

A REPORT OF THE CSIS
PROGRAM ON CRISIS, CONFLICT,
AND COOPERATION

Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan

A LITERATURE REVIEW

Project Director

Robert D. Lamb

Author

Mariam Mufti

June 2012



50
YEARS | CHARTING
OUR FUTURE

CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

A REPORT OF THE CSIS
PROGRAM ON CRISIS, CONFLICT,
AND COOPERATION

Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan

A LITERATURE REVIEW

Project Director
Robert L. Lamb

Author
Mariam Mufti

June 2012



50 | *CHARTING*
YEARS | OUR FUTURE

CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

About CSIS—50th Anniversary Year

For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed practical solutions to the world's greatest challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars continue to provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world.

CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center's 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.

Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. After 50 years, CSIS has become one of the world's pre-eminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. John J. Hamre became the Center's president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS was founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke.

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

Cover photo: *Top*—RAWA protest against Taliban, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RAWA_protest_rally_against_Taliban_in_Peshawar_April28-1998.jpg; *middle*—assault rifles in Kandahar, photo by isafmedia, <http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5301980269/sizes/l/in/photostream/>; *bottom*—former Taliban fighters receive Quran, photo by isafmedia, <http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/7293436352/sizes/h/in/photostream/>.

© 2012 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

ISBN 978-0-89206-700-8

Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 887-0200
Fax: (202) 775-3199
Web: www.csis.org



CONTENTS

Abbreviations vii

Glossary ix

1. Introduction 1

General Observations 2
Research Methods 4
Organization of the Report 5

2. State of the Literature 6

3. Ideological Roots of Religious Militancy 9

Key Terms 9
Sunni Ideological Distinctions in Afghanistan and Pakistan 11
 The Deobandi School 11
 The Barelvi School 12
 The Ahl-e-Hadith School 12
 Political Islam 13
Sunni Islam in Pakistan 14
 Political Islam in Pakistan 14
 Apolitical Movements and Ulema Networks 15
 Sectarianism 16
 “Jihad” by Religious Militant Groups 18
Sunni Islam in Afghanistan 20
 Political Islam in Afghanistan 20
 Ulema Networks 21
 The Taliban Movement 23
 Al Qaeda and Global Jihadist Networks 23
Shi’a Islam in Afghanistan and Pakistan 25
 Shi’a Islam in Pakistan 25
 Shi’a Islam in Afghanistan 26

4. Organizational Structures and Networks	27
Overview of Militant Groups in Pakistan	27
Modern Islamist Militants in Pakistan	29
Jamaat-e-Islami (Party of Islam, JI)	29
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (Party of Freedom Fighters, or HM)	30
Deobandi Militants in Pakistan	32
Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (Islamic Jihad Movement, or HuJI)	32
Jaish-e-Mohammad (Army of Mohammad, or JeM)	35
Sipah-e-Sahaba (Corps of the Prophet's Companions, or SSP)	38
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi, or LeJ)	40
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Students Movement of Pakistan, or TTP)	42
Ahl-e-Hadith Militants in Pakistan	48
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure, or LeT)	48
Barelvi Militants in Pakistan	53
Sunni Tehrik (Movement for the Sunnis)	54
Shi'a Militants in Pakistan	54
Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (Soldiers of Muhammad, or SMP)	56
Overview of Militant Groups in Afghanistan	56
The Taliban	57
The Haqqani Network (HQN)	62
Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, or HiG)	64
Foreign Militants in Afghanistan	65
Al Qaeda (AQ)	66
5. Analysis and Conclusions	69
Ideological Dimensions of Militancy	69
Fluidity in Organizational Structure	69
Patterns in Recruitment	72
Patterns in Funding	73
Militant Strategies and Tactics	74
Service Provision and Militancy	77
6. Reference List	83
About the Author and Project Director	94

List of Tables

Table 3.1. Comparison of the Three South Asian, Sunni Reformist Movements of the Nineteenth Century	13
Table 3.2. Ethno-Political Landscape of Afghanistan before the 1980s	22
Table 4.1. Differences between the Taliban and Neo-Taliban	61
Table 5.1. Types of Organizations	70
Table 5.2. Banned Militant Groups in Pakistan	71
Table 5.3. Sources of Recruitment	72
Table 5.4. Sources of Funding	74
Table 5.5. Pakistani Militant Groups and Their Areas of Operation	75
Table 5.6. Militant Strategies and Tactics	76
Table 5.7. Known Publications of Radical Islamist Groups in Pakistan	79

List of Figures


Figure 4.1. Islamist Organizations of a Militant and Nonmilitant Nature in Pakistan	29
Figure 4.2. The Formation of the HM and Its Splinter Groups	31
Figure 4.3. Splits and Mergers within the HuJI	34
Figure 4.4. Deobandi Sectarian Groups in Pakistan	38
Figure 4.5. The Jihadi Terrain in the FATA	46
Figure 4.6. Shi'a Groups in Pakistan	55



ABBREVIATIONS

AQ	Al Qaeda
CDC	Community Development Council
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSC	Civil Service Commission
DC	District Commissioner
DCO	District Coordinating Officer
DDA	District Development Assembly
EPPA	Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crimes Network
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HiG	Hizb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin)
HuA	Harkat-ul-Ansar
HuJI	Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami
HuM	Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
HM	Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
HQN	Haqqani Network
ICG	International Crisis Group
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Ittehad
IJT	Islami Jamiat-e-Tuleba
IJU	Islamic Jihad Union
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
ISO	Imamia Students Organization
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ITP	Islami Tehrik Pakistan
JeM	Jaish-e-Muhammad
JuD	Jamaat-ud-Da'wa
JAH	Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
JUI-AQ	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Ajmal Qadri)

JUI-F	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman)
JUI-S	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Sami-ul-Haq)
JUP	Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan
KLB	Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province
LeI	Lashkar-e-Islam
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LoC	Line of Control
LGO	Local Governance Ordinance
MDI	Markaz Da'watul Irshad
MQM	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PAT	Pakistan Awami Tehrik
PATA	Provincially Administered Tribal Area
SATP	South Asian Terrorism Portal
SIMI	Student Islamic Movement of India
SMP	Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan
SNGP	Sub-National Governance Policy
SSP	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
START (TOPs)	Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (Terrorism Organization Profiles)
TJ	Tableeghi Jamaat
TJP	Tehrik-e-Jaffriya Pakistan
TNFJ	Tehrik-e-Nifaaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jaffriya
TgNSM	Tehrik-e-Nifaaz-e-Shariati Muhammad
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
USIP	U.S. Institute of Peace



GLOSSARY

<i>Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wa-Jammat</i>	term used by Barelvis to describe themselves; see also <i>Sunni</i>
<i>Arbab</i>	elder or landlord
<i>Amir</i>	leader (literally, prince)
<i>arbakee; also arbakai</i>	tribal militia; guardian
<i>askari tanzeem</i>	militant organization
<i>Athna Ashariya</i>	Twelver sect of the Shi'a
<i>auqaf</i>	plural of <i>waqf</i> ; see <i>waqf</i>
<i>barakat</i>	blessing; holiness, spiritual power inherent in a saint
<i>burka</i>	all-enveloping outer garment wore by some Muslim women
<i>chanda</i>	alms
<i>chisti</i>	Sufi path of those initiated into the chain of succession originating with Muinuddin of Ajmer
<i>da'wa</i>	invitation; call to Islam
<i>din</i>	way of life contained in a religion
<i>ehya-e-sunnat</i>	revival of the <i>sunna</i>
<i>fasidah</i>	corrupt
<i>fatwa</i>	opinion of an expert on <i>sharia</i> on a point of law
<i>fidayeen</i>	literally, those who redeem themselves through sacrifice; as used here, those willing to sacrifice themselves in the name of God
<i>fiqh</i>	jurisprudence; the discipline elucidating the <i>sharia</i> and the resulting body of rules
<i>hadith</i>	sayings of the Prophet Muhammad based on the authority of a chain of transmitters
<i>Hanafi</i>	Sunni school of jurisprudence
<i>Hanbali</i>	Sunni school of jurisprudence
<i>hawala</i>	informal method of monetary exchange
<i>ijaza</i>	diploma granting permission to a student to offer instruction
<i>ijtihad</i>	individual inquiry to establish the ruling of the <i>sharia</i>
<i>ijtima</i>	congregation
<i>imam</i>	among the Shi'a, Ali and his descendants as proper leaders of the Islamic community, held to have a spiritual function as successors of Muhammad
<i>Ismailis</i>	Shi'a sect

<i>jahiliyya</i>	state of ignorance
<i>jihad</i>	striving for a worthy and ennobling cause
<i>jirga</i>	tribal council
<i>jizya</i>	per capita tax levied on non-Muslim citizens in an Islamic state
<i>karamat</i>	miracle performed by a saint
<i>khan</i>	elder
<i>kufr</i>	infidelity to Islam
<i>Lal Masjid</i>	the Red Mosque
<i>lashkar</i>	militia
<i>ma'askar</i>	training camp
<i>madrassa</i>	religious seminary; school of the <i>ulema</i> ; plural: <i>madrassas</i> or <i>madari</i>
<i>majlis-e-shura</i>	council of advisers
<i>majlis-e-amla</i>	council of members
<i>Maliki</i>	Sunni school of jurisprudence
<i>Malik</i>	elder
<i>Maulana</i>	title given to a person respected for religious learning
<i>Melmastia</i>	unconditional hospitality
<i>mawlawi</i>	learned man (sometimes <i>maulvi</i> or <i>maulwi</i>)
<i>mujahid</i>	someone who wages <i>jihad</i> ; plural: <i>mujahideen</i>
<i>mullah</i>	Muslim man educated in Islamic theology and sacred law; the name commonly given to local Islamic clerics or mosque leaders
<i>muqami</i>	local
<i>murid</i>	disciple of a Sufi <i>pir</i>
<i>naib-amir</i>	deputy leader
<i>Naqshbandiya</i>	major spiritual order of Sufi Islam
<i>nazim</i>	mayor
<i>pir</i>	Sufi master able to lead disciples on the mystical way
<i>Pashtunwali</i>	tribal code of the Pashtun
<i>Qadriya</i>	major spiritual order of Sufi Islam
<i>Qazis</i>	religious judge
<i>ridda</i>	apostate; non-Muslim
<i>salaar</i>	commander
<i>salaar-e-Aala</i>	deputy commander
<i>salaf-e-saaliheen</i>	pious predecessors
<i>Shaafi, Shafi'i</i>	referring to a Sunni school of jurisprudence
<i>Shaikhs</i>	spiritual guide; see <i>pir</i>
<i>salafism</i>	path of the ancestors; the ideology that Islam as preached by Muhammad and practiced by his companions, as well as the second and third generations succeeding them, was pure, unadulterated, and thus the ultimate authority for the interpretation of the two sources of revelation given to Muhammad—the Qur'an and the Sunnah

<i>shahdat</i>	martyrdom especially in the name of God
<i>sharia</i>	whole body of rules guiding the life of a Muslim; Islamic law
<i>Shi'a</i>	general name of that sect of Muslims that held the rights of Ali and his descendants to leadership
<i>shirk</i>	idolatry or polytheism—i.e., the deification or worship of anyone or anything other than the singular God
<i>shura</i>	consultative council
<i>sunna</i>	received custom, particularly that associated with Prophet Muhammad
<i>Sunni</i>	that majority of Muslims who accept the authority of the Caliphate; as an adjective it refers to the doctrinal position held by Muslims who are adherents of that position
<i>tabligh</i>	proselytization
<i>tafsir</i>	literal interpretation
<i>takfiri</i>	excommunication of Muslims; the act of declaring a Muslim heretic
<i>talib</i>	student; plural: <i>Taliban</i>
<i>taqlid</i>	adherence to the usual view of one's religion; blind faith
<i>tariqaat</i>	mystical way
<i>ulema</i>	Muslims learned in Islamic legal and religious studies; singular: <i>alim</i>
<i>umma</i>	brotherhood of Muslims
<i>Wahabi</i>	follower of eighteenth-century Abdul Wahab, who taught an anti-Sufi, <i>Hanbali</i> Islam
<i>waqf</i>	pious endowment of certain incomes, commonly rents or land revenues, for the upkeep of mosques, shrines, hospitals, and so on; canonical tithe; plural: <i>auqaf</i>

1

INTRODUCTION

The importance of studying the rise of Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be overemphasized. First, both Afghanistan and Pakistan have experienced serious threats from radical Islamic groups. In Afghanistan, coalition forces led by the United States were successful in overthrowing the Taliban regime after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, but since then there has been a resurgence in violence that is being perpetrated by a combination of the Taliban who have regrouped, the Haqqani Network (HQN) and Hizb-e-Islami (HiG). Foreign groups such as al Qaeda are also implicated in the violence. In Pakistan, most of the militant activity has occurred in the frontier region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, known as the FATA. But other parts of Pakistan, especially Punjab, have also been subject to bomb attacks. These attacks have not only targeted Pakistanis but also foreigners, including U.S. government facilities.

Second, the ideological and strategic nature of radical Islam in this region has changed over the years. In Pakistan, the Islamic movement evolved from being pressure groups, to being electorally active, to becoming increasingly violent militant groups that we see today. In Afghanistan, Islamist groups are in a state of decline, while the Deobandi-oriented clergy have risen to prominence.

Third, Islamic radical groups often have been viewed as monolithic, when in reality these groups are far from homogeneous in outlook, religious belief, or the strategies and tactics they use to achieve their goals. Moreover, it is clear that a mere classification of these groups in the form of typologies that attempt to capture their ideological diversity or the development of their networks is not particularly useful in determining how the U.S. government and other nations ought to engage with them.

This review of the literature (in English) on Islamic militancy in South Asia focuses on the diversity of religious beliefs held by non-state armed groups (militants) and the relationship between those beliefs and their overall objectives and activities. This religious-ideological approach was chosen for two reasons. First, there is a tendency among policymakers to presume that ideology is a key motivating force behind the insurgencies in Pakistan and Afghanistan and that extremism has its roots in a particular version of Islam. But how these versions differ from each other and how (or whether) they condition and inform the activities of these groups is not well understood. The cursory attention that policymakers pay to the role of religious belief has led to certain perspectives that structure counterinsurgency tactics (Rana 2008).

- Sunni Islam, as practiced in South Asia, is said to be represented by three predominant schools of thought: Deobandi, Bareilvi, and Ahl-e-Hadith. All three movements are described as “fundamentalist” in nature (Roy 1996) and define themselves in opposition to each other and to Shi’a Muslims.

- Of these three schools, Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith tend to be perceived as being more radical than the Bareilvi school.
- Bareilvi Islam is perceived to be more moderate because it identifies more closely with the syncretic tradition of Sufism; its followers have not been as active in militant jihad in Kashmir or Afghanistan; and Bareilvis have not waged sectarian battles against the Shi'a community, but rather its tendency toward radicalism has been noted mainly in response to Deobandi dominance.
- Sufism is understood to stress self-purification, has no apparent political dimension, and is by far the most moderate religious movement.

These claims raise questions about whether certain types of Islamic belief are more prone to extremism rather than to moderation, whether moderate ideologies are susceptible to radicalization, whether external factors play a role in radicalization, and whether policies that affect, or are affected by, these issues are sound.

The second consideration that suggests a focus on ideology and religious belief is the political threat posed by radical Islam. Many Muslim regimes that otherwise lack popular support have found a source of legitimacy in Islamist ideologies. Moreover, some radical Islamic groups have provided social services to the poor in Afghanistan and Pakistan whose governments do not have the capacity to provide a basic social safety net to their citizens, and it has been a concern to some policymakers whether social service provision expands the influence of these groups.

Hence, if the struggle against the rise of religious militancy in countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan is seen as a “war of ideas” (Fradkin and Haqqani 2005, 1), then the importance of understanding radical Islamist ideologies as thoroughly as possible has to be acknowledged: there is a need for a deliberate and consistent focus on the ideological dimensions of religious militancy as an important component of policies and strategies to counter violence by such groups.

As a preliminary step, this report is a comprehensive review of what is known publicly about militant religious organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The central organizing questions for this review are as follows:

- What is known about the religious beliefs and schools of thought of the main militant groups in the region?
- How do religious beliefs inform and shape the various activities of militant groups?

General Observations

There are two types of Islamic militant groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan: those concerned with sectarianism (directed mainly against the Shi'a community), and those engaged in a defensive struggle (or jihad, in their own terms) against non-Muslims and apostate governments in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

- Sectarian groups representing the Shi'a and Sunni sects are clearly divided over the question of succession after Prophet Muhammad. Other ideological differences exist within the different sects of Sunni Islam over the true sources of religious authority and the emphasis placed on individual responsibility and the right to *ijtihad* (individual interpretation). These ideological differences have been further exacerbated by external factors. In fact, the origins of groups

engaged in the Shi'a-Sunni conflict, such as Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP), are traced back to two events: first, the program of Sunni Islamization launched by General Zia-ul-Haq's regime in Pakistan; and second, the 1979 Iranian revolution. On the other hand, Sunni groups compete with each other not just over the supremacy of their ideological principles, but also for resources and followers. This competition has its roots in the state's allocation of *waqf*—that is, its endowment of property to religious institutions.

- Radical Islamic groups dedicated to waging what they consider to be a defensive struggle against non-Muslims and infidels all agree on the principle that jihad is an obligation of every true believer. Such groups include Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) in Kashmir; Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al Qaeda (AQ), in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan; and the Taliban in Afghanistan. In general, these groups also commonly believe that Muslims are under persistent attack and humiliation by non-Muslims, such as Christians in the United States, Zionists in Israel, or among the Jewish Diaspora and Hindus in India. There are, however, deep ideological disagreements between such groups over strategies and tactics.

A strategy is a plan of action or a policy designed to achieve a set of aims and objectives. The main strategic disagreement among Islamist groups operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan is over who the primary enemy is: who is responsible for the attacks against Islam? In the literature, a distinction often is made between the far enemy (the United States and its Western allies) and the near enemy (nominally Muslim regimes) (Gerges 2005; Fishman and Moghadam 2010). The main fault line among Pakistani groups is whether it is legitimate to attack the Pakistani government itself. In Afghanistan, the main strategic difference is between the Taliban, who want to position themselves as a legitimate alternative to the current Afghan government, and the HQN, which is less discerning in its targeting of the Afghan government.

External factors that affect the development of strategy include local and regional politics. Sunni Islamist movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan have drawn support from each other, while Shi'a movements have been more closely linked to Iran. From the development of Afghanistan's Islamist movements to the eventual rise of the Taliban and their subsequent decline in 2001, Pakistani Islamic movements have supported their Afghan counterparts. The Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency in particular, have provided support in the form of funding, weapons, and intelligence in both countries and have used them as tools to enhance Pakistan's regional policy. In addition to the political linkages between the Afghan and Pakistani movements, Arab volunteers who arrived in Afghanistan with the help of the Saudi government and the ISI during Soviet occupation eventually gave birth to al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden. The Saudi government, to curtail Iranian influence over the Shi'a Islamic groups, continued to support Sunni radical groups in both Pakistan and Afghanistan with funds and equipment. After the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union ended, the Pakistani government turned its attention to Kashmir, where the struggle was for the pursuit of national self-determination. Newly trained madrasa students and disbanded Afghan *mujahideen* focused their energies resisting Indian occupation of Kashmir. After the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the Pakistani government's decision to ally with the Americans in its efforts against terrorists and insurgents in the region, led some of these groups to deem the Pakistani government as the near enemy and therefore a legitimate target of attack.

Tactics are the specific techniques used by organizations to deploy available means to achieve their goals. In addition to differences in the strategies they employ, militants in the region have differed in their tactics as well, which have included suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, other forms of violence, propaganda, use of advanced media technologies, and service provision. An important tactical difference among groups involves the “target of violence and the means used to create it” (Fishman and Moghadam 2010, 13). These debates have centered on whether the use of violence against Muslims is justified. The question of killing other Muslims is based on the doctrine of *takfir*, “the process by which radical Islamic groups excommunicates other Muslims, thereby rendering them subject to attack” (13). More moderate members of these groups fear that the use of such violent tactics or *takfir* can alienate fellow Muslims who form their core support base. The question is whether the tactics used are worth losing legitimacy in the eyes of other Muslims and also for creating division within the Muslim *umma*. This literature review found that tactical choices seem to be determined by a combination of both exogenous factors (e.g., financial and weapons support from the ISI and Saudi government) and endogenous factors (e.g., organizational capacity and strategic objectives of the militant groups).

