the following estimate of green on blue attacks during 2008-2012

	Attacks Per Year	Deaths		Wounded	
		Number	% of Total	Number	% of Total
2012	43	61	15%	81	-
2011	16	35	6%	34	-
2010	5	16	2%	1	-
2009	5	12	2%	11-	-
2008	2	2	-1%	3	-

Adapted from the *Long War Journal*, longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php#data. Cutoff date is December 24, 2012.

On the other hand, their cumulative political impact has very significant. The Taliban and insurgents showed they were fighting a political war to influence and dominate the Afghan people and to drive out the US, other ISAF forces, and aid efforts. The insurgents knew that that the actual numbers involved are not the issue; what counts is their political impact.

And a wide variety of media reporting showed they were having an effect in influencing media coverage of the war, the US Congress the American public, and the attitudes of other ISAF and donor countries. Like other Taliban and insurgent high profile attacks on Afghan officials, major targets in Kabul, and the pervasive insurgent effort to infiltrate and influence the Afghan countryside and cities, they are having a major impact on overall support for the war in what is a battle of political attrition.

They led President Karzai to first make absurd claims that “foreign intelligence” officers are responsible – creating a new and this time pointless set of tensions with Pakistan. And then, he talked about investigating the causes as if he had not initially blamed them on foreign intelligence agents. They also led to unconfirmed media reports that much of the existing vetting system had previously been ignored in the rush to expand Afghan forces.³ They then forced ISAF to temporarily suspend training for 1,000 personnel during the ongoing effort to expand the Afghan Local Police from some 16,300 to 30,000 in the hope more intense vetting methods would reduce the problem.⁴ At the same time, ISA had to deal with the political impact of the fact that some 25,000 Afghan soldiers and more than 4,000 Afghan national policemen remained in training for a total force that was now over 350,000.

ISAF initially reacted to these political impacts by stating that reports of the suspension of recruiting for the 8,000 Commandos and 3,000 ANA Special Operations Forces in the recently inaugurated ANA Special Operations Division were incorrect, and the force continued with their normal operational activity. The vetting status of all Commandos and Special Operations Forces was being checked, but had no impact on current operations.⁵

It stated that the measures being applied to ANA special forces and ALP personnel reflected the intensive effort to recheck the vetting status of the some 350,000 ANSF personnel as part of a number of actions recently instituted to reinforce existing precautions related to the insider threat. It stated that much of this re-vetting task had already been completed and numbers of individuals, where vetting status has been found to be in doubt, have been suspended pending further investigation, or removed from the force.⁶

ISAF further stated that,⁷

The vetting status of all Commandos and Special Operations Forces is also being checked, but this again is having no impact on current operations. The measures being applied to ANA special forces and ALP personnel reflects the intensive effort to recheck the vetting status of the some 350,000 ANSF personnel as part of a number of actions recently instituted to reinforce existing precautions related to the insider threat. Much of this re-vetting task has already been completed and numbers of individuals, where vetting status has been found to be in doubt, have been suspended pending further investigation, or removed from the force.

The synergy between the Afghan government and military and the Coalition has already resulted in several concrete measures to defeat the insider threat. Among the new initiatives being implemented are improvements to the vetting process for new recruits; increasing the number of counterintelligence teams; introduction of interview procedures for ANA soldiers returning from leave; a new warning and reporting system for insider threats; enhanced intelligence exchange between the ANSF and ISAF; establishment of an anonymous reporting system; improved training for counter-intelligence agents; establishment of a joint investigation commission when insider threats occur; and enhanced cultural training to include visits to Coalition home training centers by Afghan Cultural and Religious Affairs advisers, which were authorized by President Karzai this morning.

It is unclear how such ISAF actions will affect green on blue attacks in the future, and how such efforts and political impact of future attacks will play out over time, but it is clear that they already have had a major impact on media reporting and public perceptions in ISAFG countries. They are also likely to make it more tempting for Afghans to distance themselves from the Afghan government, and they breed distrusts between Afghans and US/ISAF trainers and forces. They make it more tempting for ISAF and donor countries to rush for the exits.

***Green on Blue Attacks as a “Symptom” of the Much
Broader Political Character of the War***

What is even more important is the emergence of green on blue attacks as a major issue illustrates the degree to which the fact that both the current patterns in the fighting, and the overall Transition effort have become part of a much broader political war of attrition, and of the much broader and grimmer patterns of the war.

ISAF and the ANSF may still be winning tactically, but when green on blue and other politically-oriented strikes on both foreign and Afghan targets are considered along with the overall actions of insurgents and the wide range of weaknesses in the overall Afghan government and ANSF Transition efforts, it is the insurgents that may have the overall momentum in the war.

Simply focusing on green on blue killings does not even put the problems in this one aspect of the war in context. A detailed examination of unclassified casualty reporting

shows that official US and ISAF statistics and media coverage of such incidents has been very limited, and makes it impossible to put the overall problems in green on blue tensions and Transition in perspective.

For example, ISAF makes a major and undefined distinction between killings due to the Taliban/infiltration and killings due to personal disputes, and other reasons. So far, however, the US and ISAF don't seem to be able to agree on how to define the causes of green on blue killings, or provide meaningful data on the overall nature of the problem -- a fact largely ignored by what might politely be described as an analytically illiterate media.

ISAF and the US can't decide on whether the Taliban and other insurgents account for 10% or 25% of the direct green on blue direct kills. Worse, they provide no data on the overall problem that must include a count of green on blue -- and blue on green -- attempts, woundings, and incidents.

There is no real reporting on green on green attacks, where there are no numbers at all. There are no data on the background of attackers to show how other attackers many have been influenced by extremist propaganda, and how many have encouraged by insurgents on a target of opportunity basis or inserted as infiltrators. There has been no supporting public analyses of insurgent tactics to show when they began to focus on such attacks.

Moreover, there has been little official effort to explain that there are good reasons for non-insurgent backed green on blue incidents to increase as well. The entire ANSF force building effort is under stress and forced to recruit lower quality personnel, men with less known backgrounds, men motivated only by the desire for employment and money and men from areas where their culture is more traditional and less adaptable to encounters with US and ISAF personnel.

Rushing to create a build-up in the ANSF with less and less qualified recruits who are put under immediate pressure does create tensions, while constant US and ISAF withdrawals, rotations of personnel and trainers, base closings and realignments, efforts to transfer areas to inexperienced Afghan forces, problems in provide ANSF forces with adequate leave and recovery time, interact other sources of turbulence in ANSF manpower.

Yet, the numbers of recent attacks remains small relative to the other patterns of casualties and violence in the war and it unclear how much of a surge in such attacks there has really been. One doesn't have to be much of a mathematician to see there has been a limited correlation between recent increases in force size and the number of killings per se. Similar increases did not occur in the past when more rapid increases, higher turnover, and less leave and recovery time affected past build-up periods in the ANSF.

It also is hard to make any meaningful comparisons with Vietnam and Iraq. There were some comparable problems, but green on blue attacks were then treated largely as infiltrators, relations between US and host country forces were usually better since the cultural differences were smaller and the recruiting base was better educated, Vietnam and already had forces in being, and both ARVN and Iraqi officers and NCOs were more experienced.

