

AMERICAN MILITARY CULTURE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A Report of the
CSIS International Security Program


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Preface

THIS STUDY OF U.S. MILITARY CULTURE is timely for many reasons. First, strong organizations require strong cultures. That point is even more salient for organizations such as the armed forces that must take their men and women into harm's way.

Second, there have been many questions about how we can preserve the essential elements of U.S. military culture in the face of changes in U.S. society and in the strategic environment. Not only are the armed forces with their unique culture challenged by sea changes in U.S. society, but the tasks assigned to the military today may also divert our forces from their core competency of conducting combat operations.

Finally, our all-volunteer, predominantly married armed forces are operating under a high level of pressure. How that pressure may affect the underlying culture is an important issue for all Americans.

In the pages that follow, the CSIS study team—composed of Center staff and outside experts—reports on its two-year research effort. The team analyzed the existing literature, reviewed survey data from each of the services, sponsored two major conferences, held 125 focus-group discussions, and surveyed 12,500 men and women in operational military units and selected headquarters, including two unified commands and two service component headquarters.

The most important finding of this study is a welcome one. The CSIS team found great strengths in U.S. military culture. Common basic values, ethics, performance expectations, and standards are high across all ranks, in all of the services, in both the active and reserve components despite necessarily different service cultures. Every member of the CSIS team who visited our men and women in uniform was impressed by their skill, dedication, and patriotism.

When CSIS asked military personnel about life in their services and their units, however, they often found disappointment and frustration. In spite of a high level of pride and commitment, our dedicated people in uniform did not typically have high morale and revealed far less satisfaction from their service than one would expect. Overall, the armed forces are overcommitted, underpaid, and under-resourced in the units that form their cutting edge. Expectations for a satisfying military career are not being met. Recruiting, retention, morale, and readiness have all become problematic; in the long run, culture is likely to suffer.

In addition to these issues, the CSIS team found an uneven quality of leadership in many units, symptomatic of a leader development system that is not always able to cull the most effective leaders from a set of generally excellent officers. Also troubling was a seemingly inordinate perceptions gap between leaders in the field and fleet and senior uniformed leaders over issues ranging from readiness levels to recruit quality.

Perhaps the most important of the many recommendations here is that the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation (to which the Coast Guard answers) form a military culture task force that will monitor issues that affect the organizational climate and culture of the armed forces. This action will guarantee the long-term visibility and attention to cultural issues that are needed to create institutional solutions for the complex problems described in this study.

It is the profound hope of everyone connected with this study that our efforts will help sustain a vibrant military culture, the cornerstone of military effectiveness today and in the future. If we have done that, our efforts will have been well directed and our time well spent. In the end, we also will have helped our men and women in uniform, who, in the final analysis, must remain the masters of their own culture.

Edwin Dorn
Cochair

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A STUDY OF THE SCALE AND SCOPE of *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century* is not a simple undertaking. This project benefited from the help of dozens of people dedicated to understanding and meeting the needs of our armed forces. They shared their thoughts and experiences, read manuscripts, and surveyed thousands of service members on three continents. The leadership of William J. Taylor Jr., original director of this research project and now retired vice president of International Security Affairs at CSIS, was critical to the success of this project. The members of the working group collectively shaped the outcome of this project, and those who served as group chairs provided wisdom and key course direction. Drafters endured numerous rewrites and “helpful suggestions” about their tasks. In the end, however, responsibility for any inaccuracies in this report belongs to the study director.

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During this project, participants at two major conferences addressed a broad range of issues of military life. Both conferences took the form of workshops. At the first, in November 1998, teams were asked to identify issues affecting military culture. At the second, in February 1999, participants focused on the unique cultures of the individual services. Both conferences made significant contributions to this report and we heartily thank the participants. The participants at our November 1998 conference were:

Col. C. Kenneth Allard, USA (ret.); Lt. Col. Steven Aude, USA; Deborah Avant; A. J. Bacevich; Bernard Bass; Lt. Gen. Julius Becton Jr., USA (ret.); Maj. Paul Bliese, USA; Col. Tom Bowditch, USMC (ret.); Lt. Col. John W. Bressler, USA; Capt. Thomas W. Britt, USA; Beverly Byron; Col. Larry Carter, USAF; Lt. Col. Barbara Chine, USAF; David L. DeVries; E. Richard Diamond; Edwin Dorn; Tom Drinkwater; Stephen M. Duncan; Col. William Eckhardt, USA (ret.); Maj. Gen. Robert F. Ensslin Jr, ARNG (ret.); Capt. Gerald Fleming, USCGR; Col. Karen Frey, USA (ret.); Gen. John R. Galvin, USA (ret.); Brig. Gen. James R. Golden, USA (ret.); Lt. Gen. Howard D. Graves, USA (ret.); Milledge A. Hart III; Brig. Gen. R. G. Head, USAF (ret.); Frances Hesselbein; Milton Hill; T. O. Jacobs; Col. Robert B. Killebrew, USA (ret.); James Kitfield; Col. Wolf D. Kutter, USA (ret.); Capt. Coleman Landers, USN; Col. T. Scott Lloyd, USA; Roderick R. Magee II; Capt. Rosemary B. Mariner, USN (ret.); Lt. Col. Mark McGuire, USA; Charles Moskos; Col. Margaret N. Novack, USAR (ret.); Albert C. Pierce; Renee Roman; David R. Segal; Mady W. Segal; Lt. Gen. Alonzo E. Short Jr., USA (ret.); Maj. Gen. Perry M. Smith, USAF (ret.); Col. Don M. Snider, USA (ret.); Col. Wilder M. Snodgrass, USA (ret.); Col. Lewis Sorley, USA (ret.); Ronald Spector; Judith Hicks Stiehm; Col. Jay Swartz, USAR; Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, USMC (ret.); Lt. Gen. Walter F. Ulmer Jr., USA (ret.); Chuck Vollmer; John Allen Williams; Brig. Gen. Myrna Williamson, USA (ret.); Adam Yarmolinsky; Judith A. Youngman.

The February 1999 CSIS Service Cultures Workshop was an opportunity for experts on the individual services to share their views on the unique identity and culture each service has developed, issues each faces, and the possible effects of joint operations. A special address by Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Rudy De Leon highlighted this event. Workshop participants included:

Col. C. Kenneth Allard, USA (ret.); Lt. Col. John W. Bressler; Lt. Gen. Richard A. Chilcoat, USA; David Davis; Lt. Col. Frank Finelli, USA (ret.); Capt. Gerald Fleming, USCGR; Lt. Gen. Howard D. Graves, USA (ret.); Brig. Gen. R.G. Head, USAF (ret.); John Hillen; T.O. Jacobs; Lt. Col. Pete Jordan, USAF; Col. Robert B. Killebrew, USA (ret.); Richard Kohn; Col. T. Scott Lloyd, USA; Capt. Rosemary B. Mariner, USN (ret.); Lori Esposito Murray; Williamson Murray; Col. Margaret N. Novack, USAR (ret.); Mackubin Owens; Capt. Larry Seaquist, USN (ret.); David R. Segal; Col. James Smith, USAF (ret.); Col. Don M. Snider, USA (ret.); Capt. Peter Swartz, USN (ret.); William J. Taylor Jr.; Vice Adm. Howard Thorsen, USCG (ret.); Pat Towell; Lt. Gen. Walter F. Ulmer Jr., USA (ret.); Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (ret.); John Allen Williams; Brig. Gen. Myrria Williamson, USA (ret.); and Capt. James Woods, USN.

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WITH WARMEST THANKS TO THE 12,500 MEN AND WOMEN OF THE ARMED FORCES WHO SHARED THEIR TIME AND THOUGHTS WITH THE CSIS TEAM.

Executive Summary

THIS STUDY IS ABOUT MILITARY CULTURE, the bedrock of military effectiveness. To put military culture—the values, philosophies, and traditions that animate the force—into context, however, we must look beyond it.

Although civil and military cultures share many values in a democracy, there must be significant differences between the cultures. For example, while our civil culture appropriately emphasizes liberty and individuality, military culture downplays them and emphasizes values such as discipline and self-sacrifice that stem from the imperative of military effectiveness and success on the battlefield.

At the same time, civil and military cultures are interactive. Harvard's Samuel Huntington reminded us in 1957 in *The Soldier and the State* that a nation's military reflects both its own functional imperative and "the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant" within its parent society. Thus today's armed forces, anchored by the bonds of tradition and the requirements of military effectiveness, will also be pushed by the winds of society's pressures and pulled by the currents created by government policies and technological change. Society's pressures and the ramifications of government policies—although independent of military affairs—have a major impact on the current climate within military units and an obvious potential for affecting the underlying culture.

Civil culture in the United States today has remarkable strengths. Not only has it supported the most creative and prosperous society in history, but it has also generated the power and stamina to win three global conflicts in this century. The last of these conflicts, the Cold War, although punctuated by limited wars that cost the lives of nearly 100,000 Americans, was decided (without a third world war) on the strength of our core national values and the quality of Western civilization.

Much in our contemporary civil culture is not exemplary, however, and some of its negative features complicate the challenge of sustaining a vibrant military culture. The family structure in the United States has been weakened, and we have produced a generation of bright young people who all too often lack role models or moral anchors. In addition, a booming economy, the lack of a major military adversary, and decreasing numbers of community leaders with military experience have made military service an increasingly remote issue for many Americans. It is no surprise that the military services face difficulty in attracting, motivating, and retaining the required numbers of productive people.

The ramifications of defense and foreign policy decisions are another set of external influences on military culture. More than a generation ago the United States decided to build an all-volunteer military force, and by any measure it has been a clear success. In an era when "peacetime" America has never been safer from military aggression, however, this volunteer force has never been busier. Today the smallest force in four decades—with 56 percent married—is overworked, under-

paid, and underresourced at the cutting edge. Readiness and morale have slipped; recruiting and retention are problematic; and careers in the military have become less satisfying.

Although external societal pressures and the policy environment can affect military culture over time, the most powerful and direct influence on organizational climate and, eventually, on culture comes from within the officer corps of the armed forces. Officers turn values into action, bring coherence out of confusion, set the example, and articulate the viewpoint of the military institution. Today, external environmental pressures have complicated the tasks of the commissioned and noncommissioned officers who train, discipline, and inspire the force. Ever present organizational imperfections—leadership problems or the tendency to micromanage—thrive under these pressures. For all hands and their families, it is a challenging and often frustrating time to be in uniform.

There is little doubt in the minds of the study participants that conditions within the armed forces are far less favorable than they were a decade ago. Although better off today than in the dark days of the Vietnam War or in the trough of the “hollow” force of the late 1970s, the U.S. military is facing potentially serious rifts in its culture, with attending damage to future operational effectiveness. But after our contact with thousands of individuals in uniform, we also have no doubt that even with all the current stresses and strains, the motivation and values of our people in uniform are strong.

The aim of this study is to develop recommendations on matters concerning climate and culture that will ensure military effectiveness in the years ahead. We now summarize our analysis, findings, and recommendations.

Purpose and Context

Even a cursory review of the available evidence suggests that U.S. military culture today is undergoing significant strain owing to a variety of factors. At no comparable period in our peacetime history has the United States leaned more heavily or frequently on its armed forces. A breathless pace of operations as well as constrained resources, changing missions, shifts in the marital status and demographics of the uniformed population, rapid advances in technology, and multiple opportunities in a robust civilian society—are dramatically affecting the organizational climate in the U.S. military and may well have an unpredictable impact on the underlying culture.

Questions are often asked about the status of the military today compared with that of the armed forces during other stressful times in the past. Analogies are useful, but it is not possible to make a detailed, scientific comparison with past military forces because geopolitical, social, and economic circumstances have changed greatly. When experts drew attention to the hollow forces of the late 1970s, for example, the environment was radically different from today's. The all-volunteer force was less than 10 years old, the Soviet Union presented a clear military threat, the demographics of the armed forces were considerably different, and the propensity of youth to enlist in the military was stronger. However, even the best attempts

to compare today's force with the past will miss an important point. The challenging environment of the twenty-first century—the focal point for this study—may well require operational units that are more powerful, more agile, and better led than today's forces. The most salient issue for our armed forces is not where they have been; it is where they have to go.

This study describes how contemporary challenges and conditions are affecting U.S. military culture and, thereby, the sustained effectiveness that is the ultimate goal of the institution. The study then recommends changes necessary for preserving and enhancing the cultures that constitute the foundation of the American profession of arms. In this report, military effectiveness means the ability to accomplish assigned missions within an appropriate amount of time with minimal casualties and an appropriate expenditure of resources.

This study took advantage of a variety of sources of information. CSIS also invited participation from a wide range of experts—military and civilian—during the two years the study was in process. Members of the study working group that guided the preparation of this report included scholars, business executives, and retired military officers; the working group had more than 400 years of military service among its members.

To gain a tailored view of organizational climates and provide fresh insights that could lead to a better understanding of cultural matters, CSIS was able to conduct its own Military Climate/Culture Survey (MCCS) of the perceptions and attitudes in a number of operational units. In all, CSIS was able to survey U.S. Army (active and reserve components), Marine Corps, and Coast Guard units, as well as senior service component and joint headquarters staffs. The working group also benefited from a review of outside surveys conducted by all of the services.

During 1998–1999, CSIS teams surveyed more than 12,500 uniformed respondents at 32 locations in the United States, Korea, Hawaii, and Europe. Following the administration of the survey questionnaire, 125 focus groups—each composed of 5–7 officers or noncommissioned officers—were conducted to supplement the quantitative data and gain deeper cultural insights. In a concurrent companion study, two dozen scholars working under the banner of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) in Durham, N.C., conducted a detailed study of modern civil–military relations and the shape of the gap between military and civil societies. Although investigators shared data, each study reached its own conclusions. No attempt was made to coordinate either the findings or recommendations of these two studies.

The CSIS study confined its focus to major issues affecting the culture and operational effectiveness of the armed forces. We did not explore issues of defense funding levels, service roles and missions, force structure, strategic planning or military doctrine except as they directly affected the health or enhancement of service cultures. The study also did not address the subject of the civilian workforce or the appointed civilian leaders within the Department of Defense. Study authors took no stand on the recent debate over returning to conscription or a system of national service; we worked from an assumption that the United States can sustain an effective all-volunteer force.

Finally, while combat operations will remain their essential focus, U.S. forces will undoubtedly have to adapt to the full spectrum of operations in the twenty-first century. Most projections of the future indicate that both war fighting and peacekeeping will take place in a demanding environment that will put military people to the test in every respect. Hazardous, challenging missions will require the United States to maintain high-quality active and reserve forces that maintain the timeless values at the heart of U.S. military culture.

The Meaning of Military Culture

What is military culture, exactly? Its essence is *how things are done in a military organization*. Military culture is an amalgam of values, customs, traditions, and their philosophical underpinnings that, over time, has created a shared institutional ethos. From military culture springs a common framework for those in uniform and common expectations regarding standards of behavior, discipline, teamwork, loyalty, selfless duty, and the customs that support those elements.

Closely linked to military culture, and much easier to assess directly, is organizational climate. Climate is essentially *how members of an organization feel about the organization*. Many factors influence organizational climate; among the important factors are perceptions about the system of rewards and punishments, the flow of communications up and down the command chain, expectations for job performance, and the fairness of administrative systems; the characteristics of the workload; and the example set by leaders. Organizational climates ultimately determine how individuals feel about the quality of the institution as a whole. Although it is more malleable and responsive to immediate pressures and policy guidance than is culture, organizational climate can have a major impact on the underlying culture over the long term.

The services that make up the armed forces have much in common. All the services, for example, use boot camp or basic training as a rite of passage for new initiates—a critical cog in the turning of civilians into service members—and have adopted hierarchical, youth-oriented, up-or-out systems that allow for few lateral entry opportunities. All the services in the main are dominated by leaders from their combat elements, train their own specialists, and develop their own leaders. Each of the services also aspires to be a meritocracy, where advancement is prudently governed by a system of relatively centralized promotion boards.

Within that broad cultural framework, each service has fashioned a distinct culture that helps shape its worldview and approach to combat. The common U.S. military culture aside, men and women in U.S. uniforms do not consider themselves as part of a generic armed forces but instead take pride in identifying themselves as soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, or coast guardsmen. These unique service cultures typically perpetuate and enhance the cohesion and esprit de corps that remain vital to a unit under the stress of battle. The separate service cultures also permit concentration on skills and doctrine necessary for their respective roles and missions on land, at sea, and in the air. The key task for the future is to improve

interservice cooperation without damaging the service cultures that are so essential to cohesion and combat within their own domains.

Contemporary Cultural Strains

All available evidence gathered in this study strongly suggests that the U.S. military is nearing a critical juncture as it enters the twenty-first century. The post-Cold War era has been one of clear and remarkable change for the U.S. military. Although the military has undergone demobilization after major wars in the past, the period of downsizing and restructuring during the 1990s has been unique in several respects.

Qualitatively perhaps the best force the United States has ever fielded, the all-volunteer military today is also older and more married than traditional conscription forces, and possesses high expectations on issues affecting quality of life and job satisfaction. Today's force also has historically unprecedented percentages of women, many of them entering nontraditional jobs and formerly gender-segregated units. At the same time, the armed forces find themselves competing for personnel with a civilian society in the midst of one of the most sustained expansions of economic opportunity in modern times. For many of today's youth, enlisting in the military is an alien thought. With the number of veterans dwindling, local advocates and role models are fading in number. These dynamics have created tremendous pressures on all of the services as they struggle to recruit and retain the quality individuals needed for the high-tech force of the twenty-first century.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this period of downsizing is that, despite having cut the force by more than one-third, the U.S. military finds its pace of operations more hectic than ever before in peacetime. The rate of overseas deployments has increased more than 300 percent since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The very competence the U.S. military has displayed in successfully responding to a wide variety of contingencies seems to have encouraged its further use by national command authorities.

Given a growing array of new missions, from peacekeeping to homeland defense to drug interdiction, the primary responsibility of the U.S. military still is to deter, and, if necessary, fight and win the nation's wars. U.S. strategic nuclear forces thus remain ready; and powerful U.S. forces remain forward deployed in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. During the past decade, the U.S. military has also frequently engaged in limited but stressful conflicts in places such as Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia.

While it is coping with these many contemporary challenges, the U.S. military is confronting potentially revolutionary advances in its military capabilities. In Desert Storm, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the U.S. military has clearly demonstrated its martial prowess. This revolution in military affairs (RMA)—dominated by the rapid exploitation of information for new and more effective ways of applying military force—will both enable and place stress on traditional hierarchical military organizations. Rapid vertical and horizontal dissemination of information will change

patterns of command and staff relationships while it provides rich tactical and managerial data to higher headquarters. The armed forces will require more sophisticated models of leadership to exploit properly the enhanced capabilities of their units.

A final, indelible characteristic of this unique period is that of constrained resources at the operating level. The leadership of the armed forces today faces a series of difficult choices on how best to spend available resources for buying new equipment, maintaining current bases and facilities, training personnel, repairing aging equipment, increasing pay, and funding unforeseen contingencies.

In taking the pulse of today's military, this study found a profound stress on the armed forces created by these unique dynamics: a smaller but busier force, under-resourced at the cutting edge; the demands of nontraditional missions and frequent conflicts; older personnel who are often married who are in high demand in a robust civilian economy; and revolutionary changes in technology and threats. Sustaining the effectiveness of this military force whose competence and versatility is a bulwark of U.S. superpower status is the central thrust of our recommendations.

Findings

- **Fundamental professional values are remarkably strong but are under stress from several different sources.**

Despite obvious pressures on today's U.S. military, men and women in uniform have embraced traditional military values. In a society that celebrates the pursuit of happiness and the rights of the individual, military personnel today overwhelmingly subscribe to traditional military values such as self-sacrifice, discipline, and obedience to lawful authority. In 125 focus-group discussions, there were no complaints from service personnel that standards were too high or expectations for good order and discipline too stringent. It is clear that the U.S. military has maintained high expectations for itself.

This commitment to a traditional military code and standards of excellence, however, does not translate automatically into high morale or satisfaction with military life. Instead, many service members are frustrated that circumstances in their units seem to preclude their achieving high standards of mission readiness. Morale and satisfaction with service have both suffered, and this has had a negative impact on military effectiveness.

While U.S. military culture necessarily fosters certain values and traditions that differ from the civilian society that the military serves, the MCCS and associated focus-group discussions found no evidence of military alienation from civilian society that has been reported elsewhere. In large measure, respondents gave respect to and believed that they had the respect of civil society.

- **Morale and readiness are suffering from force reductions, high operating tempo, and resource constraints; culture may suffer in the longer term.**

Many service members have deep concerns about the state of training and readiness in their units; this strikes at the heart of a number of military values. Because the armed forces put such a premium on combat readiness and operational excellence, leaders at all levels are frustrated by signs of declining readiness in recent years. For example, at the Army's premier combat training facility, the National Training Center, observers report a marked decrease in the proficiency of participating units.

Simply put: The leadership of the armed forces has not yet adjusted to the reality that there are insufficient operating resources and personnel to match missions. This raises the question of whether the allocation of resources, the number of missions, the methods of leadership and management, the military's traditional expectation for universal excellence, or some combination of these factors must change. A sustained inability to attain expected levels of mission readiness may lead to a cynical view on the part of service members about the institution's standards and goals and may erode confidence in institutional leadership.

One clear sign of how profoundly the pressures of resources and operating tempo are affecting morale and readiness is the degree to which these pressures are producing remarkably similar symptoms across the services. In CSIS focus groups, officers and NCOs from widely different operational environments described surprisingly similar concerns about morale, levels of stress on personnel and families, problems with recruiting and retention, and, for some personnel, declining trust and confidence in the institution and its leaders. This common response to institutional stress is not only evidence of a common thread of basic culture that runs through the armed forces but also of systematic problems that transcend the separate service cultures. Left unchecked, these problems could have profound, long-term negative consequences for the underlying culture. Systemic solutions, not short-term fixes, must be found.

- **Strong local leadership, which is not uniformly in place today, is essential for maintaining the vibrant organizational climates essential for operational effectiveness in the twenty-first century. Present leader development and promotion systems, however, are not up to the task of consistently identifying and advancing highly competent leaders.**

The contention that good leadership makes a significant difference is not new. Particularly in difficult times, the single most influential factor in determining morale, cohesion and organizational climate is the quality of local leadership. Absent enlightened leadership, military organizations under stress often tend to develop a dysfunctional zero-defects rigidity that stifles effectiveness.

The MCCS survey and anecdotal evidence, however, revealed striking differences in the quality of organizational climates in today's military. Although one unit or ship had a strong sense of mission, teamwork, mutual trust, and open communication, another at the same location, with virtually identical missions and resources, had a far different climate. The quality of local leadership almost certainly explains those measurable differences.

Despite the centrality of leadership, the services have yet to master an optimal system for consistently identifying, promoting, and developing their best leaders. The primary challenge—today and into the future—is to better select and prepare leaders who can create effective organizational climates even in difficult times.

Leader selection and development systems are at the heart of the matter, and both are intimately tied to the underlying military culture. Although there have been recent reviews in the armed forces of the methods of personnel selection, development, assignment, and promotion, they do not seem to be backed by the type of institutional momentum necessary to force significant change in this sensitive area. Better systems are also needed to take the pulse of organizational climates routinely throughout the military so that the best can be emulated and the worst remedied.

- **Circumstances often require military leaders to make decisions when the value of loyal responsiveness to authority, on one hand, appears to conflict with the values of loyal dissent and candor, on the other. Conflicts among professional values, not unique to the military, if not properly and openly resolved in each case, can erode trust within the armed forces.**

The military has traditionally placed mission accomplishment above nearly all else, thus a can-do attitude is the hallmark of successful senior leaders and others. Over time, this may induce senior military personnel to take on an excessive number of missions or other projects.

In the MCCS and associated focus groups, many officers and NCOs—well informed through the Internet and by other means—expressed disappointment in their senior service leaders. Issues ranged from agreement by senior leaders to take on missions that have stressed their forces beyond what some think are prudent limits to assessments of readiness that did not match perceptions at lower levels.

Note that it is not unusual that the view from the Pentagon is at odds with the view from the trenches. However, such a perceptions gap—complicated by the need for senior military leaders to support administration policy while also speaking for their service or command—can erode the trust that is essential to the chain of command. The transitory nature of command and other personnel turbulence are likely compounding the problem.

- **Operations other than war (OOTW), although essential to the national interest, are affecting combat readiness and causing uncertainty about the essential combat focus of our military forces.**

The increased tasking of the U.S. military in OOTW has challenged the services' focus on traditional combat, the armed forces' primary responsibility. Peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations have forced many military units to train at least temporarily to different skills and standards. Although some units felt these operations provided solid training and good leadership experience for junior officers and NCOs, retraining after peace-

keeping operations was necessary to meet rigorous combat readiness standards. Ambiguity in basic missions can lower expectations for competence in traditional primary skills. Although OOTW may well be in the national interest, a dilution of the focus on combat operations can have a cultural impact.

Peacekeeping operations have broadened the myriad tasks that military units must master, contributed to deployment fatigue, created competition for scarce resources, and could alter the essence of the military profession. None of that argues that they should not be undertaken. Instead, it argues that the national command authority and the services need to understand better the considerable costs of such operations and the ways to mitigate against potentially negative impacts on the underlying military culture.

- **Although the quality and efficiency of joint operations have improved during the 1990s, harmonization among the services needs improvement.**

Since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986, the services have made great strides in their ability to coordinate activities and work together on complex operations. Lingering interoperability problems among the services remain, however; and at the service-headquarters levels, a competition for resources and missions often produces unproductive rivalries. In some areas, the competition among the services in terms of doctrine, training, and acquisition has proven healthy. The challenge confronting the services is to continue to foster distinct, vibrant service cultures while improving the services' capacity for effective joint operations.

- **The services have made significant strides in more closely integrating the plans and operations of their reserve and active forces, but continuing efforts are warranted.**

MCCS data from Army units reveal that the professional values and commitment to excellence in the reserve forces are virtually indistinguishable from the active forces. As the active forces have increased the use of their reserve components to help shoulder the increased workload, the level of stress in many reserve units has risen sharply. Reservists are increasingly concerned about an unprecedented tempo of operations that may not prove sustainable over the long term. Left unchecked, this trend of higher operating tempo is likely to cause tensions for reservists torn between their civilian and military commitments.

- **Issues of gender integration and racial imbalance in some units need to be addressed.**

MCCS data also revealed that different racial groups in the military generally hold common views regarding traditional military values, the quality of unit leadership, and other elements of organizational climate. This commonality of views among members of different races is a healthy indication that supports the contention of many sociologists that race relations in the armed forces are generally better than in the wider society. Although this comparative victory was noted in the November 1999 Armed Forces Equal Opportunity Survey, that

study of more than 40,000 service members also noted frequent acts of perceived racial discrimination and disrespect. In the MCCS, 71 percent of all respondents indicated general agreement that their units did not have racial discrimination problems, but 36 percent of minority personnel believed that there was some sort of racial problem in their units. Racial integration in military ranks may well be a comparative success story, but it is one that offers military commanders no cause for complacency or inattention.

One area that calls for continuing attention is racial distribution throughout the force. Certain units or occupational specialties—special operations forces in all of the services, light infantry units in the Army, and the submarine force—are highly racially imbalanced. The apparent source of racial imbalance (from less than 10 percent minority in some units to more than 60 percent minority in others) is apparently self-selection. Although not entirely new, the issue of self-segregation is worrisome. Soon minorities will account for few senior positions in prominent areas such as the Army's light infantry or the Navy's submarine community. Because many of the Army's and Navy's senior leaders come from these elite entities, this trend could result in fewer minority officers being selected for the most senior positions.

Gender integration in the military remains a complex and controversial issue. Our survey revealed significant differences between male and female responses at most grade levels. Females are generally less positive in their view of organizational climates and are less likely to respond positively to expressions of military values regarding self-sacrifice. At the same time, 28 percent of female personnel and 13 percent of males definitely saw sexual harassment or discrimination as a problem in their units.

The MCCS and Navy surveys indicate significant perception problems about the job performance of female personnel. Much to our surprise, these surveys also reveal that a significant percentage of female personnel seemed to be skeptical about the relative performance of service members of their own gender. Our focus group discussions revealed more concern about female job performance and the impact of gender integration on unit cohesion than many studies in the past have indicated. Generally, the more senior the respondents, the more positive they were regarding the integration of females in nontraditional billets.

- **Reasonable quality-of-life expectations of service members and their families are not being met. The military as an institution has not adjusted adequately to the needs of a force with a higher number of married people.**

While a sense of willing sacrifice remains strong in today's military, so too does the expectation of a reasonable lifestyle for individuals and families. Despite significant resources now being devoted to child-care centers, programs for single parents, and on-base housing, the data suggest that the efforts to date have fallen significantly short of the mark.

Many service members are leaving the armed forces for other careers owing in part to the inadequacy of military pay, medical care, family support, retirement benefits, and other quality-of-life factors. On the MCCS, statements about pay adequacy, pay comparability, and overall standard of living received by far the most negative responses of the survey's 99 items, ranking 99th, 98th, and 89th, respectively.

Higher pay and better housing are necessary but are not sufficient answers to the problems of morale and retention. Participants in focus groups frequently expressed the sentiment that service life was simply no longer fun. Some studies have noted a disturbing ambivalence in successful junior officers about one day commanding ships, battalions, or aviation squadrons. Frequently these mid-career officers see the lifestyles of their commanders as unnecessarily hectic and frustrating.

Although there are no hard supporting data, focus-group discussions and informal communications revealed that junior officers and NCOs in many units believe that the services are losing a disproportionate number of their most talented service members. Pay and benefits as well as long periods of family separation likely account for some of the retention problems, especially among high-skill groups such as pilots and electronic technicians who have many higher-paying job opportunities in the civilian world. However, unmet expectations for a challenging and satisfying military lifestyle were identified as a larger issue in nearly every focus group.

Major Recommendations

The CSIS study participants assembled recommendations with multiple audiences in mind. Chief among them are the decisionmakers and leaders in the legislative and executive branches, including officials—both military and civilian—in the Departments of Defense and Transportation who are most directly responsible for the care and management of the U.S. armed forces. Some factors such as the imbalance between resources and missions at the operating level that affect the current climate in the military and, potentially, the underlying culture must call on the executive branch and Congress for their resolution.

The ultimate keepers of the culture in the services are the commissioned officers. The officer corps has the responsibility for preserving and protecting what is good about the service's culture and modifying those aspects of culture that must change to meet future challenges. This report is for them too. Because the lifeblood of the U.S. military has been and will remain the sons and daughters of an enlightened and informed citizenry, we have also compiled this study with the public in mind.

Our main recommendations, which follow below, are intentionally broad and leave to the implementing agencies the matter of how these changes are to be accomplished.

- Improve public understanding of the necessary differences between civilian and military cultures and the many demands being placed on military personnel and their families; civilian and military leaders must make a greater effort in telling the military's story to the American people;
- Reiterate and emphasize to the public that combat operations remain the essential competency of the Department of Defense;
- Reduce the high levels of stress in the operating elements of the armed forces by correcting the current imbalance between available resources and mission requirements; either resources must be increased or redistributed, or missions must be decreased or redesigned;
- Provide senior decisionmakers with accurate, timely information and reinforce the value of candor within the chain of command; therefore, the services need to redesign their systems for assessing and reporting unit readiness, and they also need to develop reliable systems for determining the morale and cohesion of their units;
- Improve procedures for developing, selecting, evaluating, and promoting officers in all the services.
- Work to eliminate the gap in perceptions between the Pentagon and the operating forces about such matters as readiness, adequacy of resources, and quality of recruits; this will help to avoid a general erosion of trust within the chain of command and improve understanding;
- Encourage and reward appropriate risk taking at every level; this will help eliminate risk aversion and a zero-defects mentality;
- Address in the curricula of all senior service colleges the issue of service cultures—their distinctness, their potential positive and negative impact on joint activities;
- Maintain vigilance on equal opportunity for all racial groups and work to eliminate severe racial imbalances in certain branches, occupational communities, and functional areas of the armed forces;
- Study job performance and cohesion problems that are related to gender integration in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps;
- Meet the reasonable quality-of-life expectations—especially in pay and medical care—of service members and their families; this will help to recruit and retain competent men and women in the armed forces,
- Create a special task force on military culture that will provide the necessary oversight and institutional stamina needed to carry out the recommendations of this study; this task force, composed of representatives from the Departments of Defense and Transportation and the military services, should assess the implementation of the recommendations and report periodically to senior officials about organizational climates and military culture;

Despite considerable pressures, the people in today's force are highly motivated patriots who have continued to produce excellent results under trying conditions. To ensure that the U.S. armed forces are ready for the future, the United States must begin to make essential improvements inside the force and in the way that the force is utilized and supported. This will sustain the sound military culture and healthy organizational climates that will be essential for U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.

Introduction

ON THE DUSTY BACK STREETS OF MOGADISHU, SOMALIA, on October 3, 1993, two U.S. Army sergeants did the nearly unthinkable. While their helicopter hovered over another downed helicopter to provide air cover to its wounded occupants, Sergeants Gary Gordon and Randall Shughart came under such heavy enemy fire that their own chopper could not remain on station. Unwilling to abandon fallen comrades, Gordon and Shughart volunteered to stay behind to face the insurmountable odds. Permission was reluctantly granted.

Lowered by rope to the ground, Sergeants Gordon and Shughart extricated the wounded pilot of the downed helicopter under withering enemy fire, an action that the pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, believes saved his life. Gordon and Shughart held off the growing number of attackers until their own ammunition ran out, and they were killed. Both Gary Gordon and Randall Shughart were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

Several years later, on routine naval operations in Pusan Harbor, Korea, when one of Ensign Daniel Johnson's men became entangled in a line that was pulling him to a probable death, Ensign Johnson rushed to his aid. The citation of the Navy and Marine Corps Medal that was awarded to Ensign Johnson stated, "Immediately, without hesitation, and in the face of known risk to his own life, Ensign Johnson ran to the assistance of the entrapped line handler." The sailor survived with the loss of a leg and four fingers. Ensign Johnson lost one finger and both legs below the knee. Columnist George Will later wrote that Johnson said he took that action because "...officers are trained to be responsible for the well-being of their men." From his hospital bed, the brave young officer said of his Navy experience: "I developed a lot of self-confidence when I was doing my job. No regrets."¹

Where does the United States find such people? Or such service members as the U.S. Air Force special operations team that flew into enemy territory at night to rescue a downed U.S. pilot during Operation Allied Force? Or the U.S. marines who were recently dispatched to keep an uneasy peace in Kosovo and showed remarkable restraint in defusing tense and dangerous confrontations? Or the coast guard search-and-rescue teams that flew their helicopters out to sea at night into the face of "the perfect storm" to offer hope to imperiled ship crews when no other help could be found?