One of the less-studied areas of research on Islamic militancy is the nonmilitant activities of these groups, such as the provision of services to build local support. Such activities are the result of both strategic and tactical thinking on part of these groups. The decision to engage in broader, nonmilitant, charitable activity also depends on the organizational capacity and funding capability of these groups. The literature available on this area of research is minimal and some questions that still need answering include: What are the motivating factors behind the provision of such services? What services are provided? What role does religious belief play in this?

Finally, it is challenging to separate the Islamic movements between Pakistan and Afghanistan and to treat each country separately, because both countries are linked by regional politics and by Pushtuns who live on both sides of the border. Still, as a very general observation, it can be said that religion plays a somewhat different role in each country’s conflicts: militant groups in Pakistan tend to use religion as a justification for violence (to defend Islam), while those in Afghanistan tend to use religion as the objective of their activities (to establish an Islamic state), and there is greater diversity in religious ideology in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.

Research Methods

This report presents the results of a comprehensive review of the English-language literature on militant Islamic movements in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Materials accessed and examined included peer-reviewed academic journals, books, edited volumes, reports by governmental and study groups, reports and working papers by policy research centers, works by prominent authors and columnists, databases on militant groups available from the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) and the Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Center, and profiles of militant groups and leaders by the Jamestown Foundation.

The terms *militant* and *militancy* refer to the use of violence. Militants are groups and individuals who employ violence as a means to some end or to express hatred or contempt for some group of people. Militancy is the actual use of violence or, more generally, participation in a militant group’s activities, especially those that are violent. The terms *radical* and *extreme* refer to religious or ideological beliefs that either lie far outside of the mainstream of a society or those that are used to justify violent actions, even if the believer does not engage in violence directly.

Organization of the Report

Chapter 2 of this report is an overview of the literature and scholarship available on Islamic militancy or radicalism in South Asia. Chapter 3 maps out the ideological diversity of Islamic movements in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a way of ascertaining the role that religious belief plays in the militant and nonmilitant activities of these groups. Chapter 4 describes what is known about the organizational capacity of the Islamic militant groups operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Chapter 5 discusses some of the trends in the ideological and organizational aspects of Islamic militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

2

STATE OF THE LITERATURE

In the past, studies on radical Islam have concentrated on the Middle East. This focus was well-founded given that Islamic radicalism had received immense patronage in this region. Moreover, Hillel Fradkin and Hussain Haqqani (2005, 3) have argued that “radical religious leaders in non-Arab countries have often been of Middle Eastern origin with ongoing ties to the Arab world.” An example would be the pervasive influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on Islamist political movements globally. In contrast, Muslim communities in South Asia have been perceived to be far more moderate than those in the Middle East. This view was held for two reasons. First, the practice of Islam in South Asia has been shaped by Sufism, which is very different from the orthodox Islam of the Arab Muslim world. Second, the reformist religious movements that originated in South Asia during the nineteenth century preached a return to the true tenets of Islam instead of a radical or revolutionary Islam.

Since September 11, 2001, however, this popular opinion has changed and a vast literature has been produced aiming to understand the religious radicalism that has been experienced in South Asia over the past two decades. Since this literature has been generated in response to 9/11, it has been tied to U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This literature was produced with three objectives in mind: to know the “enemy,”¹ to understand the phenomenon of religious extremism and the use of violence (Pipes 1983; Sageman 2008, Brachman 2008; Aboul-Enein 2010); and to improve counterinsurgency strategies (Rotberg 2007; Hayes and Sedra 2008, Jones 2008; Fair and Jones 2010).²

Three themes emerge in this literature:

- *Understanding al Qaeda and its international network.* This focus is hardly surprising, since the 9/11 attacks were conducted by al Qaeda operatives. The U.S. government’s preoccupation with al Qaeda began in the early 1990s when the organization began attacking U.S. targets. After 9/11, however, an overwhelming effort has been made by both policymakers and academics to

1. See, for example, the recent proliferation of journals dedicated to understanding terrorism and conflict such as the *Terrorism Monitor* and *Militant Leadership Monitor* published by the Jamestown Foundation; the *CTC Sentinel* published at West Point; and *Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism Watch* and *Jane’s Intelligence Review*.

2. See also the extensive material that has been produced by the RAND Corporation and by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) on counterinsurgency tactics. These policy reports detail the problems of religious extremism in the region and how they may be controlled and managed. Similarly, the International Crisis Group (ICG) has also published numerous reports that attempt to understand the roots of religious extremism and to propose policy recommendations to the international community and governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

analyze what is arguably the world's largest and most complex terrorist network (Bergen 2001; Burke 2003; Gunaratna 2003; Hoffman 2006; Gunaratna and Rana 2007).³

- *Conceptualizing “terrorism,” “jihad,” and “political Islam.”* There has been a preoccupation among policy analysts and scholars to understand political Islam (Roy 1996; Salvatore 1997; Esposito 1998). This concern has been partly driven by a need to understand the anti-Western outlook of fundamentalist and neo-fundamentalist movements that have emerged in the Muslim world, and partly to assess whether Islam and Western conceptions of democracy are antithetical. In other words, is Western democracy in any way threatened by Islam? Since 9/11, there has been a shift in the focus of this literature and an effort has been made to understand the justification found in Islam for the use of violence and terror. Scholars have tried to conceptualize “terrorism” (Stern 2003; Devji 2005) and “jihad” (Jalal 2008; Kepel 2006; Fishman and Moghadam 2010). In the initial stages of its development, this literature paid little attention to South Asian religious militancy and focused more on the Middle East. It is only with the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the growing ties between Pakistani militant groups and al Qaeda that more attention is being paid to religious militancy in South Asia.
- *Criticizing U.S. foreign policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1980s.* There is a substantial school of thought that is skeptical of U.S. interests in South Asia. These ideas peaked in the 1980s when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funneled funds and weapons into Afghanistan to help wage the war against the Soviet Union (Coll 2005; Labévière 2000; Rashid 2000, 2008). The main thrust of these works is to argue that the U.S. government's pursuit of strategic interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan has played a significant role in spurring the current insurgencies.

Recently, an attempt has been made to move beyond these themes and to focus on the causes of religious militancy and insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These attempts, however, are few and far between. Nonetheless, these accounts are more nuanced in their analysis of systemic variables rooted in society, culture, and politics to explain the rise of Islamic militancy in Pakistan (Nasr 2000; Abbas 2004; Hussain, Z. 2007) and in Afghanistan (Rashid 2000, 2008; Dorronsoro 2005).

There is also recognition that in order to confront religious militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, an in-depth understanding of how these militant groups have evolved, and what their objectives are, is required. To this end, a rich literature has been produced that provides details on leadership profiles (Baweja 2002), organizational profiles (Sreedhar and Manish 2003; Rana 2007), the evolution of militant groups (Rashid 2000; Giustozzi 2008; Mir 2004, 2008), and networks and affiliations (Zahab and Roy 2004). A sizable portion of this research has been produced by journalists (Jalalzai 2003; Rashid 2000, 2008) or by policy analysts based in Washington, D.C. (Fair 2004; Jones 2008).

Knowledge of militant Islamic groups is limited for two reasons. First, political instability and insecurity in Afghanistan and Pakistan have prevented researchers from freely undertaking fieldwork that would allow them to gather first-hand information by means of interviews and surveys. In these circumstances, many researchers have relied on newspaper reports and secondhand ac-

3. See also the reports that have been published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point such as Felter et al. (2006) and Brown (2007).

counts. For example, the wealth of material available on Pakistan's militant groups cites two books (Rana 2007; Mir 2004, 2008), which are not very well sourced, thereby generating some concern about the authenticity of our knowledge base. Second, those researchers who have had access to the field and who have conducted personal interviews with the leaders and cadres of these militant groups, have been limited by the anonymous and off-the-record nature of their interactions. Moreover, the groups operating in this region are extremely secretive and do not provide easy access to their facilities or to their members for interviews. In fact, they prefer to communicate and disseminate information about their goals and activities by means of weekly or monthly publications and videos. Pakistani militant groups are more media-savvy, which partly explains why there is more information available on these groups compared to Afghan groups. As a result of these limitations, there are conflicting accounts of how certain groups originated, how many members belong to a particular group, and how many members are active fighters.

Very little academic and scientific research is being carried out on Islamic radicalism in South Asia. One reason may be that the development of this body of literature is in its early stages and more primary research has to be carried out before theories can be built. There are some scholars using sociological approaches and social movement theory to study group behavior in these organizations (Sutton and Vertigans 2005; Vertigans 2009). Qualitative research has been undertaken by Christine Fair (2004, 2008) and by Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro (2010), who have conducted surveys or used existing surveys and other qualitative research techniques to support and corroborate their general, descriptive findings.

There has been an increasing trend in the scholarship to simplify the complex militant terrain in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to think in terms of typologies. There is some merit to thinking in terms of parsimonious and neat categorizations because it enables the deduction of generalizable hypotheses. But it also has led to an oversimplification of religious militancy in this region, which is characterized by a diversity of ideologies, organizational structures, modes of decision-making and leadership, strategies and tactics, patterns of recruitment, and sources of funding. Each of these aspects merits an in-depth study before categorizations can be made. The most common typologies of militant Islamic groups are based on areas of operation and on local bases of support. However, it might also be useful to develop "intellectual frameworks that can address Islamic radicalism in terms of political trajectories, networks and ideological families" (Roy 2002, 4).

One such framework might begin with an examination of how religious beliefs inform or shape the motivations, incentive structures, and activities of militant organizations. Most scholars and analysts of Islamic radicalism in South Asia acknowledge the diversity of sectarian ideologies within Sunni and Shi'a Islam. However, no serious study has been undertaken to document how these religious beliefs inform the functions of these organizations. Fradkin and Haqqani (2005, 3) write in the introduction to the first issue of the publication, *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, that in "the struggle against terrorism there is a need to understand the contemporary radical ideologies of militant groups in the same way other recent ideological struggles have solicited in their time—for example Communism and Fascism."

3

IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS MILITANCY

There are two types of militant organizations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. On the one hand, there are nonreligious organizations; these include anti-state, secessionist, sectarian, and other secular groups, such as the sectarian Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and secessionist Baloch nationalists in Pakistan, and tribal commanders, warlords, and criminal networks in Afghanistan. On the other hand, there are militant groups that seek justification for their use of violence in Islam.

This chapter reviews the ideological predilections of the second type of militant organization to understand the role of religious beliefs in the objectives, activities, and tactics of these groups. Before the discussion of prevalent Islamic ideologies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, several key terms are defined. The main body of this chapter examines, first, Sunni Islam, and second, Shi'a Islam. (The influence of al Qaeda's ideology in Pakistan and Afghanistan is discussed in the section on Sunni Islam in Afghanistan, since its most significant effects were on the Taliban movement.)

Key Terms

Islam plays a central role in the social and political life of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, Olivier Roy (1986) suggests that the “social basis of Islam varies according to the context in which it is practiced.” Thus, one finds different forms of religious expression in Afghanistan and Pakistan such as “popular devotion, legal orthodoxy of the *ulema*, the mysticism of the Sufis, and the political Islam of the Islamists” (30). Reuven Paz (2010, xxxiii) explains that social, but apolitical, Islamic movements and Sufism seek to create an Islamic environment in Afghan or Pakistani society.¹ By contrast, Islamist groups, such as the JI, have both social and political aims, seeking to establish Islamic laws or an Islamic state (a small subset of these have radical views that permit or advocate violence to achieve those aims).

Islam is the religion of Muslims, involving belief in one God—Allah—and Muhammad as his last prophet. Two major divisions exist in Islam, between Sunnis and the Shi'as over succession after the death of Prophet Muhammad: Sunnis accept the legitimate authority of the Rashidun Caliphate (Abu-Bakr, Omar, Usman, and Ali in that order) after the death of the Prophet, while Shi'as only accept the authority of Ali (Muhammad's nephew and son-in-law) and his descendents.² The

1. “Sufism is a form of Islam that is embodied in the persons of representatives of the chains of spiritual power and piety that believers ultimately trace back to Prophet Muhammad. In South Asia, It is also the shorthand term for the nexus of spiritual theories and practices through which Muslims seek a closer relationship with God . . . and aim to transcend the affairs of the world” (Green 2011, 86). In South Asia, the most popular orders of Sufism include the Chistiya, Suhrawardiya, Qadriya, and Naqshbandiya. Of these, the last two are most popular in Afghanistan.

2. For a brief history of the divisions that arose after the Prophet's death in naming a successor, see Esposito (1998).

Sunni sect is further divided into four *fiqh* (schools of jurisprudence): Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi'i.³ The Shi'a sect split resulting in two major groups: the Twelver Shi'as (so-called because they recognize the authority of twelve successors to Muhammad) and Ismailis (who recognize the authority of the Aga Khan, a hereditary leader believed to descend from Muhammad).

Islamic movements and groups have goals ranging from simply promoting Islam to creating an Islamic state based on sharia. These movements recruit support through either political effort or social activities including welfare provision and cultural activities. These are understood as *da'wa* (Paz 2010, xxxiii). Hence, Islamist groups, which see Islam as a political ideology and as a religion, may be viewed as a subset of Islamic groups. Barry Rubin (2010, xviii) defines Islamism as a "modern political ideology seeking to seize state power and transform existing societies. The answer to the problems of countries where Muslims live . . . lies in rule by a regime based on a strictly interpreted version of Islam."

Before we can speak of Islamic militancy Roy (2002) suggests that we need to understand that this phenomenon is made up two elements. The first element is a "call for the return of all Muslims to the true tenets of Islam" (3). Roy refers to this trend as *fundamentalism*. The second element is political militancy that "advocates a defensive *jihad* against the enemies of Islam" (3). Roy (1994, 2002) provides an intellectual framework to study the growth of Islamic militancy that makes a distinction between Islamists and the *neo-fundamentalists*.⁴ Neo-fundamentalist groups emphasize a literal interpretation of sharia. In contrast to Islamists, they are not interested in state-building or in political action. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the neo-fundamentalists have emerged from the networks of religious schools (*madrassas*) that have been inspired by the Deobandi, Barelvi, and Ahl-e-Hadith movements within Sunni Islam.

Militant Islamist, therefore, is a term used to describe those groups or individuals advocating Islamist or neo-fundamentalist ideological goals principally by violent means; often this violence is termed as *jihad*. This term emerged after 9/11 to describe al Qaeda and other militant groups that used the defense of Islam as a justification for their violent strategy to achieve their goals. Nelly Lahoud (2010, 2) lists three key features that encourage militant groups toward the cause of *jihad*: "an idealistic commitment to a righteous cause; individualism in interpreting religion; a conviction that Muslims are engaged in defensive warfare, making *jihad* not just lawful but an obligatory religious duty."

Jihad, the literal meaning of which is "striving for a worthy and ennobling cause" (Jalal, 2008, 3), is commonly thought today to mean a kind of holy war against non-Muslims.⁵ Ayesha Jalal claims that this is "a hopeless distortion of a concept that is at the core of Islamic faith" (3). Thus it is important to acknowledge that jihad as understood in Islam has three levels: First, inner jihad

3. For a more detailed understanding of Sunni theology and creed see Halverson (2010).

4. An alternative approach is to view militant activity as being a type of Islamism. In this framework, Islamists may be divided into three subgroupings: Ikhwan, who want to attain an Islamist state through participation in the political process and proselytizing (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood); Salafi Ilmi, Salafists who wish to attain an Islamic state through proselytizing alone; and the militant Salafi Jihadi, who desire the attainment of an Islamic state through violent means, using Islam to instill fear rather than for any moral purpose (e.g., al Qaeda). This is the more accepted understanding of how militant Islamist ideology has evolved (Aboul-enein 2010, 5).

5. To call jihad a holy war is a specifically Western depiction that draws on the legacy of the Crusades. The best conceptualization of jihad is found in Cook (2005). For a political history of how jihad has been adopted as a strategy by Islamists to achieve their goals, see Kepel (2006).

is a personal struggle within oneself to submit to Allah; second, social jihad is a struggle against the evil, injustice, and oppression with one's self, family, and society; and third, physical jihad is a struggle against all that prevents Muslims from servitude to God, or a struggle for the defense of a Muslim society (Sharma 2006, 2–3).⁶ It is defensive and physical jihad that militant Islamist groups undertake for the achievement of their goals.

The primary ideological distinction between Shi'a and Sunni Islam is well understood but the “unique and often idiosyncratic” division among South Asian Sunni sects is less well known and is the subject of the next section (Sahni 2010, 347).

Sunni Ideological Distinctions in Afghanistan and Pakistan

The majority of Muslims in Afghanistan (80 percent) and Pakistan (75 percent) are Sunnis belonging to the Hanafi fiqh (as opposed to the other schools of jurisprudence that are relatively more rigid and popular in the Middle East).⁷ Sunni Hanafis trace their roots to the Indo-Muslim civilization, especially the religious reform movements that originated in northern India (Deoband, Bareilly, and Lucknow) during the nineteenth century. These movements including the Deobandi, Bareilvi, and Ahl-e-Hadith revere the Prophet but disagree on the interpretations of the sources of religious authority (see table 3.1). In addition to these movements, also prevalent is the modern Islamist stream of thinking. The following four sections review the Deobandi, Bareilvi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Islamist schools of thought.

The Deobandi School

The origin of the Deobandi school of thought can be traced to the establishment of the Dar-ul-Uloom seminary in the late nineteenth century in Deoband, a town in northern India, by Maulana Nanautawi and Maulana Gangohi. Deobandi ulema emphasized a range of rituals and personal behaviors prescribed by sharia, understood according to a literal interpretation of Hanafi traditions of reasoning (Zaman 2002, 11). Moreover, Deobandi scholars advocate the study of traditions attributed to the Prophet, his teachings, and his companions. Therefore, they placed quite a bit of emphasis on “personal religious development and individual responsibility in the interpretation of Islam (*ijtihād*) and its teachings” (Metcalf 1982, 267).⁸ Deobandism was a reformist movement and it defined itself in opposition to existing Muslim beliefs and practices, including Sufism and Shi'a. In so doing, Deobandi ulema distinguished themselves from not only the Shi'as but also from other Sunnis, namely the Bareilvis and Ahl-e-Hadith.

6. Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro (2010, 507–8), in a survey of Pakistani citizens, asked how the term *jihad* was understood by the general populace. The respondents were asked, “Some people say *jihad* is a personal struggle for righteousness. Others say *jihad* is protecting the Muslim *Umma* through war. What do you think?” Forty-five percent said that they believed jihad to be both a personal struggle and a way of protecting the Muslim *Umma* through war; 23 percent said that it was a personal struggle only; 25 percent said that it was war to protect Muslims; and 8 percent had no response or declined to answer. Clearly a majority of Pakistanis embrace the militant aspect of jihad in principle.

7. CIA, *World Fact Book*, accessed January 5, 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> and <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>.

8. The definitive account of the Deobandi school of thought and how it evolved is by Metcalf (1982; 2004, 265–83). For an account of the spread of Deobandi influence in northwest Pakistan see Haroon (2007).

The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Party of Islamic Religious Scholars, or JUI) and a variety of other Deobandi groups have been socially and politically influential in Pakistan and have impacted the course of sectarianism and militancy in the country and abroad. In Afghanistan, the historical influence of Deoband has been crucial to the development of Islam. Although there is a strong presence of Sufi Naqshbandiya and Qadriya traditions in Afghanistan, Deobandism makes up the largest component of the Afghan clergy, as many of them have trained in Deobandi madrassas located along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Giustozzi 2010, 190).

The Barelvi School⁹

The Barelvi school of thought traces its origin to the teachings of Ahmed Riza Khan of Bareilly, a small town in Uttar Pradesh, India. The Barelvi ulema “affirmed the authority of the prophet but also of saints and holy people, whom they revere as sources of religious guidance and vehicles of mediation between God and human beings” (Zaman 2002, 11).¹⁰ They also based their understanding on Hanafi reasoning but interpreted it broadly to include Sufism, hence placing less emphasis on individual responsibility and more on the intercession of ulema and the *shaikhs* or *pirs* (spiritual guides). Barelvi teachings “envisioned a hierarchy that elevated the prophets, saints, and *ulema* as benefactors, patrons, and intercessors” (Metcalf 1982, 265–67). Barelvis attributed “extraordinary and many divine qualities to Muhammad, conceiving of him as more than mortal” (Sahni 2010, 348). The Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith rejected this vision of Islam claiming that it was a form of idolatry. In comparison to the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith schools of thought, Barelvis are far more inclusive in that they consider themselves the ulema of the Ahl-e-Sunnat Wa Jammāt (the classical name for all Sunnis).

The Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Party of Pakistan’s Religious Scholars, or JUP) is the political expression of the Barelvi tradition in Pakistan, which is most commonly practiced in southern and western Punjab in Pakistan. The Barelvi tradition is not popular in Afghanistan even though Sufi Islam does have a significant following in the country.