Better vetting may help, and delays in further recruiting of Afghan special forces and local police but there are few reliable records for such vetting, far too much depends on tribal and local leaders who care more about their power base, polygraphs are a nightmare of unreliability, infiltrators can be better trained and given better covers, and vetting will not affect people who become hostile after they enter the force.

Tighter vetting and security measures also breed distrust and separation of forces and cause problems on their own. They will present growing problems as trainers and partners have to be more deeply involved with the ANSF and ISAF forces decline.

On the one hand, this may mean that green on blue attacks may decline as the ANSF units mature, and as ANSF units shake out problem recruits and malcontents, Similarly, they may decline as the training and partnering role puts the Afghans steadily more in charge and reduces US and ISAF “visibility” and the sources of clashes between Afghans and outside forces.

On the other hand – if the insurgents organize properly and step up infiltration and efforts to convert men already in the ANSF, the end result could be a lethal combination new pressures as more and more troops withdraw, ANSF and Afghan faith in US and allied staying power declines, and trainers and mentors become more exposed and isolated.

The Broader Strategic Context and the Need for Major Changes in Strategy and the Conduct of the War

The most important message of green on blue attacks, however, is there is a critical need for a much broader perspective and examination of what may well be ISAF tactical victories at the cost of creeping strategic defeat as Transition proceeds.

In the narrow case of green on blue tensions and attacks, vetting and better partnering measures may help to some as yet unknown degree if handled well, but they are not answer to the political impact of such attacks or the overall pattern of insurgent political warfare. Dealing with the mix of insurgent political attacks requires educating political leaders, media, and the public that enemies will exploit every vulnerability in asymmetric warfare and acceptance of the price in terms of casualties is part of the price of continuing the struggle.

This will be an ongoing duel – along with every other aspect of a “war of Transition” that will be fought on political far more than tactical terms. It will also be a duel where the broader failures in the current US approach to both the military and civil aspects of Transition – coupled to shifts in the overall struggle against a global terrorist threat, inability to push Pakistan to halt support for Afghan insurgents and giving them sanctuary, and the gross weakness in Afghan politics and governance add to the risk of defeat.

Figure 30: OSD Assessment of Reintegree Number and Figure 31: SIGAR Assessment of Reintegree Numbers

Figure 30 and Figure 31 report on another potentially important trend in the war: the extent to which insurgents may be leaving the Taliban and other insurgent movements. The problem is that no attempt is made to show the relative scale of reintegrees versus the

size of the forces they leave and new recruitment There is no way to know how many are simply waiting out Transition and the end of 2014, later go back to the insurgencies, or are active in supporting the political actions of the insurgency.

The numbers involved seem small, but there is no meaningful narrative or set of definitions, or way to put them in perspective.

Figure 32: UN Estimate of Opium Impact on Afghan Economy and Figure 33: No Reduction in Opium Growing in the South, West, and East

As noted earlier, **Figure 32** and **Figure 34** cast much of the analysis of ISAF's progress in the South in doubt, as do growing press reports of a return to government extortion and corruption in the Helmand River area. Cultivation cannot go up by 18%, largely in the south and by 19% in Helmand, if the south is more secure – these figures ignore the growing linkage between opium and Cannabis growing reflected in **Figure 35**.

Eradication and the counter narcotics effort has become an almost certain failure if there are only two more years before the program ceases to have outside support, and if cultivation is growing by 18% nationally in spite of the eradication of 3,810 acres (a 154% annual rise), and the main reasons for declines in actual output are a lack of rainfall and disease.

The estimates of the percent of GDP coming from Opium and Cannabis in Figures 32-35 also seems to be based of farm gate prices, rather than the real impact on the domestic economy include corruption and criminal networks. This is particularly important, because the Taliban and insurgents are much more like to earn the afghan equivalent of export – or “street” prices – than the far lower farm gate prices.

There is a tendency to decouple military analysis from economic analysis and often conventional Western macroeconomic data from the real world human problems and structure of the Afghan economy. This focus makes no sense in a country the UN estimated got some 40% of its GDP from narcotics before the fall of the Taliban.

Work by Stephen A. Zyck in the report on Counternarcotics in Afghanistan for August 2012 illustrates just how important economic force narcotics have been, is, and can be in the post-Transition Afghan economy. He notes that,⁸

Data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank shows that the value of Afghan opium equaled nearly half of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004. Subsequent economic growth diluted the significance of poppies, with opium comprising 15% of Afghanistan's GDP in 2011...poppies become proportionally less important to the Afghan economy in recent years. However, this trend primarily reflects fluctuations in the value of poppies and, more significantly, the increase in Afghanistan's licit GDP, which grew from a modest USD 2.46 billion in 2001 to USD 5.7 billion in 2004 and USD 17.90 billion in 2011. Despite the fact that 38% more opium was produced in Afghanistan in 2011 than in 2004...the proportional economic significance of the poppy crop was far smaller.

Conclusions

It is somewhat ironic that a large body of literature has grown up in the development field calling for more transparency in the reporting by the governments in less developed countries. No one expects governments or military in wartime to be totally transparent or to give up secrets that might help the enemy. One does expect that they provide as much transparency as possible and that they do so with credibility and integrity. Official reporting on the war in Afghanistan does not meet any of these three tests.

Moreover there has been a steady shrinking in the metrics and analysis provided on the full range of civil-military progress in the war over the last two years as the pressure for a rapid Transition has risen. The end result has – as is noted in the introduction – been a return to the “good news” emphasis of the “follies” in Vietnam, support – as the previous analysis has shown – by Vietnam quality metrics and making EIAs the modern equivalent of the body count.

This might make a kind of sense if it at least served the purposes of the US and allied governments, and the people of Afghanistan. It clearly does not. Public opinion is becoming steadily less supportive of the war, and at least part of this has to come from the lack of credible official reporting on civil and military progress in the war, and from the failure to provide a convincing path towards some form of truly successful Transition by even “Afghan good enough” standards.


Some of this is the inevitable tendency of governments to sell their current policies and the resulting shift towards propaganda. At least a large part of the problems outlined in this analysis, however, come from focusing on tactical military measures in a political military war. The end result is similar to bringing a word processor and PowerPoint presentations to a knife fight. No amount of inappropriately optimistic reporting of metrics and narrative can actually win a counterinsurgency campaign. No focus on the past can sell the future.

The US government and military also need to think carefully about this approach to limited war. There is no reason to continue a limited war with limited objectives on the basis of sunk cost and without regard to future expenditures and cost benefits. The US has far too many competing strategic objectives and far too many resource limitations. Given these constraints, there is even less rationale in missing the chance of success by distorting the nature of the analysis of the war and losing public trust.

