MOVING TOWARDS
UNITY

EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE
GCC IN GULF SECURITY

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Executive Summary

The Riyadh Declaration, which was issued at the end of the GCC meeting in December 2011, calls for efforts to explore creating a “single unity” that could deal with the many challenges facing the Arab Gulf states.

The Declaration calls for this effort to include defense and security cooperation, “confronting foreign attempts by troubled entities,” economic cooperation and dealing with the social challenges like those faced by GCC youth. It also creates a Commission, with three members from each state, to study proposals for achieving this unity and calls for a preliminary report by March 2012.

This analysis examines the range of options for improving the security aspects of such cooperation, and suggests specific areas of action that deserve priority in providing proposals for March 2012 in each of the following areas:

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Enhancing the Military Planning, Command, and Training Capacity of the GCC

It has been clear since the GCC was formed that each nation in the GCC could benefit from creating more interoperable forces, and integrated warning, IS&R, and command tailored to the key missions necessary to meet the security needs of all the GCC states.

The new momentum provided by the Riyadh Declaration creates an opportunity to move forward in many areas, particularly if the GCC builds on the experience of alliances like NATO where “unity” serves common interests while preserving individual national forces and sovereignty.

Planning and Interoperability

GCC military forces now have a very diverse mix of equipment, command and control systems, munitions, support facilities, and power projection capabilities. They cannot be easily and quickly made fully interoperable, and countries will preserve sovereign decision making authority.

One way to make steady improvements in interoperability is to set up planning staffs within the GCC that address the key tasks necessary to change this situation, and to report regularly to a committee of Ministers of Defense or their delegates. NATO has used somewhat similar methods. While the GCC has different needs, it could build on its existing efforts and adapt NATO methods as follows to produce a higher degree of unity and common effort:

• Create a GCC Force Planning Exercise

Create a Defense Planning Committee similar to that in NATO, and take the first steps towards creating a common defense planning system that would examine each member’s current forces and force plans for the next five years to examine areas where it may be possible to improve mission capability, interoperability and standardization and supplement national command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence systems (C4I) on a GCC wide basis.

Such a Defense Planning Committee could combine civil and military expertise to support top-level decision makers. It would meet regularly to review the force plans of each nation to find ways to better coordinate them and create steadily more interoperable forces.

There is a good precedent for such planning. NATO developed a Defense Planning Questionnaire in the 1960s where every member now submits a standard and regularly update report on its current forces, manpower, major weapons, munitions, and on its five-year plans – plus a longer-term supplement on procurement. This does not require any compromise of sovereignty, and allow the civilian and military experts to develop informal and formal recommendations to Ministers to develop better-integrated plans as well as make tangible suggestions as to ways to both create more effective force mixes over time, and make forces more interoperable.
• **Create a Standardization and Interoperability Committee and Staff**

Create a similar Committee that would meet regularly to focus on ways to develop immediate interoperability, provide common support and sustainability for power projection and redeployment capability, and set common standards for stockpiling and sharing munitions and key supplies. This could be supported by a staff at GCC headquarters and by designating centers of excellence in the defense colleges and centers in member states.

• **Create a Technology and Procurement Committee and Staff**

Create a Committee to meet regularly to find ways to analyze military technology and procurement needs with a focus on technical issues, test and evaluation methods, and the other aspects of military procurement that would help develop common approaches to acquiring weapons systems and technology. This could be supported by a staff at GCC headquarters and designating centers of excellence in the defense colleges and centers in member states.

• **Create a Working Group on Arms Control**

The GCC and its member states have supported the creation of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. The GCC might create a small staff to examine such options and play an active role in encouraging studies and diplomatic activity.

**Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence (C4I), Sensor, and Battle Management (BM Systems)**

The GCC has the shell of common or integrated C4I and BM system in some areas like air defense. What it needs, however, are truly integrated C4I/BM systems in several key areas, tied to common efforts to develop intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) systems.

The changes in the Iranian threat, and the threat of terrorist and extremist movements creates a broad spectrum of areas where the GCC needs to be able to react in real time or near real time to threats ranging from long range missiles to asymmetric naval attacks to complex attacks by terrorists and extremists.

