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Letter from the Editorial Board

Achieving and maintaining national, international, and regional stability is an oft-cited objective of policymakers and foreign policy experts. “Stability” can vary dramatically depending on the context, meaning anything from growing a healthy democracy to preventing violent conflicts to managing existing ones. But this common objective is also one of the most elusive. International pressures, internal divisions, and unexpected shocks can hold back progress and keep any nation from reaching its goals.

In our second issue of *New Perspectives in Foreign Policy*, young professionals grapple with the challenges of stability across diverse geography. While tensions between nationalist and Islamic factions within the terrorist organization **al Shabaab** may be a boon for the West, riots between workers and government forces in **Kazakhstan** may be a harbinger that this Central Asian country is less stable than the United States would like to think. A shift away from ethnically divisive politics in **India** holds hope for the growing nation and its democracy, while discord between Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad complicate international efforts to address the **Iranian nuclear program**. Should distribution of **foreign food aid** be driven in part by these and other geopolitical factors or solely on humanitarian grounds? What will lead to greater stability?

Solutions to these challenges are not easy. Internal divisions and geopolitical instability will continue to drive our foreign policy. We are proud to see so many young foreign policy minds ponder this challenge. You will find their insights in the following pages.

SINCERELY,

New Perspectives Editorial Board

In Search of an Indian Political Identity

Ritika Bhasker

NATIONALISM IS NOT a new phenomenon in Indian politics. Since the inception of the republic, politicians have been using group prejudices and communal differences to increase their own electoral gains. However, the recent state elections—specifically in India’s largest state, Uttar Pradesh (UP)—have shown a slow shift away from identity-based politics and toward issue-based voting.¹ The Congress Party’s tried-but-tested method of relying on sectarian divisions to garner votes was rejected by the state’s voters, who instead turned to the social issues-based rhetoric employed by the Samajwadi Party.

Whether or not the Samajwadi Party keeps to its promises is not the point at hand. Instead, analysts are watching with great anticipation to see if group rivalries are beginning to take a back seat in Indian politics for the first time in decades.

The phenomenon of national chauvinism that came to dominate Indian politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s stemmed primarily

from the origins and top-down development of Indian democracy and the resultant creation of a national political identity. Former prime minister Indira Gandhi’s career was rife with accusations of anti-Sikh politics, which culminated in her assassination by her Sikh bodyguards and the resultant Sikh Massacre of 1984. Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, went on to create separate laws for divorced Muslim women,² making them answerable to Sharia law rather than the laws of the Republic of India. Narasimha Rao, prime minister from 1991 to 1996, failed to stop a series of riots after the Babri Masjid’s destruction in 1992, further exacerbating resentment between communities. Moreover, the Hindutva movement—composed of radically conservative and nationalist Hindu groups—has been dominant throughout the history of Indian politics, and the aggressively nationalist and Hindu-dominant Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) remained in power from the 1980s through the early 2000s.³

The negative impact of selective political identities in India is exemplified by the “otherness” felt by Indian citizens in highly contested regions—namely, Jammu and Kashmir and the North Eastern states. This sense of otherness, a connectedness to communal identities above an overarching Indian identity, has grown due to the actions of the center. The Indian army has been a constant presence—and aggressor—in both regions, fueling

This failure of the center to connect to these peripheries, even as it struggles to maintain control over them, is one of the most palpable failures of an Indian political identity.

greater hostility and disillusionment with New Delhi and its policies. By waging internal conflicts against secessionist groups who struggle every day with identifying themselves as Indian, New Delhi creates a twofold crisis within these regions.

The first is a struggle against the military apparatus of a nation to which they are told they belong. The second is that of identity, with a growing number of instances of people from states like Meghalaya and Nagaland being identified as foreigners in the rest of India.⁴ This failure of the center to connect to these peripheries, even as it struggles to maintain control over them, is one of the most palpable failures of an Indian political identity.