List of Figures

Figure 1: OSD Assessment of Transitioning Provinces and Districts (as of May 13, 2012).....	26
Figure 3: ISAF Estimate of ANA Forces: December 2012	28
Figure 4: OSD Assessment of Security Metrics 2011 – 2012, Year-over-Year change April 1 – September 30.....	29
Figure 5: OSD Assessment of Monthly Nationwide Security Incidents (April 2009 – September 2012).....	30
Figure 6: OSD Assessment of Monthly Nationwide Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – September 2012).....	31
Figure 7: ISAF Assessment of Monthly Nationwide Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – October 2012)	32
Figure 8: OSD Assessment of Count of EIAs by number of people living within 1 KM.....	33
Figure 9: OSD Assessment of Nationwide Year-Over-Year (YoY) Change for Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – September 2012).....	34
Figure 10: ISAF Assessment of Nationwide Year-Over-Year (YoY) Change for Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – October 2012)	35
Figure 11: Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIA) Monthly Year-Over-Year Change by RC (Jan 08 – Oct 12).....	36
Figure 12: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-South (April 2009 -September 2012)	37
Figure 13: SIGAR: Assessment of Progress in the South: October 2012.....	38
Figure 14: OSD Assessment of Northern Helmand River Valley Area EIA Location Changes, YoY Change, June– September, 2011 vs. 2012	39
Figure 15: OSD Assessment of Kandahar EIA Location Changes, YoY Change, June – September, 2011 vs. 2012.....	40
Figure 16: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Southwest (April 2009– September 2012).....	41
Figure 17: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-East (April 2009 -September 2012)	42
Figure 18: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Capital (April 2009 -September 2012)	43
Figure 19: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-North (April 2009 -September 2012)	44
Figure 20: SIGAR Report on Security in the North, October 2012.....	45
Figure 21: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-West (April 2009 -September 2012)	46
Figure 22: OSD Estimate of Monthly IED and Mine Explosions (April 2009 – September 2012)	47
Figure 23: ISAF Estimate of Monthly IED and Mine Explosions (April 2009 – September 2012).....	48
Figure 24: OSD Assessment of Caches Found (April 2009 – September 2012)	49
Figure 25: Monthly Civilian Deaths and Injuries Caused by Insurgents and ISAF (April 2009 – September 2012).....	50
Figure 26: ISAF Estimate of Monthly Civilian Deaths and Injuries Caused by Insurgents and ISAF (April 2009 – September 2012).....	51
Figure 27: OSD Assessment of Insider Attacks	52
Figure 28: SIGAR Assessment of Insider Attacks on ISAF Personnel: October 2012	54
Figure 30: OSD Assessment of Reintegree Numbers.....	55
Figure: 31 SIGAR Assessment of Reintegree Numbers.....	56
Figure 32: UN Estimate of Opium Impact on Afghan Economy	57
Figure 33: No Reduction in Opium Growing in the South, West, and East	59
Figure 32: UN Estimate of Cannabis Impact on Afghan Economy.....	60

Figure 1: OSD Assessment of Transitioning Provinces and Districts (as of May 13, 2012)



Note: The Transition process was jointly conceived of and developed by the Afghan government, the United States, NATO, and ISAF Coalition partners in a series of international conferences during 2010, beginning with the London Conference in January and culminating in the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2012.

Transition is being implemented in accordance with the *Inteqal* Framework¹⁰ across all 261 districts from Tranches 1, 2 and 3. As the ANSF demonstrates its capability, the level of ISAF support is adjusted allowing the ANSF to take more responsibility. At the end of September, 2012, the ANSF had begun to assume the lead for security in 261 of the country's 405 districts. The increasing capability of the ANSF has expanded security gains in many Transitioning areas.


Tranche 1 and 2 areas (138 districts in 20 provinces) continue to be the most secure areas in Afghanistan, both in terms of objective measures and Afghan population perceptions.

The Transition process met another major milestone this reporting period with President Karzai's May 13 announcement of Tranche 3. With the implementation of Tranche 3, approximately 76 percent of the Afghan population lives in areas where the ANSF are in the lead for security. Tranche 3 is more expansive than the first two tranches with 122 new districts entering the Transition process. It includes all remaining provincial capitals and major transportation corridors. To better manage risk in subsequent tranches, some of Afghanistan's more challenging districts were included in Tranche 3 while ISAF has sufficient combat power to address significant security challenges in support of ANSF. Implementation of Transition in Tranche 3 areas has already begun. For Tranche 3, the Afghan government assumed responsibility for organizing Transition ceremonies, marking the start of Transition. Between July and September, Transition ceremonies were held in provinces entering Transition for the first time. With the start of Tranche 3, 11 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces are wholly in Transition, including Kabul, Balkh, Samangan, Takhar, Bamyan, Panjshayr, Daykundi and Nimroz.

Planning for Tranche 4 began during the reporting period. Transition readiness improved in 36 of the remaining 143 districts waiting to enter Transition, and no districts declined in their readiness ratings. As with Tranche 3, Tranche 4 will likely include areas with significant security challenges; however, managing the associated risk with the forces available is an important planning factor.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, December 2012, Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) as amended, and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), p. 28. Figure 2:

Figure 2: ISAF Troop Estimate as of December 3, 2012




	Albania	199		Georgia	1,561		Norway	97
	Armenia	126		Germany	4,318		Poland	1,770
	Australia	1,094		Greece	10		Portugal	141
	Austria	3		Hungary	582		Romania	1,549
	Azerbaijan	94		Iceland	2		Singapore	39
	Bahrain	95		Ireland	7		Slovakia	234
	Belgium	265		Italy	4,000		Slovenia	38
	Bosnia & Herzegovina	53		Jordan	0		Spain	1,606
	Bulgaria	581		Republic of Korea	350		Sweden	413
	Canada	950		Latvia	27		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia *	157
	Croatia	242		Lithuania	240		Tonga	55
	Czech Republic	416		Luxembourg	10		Turkey	998
	Denmark	567		Malaysia	4		Ukraine	24
	El Salvador	12		Mongolia	46		United Arab Emirates	35
	Estonia	150		Montenegro	40		United Kingdom	9,500
	Finland	112		Netherlands	500		United States	68,000
	France	543		New Zealand	156		Total	102,011

Source: <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf>, 18.12.12

Figure 3: ISAF Estimate of ANA Forces: December 2012

ANA: approx. 185,000 personnel trained



Source: <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf>, 18.12.12

**Figure 4: OSD Assessment of Security Metrics 2011 – 2012, Year-over-Year change
April 1 – September 30**


Metric	Total EIAs	High Profile Attacks	Direct Fire	Total IED Events	IED and Mine Explosions	Indirect Fire
% change from 2011 to 2012	+1%	+2%	+10%	-3%	-12%	-5%

Source: ISAF, October 2012.

Note: Metric definitions: High-profile attacks (HPA) are currently defined by ISAF as explosive hazard events, where certain executed IED attacks are taken into account. Considered are only Person-borne IED (PBIED) attacks, suicide vehicle-borne IED attacks (SVBIED), and vehicle-borne IED attacks (VBIED). Enemy Initiated direct fire occurs when effects are delivered on a target that is visible to aimer or firing unit and uses the target itself as the point of aim. Enemy Initiated indirect fire occurs when fire is delivered on a target characterized by a relatively high trajectory and where the operator typically fire from a distance beyond line-of-sight or from a position where visual contact with the target is not possible. IED and Mine Explosions occur when a IED or a Mine (which has not been stacked, altered or used in some improvised manner, which would make it an IED) event results in the partial or complete functioning of the IED or Mine. Total IED Events comprises both executed and potential IED attacks. Executed IED attacks comprise IED explosions and mine strikes, while potential or attempted IED attacks comprise IEDs and mines that were found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, December 2012, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) as amended, and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), p. 20.