The answer to the question of where does the United States find such people is that, to a degree unmatched in any other segment of society, the U.S. armed forces attract, nurture, and develop such heroic service members in a culture rich in the traditions of self-sacrifice, discipline, courage, physical rigor, and loyalty to

1. George F. Will, "An Officer's Duty," *Washington Post*, October 21, 1999, p. A29.

comrades and country. The goal of this study is to identify the elements of today's U.S. military culture that must be preserved, adapted, or modified in order to support best the military effectiveness in the twenty-first century. We define "effectiveness" as the capacity of a military organization to accomplish its assigned tasks within an appropriate amount of time with minimal casualties and with a reasonable expenditure of resources.

Many aspects of the U.S. military have undergone extensive and continuing analysis in recent years. Areas of study have included defense funding levels, the size and structure of both active and reserve forces, service and Joint Staff roles and missions, modernization and weapons procurement, domestic and overseas basing, the adequacy of military readiness, racial and gender integration and revisions of boot-camp regimens, recruiting and retention challenges, and personnel compensation.

What has been lacking for some time, however, is a comprehensive review of the fundamental philosophies, values, and traditions that form the foundation of U.S. military culture. Even a cursory review of the available evidence reveals that U.S. military culture today is undergoing tremendous strains and pressures from a variety of sources. Major changes in the geopolitical, technological, and societal landscapes in just the 1990s have been remarkable and perhaps unprecedented. Few have reflected, however, on the linkage between these immediate stresses and the underlying institutional culture. The end of the Cold War and a focus on domestic priorities, for example, have prompted the major reduction of approximately 33 percent in the size of the U.S. military and nearly 40 percent in the resources available to it. Ironically, this downsizing has occurred in a period when the pace of operations and U.S. military missions and commitments around the world have increased dramatically. In fact, the post-Cold War period has seen U.S. military forces placed in harm's way on a wider variety of both humanitarian and combat missions, far from their families, and with a greater frequency than at any comparable peacetime period in U.S. history.

The press and others have noted that the U.S. military has also experienced an exodus of talent from both the officer and enlisted ranks. All the services have found it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain the high-quality personnel that have made competence a cornerstone of the modern U.S. military. High school graduates today have expanded educational and economic options, as well as new opportunities for travel and adventure outside the U.S. military. Both within the military and without, citizens also have a rising expectation of a comfortable standard of living and supportive work environment.

Other stresses and strains affect the U.S. military and perhaps have an impact on military culture, including incidents of misbehavior such as the abuse of power and sexual misconduct by personnel at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, in 1996 and the sexual harassment by Navy personnel at the Tailhook convention in 1991. Some observers have decried a perceived softening—or demilitarization—of the military, while others have warned of a perceived gap between military and civilian values and norms. Warnings have been issued of eroding military readiness for the hardships of protracted battle, and critics charge that some top military leaders failed to sound the alarm on readiness problems in time because of inappropriate sensitivity to domestic political concerns.

Another impetus for this study came out of work done to prepare *Professional Military Education: As Asset for Peace and Progress*, a review of professional military education completed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 1997. CSIS noted then a deep reservoir of concern in military ranks about morale, readiness, and cultural values in what has proved to be a period of heightened turmoil for all the armed forces. Those warnings and CSIS's own concerns about the future vitality of the U.S. military prompted this effort.

The central purpose of this study is to identify those actions that must be taken to preserve and improve the essential U.S. military culture and, thus, enhance the effectiveness of U.S. military forces in the next century. The primary audience for this report is the decisionmakers and leaders in the legislative and executive branches—especially within the Department of Defense—both military and civilian—and the Department of Transportation who are most directly responsible for the care and management of the U.S. armed forces. Ultimately, however, as in many democracies, the lifeblood of the U.S. military will continue to be an informed and enlightened American citizenry; we have written this report with them in mind also.

We have concentrated on military effectiveness. We have defined culture as the prevailing values, philosophies, customs, traditions, and structures that collectively, over time, have created shared individual expectations within the institution about appropriate attitudes, personal beliefs, and behaviors. Essentially, it is how members of an organization do things in the organization. It is the assimilation of culture that causes everyone in uniform to turn without thinking and salute the flag as it is lowered at day's end. Military culture induces common expectations about acceptable behaviors and attitudes among those in uniform—particularly in times of stress and danger.

A direct link exists between military culture and effectiveness. The underlying culture of U.S. military forces is the foundation from which arise standards of behavior such as discipline, teamwork, loyalty, and selfless duty. The values and philosophies that have evolved as central to U.S. military culture have emerged from both the noble basic tenets of the U.S. Constitution and the harsh lessons of the battlefield.

The culture in a strong, traditional institution also influences decisionmaking at all levels. It has a powerful, often subtle, impact on both U.S. operations and U.S. assumptions. It can produce dysfunctional blind spots in thinking and limits on innovation as well as a stimulus for wonderful, selfless action.

Culture itself is difficult to assess directly, as are other vital but somewhat intangible areas of human commitment and aspiration at the heart of organizational functioning. A more convenient institutional phenomenon, and one greatly influenced by culture, is organizational climate. Climate is relatively easy to assess, and numerous studies in both military and civilian organizations have shown that culture and climate determine in large measure the effectiveness of the organization. Values, work habits, levels of trust within the chain of command, teamwork, the fidelity of communications, and commitment to excellence make differences in the productivity of organizations of every kind—in peace and in war.

Organizational climate is, essentially, how members of the organization feel about the organization. Many elements affect organizational climate, from perceptions about the system of rewards and punishments and the flow of communications up and down the command chain to work tempo and the example set by leaders. Organizational climate is simply the combined environmental stimuli that determine individual and team perceptions about the quality of working conditions. Ultimately, an organization's climate will determine how individuals feel about the quality of the institution as a whole as well as about immediate working conditions. Although more malleable and responsive to external pressures and policy guidance than culture, organizational climate can have a major impact, for good or ill, on the underlying culture over the long term.

Past changes in national policies can modify organizational climates in the military and, in some cases, can deliberately change institutional culture. The racial integration of the armed forces initiated by President Harry Truman in 1948 has been a more successful cultural intervention in the U. S. military than in many segments of the society at large. Once given its marching orders, the military, as a disciplined institution, can adapt relatively quickly although the institutional cultural transformation necessary to perpetuate those adaptations requires substantial time and effort. History also teaches that relatively successful hierarchical organizations, such as the military, usually attempt significant cultural change only when pressed by external events—political, social, economic, or technological.

Multiple surveys and analyses confirmed our assumption that, given their unique role in society, all the armed forces share a common underlying culture. Within that broad culture, however, are numerous subcultures that typically enhance esprit de corps and are often essential to mission effectiveness.

This study confined itself primarily to the internal workings and essential culture of the armed forces. We did not review such issues as defense funding levels, service roles and missions, force structure, strategic planning, and combat doctrine except where they were related to climate or culture issues. This study also has not addressed the subjects of the civilian workforce and the appointed leaders in the Defense and Transportation Departments and the military services. Finally, although the study authors take no stand in the recent debate over the advisability of returning to a system of national service or conscription, we worked from a belief that the United States can sustain an effective all-volunteer force. The question of a widening gap between values inherent in the U.S. military culture and in society at large is the subject of a ongoing study by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the two separate study teams have shared data and findings.

There is ample and convincing evidence that the challenges the United States will confront in the twenty-first century will require a strong and especially versatile military force. If anything, the first post-Cold War decade suggests that the U.S. armed forces must be prepared to respond in the future to an increasing variety of missions, from nuclear deterrence and conventional combat operations to humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, noncombatant evacuations, and homeland defense.

The demands of undergirding America's superpower status in such an uncertain age will require military forces that can anticipate and react to change. That

change could come in the form of shifts in the geopolitical landscape. It could result from unanticipated technological advancements. The change might even originate in society itself. The primary responsibility for maintaining a resilient and efficient force that can adapt to such rapid-fire change will fall on military leadership. The recruitment, education, and development of an enlightened leadership corps able to cope with hardship and ambiguity—while it maintains discipline and unit cohesion—must remain a top priority for all the armed forces.

It is the officer corps—and the general and flag officers, in particular—that has the responsibility for retaining what is good in the U.S. military culture and instituting those changes necessary to ensure an effective military force into the twenty-first century. Although the commissioned officer corps is the prime catalyst for change, a unique and essential role remains for noncommissioned officers (NCOs)—the corporals, sergeants, and petty officers. The competence and commitment of these hands-on leaders will prove at least as important in the twenty-first century as they are today. By providing vital individual leadership and developing the requisite skills in their charges, they will continue to exemplify the fundamental ideals of the military profession.

Finally, although the U.S. military must prepare for the full spectrum of operations in the twenty-first century, its primary missions will remain deterrence and, if necessary, combat and victory in U.S. wars. These demands require that the United States maintain high-quality active and reserve forces and infuse them with the traditional values at the heart of U.S. military culture: self-sacrifice; discipline; obedience to lawful authority; physical and moral courage; and loyalty to comrades, unit, and nation.

Using a wide variety of methods and data sources, the authors of this study focused on determining the elements of military culture needed to ensure military effectiveness today and into the twenty-first century. The data base included our own specially designed field survey, the Military Climate/Culture Survey (MCCS), which provided firsthand information from more than 12,500 Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel in operational units and personnel from all services in selected headquarters. These data were augmented by recent internal surveys compiled by the individual armed forces and by a number of additional studies conducted by the Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, and by nongovernmental agencies. Besides field surveys, the study group's work included conferences and discussions held from early 1998 through the summer of 1999. Two formal conferences included free-flowing discussion of the issues among a wide range of participants from the business, military, political, and academic communities.

During the two-year course of this study, participants discussed a multitude of issues affecting military effectiveness. Some issues were discarded because they were not sufficiently related to military culture. Others were seen as too fleeting or peripheral to affect fundamentally the long-term military effectiveness. The findings and recommendations have been winnowed to focus on major issues of culture, keeping in mind our goal of enhancing operational effectiveness.

The report is divided into discrete chapters, including an executive summary; chapter 1, this introduction; and chapters 2 and 3, which discuss the evolution of

our military cultures and the contemporary challenges they face. Chapter 4 provides selected information on survey and other data, and chapter 5 outlines the military challenges anticipated in the twenty-first century and the foundations of military culture that will be required to achieve operational excellence in the future. Chapter 6 presents the study findings; this is followed in chapter 7 by specific recommendations.

Contemporary Military Culture

SOCIOLOGISTS AND BUSINESS EXECUTIVES have long known that highly successful organizations usually have vibrant organizational cultures.² Given the military's unique role of managing violence on behalf of society, a strong and incorruptible culture is not only important but essential. It is no exaggeration to state that the nation's security relies in large measure on the vitality of U.S. military culture.

The main sources of the unique military culture of the United States are the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, selected U.S. and international laws, and more than 200 years of U.S. military history. The United States began as a country profoundly distrustful of a standing military, the legacy of a nation born of its rejection of kings and tyrants. Although the effects of that legacy waned as the United States became a world power, a suspicion of large, standing armed forces persists. That partly explains Americans' insistence on strong civilian control of the military and their affection for the citizen-soldiers who are today the volunteers in the National Guard, the reserves, and the active force.

At the same time, a military culture by definition must differ significantly from civil culture in a democratic society, a fact recognized in U.S. law and supported by the Supreme Court. Because the driving imperative behind U.S. military culture is the unique responsibility to fight and win the nation's wars, basic individual freedoms in the military are often curtailed for the sake of good order and discipline, and the armed forces reserve the right to dictate strict rules of behavior that would be clearly inappropriate for a civilian employer.

As mentioned earlier, military culture is essentially how things are done in a military organization. It consists of the accepted values, philosophies, traditions, and customs that are passed along to each successive generation of service members to create a shared professional ethos. From that shared identity spring common expectations. Each of the services has its own shorthand for the core values that underpin military culture: "duty, honor, and country" for the U.S. Army; "honor, courage, and commitment" for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps; "integrity, service before self, and excellence" for the U.S. Air Force; and "honor, respect, and devotion to duty" for the U.S. Coast Guard.

Closely related to military culture is organizational climate, or how the members of the organization feel about the organization. Over the long run, changes in

2. On the general topic of organizational culture, see Edgar H. Schein, "Organizational Culture," *American Psychologist* 45, no. 2 (February 1990): 109–119.

organizational climate can significantly modify culture. In this chapter, we examine some of the intense pressures affecting the contemporary organizational climate in the U.S. military, including a high tempo of operations and other activities, constrained resources, changing missions, and changes in the marital status and demographics of the uniformed population that may be affecting the underlying military culture. But first we review the fundamentals of both U.S. military culture and the cultures of the individual services.

Elements of Military Culture

According to James Burk, the four essential elements of military culture are discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps.³

Discipline is widely regarded as the essential factor that differentiates the armed forces from an armed mob. The U.S. military insists on high standards of discipline precisely because it knows that the battlefield demands it. Discipline is the quality that enables military formations to operate in that most demanding of environments—combat. Although it is backed by the threat of punishment and reinforced through drill, modern military discipline emanates more from unit cohesion and the example set by inspiring leaders.

The professional ethos of the U.S. military has traditionally centered on the imperative of combat. From the rigorous demands of the battlefield spring traditional U.S. military values such as a willingness to engage an armed opponent and sacrifice self, if necessary, to accomplish the mission; physical and moral courage; and discipline. From the U.S. Constitution and U.S. laws come the values of obedience to lawful authority; a respect for civilian control of the military; loyalty to and respect for comrades, unit, and nation; and service and advancement based on merit.

Perhaps the most visible manifestations of military culture are its ceremony and etiquette—salutes, uniforms, ribbons and medals, and the playing of taps—that are institutional imperatives to acknowledge lawful authority, control or mask anxiety, affirm solidarity, and celebrate the unit or individual.⁴ Ceremonies help forge a common identity. Although excessive ceremonies or overly formal etiquette can dampen morale, ceremonies are more often a positive factor, especially when they serve to celebrate military prowess and connect the military to the nation and society that it serves. Veterans and nonveterans alike attached a powerful symbolism to the fact that Desert Storm, unlike the war in Vietnam, ended with victory parades. Through such symbolism America demonstrates respect for its men and women in uniform, and the essential bond between the armed forces and civilian society is strengthened.

3. James Burk, "Military Culture," in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, vol. 2, ed. Lester R. Kutz and Jennifer Turpin (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999), 447–461. See also Don M. Snider, "A Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," *Orbis* 43, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 11–26.

4. Burk, "Military Culture," 451–452.

Cohesion and esprit de corps are the fourth foundation of U.S. military culture. Cohesion is the shared sense of sacrifice and identity that binds service members to their comrades in arms.⁵ Esprit de corps is pride in the larger unit and service as a whole. Morale, a close relative, represents the level of enthusiasm and satisfaction felt by individuals in a unit. All three are essential, but they can become dysfunctional if they lead to a confusion of loyalties, impede integration of new personnel, or provide a motive for covering up illegal or unethical behavior. Cohesion and esprit de corps—the by-products of bonding under the hardships that often typify military life—remain essential to combat effectiveness.

Traditional Service Cultures

Upon that common foundation, each of the services has fashioned a distinct culture that helps shape its worldview and approach to its task of fighting and winning wars. The services, however, share common cultural attributes that are as striking as the differences that separate them.

Each of the services, for instance, is a hierarchical organization with two- and three-decade career paths and little opportunity for lateral entry or even transfer between one service and another. The services are pyramidal, youth-oriented, up-or-out systems from which even the four-star general or admiral must normally retire at 35 years of service or 59 years of age, whichever comes first. All use boot camp or basic training as a rite of passage for new recruits; this training constitutes a critical step in the process of turning civilians into soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, or coast guardsmen. All the services then continue with formal training to develop service member competence in a respective specialty. Each service is likewise a meritocracy where professionalism is governed by senior officer-led promotion, command assignment, and school selection boards. Finally, in each service the keepers of the cultural flame are its commissioned officers, especially senior officers (admirals, generals, colonels, and Navy and Coast Guard captains).

The professionalism of the U.S. NCO corps (a term used here to include corporals, sergeants, and naval petty officers) is well known. NCOs act as an irreplaceable adjunct to their superior officers in transmitting service culture to new recruits and cadets and as guardians of the culture's precepts. Yet it is the officers, through their presidential commissions, who must take the lead in retaining what is good about their respective service cultures and in modifying those aspects of culture that must change to meet the challenge of the twenty-first century.

Against that backdrop of a common military culture in which all service members take pride, each of the individual services has its own distinct culture that forms an essential and powerful part of every service member's identity. Within each of the services, additional subcultures exist based on the type of unit (e.g., fighter squadron), branch (e.g., infantry) or, in the Navy, war-fighting community (e.g., aviation, surface warfare, submarine, or special operations).

5. Ibid., 454–455.

The U.S. Army

The Army, the oldest service, worships at the altar of “service to nation,”⁶ said the late Carl Builder, of the RAND Corporation. Its seminal experiences, which retain a tight grip on its imagination and doctrine, are its triumphs in campaigns in the European theater during World War II. Somewhat demoralized after the war in Vietnam, the Army underwent a revolution in the 1970s and 1980s that took it back to its familiar territory of preparing to fight major land campaigns in Europe and elsewhere.⁷ That revolution culminated in the lopsided victory of Desert Storm, which some in the Army saw as a harbinger of high-tech warfare to come but which others viewed as the last hurrah for heavy armored forces.

With its need for air support and strategic air and sea lift, the Army is inherently the service that is most compatible with joint solutions to operational issues or other military problems. Presidents and secretaries of defense have often chosen Army officers to lead complex joint or combined operations. Thus the senior U.S. commander on the scene in every major Cold War conflict was an Army officer, and 8 of 14 of the chairmen of the joint chiefs have been from the Army.

The Army counts its blessings in terms of divisions, and its downsizing from 18 to 10 divisions during the 1990s was a culturally significant development. In a similar vein, many critics have argued that the Army has been slow to move from a Cold War force, built around heavy divisions, to a more rapidly deployable and flexible force structure, an apparent priority of the Army’s new chief of staff.⁸ To some, the Army is not really different—only smaller—than it was during the Cold War.

Although the Army has been innovative in many areas, resistance to structural change has come from both the active and the reserve components, which in the Army, alone among the services, are larger (54 percent of total Army personnel) than their active counterpart. Compounding the problems of adaptation has been the Army’s checkered record in public affairs and relations with the Congress.⁹ Telling the Army story has been a challenge that Army leaders have not always met although the Army as an institution has been open and self-critical in many of its recent studies.

6. Carl Builder, *The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Bell the Cat?* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, April 1987), 23.

7. For an excellent work on this transition, see James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 1997). Not all observers of the Army’s post-Vietnam reform are complimentary. One critic, Col. Robert Killebrew (ret.), noted in correspondence with Joseph J. Collins, August 16, 1999, that although the Army adopted battlefield and leadership doctrines for a professional force, “we never took the next step.... In opposition to decentralization and mission-type orders, the Army bureaucracy centralized everything—promotions, assignments, medical care, legal authority, and so on. The only Chief [of Staff of the Army] who tried to change the system was [Edward C.] Meyer, and he failed. So what we have now is neither fully professionalized nor organized around a citizen-soldier concept.”

8. Gen. Eric Shinseki, *Intent of the Chief of Staff*, Department of the Army, June 23, 1999 <www.hqda.army.mil.csa.html> (accessed September 16, 1999).

9. Stephen K. Scroggs, “Army Relations With Congress: The Impact of Culture and Organization” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1996), 1–33, 479–486.

The Army has often had more policy and operational success than its critics give it credit for. Adapting existing structures to new missions, the Army leadership's deft use of the First Armored Division as a peace enforcement tool in Bosnia was highly successful, but it won scant praise from Army critics. While many saw the Army as slow and flat-footed in moving to Albania in 1999, few today remember the lightning speed with which it attacked multiple objectives in 1989 in Operation Just Cause in Panama.

The Army routinely receives high marks in human relations. Since its slow start in the early 1950s, the Army has become a model for the other services in the successful integration of racial minorities into its ranks and promotion of minority officers. Fully 40 percent of the active Army is composed of minority personnel, and 21 percent of the active Army's officer corps comes from minority populations. Sociologists Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler have written that, in large measure because of the Army's pioneering work, "the military is the only place in American life where whites are routinely bossed around by blacks."¹⁰

The U.S. Air Force

A descendant of the U.S. Army Air Corps and the youngest service (established in 1947), the Air Force worships at the altar of technology, according to the late Carl Builder.¹¹ Although the service measures its wealth in wings, especially tactical fighter wings, in the end the Air Force will even cut air wings and personnel to stay on the cutting edge of technology: witness the cuts in end strength the Air Force has taken in recent years in order to be able to afford the new F-22 fighter and other modern systems.

The Air Force is composed of a number of communities generally grouped around weapons platforms: the bomber community is heir to the traditions of strategic bombing in World War II and, later, the Strategic Air Command; the "fighter mafia" has dominated Air Force leadership for much of the past three decades; the strategic transport community is becoming increasingly important in this era of expeditionary warfare; the residual missile force is providing much of the nation's nuclear deterrent; and the space force and the special operations community are growing in importance.

Today the Air Force is trying to unify its various constituencies under the banner of "Global Reach, Global Power" and is reorganizing into 10 air expeditionary forces to improve its strategic agility. Some observers also perceive a shift from an air and space force to a space and air force, with the future dominated by nonaircraft systems in space. It is not surprising that such forecasts do not sit comfortably with many of the pilots who dominate the Air Force.

In recent conflicts such as Desert Fox in Iraq and Allied Force in Kosovo, the Air Force together with naval aviation and sea-launched cruise missiles has certainly become the nation's primary weapon of choice for precision strike missions that

10. Statistics on race, as of December 31, 1998, from *Defense Almanac 1999* at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/>. Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler, "Lessons on Race from the Army," *Chicago Tribune*, July 26, 1998, p. 15.

11. Builder, *The Army in the Strategic Planning Process*, 26.

achieve maximum effect with minimal casualties. The resultant high operations tempo, however, is contributing to significant retention problems in the Air Force. Topping service personnel concerns is a projected shortage of 2,000 pilots by 2002 and a fiscal year (FY) 1999 recruiting shortage of nearly 1,700 personnel.

Given its very large combat support and service support structures, the Air Force has integrated women into its ranks in greater numbers than any other service. Fully 18 percent of the Air Force is composed of women, and 99.7 percent of its jobs are open to them. Today women fly nearly every combat aircraft in the Air Force inventory.

The U.S. Navy

After two centuries of plying the seas, says Carl Builder, the Navy worships at the altar of tradition.¹² The origins of Navy culture stem from the danger of ocean voyages and preparation for battle at sea. Its seminal experiences range from the battles of John Paul Jones to its stunning victory against the Japanese fleet at Midway during World War II. Given the nature of naval combat and deployments on long, dangerous voyages, naval officers tend to be highly independent operators—the captain is still king in the Navy—as opposed to staff-centered or detail-oriented officers.

Without a major competitor for control of the seas since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Navy has recently shifted its focus from building a balanced fleet for war at sea to creating a power projection capability “from the sea.” In addition to its aircraft carrier battle groups and submarine fleet, the Navy also maintains a one-of-a-kind amphibious fleet that provides platforms for the Marine Corps to project power inland. The Navy’s close integration with the Marine Corps ensures that they will remain two separate services within one military department.

In the past it was fashionable to talk about the Navy as primarily a federation of three war fighting communities: surface, subsurface, and aviation. In recent years, however, the Navy has reorganized to achieve more unity of effort and less infighting among its communities. Although the Navy still bristles at occasional interference with sea forces by land-based commanders, it has also worked hard in the 1990s to embrace a more joint approach in close conjunction with the other services.

The Navy measures its wealth in terms of ships in general and aircraft carriers in particular. From its Cold War peak of nearly 600 battle force ships during the Reagan era, the Navy has seen its force structure decline to barely more than 300 battle force ships. Despite that downsizing, the Navy, like all of the services, has seen its operations tempo and deployment schedule in the 1990s remain at high levels for peacetime. As a result, ships and personnel have been under significant stress, and the current Navy leadership has reduced administrative burdens on personnel who are preparing to deploy.

In one sense, the Navy’s fierce streak of independence may insure its world-renowned professionalism, but it also may have insulated the service from social trends and sensitivities felt more keenly by the other services and society in general.

12. *Ibid.*, 24.

Scandal—and more than a fair amount of criticism—have been problems for the Navy in recent years. Today, with many of those problems behind it, anxiety about the retention of junior officers and aviators remains a concern for Navy leaders.¹³

The U.S. Marine Corps

The Marine Corps is a unique service and marines have the strongest service culture. Indeed, the Marine Corps has actively discouraged the emergence within the corps of subcultures based on branches or separate war-fighting communities. The Marine Corps worships at the altar of its uniqueness. Its motto is *semper fidelis*, a code of fidelity that celebrates “every marine [as] a rifleman,” and “once a marine, always a marine.” To many, like retired Lt. Gen. Paul van Riper, the essence of the Marine Corps is family. In 1999, in his first message to the rank and file, the incoming commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James L. Jones, likened the corps to the wolf pack described by Rudyard Kipling: “the strength of the pack [Corps] is the wolf [Marine], the strength of the wolf is the pack.”¹⁴

Because it has been traditionally oriented toward small wars and amphibious operations, the Marine Corps has not been as affected as the other services by the end of the Cold War. Although the Marines are often in competition with the Army for some of the “business” on the low end of the conflict spectrum such as armed intervention or peace enforcement, they have also fought side by side with the Army in nearly every major campaign of the twentieth century. During Desert Storm, for example, a two-division marine expeditionary force reinforced by an armored brigade from the Army’s Second Armored Division fought as an independent corps.

The Marine Corps is uniquely organized around three marine expeditionary forces, each of which typically has an infantry division, support troops, and an aviation wing. This flexible building-block organization gives the Marines self-contained, combined arms teams (marine air—ground task forces) that can be tailored to small or large operations. While the Army follows a similar principle, the Marine organizations may also contain fixed-wing aviation assets. (The Army would normally receive this kind of support from the Air Force, which favors centralized control of air assets and never attaches air wings to ground units.)

The Marine Corps also has some unique personnel policies that complement its force structure. Because of the mission of the Marine Corps, the fact that the Navy supplies much of its medical and combat service support, and the fact that the Army supports it farther inland, there are relatively few female marines. Only 6 percent of the Marine Corps is made up of females; this is compared with 18 percent in the Air Force; 13 percent in the Navy, and 15 percent in the Army.¹⁵

13. For a typical description of Navy problems by a habitual critic, see remarks by James H. Webb Jr., “Military Leadership in a Changing Society,” Naval War College Conference on Ethics, Newport, R.I., November 16, 1998 <www.jameswebb.com/interview/warcollege.htm> (accessed January 13, 2000). See also Rear Adm. John T. Natter, Lt. Alan Lopez, and Lt. Doyle K. Hodges, “Listen to the JOs—Why Retention is a Problem,” *Proceedings* (October 1998): 59.

14. James L. Jones, “Commandant’s Guidance” <www.usmc.mil/cmc.nsf/cmc> (accessed January 13, 2000). Lt. Gen. (ret.) Paul Van Riper made his remarks at the CSIS Service Cultures Workshop, CSIS, Washington, D.C., February 18, 1999.

To keep costs low and enthusiasm high, the Marine Corps also emphasizes youth; 50 percent of all Marines are on their initial tour of duty. This youth-oriented approach reduces deployment fatigue, keeps Marine formations low in rank and less expensive, and tends to keep relatively low the percentage of Marines who are married (44 percent, or 12 percent less than the DOD average). The youth policy does have significant costs: costs of recruiting and training are higher and the policy leads to a lower level of experience in the ranks compared with the other services.

The relatively small size of the Marine Corps has caused its leadership to harbor concerns about its health and independence. The Marines have accordingly become the best of the services in terms of public relations and one of the most adept at “working the Congress” and maintaining close contacts with their alumni in Congress and the executive branch. Marine organizational flexibility and skill in congressional relations have helped them in the 1990s to maintain a larger percentage (85 percent) of their earlier personnel strength than the other services, most of which are approximately 65 percent of their Cold War strength.

The U.S. Coast Guard

America’s “lifesaver and guardian of the sea” is part of the armed forces, but in peacetime it resides within the Department of Transportation. Unlike the other services, the Coast Guard also has law enforcement authority. On any given day, its members can be found interdicting drug smugglers, rescuing crews from vessels in distress, enforcing fishery laws, and patrolling U.S. waters to protect U.S. maritime interests.

The Coast Guard comprises 35,000 men and women in the active components backed by 8,000 reservists and 35,000 volunteer civilian auxiliaries. Its sea and air fleet is composed of 120 cutters and patrol boats, 4 icebreakers, 400 smaller boats, 70 fixed-wing aircraft, and 135 helicopters. All personnel billets in the Coast Guard are open to women.

As a seagoing service, much of the Coast Guard—especially those coast guardsmen in the cutter fleet—shares in the naval tradition. However, the Coast Guard is as different from the Navy as the Marine Corps is from the Army. Its orientation is legal and humanitarian, and it is intimately tied to and in contact with the civil society it protects. Even at the lowest levels, it works daily side by side with both civilian and military organizations.

Coast Guard culture has been shaped by a combination of the service’s legal mandates, the environment in which it operates, and a history that has spawned a culture emphasizing professionalism, courage, and maritime expertise. The most challenging of Coast Guard missions—those that involve national defense and the defense of sovereignty—have had a profound effect on its operational outlook and organization. Nevertheless, it is the service’s civil duties that give it its unique character. The United States’ smallest service prides itself on initiative, daring, and

15. Department of Defense statistics, September 1998, as noted in *Defense Almanac 1999* <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/people/>.

flexibility; for the Coast Guard, *semper paratus* (always prepared) is more than a motto—it is a mindset.¹⁶

An Emerging Joint Culture?

Although distinct and vibrant service cultures remain critical components of U.S. military culture, excessive interservice rivalry in the past blunted military effectiveness. In a typical 1980s criticism of the joint chiefs, former secretary of defense James Schlesinger harshly assessed the joint chiefs and interservice gamesmanship:

The unavoidable outcome is a structure in which log rolling, back-scratching, marriage agreements, and the like flourish. The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded. The ultimate result is that decisions regarding the level of expenditures and the design of the forces are made by civilians outside of the military structure.¹⁷

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 set out to correct these deficiencies. In what has become a case study in how legislation can achieve effective cultural change in the military, Goldwater-Nichols made the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principal military adviser to the secretary of defense and the president. It also established a vice chairman to support the chairman and improve joint influence on budgetary and program matters. In addition, it enhanced the powers of the unified commanders in the field. Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols act increased the significance of joint assignments for senior military officers, making joint duty a milestone for promotion to general or flag-officer status. Operational successes in Panama, Kuwait, Haiti, and Bosnia support former senator Sam Nunn's assertion that Goldwater-Nichols enabled the United States to make more operational progress in the past 13 years than in the entire period since "the need for jointness was recognized by the creation of the Army-Navy board in 1903."¹⁸

Goldwater-Nichols has had an important effect on service cultures. It has made the services more aware of the importance of jointness, which means improving the ability of the services and the field commands to work together; integrating service capabilities; and placing joint combat effectiveness ahead of individual service interests.

Each of the service cultures now pays homage to the needs of the joint team, but jointness is a value and not a culture unto itself. To the extent that there is a joint culture, it now resides in joint units or headquarters and is fostered by the senior

16. See *U.S. Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2000 Budget in Brief* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Coast Guard, 1999). This section draws heavily from the presentation "Mission of the U.S. Coast Guard," by Vice Adm. (ret.) Howard Thorsen at the CSIS Service Cultures Workshop, CSIS, Washington, D.C., February 18, 1999.

17. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need For Change*, report prepared by James R. Locher, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, Committee Print 99-86, 159.

18. James R. Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 13, (Autumn 1996): 63.

officers who have held multiple joint assignments. In the future, barring further service integration, an emerging joint culture is likely to come from those engaged in quintessential joint activities such as the strategic movement of personnel and matériel; or the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) functional area.¹⁹

For the foreseeable future, vibrant service cultures modified by a heavy dose of jointness will remain a critical aspect of U.S. military culture. Although the potential exists for excessive interservice rivalry, competition among the services will also remain a vital part of the U.S. system. The highest U.S. national security leadership from time to time may need to control service programs in the name of jointness, but it must not diminish service cultures in the process.

19. Don M. Snider, "The Services in an Era of Jointness," presentation at the CSIS Service Cultures Workshop, CSIS, Washington, D.C., February 18, 1999.

Environmental Change and Cultural Effects

THE RESEARCH AND SURVEYS conducted as part of this study reveal that many areas of the U.S. military are undergoing profound changes that are dramatically affecting organizational climates and may, in the long run, significantly erode the underlying military culture. Indeed, the environmental pressures outlined in this chapter are so strong that they have affected highly different service cultures and command climates in remarkably similar ways. The broad picture that emerges from the research is that U.S. military forces are highly motivated but over-committed and underresourced. Changes in military climate and culture, together with fundamental shifts in the geostrategic environment, changes in technology and demographics, and economic growth will challenge even the most competent and inspirational leader.