The growing strength of the regions vis-à-vis the center has been well documented in recent months. State-level politicians like Mamata Banerjee in West Bengal and J. Jayalalitha in Tamil Nadu have dictated important shifts in Indian national and international policy. In May 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a stop in Kolkata to meet Banerjee before continuing to New Delhi to meet the prime minister, a move commentators have taken to indicate a power shift away from the national capital and toward the regions. There has also been an increase in regional political participation, with the recent state elections generating the highest voter turnout since independence.⁵ With both UP and Punjab promoting electoral platforms based on social issues that affect the populaces of both states, and growing enthusiasm for politics at the

local level, the shift away from sectarian politics—if it does indeed take place—is more likely to manifest itself locally before expanding to the national level.

New Delhi continues to cling to sectarian divisions in its creation of national policy, currently exemplified by its removal of textbooks containing a 1940s cartoon deemed offensive by Dalit groups from the national curriculum.⁶ The cartoon in question depicts B.R. Ambedkar—the architect of the Indian constitution, and a Dalit—riding a snail labeled “constitution,” being whipped by India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. While the cartoon had been intended as a comment on the slow process of constitution building in newly independent India—and was taken as such by both Ambedkar and Nehru, who were alive at the time it was published—it caused an uproar in both Houses of Parliament. With incidents such as this, the likelihood that political identities will be forged at local levels rather than at the national level increases.

{3} It has been a long time since politicians at the national level campaigned for the “Indian” vote. With a growing presence both regionally and internationally, there is a dire need for a consolidated Indian political identity that does not manifest itself in group prejudices. Instead, Indian political identity should consolidate the many group identities in the nation and find common ground to improve the lives of all the country’s people. There is currently little indication of a move in this direction at the national level. It’s the local level, however, that holds the most promise for the future of an Indian political identity. ■

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The Mirage of Kazakh Stability

Bradford Simmons

FROM THE ASHES OF THE Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has emerged as one of the few success stories. Many of the former Soviet states have been susceptible to ethnic cleavages, political unrest, and instability in the years that followed the USSR's collapse. By contrast, President Nursultan Nazarbayev opened Kazakh doors to foreign investment, voluntarily relinquished one of the world's most extensive stockpiles of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium,¹ and prudently managed the nation's ethnic divisions. Today, Central Asia and Kazakhstan in particular are a strategic focus for both Russia and China and have attracted the investment of international corporations, largely owing to the region's vast supplies of hydrocarbon resources. U.S. oil companies in particular have already invested billions of dollars in the Tengiz and Kashagan oil fields.

However, between discovery and market lies the risk that political instability will threaten Kazakhstan as it did its neighbors and end the

country's 20 years as the beacon of stability in the region. A destabilizing event like President Nazarbayev's death or ouster could escalate the competing interests of China, Russia, and the United States. The recent events of the Arab awakening demonstrate the uncertainty of leadership transitions in autocratic states. Such instability could quickly derail the promise of Central Asian energy and send shockwaves throughout an already turbulent region.

To begin, neither Kazakhstan nor the region's powers have a plan for a political transition after the end of Nazarbayev's 21-year rule, and this should be cause for grave concern. The president is 71 years old and reportedly traveled to Germany for the treatment of prostate cancer in July 2011.² Throughout his tenure, Nazarbayev systematically eliminated any political threat, removing potential rivals from influential positions to protect his monopoly on power. Many analysts suggest that the president's son-in-law, Timur

Kulibayev, is the likely successor, but Kulibayev consistently asserts that he has no interest in politics.³ Other scenarios have circulated, but the remaining uncertainty, when combined with an increasingly boisterous opposition,⁴ suggests that the Kazakh status quo may be more volatile than suspected. Any sudden or unexpected transfer of power would likely be chaotic and would endanger the United States' significant business interests in the country—as well as disrupt the region's security architecture.

Kazakhstan has proven to be a valuable regional leader and has engaged with the international community on security issues rang-

Growing public resentment toward the political leadership threatens to destabilize the country.

ing from counterterrorism⁵ to nuclear nonproliferation.⁶ Kazakhstan's cooperation and role as a regional security leader should only increase in importance as the United States seeks to withdraw from Afghanistan. Hesitant to rely

on insurgent laden routes through Pakistan, the United States has indicated it will rely heavily on the Northern Distribution Network to remove materiel from the decade-long conflict. Most of the region's key rail lines and transport roads in the network pass through Kazakh territory, which gives added emphasis to this strategic relationship.⁷