The Ahl-e-Hadith School

Ahl-e-Hadith ulema “deny the legitimacy of all practices and customs lacking a basis in scriptural texts and in the classical schools of Islamic jurisprudence. They stringently insist on the Quran and Hadith (narrations concerning the words and deeds of the Muhammad) as the exclusive and directly accessible sources of guidance for all Muslims” (Zaman 2002, 11).¹¹ They therefore “eschew Sufi institutions, techniques of mediation, and discipline, and reject Barelvi thinking” (Metcalf 1982, 265). Barbara Metcalf has also noted that the Deobandi ulema criticize Ahl-e-Hadith thinkers for teaching a radical approach to Islamic law that makes individual responsibility far too great. Ahl-e-Hadith ulema initially directed their beliefs to those who were well-educated, belonged to an aristocratic social background, and could afford to adhere to such an austere standard of religious interpretation. As a result of this exclusive approach, the Ahl-e-Hadith believers in South Asia have been the smallest in number, forming a cohesive sect (265). Ahl-e-Hadith has been

9. Other commonly used spellings include Brelvi and Barelwi.

10. On the development of the Barelvi religious movement from 1870 to 1920, see Sanyal (1996).

11. There is still no standard work on the Ahl-e-Hadith in English, but for a brief overview, see Metcalf (1982, 268–96).

linked to Saudi Wahabism, which is an ultra-orthodox and puritanical sect.¹² Although the Ahl-e-Hadith ulema do not strictly follow any of the schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam they have moved closer to the Hanbali tradition, which also forms the basis of Wahabism (Sahni 2010, 349).

In Pakistan, the Ahl-e-Hadith sect is represented by the Jamiat Ahle-e-Hadith (Party of Those Who Follow the Hadith, JAH) and a number of other formations such as Markaz Da'wat-ul-Irshad (Center of Islamic Learning, or MDI), Jamaat-ud-Da'wa (Party of the Call to Islam, or JuD) and the militant jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure, or LeT). In Afghanistan, the Ahl-e-Hadith sect has not taken hold, but Saudi Wahabism brought by Arabs who volunteered during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, has certainly had an influence on the Taliban.

Table 3.1. Comparison of the Three South Asian, Sunni Reformist Movements of the Nineteenth Century

	Deobandi	Barelvi	Ahl-e-Hadith
Similarities	All three schools of thought express themselves as oppositional reform movements		
	Defined in opposition to Shi'a Muslims and the Ahmadi community.		
Differences			
Fiqh	Hanafi	Hanafi	None, but closer to Hanbali
Membership base	Urban and educated	Rural and less educated	Urban and educated
Exclusivity of the ideology	Less exclusive than Ahl-e-Hadith and more exclusive than the Barelvis in their teaching	Least exclusive, claiming that they represent all Sunni Muslims	Most exclusive
Emphasis on individual responsibility	A lot of emphasis on personal religious development, individual responsibility, and ijtihad	Little to no emphasis on individual responsibility; instead there is an emphasis on the close relationship to the religious guide	Place the most emphasis on individual responsibility and ijtihad

Source: Author; for data source, see Barbara Metcalf, 1982, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Political Islam

Finally, separate from these three Sunni sects is the supra-sectarian approach. Islamists view the state as a conduit for the imposition of Islamic tradition and law. Scholars, such as Olivier Roy view these Islamists as being “modern” (Roy 2002, 4) because they accept that contemporary life is full of technological, political and educational developments, and innovation. In the Middle East modern Islamism is credited to Hassan Al Banna (founder of the Muslim Brotherhood). In

12. Wahabism had its origins in a movement of the Muwahidun led by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab in eighteenth-century Nejd. Wahabism rejects “the whole structure of Sufi practices, any veneration of humans as *shirk*, and acceptance of medieval scholarly authorities as blind faith. It believes in the strict obedience to the word of God and full responsibility of the individual to form an informed, independent analysis of scriptural texts” (Voll 1982, 61).

Pakistan, the JI represents this ideology and has inspired and supported the modern Islamist movements in Afghanistan, such as the Jamiyat-e-Islami and Hizb-e-Islami (HIG).

Sunni Islam in Pakistan

According to Ajai Sahni (2010, 348) there are four broad trends that may be identified on the Pakistani landscape of Sunni Islam, “The principal divide occurs between Deobandi and Barelvi schools and the modernist-revivalist streams such as the JI, all of which are uniquely South Asian in character. The Ahl-e-Hadith inspired by Wahabism and enjoying significant support and funding from Saudi Arabia is the fourth major stream.”

This section reviews the ideological differences among political Islamic movements, apolitical Islamic movements, sectarian groups, and jihadi groups.

Political Islam in Pakistan

Mohammad Waseem (2010) describes Islam in Pakistan’s politics as having taken the form of “street agitation, anti-Western intellectual thought, and the religious scholarship of the *madaris*” (20). He notes that while the general public displays all these different versions, “official Islam is a source of legitimacy and national destiny in Pakistan” (20).

Islamic political parties—representing modern Islamist thinking (JI), the Deobandi sect (JUI), the Barelvi sect (JUP), and the Ahle-Hadith sect (JAH)—in postindependence Pakistan took the role of insuring that the constitution of Pakistan was in accordance with sharia law. The JI, for example, focused on influencing the framing of the Objectives Resolution and declaring Pakistan an Islamic republic.¹³ Meanwhile the JUI, the JUP, and the JAH, operating from their respective madrassas, or madaris, and mosques, demanded the rule of sharia in Pakistan. In 1970 these parties entered mainstream politics by participating in the election and becoming stakeholders in the political system itself.¹⁴ This move also enabled these political parties to gain a share in state resources. As electoral entities they have participated provincially and federally as coalition partners and as part of alliances.¹⁵ They even served as opposition to nonreligious political parties.

The JI, founded by Abul Ala Maududi in 1947, represents modernist Islamist thinking in Pakistan. It maintains a supra-sectarian identity and has been criticized by other Sunni movements for not following any of the Sunni fiqh. However, the JI has much in common with Hanafi reasoning (ICG 2005, 3). Moreover, the JI’s Islamist vision is different from the Deobandi, Barelvi, and Ahle-Hadith traditions because it emphasized the importance of reforming the state and legal apparatus. Hussain Haqqani (2005a, 26) cites Maududi’s work, *Al Jihad fil-Islam* (or *Jihad in Islam*), to explain

13. The Objectives Resolution passed in 1949 by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan stated that the constitution of Pakistan would be modeled on the ideological principles of Islam.

14. In the 1970 election the JUI won seven seats; the JUP won seven seats, and the JI won four seats in the National Assembly. In subsequent elections these political parties have contested independently or as part of alliances such as the (Unity of Islamic Democracy, or IJI) or (United Council of Action, or MMA).

15. The JUI, for example, has formed coalitions with the Pakistan People’s Party to form the provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. From 2002 to 2007, an alliance of six religious political parties including the JI, the JUI-F, the JUI-S, the JAH, the JUP, and the Shi’a Tehrik-e-Jaffriya Pakistan (TJP) formed the MMA. This alliance formed the provincial governments in the KPP and Balochistan and served as the main opposition in the National Assembly.

his ideology which is contained in three main premises: “Revolutionize the intellectual and mental outlook of humanity and instill Islamic attitude toward life and morality; to mobilize all those who have accepted Islamic ideals to struggle for power and seize it by all available means and equipment; and finally, to establish Islamic rule and widen the sphere of Islam’s influence by contact and example.”¹⁶

In contrast to the JI, Sunni political parties claiming to represent Deobandi (JUI), Bareilvi (JUP), and Ahl-e-Hadith (JAH) schools in Pakistan, are networks of ulema belonging to specific madrassas. Metcalf (2004, 267) has observed that “politics is an empty box filled expediently and pragmatically depending on what seems to work best in any given situation.” For these political parties, involvement in mainstream politics was merely to ensure that state law adhered to sharia-based individual practices.

Apolitical Movements and Ulema Networks

Every religious sect is driven by the need to expand its membership and increase its influence. Two strategies are used to this end: first, *da’wa* and *tabligh* (proselytization). The institutional expression of these strategies has been found in apolitical movements and in mosques and madrassa networks.

The largest apolitical, fundamentalist movement is the Deobandi-inspired Tablighi Jamaat (Society for Spreading Faith, or TJ) that places its entire emphasis on “reshaping individual lives” (Metcalf 2004, 272). She explains that pivotal to the TJ’s strategy is the belief that the “best way to learn is to teach” (272) and enjoin others to adopt an Islamic way of life. The leader of the TJ, Maulana Ilyas Khandlawi, began this mass organization in 1926 by sending out groups of Muslims to approach other Muslims to fulfill their religious obligations. Participants were encouraged to spend a night, a week, or 40 days at a time on *tabligh* missions to proselytize. These activities are described by the TJ as *jihad* in the sense that it is an “effort or struggle to purify the individual self” (274) by adhering to Hadith and Sunna. True to the original Deobandi movement, the TJ has focused on private and personal life instead of on politics (Metcalf 2004, 272–75).

Similarly, Ahl-e-Hadith leader Hafiz Saeed (founder of the JuD and the LeT) is a proponent of combining *tabligh* and *jihad*. For him, *da’wa* is an “educational philosophy that develops a *jihadi* culture by combining Islamic teaching with modern education and producing a reformed individual who is well versed in Islamic moral principles but also in science and technology” (Shafqat 2002, 142). The emphasis on Islam inculcates the motivation to wage *jihad*, while modern education equips the individual to cope with the vagaries of life.

The Bareilvis, who have a predominant following in rural Punjab and Sindh, created the Da’wat-e-Islami (Invitation to Islam) under the leadership of Maulana Ilyas Qadri as a reaction to the Deobandi TJ. It conducts *da’wa* along the same pattern as the TJ by sending people on preaching tours and by holding religious gatherings. Da’wat-e-Islami followers separate themselves from other *da’wa* groups by wearing green turbans (Rana 2007, 371–73).

An International Crisis Group (ICG) report (2005, 4) claims that all three subsects of Sunni Islam in Pakistan operate on a “principle of exclusion.” Beyond these apolitical movements are mosques and madrassa networks, which are the main media of recruitment and organization.

16. On Zia’s Islamization reforms see Kennedy (1996) and Weiss (1987).

Each subject has its own madrassa network that teaches curricula by emphasizing their particular religious ideals, thus serving to reinforce the sectarian divide within Sunni Islam.¹⁷ The ulema who graduate from these centers contribute to sectarian divisions by advocating their particular understanding of Islam, therefore competing for the largest following and support. The madrassas also have a long tradition of publishing religious literature that articulates the differences among the sectarian ideologies.

The subjects also tend to have their own mosques attended only by their own followers since religious rituals may also differ. For example, the Ahl-e-Hadith sect is known for saying a more canonical prayer (Metcalf 1982, 274). The Barelvis have different practices that derive from the syncretic version of Islam that they preach. But apart from the religious practice followed at the different mosques, Sunni sects compete over control of mosques because, as *auqaf* properties, mosques often are given funds by the Pakistani state for upkeep and maintenance.

Sectarianism

The Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Barelvi sects of Sunni Islam are not only defined in opposition to each other but in hostile opposition to Shi'as and Ahmadis. Hence, sectarianism in Pakistan has taken on two different forms: the Shi'a-Sunni conflict that has predominated sectarian conflict in the last two decades and the politics of opposition and exclusion among the various Sunni sects that was briefly discussed earlier.

The precedent for sectarian violence against the Shi'a community lay in the violent agitation against the Ahmadis between 1953 and 1974, the year the Pakistani constitution was amended to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims.¹⁸ Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith are particularly opposed to Shi'a practices such as the public displays of mourning during the month of Muharram. Barelvis in comparison are generally more tolerant of Shi'a rituals and beliefs. Hence, as an ICG report (2005) argues persuasively that the Shi'a-Sunni conflict is more accurately described as a Shi'a-Deobandi conflict.

Shi'a political activism in the wake of the Iranian revolution and Zia's Sunni-based Islamic reforms led to the formation of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Army of the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, or SSP) by radical Deobandi ulema such as Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. Qasim Zaman (1998, 699–705) explains that the SSP originated in the rural district of Jhang, which was politically and economically dominated by a Shi'a landed elite, who as pirs, had a considerable influence over the religious beliefs of the ignorant population. The SSP therefore strove to bring the people back into the fold of Sunni Islam. In the SSP mind-set, "local forms of religious belief and customary practices related to Sufism were equated with Shi'ism, while Sunni Islam was equated with text-based, urban Islam" (701). Hence, the SSP vowed to combat the Shi'a at all levels, to have

17. The five unions of madrassas in Pakistan include the Deobandi Wafaqul Madaris, the Barelvi Tanzeem al-Madaris, the Shi'a Madaris al-Arabia, the Ahl-e-Hadith Wafaq al-Madaris Salafiya, and the JI Rabita al-Madaris (ICG 2005, 4); see also ICG (2002).

18. The Ahmadis are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, whom they believe was Jesus' reincarnation and Islam's promised messiah. This belief is antithetical to the Deobandi, Barelvi, and Ahl-e-Hadith belief in Muhammad as the last of the prophets and whose practices they devotedly follow. The Ahmadis are a small community but are divided into two sects: the Qadiani and the Lahori. The former believe that Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet designating his descendants as Caliphs, while the latter believe that Ahmad was a reformer but not a prophet.

them declared non-Muslim like the Ahmadis, ban Muharram processions, and make Sunni Islam the official state religion. This last objective was the result of Sunni fear that Shi'a ulema sought to extend the Iranian revolution to Pakistan by imposing Shi'a law in a majority Sunni state.

Other strategies were less peaceful and involved a militant struggle against Shi'a organizations, which often took the form of massacres at Shi'a mosques and the publication of literature that was rabidly anti-Shi'a.¹⁹ However, as the SSP entered mainstream politics in Pakistan, radical elements within the SSP reorganized to form the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi, LeJ). The leadership of the LeJ participated in Afghan jihad and beyond, having sectarian goals also espouses a jihadist ideology.

Aside from anti-Shi'a and anti-Ahmadi sectarianism, there are reports of rivalries among the various Sunni sects themselves, specifically between the Deobandi (supported by Ahl-e-Hadith) and Bareilvi sects. Although, Bareilvi groups have received funding from Arab countries, they have been nonmilitant as a general rule. However, an ICG report (2002, 12) has noted the activities of one militant Bareilvi group, Sunni Tehrik, that directed its activism toward Deobandi sectarian groups it considered "criminal."²⁰ SSP activists have been implicated in shootings, bombings, and assassinations at mosques and prayer meetings that have targeted Sunni Tehrik leaders.²¹ This rivalry between the Deobandi and Bareilvi sects, while ideological, also has its roots in the Pakistani state in favoring the Deobandis against the generally "pacifist" Bareilvis (Sahni 2010, 357). Ajai Sahni explains how the creation of the Auqaf department during Gen. Ayub Khan's regime took control of Bareilvi mosques and other waqf properties and gave them to the Deobandis, worsening the rift between the two Sunni sects.

Unlike the clerical networks of Deobandi, Bareilvi, and Ahl-e-Hadith sects, the JI has remained separate from sectarian politics in Pakistan. In fact, it has consciously tried to promote unity among the various sects by organizing the Milli Yekjehati Council (National Unity Council). Ironically, however, the JI's student wing Islami Jamiat-e-Tuleba (Islamic Party of Students, or IJT) has not been tolerant of other student wings having different religious ideologies such as the Bareilvi Anjuman-e-Talaba Islam (Meeting of Students of Islam) and the Deobandi-influenced Jamiat-e-Talaba Islam (Party of Students of Islam).

Qasim Zaman and S.V.R. Nasr explain that this bent toward sectarianism is a case of the Sunni ulema striving for "Islamization from below" and is explained more by intra-sect differences. Nasr (2000) makes a distinction between the ideologies of the political and apolitical ulema within the Deobandi sect, while Zaman (2002) makes a distinction between the leadership of the Sunni sub-sects and the "peripheral *ulema*" associated with these sects. Not only are there "politically quiescent *ulema*" just as there are more radically-inclined *ulema*" (134) the main dichotomy is between those ulema who would like to expand their influence outside of their core support base and those who by virtue of their intellectual prowess are already well-known and influential. Zaman notes

19. An example is the *Khilafat-i-Rashida*, an SSP publication that reported on both Shi'a activism and SSP activities to combat Shi'a influence, including stories about SSP martyrs. According to Zaman (1998) this created an "imagined community" of Sunni sectarianism in Pakistan.

20. For example, Sunni Tehrik was involved in the killing of Deobandi cleric Yusuf Ludhianvi in Karachi in May 2000.

21. For example, SSP activists assassinated Sunni Tehrik leader Saleem Qadri in May 2001 in Karachi. A suicide bombing was carried out in April 2006 on a gathering of Bareilvis at Nishtar Park in Karachi; leaders of Jamaat-Ahl-e-Sunnat (Haji Hanif Billo and Hafiz Muhammad Taqi) and Sunni Tehrik (Abbas Qadri and Akram Qadri) were killed in the attack.

that organizations like the SSP and the LeJ were founded by ulema who were at the “periphery of Deobandi intellectual thought” (134).

“Jihad” by Religious Militant Groups

Several explanations for the radicalization of the modernist-Islamist JI and the clerical networks of Sunni subjects (institutionalized through madrassas and mosques) have been cited in the literature. However, the most direct and obvious causes are the war of resistance against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and Zia’s Islamization campaign during the 1980s. The jihad waged against the Soviets in Afghanistan provided Zia’s regime with much-needed legitimacy but more importantly, militarized and politicized Islamic movements through their involvement with Afghan mujahideen (Roy 2002, 10). As the war against the Soviets ended in 1989, Kashmir emerged as a new arena for jihad. Afghan mujahideen, who had been disbanded at the end of the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, and a newly trained generation of madrasa students focused their energies on resisting Indian occupation of Kashmir. The objectives of these militant groups were not the same as bin Laden’s al Qaeda, which was the establishment of a global Islamic Caliphate. Instead, their objectives conformed to the geostrategic vision of the Pakistani government and military: “the liberation of Kashmir from India; and the formation of a friendly government in Afghanistan” (Hussain, Z. 2007, 53). These goals were reinforced by the belief propounded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed of the LeT that it was the obligation of every Muslim to “destroy the forces of evil and disbelief” (Hussain, Z. 2007, 53) and that “martyrdom is not to be mourned but was a guarantee into paradise” (57–58).

However, the ideological seeds for the radicalization of Islamist groups in Pakistan were sown in the early twentieth century. Maududi, the founder of the JI, articulated a modern Islamism that viewed jihad to be the most superior of duties above all other duties imposed by Islam. Sahní (2010) cites Maududi to explain the significance of jihad: “the four pillars of Islam (prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and almsgiving) were acts of worship . . . ordained to prepare us for a greater purpose and to train us for a greater duty. . .” (357). This duty was jihad. As true followers of Islam he claimed that “Muslims could not submit to any other *din* (religion or way of life) and were obligated to exert their utmost strength to make Islam prevail on earth” (357–58). Hence, belief in Islam conflicted with all others forms of governance and political systems that strayed away from sharia law. The JI entered the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union at a time when it was highly influential in Pakistani politics by setting up a network of madrassas that also provided refuge and support to Afghan mujahideen.²² The interaction of JI cadres with Afghan mujahideen introduced to the JI’s student movement, the IJT, a new style of violent assertion (Nasr 1992). Later, the JI also entered the Kashmir theater through its involvement with (HM).

Organizations such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (Islamic Jihad Movement, or HuJI), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (Movement of the Mujahideen, or HuM), and the Jaish-e-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad, or JeM) represent what Roy (1996) has called the neo-fundamentalist shift within Islam. Their ideology was characterized by three important features:

- First, they sought to mobilize support for their jihad outside of Pakistan.
- Second, these organizations had an anti-Western worldview. For them, jihad was understood as the physical struggle against the oppression of Muslims by infidels.

22. According to Malik (1996), the JI’s influence was mainly in urban centers of Punjab and Sindh, but out of its 107 madrassas, approximately 41 were located in the Afghan-Pakistan border area.

- Third, they adhered to a very strict interpretation of sharia. For example, this is evident in their attitude toward women derived from rigid gender-separation rules.