The highest priorities for such efforts include measures that could play a critical role in deterring -- and defending against -- Iran. In many cases, the GCC would have only 7-15 minutes of warning a an major air or missile attack, or would need integrate maritime and air surveillance to determine the status of Iran’s asymmetric forces and whether they were deploying to present a threat or involved in complex operations.

Specific areas for cooperation include:
• **Create a fully integrated air and surface-to-air missile control and warning system**

Such a system would integrate sensors like the Saudi E-3A AWACs, other GCC airborne warning and intelligence platforms, ground based radars, and fighter and major surface-to-air missile systems into a Gulf-wide, secure mix of C3I, BM, IS&R capabilities. This could be based on expanding the existing Saudi air control and command facility near Riyadh and links between each GCC country and the US Combat Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar.

As the NATO NADGE system has shown over past decades, sovereignty and national security issues can be addressed by using the systems that mix national control of all national assets with the ability to operate on an alliance-wide basis of the type of integrated system developed for the NATO NADGE system.

The technical side could be supported by creating a separate technical staff on a contract level controlled by the GCC and military officers. NATO established a NATO Air Defense Ground Environment Management Office (NADGEMO) specifically for such an effort, and found it could work out compromises at a technical level that bridged over national tensions and differences.

• **Create a fully integrated maritime surveillance system**

A similar system could integrate command and control data, and IS&R sensors and systems, for naval operations, related air operations, and coastal defense activity using ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and coastal facilities along the Gulf Coast and in Oman at Goat Island and along the Oman coast. It could monitor and react to threats like deployment of the Naval Guards, mining, stack threats near the Strait, and clusters of missile-equipped smaller ships.

Bahrain has already proposed the creation of such a center in Bahrain, and such a center could have close links to the US fleet command in Bahrain, British forces in Oman, and the French facility in the UAE as well as standardized links to US, British, and French ships.

Such a system would need to be tailored to the special conditions of asymmetric warfare created by Iran’s submarines, navy, and naval guards, and by Iran’s growing air and anti-ship missile capabilities. Ideally, it would have some capability to integrate mine warfare operations as well. Coverage could begin in the Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman, but the model could be expanded to cover the Indian Ocean and Red Sea over time.

• **Create a Joint Intelligence Center**

Sharing intelligence at the military, counterterrorism, and popular unrest levels is one of the most difficult aspects of alliance operations. Once again, however, there are precedents. The Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and UAE – have already held conferences on cooperation in counterterrorism that examined options for cooperation even in some of the most sensitive areas of intelligence. The NATO MC-161 process involved semi-annual meeting of national intelligence experts supported by the NATO
civil and military staffs, and producing an agreed annual threat assessment to present to Ministers.

Creating an expanded GCC joint intelligence center to handle military tasks and then expand into counterterrorism and sources of popular unrest could be a way of slowly building up both added GCC capabilities and building trust and common joint collection and analysis capability. Creating a GCC-wide annual threat assessment would be one way to begin and tie intelligence cooperation to policy in a way that reinforced unity.

• GCC Net Assessment Group

Effective security planning requires more than a threat analysis. It requires an analysis of the trends in the balance relative to key threats and mission areas, and the analysis of current capabilities and priorities for improving them. One option that would bridge the gap between military planning and intelligence at the civil-military level would be to create a GCC Net Assessment group that could address internal and external extremist and asymmetric threats.

Such an effort could focus on Iran and common threats from violent extremism. Use the group to report on GCC-wide patterns to avoid spotlighting Bahrain or other states, but give a common legitimacy to efforts to check such threats. It could aid the defense planning effort by providing annual threat assessments highlight key threats and showing how the GCC states are moving to deal with them.

Building Common Training and Exercise Capacity

The GCC states already have some exceptional training facilities at the national level, and do cooperate in military exercises, but there are gaps, many states do relatively little large-scale training that simulates real combat, and member states still have limited cross and common training. There also is a need for joint training that cuts across service lines.

There are several measures that the GCC staff could examine on a civil-military level to improve cooperation and develop interoperability of the kind King Abdullah referred to in his speech to the GCC:

• Survey training facilities to determine how to make best use on GCC-wide basis

The GCC could create a commission of civilian staff and senior military officers to survey training facilities and methods by service and mission focus to determine where creating a common specialized facility is necessary, how to improve joint and common training, ways to increase cross training of officers and other ranks from other countries, and options for large-scale air and land combat training. Such a commission could report annually to Ministers on proposals and progress.