Yet growing public resentment toward the political leadership threatens to destabilize the country.⁸ In December 2011, riots exploded in the oil town of Zhanaozen, prompting a vicious response by the regime's security forces. The riots stemmed from a long-standing dispute between the state oil subsidiary Uzenmunaigaz and workers who were laid off after demanding higher wages to keep pace with accelerating costs of living.⁹ The government imposed a state of emergency and curfew, instituted a harsh media crackdown, and brought to trial those responsible

for inciting the unrest. Reports subsequently surfaced that the security forces used torture to get confessions from the alleged provocateurs.¹⁰

Such a callous response may further inflame tensions and undermine the Kazakh people's sense of security. The government continues to meet demands for increased political and economic transparency with empty gestures. Nazarbayev called for early parliamentary elections in January 2012, announcing that he would end the one-party rule.¹¹ Yet the "opposition" parties that gained seats in parliament are all known allies of Nazarbayev, and the legitimate opposition failed to gain a foothold in the government.

Thus far, these domestic problems have failed to disrupt Kazakhstan's most valued international relationships, but overreliance on the industrial capacity of neighbors represents another point of contention.¹² Russia has long shared a strategic energy relationship with Kazakhstan and refines 46 percent of Kazakh oil exports,¹³ while energy-hungry China, eager to expand its network of regional suppliers, is responsible for one-fifth of Kazakh oil production.¹⁴ As a result, both have a vested interest in maintaining stability and would be compelled to play an activist role in any turmoil resulting from a sudden political transition. It is unlikely the United States would stand idly by and watch this competition for the future of Central Asia.

Given the U.S. military commitment to Afghanistan and the financial interests of U.S. energy companies, the United States will retain a strategic interest in Central Asia for the foreseeable future. These realities underscore the continuing importance of the U.S.-Kazakh relationship and provide the United States with an added stake in Kazakh stability and cooperation. It is past time that the United States began paying more attention to Kazakhstan and the potential consequences of Nazarbayev's death or fall from power. How the United States responds to any destabilizing events in Kazakhstan and its engagement with other stakeholders will prove critical to broader U.S. security interests in the region. ■

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A Critical Moment for al Shabaab

Casey Hilland

AS SOMALIA MOVES toward establishing a new government, the al Shabaab militant group within its borders faces a critical test. The al Qaeda–affiliated organization must adapt to the changing environment or risk exacerbating growing tensions within its ranks between its nationalist and Islamist factions. How the group, which includes dozens of American recruits, confronts both internal and external pressures in the next 6 to 12 months will prove critical in determining the form and outlook of the organization moving forward.

The official merger of al Shabaab and al Qaeda in early 2012 formalized a relationship that had long existed. Yet this pledge of allegiance has added to longstanding tensions within al Shabaab. Differences over the objectives of the organization have existed for years, with the nationalist faction most concerned with fighting foreign interference in Somalia and the Islamist

faction prioritizing global jihadist goals. The pledge to al Qaeda has amplified this split, most recently demonstrated in the video released by Omar Hammami, an American jihadi who claimed his life was threatened by rival members of al Shabaab.¹ Tensions were further intensified when Ahmed Abdi Godane, the emir of al Shabaab, declared that al Shabaab would be the only organization allowed to wage jihad within Somalia.² These internal fractures are greater now than they had been previously and, in conjunction with other factors, signal the looming decline of al Shabaab.

External factors have also had a considerable impact on al Shabaab in recent months. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) believes it has expelled all of the al Shabaab militants from Mogadishu, claiming a critical victory that they believe could lead to the overall defeat of the group.³ By August 2012, the Transitional

Federal Government (TFG) is set to make way for a new constitution and a parliament appointed by tribal elders. While this process is not free of criticism or uncertainty, it could lead to a more

Although this new government still risks being perceived as a foreign construct, it would be an improvement over the TFG, a government propped up by international forces.

legitimate government in the eyes of the Somali people.⁴

Although this new government still risks being perceived as a foreign construct, it would be an improvement over the TFG, a government propped up by international forces. Reports suggest that some areas are prepared to elect pro-al Shabaab members of parliament, potentially providing an avenue for political engagement

by the nationalist factions within the group that are less concerned with global jihad.⁵ Political reconciliation with elements of al Shabaab was previously rejected by members of the international community; however, engagement of the group's less radical contingent could serve to further split the group.⁶