Most Deobandi literature traces the history of how Muslims have repeatedly been subjugated as evidenced by the “Zionist occupation of Palestine, Indian occupation of Kashmir, Russian occupation of Chechnya, and the subjugation of Muslim States in the Philippines” (Haqqani 2005a, 22). Ignoring the political causes of these particular events, ideologically Deobandi followers are of the opinion that “Muslims are at an inherent disadvantage because effective military power is not vested in the hands of the righteous” (22).²³

According to Haqqani (2005a, 24) militant Ahl-e-Hadith adherents justified the use of violence in defensive jihad on the basis of the Quranic verse, “You are obligated to fight even though it is something you do not like” (2:216). Based on an LeT document, *Why Are We Waging Jihad?* Haqqani (2005a, 24–25) cites the eight reasons that the LeT uses to justify jihad: “(1) to eliminate evil and facilitate conversion to the practice of Islam; (2) to ensure the ascendancy of Islam; (3) to force non-Muslims to pay *jizya* (tax on non-Muslims); (4) to help the weak and powerless; (5) to avenge the blood of Muslims killed by unbelievers; (6) to punish enemies for breaking promises and treaties; (7) to defend a Muslim state; and (8) to liberate Muslim territories under non-Muslim occupation.”

Zahid Hussain (2007, 58–60) explains that the LeT is active only in Kashmir, even though its objectives are broader. The LeT emphasizes attacks against Hindus, whom it regards as the “worst kind of polytheists” (58) and Jews, who “are singled out by the Quran as enemies of Islam” (58). The LeT claimed that it waged jihad “to avenge history and reestablish the lost glory of Islam . . . reestablish Muslim rule in India” (58). The leaders of the LeT are very clear that their view of jihad is distinct from bin Laden’s call to jihad, which they considered to be about overthrowing the rulers of Muslim countries, something the LeT believes is a violation of Islam.²⁴

The radicalization of Islamic groups in Pakistan has slowly grown to entail a strongly anti-American attitude. This has had less to do with a change in ideology and more with political developments during the 1990s. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that anti-communism could be replaced by anti-Americanism especially after the Gulf War (1990–1991); the bombing of Afghanistan by U.S. troops to avenge the attacks on the American embassies in East Africa; and the U.S.-led War on Terror after 9/11 (Roy 2002). The Pakistani government’s support to those military campaigns and its proscription of the more radical jihadi groups, such as the JeM, the LeT, the HuJI, and the HuM, broke the uneasy alliance between the Pakistani government and these groups. More recently, some militant groups, such as the JeM and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Student’s Movement of Pakistan, or TTP), have forged links with domestic sectarian groups within Pakistan, such as the SSP and the LeJ, and have become more concerned with targeting the Pakistani government. Using the takfiri doctrine, these groups argue that the Pakistani government’s collaboration with the Americans (viewed as infidels) makes them a justifiable target of defensive jihad.

It is over the legitimacy of the doctrine of takfir that a strategic ideological difference exists among the militant jihadi groups in Pakistan. Takfir is understood as “the process of excommuni-

23. Haqqani (2005, 22–23) has documented the ideology of various Deobandi groups as being encapsulated in three books by Masood Azhar, the leader of the JeM: *Ma’arka* (The Struggle); *Fa’azil Jihad* (The Virtue of Jihad); and *Tuhafa-e-Shahadat* (The Gift of Virtue).

24. For a more detailed account of the LeT’s ideology, see Zahab (2007) and Shafqat (2002).

cating a fellow Muslim based on observed actions or behaviors that appear to be a violation [of] the *Salaf-e-Saliheen* (pious predecessors)” (Burki 2011, 155). Ibn Taymiyyah, a medieval Islamic jurist advocated takfir in order to legitimize the execution of deviant Muslims without having to bear the burden of committing the sin of killing a fellow Muslim which is deemed forbidden (155). Taymiyyah’s thinking was further popularized by Sayd Qutb, who claimed that “Muslim rulers who failed to implement God’s laws were *takfir* (apostate) because they lived in a state of *jahiliyya* (ignorance) and must be opposed” (Valentine 2008). According to Qutb, every Muslim is obligated to wage jihad against such leaders. More recently, the takfiri doctrine has influenced the rise of militants who use it to legitimize the killing of fellow Muslims and revolting against nominally Muslim governments for alleged apostasy. On the other hand, more moderate Islamists such as the JI’s Maulana Maududi have refuted this doctrine claiming that it would be un-Islamic to declare someone as apostate and “preempting Allah’s judgement” and that it would sow the seeds of disension within the Muslim umma (Stanley 2005).

These developments have led to ideological disagreements over strategy and tactics. Strategically the disagreement is centered on the near enemy versus the far enemy debate as postulated by Fawaz A. Gerges (2005). The LeT differentiates itself from other militant jihadi groups such as the JeM, the HuM, and the TTP by being very clear that overthrowing rulers of Muslim countries is un-Islamic and therefore not jihad. Therefore, the LeT does not engage in attacks against the Pakistani government. Furthermore, sectarian organizations like the SSP and the LeJ justify the killing of Muslims belonging to other sects over ideological disagreements. Tactically, the disagreement is over the target of violence and the techniques used to attack it. Organizations such as the JeM, the HuM, and the TTP use the doctrine of takfir to excommunicate Muslims, and so their attacks often do target other Muslims, especially the Shi’a and those affiliated with the Pakistani government.

Sunni Islam in Afghanistan

According to Antonio Giustozzi (2010, 181) the key to understanding radical Sunni Islam in Afghanistan is understanding the historical difference between the roles of the intelligentsia and the clergy. The intelligentsia was associated with the modernist Islamist movement in Afghanistan and the clergy or ulema adhered to either the Sufi tradition (predominantly the Naqshbandiya and Qadriya orders) or to fundamentalism, a desire to return to the original texts of Islam and sharia, as influenced by Deobandi thinking. Roy (1986) has also noted that Islamists and Wahabis were in opposition to Deobandi influence on the development of Islam in Afghanistan. Unlike the situation in Pakistan, Sunni Islam in Afghanistan has not been subject to sectarian divisions among Deobandi, Bareilvi, and Ahl-e-Hadith, but more to the ethnic and tribal differences prevalent in Afghan society (Roy 1986; Rubin, Barnett 2002; Dorronsoro 2005). This section reviews Afghanistan’s Islamist movements, ulema networks, Taliban movement, and al Qaeda-led global jihadi networks.

Political Islam in Afghanistan

Roy (1986) provides an excellent background to the development of Islamist movements in Afghanistan. He explains that radical Islam was spearheaded by modernist Islamist movements that focused on recruiting university students and was led by professors who had trained at Al Azhar University in Cairo, where they had come under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. These groups split along a clear ethnic and ideological divide into Jamiyat-i-Islami led by Burhannudin

Rabbani and Hizb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HiG) in 1975.²⁵ The Hizb later split into two factions, one was led by Yunes Khalis and the other faction by Hekmatyar.

Ideologically these two Islamist parties differed from each other on the issue of takfir. Roy (1986) explains that “for most Islamist parties, a good Muslim is defined by his political actions and it was possible to declare a Muslim a heretic for purely political reasons” (78). Rabbani, who was a more moderate Islamist, rejected this interpretation and was more successful in accommodating the tribal institutions in Afghanistan as well as the liberal intellectuals within the same united front. On the other hand, Hekmatyar’s HiG denounced those who opposed the Islamist ideology and advocated an Islamist revolution against the Communist supporters of the regime in Afghanistan. These Islamist movements gained a foothold in northern and central Afghanistan among the Sunni groups. The Jamiyat’s constituency lay among Sunni Persian-speakers (Tajiks) of the Sunni sect although it also attracted a small constituency of Uzbeks and Pashtuns as well. The Jamiyat lacked a strong political apparatus and was a coalition of local military, while the Hizb developed as a centralized, political party that filled its ranks during the Soviet resistance with Arab and Pashtun volunteers such as Jalaluddin Haqqani.

The war against the Soviets was followed by a bloody civil war between Pashtun and non-Pashtun forces over the control of Kabul. Ethnic polarization that had always existed in Afghanistan became even more intensified. In 1992, Kabul came under the control of non-Pashtun forces (Uzbeks with Rashid Dostum, Tajiks with Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Shi’a Hazaras with Sheikh Mazari) (see table 3.2). The HiG, which had been patronized by the Pakistani government in Kabul, was unable to retain its influence in the capital. Hekmatyar went into self-exile in Iran until 2002, only to reemerge as the leader of the HiG operating in Afghanistan today. The Jamiyat abandoned its Islamist ideological pretensions after the Soviet war and presented itself as an Afghan nationalist party. It formed an essential part of the Northern Alliance, which opposed the Taliban (Zahab and Roy 2004). Today, many of Jamiyat’s members constitute the new generation of Afghanistan’s politicians (Guistozzi 2010).²⁶

Ulema Networks

Prior to the Soviet occupation, Afghan madrassa students were mobilized against the rising tide of Communist supporters in Afghanistan that were perceived as infidel. Religious networks of madrassas mobilized their students and teachers to join mainstream Islamic parties such as the Harakat Inqilaab-e-Islami (Movement for an Islamic Revolution) under the leadership of Nabi Muhammad. This was a decentralized network of clerics lacking an organizational structure. Ideologically, it agreed with the Islamists on the primacy of the sharia but disagreed on the creation of an Islamist republic (Guistozzi, 2010, 183; Roy 1986, 113–15). There were two types of networks that supported the Harakat: Pushtu-speaking ulema who carried out their studies in Deobandi madrassas in northwest Pakistan and the ulema who trained in madrassas located in Ghazni and Kandahar in Afghanistan.

Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the leading party was the Harakat, in terms of its prevalence throughout the country via its support base among local ulema. The second most

25. For a more detailed account of how Islamism developed in Afghanistan, see chapters 3 and 4 in Roy (1986).

26. See Guistozzi (2010) for more details of how Islamist groups have evolved since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

popular party was the Jamiyat, with its strongholds among the Tajik populations in the east and Herat in the west. The Hizb had taken root in the Pashtun-speaking areas of the northeast and south. There were also smaller conservative parties such as the Mahaz-i-Islami (Islamic Front) led by Gaylani of the Qadriya Sufi tradition and Jabha-yi-Nejat-i-Milli (National Liberation Front) led by Mujaddidi of the Naqshbandiya Sufi tradition. Support for these parties was not widespread but was stable among the tribes and clans that had personal links with the party leaders (see table 3.2).²⁷

Table 3.2. Ethno-Political Landscape of Afghanistan before the 1980s

Ethnic Group	Party Affiliation	Ideology	Social base
Pashtun	Harakat or Hizb-e-Islami	Fundamentalist Islamist	Ulema educated class
Tajik	Jamiyat (Rabbani)	Islamist	Moderate, educated class
Hazara	Shi'ite Hizb-e-Wahdat	Islamist	Educated class
Uzbek	Jamiyat	Islamist	educated class
Turkmen	Gaylani's Mahaz-i-Islami	Conservative	Tribes

Source: Author.

According to Roy (2002, 14) the Soviet invasion had three consequences:

- First, students and ulema at madrassas located in the rural Ghazni and Kandahar were militarized to resist Soviet forces. Either these students and ulema joined the Harakat to fight alongside the mujahideen or moved across the Pakistani border to seek refuge at religious seminaries run by Deobandi ulema, for example, Jamia Haqqania at Akora Khattak that is run by Sami-ul-Haq of the JUI. The growing influence of Deobandism led to a decline in the influence of the Sufi orders and traditionalist mullahs in Afghanistan.
- Second, the Pakistani ISI in collaboration with the CIA, maintained direct links with both the clerical and Islamist networks in Afghanistan to provide funds, weapons, and support to resist the Soviet forces. This encouraged the forging of links between the clergy and Islamist groups.
- Third, the anti-Soviet jihad also brought with it an influx of Arab volunteers. The Saudis wanted to kill two birds with one stone, in that they wanted to resist the spread of communism and also to subvert growing Iranian influence over the Shi'a populations in Herat and Hazarajat. This interaction with the Saudis introduced Wahabism, which is a stricter fundamentalist attitude that criticized Sufi practices, Shi'a beliefs, and Western influence, to the Islamic milieu in Afghanistan. This further influenced the development of an already strict, fundamentalist, Deobandi thought.²⁸

Currently, although traditionalist tendencies with a strong presence of the Sufi Naqshbandiya and Qadriya traditions exist in Afghanistan, the Deobandi stream is the most influential and is characterized by hostility toward the presence of foreign troops. It is impossible to ascertain the

27. For details on the evolution of these Islamist parties and ulema networks that were jihadist in their orientation, see Dorronsoro (2005, 137–72), Magnus and Naby (1998, 70–97), and Barnett Rubin (2002)

28. See footnote 15.

degree of support enjoyed by different groups in Afghanistan. But according to Guistoizzi (2010, 190), the “Deobandi stream is probably the single largest component of the clergy.” However, Guistoizzi has not provided any evidence of a larger number of Deobandi mosques and madrassas than any of the other streams in Afghanistan. Similarly among the moderate Islamist groups there are indications that Hizb-e-Islami is the most popular but that is because the Jamiyat lost much of its credibility due to its association with the government from 1992 to 1996 and from 2001 to 2005.

The Taliban Movement

The Taliban movement, which emerged during Afghanistan’s civil war in the 1990s followed in the footsteps of the ulema networks in Afghanistan. Most of its members were Afghan and belonged to the Harakat-Inqilab-e-Islami and to the Deobandi madrassa network in Pakistan. Roy (2002, 18) has argued that “the Taliban embodied two sets of logic: first, a neo-fundamentalism committed to implementing the *sharia*; and second, a Pashtun nationalism that was unified under a charismatic leadership.” This view has been echoed by other scholars as well (Giustoizzi 2008). The Taliban overcame tribal segmentation but not the ethnic divide. They secured the support of all Pashtun commanders with the exception of the Gaylani family, regardless of tribal affiliation. But no non-Pashtuns initially joined the Taliban. The Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Tajiks supported Ahmed Shah Masoud’s Northern Alliance or warlords such as Rashid Dostum or Ismail Khan (Roy 1998).

The ideology of the Taliban has been described in a number of ways in the literature. The most definitive account of the Taliban is by Rashid (2000, 4), who claims that the “Taliban interpretation of *sharia* was influenced by extremist Deobandi Islamic teachings in Pakistan, a perversion of *Pashtunwali* [the traditional Pashtun code of conduct], and its harsh enforcement all over Afghanistan.” Roy (1996, 1998) has described this as a neo-fundamentalist shift in Islam, with three important features: first, a narrow interpretation of *sharia*; second, a reduction of politics to the application of *sharia* and a strict interpretation of the Sunna; and third, a vehement opposition to Western culture. Giustoizzi (2008, 13–14; 2008a) draws a distinction between the Taliban prior to their defeat in 2002 and the “neo-Taliban” of today. First, the neo-Taliban—through their increased interaction with foreign jihadist allies such as al Qaeda and Pakistani groups such as the HuJI, the HuM, and the JeM—have adopted a more flexible attitude toward the use of electronic media.²⁹ Second, the neo-Taliban appear to be well integrated into the global jihadist movement that is committed to resisting Western influence in Afghanistan. Third, they have adopted free market principles to fight their war, even though doing so could have been considered in violation of *sharia*, demonstrating their expediency and pragmatism.³⁰

Al Qaeda and Global Jihadist Networks

In the past decade and a half, al Qaeda has emerged as the vanguard of global jihad. Its entry into Afghanistan dates back to the Soviet invasion, when the Saudi government, the ISI, and the CIA

29. For example, the Taliban had banned the use of televisions, photography, and movies but the neo-Taliban have adopted the use of documentaries, interviews, and footage of speeches for propaganda purposes (Giustoizzi 2008, 13).

30. The neo-Taliban, for example, have paid some fighters to carry out “*ad hoc* missions such as firing a rocket or a targeted assassination.” This appears to be an original contribution of the Taliban to ideological insurgency (Giustoizzi 2008, 14).

conspired to recruit volunteers to Afghanistan to aid the Soviet resistance (Zahab and Roy 2004). Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian who moved to Afghanistan in 1980, was one such volunteer and is widely acknowledged as the ideologue behind al Qaeda and bin Laden's mentor. In articles such as "The Solid Base," Azzam laid the groundwork for a group such as al Qaeda by arguing that America's social, cultural, and political hegemony could only be resisted by a "solid base of true believers" (Paz 2010, xxxviii). These believers would be motivated by the doctrines of takfir and Wahabism. In Azzam's view jihad a "religious obligation in the defense of Islam and Muslims against a defined enemy and not a speculative one" (Gunaratna 2005, 61). Azzam, would therefore not have endorsed the use of terrorist tactics by al Qaeda.

After Azzam's death, bin Laden emerged as the leader of the group. His fatwa of February 23, 1998, conveyed Azzam's ideology and objectives: to wage jihad against America in response to the financial, military, and cultural threat that it posed to Muslim identity. Bin Laden made a call to act at the global level, which was markedly different from the practices of other radical groups. The ideological vacuum left by Azzam's death was filled by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Under Zawahiri, al Qaeda's ideology was further characterized by the need to militarily resist those perceived to be threatening Islam (Gunaratna 2005, 63).

Brian Fishman and Assaf Moghadam (2010, 6) explain that global jihadists use ideology for four purposes: "First, global jihadists argue that Islam is in a state of decline relative to its past. Second, they identify the alleged source of Muslim decline in the persistent attacks by an anti-Islamic alliance of 'crusaders, zionists, and apostates.' Third, they attempt to create a new identity for their adherents by offering them membership in a globalized community of like-minded believers. Fourth, they present a program of action that they call *jihad*."³¹

Al Qaeda distinguishes between adherents to their ideology and those who reject their beliefs: Using the doctrine of takfir, al Qaeda members justify the excommunication and killing of those Muslims who reject their doctrinal ideas. However, it is important to note that al Qaeda is not made up of an ideologically homogeneous membership. In fact, Fishman and Moghadam (2010) have written extensively about the ideological cleavages that divide al Qaeda over strategy and tactics. One cleavage surrounds the question of who Islam's real enemy is—apostate regimes, Shi'a Muslims, or the far enemy? Another surrounds the question of who the far enemy is: Americans or Zionists? A third is over the use of violence: Is indiscriminate violence legitimate? Should Muslims be killed during jihad?³²

Al Qaeda's alliance with the Taliban was due initially to connections that had been formed during Afghan jihad against the Soviet forces. But they also shared many common ideals, such as enforcement of sharia as the only way to establish an Islamic society, and a perception that Islam was endangered by Western influences. However, this is where the commonalities end. Al Qaeda rejects differences of nationality, ethnicity, or sect among Muslims in favor of reconstituting the umma (Roy 2002). This supra-sectarian approach is very different from the Taliban's approach, as well as from the Islamic militant groups in Pakistan whose interests are locally defined. Al Qaeda's wider global agenda is to mobilize the entire Muslim community instead of attempting to establish Islamic society based on sharia law in any one state. Ironically, the strong influence of Wahabism on al Qaeda's ideology lends a strong anti-Shi'a color to the organization.

31. For more on the global jihadist ideology, see Moghadam (2008) and Paz (2010).

32. See Helfstein, Abdullah, and al-Obaidi (2009) for a discussion of Muslim victims of al Qaeda attacks.

Shi'a Islam in Afghanistan and Pakistan

The Twelvers sect dominates the Shi'a populations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are smaller sects in Pakistan, including the Ismailis, who are followers of the Aga Khan, Daudi Bohras, followers of Syedna Burhannudin, and the Sulemani Bohras, followers of Masood Salebhai (ICG 2005, 3). In Afghanistan, the Shi'a population consists of predominantly ethnic Hazaras residing in the central part of the country, with a small group of Qizilbash Shi'a residing in Kabul and a third group of Persian speakers settled in the provinces of Nimruz and Herat (Roy 1986, 50–51).

The Shi'a of Pakistan have formed political parties and militant groups mainly in response to threats from Sunni sectarian groups, while in Afghanistan Shi'a militancy has been motivated as well by the need to defend their ethnic community. In both countries, Shi'a politicization was strongly influenced by Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979, which has led to tensions not only with Sunnis but also to disagreements among different groups of Shi'a ulema. In Afghanistan, for example, this led to a civil war among the Shi'a from 1982 to 1984. Although Iran covertly supports the Shi'a in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, it has been careful to avoid a direct confrontation with the ruling Sunni governments in both countries.

Shi'a Islam in Pakistan

The main proponent of Shi'a political Islam has been the Tehrik-e-Nifaaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jaffriya (Movement for the Implementation of Jaffriya Law, or TNFJ). This was an Islamist political party that believed that the Quran and Sunna should form the basis of Pakistan's constitution. In this, the Shi'as were in agreement with the Sunnis. It was in the interpretation of these religious sources of tradition that they differed drastically. The Shi'a wanted to protect their right to mourn the battle of Karbala during Muharram, argued that they should not have to pay a compulsory *zakat* (canonical tithing) during the month of Ramadan like the Sunnis, and demanded effective representation in the Council for Islamic Ideology to insure that their religious freedoms were protected (Zaman 1998). The TNFJ's principal demand was that the Shi'a should not be subject to Sunni Hanafi law. As its name implied, it also wanted to implement Shi'a law, but many Sunnis believed that the TNFJ leadership wanted to extend the Iranian revolution to Pakistan by imposing Shi'a law in a majority Sunni state.³³ Such accusations degenerated into violence, perpetrated by both sects against each other, and later forced a change of the TNFJ's name to Tehrik-e-Jaffriya Pakistan (Movement of the Jaffriya, or TJP). (After the TJP was banned in 2001, it changed its name again to Islami Tehrik of Pakistan, or ITP.)