The Strong Economy of the 1990s

The unprecedented and sustained growth of the U.S. economy during the 1990s has increased opportunities in the civilian marketplace at a time when military personnel see themselves as overworked and underpaid. The exact size of the compensation gap between military and comparable civilian jobs has been the subject of intense debate; and, although some estimates put the gap as high as 14 percent, econometric studies have a difficult time accounting for the hardships of military life. There is no disputing that military pay has lagged behind civilian compensation levels. In real terms, pay for new recruits increased only a modest 16 percent in real terms during the last two decades of the twentieth century. In fact, many young service members with sizable families have been forced to rely on food stamps and other forms of public assistance.²⁰

Other factors have also contributed to difficulties in recruiting new service members. In the past, many young Americans were enticed into enlisting by a

20. On recruit pay, see Robert L. Phillips, Christopher Chambers, and Leonard Wong, "Assessment of the Factors Related to Recruiting for the U.S. Army: A Longitudinal View" (paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society Biennial Conference, Baltimore, Md., October 24–26, 1999), p. 6. On food stamps and related problems, see "Front Lines, Food Lines," *20/20*, ABC News, June 25, 1999 <http://abcnews.go.com/onair/20...2020_990625_front_lines_trans.html> (accessed June 30, 1999); and Steve Vogel, "Feeling the Pinch of a Military Salary," *Washington Post*, July 20, 1999, p. A1. On the pay gap, see "What Does the Military 'Pay Gap' Mean?" (Washington D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, June 1999), 1–9.

service's tuition assistance programs and incentives like the Montgomery G.I. Bill. Today there are many outstanding state and federal tuition assistance programs that rival those offered by the armed forces. At the same time, low-cost education and job training opportunities offered by community colleges are providing an attractive option to joining the military to learn a trade. Sociologist Charles Moskos has written:

One major obstacle to recruitment is beyond the military's control, namely the substantive federal aid given to college students who do not serve their country. We now spend more than \$10 billion annually on grants and loan subsidies to college students, in effect creating a G.I. Bill without the G.I.²¹

Because of these and other factors, the military has had increasing problems in recent years recruiting and retaining the high-quality personnel needed to man today's high-tech military. With the exception of the Marine Corps and the Navy (which was short 8,000 in FY 1998), the services had recruiting shortfalls for 1999: 6,300 for the Army; 1,700 for the Air Force; and 14,000 for the Army, Navy, and Air Force reserve components.²² The retention of well-educated, highly skilled NCOs and officers such as pilots and service academy graduates has also become a problem. A recent GAO study of "retention critical specialties" for both officers and enlisted personnel noted that 52 percent of the enlisted personnel and 42 percent of the officers were dissatisfied with the military.²³ Pay, benefits, and resources for their units were the key reasons cited for dissatisfaction. More serious enlisted retention problems may be just around the corner. Service surveys show a decrease in stated intentions to stay until retirement, and in 1999 the Air Force—long the service that has led in retention—missed its enlisted retention goals by 5 percent.

Strategic Changes and Adaptations

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of a great-power threat, the United States reduced the size of the military by 36 percent and cut military spending by 40 percent from its Cold War peak. It is an irony of recent U.S. history, however, that while the United States in peacetime has never been more secure, its armed forces have never been busier. Hopes for a new world order have been dashed repeatedly on the rocks of virulent nationalism, ethnic hatreds, and regional conflicts.

As a result, the U.S. armed forces have deployed in recent years more than 35 times, or three to four times more frequently than during the Cold War. Operating

21. Charles Moskos, "Short Term Soldiers," *Washington Post*, March 8, 1999, p. A19.

22. House Committee on Armed Services, *Summary of Major Provisions: National Defense Authorization Act for 2000*, Conference Report, 106th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 5, 1999), 5. See also Roberto Suro, "Army Exceeds Retention Goal," *Washington Post*, October 5, 1999, p. 15; and Robert Maginnis, "Filling the Ranks in Fiscal 2000," pamphlet no. 29, Military Readiness Project (Washington, D.C.: Family Research Council, January 3, 2000).

23. See *Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in Retention Critical Specialties*, GAO/NSIAD-99-197BR (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, August 1999), pp. 1–17, 20.

tempo and personnel tempo have increased dramatically. Both the Army and Marine Corps noted in 1996 that the average soldier or marine spent 140 days away from home station. The Navy continues to keep half of its ships at sea and one-third of the total fleet forward deployed, but deployment duration and personnel tempo—the frequency that individuals are deployed—have increased. At the same time, the Air Force reported a quadrupling (from Cold War norms) of personnel deployed away from home base.²⁴

All of the services, but especially the Army and the Air Force, have leaned heavily on their reserve components to help shoulder the overwhelming burden. The contribution of reserve forces to active-duty missions has increased 1,200 percent in the 1990s, from approximately 1 million man-days in 1986 to approximately 13 million man-days per year in 1996, 1997, and 1998.²⁵

To afford this largely unexpected pace of operations driven by more than 35 contingencies during the 1990s, the Pentagon underfunded the modernization of equipment and the construction and repair of base property. According to a 1999 CSIS study, the force outlined in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review is underfunded by as much as \$100 billion per year.²⁶ Despite relatively high levels of readiness appropriations, service readiness has been further eroded by aging equipment and the costs of unexpected contingencies paid for out of operating accounts until supplemental funding was made available.

The impact of operating older equipment at very high rates has been particularly significant in the field and the fleet. In an Armywide survey of 15,000 soldiers, NCOs, and junior officers, 41 percent described the condition of equipment in their units as poor.²⁷ After the Kosovo operation, Gen. Richard E. Hawley, who was retiring from the Air Force, noted that in the Air Force Combat Command “we are flying the oldest fleet of airplanes that the Air Force has ever operated.” Citing low readiness and high operational demands as a cause, he concluded that “we are going to be in desperate need...for a significant retrenchment in commitments for a significant period of time” after the Kosovo operation.²⁸ The other services report similar problems, but no other senior officer has called for a strategic pause as General Hawley did.

Personnel shortages due to recruiting and retention problems and disruptions caused by deployments have compounded equipment problems. In the CSIS Military Climate/Culture Survey, for instance, shortages of material resources and personnel in the units surveyed were among the most common complaints of the

24. For a list of these deployments see *A Force For Peace: U.S. Commanders' Views of the Military's Role in Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Peace Through Law Education Fund, 1999), 37. See also Joseph J. Collins, “The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner's View,” *Washington Quarterly* 21, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 214.

25. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, Department of Defense, telephone conversations with Joseph J. Collins, June 1999.

26. Daniel Gouré and Jeffrey M. Ranney, *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1999), 2.

27. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, July 1997), A-30, question 83.

28. Otto Kreisher, “Hawley's Warning,” *Air Force Magazine* 82, no. 7 (July 1999): 51–57.

respondents. The frustration in the armed forces caused by continually having to do more with less was also clear in many focus groups.²⁹

Stress fractures are beginning to appear in the smaller, underfunded U.S. military force that has deployed with increased frequency on a spectrum of missions ranging from high-intensity conflict to peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. Many of the respondents to the CSIS survey complained of what might be called deployment fatigue. Problems in morale and retention caused in part by overworked units are an unequivocal sign that the hardships caused by family separations in a mostly married force are having a negative impact.

The increased tasking of the military in operations other than war (OOTW)—including the use of force to support diplomacy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations—has also challenged the services' traditional combat focus. Although they are often praiseworthy, OOTW have clearly broadened the myriad tasks that military units must master, contributed to deployment fatigue, created competition for scarce resources, and altered perceptions about the essence of the military profession.

The MCCS and associated focus groups found that junior officers and NCOs appreciated the added measure of independence that was often an element of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. These same personnel, however, also saw the need to retrain to meet combat readiness standards after the peace operations were completed. They resented those times when they were unable to come back up to speed quickly. For example, interviews with elements of two U.S. Army battalions en route to Albania and thence to Kosovo made clear that none of the officers or NCOs felt that their units had completed their combat training after their preceding Bosnia rotation. Other studies of combat units pointed out a residual feeling that peace operations are fine, but they should be done mainly by military police or specially tailored units.³⁰ It is unlikely, however, that the manpower-poor armed forces could afford to maintain separate force structures for both combat and peacekeeping missions.

A recent study of senior-officer opinions noted, however, that one should not put too much blame on the actual peace operations, which account for only a small percentage of the budget and deployed force structure.³¹ A study of Air Force units also found that what some units do in peace operations is so much like their combat tasks that it might improve readiness.³² Other Air Force sources, however,

29. Anger at having to do more with fewer people was also highlighted in the report by the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues. See House Committee on Armed Services, *Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues: Final Report*, vol. 1 (July 1999), xxxii <<http://www.house.gov/hasc/publications/106thcongress/volume1.pdf>>.

30. David R. Segal, Brian J. Reed, and David E. Rohall, "Constabulary Attitudes of National Guard and Regular Soldiers in the U.S. Army," *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 4 (Summer 1998): 535.

31. *A Force For Peace*, 8–11.

32. William C. Thomas and Jeremy D. Cukierman, *The Next Peace Operation: U.S. Air Force Issues and Perspectives*, INSS occasional papers no. 25 (U.S. Air Force Academy, Colo.: U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, May 25, 1999).

highlighted training problems that are related to peace enforcement. One experienced Air Force officer wrote:

Operations Northern and Southern Watch [over Iraq] for our air-to-air fighter squadrons have been extremely disruptive. Units deploy [to either Turkey or Saudi Arabia] for 179 days and simply bore holes in the sky, using up flying hours and aircraft airframe time, stressing maintenance with little or no training value. As a result, aircrews are “non-mission ready” upon return to their bases, requiring retraining. They are also losing other valuable training opportunities such as “Red Flag” to hone their combat skills.³³

None of this argues that OOTW should be avoided or minimized. Indeed, they are an essential part of the strategic landscape and a significant way that the armed forces can contribute to conflict prevention or amelioration. At the same time, the leadership of the armed forces must realize that these operations are costly and that they have ramifications for military culture.

An Excessive Aversion to Casualties

Conducting military operations in the post–Cold War era that involved neither vital nor important U.S. interests has led to an excessive aversion to casualties. This aversion no doubt stems in part from the Vietnam War era, during which daily casualty figures and perceived lack of battlefield progress turned the majority of Americans against the war. However, the political urge to use the military without suffering casualties came to the fore in recent years after the death of 18 Army Rangers in 1993 in Somalia, where U.S. forces had initially gone to prevent starvation. The subsequent U.S. pullout from Somalia, echoing the tragic policy in Lebanon during the Reagan administration, showed that politicians believe that the public is intolerant of casualties on humanitarian missions. The tough reaction of the Congress in 1996 to the death at the hands of terrorists of 19 U.S. airmen in the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia demonstrated the political elite’s intolerance of casualties from acts of terrorism as well. The belief that some key force-protection measures had not been taken by local commanders no doubt increased congressional anger. All of these incidents were magnified by accurate and intense television reporting, which we believe has led some analysts to exaggerate the power of the media and the so-called CNN effect.

During the war in Kosovo, many observers believed that political demands for zero casualties limited the effectiveness of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air assets. Sensitivity about casualties by U.S. and allied political leaders and the top leadership of the armed forces precluded the United States from using other means (including ground forces and attack helicopters) that might have saved civilian lives and created operational advantages at a higher risk of casualties to allied forces. It is also possible that the United States and its allies implicitly traded greater collateral damage and civilian casualties for greater pilot safety. Cautious

33. The officer corresponded with Joseph J. Collins, August 1999.

tactics could have contributed to the ability of Yugoslav ground forces to withstand in good order what appeared to be devastating air attacks over many weeks.

This excessive aversion to casualties originated in the political world and is stronger among politicians than it is in the public at large. Contrary to the way that the U.S. government has conducted its policy, our men and women in uniform, as well as the American people, are prepared to take casualties when vital or important interests are at stake and there is a significant consensus among political leaders.³⁴ Inside the military, the MCCS has documented a strong willingness among service members to risk their lives. At the same time, some units have experienced an over-emphasis on force protection that in some cases has been put on a par with mission accomplishment. In Bosnia and Kosovo, U.S. allies wonder aloud about the unwillingness of U.S. forces to take on risky missions or operate creatively beyond their fortified camps or routine presence patrols.³⁵

In all, this excessive aversion to casualties has inhibited operational flexibility; hurt the U.S. reputation for power; and led to some confusion in the military, where self-sacrifice and the willingness to accept casualties in military operations has always been a key part of the ethos. Once more, a national policy with some intrinsic merit, casualty avoidance in this case, appears to be having unforeseen side effects within the armed forces.

Technological Revolution

On the positive side, rapid advances in communications and computer technology are fueling a revolution in military affairs. Synergies created by the use of advanced battle command-and-control systems, satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, stealth technology, and precision-guidance munitions have given U.S. military forces the ability to strike many adversaries with relative impunity.

Such rapid technological change has dramatically affected organizational climates and, over the long run, might have an impact on the underlying military culture. Whether service cultures are sufficiently flexible to accommodate a world where interconnected networks tend to replace traditional hierarchies might well become an important issue. The demands of an increasingly high-tech military force will also challenge people in combat-support and combat units to develop new skills. Tables of organization, rank structures, and even the traditional pay scale might have to change. Modern technology is also breaking down traditional barriers that separated the military and civilian markets. Contrary to the Cold War

34. Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996), xv–xvii. Recent research in our sister study on the civil–military gap has noted that military officers and the civilian elite are more casualty averse than the general public is on issues related to OOTW. See Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, “The Civil–Military Gap and Casualty Aversion” (paper prepared for The Gap between the Military and Civilian Society, a project of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Durham, N.C., October 1999).

35. See, for example, R. Jeffrey Smith, “Home Sweet Home in Kosovo,” *Washington Post*, October 5, 1999, p. 11.

model, technological advances today are driven primarily by the civilian marketplace, and tomorrow's military will have to become more adept at integrating civilian technologies into military platforms and systems.

Rapid technological change, for all of its benefits and promise, also has had some negative consequences for organizational climate and, probably, for military culture as well. Computers in particular have increased the opportunities for over-centralization, micromanagement, and impersonal leadership. When commanders have a much greater supply of information and the large degree of "battlespace transparency" that goes along with it, they have the ability to supervise in minute detail. CSIS focus groups revealed that many senior officers have used new technologies such as video conferencing, e-mail, and even unmanned aerial vehicles not as adjuncts to effective command and control but as tools for intrusive supervision. Just as some senior officers used the helicopter in Vietnam to become "squad leaders in the sky," these officers deny their well-qualified subordinates the latitude to best accomplish their mission.

Social and Demographic Changes

All militaries reflect the societies that they serve. More than 25 years after the end of the draft, the all-volunteer force in the United States reflects many of the social and demographic trends at play in society. Because the U.S. military today is a career force, a majority of enlisted personnel and officers are married and somewhat older than their draft-era counterparts. Women are also in the force at historically high levels, many in nontraditional jobs. The military remains a diverse and multiethnic organization, a continuity that will require periodic changes. These and other sociological and demographic factors are challenging the adaptability of military organizations.

Quality of Recruits

Despite fierce economic pressures and competition from the civilian marketplace, the services have been largely successful at maintaining the measurable quality of their recruits. Recruits entering the armed forces today, however, are clearly the products of a society where the nuclear family is under severe stress and good parenting seems to be both more rare and more essential. Problems with the emotional maturity of some new recruits and their trouble responding to military training and discipline have led to high first-term attrition rates in basic training and the years that follow. The number of service members who do not complete their initial enlistment contracts is in excess of 30 percent for the males in an entry cohort and 38 percent for the females in all of the services.

Surveys of recruits at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center in 1994 and 1996 revealed that a relatively high number of basic trainees entered the Navy with histories of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or alcohol misuse. A remarkable 47 percent of the female recruits reported experiencing past sexual assaults, while 38 percent of male recruits reported experiencing child physical abuse. Fifty percent of the males and 39 percent of females reported past binge drinking. These negative experiences

are not at all unique to military enlistees and are fairly typical for today's youth, but they are bound to inhibit dependability and maturity and provide a great obstacle to military socialization. Depending on service, between 54 and 82 percent of NCOs (E6 and E7) directly involved with training believe that the quality of recent basic training graduates has declined, especially in terms of discipline and maturity.³⁶

Such dysfunctional behavioral experiences have severely stressed the training base. In focus groups conducted as part of the MCCA, junior officers and NCOs frequently complained that some new personnel entering deployable units and ships directly from basic and advanced individual training are deficient in basic military skills and are inadequately disciplined. A number of junior officers and NCOs also complained that their superiors in the chain of command were not adequately backing them up when disciplinary measures were required or training standards needed to be enforced. In the MCCA, meanwhile, two statements about the indoctrination, quality, and motivation of recent graduates of basic training ranked in the bottom 10 of the 99 items in the survey, highlighting this issue as one of the most significant problems identified by the men and women of the armed forces.

Although the MCCA found that the military socialization process is usually successful in transmitting traditional military values, there is little doubt about the significant challenges ahead for the training base. In a first response to this problem, the Marine Corps and the Navy moved to toughen basic training on their own initiative. After urging by the secretary of defense, the Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard have since followed suit. They have also introduced enhanced values education into their basic training curriculum in recent years.

A More Married Force

Today 56 percent of service members in the U.S. armed forces are married, up from approximately 46 percent in 1973 when the draft was abolished. The percentages of married personnel in the Navy and Army are close to the DOD average, with Air Force (64 percent) and Coast Guard (61 percent) personnel significantly above the average and Marine Corps (45 percent) personnel significantly below the DOD average. All told, 1.4 million service members are responsible for more than 1.9 million dependents.³⁷

36. On first-term attrition, see Paul Richter, "Loss of Women Recruits a Warning Sign for Military," *Los Angeles Times*, November 29, 1999, p. 1. On naval recruits, the commander, Great Lakes Naval Training Center, corresponded with Joseph J. Collins, May 12, 1998. See also Mark I. Singer, Trina Menden, Li Yu Song, and Lisa Lunghofer, "Adolescents' Exposure to Violence and Associated Symptoms of Psychological Trauma," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 273, no. 6 (February 8, 1995): 477. On recruit quality and NCO opinion, see Charles B. Johnson, "The Study of Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues" (paper prepared for the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues, June 1999), Fig. 12, pp. 16–17. On the prevalence of binge drinking among youth in general, see Jack Hitt, "The Battle of the Binge," *New York Times Magazine*, October 24, 1999, pp. 31–32.

The increased maturity that comes with a higher percentage of marriages has many positive aspects. The MCCS study found that married service members are more likely to aspire to lifetime military careers and tend to demonstrate more pride and satisfaction in military service than their unmarried peers. A force with more married members has also likely helped the services maintain good order and discipline in places like Bosnia, where good relations with the local population are essential.

Of course a force with more married members puts an unprecedented emphasis on quality-of-life issues. The situation is complicated by the fact that today the vast majority of spouses who are not themselves in the military also work outside the home. In the past, nonworking spouses kept both military families and many installations on an even keel during deployments and separations. In this era, however, when a 1997 Navy survey³⁸ revealed that 78 percent of married enlisted personnel and 70 percent of married officers have spouses who are employed full-time, informal support structures are weakened. Not only are married service members now needed at home more than ever before, but spouses with lucrative off-base employment are likely to be more resistant to the frequent moves and separations that are a reality of military life.

Don Snider, a professor at West Point and a retired Army colonel, has stated:

A married military with working spouses is the most important sociological change in the military as an institution since the advent of the all-volunteer force in the 1970s. Simply stated, the armed forces today are more married at an earlier age, more divorced, and with more dependents than at any time in the post-World War II era, ...in fact, the provision of quality day-care is of more concern to many commanders today than is the issue of military training.³⁹

Race and Gender Issues

MCCS data showed that different racial groups in the military hold generally common views regarding traditional military values, the quality of unit leadership, and other elements of organizational climate. This commonality of views among races is a healthy indication that supports the contention of many sociologists that race relations in the armed forces are better overall than in the wider society. While this comparative victory was noted in the November 1999 Armed Forces Equal Opportunity Survey, that study of more than 40,000 service members also noted frequent acts of perceived racial discrimination and disrespect.⁴⁰ In our own study, while 72 percent of all respondents indicated general agreement that their units did not have

37. Department of Defense statistics for 1999 and Department of Labor statistics for 1996 were provided to CSIS by the Joint Staff in July 1999. U.S. Coast Guard statistics were provided to CSIS on June 30, 1999. The statistics on total numbers of dependents are from the DOD, September 30, 1998, and can be reviewed in the *Defense Almanac* at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac>.

38. John Kantor and Murray Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1990-1997: Summary of Trends* (San Diego, Calif.: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, November 1998), 6.

39. Don M. Snider, correspondence with Joseph J. Collins, August 31, 1999.

40. See Andrea Stone, "Poll: Most Minority Troops Encounter Racism in Military," *USA Today*, November 23, 1999, p. 15A.

racial discrimination problems, 36 percent of minority personnel believed that there was some sort of racial problem in their units. Racial integration in military ranks may well be a comparative success story, but it is one that offers military commanders no cause for complacency or inattention.

One area that calls for continuing attention is racial distribution throughout the force. Certain units or occupational specialties—special operations forces in all of the services, light infantry units in the Army, and the submarine force—have a high degree of de facto segregation. The source of racial imbalance (from less than 10 percent minority in some units to more than 60 percent minority in others) is apparently self-selection. Although not new, the issue of self-segregation is worrisome. Soon minorities will account for very few of the senior positions in some prominent areas such as the Army's light infantry or the Navy's submarine community. Because many of the Army's and Navy's senior leaders come from these elite entities, this trend could result in fewer minority officers being selected for the most senior positions.

The integration of historically unprecedented numbers of women has also had a profound effect on the U.S. military, which has a traditional culture that celebrates battlefield heroics, physical strength, and chivalry. Though service policy on inclusion of women is partially a reflection of the trend in U.S. society toward more equal opportunity for women, all of the services began trying to attract increased numbers of women in the 1970s in order to fill the ranks of the all-volunteer force with quality people. In 1971 only 43,000 women were in uniform; in 1999, 192,000 are: a full 15 percent of the Army, 13 percent of the Navy, 18 percent of the Air Force, 10 percent of the Coast Guard, and 6 percent of the Marine Corps.⁴¹ In all, 14 percent of the uniformed personnel in the Department of Defense in 1999 are women.

In recent years the number of military occupational specialties open to women has also increased dramatically. In the wake of the successful deployment of approximately 41,000 women in Operation Desert Storm, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin signed a directive that women could be excluded only from direct ground combat units. Women are also excluded from submarines, certain Navy ships, and selected special operations forces. In all, the Aspin policy changes opened nearly 260,000 new specialties to women.⁴²

It is not surprising that the considerable contributions and professionalism women have brought to the armed forces have not come without friction. As in civil society, the increased presence of large numbers of women in the military workplace has been accompanied by increases in reported cases of sexual harassment and assault. Both men and women have often noted that false accusations of sexual harassment at times have chilled interpersonal relations in military units.⁴³

41. Historical data from Mady W. Segal, "Gender and the Military," in *Handbook of the Sociology of Gender*, ed. Janet Saltzman Chafetz (New York: Kluwer Academic, 1999), 573. Current data from unpublished Department of Defense statistics, March 1999; similar statistics, as of September 1998, can be found in *Defense Almanac 1999* at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/people/>.

42. Les Aspin, "Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule," Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, January 13, 1994).

43. Charles Moskos, correspondence with Joseph J. Collins, August 24, 1999.

The general consensus is that sexual harassment is a problem but not one that is out of control. In the MCCS, for example, three-quarters of the respondents agreed (answer categories of "STRONGLY AGREE," "Agree," and "slightly agree") that sexual misbehavior and discrimination were not problems in their unit. However, 28 percent of female and 13 percent of male personnel definitely saw sexual harassment or discrimination as a problem in their units. At the same time, many focus-group participants felt that sensitivity training was often counterproductive. As with racial discrimination, the struggle against sexual harassment and the like must remain an important priority for unit commanders.

The presence of women in some units has also raised significant questions about the effects of gender integration on readiness and cohesion, particularly in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Supporting the view that gender integration has not helped readiness is that, except in the Navy, women in uniform leave before their first term of enlistment in significantly higher percentages than male soldiers do. This increases personnel turbulence in units and requires more resources be put into recruiting and the training base.

Women also receive low scores from men and mixed grades from other women on some aspects of their performance in the military workplace. In the Army's 1997 sexual harassment survey, only half of the male respondents in the ranks of captain and below believed that the female soldiers in their units pulled their fair share of the load. Nearly one-quarter of the female respondents were "not sure" or did not believe that women did their fair share of day-to-day work in the units.⁴⁴

The MCCS asked whether women in "units that I am familiar with would carry their share of the load in wartime/hazardous operations." Forty-five percent of the male junior officer respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they would; 68 percent of female junior officers agreed or strongly agreed. Approximately 33 percent of the male junior NCOs (E5 and E6) and approximately 49 percent of the female junior NCOs agreed or strongly agreed that women would carry their share of the load in these tough situations. On the lowest enlisted level (E1-E4), only 29 percent of the males agreed or strongly agreed that women would carry their load, and only 44 percent of the females agreed or strongly agreed that they would. When male and female responses of all surveyed ranks are tallied, only 36 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that female personnel would pull their fair share of the load in combat or hazardous situations. Female respondents, when asked about male contributions in combat or hazardous situations, showed more faith in male contributions than their male peers did. Senior NCOs and senior officers (both men and women), in the ranks of lieutenant commander or major and above, had more favorable views on this issue than their juniors, but their increased wisdom and experience may well be offset by their distance from the deck, the motor pool, and the small unit in the field.

Navy surveys also show a perception of what may be interpreted as a job performance shortfall. When asked during the 1998 Navy personnel survey whether gender integration had increased readiness, only 10 percent of the officers and 20

44. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment*, A-30, question 98.

percent of the enlisted respondents agreed or strongly agreed that gender integration had increased readiness in ships and aviation squadrons. Nearly 40 percent of all officers disagreed or strongly disagreed that gender integration had improved readiness. Divided by gender, a scant 24 percent of the female officers and only 7 percent of the male officers agreed or strongly agreed that integration had improved readiness.⁴⁵ This question, however, is ambiguous. Even an enthusiastic supporter of gender integration might believe that swapping a qualified female electrician for a qualified male electrician does not alter readiness on a ship. Still, other Navy survey items cast doubt on the overall effects of gender integration on readiness.

When asked if women in the Navy have the ability to “carry out the duties of their combat roles,” officer and enlisted opinion, measured by those selecting unambiguously positive answers (“STRONGLY AGREE” or “AGREE”), declined markedly during the period 1996–1998 (see table 3.1, which is not broken down for gender). Fifty-eight percent of the male officers and 52 percent of the male enlisted personnel agreed or strongly agreed that women have the ability to be successful in their combat roles. Approximately 71 percent of the female enlisted personnel and 72 percent of the female officers agreed or strongly agreed that women could successfully carry out their combat roles.

As gender integration in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps has progressed, skepticism about women’s combat-related skills, equity in burden sharing, and effect on unit readiness appears to be considerable. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps findings might represent some degree of male sexist attitudes, but some sort of performance problem is apparent as well. The skepticism or ambiguity in answers by one-third or more of Army and Navy women respondents (few Marine Corps women were surveyed) to statements about female job performance and related issues suggests that this is not only a simple male-versus-female problem. In summary, doubts linger among personnel of both sexes about the impact of gender integration on the readiness of units and ships. CSIS has no Air Force data on this issue, and it is not clear if these results also apply to the Air Force, which has had more experience with gender integration than the Army and the Navy. The CSIS survey found that the Coast Guard did not show evidence of gender-related job performance problems.

Other studies have criticized the effect of women on cohesion—the level of comradeship in small units—which is widely believed to be essential to both mission accomplishment and individual survival.⁴⁶ A team of scholars has analyzed five studies and found that the presence of women in military units on active operations or in garrison had a generally negative effect on small-unit cohesion. However, the

45. John Kantor and Murray Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1998: Statistical Tables for Officers* (San Diego, Calif.: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, March 1999), 131–132; and John Kantor and Murray Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1998: Statistical Tables for Enlisted Personnel* (San Diego, Calif.: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, March 1999), 173.

46. For the rare scholarly article that argues against the importance of cohesion, see Elizabeth Kier, “Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness,” *International Security* 23 (Fall 1998): 5–39.

Table 3.1 Opinions on Women's Combat Abilities, by percentage of "STRONGLY AGREE" and "AGREE" responses

Question: Can women carry out the duties of their combat roles?			
Category of Personnel	1996	1997	1998
Officers	76	64	60
Enlisted Personnel	64	59	55

Sources: John Kantor and Murray Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1990-1997: Summary of Trends* (San Diego, Calif.: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, November 1998), 17. See also Kantor and Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1998: Statistical Tables for Officers* (San Diego, Calif.: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, March 1999), 137; and Kantor and Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1998: Statistical Tables for Enlisted Personnel* (San Diego, Calif.: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, March 1999), 85.

studies indicated that the effects, while common, were not universal and might have been caused by other variables.⁴⁷

The MCCS and supporting focus groups conducted for this study found that women in uniform are more likely than men to have occupationally minded attitudes, not institutionally minded attitudes. This is to a lesser degree true of males in combat support (e.g., signal, intelligence, military police) and combat service support fields (e.g., supply and transportation) where women typically serve. Women service members are also more critical of leadership and quality of life issues in their units than men are. Female service members are, however, more satisfied with pay and allowances than male service members, which perhaps reflects the condition that in today's civilian economy women still have more modest economic prospects than males.

Gender-integrated basic training, a staple for 50 percent of Army's male recruits and many of the Navy's and Air Force's recruits, came under fire after the abuses by Army NCOs and officers at Aberdeen Proving Ground. The committee on gender-integrated training and related issues (chaired by former senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker) recommended many changes, among them separate barracks for males and females in basic training and also the use of separate training platoons or equivalent units for each gender. The commission indicated that giving basic training to men and women in the same small unit and housing them together was problematic:

Although the aim of the Army, Navy, and Air Force's "train as we fight doctrine" is to instill teamwork and discipline, the present organizational structure in integrated basic training is resulting in less discipline, less unit cohesion, and more distraction from the training programs.⁴⁸

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen did not order the services to separate men and women in basic training, but he did direct all of the services to toughen up

47. Robert K. Gifford, Laura N. Rosen, Paul D. Bliese, and Kathleen A. Wright, "Gender Composition and Group Cohesion in U.S. Army Units: A Comparison of Five Studies," *Armed Forces and Society* 25, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 365-382.

basic training and implement nearly all of the committee's other recommendations. A recent report by another congressional commission also supported gender-integrated basic training in the Army, Navy, and Air Force despite criticism of gender-integrated basic training from many of the Army, Navy, and Air Force trainers who were interviewed by the commission and its staff.⁴⁹

In contrast to the skeptical or negative views of women in the military is the successful service in Desert Storm of 41,000 women, amounting to more than 7 percent of the U.S. forces there. Thirteen women were among the 390 U.S. dead, and two women became prisoners of war. To the surprise of many, the armed forces, the political elite, and the general public accepted female casualties and POWs—albeit in small numbers—without much comment or demonstration.⁵⁰

In the peacetime force, relatively few women have failed training courses.⁵¹ Thousands of women are making significant daily contributions to the common defense in combat, combat support, and combat service support responsibilities from the recruit level all the way up to the rank of lieutenant general and vice admiral. Recently, not only have there been no public complaints about women pilots in Operation Allied Force, but the United States has also completed its first space shuttle mission commanded by a woman.

Some studies argue against the notion that gender integration has had a negative impact on units. For example, one RAND research project that looked at 14 recently integrated Army, Navy, and Marine Corps units concluded that “the major finding of the study is that gender integration is perceived to have had a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion, and morale.” The authors’ research indicated that both males and females contended that women perform about as well as men, but that widespread perception exists among men of a double standard favoring women. The RAND study concluded that “gender differences were cited by fewer than 1 percent of the survey respondents when queried about issues that affect morale. Leadership was overwhelmingly cited as the primary factor of morale.”⁵² Analysis of MCCS data at CSIS also indicates that the units with the best leadership tend to have the least race- and gender-related problems.

Overall, the issue of gender integration has been a challenging one. On the basis of the CSIS study and a review of some of the secondary literature, it appears that the effects of gender integration on unit effectiveness and cohesion in the Army,

48. Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues, *Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues to the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, December 16, 1997), 15 <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/git/report.html>.

49. House Committee on Armed Services, *Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues: Final Report*, vol. 1, July 1999, xlii–xliii <<http://www.house.gov/hasc/publications/106thcongress/volume1.pdf>>.

50. Mady W. Segal, “Gender and the Military,” 573. Only 148 of the 390 U.S. casualties were classified as battle casualties. On the casualties and the aftermath of Desert Storm, see Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Gulf War* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993): 448–500.

51. For a rare case claiming gender favoritism in a pilot-training environment, see Matt Labash, “Pulling the Wings off Warriors,” *Weekly Standard*, May 18, 1999, 22–30.

52. Margaret Harrell and Laura Miller, *New Opportunities for Military Women: Effects Upon Readiness, Cohesion and Morale* (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1997), xviii, 83.

Navy, and Marine Corps have been mixed. Whether this is an adjustment problem or a permanent phenomenon is not clear. Further study is required, especially about the effects of gender integration on unit effectiveness in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

At the same time, there is no denying the current need for women in the ranks or women's contribution to the armed forces. Given current funding, recruiting structures, and the all-volunteer force, there are no feasible alternatives to large numbers of women in the armed forces. When challenged by an audience at Harvard University about all of the problems and complications that come from having women in the military, Gen. Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke for nearly all senior leaders in the Department of Defense:

The fact of the matter is that we simply could not do our mission today without the women who volunteer to serve their country. We need their talent, we need their numbers, and we need their leadership. There is simply no alternative.⁵³

Homosexuals in the Military

Despite the occasional sensational headline or news story, the issue of homosexuals in the military is more prominent in the political arena than in the day-to-day concerns of men and women in the armed forces. During the 125 focus groups associated with the MCCS, for example, the issue of gays in uniform was hardly ever flagged as a key concern. Although there have been obvious problems of interpretation of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy and occasional violent crimes directed against real or suspected homosexuals in uniform, in 1999 the issue of gays in uniform is not a major concern for the rank and file in the field or fleet. At the same time, the vast majority of military personnel believe that homosexual men and women serving openly in the military would undermine cohesion.

If future political leaders decide that openly gay men and lesbians may serve in uniform, the Uniform Code of Military Justice—which outlaws certain homosexual acts—will have to be amended by Congress. If that action is taken in the next decade, the introduction of openly gay men and women will have a significant impact on the climate of many units and probably on military culture. The short-term impact is likely to be disruptive to cohesion and readiness. If and when such a decision is made, however, the leadership of the armed forces will undoubtedly carry out the change in policy with the same respect for civil authority and discipline that it has shown in the past.⁵⁴

53. Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as he related his Harvard remarks to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), Spring Conference, Reston, Va., April 24, 1997.