• Focus on key contingencies

The GCC could encourage expanded field and command post training at the GCC level with a focus on key missions and contingencies like operations to secure the borders with Yemen, deal with efforts to “close the Strait,” and deploy joint forces to deal with a contingency directed against Kuwait and secure the Iraqi-Saudi border.
Preventing for Missile and WMD Threats

No single area presents a more serious military threat to the GCC than Iran’s acquisition of long-range missiles, and movement towards acquiring nuclear weapons.

*Areas For Improved Planning and Dialogue*

The GCC needs to improve cooperation in several key areas by:

- Developing a common policy towards sanctions, and incentive/disincentives in persuading Iran to halt such policies.
- Developing a common and integrated approach toward missile defense in cooperation with the US – the only real world provider and integrator of such a system. This is critical both in ensuring the creation of any effective system that is truly interoperable, has the proper wide area coverage, can be reinforced by US ships with SM-2 missile defenses, and linked is effectively to US satellite systems. It also potentially represents the most expensive GCC investment in new types of military capability over the next decade.
- Creating a GCC estimate of the Iranian-Israeli nuclear and missile balance and the risks the rising arms race and potential use of such forces presents to the GCC states.
- Working collectively with the US to explore Secretary Clinton’s offer of “extended deterrence” to counter Iran if it does more forward to deploying nuclear weapons.
- Evaluating GCC options for acquiring a GCC deterrent.
- Evaluating the cost-benefits of supporting preventive military action.

These are sensitive areas, and involve data that is classified and needs to be closely controlled in several areas. At the same time, a lack of GCC coordination and unity will encourage Iran, waste a vast amount of money on less effective defenses, and steadily increase military risks over time.

*Plan a Joint, Integrated Missile Defense System*

The best way of handling these issues would be to create an integrated missile defense system as an expanded part of an integrated GCC air defense system. The GCC states already have made a massive investment in upgrading their surface-to-air missile defenses to the PAC-3 Patriot missile and the UAE and Qatar are buying THAAD at a combined cost of over $10 billion.

There is no way such purchases can be come a fully effective defense and deterrent unless all Gulf states have such defenses and integrate them at the C4I/BM level to provide a unified wide-area defense capability. At the same time, countries would find it easier and less sensitive to focus on a new aspect of GCC capability.
Focusing on Other Key Mission Areas

As has been touched upon earlier, security cooperation is most effective when it focuses on key mission priorities rather than formal generic training or training by military services and branch of the internal security services.

The need for integrated air and integrated sea and coastal defense tailored to both Iranian conventional and asymmetric threats has already been described. So has the need to focus on the Iranian missile and nuclear threat. Internal security issues, and infrastructure protection are addressed in following sections.

Other critical mission areas where joint planning efforts -- and coordinated improvements in forces, C3I, and training -- are necessary include:

**Iraq, the Iraqi border and Kuwaiti “Hinge”**

The current political crisis in Iraq and the lack of effective formal arrangements for US and Iraqi military cooperation highlight the fact that the primary land threat to the GCC comes through the Iraqi border and the strategic “hinge” in the upper Gulf along the border with Kuwait. This threat is compounded by the risk of both some form of Iran-led axis involving Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon; and a new round of major sectarian fighting between Iraqi Arab Sunnis and Shi’ites.

No one can estimate the future level of Iraqi unity, its political system, or level of its ties to Iran. Even under the best conditions, Iraq will not acquire significant conventional forces to counter or deter Iran before 2016 and this may well take to 2020 and beyond.

The GCC needs to develop common policies towards Iraq that encourage national unity, an Arab identity distant from Iran, and Sunni and Shi’ite unity. At present, it lacks such unity and is not competing effectively with Iran. It needs to use aid and strategic communications to do so.

Moreover, the GCC needs a common approach to contingency planning to defend Kuwait and the entire Saudi-Iraqi border; to support Kuwait’s development of ports, to guard against Iranian military probes, and consider a border “fence” to cover Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and possible Jordan with a cost-effective surveillance effort. These needs further reinforce the priority for bring Jordan in to the GCC- a step the GCC already has underway.