The TJP's manifesto suggested the creation of a "popular Islamic army based on compulsory military training for all able-bodied males...to encourage the spirit of holy war" (Zaman 1998, 696). This not only indicates the militant Shi'a view on jihad but also encouraged the development of the even more militant group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (Soldiers of Muhammad, or SMP).³⁴ Founders of the SMP had participated in the Afghan war against the Soviets and had fought in the Hazarajat alongside other Afghan Shi'a. Inspired by their experience of this form of jihad, the SMP adopted militant tactics against the SSP. They also adopted the strategy of disseminating literature that was vehement in its description of Sunni Islam. (The SMP was banned in 2001 and is currently defunct.)

33. See Hyder (1993) for details of the TNFJ's involvement in Pakistani politics.

34. See Moghadam (2004) on the Shi'a understanding of jihad.

Because Shi'a militancy arose in opposition to Sunni Islamization, Shi'a militants have not been involved in an "anti-Western" (Roy 2002, 8) insurgency. In short, the Shi'a are waging a "defensive struggle to protect a minority, without any revolutionary dimension, although it has led to some very bloody fighting between Shi'a and Sunni radicals" (8).

Shi'a Islam in Afghanistan

In the 1980s there were two Shi'a Islamist parties: the Harakat-e-Islami (urban Shi'a) and the Nasr Party (ethnic Hazara Shi'a) (Roy 2002). The difference was mainly ethnic. In the wake of the Iranian revolution several militant groups emerged in Hazarajat and around the city of Herat, and in 1989, after the Soviet withdrawal, Iran united these groups to create the Hizb-e-Wahdat (Party of Unity) led by Shaikh Mazari.

Most militant Shi'a activity in Afghanistan was not against Sunni Islam, even though it differed from Sunni groups in organization, ideology, and political allegiance, but more to protect the Hazara identity of most Shi'a. The Hazarajat region, where most Afghan Shi'as reside, played a central and strategic role in the resistance against the Soviet Union because of its location in the mountains (Roy 1986, 139–48). In the 1990s, Hazara Shi'as had to defend themselves against the onslaught by the Taliban in their quest to establish control over Afghan territory. In 1997, the Taliban, aided by fighters of the Pakistani SSP and the LeJ, massacred Shi'a villagers and engaged in ethnic cleansing and religious persecution. Hizb-e-Wahdat, with support from Uzbek commander Rashid Dostum, responded by killing hundreds of Taliban soldiers (Rashid 2000, 62–64). When the Taliban successfully captured the Hazara territory in 1998, they gave the Shi'a three choices: convert to Sunni Islam, leave for Iran, or die (74). In short, the main issues surrounding Shi'a activity in Afghanistan have been sectarian hatred and local animosities, with no ideological dimension.

4

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND NETWORKS

Chapter 3 reviewed the ideologies that differentiate radical and militant Islamic groups in the region in order to examine the role that values and beliefs play in the development of their objectives, strategies, and tactics. This chapter considers how militant groups function as organizations—that is, how they seek to integrate the individual, the group, and the society (Crenshaw 1985, 2000). It is widely accepted in the literature on militancy that the efficacy of a group depends on its capacity to recruit and train members, establish communication and logistic networks, maintain base camps, access weapons depots and media outlets, and plant sleeper cells in the heart of the enemy's territory (Palmer and Palmer 2008). It is critical to understand the degree to which such groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan have the organizational capacity to carry out these activities.

While every group is organized differently, a review of the literature suggests that the organizational structure of a typical radical Islamist group is more or less as follows: The group is usually headed by an amir (leader), who presides over a shura (consultative council) consisting of sub-amirs who in turn head various departments that are required to achieve the organization's objectives. These departments may include military operations, theology, political information, finance, liaison, and external relations. The central organization is further linked to support units that are either owned or controlled by the group. These support units may include charities, mosques, schools, businesses, banks, front organizations, and training facilities (Palmer and Palmer 2008, 171–73). For each militant group examined, this chapter provides as much information as possible on the group's organizational structures, founding, leadership and mode of decisionmaking, recruitment and training methods, sources of funding, and the networks with which it is affiliated.

Overview of Militant Groups in Pakistan

To make sense of the complex networks of militant groups in Pakistan, scholars and political analysts have come up with a number of typologies. Ashley Tellis (2008, 6), for example, presents five categories of nonreligious and religious militant groups: sectarian, anti-Indian, Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda and affiliates, and Pakistani Taliban. Tellis's typology is based on both the objectives and the local bases of these insurgent groups. Yet it is not a complete typology because it does not include nonreligious militant groups with secessionist or anti-state goals.

Fair (2004a, 491) suggests a typology in response to the flawed understanding of militancy as a homogeneous phenomenon and to the tendency to focus on a single group responsible for a particular attack. She argues that such popular accounts fail to note the differences across militant groups in terms of structure, leadership, and objectives. She proposed a typology based on the political and religious objectives of the militant groups and their sectarian affiliation: groups focused on Kashmir, such as the LeT, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, and Al Badr; sectarian groups such as the SSP, the SMP, and the LeJ; and anti-state groups such as Baloch nationalists. The main problem

with this typology was that it did not account for groups such as the HuJI and the JeM that are involved in insurgent activities in Kashmir and also elsewhere. This typology preceded the development of a resurgent Taliban force in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and hence also did not account for the TTP. Regarding the militant groups focused on Kashmir, this typology did not consider that these groups adhere to different sectarian orientations and that their operations in Kashmir are shaped by different interests.

In response to new developments in the Global War on Terrorism, Fair and Shapiro (2010, 85) suggested that militant groups in Pakistan ought to be categorized based on their network affiliations. However, they limit themselves to only those groups that are of significance to the U.S. government and to its strategic interests. The typology proposed includes al Qaeda and its affiliated networks, the Taliban, and *askari tanzeems* (militant organizations) such as the LeT, the JeM, the HuJI, and the HuM. This typology ignores the sectarian groups in Pakistan that do not have international networks and operate locally.

More recently, Hassan Abbas (2009) has suggested a distinction among militant networks in Pakistan that is based on the local origins of the Punjabi Taliban and Pashtun Taliban networks. The Pashtun network includes those groups affiliated with the TTP. The Punjabi Taliban is a loose conglomeration of members belonging to banned militant groups of Punjabi origins—such as the JeM, the LeJ, and the SSP—that are sectarian and focused on jihad in Kashmir, but that also have developed strong connections with the TTP, Afghan Taliban, and other militant groups in the FATA. Abbas (3) lists five ways in which the Punjabi Taliban can be distinguished from the Pashtun TTP:

- First, the Punjabi Taliban lack organization and instead operate as a network of members from different groups.
- Second, many Punjabi militants benefited from patronage by the Pakistani government in the 1990s.
- Third, the Punjabis are Sunnis belonging to the Deobandi or Ahl-e-Hadith sects.
- Fourth, Punjabi militants differ in language and dress from the Pashtun Taliban and are “more educated, better equipped, and technologically savvy” (3).
- Fifth, the Punjabi Taliban are more prone to mercenary action than the Pashtun Taliban.

While this distinction between the Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban is a helpful one for defining the origins of these groups, it is of little use analytically. By referring to both types of militant groups as a type of Taliban, Abbas acknowledges that there are strategic, tactical, and ideological similarities among the militant groups that has made collaboration in their activities possible, but simultaneously undermines those similarities by emphasizing the differences.

These typologies are certainly useful in simplifying our understanding of the complex and intricate web of affiliations among religious militant groups in Pakistan, but there are a few drawbacks with such neat categorizations.

- First, these typologies, with the exception of Fair (2004a), ignore the secular or nonreligious militant groups that also contribute toward the insurgency experienced in Pakistan.
- Second, they aspire to neat categorizations that gloss over the possible connections between each of the types proposed. The distinction between anti-Indian groups and Afghan militant

groups, for example, is not clear. In fact, there are several groups active in both theaters. Moreover, it is possible for these groups to have affiliations with other militant groups that transcend not just these categorizations, but that also extend beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan.

- Third, it is possible that a militant group can fit into more than one of the categories proposed. For example, in Tellis's typology, a group such as the JeM may be described as both an anti-Indian group and an affiliate of al Qaeda. For that matter, the JeM also has links with the Afghan Taliban. A similar criticism can be made of Fair's categorizations.

This chapter instead uses a framework (see figure 4.1) based on the religious-ideological distinctions discussed in chapter 3—Deobandi Sunnis, Barelvi Sunnis, Ahl-e-Hadith Sunnis, Shi'as, and modernist Islamists—but a special effort also has been made to provide information on the linkages (whether of a strategic or ideological nature) between and among these organizations.¹ This review is limited to militant organizations (sectarian and jihadi groups) and excludes the political parties, apolitical (or “quietist”) movements, trusts and charities, and student movements that are not affiliated with militant groups.

Figure 4.1. Islamist Organizations of Militant and Nonmilitant Nature in Pakistan

	SUNNI ISLAM				SHI'A ISLAM
	Deobandi	Ahl-e-Hadith	Barelvi	Modern Islamist	
Political parties	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman); Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (Sami-ul-Haq); Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (Ajmal Qadri)	Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith	Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani); Pakistan Awami Tehrik	Jamaat-e-Islami	Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan
Quietist movements	Tableeghi Jamaat	Markaz Da'wat-ul-Irshad	Da'waat-e-Islami		---
Sectarian groups	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	---	Sunni Tehrik	---	Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan
Jihadi groups	Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami; Harkat-ul-Ansar; Harkat-ul-Mujahideen; Jaish-e-Muhammad; Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan; Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariati Muhammad; Lashkar-e-Islam; Ghazi Force	Lashkar-e-Taiba; Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen	Ansar-ul-Islam (Khyber Agency)	Hizb-ul-Mujahideen; Al-Badr	Hizb-ul-Momineen
Trusts and charity organizations	Al-Rashid Trust; Al-Akhtar Trust	Khair-un-Naas; Jamaat-ud-Da'waa; Rabita Trust	Barkati Trust	Al-Khidmat Foundation	---
Student Organizations	Jamiat Tuleba-e-Islam	Ahl-e-Hadith Youth Force; Ahl-e-Hadith Students Federation	Anjuman Tuleba-e-Islam	Islami Jamiat-e-Tuleba; Islami Jamiat Tulebaat	Imamia Student Organization

Source: Author.

Modern Islamist Militants in Pakistan

Jamaat-e-Islami (Party of Islam, or JI)

The JI is not a party of the ulema but an organization represented by a diverse membership, including students, unions, and professional organizations. The JI is Pakistan's largest Islamic

1. Only one other study has adopted a similar approach. See Howenstein (2008).

political party² but its performance in politics has not been consistent. It experienced a peak in its political power under Zia's regime but following his death, the JI's involvement in politics was impacted adversely. It lost its stronghold in Karachi during the 1990s winning only a few seats in the National Assembly. It is only as part of the MMA that the JI together with the JUI, formed the provincial government in the KPK and Balochistan from 2002 to 2007.³

The JI has also been associated with militancy. Nicholas Howenstein (2008) has documented that JI volunteers entered the violent insurgency in the 1971 Bangladesh war of independence. Later, the JI was known to lend overt support to the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s through its network of madrassas, charities, and businesses and so it came to influence the Islamist forces of Hekmatyar and Rabbani in Afghanistan. Although the JI has defined itself as a "political-ideological movement" (14) and does not want to be overtly linked to militancy, it has found a way around this by playing a role in the establishment of groups such as the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), a jihadi outfit active exclusively in Kashmir

Networks and Affiliations: JI's student wing Islami Jamiat Tuleba (Islamic Society of Students, or IJT) has also been known to engage in militant activities on university campuses in Pakistan. The IJT was conceived as a missionary movement that would spread the JI's Islamist ideology among students. As one of its objectives, the IJT decided to purge university campuses in Pakistan of any overtly secular or left-leaning elements. This led to violent confrontations between the IJT and other student organizations. But most significantly, the IJT's activities emphasized ideological divisions among the supporters of Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith movements who formed their own student organizations. The IJT's most violent clashes occurred at Karachi University against the All Pakistani Mohajir Student Organization during the 1980s. These clashes claimed the lives of some 80 student leaders between 1982 and 1988, after which General Zia banned all student union activities in Pakistan. For our purposes it is important to acknowledge the IJT's role in providing a source of recruits for JI-affiliated jihadi organizations in Kashmir (Nasr 1994, 63–78, 1992).

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (Party of Freedom Fighters, or HM)

Origins: The HM is generally viewed as the militant wing of the JI that exclusively operates in Kashmir since its inception in 1989. It is also considered to be the largest Kashmiri militant group that advocates the liberation of Kashmir or that it should accede to Pakistan. However, the group's origins are mired in controversy. It is believed that the HM was formed by the ISI with the support of the JI to limit the growing influence of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Three people were instrumental in this process: JI leader in Jammu and Kashmir Maulana Saaduddin, the amir of JI Maulana Tufail, and General Zia-ul-Haq. According to Amir Mir (2008, 175–79), several smaller militant groups that sought financial and logistic support from the ISI-backed JI were merged in September 1989 to form the HM under the leadership of Ahsan Dar.


The HM, like any other jihadi group, has not been immune to differences in opinion over strategies and tactics within its leadership. This has given rise to a number of splinter groups (see figure 4.2).⁴ In the late 1990s the HM was superseded by the performance of groups such as the

2. See Nasr (1994) for the most complete and definitive account of the JI's organization, ideology, and role in Pakistan's politics. Also see White (2008, 23–45).

3. See Mufti and Waseem (2009) and White (2008) for a discussion of the JI's role in the MMA.

4. For details of how and why these splits occurred, see Rana (2007, 450–57); Howenstein (2008, 16–17); Mir (2008, 175–86); and Sreedhar and Manish (2003, 129–30).

Figure 4.2. The Formation of the HM and Its Splinter Groups



Source: Author; for data sources, see this chapter's footnote 4.

LeT and the JeM. However, it has begun to receive more attention since January 2002, when these groups were banned by the Pakistani government. The HM was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States in May 2003.

Objectives: The HM's main objective is to liberate Kashmir and to unite it with Pakistan although some of its cadres are known to support independence for Kashmir. Amir Rana (2007, 439–40) cites an HM brochure which states that the group “aims to create awareness amongst Muslims about *jihad*; nurture the spirit of *jihad* by training young men to participate in Kashmiri *jihad* and to provide funds for those involved in *jihad*.”

Strategies and Tactics: The HM's militant operations primarily target those of Indian origin or those having pro-Indian links. Its tactics include torture and assassinations (Sreedhar and Manish 2003). Howenstein (2008, 15) has also reported that the HM also has the capacity to carry out “raids, ambushes and jailbreaks.”⁵

Recruitment and Training: The recruitment process, as described by Rana (2007), deems any individual wanting to liberate Jammu and Kashmir from Indian oppression as eligible to join the HM provided he understands the beliefs and goals of the organization; conforms to the obligations of sharia; and takes an oath to this end (440). The HM has benefited from the JI's efficient organizational structure in Jammu and Kashmir to attract supporters, but its main sources of recruitment are the IJT and madaris run by the JI. Mir (2008, 175) claims that HM cadres receive training at HiG training camps in Afghanistan. This seems plausible because of the JI's links with the HiG.

5. For a complete list of the incidents that the HM has been involved in, see Sreedhar and Manish (2003, 119–24); Rana (2007, 443–45); and the SATP site, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/hizb_ul_mujahideen_tl.htm.

Funding: The HM relies heavily on the JI for its funding. The JI collects donations from boxes placed all over Pakistan and Kashmir. According to Rana (2007), it has also set up five different foundations to fund the HM's jihad and the families of martyrs who are killed in action. These foundations include the Kashmir Fund Kashmir Kafalat Fund; Al-Khidmat Foundation; Shuhada-e-Islam Foundation (Martyrs of Islam), and Islamic Mission Britain (449).

Organization: There is no consensus on the number of HM cadres. According to Rana (2007), the HM itself claims that it has 2,500 active mujahideen and a total of 13,000 members. On the other hand, Mir (2008) claims that the HM has 20,000 members. The HM operates from its headquarters in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Rana (2007) describes the HM's organization as being similar to an army. It is a highly organized and hierarchical structure, whose top tier is composed of a central council led by a commander in chief responsible for functions such as intelligence-gathering, planning logistics, finance, education, training and media. Below this tier there are either three or four battalions at the district level. Each battalion has three platoon companies led by a platoon commander. In turn, each platoon comprises three sections of 11 mujahideen each (441). In addition to this, the HM has a women's wing called Banaat-ul-Islam and has its own news agency called Kashmir Press International (Mir 2008, 177).

Networks and affiliations: The HM does not identify with the Taliban, al Qaeda, or any of the insurgent groups that operate in Afghan jihad. However, there are some reports that claim that Hekmetyar's HiG has allowed HM cadres to receive training at its camps in eastern Afghanistan (Mir 2008, 175). The HM operates exclusively in Kashmir. It is known to have some networks with other jihadi groups in Kashmir through the Shura-e-Jihad and Muttahida Jihad Council (Sreedhar and Manish (2003, 127).

Deobandi Militants in Pakistan

According to Rana (2007, 155) there are 46 Deobandi organizations, but these are divided by functional differences. The political expression of Deobandi thinking is found in the JUI, which is further split into three factions led by Fazlur Rehman, Ajmal Qadri, and Sami-ul-Haq. These factions were created less due to ideological or strategic differences but more on personality differences among the faction leaders. Apart from the JUI, the SSP also participates in mainstream politics. Deobandi sectarian groups are active against the Shi'a, Barelvi, and Ahmadis. In this review we have focused on Deobandi activity against the Shi'a by examining the SSP and the LeJ. We have also examined the jihadi groups—namely the JeM, the HuJI, and the TTP.

Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (Islamic Jihad Movement, or HuJI)

Origins: The HuJI has been referred to as the “progenitor of Deobandi *jihadi* groups in Pakistan” (Howenstein 2008, 23). Rana (2007, 263) claims that it is the first jihadi organization in Pakistan. Rana's view is contested by Zahab and Roy (2004, 27) who claim that the “precursor to Pakistani *jihad* was Massoud Alvi's *Jabha-Khalidia*” that was founded in 1973 in Multan.⁶ In 1980, three students named Irshad Ahmed, Abdus Samad Sial and Muhammad Akhtar hailing from Karachi's Jamia Uloom al-Islamia left to participate in the Afghan jihad against Soviet occupation.

6. Massoud Alvi was a mentor to Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the founder of the HuM. Alvi's movement later became the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen during Afghan Jihad. This is not to be confused with the HM offshoot of the same name in Kashmir.

They called their group Jamiat-ul-Ansar ul-Afghaneen (Party of the Friends of the Afghan People). They allied themselves with Maulvi Nasrullah Mansur's Harakat Inqilaab-e-Islami and Yunes Khalis's faction of the Hizb-e-Islami. As a result they became the principal jihadi group to impart military training to Pakistani madrassa students wanting to participate in the Afghan jihad. These trainees were later organized as the HuJI. Mir (2008, 101) provides a competing account of the HuJI's origins. According to him, the HuJI was established by the JUI and Tableeghi Jamaat in the initial stages of the Afghan jihad to run relief camps for the Afghan mujahideen. It is only as the war continued that the CIA, through the ISI, contacted the HuJI leadership to train its members to become militants against Soviet forces.