54. For data on military opinion about homosexual men and women serving openly in the military, see Laura L. Miller and John Allen Williams, "Combat Effectiveness vs. Civil Rights: U.S. Military Culture, Cohesion, and Personnel Policies in the 1990s" (paper prepared for the Triangle Institute for Strategic Studies, Durham, N.C., October 1999), p. 53, table 7-1. For contending views on homosexuals in uniform, see Kier, "Homosexuals in the U.S. Military," 5-39. Also see replies to Kier's views in Tarak Barkawi, Christopher Dandeker, Melissa Wells-Petry, "Rights and Fights: Sexual Orientation and Military Effectiveness," *International Security* 24 (Summer 1999): 181-201.

Declining Military Experience and Civil–Military Perceptions

Since the draft ended in 1973, the number of lawmakers in Congress with military experience has declined steadily from 77 percent to about 33 percent. In 1998, 63 percent of departing senators had military service; none of their newly arriving replacements did. At the same time, 35 percent of the departing representatives had some military experience, but only 25 percent of the arriving representatives did.⁵⁵ In the House Armed Services Committee, the percentage of veterans declined from 70 percent of the members in the early 1980s to 30 percent in 1998.⁵⁶ On the executive side among those in charge of national security and foreign affairs today—the secretaries and deputy secretaries of defense and state, the president’s national security affairs adviser, the CIA director—not one of these officials has served in the military.

A dwindling supply of veterans among the nation’s elite, and indeed in the American populace, is cause for concern but not panic. Some of our greatest war-time leaders—Franklin Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln, for example—were not veterans, and a Congress packed with veterans did not help us prepare for the Korean War or avoid the Vietnam tragedy. The disappearance of veterans tracks closely with the onset of the volunteer force and the post–Cold War downsizing. In this era, even wars of the magnitude of Desert Storm will not drastically raise the number of veterans nationwide. In short, the Cold War period was an anomaly. In the early decades of the twenty-first century, we are not likely again to see in government service the large numbers of veterans that were generated by World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.

Today both Korean War and World War II veterans are well into their Social Security years. Together with their counterparts from the Vietnam era, they serve as local role models who can counsel relatives and friends about military service, and they have an intuitive understanding of the burdens and hardships of military life. Veterans are also more likely to understand the necessary distinctions and differences between military and civilian cultures. Many veterans have also played a key role, especially through veterans’ organizations such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in teaching good citizenship and patriotism to America’s youth. How these functions will be replaced in the future is an important issue for our nation.

A number of observers have also noted with concern signs of a widening gap between the military and society. In a widely noted article in the *Atlantic Monthly*, author Tom Ricks claimed after spending considerable time with young Marine Corps recruits that some service members were exhibiting a “private loathing for public America.”⁵⁷

55. The Retired Officers Association, “Legislative Update,” (October 22, 1999), <www.troa.org>.

56. William T. Bianco and Jamie Markham, “Vanishing Veterans: The Decline in Military Experience in the U.S. House” (paper presented at the 1999 Triangle Security Conference on Civil–Military Affairs, Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Durham, N.C., July 1999).

Data gathered in the MCCS study and attendant focus groups, however, do not indicate an unhealthy relationship between the United States and its military. For instance, 88 percent of military personnel support (answer categories of “STRONGLY AGREE,” “Agree,” or “slightly agree”) socializing with civilians, and 75 percent believe that most military personnel have a great deal of respect for civilian society. Nearly 80 percent of survey respondents also believe that the people in their hometowns had a high regard for the military. In nearly every case, Marine Corps data were as good, if not better than, the rest of the data base.

The CSIS data are reinforced by Gallup polls that measure confidence in public and private institutions. During the 1990s, the military has consistently ranked first among all nationwide institutions, falling to second place only twice in polls since 1988. In the 1999 Gallup poll, the military again ranked first, 10 percent ahead of organized religion, 21 percent ahead of the Supreme Court, and 42 percent ahead of Congress. Such long-term, fundamental respect for the competence and sacrifice of those in uniform indicates that the relationship between Americans in general and the military is far from sour.⁵⁸

On the subject of civil–military relations, it is important to note the valuable and irreplaceable role of the National Guard and reserves. The guard and the reserves are the most visible connection between the armed forces and local communities across the United States. These citizen-soldiers, together with the hundreds of junior and senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) units across the nation, remain among the most important ties that bind the U.S. military to the society that it serves.⁵⁹

Impact of Environmental Changes

The CSIS examination of military culture and organizational climate gives us cause for both satisfaction and concern. Although values in the armed forces and devotion to duty are strong, readiness, recruiting, morale, and retention are all problematic. In fact, although current reenlistment rates are not critically low, surveys from every service have shown evidence that officers and NCOs have a diminished determination to stay until retirement. In fall 1998, highlighting material readiness, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Henry H. Shelton told the Senate Armed Services Committee that:

57. See Thomas E. Ricks, “The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society,” *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1997, 66; and Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976–1996,” *International Security* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/99): 8. See also commentary and reply by Joseph J. Collins and Ole R. Holsti, *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 199–207.

58. Leslie McAneny, “Poll Releases: The Military on Top, HMOs Last in Public Confidence,” (Princeton, N.J.: The Gallup Organization, July 14, 1999) <www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990714.asp>.

59. On the unsung benefits of Junior ROTC, see William J. Taylor Jr., *Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps: Contributions to America’s Communities* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1999).

our forces are showing increasing signs of serious wear. Anecdotal and now measurable evidence indicates that our current readiness is fraying, and that the long-term health of the Total Force is in jeopardy.⁶⁰

Today's force possesses a huge reservoir of motivation and dedication, and it is not yet the hollow force of the mid-1970s, but it is a force under tremendous pressure. Pressures on military culture are high; organizations are experiencing a high level of stress. In our survey of focus groups of men and women in uniform, CSIS found good leadership to be both mandatory and difficult. In this environment, it has become tougher to be a good soldier, sailor, airman, marine, or coast guardsman; it has also become more difficult to run a unit or a ship while maintaining a satisfactory command climate.

Today, both the electronic mail from disaffected officers and the writing of serious students of leadership and management are filled with high levels of concern:

Among the most common complaints from the field are: "up or out" officers must succeed in every assignment; stressed units and their commanders are afforded little freedom to fail; "zero defects" thinking and careerist behaviors are the rule.... There is disturbing evidence that far too many leaders are not measuring up."⁶¹

Striking a similar chord, a retired rear admiral who talked with 688 Navy junior officers noted:

The reason that 88 percent of the junior officers we listened to do not aspire to command is that command doesn't look satisfying anymore.... Among the top issues identified by the JOs [junior officers] we listened to were: loss of job satisfaction, self-inflicted pain, micromanagement and the zero-defect mentality, erosion of benefits, and lack of confidence in leadership.⁶²

In both this CSIS study and the study by Admiral Natter, many respondents complained about a zero-defects mentality, that is, the situation of nervous leaders—conscious of looking good—demanding perfection from their subordinates and oversupervising them. A zero-defects mentality can create a zero-defects environment, which leads to risk aversion, dysfunctional conformity, and meager opportunities for learning. A zero-defects environment often leads to the problem of micromanagement, the situation of untrusting leaders involving themselves in the detailed activities of subordinates, often in the pursuit of perfection.

60. "Statement by General Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 105th Congress, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, September 29, 1998" <www.dtic.mil/jcs/chairman/SASC29Sept.html>. For a more recent but similar evaluation, see "Statement of General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the 106th Congress, Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, October 26, 1999" <www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/1999/991026hs.pdf>.

61. See Collins, "The Complex Context of American Military Culture," 221; also Walter F. Ulmer Jr., "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another Bridge Too Far?" *Parameters* 28, no. 1 (Spring 1998).

62. Natter et al., "Listen to the JOs," 59.

A thoughtful Pentagon colonel tried to capture the management origins of these multifaceted problems:

The point is that in a variety of areas we are expecting the attainment of levels of training and discipline which we no longer resource. Extraordinary commanders sometimes achieve these standards without corrupting the organization—most do not.... It is more than money but it is also more than simply bad leadership.... The institution has elevated short-term task performance far above long-term organizational maintenance and development.⁶³

Although many point to the defense budget or new legislation as the fix for all of these problems, the repair of climate and culture is primarily work for the services themselves. One Marine Corps major noted that “Once we start thinking that the problems are external [to the armed forces], that thought becomes part of the problem.”⁶⁴ In addition to the traditional demand for courage and commitment, today’s taxing operational environment demands dedicated commanders with sophisticated executive skills. The armed forces must improve the way they select their officer commanders and develop their leadership and management skills.

The future security environment, discussed in the chapter 5, will require a vibrant military culture and effective organizational climates. Before moving to the future, however, it will be necessary to refine our understanding of what we found in the present. Chapter 4 presents the summary data from the MCCS and some of the other surveys that CSIS reviewed in the preparation of this report.

63. The officer corresponded with Joseph J. Collins, September 27, 1999.

64. “Hot Button Issue No. 2: Officer Retention,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (MILNET: April 7, 1999).

Study Methodology and Selected Survey Data

TO TAKE AN ACCURATE PULSE of the vitality of U.S. military culture and evaluate findings from various other surveys analyzed as part of this report, CSIS conducted its own Military Climate/Culture Survey (MCCS). During 1998 and 1999, we surveyed 12,500 respondents of all ranks (unit and staff surveys combined), primarily in Army (active and reserve), Marine Corps, and Coast Guard operational units, seeking insights into their attitudes, expectations, and perceptions. The 99-item survey—administered by CSIS at 40 locations in the United States, Korea, Hawaii, and Europe—looked at organizational climates and at basic cultural factors within selected operating units. Optional comments were also submitted by several hundred respondents.

A slightly modified version of the MCCS was also given to respondents at seven headquarters commanded by a one-star general or flag officer or higher; this effort yielded insights from a group of more senior personnel serving in staff positions. A total of 819 individuals from the different staffs participated in this 88-item survey. Members from all the armed forces were included on these staffs, and 53 percent were officers at the grade of major (O4) or higher.

Following administration of the survey questionnaire—which on average took 45 minutes to complete and was monitored by CSIS survey administrators—CSIS team members conducted a number of 50-minute focus groups with officers or NCOs at each location. The results of these sessions supplemented the quantitative data and revealed deeper cultural issues and concerns. The discussions were structured, but the structure did not heavily restrict the issues to be discussed. We thought it significant that comments from field personnel were remarkably similar in content and tone across grade groups, different types of units, and among the staffs. The results of these candid discussions were taken into account as supporting data as we compiled findings and considered recommendations.

CSIS used the MCCS as a starting point and gauge. The CSIS conclusions and recommendations evolved from a wide variety of information sources and debates. The study working group met almost every month from January 1998 through September 1999 to discuss data collection and analysis. Individuals in the study working group came with a broad range of civilian and military backgrounds and interests. Each of the armed forces was represented by former members, active or reserve. Members of the faculty and student body of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University provided assistance with study and survey design. Two formal conferences provided additional background information

and an opportunity for knowledgeable individuals to exchange ideas on the subject of military culture and climate.

On November 16 and 17, 1998, 52 outside professionals from academia, business, the military, and congressional staffs were joined by members of the CSIS study working group for a wide-ranging discussion on military culture. This assembly discussed a wide variety of topics, including the definitions of culture, the relationship between observable phenomena in field units and the underlying culture, options for study design, the likely environment of the twenty-first century, and other issues that seemed appropriate for analysis. On February 18, 1999, a workshop at CSIS addressed three main issues: the essence of service cultures, the services in an era of jointness, and service related issues. Results of this conference informed our findings and recommendations and are discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of this report.

In addition to periodic staff meetings, numerous informal discussions with subject-matter experts, the two conferences, and a continuing review of the pertinent literature (see the selected bibliography on page 109), the CSIS study relied on other survey data and related focus groups. No finding was based on information from any single source; and many of the findings were closely related to, or confirmed by, quantitative data from field surveys. For example, the study group analyzed the findings of recent personnel surveys conducted by the Air Force, Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. To varying degrees, these surveys reflected the findings of CSIS's MCCA survey, and some of them provided additional information on issues such as morale and career intentions.

A Brief Look at Selected Survey Findings

In both unit and staff surveys, the statements that elicited the most agreement and those with which there was considerable disagreement were remarkably consistent. This was one indicator, along with the similarity of issues raised in focus groups, of the relatively common response to contemporary issues across the armed forces. The MCCA used a response scale of "STRONGLY AGREE," "Agree," "slightly agree," "slightly disagree," "Disagree," "STRONGLY DISAGREE," and "Not Applicable." For certain statistical purposes these responses were given a value ranging from 6 ("STRONGLY AGREE") to 1 ("STRONGLY DISAGREE"). (A listing of all 99 items in the MCCA and all 88 items in the staff version of the MCCA is included in appendix B).

Table 4.1 presents the 15 survey statements on the MCCA that engendered the greatest amount of agreement with the text of the statement. Three themes emerge immediately in these top 15 statements: intrinsic satisfaction from being in the armed forces, a strong, personal commitment to duty, and the importance of climate. Respondents respected traditional values and ethics. The relatively uniform strength of these responses across service and ranks suggests that military socialization—despite problems associated with the attrition of first-term personnel—appears to be working well.

Table 4.1 MCCS Statements with Most Agreement
Data for Total Sample, 11,680 respondents

Rank	Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
1	5.29	1.05	1	I am proud to serve in America's armed forces.
2	5.16	1.10	17	The American military plays an important role in the world today.
3	5.08	1.17	11	My job is important in accomplishing the mission of this unit.
4	5.08	1.13	43	The essential mission of America's armed forces is to be prepared to win in combat.
5	4.88	1.41	10	If necessary to accomplish a combat/lifesaving mission, I am prepared to put my life on the line.
6	4.83	1.15	98	Whenever I have the opportunity, I socialize with civilians as well as with military friends.
7	4.77	1.35	38	The armed forces have a right to expect high standards of me when I am off-duty as well as on-duty.
8	4.67	1.43	60	I have a deep personal commitment and a strong desire to serve the nation as a member of the armed forces.
9	4.49	1.16	35	Male members of units that I am familiar with would carry their share of the load in wartime/hazardous operations.
10	4.46	1.32	30	Even in today's highly technical armed forces, military ritual and tradition are essential parts of our culture.
11	4.44	1.11	23	I have confidence in the other American military services that we might work with in joint operations.
12	4.42	1.37	46	If I could not maintain proficiency in my wartime skills I would be less interested in a military career.
13	4.41	1.42	15	I am confident that my unit commander trusts me.
14	4.41	1.34	77	Leaders in this unit do not tolerate dishonest or unethical behavior from anybody.
15	4.36	1.33	18	Our organization is serious about honesty and integrity.

The bottom 15 survey items—on which there was least agreement with the given statement—shown in table 4.2 expose four key problems that are affecting organizational climates and, in the long run, military culture. First, as noted in the 99th, 98th, and 89th items, pay and quality of life are highly problematic. The items that came out 97th (stress), 94th (mission surprise), and 87th (family–work balance) suggested problems related to excessive operations tempo. The statements that scored 96th (shortage of material resources), 92nd (insufficient personnel), and 85th (training) go to the heart of a lack of resources in units, something that affects readiness, training, and morale. The items that scored 90th and 95th

**Table 4.2 MCCS Statements with Least Agreement
Data for Total Sample, 11,680 respondents**

Rank	Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
85	3.54	1.48	26	The training in this unit is realistic and challenging.
86	3.49	1.45	63	If I make a request through channels, I know somebody will listen and inform me about my request.
87	3.49	1.48	73	Single parents in this unit are able to carry their share of unit duties while also providing adequate care for their children.
88	3.47	1.52	81	In my Service, people are given the flexibility needed to balance the demands of work and personal or family life.
89	3.42	1.72	69	My standard of living is as good as—if not better than—others my age who are not in the armed forces.
90	3.39	1.49	72	Individuals being assigned to our unit from initial entry training come to us well indoctrinated with the standards and values of our service.
91	3.32	1.56	27	We have high morale in this unit.
92	3.30	1.62	16	This unit has sufficient personnel to do our job effectively.
93	3.18	1.58	65	Married and single personnel in this unit have reasonably similar qualities of life.
94	3.17	1.45	22	Our branch of service is attracting high-quality, motivated recruits.
95	3.16	1.76	5	In my unit, we are rarely surprised by unexpected missions or taskings.
96	2.90	1.54	62	This unit routinely is provided adequate material resources (parts, supplies, funds) needed to accomplish our assigned missions.
97	2.76	1.57	25	People in this unit are not “stressed out.”
98	2.61	1.57	49	My military income allows me to provide adequately for my family.
99	2.27	1.50	66	I receive pay, allowances, and other benefits comparable to individuals in civilian life who have my skills and responsibilities.

indicated a significant problem with recruits and recruit training, also a persistent theme of focus-group comments.

This brief slice of data emphasizing the areas of highest and lowest agreement with the given statements among the respondents presents a snapshot of today's force that is remarkably consistent with other information compiled as part of this study. The responses with which there was most agreement reveal a U.S. military force with a strong commitment to core military values such as pride in service and job, a willingness to sacrifice self for accomplishment of the mission, an embrace of good order and discipline, a healthy respect for the civil society from which the

military draws its strengths, and an appreciation of the need of the services to operate together in joint operations.

The statements with which respondents agreed the least are equally revealing. For all its commitment to core values, the U.S. military reflected in these responses is one that has deep concerns about the level of morale in units, is clearly under stress because of unexpected missions and personnel shortages; perceives new recruits as poorly trained and soft, and feels that it has a substandard quality of life and pay.

The most significant demographic differences, in addition to those expected by age and grade groups, appeared when men's and women's answers were compared. These differences are probably greatest in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, and least in the Coast Guard. We do not have sufficient data about the Air Force to assess any gender differences. The impact of these rather large statistical differences on unit cohesion and effectiveness is not clear.

General Information and Observations from Focus Groups

During 1998 and 1999, CSIS also conducted 125 focus groups as part of this study of organizational climates and cultures. Eighty-five of the groups were from Army units. Twelve focus groups were composed of members of the staffs of single service or joint headquarters. Staff personnel were primarily commissioned officers and senior NCOs. The remainder of the focus groups came from Army reserve component units and Coast Guard active duty units. CSIS facilitators used an outline that provided some structure to the discussions but left latitude for the participants to open issues of their choosing in areas related to climate or culture. The following themes were common—but not universal—among the focus groups that included reserve-component as well as active personnel:

- A strong and enthusiastic commitment to excellence (and frustration when it cannot be attained);
- Clear, strong support for traditional military values;
- Typical pride in unit and in specific unit accomplishments related to accomplishment of some particular mission or training event;
- Unease over the state of combat readiness, and concern about the adequacy of resources and lack of mission focus essential to attain readiness standards;
- Concerns about the adequacy of pay, retirement benefits, family life, and medical care—particularly in contrast with those believed to be the norm in contemporary civilian life;
- Concerns in some units that bad news is not allowed to flow upward and that reports may paint an overly optimistic picture;
- Frustration with micromanagement in some units and with the apparent lack of confidence in subordinates' judgment and commitment; and

- Concerns in some units that junior leaders may not be supported by the chain of command when they take action to maintain high standards of training or discipline.

Focus groups that included personnel from other than Army and Coast Guard units voiced remarkably similar support for traditional values and common concerns about their mission readiness and organizational climates. Clear differences were observable in the state of morale among focus groups from similar types of units within the same service; we saw these differences too in the quantitative survey results for these units. Anecdotal evidence on reputations of units and observations by the CSIS facilitators also support this finding.

Even in units or on ships with virtually identical missions and resources, we found a dramatic difference in the quality of the organizational climates. The only logical source of this significant difference is variation in the effectiveness of local leadership. Although all units surveyed could be operationally effective, clearly the units with the better command climate have a better chance of successful performance under stressful conditions. Indeed, the relation between measurable command climate and operational effectiveness has been confirmed in both military and civilian studies. One of the more recent was a study of Army light infantry platoons completed in 1999 by the Army Research Institute. Platoons with stronger trust in leaders, better communication, more teamwork, and so forth performed better in a realistic tactical scenario at a combat training center than did platoons with less positive climates.⁶⁵

Survey Scales and Comparisons

Statements on the survey were clustered around various themes for ease of analysis. This set of eight scales represents general characteristics that an effective organization must possess in any environment but that are likely to be especially critical for military organizations confronting the challenges of the twenty-first century. Thematic clusters of items included:

- Support by the unit or organization for a learning environment:
 - “If I took a prudent risk and... failed,....”
 - “Leaders in this unit are willing to listen....”
- Traditional military standards and readiness:
 - “Military traditions and values mean a lot to most people in this unit.”
 - “I have confidence in this unit’s ability to perform....”
- Commissioned officer leadership:

65. See B. M. Bass and B. J. Avolio, *Effects on Platoon Readiness of Transformational/Transactional Leadership*, (report prepared at Center for Leadership Studies, Binghamton University, Binghamton, N.Y.) contract DASWO1-96K-008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, forthcoming).

- “Commissioned officers... put mission and people ahead of their own ambition.”
- “Commissioned officers in this unit take care of their people.”
- NCO leadership:

“I am proud of the NCO/Petty Officer leaders in this unit.”
 - Fairness, trust, and teamwork:

“People are treated fairly in this unit.”

“We have a lot of teamwork going on in this unit.”
 - Pride and commitment to duty:

“I am proud to serve in America’s armed forces.”

“I have a deep personal commitment and a strong desire to serve....”
 - General satisfaction with branch of service:

“My service responds to the changing conditions and needs of its personnel.”

“In my service, I believe that I can achieve my full potential in rank and responsibility.”
 - Family and living standards:


“My military income allows me to provide adequately for my family.”

“...people are given the flexibility needed to balance...work and...family....”

Figure 4.1 shows, by rank grouping, the percentage of responses, on average, to the items that made up each of these scales.

Once again, the responses show strong pride and commitment to traditional values. At the same time, however, there is much less satisfaction with the typical command climate and clear dissatisfaction—in both absolute and relative terms—with family balance and living standards. We noted the hierarchical effect of rank and status on satisfaction with the climate, which is typical on most climate surveys of organizations: the higher the person’s level in the organization, the greater the satisfaction with the climate. This natural, and probably healthy, variance in perceptions becomes a problem only when the difference between grade levels seems severe or nearly disappears altogether. In these scale comparisons some officer groups might be on the verge of being out of touch with the subordinates in the organization, but it would take additional analysis of a specific unit climate to confirm an unhealthy situation. On the subject of officer leadership, for instance, there seems to be a relatively large difference in views between the company-grade officer respondents and the enlisted personnel and NCOs. It is clear, however, that significant comparative as well as absolute statistical differences exist among grade groups within units of the same type. Again, uneven or poor local leadership is often at the root of variations in organizational climates among units of the same type and in the same geographic location.

Figure 4.1 Responses to Clusters* of Survey Statements Grouped by Themes, by military rank



* Each cluster comprises 4–6 statements in the survey.

Other Survey Data

Other surveys, developed by the military services and reviewed by CSIS, disclose a remarkable degree of agreement with many findings of the MCCS. This broad level of alignment is also reflected in the comparable service responses to the staff version of the MCCS. Space does not permit an item-by-item analysis of these surveys in this report, but it is useful to look at some areas of agreement between survey data provided by the services and data compiled from the MCCS in support of this particular study.

Values

Every service survey that CSIS reviewed showed a strong support for traditional military values and a strong support for service programs that promulgate values and ethics. As in the MCCS, respondents to these surveys also indicated that they had witnessed individual and leader behaviors that were not consistent with the values.

Stressful Environment

The MCCS showed a stressful operational environment that put significant pressure on a force with a majority of members who are married. Other surveys did as well, with environmental stress being evident in the surveys from all of the services. For example, the 1997 CSAF survey showed significant increases in hours worked and days away from duty station, especially for pilots. Thirty percent of Air Force respondents indicated that they definitely did not have enough people in their work groups.⁶⁶ Compared with the previous two Air Force surveys, the number in the 1997 survey who said they would stay until retirement declined 10 percent for officers and 6 percent for enlisted personnel.⁶⁷

The 1998 survey, *Quality of Life in the USMC*, showed that the average time between deployments declined from 17.2 months in 1993 to 15.6 months in 1998. Marines noted an inadequate amount of family time and a decline in their spouse's support for their careers. Between 1993 and 1998, the total number of marines who believed that they would remain in the corps until retirement declined 14 percent. The number of Marines in the E4 and E5 pay grades (corporals and sergeants) who intended to stay until retirement declined 30 percent over the same period.⁶⁸

In the Army's fall 1998 edition of its semiannual *Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP)*, the percentages of officers (59.5) and enlisted personnel (34.8) that believed that they would stay for retirement were at the low point in the decade.⁶⁹

66. Chief of Staff of the Air Force, *CSAF Climate and Quality of Life Survey (Air Force Summary)* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, 1997), 6–7.

67. *Ibid.*, 5.

68. U.S. Marine Corps, "Current E4–5 Career Intentions," from selected slides on the survey, "Quality of Life in the USMC," provided to CSIS by the U.S. Marine Corps, June 1999.

69. Data from the U.S. Army's *Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP)*, as reported to CSIS in an August 3, 1999, memo from the office of the deputy chief of staff for personnel.

Note, however, that reenlistment rates throughout the armed forces, except in the Air Force, in 1999 remained at a satisfactory level.

Surveys from each service showed varying degrees of problems with job satisfaction or service satisfaction. The CSAF survey in 1997 indicated (“agree” and “strongly agree”) more than a 58 percent job satisfaction level. The 1998 job satisfaction in the Navy was down slightly, putting it among the lowest levels recorded in 1990s for both officers and enlisted personnel.⁷⁰ Marine job satisfaction was up 4 percent from 1993 but could not be considered high. In the Army’s fall 1998 *SSMP*, satisfaction with the overall quality of Army life was the lowest recorded in the decade of the 1990s.

Leadership

The MCCA survey by unit found many leadership problems and an uneven quality of leadership among some like units living under similar circumstances. Nearly all of the surveys we reviewed for this study—except the Marine Corps quality of life survey—showed leadership-related problems akin to those found in the MCCA and subsequent focus groups. For example, fewer than half of the more than 200,000 respondents to the CSAF survey in 1998 agreed or strongly agreed that they see “unit leaders doing the same thing they publicly promote.”⁷¹ In the Navy’s three most recent personnel surveys, officer perception of the service’s leadership declined markedly. The percentage of officers satisfied or very satisfied with Navy-wide leadership declined from 63 percent in 1996, to 53 percent in 1997, to 51 percent in 1998.⁷² Satisfaction among officers with the leadership at their particular commands was 11 percent higher than the Navywide figures but was down 4 percent from the 1996 level.⁷³ Among enlisted respondents, satisfaction (very satisfied or satisfied) with Navywide leadership from 1996 to 1998 declined more than 5 percent, but satisfaction with leadership at their own commands remained at the 37–38 percent level throughout the three-year period.

Compensation

Just as in the MCCA all of the service surveys reviewed for this study showed that pay and quality of life were among the top problems identified by military personnel. Although complaints about compensation are likely to be loud in any organizational climate survey—civilian or military—there is a particular salience to these complaints in an era of unparalleled American prosperity. For example,

70. Compare Kantor and Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1998*, question 77B, with Kantor and Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1990–1997: Summary of Trends*, question 71B.

71. Chief of Staff of the Air Force, *CSAF Climate and Quality of Life Survey (Air Force Summary)*, item 31.

72. Compare Kantor and Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1998*, question 84, with Kantor and Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1990–1997: Summary of Trends*, question 78.

73. Compare Kantor and Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1998*, question 77A, with Kantor and Olmsted, *Navy-wide Personnel Survey (NPS) 1990–1997: Summary of Trends*, question 71A.

Marine Corps respondents to their 1998 quality of life survey noted significant increases in letters of indebtedness, trouble over child support payments, and repossession of personal property. Only one-quarter of the 4,160 marine respondents were satisfied or completely satisfied with their pay.⁷⁴ Each of the service surveys also demonstrated a high level of support for the notion that retirement pay and benefits are important to the motivation of career personnel in the military.

In general, service surveys mirror many of the quality of life and organizational climate findings of the MCCA. The next chapter broadens the scope of the analysis to take into consideration the future security environment.

74. U.S. Marine Corps, "How satisfied are you with your current financial situation overall?" from selected slides on the survey, "Quality of Life in the USMC," provided to CSIS by the U.S. Marine Corps, June 1999.

Shaping American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century

MILITARY CULTURE IN THE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY will be meaningfully affected by changes in the way nations wage war, a more challenging international environment, and the likely emergence of non-traditional threats. Worrisome trends already visible on the not-so-distant horizon include a global population explosion and increased competition for scarce resources; the globalization of the world economy and a rapid increase in capital flows; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and the emergence of powerful nonstate actors such as terrorists, global organized crime syndicates, and drug cartels.

Perhaps the dominant force helping to reshape the U.S. military and its underlying culture is the rapid advance of communications and information technology. This has already been felt throughout the entire military establishment, leading to new and more effective ways of applying military force and forcing significant adaptations in military organizations and, more important, the people who run them. That recent past is likely to serve as prologue to a future where the pace of technological change accelerates dramatically, leading perhaps to a revolution in military affairs (RMA) early in the twenty-first century.

Military Culture in Transition

Despite the scope and speed of this technological transformation, war itself will remain a constant in which life, death, and personal sacrifice ultimately determine victory in combat. If history is any guide, sustaining an effective military culture in this time of transformation will require the support of timeless values and adequate resources coupled with an improved capacity for rapid adaptation to changing circumstances.

As much as any weapon, military culture—discipline, professionalism, distinctive customs, and esprit de corps—will set the conditions that determine future success in peace and war. These cultural elements provide a powerful bulwark supporting every soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and coast guardsman. From the first moments of basic training to the mustering-out rituals at the end of a career, they reinforce the idea that the defense of a democratic society is a unique calling and a

solemn responsibility. The conscious inculcation of a set of values reinforces a special purpose, beginning with the ideal of service and self-sacrifice. As General Douglas MacArthur said at West Point more than a generation ago,

Duty, honor, country. Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying points: to build courage when courage seems to fail; to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith; to create hope when hope becomes forlorn. They determine not only who you will be but who you must be.

In ways ranging from the profound to the trivial, these values shape military culture, and military culture in turn will shape the future performance of the U.S. armed forces in peace and war. This linkage is partly a reflection of the fact that culture and the military itself exist simultaneously in the past, the present, and the future. As an institution predating the founding of the Republic, the American military has deep historical roots, symbolized in its battle flags, its uniforms, and its customs. But the U.S. military also exists in the present; it knows that it must be instantly ready to defend the nation or its vital interests, combat readiness being the prime reason that societies maintain armed forces.

Military Culture and Modernization

An inherent tension exists between today's force and the force that must be built for the future. Both compete for resources and priorities in trade-offs between current readiness and future modernization. Politics and unforeseen contingencies—Bosnia, Kosovo, and hurricane disaster relief, for example—make this complex balancing act even more difficult. The U.S. military has no choice, however, but to think seriously about its future, routinely projecting a 10- or 20-year view of its likely requirements in personnel, equipment, and force structures. The principal reason for this long-range focus is simple: major weapons platforms are best thought of as generational investments. It routinely requires 10 years to research, develop, manufacture and field a major new weapon system. Some, such as aircraft carriers or today's B-52 bombers, have life spans longer than 50 years.

Precisely because of the need to enforce budget priorities and make strategic choices that will affect a military service for decades, the modernization process is one of the principal testing grounds of military culture. The stakes here are high, potentially involving the future relevance of a service and its effectiveness in fighting U.S. wars. Consequently, modernization is an intensely competitive environment in which the culture essentially rearticulates its purposes and reinvents itself through weaponry designed to be handed down to the next generation. A peculiarly Darwinian logic reigns as basic questions are thrashed out again and again: How will the services fight? Which weapons should they develop? What kinds of professionals will be needed to man the force of the future?

Historians have long been fascinated by these struggles. Thirty years ago, MIT historian Elting Morison described the effects on naval culture of a battleship-centered establishment so wedded to the status quo that it steadfastly resisted revo-

lutionary improvements in gunfire technology.⁷⁵ Another example of a military culture resistant to change was the Army Ordnance Corps on the eve of the Civil War. Despite pressure from President Abraham Lincoln, the Ordnance Corps was obdurate in resisting the substitution of breech-loading and repeating rifles for the traditional muzzle loader.⁷⁶ Robert Killebrew, a CSIS conference participant pointed out that because culture is, among other things, the “accumulated experience of the service,” it tends to reinforce existing ways of doing business.

Other examples, however, show that military innovation fortunately was accomplished despite the resistance of the dominant-weapons-systems culture that controlled the army, navy, and air force establishments of their day.⁷⁷ Morison delivered a classic warning that the difference between success and failure in these endeavors depended on whether the primary constituencies involved in the process allowed themselves to become “victims of severely limited identification.”⁷⁸ Put simply, in aligning themselves with a certain constituency, uniformed leaders and others involved lost sight of the overriding imperative to improve the national security writ large.

As Morison notes, core military values are critical in overcoming the narrower focus of careerist or bureaucratic agendas. Core values and the underlying culture ultimately help determine whether innovations will succeed or fail. Values and culture are a vital institutional counterweight to the innate conservatism of military hierarchies and the inertia of large bureaucracies.

One of the most perceptive students of military innovation, the historian Williamson Murray, has written that this process is more art than science and is driven by competing actors, interests, technologies, and circumstances. All of these uncertainties suggest that

...effective military innovation is evolutionary rather than revolutionary.... Evolutionary innovation depends on organizational focus over time rather than guidance by one individual for a short period. Military leadership can affect the process through long-term cultural changes rather than short term decisions.⁷⁹

To be successful in the twenty-first century, today’s military culture must reflect this evolutionary process. It must continue to emphasize timeless core values as a stable foundation for service members in the face of profound changes that will alter service prerogatives, bureaucratic agendas, and the shape of various warfare communities and military organizations. Stewards of U.S. military culture cannot

75. See Elting Morison, “Gunfire at Sea: A Case Study in Innovation,” in *Men, Machines and Modern Times* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966).

76. Robert V. Bruce, “Bureaucrats and Breechloaders,” in *Lincoln and the Tools of War* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 99–117.

77. See, for example, Susan J. Douglas’s account of Stanford Hooper, the father of naval radio, in “Technological Innovation and Organizational Change: The Navy’s Adoption of Radio, 1899–1919,” in *Military Enterprise and Technological Change*, ed. Merrit Roe Smith (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 117–173.