**Yemen Border Security and Threat**

Unrest in Yemen, the resurgence of Houthi opposition and AQAP, and the major problems created by illegal immigration and smuggling across Yemen’s borders are now primarily a threat to Saudi Arabia and Oman, but also involve the other GCC states as Yemeni, Somali, and Ethiopian migrants cross their borders. Saudi Arabia will have to play the lead role, but dealing with Yemen should be a GCC problem and one that will inevitably involve cooperation with the US, Britain and France.

As is the case with the Kuwait hinge and Saudi-Iraqi border, the GCC needs a common approach to contingency planning to deal with Yemen and the secure entire Saudi-Omani-Yemeni border; and consider a border “fence” to cover Yemen with a cost-
effective surveillance effort. It also needs to consider how best to develop a collective aid effort to help restore Yemeni stability and offer its people some form of economic hope.

**Mine and Anti-Submarine (ASW) Warfare**

It is unclear just how far Iran has gotten in acquiring or building smart mines. Even older “dumb” mines, however, present a critical threat. This became all too clear the Iran-Iraq War during 1987-1988. Today, however, the GCC only has four aging minesweepers in the Saudi Navy, and the US, British, and French navies have limited capability. The GCC badly needs to reassess requirements for mine warfare capability.

In contrast, the cost of effective anti-submarine warfare against a limited Iranian threat, and establishing an effective and well-trained GCC force, is probably a waste of resources if the US takes responsibility for the mission in inside and outside the Gulf. Resolving the relative role of the US (and British and French) navy and GCC navies is a critical common security issue.

**Strait/Gulf of Oman/Indian Ocean/Red Sea/Horn**

The current command and mission structure of GCC naval and air units divide up the Gulf by country. It puts the burden of covering the Strait largely on Oman and the UAE. It largely ignores the security Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean, and leaves the Red Sea to the Saudi Red Sea fleet.

The combined threat from Iran, Yemen instability, Somali piracy, and political instability in the rest of the Red Sea area -- including Egypt -- now require the GCC to start rethinking this naval posture, how best to cooperate with the US and European navies, and how to develop an integrated and more regional approach to tanker and shipping security.

**Improving Internal Security Efforts**

Several earlier suggestions have already focused on the need for integrated intelligence efforts. It is clear that cooperation in internal security is extremely sensitive on a national basis. Nevertheless, there again are areas where the GCC staff and member states may be able to develop important options for improving GCC “unity.”

**GCC Identity Cards, Passport Data**

Require GCC-wide identity cards for both nationals and foreign labor and business residents – with matching passport data for nationals -- that contain digital photo, fingerprint, and eye scan data, and track each major use of the card. Tying the use of the card to remittances, and banking/Hawala use, would provide further security information.

Such data could be encrypted so only governments can read it, and national programs could be set up to track major “events” or actions that fit a pattern of terrorism human trafficking, improper financial transfers, etc. Setting up a GCC wide pattern analysis where given uses of the card or card data were flagged as warnings, could further assist in security operations. This could include flagging movements to sensitive countries like Iran.
A GCC-wide Intelligence Effort for Counterterrorism and Dealing with Popular Unrest

Expand current cooperation to create the GCC equivalent of Interpol to create a common intelligence and data center that focused on tracking both political extremists and terrorists and providing near real time warning of the kind provided by the US National Counterterrorism Center. This effort could be tailored to reflect national standards for report to a degree that ensured such a body did not did not infringe on national sensitivities and prerogatives.

GCC Internal Security Center

In time, it may be possible to create a combined intelligence, training, and ops center to deal with low-level threats, extremism, terrorism, sabotage, and actions by states like Iran. This could create a staff that integrated GCC data on terrorism and extremist and outside asymmetric threats, looked at defense options, and found efficient ways to do common training.

The political sensitivities are obvious, but could be avoided by focus on the areas where states are know to be willing to cooperate from the start and by focusing on cooperation where countries did not have to reveal key intelligence data and sensitive information. Even if it did nothing more than bring policing, Ministry of Interior, and counterterrorism experts together – with a suitable support staff – it would help.

Common Counterterrorism Training

Create common training facilities for counterterrorism options, and developing programs to ensure cross training from one country to another. This could include related intelligence, SOF, special branch, and regular police training. It is also an area where Jordan has excellent SOF training facilities, and where joint training might occur with US, British, and French SOF forces.