Figure 5: OSD Assessment of Monthly Nationwide Security Incidents (April 2009 – September 2012)



Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED events. IED events include IED explosions, IEDs found and cleared, mine explosions, and mines found and cleared. The figure depicts a one percent increase in total security incidents from the corresponding reporting period one year ago. Each of the first three months of this reporting period had more security incidents than the same three months one year ago. This rise is considered the result of an earlier start of the fighting season as well as a shortened poppy harvest.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, December 2012, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) as amended, and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), p. 151.


Figure 6: OSD Assessment of Monthly Nationwide Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – September 2012)



Enemy-initiated attacks comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks only (IED/mine explosions); potential or attempted attacks (i.e., IEDs/mines found and cleared, prematurely detonated IEDs, and IEDs turned in) are not included. Nationally, EIAs during the reporting period were up one percent from the same period one year ago. Two of six months saw lower EIAs than the same period the prior year

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, December 2012, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) as amended, and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), p. 152.

Figure 7: ISAF Assessment of Monthly Nationwide Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – October 2012)



Definition: Enemy-initiated attacks comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, to include executed attacks only (improvised explosive device (IED) explosions / mine strikes).

Data Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Database, as of 17 Nov 2012.

ISAF Observations


- EIA decreased 6% in Jan-Oct 2012 compared to the same period in 2011.
- EIA levels reported by ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces in October 2012 were 20% lower than in October 2011.
- The October 2012 numbers were 26% lower than in October 2010.

Source:

[http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_\(FINAL\).pdf](http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_(FINAL).pdf), 18.12.12

Figure 8: OSD Assessment of Count of EIAs by number of people living within 1 KM.


Enemy attacks are shifting to less populated areas. As seen in the graphic below, attacks have increased in remote areas with 500 or less people (BLUE) while enemy activity in more densely populated areas is on the decline (RED).



Population Data from LandScan, 2010.
 SIGACTs Data: AMN CIDNE, 08 Nov 2012.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 2012, p. 164


Figure 9: OSD Assessment of Nationwide Year-Over-Year (YoY) Change for Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – September 2012)



The figure depicts a one percent increase in EIAs from the corresponding period one year ago. Each of the first three months of this reporting period had more security incidents than the same three months a year ago. This rise is considered the result of an earlier start of the fighting season as well as a shortened poppy harvest.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, December 2012, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), p. 153.

Figure 10: ISAF Assessment of Nationwide Year-Over-Year (YoY) Change for Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – October 2012)



ISAF Observations


- Enemy-initiated attacks over the last 3 months are 10% lower compared to the same quarter last year.
- After rising in May and June, EIAs continued to drop through October.

Definition: This chart shows the year-over-year **change** in enemy-initiated attacks (EIA). The total number of EIAs is shown in the background (light blue). The red bars represent an increase of monthly enemy-initiated attacks **compared to the same month the year before**; blue bars represent a decrease. The changes over three month periods are depicted at the top of the chart.

Data Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Database, as of 17 Nov 2012.

[http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_\(FINAL\).pdf](http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_(FINAL).pdf), 18.12.12

Figure 11: Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIA) Monthly Year-Over-Year Change by RC (Jan 08 – Oct 12)




ISAF Observations

- In RC East, from Jan-Oct 2012, EIAs decreased 8% compared to the same period in 2011.
- In RC West, from Jan- Oct 2012, EIAs increased 21% compared to the same period in 2011.
- In RC South, from Jan-Oct 2012, EIAs decreased 5% compared to the same period in 2011.
- In RC North, from Jan-Oct 2012, EIAs increased 13% compared to the same period in 2011.
- In RC Southwest, from Jan-Oct 2012, EIAs decreased 8% compared to the same period in 2011.
- RC Capital, which has fully entered the transition process, has the lowest number of attacks for any of the RCs. From Jan-Oct 2012, EIAs decreased 27% compared to the same period in 2011

Source: [http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_\(FINAL\).pdf](http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_(FINAL).pdf), 18.12.12

Figure 12: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-South (April 2009 -September 2012)

RC-S contributed 21 percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, a decrease of one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-S decreased four percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 , December 2012, p. 157.

Figure 13: SIGAR: Assessment of Progress in the South: October 2012

Helmand Province

The Afghan government's provincial and district governments in Helmand have made progress in administering and governing urban areas. However, they are less effective in rural areas, where the central government has not provided robust support. DoS noted that effective provincial and district leadership is expanding government influence in Helmand. The Taliban no longer has outright control of most areas of Helmand, although it can still provide shadow governance in certain locations. The Taliban gains much of its influence through violence and intimidation of the local populace. The central government will need to provide additional support to Helmand to sustain progress.²²⁴

Coalition troop reductions and the summer fighting season did not materially affect government officials' freedom of movement in Helmand this quarter. Improved security allowed government officials, civil servants, and residents to travel from the province's capital, Lashkar Gah, to outside districts such as Musa Qala, Sangin, Kajaki, Khan-e Shin, and Now Zad. With the exception of the Kajaki district, local officials can commute to their duty locations without ISAF support.²²⁵ Improving governance in Helmand remains a challenge. Senior officials continue to draw on political connections and patronage networks to hire civil servants.

Corrupt hiring practices have allowed for many incompetent directors to remain in charge of the provincial and district officials. This has undermined efforts to promote good governance in Kajaki and improve security in Gereshk.²²⁶

Kandahar Province


The Afghan government and Taliban shadow government continue to vie for control of Kandahar, birthplace of the Taliban, but DoS says Afghan government influence in the province appears to be increasing. In those areas where the Afghan government has control, it has demonstrated improved capacity. The Afghan government is functioning in Kandahar City and the larger cities. However, districts further from the capital have proven difficult to hold; the Taliban largely controls the Zharay, Panjwai, and Maiwand regions.²²⁷

The improved security situation in Kandahar has increased government officials' ability to travel independently within the province. DoS noted that the province's governor can move around the province in a way he could not as recently as May 2012. Government officials are able to travel without ISAF support. Many provincial leaders are now relying on their own security details for longer ground movements.²²⁸

Although there have been gains in implementing hiring standards and training for government employees, political connections and patronage networks continue to influence hiring. The United States is working with the Kandahar government to ensure that provincial and district positions are filled with qualified and dependable civil servants and that salaries are paid to the right people.²²⁹


SIGAR, Special Inspector General For Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, October 30 2012, pp. 112-113.

Figure 14: OSD Assessment of Northern Helmand River Valley Area EIA Location Changes, YoY Change, June– September, 2011 vs. 2012



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 , December 2012, p. 163


Figure 15: OSD Assessment of Kandahar EIA Location Changes, YoY Change, June – September, 2011 vs. 2012



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 , December 2012, p. 162

Figure 16: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Southwest (April 2009– September 2012)


RC-SW contributed 30 percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, the same percentage compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-SW increased by two percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 , December 2012, p. 153

Figure 17: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-East (April 2009 -September 2012)


RC-E contributed 41 percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, a decrease of one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-E were down one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 , December 2012, p. 156

Figure 18: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Capital (April 2009 -September 2012)


The contribution of RC-C to all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012 is statistically insignificant. The change in EIAs in RC-C over this period was therefore statistically insignificant, based on a decrease of 34 attacks over the corresponding period one year ago.