78. Morison, “Gunfire at Sea.”

79. Williamson Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 12 (Summer 1996): 52. See also the classic work on which that article is based, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

allow it to become inextricably tethered to bureaucratic agendas or transitory technologies.

Shaping the Environment

The concept of an ideal military culture for the twenty-first century raises a key question: What will the international security environment look like? Because the steady and dependable threat posed by the Soviet Union has morphed into the much less stable and predictable set of challenges of the post-Cold War era, the challenge of threat forecasting has become particularly difficult, and it is no surprise that the various commissions and studies charged with peering into the future have varied considerably in their visions. Most, however, share two often tacit assumptions: that military power will remain a viable element of statecraft, and that other nations will eventually challenge current U.S. military dominance in a variety of innovative ways. These assumptions are based on a reading of history that suggests that military advantages are usually transitory.

One method adopted by several studies has been to examine current trends and then project them into alternative-futures scenarios. Such approaches make sense because even the most conservative projections of the security environment of the twenty-first century must come to terms not merely with one or more of these trends but with the cascading effects of a great number of them.

One study, by CSIS, is called “Seven Revolutions”:

- **Demographics:** global population growth that increases at a rate equal to adding the population of Mexico to the global rolls each year, raising issues such as urbanization, mass migration, and an increased competition for scarce resources;
- **Environment:** the demand for increased living standards and food supplies leading to severe pressure on the world’s forests and water reserves;
- **Technology:** current patterns of dynamic change leading to unpredictable future innovations in the manipulation of matter at the molecular level, quantum leaps in computational ability, and information technology developments that further erode barriers in language and distance;
- **Knowledge:** spurred on by the growth of technology, taking its place alongside the traditional factors in production: land, labor, and capital, and possibly leading to gaps between the knowledge-proficient and the knowledge-deprived that mirror gaps in production today between the industrialized and nonindustrialized worlds;
- **Finance and Economics:** with capital flows continuing to grow at astronomical rates, market forces possibly producing insurmountable chasms instead of the traditional gaps between rich and poor countries;
- **Society and Politics:** relationships changing at every level as individuals empowered by the information revolution bypass traditional regulatory controls, new

classes of nonstate actors emerge, and governments grow too big to deal with citizens and too small to cope with these revolutions;

- Conflict: the same factors promoting the above changes also empowering the rise of subnational groups, new regional or global powers, and possibly new classes of advanced weaponry; in addition, traditional rivalries exacerbated by political, social, economic, and religious frictions that may combine in endless variations.⁸⁰

Two authoritative 1997 studies by DOD also profiled many of these same developments by focusing on the security environment that will be faced by U.S. forces in the twenty-first century. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) chaired by the secretary of defense noted both the current military superiority of the United States as well as a number of challenges it would face through the year 2015:

- Regional Threats: "...more than one aspiring regional power will have both the desire and the means to challenge U.S. interests militarily";
- Weapons Proliferation: "The proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies will continue," including nuclear, biological and chemical munitions;
- Transnational Threats: "The international drug trade and international organized crime will continue to ignore our borders, attack our society and threaten our personal liberty and well-being"; and
- Homeland Defense: called attention to the potentially devastating effects on U.S. territory of attacks by intercontinental ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, and information warfare; indeed, these unconventional attacks might represent an "asymmetric means to attack our forces and interests overseas and Americans at home."⁸¹

In what was perhaps its most sobering note, the QDR pointed out that, in addition to these trends, there were any number of wild-card scenarios—a new technological threat or a surprise hostile takeover of a friendly regime, for example—that could threaten U.S. interests worldwide:

Taken individually, these scenarios are unlikely. But taken together, it is more likely that one or more wild cards *will* occur than it is that *none* will occur. Therefore the United States must maintain military capabilities sufficient to deal with such events.⁸²

A report published later in 1997 by the National Defense Panel (NDP) extended this same line of inquiry. Declaring the need to "transform defense," the NDP looked at long-term security issues out to the year 2020 and posited four of these scenarios as "alternative worlds":

80. "Seven Revolutions" (briefing by the CSIS, Washington, D.C., June 29, 1999).

81. William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1997), 3–4 <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/>.

82. *Ibid.*, 5 [emphasis added].

- **Shaped Stability:** In this projected scenario, the same types of frictions noted by the CSIS report are present but are dealt with by a “relatively stable international order” that the U.S. military reinforces by augmenting diplomatic, economic, and political efforts;
- **Extrapolation of Today:** This world is considerably more of a mixed bag of increasingly competitive international actors. With rogue states and nonstate actors having acquired weapons of mass destruction, “[t]he American homeland cannot be viewed as a sanctuary from their use”;
- **Competition for Leadership:** U.S. leadership is challenged by either a hostile regional alliance or a single nation that opposes Western political, economic, and cultural influences. Not only must the U.S. military “plan for the possibility of major combat operations capable of quickly concentrating force” against regional adversaries, but it must also defend against the covert use against the U.S. homeland of information warfare or weapons of mass destruction; and
- **Chronic Crisis:** Deteriorating global economic conditions spawn not only resource-driven regional conflicts but also the breakdown of most international institutions. Violent independence movements, virtual narcostates, and unchecked massive migrations accelerate the breakdown of many nation-states. With chaos abroad, “the American public...is preoccupied with domestic security.”⁸³

It is against this daunting range of possibilities that the NDP made a strong case for a new set of operational challenges to the U.S. military in the twenty-first century. It fully embraced the notion of asymmetric threats in which future adversaries would exploit their own strengths while attacking known U.S. weaknesses. Instead of simply mirror imaging U.S. military power, an adaptive adversary might move the fight to urban areas, target massed formations, attack U.S. information systems, and, in general, target the U.S. will to fight.⁸⁴

In one of its more incisive contributions to the debate on the future of the U.S. military, the NDP also highlighted some traditional U.S. strengths that an adaptive adversary might turn into weaknesses:

- **Power Projection:** Throughout the twentieth century, the United States has based its strategy on the ability to carry the fight to the enemy’s territory. “Adaptive enemies, emerging technologies, greater distances and altered alliance relations” all present clear challenges to U.S. power projection;
- **Information Operations:** Although information is the lifeblood of twenty-first century military operations, it primarily depends on the effective exploitation of commercial information technology. Given that importance, “...the competition to secure an information advantage will be a high-stakes contest, one that will ultimately affect the continued preeminence of U.S. power”;

83. *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Panel, December 1997), 8–9.

84. *Ibid.*, 11–12.

- **Space:** Because the command and control of U.S. military forces depends on space-based platforms, the United States must expect future adversaries to exploit the increasing commercial use of space to counter or to neutralize this advantage. Therefore, "...we must protect our space assets...and deny our enemies the opportunity to gain military advantage through their use of space;"
- **Urban Operations:** Although the classic military prescription for urban warfare has been to avoid it, the development of megacities and new missions (e.g., peacekeeping) means that our forces will have to learn how to be effective in this most demanding of all military environments;
- **Weapons of Mass Destruction:** With the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical technologies, these weapons will be a threat at home and abroad. "As we did with the Cold War nuclear threat, we must invest in preparing for the 'unthinkable'"; and
- **Transnational Threats and Challenges:** Many or all of these asymmetrical challenges—including weapons of mass destruction—can be wielded by terrorists or international criminal organizations. "In short, the increasing erosion of the sanctity of international borders as barriers to [these] challenges...will force us away from our existing paradigms."⁸⁵

This sobering look forward is reason enough to consider carefully the challenges that will be faced by the U.S. military in the twenty-first century—larger, messier, and nastier challenges, as one recent assessment summarized them.⁸⁶ Most of the studies cited here, as well as a number of others, have also pointed to the possible emergence of key regional powers that could directly challenge U.S. interests; Russia, China, and India are the countries most often cited, and only one among them is a democracy. Not only do these countries exert powerful regional influences through their large populations and military forces, but they all have significant capabilities for projecting power beyond their own borders.

With China, for example, the development of naval, amphibious, and air power (including missiles) is seen by many as necessarily constituting a direct threat to the continued status of Taiwan, regarded by China as a renegade province, not an independent country. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. sent naval forces to the Taiwan Strait whenever war appeared to threaten. Despite having long ago switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to mainland China, the United States in 1996 again sent a powerful naval force to the Strait after a round of missile rattling from Beijing. It is interesting to contemplate how the U.S. response might change as China's military establishment modernizes and adds more sophisticated weaponry that could challenge any U.S. regional presence. Similar scenarios could be cited involving other major regional competitors.

Countries on another tier—North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, for example—lack the clout of dominant regional powers but can still wield sufficient military power to threaten neighbors or challenge U.S. military forces. All three countries currently

85. *Ibid.*, 12–17.

86. Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1998* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), 217–230.

have short-range tactical missiles and have recently been cited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as also having the potential to acquire long-range intercontinental weapons that by 2015 could directly threaten U.S. cities.⁸⁷ As significant as they are, the individual military capabilities of these countries are probably less significant than what they might produce if they were to act in concert.

Some analysts have also pointed to the unnatural power vacuum that was created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, predicting that a vacuum would inevitably call forth some response to counter U.S. military dominance. Instead of the emergence of a rival superpower, a more likely venue for competition would be the formation of anti-U.S. coalitions—of, say, China and Russia together with one or more of the second-tier powers. In exactly the same way that balance-of-power politics dominated classic European diplomacy, U.S. military power will likely be countered in the twenty-first century by one or more regional powers determined to seize maneuvering room out of global disequilibrium.⁸⁸

All of these complex environmental factors suggest a correspondingly wide range of potential conflicts. Some observers believe that these future wars are more likely to be long, dirty guerrilla-type conflicts, not the high-tech, precision combat of Kosovo or the Persian Gulf. And no matter what form they take, some potential conflicts are likely to erupt with little or no warning. What can be predicted with some degree of confidence, however, is that today future enemies are studying U.S. military capability and are searching for asymmetric answers to counter U.S. military strength.

Technological Revolution

A common thread running through many of these formulations is unprecedented technological change that is unlikely to long favor the status quo. Much of that change is oriented around the electron, which wears no uniform, bears no allegiance, and respects no boundaries—national, bureaucratic, or conceptual. Although in the past it has been accused of preparing for the most recent conflict, the Pentagon has spent much of 1990s preparing to exploit that onrush of technology in an RMA. Whatever form it eventually takes, that technological revolution will almost certainly bring fundamental changes in the American way of war.

Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies assessed this potential several years ago:

Such a revolution would touch virtually all aspects of the military establishment. Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles would replace fighter planes and tanks as chess pieces in the game of military power. Today's military organizations—divisions, fleets and air wings—could disappear or give way to

87. Robert A. Burns, "CIA Wary on North Korea, Iran Missiles," Associated Press, September 10, 1999.

88. See, for example, *1999 Annual Forecast: A New and Dangerous World* (Austin, Tex.: STRATFOR, Inc., January 4, 1999) <www.stratfor.com>.

successors that would look very different. And if the forces themselves change, so too would people, as new career possibilities, educational requirements, and promotion paths became essential. New elites would gain in importance....⁸⁹

Former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William Owens, and Harvard's Joseph Nye even went so far as to assert, "The one country that can best lead the information revolution will be more powerful than any other. For the foreseeable future, that country is the United States.... This information advantage can help deter or defeat traditional military threats at relatively low cost."⁹⁰ These were not just philosophical points. While serving as vice chairman, Admiral Owens was closely identified with the concept of "dominant battlespace awareness" provided by future information "system of systems," enabling U.S. commanders to understand future enemies so profoundly that their actions could be predicted.⁹¹

Even with the constrained procurement budgets of the post-Cold War era, each of the services is preparing major investments based on advanced technology, including the digitization of Army divisions, the establishment of information warfare squadrons in the Air Force, and the development of networkcentric warfare in the Navy. The vision that binds many of these efforts is the 1996 publication, *Joint Vision 2010*, which continues to set a direction for U.S. armed forces in the twenty-first century. Issued over the signature of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, the document lays out a vision of future combat in which improved command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities are the keys to U.S. military power in the twenty-first century:

By 2010, we should be able to change how we conduct the most intense joint operations,... Information superiority and advances in technology will enable us to achieve desired effects through the tailored application of joint combat power. Higher lethality weapons will allow us to conduct attacks concurrently that formerly required massed assets, applied in a sequential manner.⁹²

To maximize the impact of these technological advances, *Joint Vision 2010* also prescribes a number of new operational concepts:

- Dominant Maneuver: U.S. forces would use space, air, land, and sea to gain a decisive positional advantage over enemy forces "by controlling the breadth, depth and height of the battlespace";
- Precision Engagement: Through a system of systems, U.S. forces would use information operations and other means to strike targets with precision, "delivering the desired effect, lessen[ing] the risk to forces, and minimiz[ing] collateral damage";

89. Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 39.

90. Joseph S. Nye Jr. and William A. Owens, *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 20.

91. William A. Owens, "The Emerging System of Systems," *Proceedings* 212, no. 5 (May 1995): 35-39; see also the Owens introduction to *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge*, ed. Martin C. Libicki (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1995).

92. John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 1996), 17 <www.dtic.mil/jv2010/jv2010.pdf> (accessed January 24, 2000); reprinted in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 12 (Summer 1996).

- Full Dimensional Protection: Because of the need to protect U.S. forces from the very technologies they are exploiting, full dimensional protection would be essentially “multi-layered defenses for forces and facilities at all levels”; and
- Focused Logistics: Unlike traditional logistics, this new form would be the “the fusion of information, logistics and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets while en route and to deliver tailored logistical and sustainment packages.”⁹³

Although it is easy to be cynical about vision statements, *Joint Vision 2010* clearly commits the armed forces of the United States to a new American style of war. It must be taken seriously as an endorsement of the idea of revolutionary change in general, and the RMA in particular. The document also raises some profoundly important questions about the military culture of the twenty-first century.

One of the most troubling questions is whether the United States military can adapt to an RMA that will not in the long run necessarily favor the United States. After all, the technologies on which the RMA is based are primarily commercial and available around the globe. There is thus no technological monopoly by U.S. corporations or the U.S. military. What cannot be monopolized is most likely to be exploited by the swift and the clever—and here the U.S. military might be at a surprising disadvantage. For all the rhetoric in documents like the report of the National Defense Panel and *Joint Vision 2010* about better joint teamwork and more adaptive organizations, a basic fault line still exists in the U.S. military establishment.

With the force of both law and custom, the individual military services still organize, train, and equip the armed forces, even though they fight under unified or joint command. This historical division of labor has on the whole served the nation well because it has succeeded in focusing the military services on the task of future planning. But the same system that enshrines broad service prerogatives has sometimes made joint teamwork more difficult. In the Information Age, that system continues to produce command-and-control systems that are redundant and frequently lack interoperability. These systems are produced by procurement bureaus in each of the services that are simply not equipped to look at any priorities other than those of the services that created them. The predictable results are the separate, single-service stovepipe information systems that have bedeviled U.S. forces every time they have taken the field in the past generation. By some estimates, there are as many as 5,000–9,000 of these redundant systems, straining not only operating budgets but also the rapid integration of the newest commercial technology.⁹⁴

Another characteristic of the modern U.S. military that might become increasingly incompatible with Information Age demands is a rank-heavy personnel structure. This fact is no doubt closely related to the U.S. policy, started in 1947, of

93. *Ibid.*, 20–25.

94. For a discussion of the interoperability problem, see C. Kenneth Allard, *Command, Control and the Common Defense*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996) and, by the same author, “Information Warfare: The Burden of History and the Risk of Hubris,” in *The Information Revolution and National Security*, ed. Stuart Schwarzstein, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1996), 233–249.

maintaining an excess of officers on active duty in order to facilitate mobilization. Indeed, overall U.S. officer-to-enlisted ratios are double those that exist in other armies although the commanders of tactical units and the number of officers therein are similar to historical norms.⁹⁵

At the top, of course, are the flag officers—the generals and admirals. Only 2,000 flag officers were required to command the 12 million men under arms in World War II. Today, with roughly one-tenth of that number (1.4 million) on active duty, the United States authorizes the presence of more than 1,000 generals and admirals. And despite the vast increase in telecommunications during the intervening 50 years, as many four-star generals and admirals serve today as during World War II.⁹⁶ There are thus grounds for questioning whether the current rank and personnel structure supports the twenty-first century ideal of technology-enhanced, decentralized leadership.

Another issue likely to affect military culture in the future touches on the career paths and status within the organization. How will the services adequately compensate and convey appropriate status on the technologists and specialists who will be needed in the force? Should they be sergeants major, warrant officers, or civilian contractors? To what degree should the military's rank structure equate seniority with technical competence or with leadership potential? These are important questions.

The misapplication of advanced communications technology in today's military is also an issue. The suspicion is pervasive that military information technology is often misused for micromanagement and enforcement of the zero-defects mentality documented by this study. Recall the warning delivered in 1936 by Major General J. F. C. Fuller in his classic, *Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure*: "The more mechanical... the weapons with which we fight, the less mechanical must be the spirit which controls them."⁹⁷

An even more fundamental question is how far the U.S. military should go in embracing the precepts of a RMA. Eliot Cohen correctly noted that "[t]he cautious military historian (and even more cautious soldier) looks askance at prophets of radical change, although by no means at change itself."⁹⁸ Indeed, a serious critique of the RMA has arisen from within military ranks. Some in uniform are worried about the tendency to use technology as a tool of micromanagement. Others challenge the affordability of the necessary investment. Still others question the effectiveness of these technologies in war and the propensity to substitute gadgets for indispensable human versatility.

One of the most trenchant of these critiques comes from a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general, Paul K. Van Riper, and Lt. Col. F. G. Hoffman of the Marine

95. For details on numbers of officers in various nations and how the United States came to maintain so many on active duty, see the four-hour briefing by Maj. Donald E. Vandergriff, USA, "Change the Culture for the 21st Century," June 5, 1999, version.

96. Data on flag officers provided by Statistical Studies Service, Office of the Secretary of Defense, fall 1999.

97. J. F. C. Fuller, *Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Services Publishing Company, 1936), 13.

98. Eliot A. Cohen, "Revolution in Warfare," 40.

Corps reserves, who felt it necessary to restate that warfare in the twenty-first or any other century is not likely to be won by those who simply possess the most high-tech gadgets. "War is a highly complex interactive system characterized by friction, unpredictability, disorder, and fluidity. It is not a mechanistic system amenable to precise, positive control mechanisms or synchronized, centralized systems," said Van Riper and Hoffman. "War has more in common with biological and ecological systems... than with closed mechanical systems."⁹⁹

Although the RMA shows promise in clearing away some of the fog of war, it is important to note that Murphy's Law still applies. Precisely because war is conducted by fallible, emotional men and women, it is unpredictable; and RMA proponents err in thinking that it is possible to engineer out the human propensity for making mistakes. Some aspects of information technology undeniably can add clarity to the battlefield. Van Riper and Hoffman warn RMA proponents, however, that "...over-investing in information and precision engagement systems is predicated upon a linear approach to future warfare requirements which will leave the United States more, not less, vulnerable to future antagonists."

Major Issues

Perhaps the best way to appreciate the impact of the information age on military culture is to compare it with the revolution that gunpowder brought about on European battlefields. After the Battle of Agincourt, the gradual proliferation of missiles fired by gunpowder upset the military balance. New balances in command, organization, and tactics, had to be struck, most of them were the result of painful trial and error. We strongly suspect that the same will be as true in the twenty-first century as it was in the sixteenth. For that reason, the specific cultural issues outlined here are more often posed as questions for further study and debate than as hard-and-fast policy prescriptions. Some issues nevertheless must be faced if an innovative, adaptive military culture is to be advanced.

New Methods of Leadership

Official documents such as *Joint Vision 2010* constantly stress the importance of leadership and individual initiative in both capturing technology and exploiting it in combat. CSIS study group members believe that an effective military culture will cause the Pentagon to explore new patterns of leadership and command relationships. This is partly a generational issue, however. Many current leaders were raised in an era of relative information scarcity that leaves them singularly unprepared to deal with today's usual problems of information overload. This generation gap between junior and senior officers is nothing new, but it may be exacerbated by the rapid advances in technology.

Quite simply, the noted tendency toward top-down micromanagement must be reversed before major technological investments are made that reinforce such dys-

99. Paul K. Van Riper and F. G. Hoffman, "Pursuing the Real RMA: Exploiting Knowledge-Based Warfare," *National Security Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 5.

functional executive behaviors. Rank and age often being inversely proportionate to competence on information technology issues, a new balance also must be struck between leaders and those they lead. The services need to reassess who will be responsible for what tasks and decisions, at what levels, under what conditions, and with what information resources. The zero-defects mentality often encountered in the U.S. military today is anathema to the kind of innovative risk taking needed to answer these questions.

Not only will new military doctrine be required, but so too will new management techniques be needed to counter the tendency for bureaucracies to wear down innovative thinkers. It's worth noting General Fuller's warning on the subject of the bureaucratic tendencies of large staffs:

The staff becomes an all-controlling bureaucracy, a paper octopus squirting ink and wriggling its tentacles into every corner. Unless pruned with an axe it will grow like a fakir's mango tree, and the more it grows the more it overshadows the general. It creates work, it creates offices, and, above all, it creates the rear-spirit.¹⁰⁰

Because bureaucracy and careerism often go hand in hand, it might be time to conduct a thorough examination of today's accession, promotion, and retirement policies. Issues requiring careful study include the numbers of flag officers required for leadership of an adaptive military force with a professional NCO cadre and technologically sophisticated junior officers, as well as the challenges the services confront in attracting and adequately rewarding a new breed of technical specialists.

New Organizational Blueprints

In his seminal essay on organization, RAND analyst David Ronfeldt identifies hierarchical institutions, competitive markets, and multiorganizational networks as three enduring forms of human society, with the networks emerging as the dominant form in the Information Age.¹⁰¹ This same evolutionary pattern is already evident in defense organization, where the emphasis has decisively shifted from single-service combat models to joint task forces. Interdependent smaller forces of all services must be prepared to merge quickly with each other and with coalition forces to form tailored organizations. Here again, there is broad agreement on the need for more effective joint teamwork and less-hierarchical fixed structures—meaning that both structure and systems must evolve. Structural evolution is the toughest problem because the current organization of the DOD reflects the traditions of service prerogatives and dominant weapons systems. Today's systems are scarcely less difficult to change even though there is an urgent need to replace the hierarchical single-service communications stovepipes with network-centered systems.

100. Fuller, *Generalship*.

101. David Ronfeldt, *Institutions, Markets and Networks: A Framework about the Evolution of Societies*, Report DRU-590-FF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, December, 1993).

The intersection of these lines of procurement and service prerogative should be examined closely. More needs to be done in reducing service parochialism in building the future “systems of systems” on which DOD is staking its collective future, even if legislation is ultimately required to break bureaucratic inertia. The fundamental question is whether the current Title 10 authority—which allows the individual services to procure distinctly different command, control, and communications systems—should be shifted to the Joint Staff or a new defense agency.

The Twenty-First Century Military—Closed or Open?

Although the services need to maintain the core values of discipline and cohesion, the military institution may need to be more frequently refreshed at the wellspring of American civil society. Here the American tradition for making a virtue of the diversity of its citizenry is likely to translate once again into military advantage. One clear sign of this is the increasing use of the reserve component in recent years. Precisely because the reservist daily practices a civilian specialty, that reservist represents a rich potential source of technological expertise. The trick will be to match better these areas of expertise with developing military requirements.

Another way to acquire such expertise is by lateral entry into military ranks from the civilian world. Although this route of service has typically been open only to a limited number of critical specialists such as physicians, lateral entry offers the services a potentially rich source of critical skills in the fields of information security, biomedical technology and linguistics.

The most traditional method of meeting required manpower needs, of course, is the draft. Although conscription is historically one of the most divisive issues in the U.S. political spectrum, the issue is once again being debated in Congress on both manpower and sociological grounds. Although this study began with an assumption of the continued viability of the all-volunteer paradigm, conscription and other forms of manpower procurement such as lateral entry require careful study as the services contemplate their needs for the twenty-first century.

Planning, Programming, and Funding

Although this study did not address the overall issue of military funding, the services in fiscal year 2000 are undeniably at the bottom of one of the boom-or-bust cycles so sadly typical of U.S. defense policy. An essential minimum investment must be made in order to keep our armed forces competitive with the challenging environment ahead of them, and, as with most investments, steady-as-you-go over the long term is the best strategy. It is particularly important to make such a commitment to keep the constant strain of day-to-day readiness from compromising necessary experimentation and innovation.

DOD and the services are also clearly responsible for helping insure that they receive maximum value for every defense dollar. Whenever permitted by law and political realities, the Pentagon needs to substitute commercial products and services for outmoded procurement and support structures.

Finally, the need for constant innovation suggests an overhaul of the current system for programming defense dollars. The current planning, programming, and

budgeting system (PPBS) introduced by Robert McNamara in the 1960s has served its purpose, but to become truly adaptive defense organizations will require far more agile systems of resource planning.

Ethics

Given the recent history of the Gulf War and Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia as well as the emphasis in current and future U.S. military strategy on precision engagement and force protection, the services must pay more attention to the ethical guidelines contained within the future military culture. The U.S. military has already reached a point where the requirements for force protection have resulted in a dysfunctional aversion to casualties. These perceptions not only have important consequences for national security policy, but they can also potentially jeopardize future missions and erode core values such as self-sacrifice. Similar troubling questions arise about the ethics of using standoff technology to reduce the danger to our pilots while demonstrably increasing the danger to noncombatants on the ground. These and other troubling ethical questions are likely in the future as the services turn increasingly to new forms of warfare.

An effective military culture in the twenty-first century will likely incorporate many of the adaptations cited here, including new patterns of leadership; more agile, streamlined organizations; redefinitions of the civil-military relationship; and renewed attention to the ethics of modern warfare. Just as clearly, the core values emphasized in U.S. military culture will continue to anchor the services in a tempest of change. Because professional military educational institutions stand at the crossroads of doctrinal developments, experimentation, and the inculcation of the institution's core values to succeeding generations of officers, they are the logical nexus for adapting today's military culture to the challenges of the next century.

In summary, the twenty-first century is likely to present unique challenges to the U.S. military. New balances will likely have to be struck between progress and retrenchment, experimentation and caution, centralization and decentralization, even between leaders and the led. The product must be military effectiveness that leads to victory in combat. That outcome will depend on a military establishment that can make these choices more effectively than its opponents and, in turn, on a military culture that prizes both constant change and unchanging values.

Findings

MANY SOURCES—surveys of military personnel; papers by knowledgeable military and academic scholars; articles from the popular press; discussions with members of Congress and their staffs; group interviews of current members of the armed forces; and studies conducted by the DOD, DOT, and the military departments—contributed to the findings in this chapter. Despite expected differences in perspective from these varied sources, a broad consensus exists on a number of issues. Some of these issues require prompt and continuing attention.

The data gathered during this study show an unflinching commitment by current members of the armed forces to codes of behavior that demand discipline, teamwork, and individual responsibility. During all of the focus-group discussions and informal interview, with hundreds of individuals, no one complained that standards were too high or expectations for good order and discipline were irrelevant. The tone was quite the opposite: circumstances or lack of resources often precluded the attainment of individual or unit capabilities needed to live up to the traditional service standard. Still this commitment did not translate directly to high levels of morale or to satisfaction with life in the armed forces.

Contemporary factors both outside and within the institution of the military have created stress and disillusionment of considerable proportion. It is also noteworthy that the key cultural values that have sustained the U.S. military profession for 200 years—loyal response to legitimate authority, a willingness to endure hardship to accomplish the mission, a never-say-die philosophy—have to some degree complicated the challenge of adjusting to the realities of the late twentieth century. Uniformed military leaders have also had to maintain a precarious balance between loyal responsiveness to the immediate requirements of the executive branch and Congress, on one hand, and their obligations as stewards of the core values and future capabilities of their institution, on the other.

A prime external cause of stress and disillusionment is imbalance between assigned missions and the resources—personnel and matériel—available to accomplish those missions. Levels of pay and benefits that are inadequate and not competitive with civilian levels are another key external factor. A prime internal factor is perception of decreased opportunity for a challenging and satisfying career as a consequence of command, management, and leadership methods that have not kept pace with the increasing sophistication of warfare or with the expectations of military families for a reasonable lifestyle.

These external and internal factors, many of which are related to organizational climate, have links to armed forces culture. These links were critical to the formulation of findings. For example, CSIS study participants hypothesized that MCCC

data would show differences between units in elements of the climate such as teamwork, or mutual trust, or open communications. These differences could be related to fundamental elements of the culture such as willingness to sacrifice for mission accomplishment, or loyal response to legitimate authority, or physical and moral courage. One specific example: There were measurable differences in the quality of climates among field organizations of the same type, mission, resources, and location. The likely primary cause of these differences was the comparative quality of local leadership. Commanders in particular have major impact on perceptions of mutual trust, on the flow and quality of information, on teamwork, and on mission clarity.

These climate factors appear to be crucial to operational effectiveness in the complex environment of the twenty-first century. They are linked with culture in two ways. First, perceptions about these climate factors will, over time, influence expectations about such institutional values as selfless service, trust, and integrity. Second, climate itself is in part an indirect product of culture. Understanding of organizational climate therefore permits inferences about the cultural values, philosophies, and traditions that drive policies for developing and selecting commanders. For this example, the operative question is whether aspects of the current culture work against the implementation of policies for attaining improved effectiveness among commanders.

Another example of linkage between organizational climates and deeper cultural issues is the reluctance of military organizations to adjust to expectations of a force with a high percentage of working spouses for a reasonable balance between work and family life. Also, many service members perceive that medical and other services for family members have been reduced, even as a high operating tempo has increased separation and added family stress to an already demanding life style.

The question is whether a strong cultural need to accomplish immediate missions—an essential professional value—has prevented adequate focus on the longer-term institutional need to maintain the kind of supportive organizational climates that attract and retain people of high competence and commitment. Note that this study did not address the external issue of the overall adequacy of current defense funding or the roles, missions, and structures of the armed forces. The study did address the reported imbalance between the resources typically available to operating units and the missions assigned to those units.

The remainder of this chapter will present findings in nine areas:

- Fundamental professional values are remarkably strong but are under stress from several different sources.
- Morale and readiness are suffering from force reductions, high operating tempo, and resource constraints; culture may suffer in the longer term.
- Strong local leadership, which is not uniformly in place today, is essential for maintaining the vibrant organizational climates essential for operational effectiveness in the twenty-first century. Present leader development and promotion systems, however, are not up to the task of consistently identifying and advancing highly competent leaders.

- Circumstances often require military leaders to make decisions when the value of loyal responsiveness to authority, on one hand, appears to conflict with the values of loyal dissent and candor, on the other. Conflicts among professional values, not unique to the military, if not properly and openly resolved in each case, can erode trust within the armed forces.
- Operations other than war (OOTW), although essential to the national interest, are affecting combat readiness and causing uncertainty about the essential combat focus of our military forces.
- Although the quality and efficiency of joint operations have improved during the 1990s, harmonization among the services needs improvement.
- The services have made significant strides in more closely integrating the plans and operations of their reserve and active forces, but continuing efforts are warranted.
- Issues of gender integration and racial imbalance in some units need to be addressed.
- Reasonable quality-of-life expectations of service members and their families are not being met. The military as an institution has not adjusted adequately to the needs of force with a higher number of married people.

Fundamental Professional Values

U.S. military culture derives its essence from the precepts of the U.S. Constitution and the heavy demands of warfare. It consequently must foster certain foundation values and traditions that differ from those of civilian society. We believe, however, that these value differences have not produced military alienation from civilian society. Formal and informal data show continued understanding of, and respect for, civilian control. Some theories indicate a politically conservative shift among military personnel, but our survey data show no evidence of any movement away from close ties to, or any disrespect for, the larger society (see table 6.1). Military members do not separate themselves from civilian friends, and they indicate respect for civilian society. However, they also are proud of their high standards of performance and behavior, feeling civilian society might well benefit from adopting more of these higher standards.

Even so, the culture of the military must differ in some respects from that of the civilian society. To ensure effectiveness in combat, military members must embrace such values as self-sacrifice, loyal obedience to authority, and deference to the needs of the group. This generation of armed forces personnel accepts as relevant and proper the concept of mission that overrides personal preference or personal safety. Current members of the U.S. armed forces, both active and reserve, clearly endorse such historical military values as willingness to sacrifice self for mission; loyal response to lawful authority; physical and moral courage; and loyalty to comrades, unit, and nation (see table 6.2). Survey responses, as did follow-up discussion groups, showed high agreement with items that address basic values.

Table 6.1 MCCS Statements about Military Ties to Civilian Society

Survey Statements	"Strongly Agree," "Agree," and "Slightly Agree" (%)
Whenever I have the opportunity, I socialize with civilians as well as with military friends.	89
Most members of the armed forces have a great deal of respect for American civilian society.	75
Most civilians have a great deal of respect for the armed forces.	65
Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military values and customs.	67

As expected, commitment to traditional values increases as length of service increases and varies somewhat among organizations of different function. Real or perceived deviations from these cultural values by members of the armed forces—particularly by senior leaders—are taken seriously by personnel of all grades.

Although we have spoken of military culture in a unitary sense, there are distinct service cultures, and these exist for good reason. They take advantage of rich traditions, enhance esprit de corps, and facilitate functional specialization and mission focus. Men and women in uniform relate primarily to their services. Traditions and pride rest within the individual services, as does the mastery of special skills. The challenge posed by appropriately strong service cultures is the need to blend operating units into effective joint teams and prevent dysfunctional interservice rivalry in such areas as recruiting and resource distribution.

One concern of military observers in recent decades is the perceptible movement toward a blend of occupational (motivation from the marketplace) and institutional (motivation from a sense of service) career models. Our data suggest the basic military values that support discipline and commitment do not appear to have been compromised (see table 6.3). The strength of institutional themes of adventure, challenge, and service to country was clear from survey data. Statements revealing idealistic commitment were the top-ranking responses among individuals of all grades.