Common Police and Crowd Control Standards and Training

Dealing with domestic protests, unrest, and riots is an extremely sensitive issue. It is also one where the last year has shown that GCC countries need to set the highest possible standards to minimize abuses and escalating problems that could be quickly controlled by effective and moderate action.

Developing common methods and capabilities in terms of procedures, equipment, use of force, toleration of legitimate popular protest and dissent, use of arrests and detention, and immediate expert negotiation would both aid individual countries and serve a common interest.

Create large-scale police and internal security facility that could simulate crown control, peaceful negotiation and treatment of demonstrators, and teach the use of non-lethal and non-provocative use of force. This could help could prepare all GCC states for future contingencies and raise their internal security and police forces to a high level of proficiency.
Such efforts could be given the kind of visibility to show GCC citizens and the world that GCC states are making a common effort to minimize the use of force and protect their citizens. Similarly, showing all GCC countries are acting in ways that define and allow legitimate opposition -- and limit the use of force, trials and detention to truly necessary cases -- is a key way of building public trust.

**A GCC-wide Rapid Reaction Forces for Counterterrorism and Dealing with Violent Unrest**

Dealing with violent unrest and demonstrations is very different from counterterrorism and from a military rapid reaction force. The GCC should seek peaceful internal resolution of internal issues and tensions and avoid the use of forces from other GCC countries in dealing with popular protests and unrest limited to given member states if at all possible. Outside intervention should be a last resort option that discredits the government asking for aid and requires outside forces to deal proportionately with protests they do not fully understand and cannot easily characterize.

As events in Bahrain show, however, there may be a need for carefully trained and equipped reinforcement by outside forces to deal with violent demonstrations, crowd control and popular unrest. Ensure a capability to operate effectively across borders and reinforce in dealing with popular unrest in ways that minimize the need to use force and political complications.

One option might be go create a GCC-wide capability by identifying national force elements trained, equipped, and mobile enough to come to the aid of other GCC countries, or the creation of a common force. The latter would be cheaper, identify neighboring forces in close proximity, and take best advantage of existing helicopter lift and mobility and specialized vehicles, weapons and equipment, and intelligence/communications gear.

**Encouraging Stability Through Economic, Educational, and Social Measures**

The GCC should also consider ways to improve security cooperation that address the causes of security issues as well as ways to deal with such threats. The last year has made it clear that the combination of high population growth, issues in educating and employing native youth, housing, infrastructure pressures, medical services, and other material issues plays a critical role in the security of each GCC state. These issues are compounded by sectarian differences, tribal pressures, foreign labor issues, and popular perceptions of corruption, responsiveness and integrity of government services, and divisions by region and income group over the quality of government services.

Most GCC states are now attempting to deal with these issues on a national basis, and national sensitivities preclude “unity” in addressing the problems of each state in a GCC-wide environment. There also are sufficient national differences so one size scarcely fit all.

At the same time, the need to encourage stability and security through economic, educational, and social measures is at least as great security issue as any foreign threat or terrorism. The also are important areas for cooperation in spite of national differences.
**Education**

The creation of GCC-wide scholarship and exchange programs, and GCC-wide educational standards, would help develop a common effort to improve readiness for employment, a consciousness of the importance of GCC as well as national values, and potentially serve to speed education reform by moving the debate away from purely national issues to a broad regional standard that could focus on educating young men and women for practical careers.

**GCC Domestic and Foreign Labor Policies**

It is easy to talk about “Omanization” and “Saudization,” and other policies for dealing with foreign labor, but it is even easier to continue exploiting low-cost foreign labor and relying on outside technical expertise. Creating common labor policies that give priority to hiring local nationals from within the GCC, and common apprentice and training programs that support such efforts could be used to show the concern of governments and set broad standards for reducing dependence on foreign labor. These policies could be expanded to include Jordan and other critical Arab states.

The same common policies could be used to create a GCC wide approach to foreign labor. This could include visas, protection and rights, salary and remittance policies, and limits of foreign vs. Gulf labor.

It is important to note that setting higher standards for foreign labor, and raising real world labor costs, is a key way to encourage employment of GCC nationals. Such efforts can also be joined to the use of GCC-wide identity cards to help ensure the stability of foreign workers by protecting them, managing visas, and tracking every entry, departure, and change in job status.