In the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the HuJI turned its attentions toward Kashmir but due to internal disagreements among the leadership, the group split in 1991 resulting in the formation of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (Movement of the Mujahideen, HuM) under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil.⁷ It is reported that this rift did not suit the Saudi patrons of the HuJI and so efforts were made in 1993 to unite the two groups in the form of Harkat-ul-Ansar (Movement of Friends, or HuA) under the leadership of Maulana Saadatullah Khan (Jamal 2009b, 9).⁸ Alternatively, the Terrorist Organization Profiles database (TOPs), managed by Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), suggests that this merger was facilitated by the ISI.⁹ This may be entirely plausible because it was at this stage that the ISI began to encourage collaboration between the HuA and the HM in Kashmir. However, this alliance lasted only four years. In 1997, the HuA was designated a terrorist organization by the United States, which was a contributing factor for the group to once again split into the HuJI and the HuM (see figure 4.3). Since 9/11, the HuJI, under the leadership of Qari Saifullah Akhtar, has supported al Qaeda and the Taliban against the U.S.-led coalition forces.¹⁰


7. The reasons behind the split between the HuJI and the HuM are unclear. Despite the split the HuM retained the same goals as those of the HuJI, which involved assisting the Afghan jihad. In 1993, the merger between the HuJI and the HuM led to the formation of the HuA. However, when the HuA was designated a terrorist organization, the HuM decided to separate again. In 1998, the HuM was one of the co-signatories to bin Laden's fatwa. Musharraf banned the operation of the HuM in late 2001; hence the organization temporarily renamed itself Jamiat-ul-Ansar (Party of Friends), which was banned in 2003. Mir (2008, 106) claims that the HuM now operates under the cover name of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Alami (International Movement of Mujahideen). The HuM has a similar recruiting process as the HuJI although Howenstein (2008) reports that it also recruits from public schools and local mosques. The HuM is loosely organized along the same lines as the HuJI. Its broadcasting department is most active as it publishes the monthly called *Sada-e-Mujahid* and a bimonthly called *Al Hilal*. In 2000, the HuM suffered a major setback when a bulk of its members defected to form the JeM. It was during this year that Fazlur Rehman Khalil stepped down as the leader of the organization and was succeeded by Farooq Kashmiri.

8. Harkat-ul-Ansar (Movement of Friends, or HuA). The merger between the HuJI and the HuM in 1993 led to the formation of the HuA under the leadership of Maulana Saadatullah Khan. The HuA was most active in the jihad in Kashmir. It has been known to use the cover name of Al Faran for its terrorist activities.

9. START manages the TOPs Database, which was originally created by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/.

10. The HuJI has carried out high-profile terrorist attacks but has claimed responsibility through previously unknown front groups. For example, the attack on Pakistan's ex-prime minister Shaukat Aziz was claimed by the Islambouli Brigade; the attack on Lt. Gen. Ahsan Saleem Hayat was claimed by Jundullah of Karachi (Jamal 2009b, 10).

Figure 4.3. Splits and Mergers within the HuJI



Source: Author, using data from various sources cited in this chapter.

Objectives: Zahab and Roy (2004, 28) have described the HuJI as pan-Islamic in its objectives, that is, “to combat the worldwide oppression of Muslims by infidels . . . and to give Muslims back their past glory, placing special emphasis on occupied Muslim territory such as Kashmir and Palestine.” In the 1980s, the HuJI was focused on Afghan mujahideen fight against the Soviet invasion. On the other hand, Howenstein (2008, 24) has described the HuJI’s goals as “being focused on Jammu and Kashmir and the broader Islamization of Pakistani society.” It is plausible to argue that the HuJI’s goals have evolved over the years and that with the end of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, it refocused its attention on Kashmir. However, an examination of the HuJI’s current activities, areas of operation, and affiliations with al Qaeda and the Taliban, indicates that the HuJI also buys into the anti-U.S., global Islamic jihad.

Strategies and Tactics: The HuJI operations are similar to “army maneuvers, with a large number of militants directly confronting Indian forces rather than using guerilla tactics” (Howenstein 2008, 25). According to START TOPs, the HuJI’s other tactics of choice include bombings, kidnappings, and armed attacks, mainly directed at Indian targets in Kashmir. Since 9/11, the HuJI seems to have expanded its sphere of activities and has been implicated in the January 2002 attack in Kolkota on the United States Information Service Office; the suicide attack that killed 11 French engineers in Karachi in 2005, and assassination attempts on Pakistani politicians and military.¹¹

Recruitment and Training: The HuJI recruits a majority of its personnel from religious schools run by Deobandi Ulema in Punjab and in the KPK. It also benefits from the TJ’s proselyti-

11. A complete list of incidents in which the HuJI has been involved, can be found on the SATP, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/HUJI.HTM>.

zation campaigns to solicit recruits. Rana (2007, 267) explains that madrassa students are attracted to the HuJI more than any other militant organization because it adheres strictly to Deobandi principles; it has a large network so that recruits are assigned almost immediately; and finally, because as an organization it is close to the Taliban, which has meant greater access to jobs in the past.

The HuJI is held responsible for running six training camps (*ma'askar*) in Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹² K. Santharan Sreedhar and Sudhir Saxena Manish (2003, 107) describe the HuA's training curriculum, which can be considered to be followed by both the HuJI and the HuM given that these organizations share members. The training curriculum is based on religious indoctrination and training in military practices. Apparently, the HuA places no conditions on its training, that is, a trainee is free to decide which militant organization or which area of operation he wants to be a part of after his training is complete. The actual training program consists of a one-month course in techniques of weapons-handling and guerrilla warfare and a three-month course in advanced techniques of mountain warfare, map reading, and secure communications.

Funding: Like other militant organizations, funding is generated through the collection of donations from Pakistan and abroad. But Rana (2007, 267) also claims that the HuJI also profits from the sale of small arms to smaller jihadi organizations.

Organization: The HuJI is known to have an established network of offices in some 40 districts of Pakistan that are responsible for recruitment and funding. The organizational structure consists of five departments including Da'wa-o-Irshad (the Call to Islam), military operations, finance, broadcast, and organization (Rana 2007, 265–66).

Networks and Affiliations: The HuJI has a wide transnational network. In fact, it prides itself for being “the second line of defense of every Muslim country” (Rana 2007, 268). An introductory brochure of the HuJI claims that it has links with other militant groups in at least twenty-four countries.¹³ The HuJI has been directly linked to the Taliban and al Qaeda. The HuJI operatives fought alongside the Taliban during the jihad against the Soviets as a result of which close interpersonal relationships exist among the leaders of the two organizations. Within Pakistan the HuJI is linked to other militant groups that serve as fronts for HuJI activities such as Harkatul Jihad Brigade 111 in Kashmir. More recently, 313 Brigade, led by Ilyas Kashmiri, has also been affiliated with the HuJI. The Brigade claimed responsibility for the failed assassination attempt on President Musharraf in December 2003 after which Ilyas Kashmiri was arrested (Jamal 2009b).

Jaish-e-Mohammad (Army of Mohammad, or JeM)¹⁴

Origins: The JeM was founded in January 2000 by Masood Azhar¹⁵ who had formerly been an influential member of the HuM. Azhar had been implicated and arrested in the Indian airline

12. These training camps include Ma'askar Mehmood Ghaznavi in Kotli, Ma'askar Abu Ubaida bin Jarrah in Gilgit, and Ma'askar Abu Haneefa in Mansehra in Pakistan. In Afghanistan, the HuJI runs Ma'askar Irshad in Jalalabad; Ma'askar Khalid Zubair Shaheed in Rashkor and another camp in Kirgha (Jamal 2009b, 10).

13. For details of the HuJI's involvement in Bangladesh, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Uzbekistan see Rana (2007, 270–78).

14. According to START TOPs, the following are listed as aliases of the JeM: Army of Mohammed, Army of the Prophet, Mohammed, Jaish-e-Mohammad (Mohammed), Jaish-e-Mohammad, Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem, Jaish-i-Mohammed (Mohammad, Muhammad, and Muhammed), Jeish-e-Mahammed, Mohammed's Army, National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty, and Army of the Prophet, Tehrik-ul-Furqaan.

15. For a detailed profile of Azhar's life and career as a militant jihadi see Baweja (2002, 38–55).

hijacking in 1999 and upon his release split from the HuM to form his own group (see figure 4.3).¹⁶ The JeM received endorsements from influential Deobandi scholars and ideologues such as Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai and Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi claiming that the emergence of the JeM as a militant group that would “refresh the *jihadi* cause . . . and avoid the rifts that had emerged in the other groups” (Howenstein 2008, 28). When the JeM first emerged, it established links with the SSP and the LeJ and formally aligned itself with the JUI-F.

In December 2001, the JeM was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, after which it renamed itself Tehrik-ul-Furqaan (Movement of the True Standard) with Shamzai as the chief patron. This organization was banned by the Musharraf government in 2002. Around the same time, a military commander of the JeM, Maulana Abdul Jabbar and other high-profile members of the JeM demanding an increase in attacks on Western interests in Pakistan split from JeM to form the Jamaat-ul-Furqan (Party of the True Standard) (see figure 4.3). This organization claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks on the Christian churches in Islamabad, Murree, and Taxila in 2002. According to Mir (2008, 136), in the aftermath of these attacks, Azhar confirmed the ouster of Abdul Jabbar from the JeM and that his organization could not be held responsible for Jamaat-ul-Furqaan’s activities.¹⁷ It was after this incident that Azhar once more renamed the JeM and called it Khudaam-ul-Islam (Movement of the Servants of Islam).¹⁸

Objectives: The JeM espouses a Sunni Deobandi ideology. In fact, Azhar has authored several important texts in Deobandi Islam.¹⁹ However, the initial involvement of the JeM’s leadership with the HuJI lends it a pan-Islamic ideology that is “anti-Western, anti-Jewish and anti-Indian” (Howenstein 2008, 28). Both the SATP and START TOPs emphasize the JeM’s main objectives to be centered on jihad in Kashmir.

Strategies and Tactics: The JeM was implicated in assassination attempts on President Musharraf in late 2003 and on the murder of journalist Daniel Pearl.²⁰ However, most of the JeM’s activity has been in Kashmir where it has carried out a number of fidayeen attacks on Indian security

16. See Z. Hussain (2007, 62–63), for an account of the Indian airline hijacking and how the episode was resolved with the release of Azhar and Omar Saeed Shaikh.

17. Other reasons have also been cited for the split within the JeM. Apparently there was dissension among the leaders over the use of resources. Leaders of Jamaat-ul-Furqaan blamed Azhar for misappropriating the JeM’s funds for his own personal benefit. Another dispute was over the JeM’s policy over jihad. After the downfall of the Taliban, JeM lost access to its training camps in Afghanistan. The JeM also stopped targeting Western interests at the behest of the ISI. This was perceived as a lack of leadership on Azhar’s part hence causing a split between the more radical members of the JeM and Azhar’s supporters (Mir 2008, 137).

18. On the contrary to this account, Zahab and Roy (2004) claim that the JeM once renamed Khudaam-ul-Islam split in 2003 over violent clashes over the control of a mosque in Karachi, the two factions were led by Azhar and Abdullah Shah Mazar.

19. Haqqani (2005a) has listed some of these publications including *Ma’arka* (The Struggle), *Tuhafa-e-Shahdat* (The Gift of Virtue), and *Fa’azil Jihad* (The Virtue of Jihad), which is a translation of the classical text by Ibn Nahlas, a student of Ibn Taimiyah, a fourteenth-century Islamic scholar. Through these texts, Azhar has attempted to motivate other Muslims to participate in jihad by regaling stories of Muslim conquests against unbelievers.

20. A complete list of the JeM’s activities and operations are listed on the SATP website at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm.

forces.²¹ According to Sreedhar and Manish (2003), the JeM is the first militant organization to use suicide attacks in Kashmir. The JeM also publishes and widely disseminates its publications *Islah* (reform) and *Shamshir* (sword) as propaganda tools.

Recruitment and Training: The JeM primarily derives its strength from Punjab because of which it has been lumped by Abbas (2009) as part of the Punjabi Taliban network. General estimates that have appeared in Abbas (13) places the JeM's active ranks at around 5,000 with 1500–2000 fighters. The JeM regularly sends student teams for tabligh to madrassas, government schools, and colleges to recruit potential militants (Rana 2007, 97). The JeM is known to operate two major training camps in Balakot and Kabul (Sreedhar and Manish 2003, 200).

Funding: It is widely understood that when the JeM split from the HuM, it took a lot of material resources from its parent organization. But it also received support from other Sunni groups that gave the fledgling group seed money to start its operations. The JeM, like all other militant groups, depends on donations from supporters in Pakistan and Middle East and as an organization is particularly adept at pamphleteering to solicit these donations. The Al-Rashid Trust founded by Maulana Abdul Jabbar of Jamia Binoria, Karachi, is strongly affiliated to the JeM. It is known to have provided nearly Rs 20 million, or US\$(2008)250,000, as seed money for the creation of the JeM (Mir 2008, 138). The trust's network of mosques and madrassas in Afghanistan have facilitated the expansion of the JeM's activities (Hussain 2007, 66). Rana (2007, 233) has also mentioned the Al-Akhtar Trust, a charitable organization that supports the JeM among other militant organizations by collecting funds for the welfare of mujahideen.²² Rana (2007, 232) reports that the JeM also makes a profit from the sale of sacrificial animal skins.

Organization: Rana (2007) has reported on the extent of the JeM's network in Pakistan that is spread more than 78 districts with its main offices in Karachi, Bahawalpur, and Multan. Its central decisionmaking body is the 12-member Majlis-e-Shura (Council of Advisers) headed by an amir. This body oversees the operations of seven other departments responsible for military operations, the release of captured mujahideen, recruitment, the families of the martyrs, enforcement of vice and virtue, revival of Sunnah and media. (Rana 2007, 224–30).

Networks and Affiliations: The JeM is strongly linked to the Jamia Binoria, a madrasa in Karachi. Ulema from Jamia Binoria, Shamzai, and Ludhianvi helped in the formation of the JeM, headed by Azhar who is a former student and teacher at the madrasa. Due to its adherence to Deobandi principles, the JeM also established links with Pakistani sectarian organizations, the SSP and the LeJ. These groups share mentors and ideologues. The JeM is now included by analysts in the Punjabi Taliban network.

The JeM is believed to have close links with the Pakistani ISI, the Taliban, and al Qaeda who have all contributed finances and equipment to establish the JeM. The link with the Taliban is especially important to mention, since it was the Taliban who negotiated Azhar's release after the hijacking of the Indian airline in 1999. Several JeM members who defected from the HuJI and the HuM were closely connected to the Taliban leadership since the days of the Afghan war.

21. The word *fidayeen* is literally translated as someone who redeems himself by sacrificing himself. In this context it would mean someone who is willing to sacrifice himself in the name of God. See page 50.


22. Also see profiles of Al Rasheed Trust and Al-Akhtar trust on SATP, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Al-Rashid_Trust.htm and http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Al-Akhtar_Trust.htm.

Sipah-e-Sahaba (Corps of the Prophet's Companions, or SSP)

Origins: Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and his associates²³ founded the SSP, initially known as the Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba in September 1985 in Jhang, a district in western Punjab to counter the rising influence of Shi'ism in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. Zahab and Roy (2004, 23) claim that the SSP emerged from the JUI, which was “in agreement with SSP over ideology but not method.” There was no formal split and hence, the relationship between the JUI and the SSP has been very ambiguous. Mir (2008, 216) corroborates this account by explaining that Jhangvi remained a member of the JUI eventually rising to the position of naib-amir (deputy leader). But Jhangvi had a more hard-line, militant, anti-Shi'a agenda than his contemporaries in the JUI and it is in 1989 that the SSP emerged as a separate organization.

The SSP has operated as a political party in its own right by participating regularly in provincial and national elections; for instance, SSP leader Azim Tariq was a serving member of the National Assembly when he was assassinated in 2003. In 1996, the LeJ, led by Riaz Basra, emerged after dissension in SSP ranks led by Riaz Basra (see figure 4.4). It is widely believed that no formal split occurred but that the LeJ was the militant wing of the SSP. Besides the LeJ, the SSP also spawned a number of splinter groups, more militant in character than itself—the Jhangvi Tigers, Al-Haq Tigers, Tanzeem-ul-Haq, Al-Farooq, and the Al-Badr Foundation. In 2002, the SSP was one of the five militant organizations that were banned by the Musharraf regime. After the ban, the SSP continued to operate under the name Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (Nation of an Islamic Pakistan).²⁴

Figure 4.4. Deobandi Sectarian Groups in Pakistan



Source: Author, using data from various sources consulted for this chapter.

Objectives: Several factors explain the impetus behind the formation of the SSP. The most obvious reason was to counter Shi'a influence, and to curtail the organizational rise of the TNFJ, which was believed to be supported by the Iranian government. Nasr (2000, 2002) has traced the roots of sectarian violence in Pakistan to the Zia regime's drive toward Islamization based on Sunni interpretations of Islam. A socioeconomic explanation is provided by Zaman (1998) who claims that the SSP was formed in response to the domination of the Sunni Muslims by Shi'a land-

23. Qari Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Maulana Israr-ul-Haq Qasimi, and Maulana Azam Tariq were also founding members of the SSP and after Jhangvi's death in 1993 served as leaders of the SSP.

24. Currently Allama Ali Sher Ghazni is the patron-in-chief of the banned SSP with Maulana Zia-ul-Qasmi serving as the chair of the Supreme Council (SATP site, accessed on January 24, 2011, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm>).

lords in Jhang. Ideologically, the SSP was created to demand the establishment of a Pakistani state that is based on Sunni, Hanafi Islam and emulated the “rightly guided” caliphs of early Islam.

Strategies and Tactics: According to the profile of the SSP on the SATP, SSP extremists have mostly operated in two ways: targeted killings of prominent members of the Shi’a community and in particular TNFJ members and to attack worshippers in Shi’a mosques.²⁵ The SSP has also not shied away from attacking symbols of the Iranian government.²⁶ With time, SSP militants have started using more sophisticated weaponry to carry out their operations.

A more subversive tactic to recruit and spread awareness of the SSP has been the dissemination of virulent anti-Shi’a literature in madaris and mosques (Zaman 1998, 714). It publishes a monthly called *Khilafat-e-Rashida* (The Rightly Guided Caliphate). The SSP also organizes anti-shi’a rallies and campaigns (Howenstein 2008, 35)

Recruitment and Training: The core of the SSP’s supporters is formed by Sunni peasantry in the rural Jhang and by the merchant and trader classes in the urban centers. The madrassas are also a major recruiting ground for the SSP. Initially the SSP recruited from Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas, but over time the SSP has established its own madrassa network centered in Punjab and Karachi. SSP militants have been known to get jihadi training in Afghanistan while fighting alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and the Hazarajat Shi’a population.

Funding: To fund its organization and activities the SSP has relied on contributions from its supporters in the form of zakat. Animesh Roul (2005) has noted that although the SSP is rooted in rural Punjab, it relies heavily on Sunni businesspeople for its funding. It is also widely understood that the SSP thrives on considerable financial and logistic backing from the Saudi government, which has wanted to curb Iran’s influence over the Shi’a population in Pakistan.

Organization: An ICG report (2005, 15) claims that the SSP is a tightly organized group and has branches in 74 districts of Pakistan with approximately 1 million members. It also has an affiliated student wing and welfare trust. Roul (2005) has reported that the SSP maintains its headquarters in two of the largest Deobandi madrassas, Jamiat-ul-Uloom Eidgah in Bahawalnagar and Dar-ul-Uloom Faqirwali in Fort Abbas. From these two madrassas it coordinates the activities of 5,000–6,000 activists and a vast network of 500 local offices in Pakistan and abroad. He further writes that the SSP has branches in countries including Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Canada, and the United Kingdom, making it a pervasive radical organization.

Networks and Affiliations: Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi (2010b, 7–8) writes that the SSP has consisted of two loosely allied subgroups, namely the LeJ (a domestic anti-Shi’a group) and the JeM (an externalist face of the SSP).²⁷ He says that this is in keeping with the trend that “newly emerging militant groups remain under the tutelage of established organizations until they develop required levels of proficiency and organizational salience” (8).

25. For a complete list of incidents that the SSP has been involved in, see the SSP’s profile at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SSP_tl.htm.

26. SSP activists blamed Iran-backed Shi’a militants for the assassination of their leader Maulana Jhangvi in 1990. In December SSP militants killed Sadiq Ganji, Iran’s consul general in Lahore. In January 1997, an Iranian cultural center was set on fire. Other similar attacks led to the deaths of an Iranian diplomat and air force personnel. In retaliation, Shi’a militants carried out a bomb blast on Lahore High Court killing Jhangvi’s successor, Zia-ur-Rehman (Hussain, Z. 2007, 93–94).

27. This view is at odds with the account given by Zahab and Roy (2004) and by Mir (2008) regarding the SSP’s background.

As mentioned earlier, the SSP also has links with the Taliban since many activists participated in the Afghan jihad and later helped Taliban forces fight the Northern Alliance and Shi'a population in Hazarjat, Afghanistan. After 9/11, the exploitation of sectarian differences in Kurram and Orakzai agencies in the FATA have also drawn SSP activists to support the TTP against the Shi'a population there. It is also believed that the SSP supports al Qaeda's agenda of global jihad. But there is no concrete evidence to suggest that a strategic or operational alliance exists between the SSP and al Qaeda.