Members of the armed forces exhibit strong concerns about pay and benefits, however. Expectations for a good quality of life are high. The current generation of service personnel may be as willing as their predecessors to sacrifice themselves for a worthy cause, but they clearly do not want to subject their families to unwarranted hardships. In any case, there are clear elements of the occupational model within the motivational mix, and there probably always have been. Some first-term military personnel may be motivated exclusively by monetary and medical benefits. The primary conclusion, however, is that willingness to endure the hardship of a military lifestyle persists strongly among nearly all men and women in uniform. Another reality is that a combination of factors now produces high attrition rates among armed forces personnel. The U.S. military has created high expectations of itself, and these expectations historically have supported prolonged individual

Table 6.2 MCCS Statements about Self-Sacrifice and Duty to Mission

Survey Statements	"Strongly Agree," "Agree," and "Slightly Agree" (%)
If necessary to accomplish a combat/lifesaving mission, I am prepared to put my life on the line.	86
Personal interests and wishes of military personnel must take second place to operational requirements.	69
Our organization is serious about honesty and integrity.	78

and family commitment to the hardships and hazards of a military career. However, these commitments are now under stress from a variety of factors external to the institution:

- The absence of a clear military threat to the United States;
- A multiplicity of educational, employment, travel, and adventure opportunities outside the military;
- A decade of domestic economic growth not fully shared by military members;
- Decreased willingness of military personnel to subject their family members to unwarranted hardships connected with military life;
- Ignorance about the U.S. military institution among some opinion leaders in American society; and
- A redefinition of the citizen obligation for service in the armed forces.

The study group's judgment is that the fundamental U.S. military values, philosophies, customs, and traditions, even though under stress, are fundamentally suitable for, and essential to, effective military operations in the envisaged environment of the twenty-first century. But they must be modified in their application to ensure optimum operational effectiveness. This is particularly true considering that likely operations in the future will demand both traditional stamina and greater tactical flexibility.

DOD and DOT cannot easily change the sources of external stress. They must therefore make the internal policy and program changes to create and maintain effective military units. Mission clarity, good leadership, and proper resource allocation will be particularly critical. Some adjustments will be necessary to develop organizational climates that are consistently rational, motivational, coherent, and productive, and that contribute to operational effectiveness.

Morale and Readiness

Because the armed forces put great emphasis on mission readiness, leaders at all levels have high expectations for operational excellence and vigorously seek to attain it. They are deeply concerned when circumstances prevent it. However,

Table 6.3 MCCS Statements about Occupational and Institutional Career Models

Survey Statements	"Strongly Agree," "Agree," and "Slightly Agree" (%)
I am proud to serve in America's armed forces.	95
The American military plays an important role in the world today.	92
I receive pay, allowances, and other benefits comparable to individuals in civilian life who have my skills and responsibilities.	24
My military income allows me to provide adequately for my family.	33

readiness degradation has been apparent in recent years, largely because resources at the operating levels are insufficient for meeting traditional and/or regulatory expectations for excellence. At the Army's National Training Center, the tactical proficiency of participating units has declined recently. In testimony on October 26, 1999, to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff again noted significant problems in force readiness.¹⁰² Confidence in mission readiness is critical to high morale in operating units. Many data sources—surveys within the services and testimony before congressional committees as well as anecdotal evidence—show that decline in mission readiness has been accompanied by a decline in morale. Our data will not prove that the former has caused the latter, but the inference is compelling (see table 6.4).

The many deployments and other operations that require time to be spent away from home stations have created stress on both units and service members. The CSIS survey and other surveys internal to the services show this. Military organizations are designed to operate well under physically stressful conditions; however, they are less well able to operate under the stress induced by the perception that mission-resources mismatch will for the long term continue to frustrate professional expectations for mission excellence. The potential for lasting counterproductive cultural change from such a mismatch is substantial.

Finally, there is a widespread perception in operating units that recent years have seen a disproportionately high loss of particularly talented junior and middle-grade officers and NCOs. Personnel managers are deeply concerned about high losses among particular groups such as aviators and technicians. While available quantitative data do not strongly support this perception of talent loss, focus-group interviews do. Junior officers and middle-grade NCOs in many operating units and staffs believed that many of their top contemporaries have moved to the civilian world because their expectations for a challenging and satisfying military career were not being met.

Pay, benefits, and operating tempo are clearly part of the problem; however, there is more to it. Unmet expectations for a challenging and satisfying lifestyle coupled with concerns about the opportunities for professional growth were a part

102. See, for example, "Statement of General Henry H. Shelton," <http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/1999/991026hs.pdf>.

Table 6.4 MCCS Statements about Morale and Readiness

Survey Statements	"Strongly Agree," "Agree," and "Slightly Agree" (%)
People in this unit are not "stressed out."	34
This unit routinely is provided adequate material resources (parts, supplies, funds) needed to accomplish our assigned missions.	38
We have high morale in this unit.	51
I can do well in this unit and still devote sufficient time to family/personal life.	57
The people we are retaining in service have the skills and commitment needed to sustain unit excellence.	70

of every focus-group discussion. The immediate impact of these perceptions about talented individuals leaving the military is lowered morale and decreased confidence in the institution. If these perceptions of quality loss are in fact accurate, the long-term impact on the entire institution will be even more serious.

Intense pressures from austere budgets and manning levels coupled with a high operations tempo in many units have produced remarkably similar effects on the organizational climates of diverse units across all of the services. The effects include eroded trust and confidence within the institution, lowered morale, problems in recruiting and retention, and evidence of high stress on both military personnel and their families. Individuals from different services in focus groups in widely different environments described remarkably similar concerns and revealed notably similar attitudes about readiness, resource adequacy, the quality of training, and family stress.

These responses to institutional stress are not only evidence of a common thread of basic culture across the armed forces but also of systemic problems that transcend the separate services. The implication is that systemic solutions must be found: Either expectations for mission readiness must change, resource management must change, the allocation of missions must change, or some combination of these solutions must take place.

Strong, Effective Leadership

The envisaged twenty-first century environment will require adaptable and versatile units with strong internal cohesion to sustain effectiveness under stress. Some, not all, units now possess those attributes. Although just the opposite is required, centralized control and risk aversion have increased during the 1990s as stress on the military institution has increased. Worldwide media scrutiny of military operations and congressional pressures have undoubtedly contributed to this. The importance of effective control and respect for authority remains undiminished.

On the other hand, operations in fast-moving or technically complex tactical situations cannot be micromanaged from Washington or a distant command post. Agility and quickness are achieved when decisions are made at the lowest level at which the right competence, commitment, and information reside. Control then becomes the product of self-discipline based on shared organizational values. The past 20 years have seen significant advances in methods of leadership education and training, but they have not been widely adopted although they are consistent with the needs of military organizations. The same can be said about techniques of operational leadership in an era marked by huge advances in information technology.

During the last two decades of the twentieth century, previously unimaginable tools for handling and using information have become widespread in the Western world. These tools bring great potential advantages, but they also bring a need for both cultural adaptation and perhaps for more insightful leadership practices. E-mail, for example, speeds communication, facilitates time management, and can enable wide distribution of information. However, it displaces human interaction, is impersonal, tempts the micromanager, and places new demands on organization members for mutual trust and discretion in use of data. In efficient organizations, decisions are made wherever critical information and requisite competence reside. Most military leaders understand this concept but have some difficulty implementing it. Some degree of cultural change probably is needed to enable the best use of information technology, both to develop more resourceful and innovative leaders and to enhance cooperation among units in twenty-first century operations.

Another specific concern about institutional leadership is that junior leaders in some units believe current policies and practices give undue weight to political sensitivities at the cost of required unit disciplinary and training standards. The issue is whether laudable social concerns about individual rights in effect limit the ability of the chain of command to enforce high standards. Wide differences of opinion on this issue exist between Washington and some operating units and within operating units themselves, which suggests this may be more an issue of command climate and local leader competence than an inherent issue of the institution taking on an unmilitary softness. Nevertheless, the fact that some junior leaders in the chain of command lack confidence that they will be supported when they enforce training or discipline standards is clear from discussion groups and informal reports.

Some evidence points to a decline in the quality of leadership practices as well as possible increased expectations for good leadership. This was clear from MCCA data and from other surveys. For example, although a three-year trend is not conclusive, published naval personnel survey data—cited in chapter 4—raised questions about both officer and enlisted perceptions of Navywide leadership. In addition, MCCA survey data and anecdotal information alike reveal clear differences in the quality of organizational climates (factors of morale, commitment, and perceived adaptability) among units of similar structure and circumstance.

The probable major source of these differences, again, is variation in the quality of local leadership. Where one climate reflected a clear sense of mission, teamwork, open communication, and mutual trust, another at the same location did not. While some differences are expected, the question arises of the effectiveness of the less healthy organizations when under great stress. Studies by academics and

military experts have usually shown that high cohesion—mutual trust and shared commitment to unit goals—markedly enhances unit performance under stress. The fact that leaders make a difference is not new. What would be new is an institutional commitment to select and prepare leaders who can develop and sustain healthy climates and to stabilize them long enough to achieve lasting results.

In today's armed forces, there are stories of wonderful results achieved by local commanders who focus on vision and demand high standards but give trust and latitude to subordinates. This should be the normal mode of command, but often it is not. Members of operating units in our sample perceive that micromanagement has increased in the 1990s, both from technology advances and from widespread zero-defects concerns in a competitive career environment. CSIS discussions with operational leaders reveal a typical maturity, mission sensitivity, and capacity for initiative that argue against paternalistic rules from higher headquarters that in the long run are incompatible with the adaptable, resilient characteristics required for effective twenty-first century operations.

Selection and promotion systems are power levers for changing or maintaining culture. Officer personnel management systems have been reviewed and modified in recent years in the various services, but these efforts have not forced the significant cultural change needed to reform selection and promotion models. Suitable education, development, and promotion systems are needed at all levels. Systems also are needed for periodic assessment of the quality of organizational climates; they should be related to leader performance to reinforce and replicate the best climates and prevent the worst. The new chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Eric Shinseki, stated in June 1999 that “[d]eveloping leaders for joint war-fighting as well as for change” was one of the six key “intentions.” He also stated that “[t]he development of bold, innovative leaders of character and competence is fundamental to the long-term health of the Army.”¹⁰³ Achieving the laudable goals implied in these comments would require fundamental change both in the systems and in the culture in which they are embedded.

The leadership and management challenges highlighted in this study have been apparent in various forms for years, as have been characteristics of the challenging environment of the twenty-first century. However, changes toward productive and supportive organizational climates and the uniformly excellent leadership needed to meet future challenges have been institutionally modest. There well may be an underlying cultural predisposition to emphasize and more readily accept change in areas of technology and tactical doctrine than in concepts of organization and human functioning—things as opposed to people.

There may also be a culturally based predisposition to short-term, career-enhancing accomplishments at the expense of long-term institutional needs. Transitory commanders gain recognition through measurable accomplishments. They are typically not on station long enough to be held accountable for decreasing morale or improper resource allocation. In the view of their subordinates, some are conspicuously self-serving. They often have little time for mentoring

103. Shinseki, “Intent of the Chief of Staff of the Army” <www.hqda.army.mil.csa.html> (accessed September 16, 1999).

subordinates—a leadership obligation rarely rewarded when it is done well. These impediments to future effectiveness may stem more from an improperly tuned personnel management system than from any real shortage of potentially capable leaders. (A number of initiatives in the services, such as the Army’s OPMS XXI reorganization of officer career progression, have recently addressed related issues.)

As a further example, many data sets bearing on human-resources issues are compartmentalized in various locations in the services. All of the services, DOD, and DOT might make more effective use of these data if access was more convenient. One current obstacle to sharing is technical; however, another is trust and confidence that such data will be used constructively by other than the originating service.

Conflicting Values

In large part because of external sources of stress, institutional leadership has become more difficult in recent years. In our society, advances in the development of human systems usually have not kept pace with changes in technology or with increased complexity of global systems. The MCCS survey found a strong foundation of relevant military values at every level. However, current pressures—not unique to the military organization—often produce conflicts among loyalties to unit, service, seniors, subordinates, and one’s professional ethics. The senior leadership is mandated to provide candid advice to the national command authority; at the same time, the senior leadership is entrusted with an institution that must be simultaneously maintained and transformed to carry out its constitutionally derived mandates. These mandates might not be in conflict in a perfect world where resource allocation, mission clarity, and the ability to anticipate global events were all totally under control. However, all of them are in fact somewhat beyond the control of the nation’s military leaders.

Some officers and NCOs in the field and fleet have views on the condition of the force that are at odds with those expressed by senior military leaders in Washington. The joint chiefs of staff, for example, were criticized in some focus groups for readiness assessments that appear inconsistent with reality at operating unit level. Senior leaders were also criticized for taking on missions that have stressed force capabilities past prudent limits. Some focus-group participants believed these differences regarding resource adequacy and combat readiness result partly from a lack of candor among some senior leaders; others believed that senior leaders were out of touch with conditions in the field and fleet. The MCCS survey data in this chapter do not contradict the theme of mistrust between top military leaders and some officers and NCOs in the field and the fleet.

It is not unusual that the view from the Pentagon is at odds with the view from the trenches. These worldviews are simply different. Nonetheless, erosion of mutual trust and confidence within the chain of command must eventually have an impact on candor, an important value within the military profession. It is possible that these differences are to some degree a product of miscommunication. The idealized value of candor remains strong in both operating forces and within staffs (and

Table 6.5 MCCS Statements about Views of Military Leadership

Survey Statements	“Strongly Agree” and “Agree” (%)
When my Service’s senior leaders say something, you can believe it is true.	35
My Service’s senior leaders have the will to make the tough, sometimes unpopular, decisions that are in the best long-term interest of the Service.	44
In my Service an atmosphere of trust exists between leaders and their subordinates.	36

surely within the Pentagon also). Perceived deviation from that value is a source of discontent (see table 6.5).

Operations Other Than War

Value conflict is exacerbated by the increased variety of missions facing the armed forces in the post–Cold War era. Many commanders think that OOTW cause degradation in the combat readiness of their units; yet they typically have combat readiness, a keystone in military culture, as an assigned high priority. This stressful conflict is intensified when training and equipment-maintenance resources are less than what service members consider adequate. Some Army units in Bosnia, for example, reveal strong spirit, good cohesion, and considerable satisfaction in performing an important task.

But that environment does not permit these personnel to train in their basic combat-operations mission—their top priority and also the reason why many of them are in the Army in the first place. A synthesis of many comments has been that “We are doing some good work for these people, but I joined the Army to be in a combat-ready unit, not to be a policeman.” On the other hand, some units report that participation in peacekeeping operations provided solid training for their primary missions. Strategic and structural issues as well as motivational issues must be addressed here.

A related issue is the perception of an increasing and dysfunctional aversion to risk taking that is evident in operations, when casualty prevention becomes the overriding doctrinal principle that guides plans, and in administration, when perfect records become the essential individual and organizational goals (see table 6.6). Commanders should be concerned about exposing personnel to unnecessary hazard, and avoiding unnecessary casualties should remain the hallmark of a military leader. But the United States cannot allow casualty avoidance to cripple the larger military machine. Some military leaders believe that peacekeeping and humanitarian missions do not justify the loss of life, and they urge that rules of engagement where the use of force is limited must not generalize to the broader operational culture, which must retain the value of self-sacrifice. If self-sacrifice is downplayed, the institution’s capacity for carrying out its primary reason for existence will itself be

Table 6.6 MCCS Statements about Perceptions of Risk Taking

Survey Statements	"Strongly Agree," "Agree," and "Slightly Agree" (%)
In this unit we are encouraged to take reasonable risks in an effort to improve performance. (We do <i>not</i> have a "Zero defects" mentality.)	66
If I took a prudent risk, did my best and failed, my superiors would support me.	66

at risk. A British Army officer recently commented on U.S. "...nervousness over the issue of force protection" and on a commonplace reluctance of service members to "...disagree with their superiors, even way in advance of the point of decision."¹⁰⁴

Fortunately, MCCS data show risk taking to be reasonably acceptable at unit level and the crucial military value of selfless service to be alive and well. Conventional wisdom is that risk aversion is the product of a peacetime garrison mentality, but today's casualty aversion taken to an extreme appears to lie outside the purview of operating units and, indeed, perhaps outside the military services themselves. Whatever the source, it remains a concern because its eventual impact on military culture and the operational effectiveness of the armed forces could be significant.

Joint Operations

Although the quality and efficiency of joint planning and operations have improved notably during the 1990s, harmonization among services still requires improvement. Understanding of and respect for effective integration of service capabilities are robust in operating units. Some lingering interoperability problems might remain, but joint commanders and their service component commanders are identifying and remedying them. Indeed, some kinds of competition within and among the services produce better doctrine, training, and matériel development.

On the other hand, competition at the service-headquarters level sometimes turns into parochial competition for resources and missions. Also concerns exist that the Joint Staff might interfere with the responsibilities of service leaders for maintaining their organizations as directed by Title X of the U.S. Code. The issue is not whether the existing service cultures maintain their appropriate unique status but instead how they adapt to the needs for effective and efficient joint operations and Joint Staff priorities. There appears to be an informal consensus among senior officers that an update to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation would facilitate further development of joint effectiveness.

104. Lt. Col. D. T. Eccles, "Risk Aversion and the Zero Defects Culture," *British Army Review*, no. 114 (December 1996): 114–115; text also can be found at <home.earthlink.net/~sherikez/rivtroa/britview.htm> (accessed January 20, 2000).

Reserve Forces

Reserve component units are more highly integrated with active forces than ever before. The Army and Air Force in particular are now dependent on the use of their Reserve and National Guard units to sustain overseas deployments, particularly in peacekeeping operations. Surveys and focus groups of Army National Guard and Army Reserve units show high levels of commitment to professional values—indistinguishable from those of the active forces—and organizational climates that reflect solid leadership. In some cases, we found a yearning for a clearer mission and the resources to support it. However, levels of stress in some reserve units are rising as more frequent calls to active service and more demanding training create tensions between the individual's responsibilities to both civilian and military commitments.

Gender and Race Issues

Our survey found differences between male and female members' perceptions of the quality of organizational climates and the importance of certain military values. Females are generally less positive about climate and less likely to endorse military values of self-sacrifice and performance under hardship. These differences vary among the armed forces and in degree between functional areas. They may arise from the traditional male-dominated military culture, the characteristics of individuals who join the armed forces, and the essence of a combat organization where high levels of cohesion are a functional necessity. CSIS focus-group discussions reveal more concern about the impact of females on unit cohesion and effectiveness than some earlier studies have indicated.

MCCS data for the Army and Marine Corps indicate that both males and females have more confidence that male members would carry "their share of the load in wartime/hazardous operations." Many men and women—especially in the enlisted and NCO ranks—were ambiguous or negative about prospective female performance in combat. Data from Navy surveys, detailed in chapter 3, also show an apparently growing skepticism about both the effects of gender integration on readiness and the combat-related skills of female Navy personnel.

Perceptions among various racial groups regarding traditional military values, the quality of unit leadership, and satisfaction with service appear similar in both active and reserve components. This healthy finding supports the thesis that, although imperfect, race relations in the armed forces are generally better than in society at large and are a success story. The differences in perception among racial groups that do appear are most pronounced when race and gender are combined. Whether or not these differences are important requires further study.

A potential problem in the area of race is that some military units have become racially imbalanced, primarily because of self-selection by minority personnel. In the Army, for example, there will soon be few minority senior NCOs or commissioned officers with experience in light or parachute infantry or in special operations forces (SOF). In one SOF unit in our sample, all minority soldiers com-

Table 6.7 Satisfaction with Overall Quality of Army Life, percent

Category of Personnel	1996	1998
Officers	72.3	57.9
Enlisted Personnel	52.5	45.8

Source: Data from the U.S. Army's *Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP)*, as reported to CSIS in an August 3, 1999, memo from the office of the deputy chief of staff for personnel.

bined constituted only 15 percent of those responding, less than half of what a more balanced profile would have shown. The Navy's submarine community also has relatively few minority personnel. All of the services are working to resolve these imbalances.

Racial imbalances in some types of units are not an entirely new phenomenon. Although there are no data to indicate that less integrated units are less operationally effective, many of the military's senior leaders come from these types of combat units, and a reduced number of minority officers with these credentials may eventually cause a decrease in the percentage of minority senior leaders. Further, the mere existence of racially segregated units or specialties is inconsistent with the best practices of a twenty-first-century national institution.

Quality of Life

Reasonable expectations for quality of life for service members and their families are simply not being met (see table 6.7). Service life itself appears to have become less rewarding, and family life in the military appears to have become more stressful.

The current military environment is characterized by both a high operating tempo and a scarcity of matériel and personnel resources. Satisfying career opportunities are thought fewer, and excessive centralization and oversupervision are thought more frequent. The collision of resource scarcity, a sometimes unsatisfying command climate, and an intense training and deployment tempo has created noteworthy organizational pressures. The comment, "It's just not fun anymore," is widespread. Fun in this context means challenge, camaraderie, and adventure along with some degree of coherence and balance in life.

Although the idea of service to the nation remains compelling, a sense of fulfillment from one's work is simply essential in today's world of multiple career options. The stated lack of fun is best exemplified by the disinterest of some successful middle-grade officers in becoming commanders of ships or brigades or wings because of what they see as the frustrating lifestyle of their own commanders. An equally serious potential impact is loss of high-quality individuals. Although the evidence is not totally clear on this point, the Army's fall 1998 *SSMP* and many other service surveys show officer and enlisted intentions to stay until retirement at decade lows.

Further, many leaders at tactical levels are overloaded with the combination of demands imposed by considerations for married and single-parent service members, on the one hand, and a more demanding technical and doctrinal package for junior leaders, on the other hand. Leaders have had and should continue to have primary responsibility for the welfare of their subordinates; however, the prevalence of family financial hardships among junior enlisted married personnel, single-parent responsibilities, and other personal problems place extraordinary demands on leader time that distract from operational priorities and reduce job satisfaction. Some institutional response—better than the social support agencies now established to assist in these matters—is needed to reduce the current level of effort given by local leaders to these persistent problems of individual service members.

During the 1990s, service life became harder for families. Service members, particularly in the lower ranks, expressed major concerns about pay and benefits, including the adequacy of family medical care. Military members often find it difficult to maintain a reasonable balance between the demands of their profession and their responsibilities to their families. In a force with increasing percentages of married and single-parent personnel, these concerns take on increasing importance. The MCCS contained two statements: one about adequacy of pay and benefits and the second about time available for family and personal life. When responses were controlled for rank of respondent, answers to pay and benefits correlated $-.20$ with career intentions, a significant but low relation. Time available for family and personal life correlated $-.35$ with career intentions, a significantly higher and more meaningful relation.

Many good people are leaving the services for other careers because of the pace and quality of activities, the lack of satisfaction in their jobs, and what they view as their marginal ability to provide for their families. It is the combination of these factors that seems to cause significant disillusion with military life. Service members who seek intrinsic satisfactions from their work perform better than those who are motivated by extrinsic rewards. The MCCS data did not show differences between married and unmarried personnel in support of traditional standards. Married personnel do show somewhat greater pride in the duty they perform.

We have, in sum, a remarkable military institution that continues to perform important missions with pride, effectiveness, and unquestionable loyalty to the society it serves. But the institution is under notable stress that could compromise elements of the culture if certain remedial actions are not forthcoming.

Recommendations

AT NO COMPARABLE PERIOD OF PEACE in our history has the United States leaned more heavily on its armed forces. Fortunately, but not at all by chance, the U.S. military has responded with remarkable aplomb and skill when it has answered the nation's many calls to duty during the 1990s. It is clearly in the continuing interest of every American that the core values that buttress the U.S. armed forces not only be protected but also enhanced to ensure that this record of operational excellence will be sustained in the future.

Modifying or adapting the culture of institutions as large, powerful, and steeped in tradition as the U. S. military is a daunting task. A sustained, successful effort will require clear focus and persistence, attributes not always displayed in organizations with pressing immediate needs and a high rate of turnover among the leaders. Some factors—such as the imbalance between resources and missions at the operating level—that have an impact on the current climate in the military and, potentially, the underlying culture must finally be resolved by the executive branch and Congress. Other factors—such as the level of propensity of America's youth to aspire to military service and sustain a commitment once in uniform—are affected by a combination of societal influences and the perceived quality of military life. Other major factors related to military culture—such as leader selection and other personnel management policies—fall mostly within the purview of the services.

Although DOD and DOT have major roles to play in any substantive institutional initiatives, the services as the true custodians of culture must ultimately take the lead in adapting to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Within the services, the officer corps, especially the senior officers, has the responsibility for preserving and protecting the relevant essence of service culture and for modifying those aspects of culture that need to be changed. Because officers are deeply immersed in their individual service cultures and are understandably concerned with preserving the critical elements of those cultures, these officers' essential role as agents of cultural change will be inherently difficult.

As difficult as cultural modification is within our armed forces, disregarding the unmistakable signs of current institutional stress would be irresponsible. The start date of the current decline in morale and readiness, or the rate of that decline, or a comparison between today and some past period of stress in the armed forces is not the issue. The issue is the requirement for military effectiveness across a wide spectrum of activities in the complex world of the twenty-first century.

Any erosion of morale and readiness is reflected more clearly in the organizational climates than in the basic elements of culture. However, it is clear that cultural matters—values, philosophies, and customs—are ultimately the key to any institutional adaptation. It is also clear that current negative trends in the state of

organizational climates, if left unattended, could weaken the unique, productive military culture that has taken centuries to develop.

The following recommendations—each listed under the finding (in bold print) that served as its inspiration—are intended to reinforce the fundamental strength of American military culture and prevent future weakness.

- **Fundamental professional values are remarkably strong but are under stress from several different sources.**
 - With fewer and fewer of the nation's families now touched by military service—and fewer still of the sons and daughters of American elites now serving in uniform—civilian and military leaders must assume greater responsibility in telling the military's story. Americans need to understand the rationale for the distinct standards and values that are the foundation of U.S. military culture. Leaders must also create more opportunities to convey to both the public and opinion leaders the extraordinary contemporary demands being placed on military personnel and their families.
 - The cultural flame in the U.S. military burns brightest within the distinct culture of each individual service. Our men and women in uniform identify themselves not as part of a generic armed forces but, instead, as soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen. These distinct service cultures are a national treasure and have been built on the blood, sweat, and sacrifice of countless men and women in uniform. The services should preserve these unique cultures and invest in the traditional ceremonies and activities that perpetuate them and enhance esprit de corps.
 - To improve civil–military relations, including the understanding of the unique military culture in an era when few serve in the armed forces, the senior military colleges should expand compensated, full-time civilian enrollment and offer special courses for legislators, congressional and executive branch staff, journalists, educators, and academicians.
- **Morale and readiness are suffering from force reductions, high operating tempo, and resource constraints; culture may suffer in the longer term.**
 - The national command authority as well as DOD and DOT must correct the imbalance between mission requirements and available resources at the operating levels of the armed forces. Simply put, systematic solutions must be found that either increase or redistribute resources, decrease mission load, or adjust expectations for universal standards of military readiness. Alternatively, some combination of all three must occur.
 - Readiness requirements must be clarified to eliminate any confusion regarding mission priorities and acceptable standards. This is particularly relevant when peacekeeping or humanitarian missions are undertaken by units that must also be ready to fight in high-intensity conflicts. If necessary, strategic plans should be modified to ensure that mission readiness requirements remain realistic.

- DOD and the services need to redesign current systems for assessing and reporting unit readiness. Current systems are clearly not sophisticated or sensitive enough to portray accurately the impact on readiness of rapidly changing missions and responsibilities. Redesigned systems should ensure efficient, timely reporting of reliable information relevant to both near- and long-term readiness.
- Each military service should also develop and implement a new system for assessing organizational climates in units. Senior leaders should be fully aware of which units reward competence, set clear priorities, allow a free flow of information, inspire trust, support learning, and stimulate innovation and versatility. The results of these organizational-climate assessments should be incorporated into unit-readiness reports to make those reports more useful and reliable.
- **Strong local leadership, which is not uniformly in place today, is essential for maintaining the vibrant organizational climates essential for operational effectiveness in the twenty-first century. Present leader development and promotion systems, however, are not up to the task of consistently identifying and advancing highly competent leaders.**
 - Each military service should review its procedures for developing, selecting, evaluating, and promoting its officers. Promotion boards should be provided supplemental data more relevant to leader competency than the standard performance reports rendered exclusively by an individual's senior officers. To enhance the reliability of the selection process, for example, peer and subordinate input collected in a manner not to compromise the chain of command could be provided as behavioral feedback to junior officers for their development and provided as additional information to boards that are selecting mid- and senior-grade officers for promotion.
 - Considering the extraordinary challenges and responsibilities the United States places on operating units, commanders should be given all possible latitude in carrying out their missions. Micromanagement and a zero-defects standard must be identified as unacceptable command techniques.
 - Given the growing demand within the services for high-tech skills and aptitudes to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, DOD, DOT, and the military services should consider more programs for lateral entry of specialists into the armed forces as NCOs, petty officers, warrant officers, and commissioned officers.
- **Circumstances often require military leaders to make decisions when the value of loyal response to authority, on one hand, appears to conflict with the values of loyal dissent and candor, on the other. Conflicts among professional values, not unique to the military, if not properly and openly resolved in each case, can erode trust within the armed forces.**
 - In any hierarchical organization as large as the U.S. military, getting timely and reliable information flowing up and down the chain of command is

inherently difficult. The services need to address an obvious and possibly growing perception gap between the senior leaders and the officers and the NCOs at lower levels on issues such as quality of life, quality of recruits, and unit readiness. Perceptions in operating units need to be carefully examined and answered, either by fixing the problem or by better explaining the situation. Left unattended, perception gaps can erode trust in leaders and in the institution in general.

- Because the professional military education system is a key fulcrum in sustaining military culture, all of the services should reinforce in their curricula the imperative of candor in reporting within the military chains of command and in providing military advice to civilian officials. Senior uniformed officers must communicate in ways that are credible to both members of the forces and civilian policymakers, and leaders at all levels must report candidly on unit conditions without regard to career concerns.
- **Operations other than war (OOTW), although essential to the national interest, are affecting combat readiness and causing uncertainty about the essential combat focus of our military forces.**
 - Although the services can be expected to engage across the entire spectrum of conflict in the twenty-first century, it must be made absolutely clear that combat operations—in whatever new forms they might take—remain the unique, core competency of the armed forces and DOD.
 - The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should review force protection policies to ensure that they are not leading to a dysfunctional mind-set in which risk avoidance supersedes mission accomplishment. Rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations should be designed carefully to preserve the initiative and confidence necessary for subsequent combat missions.
 - Because boldness and initiative will remain hallmarks of successful military operations, each military service should encourage and reward appropriate risk taking as an essential element in its organizational ethos.
- **Although the quality and efficiency of joint operations have improved during the 1990s, harmonization among the services needs improvement.**
 - Current efforts to enhance the effectiveness of joint operations should continue, building on the success of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. (We note with approval the recent designation of the Atlantic Command as the Joint Forces Command and clarification of its role as the center for joint experimentation, increasing joint use of the combat training centers, identification of the Joint Battle Center in Suffolk, Va., and the work on the concept for future joint operations, as well as other promising initiatives.)
 - Increased educational cross-fertilization among the services should be stressed at the cadet/midshipman and junior officer levels. Junior officers should also be given credit for a joint tour of duty after suitable joint service.

- All of the senior service colleges and staff colleges should bolster their curricula with more in-depth discussion of the unique characteristics of each service culture. Such a discussion should include historical review and analyses of how service cultures and traditions have affected and can affect joint operations.
- **The services have made significant strides in more closely integrating the plans and operations of their reserve and active forces, but continuing efforts are warranted.**
 - Recent efforts to integrate more closely the active and reserve components and to have reserve forces shoulder a greater share of the burden of numerous deployments should be reinforced with an aim to improve operational effectiveness. The services must insure, however, that they do not impose unreasonable demands on America's citizen-soldiers by asking them to deploy regularly for extended periods.
- **Issues of gender integration and racial imbalance in some units need to be addressed.**
 - To preclude de facto racial segregation in any segment of the armed forces, DOD should study the causes and implications of trends toward dramatic racial imbalances in some units and formulate appropriate responses. Although the services have undertaken laudable efforts in the area of race relations, the imperatives of equal opportunity and shared sacrifice dictate continuing attention to this trend.
 - Although a number of prior studies of the roles of women in the armed forces have been conducted, a comprehensive review is needed to assess thoroughly the impact of gender integration on unit cohesion and operational effectiveness, especially in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Recommendations should include any necessary modifications in recruiting, training, education, and assignment policies.
- **Reasonable quality-of-life expectations for service members and their families are not being met. The military as an institution has not adjusted adequately to the needs of a force with a higher number of married people.**
 - While uniformed service members are not motivated primarily by monetary gain, a high-quality volunteer force will demand a reasonable degree of financial security and suitable pay and benefits, including medical care for families. Congress, DOD, and DOT should provide compensation at necessary levels to ensure that recent enlistment and retention problems are addressed.
 - The services should provide specialists to assist junior officers, NCOs, and petty officers in attending to personal problems of junior enlisted personnel. These specialists could free unit leaders from tasks such as finding suitable housing for single-parent junior enlisted members, educating married personnel in financial planning, or arranging appropriate child-care services during deployments. Many junior leaders are overwhelmed by such

tasks, which interfere with training, discipline, and overall mission readiness.

Because modifying cultures of major institutions is a daunting task that requires clear focus and persistence over time, the **final recommendation** of this study is the **creation of a special task force on military culture** to ensure sustained implementation of these policies. The task force should comprise representatives from DOD, DOT, and the military services as well as knowledgeable civilians and retired military officers. Members of this task force would assess the implementation of the recommendations in this report and other related initiatives, gauge their impact on service cultures over time, and make periodic reports to senior officials on the state of U.S. military culture. Without the oversight of this task force—especially when dealing with long-term sensitive issues such as officer development and promotion—meaningful institutional change is unlikely given the normal reluctance to address cultural issues amid the stresses of immediate, high-profile missions.

As difficult as it may be to marshal the energy to address fundamental, complex issues of military culture during a period of profound stress, to do less at this juncture in our history would be irresponsible. The negative trends that are conspicuous within a still strong and robust culture can be reversed. Some reversals may take months to accomplish, some may take years. Left unchecked, however, current deficiencies in climate show clear potential for weakening the sinews of the proud, productive culture that has sustained the United States for two centuries. Nothing less is at stake here than the ability of the United States to confront successfully and reliably the national security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Survey Data

THIS APPENDIX PROVIDES DATA FROM BOTH SURVEYS: the 99-question MCCA and the 88-question staff version (MCCA Staff). (See appendix B for reproductions of the survey booklets.) The MCCA was given to 11,680 personnel in operational units worldwide; respondents included personnel in Army (active and reserve components), Marine Corps, and Coast Guard operational units. The MCCA Staff survey was given to 819 personnel in single-service or joint staffs worldwide. Each staff was commanded by a general officer or a flag officer with at least a one-star (O7) rank. MCCA Staff respondents included officer and enlisted personnel from all services; but, owing to the nature of high-level staffs, the respondents were mainly senior NCOs and officers. More than half of the respondents to the MCCA Staff survey were officers in the rank of major or lieutenant commander and above.