**Setting Common Social and Economic Standards/Goals**

The last year has shown that education, housing, medical services, utilities and water, equity of income distribution, perceptions of corruption, quality of governance/rule of law, human rights, and levels and quality of employment all act as critical factors shaping domestic stability and unrest.

Gulf states differ sharply today in the levels of such services. They are, however, improving in each state. Setting up a Commission or body in the GCC to examine the level of performance in each country, set common goals and standards, and show the people of each country that they and their children will benefit over time offers a potential way to increase stability.

Making key elements of such an effort public is a way of focusing protest and public dissent on real issues and ones government’s can actually solve, as well as reassuring Gulf youth. This is particularly true if it shows each government is providing equity across sectarian and regional standards and is actively working to determine current problems and solve them.
Building Dignity, Trust, and Faith in Government Integrity

The political crises in the Middle East and North Africa last year – along with the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan – has provide a long series of lessons in the fact that calls for democracy do not suddenly produce working representative government and viable political systems. At the same time, these events provide a grim warning of the degree to which regimes can underestimate popular anger, distrust, and feelings that governments are corrupt and do not respect their peoples. They also have revealed a fact that is consistent in the history of governments throughout the world: Unless there are reliable ways to measure public opinion, leaders overestimate their support and bureaucracies and those around them tell them what they want to hear.

Steps towards local elections, and empowering a national Majlis, can help deal with such pressures without disrupting the current political system and national stability. At the same time, GCC governments need feedback that is more reliable, and provides better measures of popular discontent.

The use of polling is a key tool towards this end, and polling could be conducted on a GCC-wide basis to both provide broad goals for the GCC in an open form and provide detailed warnings to individual governments – warnings that could be kept confidential by tailoring the release of the data. Such polling would also serve as another way of focusing popular opinion on issues and real-world government actions – particularly if it took the form of individual surveys that focused on key areas, rather than sweeping efforts that would focus on every problem or issue at once.

Once again, the key areas of concern are: education, housing, medical services, utilities and water, equity of income distribution, perceptions of corruption, quality of governance/rule of law, human rights, and levels and quality of employment. These are areas where each GCC government needs to develop better ways to monitor how its citizens actually feel, get advance warning of discontent, and react preemptively to deal with popular discontent. They are also ways of setting better and more realistic priorities for councils, planning groups, Majlis action, etc.

At the same time, surveys and measures of effectiveness need to focus heavily on corruption at lower levels, frustrating bureaucratic and government systems that seem to ignore public needs, apparent favoritism, and corruption and delays in the courts and police system. These aspects of governance, coupled to growing income inequality and high level cronyism and special treatment, have been key factors in leading to popular perceptions that governments fail the people.

Creating GCC Study and Planning Efforts

There are several areas where the GCC staff might work with member countries to provide advice and planning that would aid in security and stability:

- GCC Development Report

Build on the Arab Development Report of 2009, but tailor to the GCC states – possibly include Jordan Iraq, and Yemen. Avoid sensitive political areas like “democracy” and
political reform, but focus on core elements of stability like housing, services, education, health, job creation, and youth employment.

Put together an annual report showing the scale of the key social, economic, and demographic problems that have led to political unrest in other areas, and show the progress and plans to improve life, serve citizens, and encourage stability.

Doing this on a multinational level ensures no one state is singled out, that public attention is focused on material progress state can actually address, shows governments really care, and makes the case to tot world for the GCC.

- **GCC Survey**

Create a carefully structure survey to get a clear picture of the level and causes of internal tensions and dissatisfaction that threat stability in each country. Provide leaders with a base that does not single out a given country, but provides a real world overview of popular priorities for stability.

- **GCC Jobs Creation Program**

Build on national job programs to go GCC-wide. Focus on youth unemployment. Highlight existing efforts, but look towards the future. Examine demographic and educational impacts. Serious examine the risks of overdependence on foreign labor.

Look beyond simple measures of employment to address disguised unemployment, career satisfaction, school to employment lags, income distribution, biases toward government employment, and ability to afford marriage and separate housing. Focus on the most important single problem affecting internal stability.

- **GCC Housing Program**

Do the same for housing.