These factors suggest that al Shabaab could experience a highly transformative period in the coming months. If the country is able to develop a government that appears to be generally representative of the Somali people, the nationalist faction within al Shabaab will be faced with a difficult decision: whether or not to splinter off from al Shabaab's jihadist agenda, choosing instead to engage the new government in some capacity. The nationalists may view this option as superior to continuing their relationship with the foreign fighters and al Qaeda.⁷ This would not bode well for al Qaeda, as the group has historically struggled to operate independently in the region.⁸

Alternatively, al Shabaab could assess the new parliament as another manifestation of foreign intervention in Somalia. This

option would not necessarily dictate a renewed bond between the factions within al Shabaab, though this is certainly a possibility. The organization may instead decide on transforming the factions into two formally differentiated

groups. The militants focused on the global objectives of al Qaeda would likely rebrand themselves as an al Qaeda group in the Horn of Africa, while the Somalia-focused members of al Shabaab return to their nationalist roots. This

evolution would not be uncommon in a country that has seen Islamist groups take many forms over the years. An alternative option for al Shabaab would be to maintain the internal status quo. However, by differentiating itself from al Qaeda, al Shabaab could potentially reduce the pressure placed on it by the international community and restore its focus to just the Somali state.

al Shabaab could assess the new parliament as another manifestation of foreign intervention in Somalia.

Regardless of the group's internal decisionmaking, its continued existence remains in jeopardy. AMISOM has achieved sustained success in its efforts against the militant organization, establishing a level of security in Mogadishu that has not been seen for many years.⁹ Ethiopian and Kenyan troops are continuing to make progress on all fronts against the fighters, aided by training and support from the U.S. military.¹⁰ Some officials believe the group, and the larger al Qaeda network, is in decline.¹¹

Suggesting that Somalia is making progress toward stability is always a risky proposition. The transition to a new government will not be a smooth process, and it presents a situation rife with potential for backsliding toward instability. Nevertheless, al Shabaab will remain threatened by internal divisions. Furthermore, if security forces can achieve continued success against al Shabaab

fighters, a potential split may become irrelevant. The successful transition to a new government would be yet another external pressure on the group, forcing them to decide between political engagement and irrelevancy. It is too early to predict the death of al Shabaab, but new and persistent drivers threaten to change the shape of the organization in the near term, with greater implications for the region and the global al Qaeda movement. ■

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Food, Nukes, and the Politics of Foreign Aid

Barbra Kim and Nick Anderson

GIVEN THE IMPORTANT humanitarian role that foreign assistance plays in areas of crisis around the globe, some argue that aid should be allocated absent political consideration. But the swift collapse of the February 2012 “Leap Day deal” between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) demonstrates the need to balance political necessity with humanitarian imperatives. Completely delinking humanitarian aid decisions from geostrategic goals can result in an array of unwelcome circumstances.

The Leap Day deal fell apart in less than 20 days when the notoriously unpredictable DPRK regime declared a missile launch in the name of “agricultural science.” The United States immediately suspended the promised food aid,¹ drawing a barrage of criticism. David Austin, the North Korea program director at Mercy Corps, called the U.S. decision “a shift to using food as a policy tool...that we have a lot of concern about.”² And Andrew Natsios, former administrator of the U.S. Agency

for International Development, agreed, saying that “the purpose of humanitarian assistance under U.S. law and international humanitarian convention is to save lives and relieve suffering. It must not be used as a weapon of U.S. diplomacy.”³

In response, U.S. government officials have been on the defensive. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland claimed that “we make it a practice not to link humanitarian aid with any other policy issues, particularly in the case of the DPRK.”⁴

There is no doubt that some criticism is warranted. Using humanitarian aid to further a state’s national interests certainly seems to undercut the important moral foundation on which foreign aid programs rest. But to completely divorce the allotment of aid from political considerations can ultimately be ineffective, leading to worsened humanitarian and geopolitical situations within and among states. The *context* of

food aid is vitally important to its success, and in some cases, the inclusion of conditionality enhances international aid's effectiveness as a tool of foreign policy. North Korea is not the only case that illustrates this point.