Finally, observers of the SSP also link the organization to the ISI. This seems to be plausible given that the SSP had the backing of the military regime when it first emerged in the 1980s. Furthermore, through its elected representatives the SSP has maintained close ties with the Pakistani state. It has also remained linked with other religious political parties, most notably the JUI and the JI through the Milli Yekhjehati Council (Council for National Unity).

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi, or LeJ)

Origins: The LeJ is a radical offshoot of the SSP that was formed in 1996 by Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori, and Malik Ishaque (see figure 4.4).²⁸ There is a line of thinking that the LeJ was formed to function as the militant wing of the SSP to carry out attacks against the Shi'a community and that it became independent when it gained more proficiency (Jamal 2009a; Zaidi 2010b). On the other hand, it is also believed that the LeJ was formed because a faction of extremist SSP members was dissatisfied with SSP leadership for moving away from Jhangvi's ideals (Roul 2005a). Mir (2008, 224) describes this process as a merger between Basra's organization and the already existing SSP splinter groups Jhangvi Tigers, Al Haq Tigers, and Allah Akbar.²⁹

In October 2000, the LeJ split into two factions (see figure 4.4), one headed by Riaz Basra and the other led by Qari Abdul Hai (aka Qari Asadullah or Talha). The reason given for the split was a strategic difference over whether or not to resume sectarian strife that had receded considerably after Musharraf's coup in 1999 (Mir 2008, 227). While Basra was in favor of resuming militant attacks on the Shi'a community, Hai opposed the plan. Musharraf attempted to curtail the violence that was unleashed by the LeJ by banning the group in August 2001. In 2002 during a shoot-out with the police, the leaders Riaz Basra and Asif Ramzi were killed in Multan and Karachi, respectively. This was a major setback for the LeJ. Akram Lahori was appointed as Basra's successor, but he was taken into police custody two years later. The United States designated the LeJ as a foreign terrorist organization in 2003.

Objectives: Many reasons have been given for the LeJ's split from the SSP ranging from accusations by the LeJ's membership that the SSP had deviated from Jhangvi's ideals; the rising violence of the Shi'a sectarian group, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan; the assassinations of SSP leaders by Shi'a militant groups; and finally, to enable the LeJ to emerge as a militant organization in its own right. However, the objectives of the LeJ remained the same as its parent organization. Its primary objective was to attack Shi'a and Iranian targets in Pakistan. But after 9/11 the LeJ's activities have expanded to include wider Islamic jihad and the group has bought into the ideology of the al Qaeda.

28. Zahab and Roy (2004) claim that the founding date for the LeJ is 1994.

29. Also see Nasr (2002, 98–99) for more factors that contributed to the formation of the LeJ.

Strategies and tactics: Roul (2005a, 4) has observed that the LeJ was a unique militant organization in that “it shuns media exposure and operates as covertly as possible.” It communicates through fax messages to accept responsibility for its activities and through its publication *Intiqam-e-Haq*.

Initially, the LeJ’s main strategy was to kill targets from moving motorbikes. As LeJ operatives have gained more training and have started using more advanced weapons (Mir 2008, 226) describes a typical Lashkar encounter, “hit men use a combination of hand grenades to kill and create panic, automatic fire to strike those stampeding to safety and suicide detonations to finish themselves off and the rest.” He also claims that the LeJ times its attacks during daylight hours so that they make the evening news (227). The LeJ is known to favor suicide bombing. There are reports of the LeJ training female bombers to carry bombs concealing them under their burkas or in their handbags (Howenstein 2008, 36). The LeJ typically works alone, but is known to have collaborated with other militant groups like the JeM, for example, in the murder of Daniel Pearl.³⁰ There is also evidence to suggest that HuM, LeJ, and JeM militants have collaborated under the front name Al-Qanoon (The Law) as an ad hoc hit squad (36).

Arif Jamal (2009a, 12) reports that Basra used to make threatening phone calls to police officers who made attempts to investigate the LeJ’s activities. These calls were effective in deterring police officers from investigating the LeJ, to the extent that police officers concealed their identities when interrogating SSP and LeJ operatives. The LeJ is also unique in its policy to assassinate those police officers who investigate their activities.

Recruitment and training: The LeJ recruits primarily from mosques and madrassas that are linked to the Deobandi school of thought. According to Mir (2008, 227), the LeJ’s leadership conducts a thorough whetting process before it recruits members. The criteria for selection are based on religious conviction, skill, and commitment to carry out fidayeen and suicide attacks. The LeJ recruits receive training at a camp located near Kabul and some have been trained at Ma’askar Khalid Bin Walid run by the HuJI.

Funding: Not much is known about the LeJ’s financial resources. But like the SSP, the LeJ has also benefited from contributions made by other Deobandi groups and sympathizers in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (Howenstein 2008, 36).

Organization: When the LeJ was established, Riaz Basra was appointed as the Salaar-e-Aala (commander in chief) with 12 Salaars (sub-commanders) under his command. Zaidi (2010b, 8) describes the LeJ’s organization as decentralized and similar to that of al Qaeda. The LeJ adopted a cell-based structure because it has the advantage of providing increased security. Typically, a cell of three to seven members carries out a particular operation and is disbanded later (Nasr 2002, 99; Mir 2004, 179). Due to this decentralized and compartmentalized configuration, it is difficult to determine the actual number of LeJ activists.

Networks and affiliations: The Taliban have been a staunch ally of the SSP and the LeJ, allowing the latter to establish a training base in its territory. The LeJ has been implicated in attacks that were carried out in collaboration with other militant groups, namely the HuM and the JeM. Roul (2005a) has also reported a strong operational relationship between the LeJ and the Islamic

30. A complete list of incidents in which the LeJ has been involved is available at SATP, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm>.

Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). These links were forged in Afghanistan when both groups were fighting the Northern Alliance on behalf of the Taliban. The LeJ's endeavor to train female suicide bombers has provided evidence of links to the IMU, which the only organization imparting such training.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Students Movement of Pakistan, or TTP)³¹

Origins: The TTP is the overarching organization that presents a united front for Deobandi Sunni militants in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan.³² In December 2007, a number of militant groups formally came together under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud from South Waziristan to attack U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and targets within Pakistan.³³ Jon Lunn and Ben Smith (2010) write that “the TTP is a catch-all name for ethnically Pashtun militants on the Pakistani side of the border” (3). But this blurs the “fractious and decentralized nature of the various militant groups. Not all militant groups operational in this area are members of the TTP” (3). To refer to the TTP as the Pakistani Taliban is also misleading because it implies a distinction from the Afghan Taliban.³⁴ Fishman (2010) argues that this distinction is not useful for three reasons. First, the tribes inhabiting this region spill over onto both sides of the border. Second, some of the militant groups may have their headquarters in Pakistan but may only be operational in Afghanistan (e.g., the HQN and the HiG). Third, by referring to the Taliban as Pakistani implies that only the Pakistani government is responsible for countering the militant insurgency and that the so-called Afghan Taliban are someone else's responsibility.

Abbas (2008) and Rohan Gunaratna and Amir Rana (2007) have documented how tribal militant groups operating in the FATA have become a militant force in their own right. Three events triggered small, militant groups to network with each other. First, Pakistani forces focused their attentions in the FATA on capturing foreign militants linked to al Qaeda, leaving these groups to operate freely. Second, the proscription of various Pakistani militant groups led many of their members to seek refuge in the FATA and to join Taliban ranks. Finally, most observers agree that the Pakistani government's military operation against Lal Masjid in 2007 triggered militancy in the region because it was perceived as an attack by the Pakistani government on its own people (Fish-

31. TTP is also known as the Pakistan Taliban as opposed to the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar. The latter are also known as the Quetta Shura (Fishman 2010). Also see footnote 34 below.

32. FATA is subdivided into seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions, which lie adjacent to settled districts of KPK. The tribal agencies include Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Bajaur, Mohmand, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan and form the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

33. We have not been able to determine a complete list of the militant groups that initially came together to form the TTP. Some claim that there were 13 groups (Lunn and Smith 2010) or 27 groups (“Tribal Areas under Centralized Control,” *Daily Times*, December 16, 2007) that swore allegiance to the TTP. There are other reports which claim that 40 senior Taliban formed the TTP (Abbas 2008, 2; *Jane's Intelligence Review* 2009). When the TTP was formed Baitullah Mehsud was appointed as the leader and Faqir Muhammad and Hafiz Gul Bahadur were appointed as deputy leaders. There is some doubt over the current status of TTP's leadership. The group has denied reports that Mehsud was killed in a drone strike in August 2009, but that Hakimullah Mehsud has been appointed as the leader of the TTP. However, Pakistani security forces claim that Hakimullah Mehsud is also dead (“TTP Leader Hakimullah Mehsud Dead,” *Dawn*, September 1, 2009).

34. The Afghan Taliban are understood to comprise the leaders of the former Taliban government of Afghanistan. These leaders are referred to as the “Quetta Shura” after the Pakistani city where they are based. The Quetta Shura is led by Mullah Omar. The HQN is also considered a part of the Afghan Taliban because of its tribal roots and operational capacity in Afghanistan, but it has deep roots in North Waziristan in the FATA (Fishman 2010, 12).

man 2010; Siddique 2010). These groups chose not to merge with the Quetta Shura led by Mullah Omar and instead developed their own identity. They differed from the Quetta Shura Taliban in their area of operation and volatile relationship with the Pakistani government. Not only did the TTP engage in military attacks within Pakistan, at other times it signed peace deals directly with the government. . . .³⁵

In the literature available on the TTP, several systemic factors explain why these disparate groups came together despite their different backgrounds, tribal affiliations, and strategic inclinations. First, they are all linked by ideological and historical commonalities. A large number of these militants emerged out of Deobandi madaris located in Pakistan's KPK and Balochistan provinces and sought ideological guidance from the Taliban led by Omar. Many of them also fought alongside the Taliban as mujahideen to expel the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the 1980s. Hence, militancy in the FATA has been described "less as a cause than a symptom of radicalism in Pakistan's politics" (ICG 2009, 1). Second, the Pakistani government's neglect of FATA's governance alienated the men who joined these groups looking for an alternative form of political structure.³⁶ How these groups managed to expand their influence over the FATA and gain support locally is a separate question, one that is answered by political analysts in a number of ways. The most common explanation is that "TTP exploited local grievances: socio-economic concerns among local Pakistanis; Pakistani government's failure to provide security and justice; and frustration with government corruption It was less costly for local populations to acquiesce to the militant groups than actually confronting or opposing them" (Fair and Jones 2010, 28).

Objectives: The main objectives of the TTP are to "enforce *Sharia*, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan and perform defensive *jihad* against the Pakistani army" (Abbas 2008, 2). However, within the TTP there are numerous disagreements regarding whether the Pakistani government ought to be viewed as a legitimate target of jihadi activity or not; whether foreign fighters ought to be included under the banner of the TTP; and what is the right balance between the number of operations that should be carried out in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These disagreements have led to a lack of cohesion within the TTP's organization. Yet, what binds these groups together is a common purpose to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan that is based on sharia law, to resist any attempts that counter this goal and to support efforts to expel the coalition forces in Afghanistan (Lunn and Smith 2010, 3–4). Their specific interpretation of sharia law, much like the Quetta Shura Taliban, is austere and manifested itself in the establishment of parallel sharia courts and in the reformation of society along rigid Deobandi lines (attacks on girl's schools, barbershops, and DVD and CD stores) (ICG 2009, 12).

Simon Ross Valentine (2010, 7) has explained that TTP leadership does not participate in Kashmiri jihad because that does not help to advance their goals in Afghanistan or against the Pakistani government, which is mistrusted because of its collaboration with U.S. and NATO forces. Valentine has further explained that the TTP justifies its attacks on fellow citizens and fel-

35. The FATA is governed by political agents who form the conduit between the Pakistani state and the inhabitants of the FATA. Political agents are accountable to the governor of the KPK. Political agents have relied on their structured relations with Maliks (tribal leaders) to ensure the cooperation of tribesmen. For a detailed overview of the FATA's governance see Fair and Chalk (2006, 10–15).

36. An ICG report (2009, 5) titled *Pakistan's Militant Jihadi Challenge* has explained how peace deals signed between Musharraf's military regime and the militants, such as the Shakai Agreement in 2004, extended amnesty and financial incentives to the Pakistani Taliban (yet to emerge as the TTP) and allowed them to enforce Islamic law through Sharia courts. Such deals expanded the space for the militant groups to spread their political influence across the FATA and settled districts like Swat.

low Muslims by adopting the takfiri doctrine. Under this doctrine the Pakistani government, due to its allegiance to Western states, is regarded as “apostate and corrupt” (8).

Strategies and Tactics: To indicate their resentment toward the Pakistani government, the TTP has used a combination of intimidating local tribal leaders and targeting the limited administrative infrastructure in the tribal areas (ICG 2009). To spread their message, the TTP has ironically employed FM radio stations as the primary medium of communication.³⁷

According to Jonathan Paris (2010, 39–42) the TTP adopted six strategies to achieve their objectives: First, it recognizes the advantages of forging links with militant groups in Punjab and Karachi. Second, the TTP has exploited the dissatisfaction of the local populace toward the Pakistani government to form a support base for itself. Third, the TTP is willing to share power and to coexist with the Pakistani government so as not to give the latter any reason to take military action against the militants. Fourth, the TTP has exploited sectarian differences to strengthen its Sunni constituency. Fifth, the disparate militant groups that form TTP have preferred to present a united front under common names such as Ittehad Shura-ul-Mujahideen (United Council of Mujahideen) because it provides them with legitimacy and access to resources. Sixth, the TTP has pressed for compromises by making deals with the Pakistani government.

Recruitment and Training: According to an ICG report (2006, 21) the TTP has two types of recruits: “unemployed youth who are drawn to *jihad* as a way of gaining a livelihood or enhance their social importance; and local criminals who see *jihad* as a lucrative business.” Those who are not ideologically motivated toward jihad have seen an opportunity to generate revenue by charging a price for providing shelter and support to militants. There are also a number of reports, which claim that a large number of TTP’s members and senior leadership are recruited from Deobandi madaris (Lunn and Smith 2010, 3).

Qandeel Siddique (2010, 12) has cited Talat Hussain (2009), who has analyzed the social background of TTP members: The average age of a member is 35, with little or no formal education and often not even from a madrassa. A majority of the members have a poor family background. The leaders of the TTP have been observed to have affiliations with the dominant religious parties in Pakistan—JUI and JI.

Funding: The TTP finances its organization and its activities through extortion, smuggling, donations, and ransom money from kidnappings. Each of these methods has been documented in detail by Catherine Collins and Ashraf Ali (2010); John Solomon (2008, 4–6), and Siddique (2010, 52–57). The TTP, unlike the Quetta Shura Taliban, has not been averse to using advanced media technologies to solicit donations from local madrassas, businesspeople, and ordinary people who are afraid to confront the militants. Other methods of collecting funds are more unique to the TTP. For example, the TTP is connected to crime-networks such as Jundullah in Karachi. These criminals are provided with hit lists, money, and weapons to carry out bank robberies and kidnappings. The stolen money is then transferred via TTP money couriers to South Waziristan (Solomon 2010, 5). The TTP has also carried out kidnappings for ransom targeting mostly busi-

37. This has been the case in Mangal Bagh and Mullah Fazlullah in Khyber agency and in KPP’s Swat district, respectively.

nesspeople and aid-workers.³⁸ Similar to the Quetta Shura Taliban, the TTP has also relied on raising revenue from the narcotics trade, extortion rackets, and by levying taxes on the transport and timber industry. Merchants and truckers who require a secure transit corridor pay taxes, make contributions and lend support to the TTP (Acharya, Bukhari, and Sulaiman 2009). The TTP's leaders have also tapped valuable natural resources such as wood, gem stones, and marble, which can be quite profitable. The timber industry, for instance, lends support to extremists not just for its own protection but to prevent the government from closely monitoring its activity (Collins and Ali, 2010, 7).³⁹

Organization: The majlis-e-shura of the TTP has representation from all of the FATA's seven tribal agencies and from the KPK's settled districts of Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and Malakand (see figure 4.5). Abbas (2008) has noted that even though the TTP is a young organization, it has "strong operational capabilities" (4). He notes that the total number of fighters is unknown. Siddique (2010, 29) has drawn up a very useful categorization of the Taliban movement in Pakistan. She has done this by creating a typology of the various militant groups fighting under the umbrella of the TTP, based on their alleged goals:

1. *The Mehsud Group*: the core conglomerate of the Tehrik-e-Taliban, including Baitullah Mehsud's group and his affiliates across FATA, as well as Maulana Fazlullah's Swat chapter, who have waged a *jihad* against the Pakistani state.
2. *Muqami Taliban*: typically pro-government factions, including Maulvi Nazir (South Waziristan) and Gul Bahadur (North Waziristan), focused primarily on supporting the Afghan *jihad*.
3. *Punjabi Taliban*: factions of groups previously focused on sectarianism inside Pakistan or the Kashmir/India *jihad* now networking with TTP.
4. *Niche groups* with specific ambitions, e.g. *Ghazi Force*, now interlinked with TTP (29).

On the other hand, political analysts have understood the TTP by analyzing the dynamics in each of the seven tribal agencies in the FATA. One of the first such studies was by Abbas (2007) and a profile that was posted by the BBC Urdu service.⁴⁰ More recently, the most definitive study of the political situation and the characteristics of the insurgency in the tribal agencies has been carried out by the New America Foundation in a series of papers titled the *Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict across the FATA and NWFP*, edited by Brian Fishman.

38. Also see newspaper reports of such criminal activities like Sabrina Tavernise, "Organized Crime in Pakistan Feeds Taliban," *New York Times*, August 29, 2009.

39. See newspaper articles such as Roul, "Resourceful Taliban Milk the Land"; *Asia Times Online*, May 6, 2009; and Ashfaq Yusuf Zari, "Taliban Jihad against the West Funded by Emeralds from Pakistan," *Telegraph*, April 4, 2009.

40. Also see Yusufzai (2008, 2009); the interactive map of the FATA by the Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/18405/pakistans_troubled_tribal_belt.html; and Wadhams and Caroline and Colin Cookman, "Faces of Pakistan's Militant Leaders: In-Depth Profiles of Major Militant Commanders," July 22, 2009, by Center for American Progress, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/07/talibanleaders.html>.

Figure 4.5. The Jihadi Terrain in the FATA

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)						
North Waziristan	South Waziristan	Khyber	Kurram	Orakzai	Bajaur	Mohmand
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HQN • Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TTP (Baitullah Mehsud-deceased) • Mullah Nazir • Turkistan Bhattani 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LeI (Mangal Bagh) • Ansar-ul-Islam (Pir Saif-ur-Rehman) • TTP (Khyber) • AMNAM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TTP (Kurram) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TTP (Orakzai) • LeJ • Ghazi Force 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TTP (Maulvi Faqir Muhd) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TTP (Omar Khalid)

Source: Author; for primary data source, see Brian Fishman, 2010, *The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict across the FATA and NWFP* (Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation).

Figure 4.5 breaks down the insurgency in the FATA according to local power structures found in each of the agencies and how they relate to the TTP. North and South Waziristan have been identified by Fishman (2010) as the most important centers of militancy in the FATA today. North Waziristan's Shawal region has served as a safe haven for numerous militants escaping from U.S.-led counterinsurgency operations. Today, this agency is home to the HQN, Hafiz Gul Bahadur's group, al Qaeda, and Uzbek fighters. South Waziristan is the center of TTP activity. The leader of the TTP, Baitullah Mehsud, led the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan. After Mehsud's death, his close aid, Wali-ur Rehman, resumed the TTP command of the Mehsud tribe. The TTP's anti-Pakistan stance is a source of division among the agency's major tribes, the Mehsuds, Wazirs, and Bhattanis (Mahsud 2010).

Khyber, Kurram, and Orakzai agencies came under the sway of the TTP when Hakimullah Mehsud assumed command of the region. According to Siddique (2010, 38), the militancy of the extremist groups in these agencies appears to be more "localized in its agenda." Kurram agency with its large Shi'a population, is torn by Shi'a-Sunni violence that has been further fueled by the TTP presence and the interference of the LeJ and the SSP (Mahsud 2010a). The conflict in Khyber agency is more a Deobandi-Barelvi clash between Mufti Shakir's Lashar-e-Islam (Army of Islam)⁴¹ and Pir Saif-ur-Rehman's Ansar-ul-Islam (Friends of Islam) formed in 2006.⁴² Finally, Orakzai agency is controlled by a number of "niche" militant groups such as the Abdullah Azzam Brigade and the Ghazi Force⁴³ that support the TTP cause (Shah 2010).