Response options for each item in both surveys ranged from STRONGLY DISAGREE (a value of 1), Disagree (2), slightly disagree (3), slightly agree (4), Agree (5), and STRONGLY AGREE (a value of 6). All questions were phrased so that a positive answer was considered one that was conducive to a strong climate or a healthy culture.

Note that no finding in the text area of this study was made solely on the basis of survey data. In addition to the data from the two versions of the survey, CSIS analysts drew on focus-group discussions (more than 125 in all) with groups of 5–8 officers or NCOs in selected units. Both of these sources were buttressed by secondary sources, recent internal climate-survey data made available by the individual services, and discussions with experts within the confines of study conferences and workshops.

The following tables summarize the results of the two MCCA surveys.

Table A.1 MCCA Results, by item number (11,680 respondents)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
5.29	1.05	1	I am proud to serve in America's armed forces.
4.07	1.37	2	We have high standards of discipline in this unit.
3.94	1.32	3	Members of this unit are physically and mentally fit to perform their duties under all conditions.
3.99	1.43	4	We have a lot of teamwork going on in this unit.
3.16	1.76	5	In my unit, we are rarely surprised by unexpected missions or taskings.
3.70	1.54	6	People are treated fairly in this unit.
3.68	1.36	7	Military traditions and values mean a lot to most people in this unit.
3.89	1.53	8	Promotions in the junior enlisted grades in this unit are done fairly.
4.28	1.28	9	Leaders in this unit have the necessary authority to carry out their responsibilities.
4.88	1.41	10	If necessary to accomplish a combat/lifesaving mission, I am prepared to put my life on the line.

Table A.1 MCCS Results, by item number (11,680 respondents) (continued)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
5.08	1.17	11	My job is important in accomplishing the mission of this unit.
3.67	1.53	12	Excellence in this unit is properly acknowledged and rewarded.
3.76	1.40	13	We have a clear sense of mission and priorities in this unit.
4.18	1.38	14	Senior officers in this organization set a positive example in their behavior.
4.41	1.42	15	I am confident that my unit commander trusts me.
3.30	1.62	16	This unit has sufficient personnel to do our job effectively.
5.16	1.10	17	The American military plays an important role in the world today.
4.36	1.33	18	Our organization is serious about honesty and integrity.
4.33	1.58	19	My immediate supervisor does not "play favorites."
4.14	1.49	20	I can trust the other members of my team to do their share of the work, in war or in other operations.
4.18	1.34	21	People in this unit are encouraged to learn new skills and concepts.
3.17	1.45	22	Our branch of service is attracting high-quality, motivated recruits.
4.44	1.11	23	I have confidence in the other American military services that we might work with in joint operations.
3.56	1.68	24	I can do well in this unit and still devote sufficient time to family/personal life.
2.76	1.57	25	People in this unit are not "stressed out."
3.54	1.48	26	The training in this unit is realistic and challenging.
3.32	1.56	27	We have high morale in this unit.
3.90	1.36	28	Members of this unit believe it is appropriate for us to be involved in a variety of operations—from "humanitarian" to combat.
4.05	1.40	29	NCO's/Petty Officers in this unit take care of their people.
4.46	1.32	30	Even in today's highly technical armed forces, military ritual and tradition are essential parts of our culture.
4.27	1.45	31	My immediate supervisor lets me know how well I am doing my job, and how I might enhance my performance.
4.13	1.38	32	This unit has the spirit and courage needed to perform any mission assigned.
4.09	1.37	33	Commissioned officers in this unit set a good example of professional behavior.
3.69	1.45	34	Commissioned officers in this unit put mission and people ahead of their own ambition.
4.49	1.16	35	Male members of units that I am familiar with would carry their share of the load in wartime/hazardous operations.
3.93	1.36	36	I am proud of the NCO/Petty Officer leaders in this unit.
3.72	1.51	37	Female members of units that I am familiar with would carry their share of the load in wartime/hazardous operations.
4.77	1.35	38	The armed forces have a right to expect high standards of me when I am off-duty as well as on-duty.
3.79	1.49	39	Leaders in this unit are willing to listen to ideas from their subordinates.
3.83	1.37	40	In this unit we are encouraged to take reasonable risks in an effort to improve performance. (We do not have a "Zero defects" mentality.)
3.68	1.60	41	You can "tell it like it is" in our unit; we don't hide bad news.
3.63	1.40	42	In my experience, active and reserve units work well together.
5.08	1.13	43	The essential mission of America's armed forces is to be prepared to win in combat.
4.13	1.33	44	This unit appreciates and supports individual initiative and resourcefulness in accomplishing the mission.
4.33	1.19	45	Our organization can adjust to new technologies and changing doctrine.
4.42	1.37	46	If I could not maintain proficiency in my wartime skills I would be less interested in a military career.
4.21	1.36	47	My leaders evaluate my performance on the job competently and fairly.
4.31	1.46	48	My immediate supervisor sets a good example of professional behavior.
2.61	1.57	49	My military income allows me to provide adequately for my family.
3.79	1.40	50	In general, members of this unit who are junior to me are committed to do their best.
4.11	1.40	51	When we are deployed, the families have access to a support system that meets their needs.
3.99	1.47	52	I have confidence in this unit's ability to perform in wartime/combat.
4.13	1.25	53	This unit would work smoothly with units from other military services.

Table A.1 MCCS Results, by item number (11,680 respondents) (continued)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
3.90	1.29	54	The people we are retaining in service have the skills and commitment needed to sustain unit excellence.
4.16	1.27	55	Senior officers in this organization are tactically and technically proficient.
3.99	1.26	56	Our leaders consider the future, exploring new doctrine, tactics, equipment, and procedures.
4.24	1.71	57	My family would support my making the armed forces a career.
4.13	1.40	58	This unit is flexible, and can adapt quickly to changing situations.
4.17	1.26	59	I can rely on my immediate subordinates to use good judgment and initiative in carrying out their assigned missions.
4.67	1.43	60	I have a deep personal commitment and a strong desire to serve the nation as a member of the armed forces.
4.32	1.22	61	My immediate subordinates have the skills and intellect to handle their assigned duties.
2.90	1.54	62	This unit routinely is provided adequate material resources (parts, supplies, funds) needed to accomplish our assigned missions.
3.49	1.45	63	If I make a request through channels, I know somebody will listen and inform me about my request.
3.99	1.43	64	Personal interests and wishes of military personnel must take second place to operational requirements.
3.18	1.58	65	Married and single personnel in this unit have reasonably similar qualities of life.
2.27	1.50	66	I receive pay, allowances, and other benefits comparable to individuals in civilian life who have my skills and responsibilities.
4.26	1.26	67	My immediate subordinates would react professionally in a combat/hazardous situation.
4.24	1.29	68	In this unit, we learn from our mistakes and get better.
3.42	1.72	69	My standard of living is as good as, if not better than, others my age who are not in the armed forces.
3.87	1.41	70	Commissioned officers in this unit take care of their people.
3.83	1.45	71	If I took a prudent risk, did my best and failed, my superiors would support me.
3.39	1.49	72	Individuals being assigned to our unit from initial entry training come to us well indoctrinated with the standards and values of our service.
3.49	1.48	73	Single parents in this unit are able to carry their share of unit duties while also providing adequate care for their children.
3.97	1.42	74	If I ever get into a tight spot, I can depend on people in my unit to take action to help.
4.14	1.50	75	This unit does not have problems with racism or racial discrimination.
4.30	1.46	76	This unit does not have problems with sexual misbehavior or sexual discrimination.
4.41	1.34	77	Leaders in this unit do not tolerate dishonest or unethical behavior from anybody.
3.91	1.50	78	Overall, I am satisfied with service in the armed forces.
3.79	1.39	79	When my Service's senior leaders say something, you can believe it is true.
4.10	1.28	80	My Service's senior leaders have the will to make the tough, sometimes unpopular, decisions that are in the best long-term interest of the service.
3.47	1.52	81	In my Service people are given the flexibility needed to balance the demands of work and personal or family life.
3.81	1.35	82	In my Service an atmosphere of trust exists between leaders and their subordinates.
3.61	1.35	83	My Service has a culture where people can explore better ways of doing things, and can challenge traditions or policies that seem outdated.
4.00	1.29	84	The Active Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
4.21	1.15	85	Within my Service I can depend on the other branches/components/specialties to effectively carry their share of the load.
3.64	1.46	86	My Service has a promotion system that is generally fair and reliable.
3.89	1.31	87	My Service does not generate such a competitive climate that teamwork takes second place to individual ambition.
3.67	1.41	88	People in my Service can make an honest mistake without it ruining their career.

Table A.1 MCCS Results, by item number (11,680 respondents) (continued)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
3.61	1.38	89	The Reserve Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
3.96	1.38	90	My Service has the flexibility and resources to handle "peacekeeping" and other non-combat missions without significantly degrading its wartime readiness.
4.19	1.48	91	In my Service, I believe that I can achieve my full potential in rank and responsibility.
3.99	1.29	92	Emphasis on joint education, doctrine, and training has contributed to the effectiveness of my Service.
3.70	1.33	93	My Service responds to the changing conditions and needs of its personnel.
3.78	1.47	94	Most civilians have a great deal of respect for the armed forces.
3.97	1.55	95	Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military values and customs.
4.15	1.28	96	Most members of the armed forces have respect for American civilian society.
4.35	1.30	97	People in my hometown have high regard for America's armed forces.
4.83	1.15	98	Whenever I have the opportunity, I socialize with civilians as well as with military friends.
4.10	1.81	99	Public service, whether in the military or in something like a domestic Peace Corps, should be required of all American citizens.

Table A.2 MCCS Results, by mean (11,680 respondents)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
5.29	1.05	1	I am proud to serve in America's armed forces.
5.16	1.10	17	The American military plays an important role in the world today.
5.08	1.17	11	My job is important in accomplishing the mission of this unit.
5.08	1.13	43	The essential mission of America's armed forces is to be prepared to win in combat.
4.88	1.41	10	If necessary to accomplish a combat/lifesaving mission, I am prepared to put my life on the line.
4.83	1.15	98	Whenever I have the opportunity, I socialize with civilians as well as with military friends.
4.77	1.35	38	The armed forces have a right to expect high standards of me when I am off-duty as well as on-duty.
4.67	1.43	60	I have a deep personal commitment and a strong desire to serve the nation as a member of the armed forces.
4.49	1.16	35	Male members of units that I am familiar with would carry their share of the load in wartime/hazardous operations.
4.46	1.32	30	Even in today's highly technical armed forces, military ritual and tradition are essential parts of our culture.
4.44	1.11	23	I have confidence in the other American military services that we might work with in joint operations.
4.42	1.37	46	If I could not maintain proficiency in my wartime skills I would be less interested in a military career.
4.41	1.42	15	I am confident that my unit commander trusts me.
4.41	1.34	77	Leaders in this unit do not tolerate dishonest or unethical behavior from anybody.
4.36	1.33	18	Our organization is serious about honesty and integrity.
4.35	1.30	97	People in my hometown have high regard for America's armed forces.
4.33	1.58	19	My immediate supervisor does not "play favorites."
4.33	1.19	45	Our organization can adjust to new technologies and changing doctrine.
4.32	1.22	61	My immediate subordinates have the skills and intellect to handle their assigned duties.
4.31	1.46	48	My immediate supervisor sets a good example of professional behavior.
4.30	1.46	76	This unit does not have problems with sexual misbehavior or sexual discrimination.

Table A.2 MCCS Results, by mean (11,680 respondents) (continued)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
4.28	1.28	9	Leaders in this unit have the necessary authority to carry out their responsibilities.
4.27	1.45	31	My immediate supervisor lets me know how well I am doing my job, and how I might enhance my performance.
4.26	1.26	67	My immediate subordinates would react professionally in a combat/hazardous situation.
4.24	1.71	57	My family would support my making the armed forces a career.
4.24	1.29	68	In this unit, we learn from our mistakes and get better.
4.21	1.36	47	My leaders evaluate my performance on the job competently and fairly.
4.21	1.15	85	Within my Service I can depend on the other branches/components/specialties to effectively carry their share of the load.
4.19	1.48	91	In my Service, I believe that I can achieve my full potential in rank and responsibility.
4.18	1.38	14	Senior officers in this organization set a positive example in their behavior.
4.18	1.34	21	People in this unit are encouraged to learn new skills and concepts.
4.17	1.26	59	I can rely on my immediate subordinates to use good judgment and initiative in carrying out their assigned missions.
4.16	1.27	55	Senior officers in this organization are tactically and technically proficient.
4.15	1.28	96	Most members of the armed forces have respect for American civilian society.
4.14	1.49	20	I can trust the other members of my team to do their share of the work, in war or in other operations.
4.14	1.50	75	This unit does not have problems with racism or racial discrimination.
4.13	1.38	32	This unit has the spirit and courage needed to perform any mission assigned.
4.13	1.33	44	This unit appreciates and supports individual initiative and resourcefulness in accomplishing the mission.
4.13	1.25	53	This unit would work smoothly with units from other military services.
4.13	1.40	58	This unit is flexible, and can adapt quickly to changing situations.
4.11	1.40	51	When we are deployed, the families have access to a support system that meets their needs.
4.10	1.28	80	My Service's senior leaders have the will to make the tough, sometimes unpopular, decisions that are in the best long-term interest of the service.
4.10	1.81	99	Public service, whether in the military or in something like a domestic Peace Corps, should be required of all American citizens.
4.09	1.37	33	Commissioned officers in this unit set a good example of professional behavior.
4.07	1.37	2	We have high standards of discipline in this unit.
4.05	1.40	29	NCO's/Petty Officers in this unit take care of their people.
4.00	1.29	84	The Active Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
3.99	1.43	4	We have a lot of teamwork going on in this unit.
3.99	1.47	52	I have confidence in this unit's ability to perform in wartime/combat.
3.99	1.26	56	Our leaders consider the future, exploring new doctrine, tactics, equipment, and procedures.
3.99	1.43	64	Personal interests and wishes of military personnel must take second place to operational requirements.
3.99	1.29	92	Emphasis on joint education, doctrine, and training has contributed to the effectiveness of my Service.
3.97	1.42	74	If I ever get into a tight spot, I can depend on people in my unit to take action to help.
3.97	1.55	95	Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military values and customs.
3.96	1.38	90	My Service has the flexibility and resources to handle "peacekeeping" and other non-combat missions without significantly degrading its wartime readiness.
3.94	1.32	3	Members of this unit are physically and mentally fit to perform their duties under all conditions.
3.93	1.36	36	I am proud of the NCO/Petty Officer leaders in this unit.
3.91	1.50	78	Overall, I am satisfied with service in the armed forces.
3.90	1.36	28	Members of this unit believe it is appropriate for us to be involved in a variety of operations—from "humanitarian" to combat.

Table A.2 MCCS Results, by mean (11,680 respondents) (continued)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
3.90	1.29	54	The people we are retaining in service have the skills and commitment needed to sustain unit excellence.
3.89	1.53	8	Promotions in the junior enlisted grades in this unit are done fairly.
3.89	1.31	87	My Service does not generate such a competitive climate that teamwork takes second place to individual ambition.
3.87	1.41	70	Commissioned officers in this unit take care of their people.
3.83	1.37	40	In this unit we are encouraged to take reasonable risks in an effort to improve performance. (We do not have a "Zero defects" mentality.)
3.83	1.45	71	If I took a prudent risk, did my best and failed, my superiors would support me.
3.81	1.35	82	In my Service an atmosphere of trust exists between leaders and their subordinates.
3.79	1.49	39	Leaders in this unit are willing to listen to ideas from their subordinates.
3.79	1.40	50	In general, members of this unit who are junior to me are committed to do their best.
3.79	1.39	79	When my Service's senior leaders say something, you can believe it is true.
3.78	1.47	94	Most civilians have a great deal of respect for the armed forces.
3.76	1.40	13	We have a clear sense of mission and priorities in this unit.
3.72	1.51	37	Female members of units that I am familiar with would carry their share of the load in wartime/hazardous operations.
3.70	1.54	6	People are treated fairly in this unit.
3.70	1.33	93	My Service responds to the changing conditions and needs of its personnel.
3.69	1.45	34	Commissioned officers in this unit put mission and people ahead of their own ambition.
3.68	1.36	7	Military traditions and values mean a lot to most people in this unit.
3.68	1.60	41	You can "tell it like it is" in our unit; we don't hide bad news.
3.67	1.53	12	Excellence in this unit is properly acknowledged and rewarded.
3.67	1.41	88	People in my Service can make an honest mistake without it ruining their career.
3.64	1.46	86	My Service has a promotion system that is generally fair and reliable.
3.63	1.40	42	In my experience, active and reserve units work well together.
3.61	1.35	83	My Service has a culture where people can explore better ways of doing things, and can challenge traditions or policies that seem outdated.
3.61	1.38	89	The Reserve Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
3.56	1.68	24	I can do well in this unit and still devote sufficient time to family/personal life.
3.54	1.48	26	The training in this unit is realistic and challenging.
3.49	1.45	63	If I make a request through channels, I know somebody will listen and inform me about my request.
3.49	1.48	73	Single parents in this unit are able to carry their share of unit duties while also providing adequate care for their children.
3.47	1.52	81	In my Service people are given the flexibility needed to balance the demands of work and personal or family life.
3.42	1.72	69	My standard of living is as good as—if not better than—others my age who are not in the armed forces.
3.39	1.49	72	Individuals being assigned to our unit from initial entry training come to us well indoctrinated with the standards and values of our service.
3.32	1.56	27	We have high morale in this unit.
3.30	1.62	16	This unit has sufficient personnel to do our job effectively.
3.18	1.58	65	Married and single personnel in this unit have reasonably similar qualities of life.
3.17	1.45	22	Our branch of service is attracting high-quality, motivated recruits.
3.16	1.76	5	In my unit, we are rarely surprised by unexpected missions or taskings.
2.90	1.54	62	This unit routinely is provided adequate material resources (parts, supplies, funds) needed to accomplish our assigned missions.
2.76	1.57	25	People in this unit are not "stressed out."
2.61	1.57	49	My military income allows me to provide adequately for my family.
2.27	1.50	66	I receive pay, allowances, and other benefits comparable to individuals in civilian life who have my skills and responsibilities.

Table A.3 MCCS Results, mean by pay grade (11,680 respondents)

Item Number	Total 11,680*	E1-E4 7,195	E5-E6 2,716	E7-E9 730	O1-O3 682	O4+ 299
1	5.29	5.09	5.52	5.71	5.72	5.72
2	4.07	4.00	3.95	4.41	4.46	5.01
3	3.94	3.80	3.98	4.41	4.30	4.79
4	3.99	3.81	4.03	4.60	4.68	4.93
5	3.16	3.15	3.07	3.33	3.28	3.48
6	3.70	3.41	3.85	4.53	4.66	4.84
7	3.68	3.49	3.75	4.28	4.35	4.75
8	3.89	3.60	4.13	4.69	4.77	4.93
9	4.28	4.19	4.27	4.60	4.65	4.96
10	4.88	4.68	5.11	5.37	5.36	5.42
11	5.08	4.91	5.29	5.52	5.35	5.45
12	3.67	3.44	3.81	4.40	4.39	4.65
13	3.76	3.66	3.72	4.14	4.21	4.59
14	4.18	4.12	4.11	4.37	4.64	4.92
15	4.41	4.21	4.56	4.91	4.97	5.14
16	3.30	3.36	3.17	3.20	3.15	3.76
17	5.16	5.06	5.28	5.38	5.38	5.49
18	4.36	4.23	4.41	4.81	4.80	5.03
19	4.33	4.08	4.58	5.03	4.89	5.14
20	4.14	3.87	4.39	4.84	4.85	5.13
21	4.18	4.02	4.25	4.65	4.71	5.00
22	3.17	3.07	3.09	3.56	3.70	4.25
23	4.44	4.35	4.52	4.69	4.66	4.85
24	3.56	3.37	3.73	4.16	3.98	4.15
25	2.76	2.49	2.96	3.49	3.52	3.75
26	3.54	3.42	3.53	3.96	4.01	4.40
27	3.32	3.13	3.33	4.01	4.05	4.53
28	3.90	3.74	4.01	4.33	4.26	4.58
29	4.05	3.79	4.35	4.68	4.60	4.72
30	4.46	4.26	4.66	4.90	4.95	5.08
31	4.27	4.21	4.28	4.53	4.40	4.69
32	4.13	3.95	4.19	4.66	4.78	5.02
33	4.09	4.02	4.00	4.25	4.76	4.86
34	3.69	3.57	3.64	3.84	4.50	4.57
35	4.49	4.32	4.64	4.89	4.99	5.15
36	3.93	3.59	4.28	4.74	4.73	4.90
37	3.72	3.55	3.72	4.20	4.24	4.74
38	4.77	4.50	5.11	5.31	5.38	5.39
39	3.79	3.50	4.01	4.48	4.72	4.82
40	3.83	3.73	3.82	4.10	4.25	4.50
41	3.68	3.52	3.70	4.16	4.30	4.54
42	3.63	3.49	3.70	4.00	3.84	4.10
43	5.08	4.97	5.22	5.30	5.30	5.40
44	4.13	3.93	4.27	4.63	4.73	4.98
45	4.33	4.20	4.42	4.69	4.73	4.93
46	4.42	4.32	4.51	4.57	4.77	4.64
47	4.21	4.03	4.36	4.70	4.68	4.84
48	4.31	4.11	4.46	4.88	4.91	5.13
49	2.61	2.31	2.63	3.43	3.87	4.12
50	3.79	3.52	3.93	4.52	4.54	4.84
51	4.11	4.06	4.05	4.28	4.36	4.44
52	3.99	3.85	4.01	4.41	4.54	4.88
53	4.13	3.96	4.22	4.58	4.65	4.94
54	3.90	3.78	3.97	4.25	4.18	4.66
55	4.16	4.04	4.20	4.39	4.67	4.82
56	3.99	3.82	4.10	4.33	4.56	4.72

Table A.3 MCCA Results, mean by pay grade (11,680 respondents) (continued)

Item Number	Total 11,680*	E1-E4 7,195	E5-E6 2,716	E7-E9 730	O1-O3 682	O4+ 299
57	4.24	3.96	4.55	5.07	4.76	4.86
58	4.13	3.95	4.25	4.64	4.76	4.96
59	4.17	3.92	4.37	4.81	4.78	5.08
60	4.67	4.35	5.07	5.40	5.33	5.44
61	4.32	4.09	4.55	4.82	4.87	5.07
62	2.90	2.82	2.95	3.17	3.00	3.51
63	3.49	3.37	3.54	3.85	3.80	4.19
64	3.99	3.87	4.09	4.29	4.36	4.41
65	3.18	2.97	3.28	3.92	3.84	4.05
66	2.27	2.24	2.19	2.38	2.54	2.91
67	4.26	4.06	4.38	4.75	4.87	5.07
68	4.24	4.10	4.32	4.56	4.66	4.89
69	3.42	3.40	3.35	3.54	3.58	3.80
70	3.87	3.73	3.83	4.17	4.77	4.91
71	3.83	3.65	3.95	4.25	4.38	4.59
72	3.39	3.46	3.12	3.46	3.54	3.82
73	3.49	3.38	3.59	3.75	3.69	3.87
74	3.97	3.80	4.02	4.50	4.60	4.77
75	4.14	3.98	4.18	4.73	4.78	4.90
76	4.30	4.17	4.36	4.73	4.68	4.77
77	4.41	4.30	4.47	4.75	4.80	4.98
78	3.91	3.59	4.24	4.78	4.50	4.99
79	3.79	3.65	3.90	4.14	4.21	4.36
80	4.10	4.01	4.20	4.34	4.31	4.35
81	3.47	3.30	3.60	4.01	3.98	4.08
82	3.81	3.64	3.91	4.29	4.45	4.58
83	3.61	3.45	3.71	4.08	4.11	4.35
84	4.00	3.90	4.08	4.24	4.23	4.51
85	4.21	4.10	4.31	4.41	4.48	4.63
86	3.64	3.56	3.56	3.98	4.17	4.47
87	3.89	3.78	3.97	4.21	4.22	4.32
88	3.67	3.58	3.71	3.99	4.03	4.08
89	3.61	3.56	3.60	3.85	3.55	4.03
90	3.96	3.99	3.98	3.90	3.65	3.97
91	4.19	4.09	4.21	4.59	4.51	4.52
92	3.99	3.85	4.13	4.35	4.37	4.39
93	3.70	3.59	3.76	4.03	4.03	4.29
94	3.78	3.68	3.85	4.02	4.09	4.31
95	3.97	3.73	4.20	4.56	4.61	4.77
96	4.15	4.04	4.25	4.51	4.33	4.53
97	4.35	4.22	4.50	4.66	4.63	4.75
98	4.83	4.76	4.87	4.98	5.05	5.03
99	4.10	3.86	4.40	4.73	4.50	4.73

* The sum of the individual rank groupings is less than the total number who took the survey because 58 respondents did not provide their ranks.

Table A.4 MCCS Staff Results, by item number (819 respondents)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
5.67	0.65	1	I am proud to serve in America's armed forces.
4.91	0.95	2	Members of this staff are physically and mentally fit to perform their duties in wartime/combat.
4.50	1.22	3	We have a lot of teamwork going on in this staff.
3.28	1.53	4	We are rarely surprised by unexpected missions or tasks.
4.50	1.08	5	Military traditions and values mean a lot to most people in this staff.
4.67	1.10	6	Leaders in this staff are provided the necessary authority to carry out their responsibilities.
5.30	0.99	7	If necessary to accomplish a combat/lifesaving mission, I am prepared to put my life on the line.
4.18	1.25	8	Excellence on this staff is properly acknowledged and rewarded.
4.19	1.24	9	We have a clear sense of mission and priorities.
4.72	1.12	10	Senior officers in this organization set a positive example in their behavior.
4.67	1.24	11	My education and training have prepared me well to do my assigned job.
4.95	0.96	12	Our organization is serious about honesty and integrity.
4.73	1.08	13	People on this staff are encouraged to learn new skills and concepts.
4.77	1.16	14	I am confident that the leaders of this staff trust me.
4.14	1.53	15	I can do well in this assignment and still devote sufficient time to my family/personal life.
3.23	1.54	16	This staff has sufficient personnel to do our job effectively.
3.92	1.31	17	We have high morale on this staff.
4.50	1.16	18	Members on this staff believe it is appropriate for us to be involved in a wide variety of operations—from "humanitarian" to combat.
4.81	1.12	19	Even in today's highly technical armed forces, military ritual and tradition are essential parts of our culture.
3.11	1.43	20	People on this staff are not "stressed out."
4.74	0.97	21	Officers on this staff set a good example of professional behavior.
4.09	1.28	22	Officers on this staff put mission and people ahead of their own ambition.
5.45	0.87	23	The armed forces have a right to expect high standards of me when I am off-duty as well as on-duty.
4.45	1.25	24	Leaders in this headquarters are willing to listen to ideas from their subordinates.
4.11	1.24	25	In this staff we are encouraged to take reasonable risks in an effort to improve performance. (We do not have a "zero defects" mentality.)
4.08	1.36	26	You can "tell it like it is" in this staff; we don't hide bad news.
4.34	1.21	27	In my experience, active and reserve units work well together.
5.47	0.88	28	The essential mission of America's armed forces is to be prepared to win in combat.
5.13	0.84	29	I have confidence in the other American military services that we might work with in joint operations.
4.92	0.94	30	This headquarters can adjust to new technologies and changing doctrine.
4.50	1.24	31	If I could not maintain proficiency in my wartime skills I would be less interested in a military career.
4.62	1.13	32	My leaders evaluate my performance on the job competently and fairly.
4.26	1.22	33	We share good ideas and current information regularly among the staff sections.
4.80	0.98	34	In general, members on this staff who are junior to me are committed to do their best.
4.85	0.91	35	I have confidence in this staff's ability to perform in wartime/combat.
4.83	0.89	36	This staff would work smoothly with organizations from other military services.
4.90	0.96	37	I can trust the other members of my team to do their share of the work, in war or in other operations.
4.61	1.05	38	This staff appreciates and supports individual initiative and resourcefulness in accomplishing the mission.
4.28	1.11	39	The people we are retaining in service have the skills and commitment needed to sustain unit excellence.
4.83	0.95	40	Senior officers on this staff are tactically and technically proficient.
4.96	0.90	41	Senior officers in this headquarters consider the future, exploring new doctrine, tactics, equipment, and procedures.

Table A.4 MCCS Staff Results, by item number (819 respondents) (continued)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
4.59	1.02	42	This organization is flexible, and can adapt quickly to changing situations.
5.39	0.91	43	I have a deep personal commitment and a strong desire to serve the nation as a member of the armed forces.
4.99	0.84	44	I can rely on my immediate subordinates to use good judgment and initiative in carrying out their assigned missions.
4.98	0.85	45	My immediate subordinates have the skills and intellect to handle their assigned duties.
4.57	1.19	46	Personal interests and wishes of military personnel must take second place to operational requirements.
3.83	1.26	47	Senior leaders in this organization are aware of the issues and concerns of the personnel at the lower levels of the organization.
4.30	1.33	48	My immediate leader lets me know how well I am doing my job, and how I might enhance my performance.
4.90	0.89	49	My immediate subordinates would react professionally in a combat/hazardous situation.
4.58	1.06	50	In this staff, we learn from our mistakes and get better.
4.88	1.04	51	Leaders on this staff do not tolerate dishonest or unethical behavior from anybody.
4.35	1.21	52	If I took a prudent risk, did my best and failed, my superiors would support me.
4.36	1.18	53	Commissioned officers on this staff take care of their people.
4.58	1.09	54	If I ever get into a tight spot, I can depend on people in this staff to take action to help.
4.12	1.23	55	I do not sense any parochialism that inhibits the effectiveness of work on this staff.
4.00	1.37	56	This staff devotes its energy mostly to important, substantive issues, not to "look good" projects.
4.98	1.01	57	This headquarters does not have problems with racism or racial discrimination.
4.93	0.93	58	This headquarters does not have problems with sexual misbehavior or sexual discrimination.
4.57	1.03	59	Civilian agencies with which we work seem to have a good understanding of the military profession.
3.42	1.56	60	My standard of living is as good as—if not better than—others my age who are not in the armed forces.
4.21	1.25	61	Decisions in this headquarters are not influenced inappropriately by external societal trends or issues.
3.87	1.23	62	Our higher headquarters provides timely guidance to frame the issues and set priorities.
2.63	1.43	63	I receive pay, allowances, and other benefits comparable to individuals in civilian life who have my skills and responsibilities.
4.82	0.93	64	This staff has the spirit and courage to perform any mission assigned.
4.44	1.33	65	All in all, I am satisfied with this assignment on the staff.
4.22	1.33	66	Emphasis on joint education, training, and doctrine has contributed to the effectiveness of my Service.
4.29	1.22	67	When my Service's senior leaders say something, you can believe it's true.
4.26	1.25	68	My Service's senior leaders have the will to make tough, sometimes unpopular, decisions that are in the best long-term interest of the service.
3.69	1.42	69	In my Service people are provided the flexibility needed to balance the demands of work and personal or family life.
4.31	1.18	70	In my Service an atmosphere of trust exists between leaders and their subordinates.
4.19	1.18	71	My Service has a culture where people can explore better ways of doing things, and can challenge traditions or policies that seem outdated.
4.53	1.02	72	The Active Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
4.67	0.92	73	Within my Service I can depend on the other branches/components/specialties to effectively carry their share of the load and to cooperate in operations or support.
4.27	1.08	74	The customs and policies of my Service facilitate individual intellectual growth as required to prepare sufficient numbers of officers to handle assignments at the strategic level.

Table A.4 MCCS Staff Results, by item number (819 respondents) (continued)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
3.96	1.27	75	My Service does not generate such a competitive climate that teamwork takes second place to individual ambition.
3.79	1.28	76	People in my Service can make an honest mistake without it ruining their career.
3.71	1.24	77	The Reserve Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
3.50	1.47	78	My Service has the versatility and resources to handle "peacekeeping" and other non-combat missions without significantly degrading its overall readiness.
3.91	1.36	79	My Service has a promotion system that is generally fair and reliable.
4.59	0.98	80	The customs and policies of my Service would support and facilitate my effectiveness as a productive, objective member of a joint staff.
4.66	1.29	81	My future value to my Service would be enhanced by my completing a tour on a joint or combined staff.
4.24	1.43	82	Even if civilian society did not appreciate the commitment and unselfishness that are essential military values, our armed forces could still maintain their traditional standards.
4.18	1.12	83	Most civilians have a great deal of respect for the armed forces.
4.53	1.20	84	Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military values and customs.
4.20	1.10	85	Most members of the armed forces have a great deal of respect for civilian society.
4.65	1.02	86	People in my hometown have high regard for America's armed forces.
5.06	0.86	87	Whenever I have the opportunity, I socialize with civilians as well as with military friends.
4.63	1.58	88	Public service, whether in the military or in something like a domestic Peace Corps, should be required of all American citizens.

Table A.5 MCCS Staff Results, by mean (819 responses)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
5.67	0.65	1	I am proud to serve in America's armed forces.
5.47	0.88	28	The essential mission of America's armed forces is to be prepared to win in combat.
5.45	0.87	23	The armed forces have a right to expect high standards of me when I am off-duty as well as on-duty.
5.39	0.91	43	I have a deep personal commitment and a strong desire to serve the nation as a member of the armed forces.
5.30	0.99	7	If necessary to accomplish a combat/lifesaving mission, I am prepared to put my life on the line.
5.13	0.84	29	I have confidence in the other American military services that we might work with in joint operations.
5.06	0.86	87	Whenever I have the opportunity, I socialize with civilians as well as with military friends.
4.99	0.84	44	I can rely on my immediate subordinates to use good judgment and initiative in carrying out their assigned missions.
4.98	0.85	45	My immediate subordinates have the skills and intellect to handle their assigned duties.
4.98	1.01	57	This headquarters does not have problems with racism or racial discrimination.
4.96	0.90	41	Senior officers in this headquarters consider the future, exploring new doctrine, tactics, equipment, and procedures.
4.95	0.96	12	Our organization is serious about honesty and integrity.
4.93	0.93	58	This headquarters does not have problems with sexual misbehavior or sexual discrimination.
4.92	0.94	30	This headquarters can adjust to new technologies and changing doctrine.
4.91	0.95	2	Members of this staff are physically and mentally fit to perform their duties in wartime/combat.
4.90	0.96	37	I can trust the other members of my team to do their share of the work, in war or in other operations.