Take Somalia in the early 1990s. After the fall of the socialist Mohamed Siad Barre government in 1991, the country descended into anarchy as power-hungry warlords vied for larger pieces of the pie. Preeminent among these was Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the Western-educated general who led militias of armed, drugged-up teenagers and used the bulk of UN World Food Programme (WFP)

To completely divorce the allotment of aid from political considerations can ultimately be ineffective, leading to worsened humanitarian and geopolitical situations within and among states.

aid as a virtual weapon against the famine stricken Somali populace.⁵ Aidid would seize food shipments by force and allocate them in ways that would strengthen his militias and solidify his rule.⁶ Even with Aidid being long dead, the anarchic state and endemic corruption of aid in Somalia continues,

with recent reports of the ongoing “wholesale theft of food aid” in the country.⁷ This is not to say that the people of Somalia do not deserve relief from their plight, as they most certainly do. Yet it does serve as a prime example of the fact that when aid is allotted with the best of intentions but insufficient political consideration, it can lead to the exacerbation rather than alleviation of human suffering.

Iraq in the mid-1990s provides a further example of the ways in which aid can have unintended negative consequences. UN-mandated sanctions piled on top of years of harsh rule under Saddam Hussein unleashed catastrophic humanitarian suffering on the population.⁸ Over this period, civilian deaths numbered in the hundreds of thousands, a good portion of which were children under the age of five.⁹

In response, the UN “Oil-for-Food” program emerged, loosening sanctions to allow Hussein’s regime to sell oil for humanitarian supplies such as food and medicine.¹⁰ But this effort, much like the WFP aid to Somalia, was saturated with corruption at every level and is said to have lined the Iraqi leadership’s pockets with \$21.3 billion before it was cancelled in 2003.¹¹ Without due consideration of the political environment in Iraq, corruption and authoritarian rule undermined the noble intentions of the United Nations’ aid programs.

The “food-for-nukes” debacle in North Korea is only the latest iteration of an ongoing pattern of behavior from Pyongyang.¹² The population of this reclusive socialist state has long suffered under the totalitarian leadership of the Kim dynasty. During the latter half of the Cold War, it was kept afloat by regular economic aid from the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.¹³ After the fall of their Soviet patron, the leadership in Pyongyang was forced to look elsewhere for sustenance and has received relatively regular allotments of aid from China, South Korea, Japan, and even “public enemy number one,” the United States.¹⁴

Over the past two decades, the Kim dynasty has used provocative actions to garner international attention and leveraged this aggressive posture to ask for food, fuel, and funds in exchange for stepping back from the brink.¹⁵ And while there has been a steady stream of aid to the country, it has been accompanied by the growth of two near-functional nuclear weapons programs, a consolidation of Kim family power, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of North Korean citizens.¹⁶

The allotment of aid never takes place in a political vacuum. While the understandable and all-too-human impulse may be to bring relief to suffering when it presents itself, attention to context is essential, and as North Korea and these other cases have shown, we ignore it at our peril. ■

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The 2012 Iran Nuclear Talks: The Cost of Stalemate

Robert M. Shelala II

AS UNCERTAINTY INCREASES over the potential for Israeli military action against Iran, the stakes for successful negotiations over Iran's nuclear program are rising rapidly. Nuclear talks have become a regular occurrence between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) and Iran, but no progress has been made toward rapprochement since they began in 2008. The last round of negotiations in the spring of 2012 highlight the difficulties facing the United States and Iran as they seek to avoid military confrontation.