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 , December 2012, p. 154

Figure 19: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-North (April 2009 -September 2012)


RC-N accounted for four percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012 an increase of one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-N increased by 28 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 , December 2012, p. 153

Figure 20: SIGAR Report on Security in the North, October 2012

NORTHERN PROVINCIAL DISTRICTS WITH TALIBAN PRESENCE



Note: Districts shaded in blue were not specifically identified by DoS as having a sizable Taliban presence. The extent of Taliban presence differs among the districts.

Source: DoS/SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2012.

Balkh Province

Balkh's capital, Mazar-e-Sharif, enjoys relative stability and provincial officials are able to govern effectively. The United States has little engagement with the province's rural district governments as there are no longer any DSTs in these areas. Consequently, U.S. officials do not have much insight into whether the local governments are effective. Although the Taliban shadow government has limited control of the province, it is present in several districts such as Chimtal, Sholgara, Chahar Bolak, and Balkh.²³⁰

Kunduz Province

Taliban influence is strongest in Chahar Dara and is significant in Aliabad, Imam Sahib, and Dasht e Archi districts, where government influence is weak. However, the governor has recently been able to travel to those areas. DoS noted that the governor's successful response to a recent flareup in violence that left 16 civilians dead demonstrated effective leadership. During that episode, the governor acted as an honest broker between the two sparring groups by conducting peace shuras and mediation sessions. However, the government has not been willing to address many of the underlying stability problems that are caused by illegally armed factions in the province.


Takhar Province

Takhar province is fairly stable with little in the way of Taliban shadow governance. However, some insurgent presence lingers in Khwaja Gar, Darqad, and Ishkamesh. The province's former governor, replaced in President Karzai's September 2012 provincial leadership shake-up, was largely absent from the province during his tenure and rarely travelled to the districts. As of September 30, 2012, his replacement had not yet assumed the governorship.

SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to Congress*, October 30, 2012, pp. 113-114

Figure 21: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-West (April 2009 -September 2012)


RC-W accounted for five percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, an increase of one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-W increased 44 percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 , December 2012, p. 155.


Figure 22: OSD Estimate of Monthly IED and Mine Explosions (April 2009 – September 2012)

This reporting period saw a 12 percent year-over-year decrease in IED and mine explosions, while total IED and mine activity (which includes executed and potential IED attacks) decreased three percent. Potential IED attacks include those that were found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and those turned in to the coalition by local nationals. IED turn-ins more than doubled during this period compared to one year ago.



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 , December 2012, p. 160

Figure 23: ISAF Estimate of Monthly IED and Mine Explosions (April 2009 – September 2012)



ISAF Observations


- Insurgents continue to rely on IEDs as a principal means to execute their campaign.
- In Jan-Oct 2012, more than 65% of civilian casualties caused by insurgents resulted from IED explosions.
- More than half of IEDs and mines were found and cleared rather than exploded.
- Executed IED attacks decreased by 17% in Jan-Oct 2012 compared to the same period in 2011.

Definition: Executed Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks comprise only of these explosive hazard events: IED explosions and mine strikes.

Data Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Database, as of 17 Nov 2012.


Source: [http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_\(FINAL\).pdf](http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_(FINAL).pdf), 18.12.12

Figure 24: OSD Assessment of Caches Found (April 2009 – September 2012)



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 , December 2012, p. 161

Figure 25: Monthly Civilian Deaths and Injuries Caused by Insurgents and ISAF (April 2009 – September 2012)




The ISAF CCMT (Civilian Casualties Mitigation Team) methodology is based on internal and comprehensive reports provided by ISAF troops within Afghanistan, and the activation of Joint Incident Assessment Teams comprised of Afghan government representatives as well as ISAF to review evidence and conduct interviews. The amount of available information depends on ISAF involvement in the event, and therefore it is possible that ISAF statistics under-estimate CIVCAS caused by events where ISAF was not present.

From April through September 2012, approximately 90 percent of CIVCAS were caused by insurgents. Insurgents continue to rely heavily on the use of indiscriminate tactics, such as IEDs. In the reporting period, 59 percent of insurgent-caused CIVCAS were due to IEDs. ISAF has continued its efforts to find and clear IEDs prior to detonation.

An area of great concern, however, continues to be alleged and disputed CIVCAS. Since conditions on the ground do not always permit complete battle damage assessments, insurgents have exploited opportunities to claim that those killed in ISAF-ANSF operations were innocent Afghan civilians, despite ISAF information to the contrary. The CCMT tracks alleged CIVCAS incidents as an indicator of public perception. Notably, from April-September 2012, there were a total of 187 confirmed ISAF-inflicted CIVCAS. Additionally, a total of 29 CIVCAS were alleged in the same period. ISAF investigates all alleged CIVCAS to determine responsibility and provides guidelines on consequence management.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, December 2012, Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) as amended, and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), p. 33.

Figure 26: ISAF Estimate of Monthly Civilian Deaths and Injuries Caused by Insurgents and ISAF (April 2009 – September 2012)



ISAF Observations


- Insurgents caused over 93% of confirmed civilian casualties (dead and wounded) in Oct 2012.
- The number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF in Aug-Oct 2012, compared to the same three months in 2011, decreased by approximately 48%.
- ISAF continues to work with the ANSF to make every effort to protect the Afghan population and to prevent and mitigate civilian casualties.

Definition: The figures reported in this chart reflect incidents of conflict-related civilian casualties (dead and wounded) that have been confirmed, through investigation, to have been caused by either ISAF or insurgents. The data reported here is consistent with ISAF policy, which directs that all credible allegations of civilian casualties be reviewed.


Data Source: ISAF Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Data Tracker, as of 17 Nov 2012, [http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_\(FINAL\).pdf](http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_(FINAL).pdf), 18.12.12

Figure 27: OSD Assessment of Insider Attacks

On ISAF Personnel



On ANSF Personnel



The number of Insider Attacks is subject to change based on on-going analysis and as new incidents emerge. Insider attacks are characterized by incidents in which ANSF members knowingly attack and/or help facilitate an attack against the Coalition with the intent to maim or kill Coalition personnel; incidents in which insurgents portray themselves as ANSF members with the intent to target Coalition Force (CF) personnel; and incidents in which previously friendly third-country nationals and local nationals, for

whatever reason, seek to attack CF personnel.

The probable motives for Insider Attacks are categorized as:

- **Infiltration:** An existing insurgent member clandestinely joins the ANSF through the standard recruitment process in order to support the insurgency by conducting intelligence collection, sabotage, subversion, or attacks.
- **Co-option:** An existing ANSF member is recruited to assist or act on behalf of the insurgency. A member can be recruited through various means, including ideological pressures, financial incentives, intimidation, extortion, or familial and tribal ties. In contrast to infiltration, co-opting an existing ANSF member circumvents the initial screening and vetting process to which new ANSF recruits are subjected.
- **Impersonation:** An insurgent or non-ANSF member poses as an ANSF member to conduct attacks. With the availability of counterfeit uniforms and IDs, impersonation is often easier to accomplish than co-option or infiltration. More sophisticated cases of impersonation have often incorporated some level of facilitation, complicity, or awareness by ANSF members, whether by providing an ID, escorting the individual onto base, or simply knowing of the attacker's intentions to target ISAF members.
- **Personal motives:** An ANSF member acts intentionally yet independently as an individual perpetrator – without direct guidance, command, or pre-planning by external entities.