Table A.5 MCCS Staff Results, by mean (819 responses) (continued)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
4.90	0.89	49	My immediate subordinates would react professionally in a combat/hazardous situation.
4.88	1.04	51	Leaders on this staff do not tolerate dishonest or unethical behavior from anybody.
4.85	0.91	35	I have confidence in this staff's ability to perform in wartime/combat.
4.83	0.89	36	This staff would work smoothly with organizations from other military services.
4.83	0.95	40	Senior officers on this staff are tactically and technically proficient.
4.82	0.93	64	This staff has the spirit and courage to perform any mission assigned.
4.81	1.12	19	Even in today's highly technical armed forces, military ritual and tradition are essential parts of our culture.
4.80	0.98	34	In general, members on this staff who are junior to me are committed to do their best.
4.77	1.16	14	I am confident that the leaders of this staff trust me.
4.74	0.97	21	Officers on this staff set a good example of professional behavior.
4.73	1.08	13	People on this staff are encouraged to learn new skills and concepts.
4.72	1.12	10	Senior officers in this organization set a positive example in their behavior.
4.67	1.10	6	Leaders in this staff are provided the necessary authority to carry out their responsibilities.
4.67	1.24	11	My education and training have prepared me well to do my assigned job.
4.67	0.92	73	Within my Service I can depend on the other branches/components/specialties to effectively carry their share of the load and to cooperate in operations or support.
4.66	1.29	81	My future value to my Service would be enhanced by my completing a tour on a joint or combined staff.
4.65	1.02	86	People in my hometown have high regard for America's armed forces.
4.63	1.58	88	Public service, whether in the military or in something like a domestic Peace Corps, should be required of all American citizens.
4.62	1.13	32	My leaders evaluate my performance on the job competently and fairly.
4.61	1.05	38	This staff appreciates and supports individual initiative and resourcefulness in accomplishing the mission.
4.59	1.02	42	This organization is flexible, and can adapt quickly to changing situations.
4.59	0.98	80	The customs and policies of my Service would support and facilitate my effectiveness as a productive, objective member of a joint staff.
4.58	1.06	50	In this staff, we learn from our mistakes and get better.
4.58	1.09	54	If I ever get into a tight spot, I can depend on people in this staff to take action to help.
4.57	1.19	46	Personal interests and wishes of military personnel must take second place to operational requirements.
4.57	1.03	59	Civilian agencies with which we work seem to have a good understanding of the military profession.
4.53	1.02	72	The Active Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
4.53	1.20	84	Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military values and customs.
4.50	1.22	3	We have a lot of teamwork going on in this staff.
4.50	1.08	5	Military traditions and values mean a lot to most people in this staff.
4.50	1.16	18	Members on this staff believe it is appropriate for us to be involved in a wide variety of operations—from "humanitarian" to combat.
4.50	1.24	31	If I could not maintain proficiency in my wartime skills I would be less interested in a military career.
4.45	1.25	24	Leaders in this headquarters are willing to listen to ideas from their subordinates.
4.44	1.33	65	All in all, I am satisfied with this assignment on the staff.
4.36	1.18	53	Commissioned officers on this staff take care of their people.
4.35	1.21	52	If I took a prudent risk, did my best and failed, my superiors would support me.
4.34	1.21	27	In my experience, active and reserve units work well together.
4.31	1.18	70	In my Service an atmosphere of trust exists between leaders and their subordinates.

Table A.5 MCCS Staff Results, by mean (819 responses) (continued)

Mean	S.D.	Item	Text of Statement
4.30	1.33	48	My immediate leader lets me know how well I am doing my job, and how I might enhance my performance.
4.29	1.22	67	When my Service's senior leaders say something, you can believe it's true.
4.28	1.11	39	The people we are retaining in service have the skills and commitment needed to sustain unit excellence.
4.27	1.08	74	The customs and policies of my Service facilitate individual intellectual growth as required to prepare sufficient numbers of officers to handle assignments at the strategic level.
4.26	1.22	33	We share good ideas and current information regularly among the staff sections.
4.26	1.25	68	My Service's senior leaders have the will to make tough, sometimes unpopular, decisions that are in the best long-term interest of the service.
4.24	1.43	82	Even if civilian society did not appreciate the commitment and unselfishness that are essential military values, our armed forces could still maintain their traditional standards.
4.22	1.33	66	Emphasis on joint education, training, and doctrine has contributed to the effectiveness of my Service.
4.21	1.25	61	Decisions in this headquarters are not influenced inappropriately by external societal trends or issues.
4.20	1.10	85	Most members of the armed forces have a great deal of respect for civilian society.
4.19	1.24	9	We have a clear sense of mission and priorities.
4.19	1.18	71	My Service has a culture where people can explore better ways of doing things, and can challenge traditions or policies that seem outdated.
4.18	1.25	8	Excellence on this staff is properly acknowledged and rewarded.
4.18	1.12	83	Most civilians have a great deal of respect for the armed forces.
4.14	1.53	15	I can do well in this assignment and still devote sufficient time to my family/personal life.
4.12	1.23	55	I do not sense any parochialism that inhibits the effectiveness of work on this staff.
4.11	1.24	25	In this staff we are encouraged to take reasonable risks in an effort to improve performance. (We do not have a "zero defects" mentality.)
4.09	1.28	22	Officers on this staff put mission and people ahead of their own ambition.
4.08	1.36	26	You can "tell it like it is" in this staff; we don't hide bad news.
4.00	1.37	56	This staff devotes its energy mostly to important, substantive issues, not to "look good" projects.
3.96	1.27	75	My Service does not generate such a competitive climate that teamwork takes second place to individual ambition.
3.92	1.31	17	We have high morale on this staff.
3.91	1.36	79	My Service has a promotion system that is generally fair and reliable.
3.87	1.23	62	Our higher headquarters provides timely guidance to frame the issues and set priorities.
3.83	1.26	47	Senior leaders in this organization are aware of the issues and concerns of the personnel at the lower levels of the organization.
3.79	1.28	76	People in my Service can make an honest mistake without it ruining their career.
3.71	1.24	77	The Reserve Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
3.69	1.42	69	In my Service people are provided the flexibility needed to balance the demands of work and personal or family life.
3.50	1.47	78	My Service has the versatility and resources to handle "peacekeeping" and other non-combat missions without significantly degrading its overall readiness.
3.42	1.56	60	My standard of living is as good as—if not better than—others my age who are not in the armed forces.
3.28	1.53	4	We are rarely surprised by unexpected missions or taskings.
3.23	1.54	16	This staff has sufficient personnel to do our job effectively.
3.11	1.43	20	People on this staff are not "stressed out."
2.63	1.43	63	I receive pay, allowances, and other benefits comparable to individuals in civilian life who have my skills and responsibilities.

Table A.6 MCCS Staff Results, mean by pay grade (819)

Item Number	Total 819	E1-E9 312	O1-O3* 77	O4 212	O5-O6 218
1	5.67	5.53	5.62	5.73	5.81
2	4.91	4.69	4.89	5.00	5.13
3	4.50	4.31	4.64	4.54	4.66
4	3.28	3.66	3.07	3.10	3.02
5	4.50	4.40	4.43	4.45	4.68
6	4.67	4.68	4.62	4.63	4.72
7	5.30	4.99	5.51	5.41	5.55
8	4.18	4.04	4.29	4.23	4.29
9	4.19	4.49	4.04	3.99	4.00
10	4.72	4.59	4.66	4.71	4.94
11	4.67	4.58	4.52	4.69	4.82
12	4.95	4.85	4.88	5.02	5.03
13	4.73	4.74	4.97	4.59	4.78
14	4.77	4.67	4.79	4.73	4.94
15	4.14	4.71	3.96	3.73	3.83
16	3.23	3.63	2.74	3.25	2.85
17	3.92	3.97	3.95	3.88	3.87
18	4.50	4.54	4.40	4.54	4.45
19	4.81	4.64	4.71	4.90	4.98
20	3.11	3.08	3.17	3.11	3.13
21	4.74	4.48	4.82	4.83	4.98
22	4.09	3.87	4.01	4.13	4.38
23	5.45	5.27	5.48	5.54	5.58
24	4.45	4.23	4.47	4.43	4.76
25	4.11	4.14	4.09	3.99	4.20
26	4.08	3.78	4.16	4.18	4.36
27	4.34	4.49	4.26	4.17	4.34
28	5.47	5.24	5.53	5.62	5.63
29	5.13	5.05	5.04	5.17	5.23
30	4.92	4.94	4.86	4.85	5.00
31	4.50	4.10	4.99	4.67	4.73
32	4.62	4.59	4.68	4.53	4.74
33	4.26	4.21	4.37	4.22	4.32
34	4.80	4.43	4.92	4.92	5.15
35	4.85	4.75	4.71	4.86	5.03
36	4.83	4.81	4.77	4.79	4.94
37	4.90	4.70	4.92	4.93	5.16
38	4.61	4.56	4.61	4.56	4.74
39	4.28	4.21	3.97	4.27	4.53
40	4.83	4.69	4.82	4.89	4.94
41	4.96	4.94	4.99	4.91	5.03
42	4.59	4.71	4.57	4.47	4.54
43	5.39	5.23	5.24	5.48	5.59
44	4.99	4.80	5.02	5.01	5.22
45	4.98	4.83	4.91	4.97	5.21
46	4.57	4.39	4.54	4.63	4.76
47	3.83	3.69	3.89	3.82	4.02
48	4.30	4.42	4.32	4.13	4.30
49	4.90	4.68	5.03	4.91	5.18
50	4.58	4.61	4.42	4.53	4.67
51	4.88	4.66	4.92	4.96	5.10
52	4.35	4.34	4.30	4.26	4.47
53	4.36	4.16	4.34	4.39	4.63
54	4.58	4.42	4.58	4.58	4.82
55	4.12	4.25	4.03	4.10	4.00
56	4.00	4.01	3.84	3.84	4.17

Table A.6 MCCS Staff Results, mean by pay grade (819) (continued)

Item Number	Total 819	E1-E9 312	O1-O3* 77	O4 212	O5-O6 218
57	4.98	4.70	5.11	5.09	5.24
58	4.93	4.72	4.92	5.08	5.09
59	4.57	4.62	4.41	4.67	4.46
60	3.42	3.50	3.47	3.27	3.43
61	4.21	4.26	3.90	4.16	4.30
62	3.87	4.26	3.62	3.74	3.57
63	2.63	2.45	2.89	2.75	2.68
64	4.82	4.74	4.86	4.81	4.92
65	4.44	4.47	4.37	4.40	4.49
66	4.22	4.31	4.13	4.13	4.23
67	4.29	4.40	4.25	4.27	4.18
68	4.26	4.52	4.30	4.07	4.06
69	3.69	4.16	3.13	3.37	3.53
70	4.31	4.29	4.16	4.29	4.39
71	4.19	4.37	4.16	3.96	4.17
72	4.53	4.55	4.32	4.36	4.72
73	4.67	4.70	4.51	4.62	4.74
74	4.27	4.51	3.87	4.13	4.25
75	3.96	4.12	4.00	3.71	3.96
76	3.79	4.02	3.59	3.56	3.72
77	3.71	3.97	3.38	3.59	3.63
78	3.50	4.12	3.17	3.08	3.15
79	3.91	3.76	4.05	3.78	4.19
80	4.59	4.67	4.55	4.48	4.59
81	4.66	4.53	4.88	4.77	4.63
82	4.24	4.38	4.24	4.05	4.24
83	4.18	4.18	3.84	4.22	4.25
84	4.53	4.38	4.53	4.50	4.78
85	4.20	4.37	3.97	4.07	4.16
86	4.65	4.69	4.36	4.67	4.70
87	5.06	5.16	5.04	5.00	4.98
88	4.63	4.31	4.90	4.80	4.81

* O1-O3 category also includes warrant officers.


The Surveys


DURING 1998 AND 1999, the MCCA team from CSIS surveyed more than 12,500 respondents (unit and staff surveys combined) of all ranks, primarily in operational units in the Army (active and reserve), the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, seeking insights into their attitudes, expectations, and perceptions. The survey—administered by CSIS at 40 locations in the United States, Korea, Hawaii, and Europe—comprised 99 items and looked at organizational climates and at basic cultural factors within selected operating units. Optional comments were also submitted by several hundred respondents.

A slightly modified version of the MCCA (a staff version) was also given to respondents at seven headquarters commanded by a one-star general or flag officer or higher. This effort yielded insights from a group of more senior personnel serving in staff positions. A total of 819 individuals from the different staffs participated in this 88-item survey. Members from all the armed forces were included on these staffs, and 53 percent were officers at the grade of major (O4) or higher. Administration of the questionnaire usually took approximately 45 minutes. Respondents marked their answers on separate answer sheets.

Both surveys and the answer sheet* are reproduced on the following pages.

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ULMER-CAMPBELL
**Military
 Climate/Culture
 Survey**

(MCCS)

**PLEASE DO NOT MARK ON THIS
 BOOKLET.
 (WE PLAN TO USE IT AGAIN.) THANKS!**

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) will be using this version of the MCCS as one source of data from a variety of armed forces units in support of the *American Military Culture in the 21st Century* study. No individuals, units, or unit locations will be identified in the report. Individual participation is voluntary. A report will be available next year. Your organization may receive some preliminary data at an earlier time.

The authors and CSIS gratefully acknowledge the significant contribution to the development of this version of the MCCS by the faculty and students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University.

MCCS Version 4.1
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 Center for Creative Leadership
 Colorado Springs, Colorado 80906

This is the Ulmer-Campbell Military Climate/Culture Survey (MCCS) - Version 4.1
 Please read each statement below and indicate on the separate answer sheet how much you agree or disagree.
 SA-STRONGLY AGREE A-Agree a-slightly agree d-slightly disagree D-Disagree SD-STRONGLY DISAGREE
 NA-Not Applicable or Do Not Wish to Answer

*Note that some questions seem similar to others. This is intended to make the survey more reliable
 by providing more than one question on a particular topic*

Please take a look at the answer sheet. Make sure that you are filling out the same question number
 on the answer sheet that you are reading in this booklet.

1. I am proud to serve in America's armed forces.
2. We have high standards of discipline in this unit.
3. Members of this unit are physically and mentally fit to perform their duties under all conditions.
4. We have a lot of teamwork going on in this unit.
5. In my unit, we are rarely surprised by unexpected missions or taskings.
6. People are treated fairly in this unit.
7. Military traditions and values mean a lot to most people in this unit.
8. Promotions in the junior enlisted grades in this unit are done fairly.
9. Leaders in this unit have the necessary authority to carry out their responsibilities.
10. If necessary to accomplish a combat/lifesaving mission, I am prepared to put my life on the line.

11. My job is important in accomplishing the mission of this unit.
12. Excellence in this unit is properly acknowledged and rewarded.
13. We have a clear sense of mission and priorities in this unit.
14. Senior officers in this organization set a positive example in their behavior.
15. I am confident that my unit commander trusts me.
16. This unit has sufficient personnel to do our job effectively.
17. The American military plays an important role in the world today.
18. Our organization is serious about honesty and integrity.
19. My immediate supervisor does not "play favorites."
20. I can trust the other members of my team to do their share of the work, in war or in other operations.

* Please check often to be sure that the line on the answer sheet corresponds to the numbered question! *

21. People in this unit are encouraged to learn new skills and concepts.
22. Our branch of service is attracting high-quality, motivated recruits.
23. I have confidence in the other American military services that we might work with in joint operations.
24. I can do well in this unit and still devote sufficient time to family/personal life.
25. People in this unit are not "stressed out."
26. The training in this unit is realistic and challenging.
27. We have high morale in this unit.
28. Members of this unit believe it is appropriate for us to be involved in a variety of operations—from "humanitarian" to combat.
29. NCO's/Petty Officers in this unit take care of their people.
30. Even in today's highly technical armed forces, military ritual and tradition are essential parts of our culture.

31. My immediate supervisor lets me know how well I am doing my job, and how I might enhance my performance.
32. This unit has the spirit and courage needed to perform any mission assigned.
33. Commissioned officers in this unit set a good example of professional behavior.

- 34. Commissioned officers in this unit put mission and people ahead of their own ambition.
- 35. Male members of units that I am familiar with would carry their share of the load in wartime/hazardous operations.
- 36. I am proud of the NCO/Petty Officer leaders in this unit.
- 37. Female members of units that I am familiar with would carry their share of the load in wartime/hazardous operations.
- 38. The armed forces have a right to expect high standards of me when I am off-duty as well as on-duty.
- 39. Leaders in this unit are willing to listen to ideas from their subordinates.
- 40. In this unit we are encouraged to take reasonable risks in an effort to improve performance. (We do *not* have a "Zero defects" mentality.)

- *****
- 41. You can "tell it like it is" in our unit; we don't hide bad news.
 - 42. In my experience, active and reserve units work well together.
 - 43. The essential mission of America's armed forces is to be prepared to win in combat.
 - 44. This unit appreciates and supports individual initiative and resourcefulness in accomplishing the mission.
 - 45. Our organization can adjust to new technologies and changing doctrine.
 - 46. If I could not maintain proficiency in my wartime skills I would be less interested in a military career.
 - 47. My leaders evaluate my performance on the job competently and fairly.
 - 48. My immediate supervisor sets a good example of professional behavior.
 - 49. My military income allows me to provide adequately for my family.
 - 50. In general, members of this unit who are junior to me are committed to do their best.

- *****
- 51. When we are deployed, the families have access to a support system that meets their needs.
 - 52. I have confidence in this unit's ability to perform in wartime/combat.
 - 53. This unit would work smoothly with units from other military services.
 - 54. The people we are retaining in service have the skills and commitment needed to sustain unit excellence.
 - 55. Senior officers in this organization are tactically and technically proficient.
 - 56. Our leaders consider the future, exploring new doctrine, tactics, equipment, and procedures.
 - 57. My family would support my making the armed forces a career.
 - 58. This unit is flexible, and can adapt quickly to changing situations.
 - 59. I can rely on my immediate subordinates to use good judgment and initiative in carrying out their assigned missions.
 - 60. I have a deep personal commitment and a strong desire to serve the nation as a member of the armed forces.

- *****
- 61. My immediate subordinates have the skills and intellect to handle their assigned duties.
 - 62. This unit routinely is provided adequate material resources (parts, supplies, funds) needed to accomplish our assigned missions.
 - 63. If I make a request through channels, I know somebody will listen and inform me about my request.
 - 64. Personal interests and wishes of military personnel must take second place to operational requirements.
 - 65. Married and single personnel in this unit have reasonably similar qualities of life.
 - 66. I receive pay, allowances, and other benefits comparable to individuals in civilian life who have my skills and responsibilities.

- 67. My immediate subordinates would react professionally in a combat/hazardous situation.
- 68. In this unit, we learn from our mistakes and get better.
- 69. My standard of living is as good as-- if not better than-- others my age who are not in the armed forces.
- 70. Commissioned officers in this unit take care of their people.

- 71. If I took a prudent risk, did my best and failed, my superiors would support me.
- 72. Individuals being assigned to our unit from initial entry training come to us well indoctrinated with the standards and values of our service.
- 73. Single parents in this unit are able to carry their share of unit duties while also providing adequate care for their children.
- 74. If I ever get into a tight spot, I can depend on people in my unit to take action to help.
- 75. This unit does not have problems with racism or racial discrimination.
- 76. This unit does not have problems with sexual misbehavior or sexual discrimination.
- 77. Leaders in this unit do not tolerate dishonest or unethical behavior from anybody.
- 78. Overall, I am satisfied with service in the armed forces.

The following questions, numbers 79-93, relate to your views of the overall situation in your particular Service—Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, or Coast Guard.

- 79. When my Service's senior leaders say something, you can believe it is true.
- 80. My Service's senior leaders have the will to make the tough, sometimes unpopular, decisions that are in the best long-term interest of the Service.


- 81. In my Service people are given the flexibility needed to balance the demands of work and personal or family life.
- 82. In my Service an atmosphere of trust exists between leaders and their subordinates.
- 83. My Service has a culture where people can explore better ways of doing things, and can challenge traditions or policies that seem outdated.
- 84. The Active Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
- 85. Within my Service I can depend on the other branches/components/specialties to effectively carry their share of the load and to cooperate in operations or support.
- 86. My Service has a promotion system that is generally fair and reliable.
- 87. My Service does not generate such a competitive climate that teamwork takes second place to individual ambition.
- 88. People in my Service can make an honest mistake without it ruining their career.
- 89. The Reserve Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
- 90. My Service has the flexibility and resources to handle "peacekeeping" and other non-combat missions without significantly degrading its wartime readiness.

- 91. In my Service, I believe that I can achieve my full potential in rank and responsibility.
- 92. Emphasis on joint education, doctrine, and training has contributed to the effectiveness of my Service.
- 93. My Service responds to the changing conditions and needs of its personnel.

The following questions, numbers 94-99, are from an important related study of military culture.

- 94. Most civilians have a great deal of respect for the armed forces.
- 95. Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military values and customs.
- 96. Most members of the armed forces have a great deal of respect for American civilian society.
- 97. People in my hometown have high regard for America's armed forces.
- 98. Whenever I have the opportunity, I socialize with civilians as well as with military friends.
- 99. Public service, whether in the military or in something like a domestic Peace Corps, should be required of all American citizens.

Thanks for your participation. Your individual or unit responses will not be disclosed.



ULMER-CAMPBELL
**Military
 Climate/Culture
 Survey**

(MCCS)
[Staff Version]

**PLEASE DO NOT MARK ON THIS BOOKLET.
 (WE PLAN TO USE IT AGAIN.) THANKS!**

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) will be using this version of the MCCS as one source of data from a variety of armed forces units in support of the *American Military Culture in the 21st Century* study. No individuals, units, or unit locations will be identified in the report. Individual participation is voluntary. A report will be available next year. Your organization may receive some preliminary data at an earlier time.

The authors and CSIS gratefully acknowledge the significant contribution to the development of this version of the MCCS by the faculty and students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University.

MCCS Version 4.1 B
 © 1998 David Campbell, Ph.D.
 Center for Creative Leadership
 Colorado Springs, Colorado 80906

This is the Ulmer-Campbell Military Climate/Culture Survey Version 4.1 B (Staff)
Please read each statement and on the separate answer sheet indicate how much you agree or disagree.
SA- STRONGLY AGREE A- Agree a- slightly agree d- slightly disagree D- Disagree SD- STRONGLY DISAGREE
NA- Not Applicable or Do Not wish to Answer

Note that some questions are similar to others. This is intended to enhance topic reliability.

Please look at the answer sheet and make sure you are filling out the same number answer as the question.

- 1. I am proud to serve in America's armed forces.
2. Members of this staff are physically and mentally fit to perform their duties in wartime/combat.
3. We have a lot of teamwork going on in this staff.
4. We are rarely surprised by unexpected missions or taskings.
5. Military traditions and values mean a lot to most people in this staff.
6. Leaders in this staff are provided the necessary authority to carry out their responsibilities.
7. If necessary to accomplish a combat/lifesaving mission, I am prepared to put my life on the line.
8. Excellence on this staff is properly acknowledged and rewarded.
9. We have a clear sense of mission and priorities.
10. Senior officers in this organization set a positive example in their behavior.
11. My education and training have prepared me well to do my assigned job.
12. Our organization is serious about honesty and integrity.
13. People on this staff are encouraged to learn new skills and concepts.
14. I am confident that the leaders of this staff trust me.
15. I can do well in this assignment and still devote sufficient time to my family/personal life.
16. This staff has sufficient personnel to do our job effectively.
17. We have high morale on this staff.
18. Members on this staff believe it is appropriate for us to be involved in a wide variety of operations— from "humanitarian" to combat.
19. Even in today's highly technical armed forces, military ritual and tradition are essential parts of our culture.
20. People on this staff are not "stressed out."
21. Officers on this staff set a good example of professional behavior.
22. Officers on this staff put mission and people ahead of their own ambition.
23. The armed forces have a right to expect high standards of me when I am off-duty as well as on-duty.
24. Leaders in this headquarters are willing to listen to ideas from their subordinates.
25. In this staff we are encouraged to take reasonable risks in an effort to improve performance. (We do not have a "zero defects" mentality.)
26. You can "tell it like it is" in this staff; we don't hide bad news.
27. In my experience, active and reserve units work well together.
28. The essential mission of America's armed forces is to be prepared to win in combat.
29. I have confidence in the other American military services that we might work with in joint operations.
30. This headquarters can adjust to new technologies and changing doctrine.
31. If I could not maintain proficiency in my wartime skills I would be less interested in a military career.
32. My leaders evaluate my performance on the job competently and fairly.

- 33. We share good ideas and current information regularly among the staff sections.
- 34. In general, members on this staff who are junior to me are committed to do their best.
- 35. I have confidence in this staff's ability to perform in wartime/combat.
- 36. This staff would work smoothly with organizations from other military services.
- 37. I can trust the other members of my team to do their share of the work, in war or in other operations.
- 38. This staff appreciates and supports individual initiative and resourcefulness in accomplishing the mission.
- 39. The people we are retaining in service have the skills and commitment needed to sustain unit excellence.
- 40. Senior officers on this staff are tactically and technically proficient.

- 41. Senior officers in this headquarters consider the future, exploring new doctrine, tactics, equipment, and procedures.
- 42. This organization is flexible, and can adapt quickly to changing situations.
- 43. I have a deep personal commitment and a strong desire to serve the nation as a member of the armed forces.
- 44. I can rely on my immediate subordinates to use good judgment and initiative in carrying out their assigned missions.
- 45. My immediate subordinates have the skills and intellect to handle their assigned duties.
- 46. Personal interests and wishes of military personnel must take second place to operational requirements.
- 47. Senior leaders in this organization are aware of the issues and concerns of the personnel at the lower levels of the organization.
- 48. My immediate leader lets me know how well I am doing my job, and how I might enhance my performance.
- 49. My immediate subordinates would react professionally in a combat/hazardous situation.
- 50. In this staff, we learn from our mistakes and get better.

- 51. Leaders on this staff do not tolerate dishonest or unethical behavior from anybody.
- 52. If I took a prudent risk, did my best and failed, my superiors would support me.
- 53. Commissioned officers on this staff take care of their people.
- 54. If I ever get into a tight spot, I can depend on people in this staff to take action to help.
- 55. I do not sense any parochialism that inhibits the effectiveness of work on this staff.
- 56. This staff devotes its energy mostly to important, substantive issues, not to "look good" projects.
- 57. This headquarters does not have problems with racism or racial discrimination.
- 58. This headquarters does not have problems with sexual misbehavior or sexual discrimination.
- 59. Civilian agencies with which we work seem to have a good understanding of the military profession.
- 60. My standard of living is as good as—if not better than—others my age who are not in the armed forces.

- 61. Decisions in this headquarters are not influenced inappropriately by external societal trends or issues.
- 62. Our higher headquarters provides timely guidance to frame the issues and set priorities.
- 63. I receive pay, allowances, and other benefits comparable to individuals in civilian life who have my skills and responsibilities.
- 64. This staff has the spirit and courage to perform any mission assigned.
- 65. All in all, I am satisfied with this assignment on the staff.

The following questions pertain to your branch of Service overall.

- 66. Emphasis on joint education, training, and doctrine has contributed to the effectiveness of my Service.
- 67. When my Service's senior leaders say something, you can believe it's true.
- 68. My Service's senior leaders have the will to make tough, sometimes unpopular, decisions that are in the best long-term interest of the service.
- 69. In my Service people are provided the flexibility needed to balance the demands of work and personal or family life.
- 70. In my Service an atmosphere of trust exists between leaders and their subordinates.

- 71. My Service has a culture where people can explore better ways of doing things, and can challenge traditions or policies that seem outdated.
- 72. The Active Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
- 73. Within my Service I can depend on the other branches/components/specialties to effectively carry their share of the load and to cooperate in operations or support.
- 74. The customs and policies of my Service facilitate individual intellectual growth as required to prepare sufficient numbers of officers to handle assignments at the strategic level.
- 75. My Service does not generate such a competitive climate that teamwork takes second place to individual ambition.
- 76. People in my Service can make an honest mistake without it ruining their career.
- 77. The Reserve Components of my Service are appropriately trained for their assigned wartime missions.
- 78. My Service has the versatility and resources to handle "peacekeeping" and other non-combat missions without significantly degrading its overall readiness.
- 79. My Service has a promotion system that is generally fair and reliable.
- 80. The customs and policies of my Service would support and facilitate my effectiveness as a productive, objective member of a joint staff.

- 81. My future value to my Service would be enhanced by my completing a tour on a joint or combined staff.

The following questions are from an important related study of military culture.

- 82. Even if civilian society did not appreciate the commitment and unselfishness that are essential military values, our armed forces could still maintain their traditional standards.
- 83. Most civilians have a great deal of respect for the armed forces.
- 84. Civilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the military values and customs.
- 85. Most members of the armed forces have a great deal of respect for civilian society.
- 86. People in my hometown have high regard for America's armed forces.
- 87. Whenever I have the opportunity, I socialize with civilians as well as with military friends.
- 88. Public service, whether in the military or in something like a domestic Peace Corps, should be required of all American citizens.

Thanks for your participation. Your individual or unit responses will not be disclosed.

Ulmer-Campbell

Military Climate/Culture Survey (MCCS)

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Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, CO

PART I — Basic Information About You: (Do not provide name or ID number)

Use a soft lead pencil.
Make heavy dark marks that fill the circle completely.
Correct Mark ● Incorrect Marks ⊗ ⊙ ⊖ ⊕

Today's Date:	Test Site Number:	Sub-site Number:	Specialty Area:		Years of Active Service:	Age:	Weeks Deployed from Home Station in Last 12 Months:																																																																																																																																																												
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Military Grade:	
<input type="radio"/> E1/2	<input type="radio"/> O1/2
<input type="radio"/> E3/4	<input type="radio"/> O3
<input type="radio"/> E5/6	<input type="radio"/> O4
<input type="radio"/> E7/8	<input type="radio"/> O5
<input type="radio"/> E9	<input type="radio"/> O6
<input type="radio"/> W1-3	<input type="radio"/> O7
<input type="radio"/> W4-5	<input type="radio"/> O8+

Time Assigned to Present Unit:	
<input type="radio"/> 1-4 mos.	
<input type="radio"/> 5-12 mos.	
<input type="radio"/> 13-24 mos.	
<input type="radio"/> 25-36 mos.	
<input type="radio"/> 37+ mos.	

Racial Background:	
<input type="radio"/> Asian-American/Pacific Islander	
<input type="radio"/> Black/African American	
<input type="radio"/> Hispanic/Latino	
<input type="radio"/> Native American/Alaskan Native	
<input type="radio"/> White/Caucasian	
<input type="radio"/> Other	

Gender:	
<input type="radio"/> Male	
<input type="radio"/> Female	

Marital Status:	
<input type="radio"/> Married	
<input type="radio"/> Single	
<input type="radio"/> Single parent	

Career Intentions:	
<input type="radio"/> Probably stay until retirement	
<input type="radio"/> Possibly stay until retirement	
<input type="radio"/> Not sure at this point	
<input type="radio"/> Probably depart as soon as possible	
<input type="radio"/> Definitely depart as soon as possible	

Survey Type:	
<input type="radio"/> A	<input type="radio"/> D
<input type="radio"/> B	<input type="radio"/> E
<input type="radio"/> C	<input type="radio"/> F

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PART 2 — Answer Sheet

The term "unit" which is used in many questions means: **Army and Marines** — a company, battery, troop, separate detachment, or staff section; **Navy and Coast Guard** — a ship, aviation squadron, separate detachment, or staff section; **Air Force** — a squadron, separate detachment, or staff section. The term "organization" means the next larger element or next higher echelon. **If you believe the question does not apply to you, or if you do not wish to answer, fill in the NA (Not Applicable) response.**

These are the possible responses to each question:

STRONGLY AGREE	Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Disagree	STRONGLY DISAGREE	Not Applicable
(SA)	(A)	(a)	(d)	(D)	(SD)	(NA)

Note: Do not place your name or other identifying marks on this answer sheet, the biographic sheet, or the questionnaire. Your individual responses will not be disclosed.

Mark your responses by filling in completely with a soft lead pencil one of the seven circles that indicates your response to each question. Do not make any other marks on the answer sheet. If you change a response, erase the prior response.

<p>Q. 1. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 2. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 3. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 4. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 5. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 6. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 7. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 8. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 9. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 10. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <hr/> <p>Q. 11. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 12. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 13. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 14. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 15. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 16. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 17. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 18. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 19. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 20. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <hr/> <p>Q. 21. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 22. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 23. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 24. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 25. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 26. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 27. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 28. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 29. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 30. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <hr/> <p>Q. 31. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 32. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 33. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p>	<p>Q. 34. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 35. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 36. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 37. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 38. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 39. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 40. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <hr/> <p>Q. 41. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 42. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 43. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 44. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 45. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 46. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 47. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 48. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 49. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 50. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <hr/> <p>Q. 51. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 52. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 53. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 54. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 55. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 56. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 57. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 58. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 59. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 60. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <hr/> <p>Q. 61. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 62. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 63. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 64. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 65. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 66. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p>	<p>Q. 67. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 68. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 69. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 70. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <hr/> <p>Q. 71. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 72. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 73. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 74. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 75. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 76. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 77. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 78. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 79. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 80. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <hr/> <p>Q. 81. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 82. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 83. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 84. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 85. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 86. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 87. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 88. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 89. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 90. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <hr/> <p>Q. 91. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 92. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 93. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 94. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 95. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 96. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 97. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 98. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p> <p>Q. 99. (SA) (A) (a) (d) (D) (SD) (NA)</p>
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Optional Comments: (Please indicate the question number(s) that your comments are related to.)

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