A combination of uncompromising negotiating positions and heightened tensions between the West and Iran of late risk a military conflict, but a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue is still attainable if both sides address the core issues at stake and limit unnecessary escalations and tensions. For both the United States and Iran, the prospect of an Israeli strike remains a real threat if negotia-

tions fail. A strike could, in theory, fulfill Israel's goals of neutralizing the Iranian nuclear threat before it reaches the "zone of immunity" feared by the government of Benjamin Netanyahu. However, it is questionable whether the Israeli Air Force could destroy the buried enrichment facility at Fordo with the conventional ordinance at its disposal.¹ For the United States, this raises the risk that a strike would fail and that the United States would then face pressure to intervene. Such an attack could reinforce Iran's commitment to a nuclear deterrent and prompt a forceful retaliation against Israel and U.S. interests in the region.²

In addition to the threat of military conflict, economic sanctions provide a clear incentive for Iran to work toward an agreement. Current sanctions became considerably stronger and more effective this summer and may result in a nearly 50 percent reduction in Iranian oil exports.³ At the beginning of

July, the European Union imposed an embargo against Iran on oil and insurance, and the United States placed restrictions on Iran's financial sector.⁴ As a result, one of Iran's top buyers, South Korea, has stated that it will stop importing oil from Iran.⁵ Those countries that continue to import oil from Iran, namely Japan and Turkey, were pushed by the United States to scale back purchases this spring.⁶

Despite these security and economic incentives for working toward an agreement, both Iran and the United States hold inflexible negotiating positions that have inhibited progress.⁷ For the Iranians, the country's nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, is now directly accountable to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This reduces the likelihood that Iran will adopt an ambiguous negotiating strategy as in the past, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei pulled the Iranian position in divergent directions.⁸

Both Iran and the United States hold inflexible negotiating positions that have inhibited progress.

Iran's stance at the Baghdad meeting in May demonstrated Iran's inflexibility. The country's delegation continued to emphasize its "right to enrich," demanding that the P5+1 allow

it to enrich uranium to 20 percent, something the P5+1 are unwilling to entertain.⁹ While 20 percent enrichment is not a high enough grade for a bomb, it is a significant enrichment benchmark because it can take as little as one month from that point, according to one estimate, to reach the 90 percent enrichment level needed for a bomb.¹⁰

The United States has also demonstrated an inflexible stance. Before this year's negotiations began, U.S. officials suggested that the United States would enter negotiations with a list of demands, including that Iran immediately halt the enrichment of high levels of uranium and allow in international inspectors.¹¹ As important as these demands are in advancing nonproliferation, the United States risked driving Iran away from the table by demanding such

measures early on in talks. The rhetoric of entrenchment continued in Baghdad as the P5+1 pushed a plan that would have required a halt to enrichment, removed highly enriched uranium from Iran, and had the Fordo facility inspected.¹²

By the end of the Moscow meeting in June, it appeared that both sides were starting to ease their positions: with the P5+1 continuing to offer sanctions exemptions, albeit in a limited sense, and the Iranians suggesting that they may be willing to sacrifice some enrichment.¹³ However, rising tensions between Iran and the West this summer threaten to derail this progress. The Obama administration has since ramped up sanctions for a second time,¹⁴ and the Israeli government held Iran responsible for a bomb attack targeting Israeli tourists in Bulgaria, though Iranian involvement has not been confirmed.¹⁵

For these talks to succeed, the P5+1 countries must acknowledge that an intransigent position with demands that go beyond addressing the true threat makes it difficult for the Iranian government to negotiate while saving face. The threat to the United States and its allies emanates not from low-enriched uranium in Iran, but from the uranium enriched to 20 percent that can easily be made weapons grade. Any U.S. position that prohibits enrichment below 20 percent risks creating the perception in Iran that the West is more concerned with denying them the freedom to pursue nuclear technology than protecting against a nuclear weapon—a perception that could reinforce Iranian retrenchment.

Likewise, Iran's supreme leader must recognize that without genuine progress toward alleviating U.S., European, and Israeli security concerns about its attempts to enrich uranium in highly secretive facilities, the P5+1 will have little reason to negotiate. Iran will need to end high-level enrichment, promote transparency in its nuclear endeavors, and be prepared to negotiate less ideologically and more earnestly for an agreement to be reached.

Neither the United States nor Iran wish to go to war. Both President Barack Obama and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have

strong incentives to ensure that talks do not collapse. Moreover, coercive actions such as imposing new sanctions or supporting anti-Israeli terrorist activity—if true—are not only counter-productive to negotiations, but make war less avoidable. An agreement that alleviates the immediate short-term concerns of both sides while setting the stage for more substantial future negotiations would go a long way toward helping the seven states involved transcend this dangerous stalemate. ■

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
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