In cases the attacker's motive cannot be discerned, the category "Unknown" is used. Insider attacks incidents do not include cases of misidentification, negligent discharge, or any other ANSF-inflicted accidental injury or death of CF personnel.

Between May 2007 and the end of September 2012, a total of 79 Insider Attacks occurred. Of those 79 incidents, five (six percent) are possibly or likely attributable to infiltration; 11 (14 percent) are assessed as likely or possibly attributable to co-option; 30 (38 percent) are possibly or likely attributable to personal motives; three (four percent) are considered related to unknown reasons but having insurgent ties, and 30 (38 percent) to unknown (or pending due to ongoing investigations). Of the 79 insider attacks, 69 resulted in CF (military and civilian personnel) deaths and/or wounded, causing a total of 116 CF deaths and 164 CF wounded. As of the end of the reporting period, there have been 37 attacks in 2012, resulting in 51 coalition deaths (32 U.S deaths) and 74 wounded.

The Taliban has adapted its propaganda, hoping to inspire attacks through themes of praise, revenge, and provision of support and sanctuary. For example, in Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar's August 2012 Eid al-Fitr address, he praised ANSF members who conduct insider attacks and urged other ANSF to do as "your brave friends have done." Taliban statements have promoted the protection and facilitation of attackers out of Afghanistan, and projected a willingness to support those committing insider attacks, even those without prior Taliban affiliation. As part of this messaging, the Taliban claims attacks they did not engineer and exaggerates ISAF casualty numbers for attacks that do occur.

The cause of the majority of insider attacks in 2012 has yet to be determined, and sometimes the cause is impossible to determine given that in many cases, the attacker is killed during the incident. There may be a correlation in attacks inspiring one another. Seventeen events in 2012 occurred within 48 hours of a previous attack; however, there is no hard evidence to definitively conclude that these subsequent attacks were inspired by a previous event.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, December 2012, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) as amended, and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), pp. 34-35.

Figure 28: SIGAR Assessment of Insider Attacks on ISAF Personnel: October 2012

Insider or “green-on-blue” attacks—persons in ANSF uniform attacking coalition partners—continued to hamper U.S. and coalition efforts to prepare the Afghans to take the security lead in 2014. These attacks have strained the relationship between coalition partners and their Afghan counterparts. As this report went to press, 37 insider attacks had occurred since the beginning of the year, resulting in the deaths of 51 coalition forces (including 32 U.S. military personnel).⁷² According to NATO/ISAF officials, about 25% of these attacks had “direct enemy planning to support an attacker.” They say some of the insider attacks stem from cultural clashes or grievances.⁷³ Afghan officials have blamed terrorist infiltration and foreign spies for the rise in insider attacks.⁷⁴

ISAF has acted to prevent future insider attacks. Its response has evolved to include several measures. In August, ISAF required all coalition forces to carry loaded weapons at all times.⁷⁵ In addition, it implemented a “guardian angel” program, in which one or more U.S. or coalition force soldiers remain armed and ready when working or meeting with ANSF counterparts.⁷⁶ By September, ISAF and Afghan government measures also included a new warning system, enhanced intelligence exchanges, an anonymous reporting system, the establishment of a joint investigation commission, and enhanced cultural training.⁷⁷

ISAF is helping the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) reexamine their vetting procedures and identify insurgents who have infiltrated the ranks of the ANA and the ANP. In addition, the Afghan government has a counterintelligence initiative that places people inside ANSF units to identify possible threats to prevent insider attacks.⁷⁸ But “green-on-blue” attacks are not the only worrisome trend. Incidents of ANSF members attacking other members have raised concerns about the future stability of Afghan forces.⁷⁹ In some cases, these Afghan-on-Afghan attacks involved members of one ethnic group attacking members of another.


Details of insider attacks within the ANA and the ANP are often classified. However, according to the UN Secretary-General, nine Pashtuns were killed this quarter by perpetrators rumored to be Hazaras disguised as local defense forces. This followed the Taliban killing of two Hazaras. In addition, a member of the ANP in Nimroz killed 10 of his colleagues on August 11.

The Secretary-General also noted reports of defections from the Afghan security forces this quarter; 17 local policemen reportedly joined the Taliban on June 24, followed by 93 more on July 3.⁸⁰ Insider attacks are also affecting the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a key component of the Afghan government and coalition strategy to secure rural areas ahead of the 2014 transition.

In March 2012, ISAF Commander General John R. Allen testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services that he was heartened by “success of the Afghan local police” and noted, “There has yet to be an attack on any one of our Green Berets, SEALs, or Marines” who are embedded with and training ALP units.⁸¹ However, in August, two U.S. Special Forces members were killed by an ALP recruit in Farah.⁸² In September, U.S. Forces temporarily suspended training 1,000 ALP recruits because of the threat of insider attacks. During the suspension, partnered operations with trained ANSF members continued while members of the 16,300-person ALP were “re-vetted.”⁸³

U.S. Special Forces resumed training the ALP in October.⁸⁴ DoD said “ALP insider attacks make up a small percentage of total [insider] attacks.”...General Allen has sought to put these attacks in context. He said the focus on insider attacks “obscures the callous slaughter of Afghan civilians by insurgents.” He also said, “Most Americans do not get to see Afghans’ commitment to their country or the improving security that has emerged from our fight together. But I do.”

SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress*, October 2012. 80

Figure 30: OSD Assessment of Reintegree Numbers

Afghan Presidential Decree #43 established the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) in June 2010. The APRP is a GIROA National Priority Program (NPP) managed by the High Peace Council (HPC) and executed at the national level by the Joint Secretariat (JS).


The overall reintegration rate slowed during this reporting period as compared to the previous period (see Figure 7). From April 1 to September 30, 2012, the APRP enrolled 954 reintegrees, compared to 1,606 during the previous six months. The pace of reintegration, however, is difficult to predict, especially during the peak of the fighting season.

As of September 24, 2012, the APRP had formally enrolled 5,044 former insurgents; this number is up from 3,907 since the close of the previous reporting period on March 31, 2012. Program recidivism still remains low, at less than one percent. RC-N and RC-W again achieved the greatest reintegration numbers, enrolling a total of 810 reintegrees. Despite the fact that reintegration momentum decreased in RC-E overall during the reporting period, it is significant to note that Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar enrolled 57 official reintegrees. This figure is more than half of the 101 reintegrees enrolled for RC-E. Although RC-S and RC-SW enrolled only 34 total reintegrees, Uruzgan has a group of 26 insurgents undergoing the reintegration process and RC-S is cautiously optimistic regarding the outlook for the next six months. Although reintegree numbers still lag in RC-E, RC-S, and RC-SW, there has been increased dialog with insurgent individuals and groups in these areas concerning the process.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, December 2012, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) as amended, and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), pp. 40-41.

Figure: 31 SIGAR Assessment of Reintegree Numbers

REINTEEGRES BY REGIONAL COMMAND, DECEMBER 2011-SEPTEMBER 2012



Note: Data for RC-Capital was not given until June 2012. The decrease in RC-North in March 2012 was due to the Joint Secretariat disqualifying approximately 250 previous enrollees from Sare-Pul.
 Source: DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2012, 7/5/2012, 3/30/2012, and 12/30/2011.