**Improving Energy and Infrastructure Security: Passive Defense**

Civil defense and passive defense are other areas for cooperation and ones where the GCC can act to provide studies plans, and create a dialogue. The GCC states are extremely dependent on central power, desalination, and energy facilities – and several require major increases in capacity to deal with growing populations. GCC states have already taken some measure to create pipeline routes that by pass the Strait, but “unity” in the GCC requires a broader range of actions:

- Collective efforts and standards for the passive and active defense of critical infrastructure and key energy facilities.
- Common stockpiling of critical parts and components to allow rapid repair of sabotage and combat damage without waiting for long-lead items.
- Integrating power and water systems so the GCC can compensate for a breakdown or damage to a critical power or desalination facility.
• Creating a broader range of pipelines that by pass the Straits and go though Oman, to Yanbu, and possibly through Jordan.
• Improving roads and possibly create a rail capability to move bulk cargo broadly through the Gulf from ports in Oman and from Jeddah.
• GCC wide planning to reduce the growth of water and power use through conservation and realistic pricing.
• Applying the same efforts to reduce wasteful use of domestic fuel, gasoline, and natural gas use.

One key test of such security is that no Gulf city should be critically vulnerable to an Iranian attack or some form of sabotage to a major power or desalination facility. Another goal is to disperse energy facilities in ways that share national use and reduce reliance on any one facility.

**Creating More Effective Cooperation with Power Projection Forces Outside the GCC**

There are limits to the GCC options in cooperating with forces outside the Gulf. Only one additional regional power now seems to be a viable immediate candidate. Including Jordan in the GCC would add an important military force, although one from a country where stability may be an issue. Pakistan is approaching the status of a failed state, no longer is superior to Gulf force in training and leadership, and present a far great political risk than Jordan. Russia and China are not acceptable options. Turkey is a rising power, but its forces are not designed for power projection, and Turkish support still presents political sensitivities in some GCC states.

This leaves the GCC dependent on the Europe and the US, and both have limitations of their own. The GCC faces the reality that British and French power projection capabilities are already severely limited in going beyond the Mediterranean areas and the operating range from major peacetime basing facilities. Current plans and budget pressures make it clear that they are going to be steadily reduced as a result of financial pressure over the next five years.

The situation is more favorable in regard to European arms sales. Cutbacks in European military procurement have limited the range of advance air and surface-or-missile equipment, smart munitions, and systems like UCAVs that Europe can sell and support at a contractor level. However, Europe still can provide excellent land weapons, helicopters, and trainers; and Europe also produces naval vessels that often area better suited to the operating needs and ranges of GCC states than most US naval systems.

Europe still offers GCC states alternative sources of arms, but it should be noted that GCC states need to be careful to ensure that contract supports offer high degrees of interoperability with US or other European forces, and that both the European and US contract teams that support equipment in peacetime will be adequate and willing to support combat operations.

The US remains the leading global military power, and has a large presence in the Gulf. The US is already cooperating in depth in areas like the modernization of GCC air forces, common training, and many other areas. USCENTCOM, the US 5th Fleet, and the US commands in Kuwait and Qatar all provided major support as do US advisory teams. At
the same time, the US does face force and military spending cuts, and has not established a stable Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq.

The GCC needs to establish a much clearer base for mid and long-term planning for the support US, British, and French power projection forces can actually provide over time. It also needs to linking GCC force planning and procurement to clear plans for interoperability, and develop suitable contingency plans.

- **This is not a NATO function.** NATO does not control forces, and has no special expertise in power projection. It also includes far too many members that cannot contribute and which can present political complications.

- **It is, however, in the interest of every GCC state to preserve as much British and French power projection capability and training presence as possible, and to ensure that the US will preserve a major presence in the region over time.** It is equally important to ensure that at some point, the US, British, and French presence evolves in ways that focus more on projection from outside to deal with truly critical contingencies in ways directly linked to the rate of improvement in GCC forces.

One way to help achieve more unity inside and outside the GCC would be to ask that the US and Britain, and France set up military liaison offices to support GCC force planning, procurement, and exercise efforts, and proving military representatives to take on an “observer” status in GCC military meetings. This would effectively recognize efforts that already exist in most GCC countries, but develop a more integrated and effective effort without compromising GCC sovereignty.