The Defense Department reported reintegration has been slow to take hold in the eastern, southwestern, and southern parts of Afghanistan because of overall insecurity and provincial officials' perception that they receive few tangible benefits from the program. Some insurgents who have shown an interest in reintegration, or who have been reintegrated, have been threatened or killed by the Taliban.¹⁹⁰ Some communities like Ghazni have had no reintegrees come forward. These areas are therefore ineligible for community recovery activities like basic community infrastructure, agriculture, health education, and water and sanitation that could raise the profile of the program. However, local uprisings against the Taliban in some of these areas have raised hope that the program will become more popular in the future.

The APRP's capacity to reintegrate insurgents at the provincial level continued to vary considerably. Some Provincial Peace Councils (PPCs) and Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) are able to act independently and make strong appeals to the APRP's Joint Secretariat for their provinces' financial reintegration needs. Other PPCs and PJSTs lack basic accounting and technical skills needed to properly operate their budgets.

The High Peace Council has determined that it needs to quickly assess and restructure the weaker PPCs. PJSTs will be challenged to successfully assume all of their responsibilities as reintegration efforts intensify. Greater coordination between the PJSTs and provincial governors, as well as with relevant security institutions, will be key to promoting successful reintegration and managing the overall program.

From April 2011 to September 2012, the APRP's vetting procedures greatly improved, according to DoS and DoD. To confirm that each reintegree is in fact an insurgent, vetting procedures now require multiple offices—political, military, and intelligence—of both the provincial and national governments to confirm that each reintegree poses a genuine threat. This quarter, ISAF said 100 potential reintegrees are turned away from joining the APRP every month, demonstrating the effectiveness of current vetting procedures. DoS reported one instance where 155 potential reintegrees were rejected from the program in Herat this quarter. The State Department reported that as of September 30, 2012, only 15 reintegrees who had entered the program were either confirmed or rumored to have rejoined the insurgency. However, the strengthened vetting process has also created program bottlenecks: until reintegrees are fully vetted, they cannot receive APRP benefits

Figure 32: UN Estimate of Opium Impact on Afghan Economy

	2011	Change from 2011	2012
Net opium poppy cultivation (after eradication) in hectares (ha)	131,000 ha (109,000-155,000)	+18%	154,000 ha (125,000 – 189,000)
Number of poppy-free provinces ²	17	0%	17
Number of provinces affected by poppy cultivation	17	0%	17
Eradication	3,810	+154%	9,672
Average opium yield (weighted by area)	44.5 kg/ha	-47%	23.7 kg/ha ³
Potential production of opium	5,800 tons (4,800-6,800)	-36%	3,700 tons (2,800 – 4,200 tons)
Average farm-gate price (weighted by production) of fresh opium at harvest time	US\$ 180/kg	-9%	US\$ 163/kg
Average farm-gate price (weighted by production) of dry opium at harvest time	US\$ 241/kg	-19%	US\$ 196/kg
Current GDP ⁴	US\$ 16.34 billion		US\$ 18.95 billion
Total farm-gate value of opium production	US\$ 1.4 billion	-49%	US\$ 0.7 billion (US\$ 0.5 – 0.8 billion)
In percentage of GDP	7%		4%
Gross income from opium per hectare ⁵	US\$ 10,700	-57%	US\$ 4,600

¹ Numbers in brackets indicate the upper and lower bounds of the estimation range.

² Poppy-free provinces are those estimated to have less than 100 hectares of opium cultivation.

³ There have been reports from the Eastern, Western and Southern regions that a significant area was affected by disease and/or adverse weather conditions, which reduced the opium yield. The yield survey captured this impact at least partially. However, a stronger reduction of yield cannot be excluded.

⁴ Relation to nominal GDP of the respective year. Source: Government of Afghanistan, Central Statistical Office.

⁵ Income figures are indicative only as they do not include all expenditure and income components associated with opium cultivation.

- Despite the eradication of opium poppy by Governor-led Eradication (GLE) having increased by 154% in comparison to its 2011 level (9,672 hectares eradicated in 2012), the total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 154,000 hectares (125,000 – 189,000) in 2012.
- While that represents a 18% increase in cultivation, potential opium production was estimated at 3,700 tons (2,800 – 4,200 tons) in 2012, a 36% decrease from the previous year. This was due to a decrease in opium yield caused by a combination of a disease of the opium poppy and adverse weather conditions, particularly in the Eastern, Western and Southern regions of the country.
- The high level of opium prices reported in 2011 was one of the principal factors that led to the increase in opium poppy cultivation in 2012. However, while opium prices remained high during 2012 there was some decline in all regions of the country, though differences between regions became more and more pronounced.
- The vast majority (95%) of total cultivation took place in nine provinces in Afghanistan's


Southern and Western regions,⁶ that include the most insecure provinces in the country.

- Opium cultivation increased in most of the main opium poppy-growing provinces, including Farah, Nangarhar, Badghis and Nimroz, whereas cultivation remained stable in Uruzgan and decreased by 11% ⁷ in Kandahar, the second most important poppy cultivating province between 2009 and 2011.
- Opium cultivation rose by 19% in Hilmand that, with 75,176 hectares or 49% of total opium cultivation in 2012, remained the largest opium-cultivating province in Afghanistan. However, a separate estimate was also available for the Hilmand “Food Zone” alternative livelihood project ⁸, which showed that relatively less poppy is cultivated within the food zone than outside it.
- Opium cultivation also increased in the Eastern region where it rose significantly in Kunar (121%), Kapisa (60%) and Laghman (41%) provinces. However, the Eastern region contributed only 4% to the national total of opium production in 2012. In the Northern region, opium cultivation increased by 10% in Baghlan province despite the eradication of 252 hectares in 2012.
- Badakhshan, the only opium-cultivating province in the North-eastern region, also experienced an increase in opium cultivation of 13% despite the eradication of 1,784 hectares. In Kabul, the Central region’s only opium-cultivating province, opium cultivation decreased by 45% between 2011 and 2012, but the province narrowly missed the poppy-free status threshold of 100 hectares.

Source: UNDOC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Summary Findings*, November 2012, pp., 3-8

Figure 33: No Reduction in Opium Growing in the South, West, and East

Opium cultivation in Afghanistan, 2010-2012



Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
 Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

PROVINCE	Cultivation 2006 (ha)	Cultivation 2007 (ha)	Cultivation 2008 (ha)	Cultivation 2009 (ha)	Cultivation 2010 (ha)	Cultivation 2011 (ha)	Cultivation 2012 (ha)	Change 2011-2012 (%)	Eradication in 2011 (ha)	Eradication in 2012 (ha)
Kapisa	282	835	436	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	181	290	+60%	5	54
Kunar	932	446	290	164	154	578	1,279	+121%	1	70
Laghman	710	561	425	135	234	624	877	+41%	21	76
Nangarhar	4,872	18,739	Poppy-free	294	719	2,700	3,151	+17%	61	784
Nuristan	1,516	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	NA	0	0
Eastern Region	8,312	20,581	1,151	593	1,107	4,082	5,596	+37%	89	985
Badakhshan	13,056	3,642	200	557	1,100	1,705	1,927	+13%	367	1,784
Takhar	2,178	1,211	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	NA	0	0
Kunduz	102	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	NA	0	0
North-eastern Region	15,336	4,853	200	557	1,100	1,705	1,927	+13%	367	1,784
Baghlan	2,742	671	475	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	161	177	+10%	31	252
Hilmand	69,324	102,770	103,590	69,833	65,045	63,307	75,176	+19%	1,940	3,637
Kandahar	12,619	16,615	14,623	19,811	25,835	27,213	24,341	-11%	287	922
Uruzgan	9,703	9,204	9,939	9,224	7,337	10,620	10,508	-1%	154	485
Zabul	3,210	1,611	2,335	1,144	483	262	424	+62%	85	88
Day Kundi	7,044	3,346	2,273	3,002	1,547	1,003	1,058	+5%	235	236
Southern Region	101,900	133,546	132,760	103,014	100,247	102,405	111,507	+9%	2,701	5,368
Badghis	3,205	4,219	587	5,411	2,958	1,990	2,363	+19%	36	53
Farah	7,694	14,865	15,010	12,405	14,552	17,499	27,733	+58%	212	316
Ghor	4,679	1,503	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	125	NA	43	11
Hirat	2,287	1,525	266	556	360	366	1,080	+195%	227	600
Nimroz	1,955	6,507	6,203	428	2,039	2,493	3,808	+53%	20	148
Western Region	19,820	28,619	22,066	18,800	19,909	22,348	35,109	+57%	539	1,130
Total (rounded)	165,000	193,000	157,000	123,000	123,000	131,000	154,000	18%	3,810	9,672

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Summary Findings*, November 2012, pp. 3-8

Figure 32: UN Estimate of Cannabis Impact on Afghan Economy

	2010	Change on 2010	2011
Commercial, mono-crop cannabis cultivation ¹	9,000-29,000 ha		12,000 ha (8,000-17,000 ha)
Number of provinces with commercial, mono-crop cannabis cultivation	19	+2	21
Average cannabis resin powder (garda) yield from cannabis in mono-crop cultivation	First Garda: 63 kg/ha Second Garda: 41 kg/ha Third Garda: 24 kg/ha Total: 128 kg/ha	-13%	First Garda: 51 kg/ha Second Garda: 36 kg/ha Third Garda: 25 kg/ha Total: 112 kg/ha
Potential cannabis resin powder (garda) production ²	1,200-3,700 tons		1,300 tons (1,000-1,900 tons)
Average farm-gate price of cannabis resin powder at time of resin processing (January), weighted by production	First Garda: US\$ 86/kg Second Garda: US\$ 66/kg Third Garda: US\$ 39/kg		First Garda: US\$ 95/kg Second Garda: US\$ 63/kg Third Garda: US\$ 39/kg
Total farm-gate value of cannabis resin production (all garda qualities)	US\$ 85-263 million		US\$ 95 million (US\$ 78-135 million)
As percentage of GDP ³	0.7%-2.0%		0.6%
Cannabis growing households ⁴	47,000	+38%	65,000
Average cannabis cultivated per cannabis growing household (all households)	0.33 ha	-12%	0.29 ha
Proportion of cannabis farmers who also grew opium	61%		58%
Average yearly gross income from cannabis of cannabis growing households ⁵	US\$ 3,000	-20%	US\$ 2,400
Income from cannabis per ha (gross/net)	US\$ 9,000/8,300	-10%/ -12%	US\$ 8,100/7,300

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the lower and upper bounds of the estimation range.

¹ Refers to the area with commercial, mono-crop cultivation in the cannabis risk area (23 out of 34 provinces of Afghanistan). Small-scale cannabis cultivation in kitchen gardens, lines of cannabis around fields (bund cultivation) and

fields of cannabis mixed with other crops are not considered in this area estimate.

² Refers to air-dried cannabis powder (not adjusted for moisture). Includes estimated potential production from fields of cannabis mixed with other crops and from bunds (about 2% of total production). Production from other cultivation types e.g.

in kitchen gardens could not be estimated.

³ Nominal GDP for the respective year. Source: Government of Afghanistan.

⁴ The estimate is based on headmen interviews from the village survey. It comprises all cannabis-growing households reported by headmen, i.e. possibly also households with only small-scale cannabis cultivation. The contribution of such households to the total cannabis cultivation area and cannabis production could not be estimated.

⁵ Income figures are indicative only; they do not include all expenditure and income components associated with cultivation.

Source: UNODC, *Afghanistan Survey of Commercial Cannabis Cultivation and Production 2011*, September 2012, p. 6.

¹ These numbers are drawn from OSD and ISAF reporting, The October 2012 SIGAR Quarterly report provides different numbers for the US: “According to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), 76,000 U.S. forces were serving in the country as of September 30, 2012. Of those, approximately 54,000 were assigned to ISAF, 2,000 to NTM-A/CSTC-A (the joint NATO/U.S. mission responsible for training, equipping, and sustaining the ANSF), and 7,800 to USFOR-A, while 12,200 were categorized as “other U.S. military personnel.”...On September 21, 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that the drawdown of the 30,000 surge force was complete. (p. 95)

² Major shortages remain in functioning courts, judges, lawyers and prisons, and every element of the legal system has a high level of corruption. Prisons present a special problem. The October SIGAR Quarterly report notes that, “Afghanistan’s prisons remained overcrowded at almost 176% over capacity, as of September 30, 2012. However, this is an improvement in prison conditions from March 2012, when prisons held more than double their capacity (202%). There were over 16,400 male prisoners and 471 female prisoners in Afghan custody. The State Department had obligated almost \$70.47 million for the construction of prisons and detention centers. (p. 115). These data still, however, grossly understate the problem because so many arrestees are released because there is no way to provide the needed evidence or process them within the time permitted to hold them. The quality of governance is often far worse. It is more venal and corrupt at the field level, will not operate in areas with significant risk, and numbers are made up in high risk areas by waiving all entry standards.

³ Greg Jaffe and Kevin Sieff, “Training suspended for new Afghan recruits,” *Washington Post*, September 1, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/training-suspended-for-new-afghan-recruits/2012/09/01/adc4ed1c-f398-11e1-b74c-84ed55e0300b_story.html

⁴ Graham, Bowley and Richard A. Opiel, “NATO Halting Program to Train Afghan Recruits,” *New York Times*, September 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/world/asia/nato-halting-program-to-train-afghan-recruits.html?_r=2&adxnnl=1&seid=auto&smid=tw-nytimes&adxnnlx=1346565647-A0+mn7D5VsIoxHFiR7UYHg.

⁵ Graham, Bowley and Richard A. Opiel, “U.S. Halts Training Program for Some Afghan Recruits,” *New York Times*, September 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/world/asia/us-halting-program-to-train-afghan-recruits.html?_r=1&emc=tnt&tntemail1=y.

⁶ ABC report of brief by Lt. Gen. Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, September 2, 2012.

⁷ ABC report of brief by Lt. Gen. Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, September 2, 2012,

⁸ Steven A. Zyck, “Opium Poppies & the Afghan Economy,” *Counternarcotics in Afghanistan*, August 2012, www.cimicweb.org