41. Army of Islam (LeI) was inspired by a local tribesman, Haji Namdar, who founded the Amr bil Ma-roof Nahi Anil Munkar (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, or AMNAM) in Khyber agency. The control of this group was taken over by Mufti Munir Shakir, who disseminated his militant rhetoric through FM radio broadcasts. Shakir was exiled in 2005, after which the LeI was led by Mangal Bagh (a bus conductor and party activist). The LeI was portrayed as a reformist organization against criminal activity, drug trafficking, and gambling. Its major clash was with the Barelvi-oriented Ansar-ul-Islam. The LeI under Bagh's leadership did not attempt to merge with the TTP. However, Pakistani military operations have indirectly had the effect of bringing Bagh and the TTP closer, with both organizations united in their effort against Pakistani security forces. For the full article on the LeI, see Zaidi (2010, 4–6).

42. For a detailed description of the insurgency in Khyber agency see Khan, Raheel (2010) and Zaidi (2010a).

43. The Ghazi Force is named after the head cleric of Lal Majid (Red Mosque) who was killed during the military siege on the mosque in July 2007. Its founder, Fidaullah (arrested by Pakistani security forces

Bajaur is home to a number of militant groups of which the TTP and the TNSM are most predominant. Bajaur's importance is augmented because of its ideal location to access trade routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Maulvi Faqir Muhammad is the TTP leader in this agency and is believed to have close links with in Laden's deputy, Zawahiri. Faqir Muhammad was originally a member of the JI and later joined the TNSM, which he left to join the TTP (Siddique 2010, 35; Rahmanullah 2010). Another key figure in Bajaur is Qari Zia-ur Rahman, an Afghan commander who leads a militia of trained fighters hailing from Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan (Rahmanullah 2010). Other militant groups operating in Bajaur include the Jaish-e-Islami headed by Wali-ur Rehman, Karwan-e-Niamatullah, and Dr. Ismail's group are reportedly allied with Mehsud's TTP (Yusufzai 2009). In the aftermath of Mehsud's death in August 2009, Wali-ur Rehman took over as head of the Mehsud tribe of South Waziristan. The presence of international terrorist groups such as the Islami Jihad Union (IJU), IMU, and al Qaeda have also been traced to Bajaur agency (Khan, M. 2009).

Mohmand agency has been relatively peaceful because pro-Pakistani government tribal leaders still have some influence in the areas. The Taliban in Mohmand agency are led by Maulana Omar Khalid who rose to prominence during the Lal Masjid crisis when he captured a shrine in protest. The lack of organized opposition in Mohmand agency has allowed Omar Khalid to establish control. The Quetta Shura Taliban and the HiG also have a presence in Mohmand (Khan, Raza 2010).

Militancy in Swat centers around the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariati-Mohammad (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law, TNSM).⁴⁴ Unlike the FATA, Pakistani politics significantly influences militancy in Swat as this is a settled district in the KPK that participates in the national electoral system. Upon the formation of the TTP in December 2007, Fazlullah, the leader of the TNSM was appointed the leader of the TTP in Swat. The Lal Masjid crisis was used by Fazlullah as a pretext to launch an aggressive operation against Pakistani security forces in Swat. The confrontation reached such a point that the provincial government signed an agreement with Sufi Muhammad in February 2009 stipulating that sharia would be implemented in Swat. However, further escalation of violence prompted the Pakistani government to launch a military offensive against the TNSM in April 2009, which displaced nearly 2.5 million people.

Networks and affiliations: As a direct consequence of Pakistan's collaboration with the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism militant groups whose goals were driven more by Kashmir or by anti-

in 2009), studied at a Lal Masjid seminary, and since 2007 has been encouraging his students to enter jihad and seek military training in Waziristan. The primary purpose of the Ghazi Force is to avenge the Pakistani military's raid on Lal Masjid. To achieve these ends it has collaborated with the TTP to carry out attacks on Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The group is based in Orakzai agency and has a training camp in Hangu, KPK (Zaidi 2010a, 11). The Ghazi Force relies on a cell-based organization and is believed to have 50 fighters mostly recruited from madaris (11). Moreover, the Ghazi Force is anti-Shi'a, which means that there is a possibility of future collaboration with sectarian groups that operate on the same ideological lines. In a sense, the Ghazi Force is akin to a "franchise group" that has emerged out of the TTP.

44. The TNSM was originally founded in the early 1990s by Sufi Muhammad, Maulana Fazlullah's father-in-law. Muhammad rose to prominence as a local leader of the JI. After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the TNSM mustered an army of 10,000 men to wage jihad against the U.S. and NATO forces. This operation was a complete disaster and many Pakistanis lost their lives. Muhammad was arrested by Pakistani security forces in 2002, clearing the way for Fazlullah to take over the leadership of the TNSM. Fazlullah cleverly combined dissatisfaction with the Pakistani government, anti-American sentiment, and religious rhetoric to build a constituency for himself. For more on Fazlullah's leadership of the TNSM and the so-called Talibanization of Swat, see Siddique (2010) and White (2008, 34–35).

Shi'a sectarianism are beginning to support the anti-Pakistani outlook of the TTP. These groups include the LeJ, the JeM, the SSP, and the HuM. But it is important to acknowledge that these links are not new since many personal relationships were formed during the 1980s when the leaders of these groups interacted with each other in Deobandi madaris or had the opportunity to wage jihad against the Soviets. The so-called Punjabi Taliban network has provided logistic assistance to the TTP within Pakistan's heartland.

After the downfall of the Taliban regime in Kabul post 9/11, many Taliban were given shelter in the FATA by the tribes residing there. One of the factors explaining the hospitality afforded to the refugees is the Pashtunwali code.⁴⁵ TTP's anti-Pakistan objectives are in direct conflict with the Quetta Shura and the HQN's efforts to accommodate the Pakistani government as they stage attacks inside Afghanistan. At the same time, the TTP and the Taliban led by Mullah Omar are deeply connected because of interpersonal relations and a shared history. But operational cooperation does not obscure the strategic differences. A third group that is often incorrectly lumped with the Taliban is the HiG. This organization has an extensive base in the refugee camps in Peshawar, and therefore uses the routes through Khyber agency and training camps located in northern FATA.

Fishman (2010, 7–8) has documented that al Qaeda continues to operate in the FATA by building a close relationship with TTP militant groups. There is evidence to suggest that al Qaeda's organizational infrastructure is concentrated in North Waziristan and that it has been training its militants in the same training camps as the TTP. Finally, al Qaeda has provided tremendous ideological support to the TTP, support that the Quetta Shura has not been willing to provide. The al Qaeda has been vocal in its condemnation of the Pakistani state and therefore supports the anti-Pakistan activities of the TTP.

Ahl-e-Hadith Militants in Pakistan

The number of Ahl-e-Hadith organizations is the smallest. According to Rana (2007, 295) there are 17 Ahl-e-Hadith organizations in Pakistan. In this review we have examined the LeT as the most prominent militant organization representing this sect.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure, or LeT)⁴⁶

Origins: The Markaz Da'watul-Irshad (Center for Preaching, or MDI) was set up in 1987 at Muridke in Punjab with the objective of assisting in jihad efforts in Kashmir and Afghanistan (Clarke 2010; John 2005).⁴⁷ This institution was founded by two professors, Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal. It is believed that Abdullah Azzam known for being bin Laden's ideological mentor also

45. Pashtunwali is the honor code of the Pashtuns. It stresses among other things, *melmastia* (unconditional hospitality). To an extent this explains why inhabitants of the FATA have been hospitable to the influx of foreign Islamists.

46. Lashkar-e-Taiba is sometimes also known as "the Army of Medina." This is because Taiba is also the old name of Medina, the Saudi Arabian city. According to START TOPs, suspected aliases for LeT include al-Mansoorain and Islami Inqilaabi Mahaaz (Islamic Revolutionary Front).

47. There is some disagreement over the founding date of the MDI as noted by Howenstein (2008, 18). Clarke (2010), John (2005), and Shafqat (2002) agree that the founding date of the MDI is 1987, while Fair (2009), Mir (2004), and Rana (2007) claim that the founding date is 1986. There is further disagreement on whether the LeT was formed as part of the original organizational structure of the MDI as the militant wing

played a role as a founding member.⁴⁸ The LeT was formed as the militant wing of the MDI in the late 1980s and began its militant activities in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, but its attentions were soon refocused by the ISI toward Kashmir in the 1990s (John 2005; Evans 2000; Fair and Chalk 2002).

The LeT was declared a terrorist organization by the United States in December 2001 and banned by Gen. Pervez Musharraf in the same year. In 2005 it was also proscribed by the United Nations. The ban triggered the separation of the MDI from the LeT and it was renamed Jamaat-ud-Da'waa (Party of the Calling, or JuD) under the leadership of Hafiz Saeed. Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri was appointed the new chief of the LeT and was quick to announce that the LeT's base of operations had been shifted to Indian-ruled Kashmir (John 2005). While most informed observers are convinced that the JuD is a front organization so that the LeT can continue its operations unabated, Saeed adamantly claims that there is no link between the LeT's operations and the JuD, the latter strictly being a charitable organization. Since the ban, there have also been reports that the LeT has fractionalized on account of defections resulting from Saeed's pro-Pakistani government position. The most notable defection was of Maulana Zafar Iqbal, a founding member of the MDI, who has set up a charity organization by the name of Khair-un-Naas (People's Welfare). The organization has thus far not participated in any militant activity (Clarke 2010, 396).

Objectives: According to an LeT pamphlet titled "Why Are We Waging *Jihad*?" the group has declared United States, India, and Israel to be existential threats to Islam, and as such has deemed jihad against all threats to Islam to be a religious obligation for all Muslims. The group's literature further justifies a perpetual state of jihad to avenge the loss of any territory that was once under Muslim rule (Haqqani 2005a, 25).⁴⁹

A close examination of the LeT's militant activities reveals three types of objectives that are categorized as being local, regional, and global. Locally, the LeT concentrates its activities in Kashmir, aiming to rid Kashmir of Indian domination (Hussain, Z. 2007, 58–59), fomenting larger Hindu-Muslim discord in India (Fair 2009) and manipulating ethno-religious tensions in Kashmir to incite revolution across India (Chalk 2010, 7).⁵⁰ Regionally, the LeT aims to develop and strengthen a number Muslim-majority states surrounding Pakistan, which is why it has been known to form links with other militant groups in Chechnya, Central Asia, India, Burma, and Bosnia (Clarke 2010, 397). Finally, the LeT, since 2006–2007, is showing signs of expanding its interests beyond the subcontinent. It considers the United States and Israel to be the main enemies of Islam and to that end it has attempted to assist al Qaeda's global jihad (Tankel 2009a; 2009b).⁵¹

(Fair 2009) or whether it was an offshoot of the MDI that emerged later in 1993 (Fair and Chalk 2002; Chalk 2010).

48. There is evidence to suggest that the seed money of Rs 10 million, or US\$(2005)170,000, for the establishment of the MDI and the LeT came from bin Laden (John 2005). The link between the LeT and bin Laden is Abdullah Azzam, who is widely acknowledged as bin Laden's mentor (Zahab and Roy 2004).

49. Also see page 19 for more details on the LeT's reasons to wage jihad.

50. A complete list of the LeT activities can be downloaded from the SATP portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba_lt.htm. However, a more comprehensive list of LeT activities directed toward India are listed in Clarke (2010, 402–3). The most important among these is the attack on India's Red Fort in 2000, the attack on the Indian National Parliament in 2001, serial explosions in Delhi in 2005, and the Mumbai assaults in November 2008.

51. Evidence of the LeT's shift in focus to the West includes the increasing number of Islamic converts being recruited and trained in LeT camps such as David Hicks from Australia and Willie Brigitte from France. These cases have been taken as evidence of LeT training, indoctrinating, and deploying so-called

Strategies and Tactics: In keeping with its primary objective to rid Kashmir of Indian presence, the LeT has spearheaded terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and in India. It has developed guerrilla style “hit and run” operations against Indian targets. Assaults are usually carried out with bombs, land mines, and improvised incendiary devices. This indicates that the LeT has had no compunction in targeting both civilian and security forces.⁵²

Fair (2009, 8) writes that the LeT’s hallmark modus operandi is a “*fidayeen* attack.” She explains that these have been misconstrued as suicide attacks, where the goal of the attacker is to die in the execution of the attack. However, a *fidayeen* is “one who must complete the mission in the worst circumstances” (Z. Hussain 2007, 57) and who engages in combat during which dying is preferable to being captured. Hence, the goal is not to commit suicide but to kill as many of the enemy as possible until the mission is fulfilled, aborted, or been completed.⁵³

Finally, a less violent strategy of the LeT to fuel its jihadist activities is the dissemination of propaganda and recruitment materials such as its monthly and weekly publications. These are distributed in mosques and madrassas in Pakistan and abroad.⁵⁴ In the absence of efficient delivery of social services by the Pakistani state, the LeT has capitalized on the opportunity to spread its network by doing charitable work through the JuD. Within the headquarters of MDI, a network of social services is coordinated including schools, madrassas, and clinics (John 2005).

Recruitment and Training: The LeT has been known to “recruit and train more militants than it actually needs so that it is never vulnerable to a massive strike” (Clarke 2010, 399). However, Fair (2009, 3) explains another rationale for “over-recruitment,” which is to increase awareness of the organization. Its recruitment offices are located throughout Pakistan. Fair (2009, 8) and Z. Hussain (2007, 56) claim that the LeT’s recruits do not hail from the madrassas but tend to be better educated than the average militant from the other groups. A majority of LeT recruits have secondary education or even college degrees. Proselytization campaigns at college campuses encourage potential recruits to attend congregations held at Muridke. A vast majority of the recruits are Punjabi, usually hailing from Lahore, Gujranwala, and Multan, districts that are all Ahl-e-Hadith strongholds.

Howenstein (2008) has noted that there are conflicting accounts of the LeT’s training regimen. Stephen Taniel (2009, 11) explains that recruits traditionally go through a basic course for two to three weeks (Dura-e-Am) and three weeks of religious indoctrination in Ahl-e-Hadith faith (Dura-e-Suffah). This is followed by training in guerrilla warfare (Dura-Khas). It is only after Dura-e-Khas that a select few receive advanced training in specialized skills. It is not unusual for trainees to wait up to a year or more before they graduate to military training. In the meantime they undertake fundraising or proselytization campaigns. This understanding of the LeT’s training regimen is corroborated by the SATP but the length of the various training stages differ.⁵⁵ The SATP

clean skins to carry out terrorist attacks in the West or in their country of origin (Chalk 2010, 7; Taniel 2009a, 12).

52. However, Taniel (2009a, 15) notes that the LeT always denies any role in a terrorist attack that kills civilians.

53. Also see Zahab (2007) for a description of a typical LeT encounter.

54. The LeT routinely publishes on its website <http://www.jamaatudda'wa.com>. It also publishes an Urdu monthly, *Al Da'waa*; Urdu weeklies, *Al Jihad* and *Gazwa*; an English monthly, *Voices of Islam*; an Arabic monthly, *Al Rabat*; and an Urdu monthly for students, *Mujala-e-Tulaba*.

55. See http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.

also makes a distinction between the training given to the militant cadre and the ulema cadre. The latter are made to go through a 42-day course following a refresher course called Bait-ur-Rizwan. Saeed Shafqat (2002) differs from both these accounts and makes a distinction between ordinary and specialist trainees. The first stage for an ordinary trainer is a 21-day course, prior to which the trainee is sent on a 15-day *da'wa* course; this is quite different from Tankel's account of indoctrination in the Ahl-e-Hadith faith. Shafqat (2002, 144), unlike the others, also claims that the trainees have to undergo a three-month long character assessment before they can be cleared to proceed to the second stage of training in military tactics. Finally, Fair and Chalk (2002) have further broken down the military training phase into three stages: "six-month induction period in which recruits learn basic field craft and weapons handling; four to five months of advanced training focusing on language proficiency, urban warfare, small unit tactics, sabotage and assassination; the tertiary stage, which is for [a] select few, is specialized training in suicide assaults, computer skills, field communication and explosive techniques."

The LeT has camps, recruitment centers, and offices spread across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in Muzaffarabad. The LeT reportedly has 2,200 offices across Pakistan. According to Chalk and Fair (2002), the LeT trains its recruits in training camps run by the ISI. But other reports claim that the LeT is known to use training camps located in eastern Afghanistan in Kunar and northern Afghanistan in Nuristan that are shared with the HiG and al Qaeda. These camps are mainly used for weapons training. The LeT's largest and most active training camp is located in Muzaffarabad (Clarke 2010, 399).

Funding sources: There are no accurate accounts of the LeT's assets. But it is known that funds are collected through three sources: donations; Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and sympathetic militant groups. The means used to secure these contributions include collection boxes and solicitation over the Internet. The LeT no longer deposits its funds into banks; instead it invests in legitimate front organizations in order to avoid the risk of bank accounts being frozen or seized (Clarke 2010, 406). After the ban, the LeT has followed the practice of funneling its funds through informal banking systems such as Hawala through intermediaries outside Pakistan.⁵⁶

Organization: The LeT's membership is believed to consist of approximately 500 core members (Clarke 2010, 400).⁵⁷ According to the profile of the LeT on the SATP, the LeT has a hierarchical organization resembling an army, with a chief commander, provisional commander, district commander, battalion commander, and so on. The group also has a policymaking body that is headed by an amir,⁵⁸ and a naib-amir vice chief).⁵⁹ On the other hand, Fair and Chalk (2002) describe the LeT's organization to be composed of cells of ten militants each. These militants typically serve on a contract basis receiving between Rs 10,000 to 20,000, or US\$(2002)150–300, per month in salary.

56. See Clarke (2010, 406–8) for a detailed account of the LeT's financial practices.

57. The number of militant cadres in the LeT is not agreed upon. Chalk (2010) estimates that there are 150,000 militant cadres, with 750 insurgents on the ground in Jammu and Kashmir.

58. The current amir of the LeT is Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri, and the operational commander is Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi. Hafiz Saeed is still considered the ideological leader of the LeT, but he is more involved in running the JuD. For more information on Saeed's life and teachings, see Mir (2002, 56–73).

59. See http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.

The LeT is also reported to have an extensive network of sleeper cells in Europe, Australia, and United States (Clarke 2010, 401). It is very likely that these cells are responsible for fund-raising, but many observers are concerned that these cells may potentially be used for staging attacks in the West.⁶⁰

Networks and affiliations: There is a consensus among observers of the LeT that the main reason for its enhanced potential is that the ISI has supported it in a number of ways: The ISI has been known to run some of the LeT's training camps as well as being the group's financier, weapons provider, and abetting the movement of LeT militants across the Line of Control (LoC). The ISI's support to the LeT has revolved around the conflict with India, which is viewed as a fundamental threat to Pakistan. As Fair and Chalk (2002), Yoginder Sikand (2007), and Alexander Evans (2000) have observed, the ISI found that using the LeT as a proxy proved to be an effective strategy to combat India in Kashmir. The LeT's focus on Kashmir and its special relationship with the ISI has enabled it to remain relatively unaffected by counterterrorism measures implemented by the Pakistani government (Chalk 2010; Tankel (2009a).

The LeT prefers to operate independently. But there is evidence to prove that it has operated alongside the Pakistani armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir during such wars as the Kargil war in 1999 (Clarke 2010). The LeT has also had numerous opportunities to collaborate with other Deobandi militant groups. However, Tankel's (2010, 3) interviews with the LeT leadership have revealed the disdain with which Deobandi groups are viewed because of their jihad against the Pakistani state. But since 2006, there have been increasing reports of collaboration between the LeT and al Qaeda and pro-Taliban groups.⁶¹ While the LeT allows other jihadi actors to avail of its training facilities, it is said that the LeT is averse to engaging in joint training programs with Deobandi militant groups due to the ideological disagreement over the conduct of jihad within Pakistani territory. Yet the LeT has been known to engage with the Taliban, the TTP, and the JeM over tactics. Clarke (2010, 397) explains that this cooperation takes the form of "an information exchange and sharing of best practices."

New evidence is emerging that the LeT has maintained a covert relationship with al Qaeda. Tankel (2009a) has described this as the LeT's "bad *jihadi* face."⁶² Chalk (2010, 8) has listed a series of instances that reasonably connect LeT to al Qaeda.⁶³ However, he concludes that these isolated incidents cannot be seen as definitive evidence of an established link between the two organizations and that this relationship needs to be closely monitored. Perhaps the LeT's most dangerous affiliation is with the Indian Mujahideen and the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which has been suspected of involvement in the July 2006 Mumbai attacks. Not only is there

60. See Emerson (2006, 280–85) for a detailed account of the LeT's networks in the United States.

61. This collaboration has taken many forms. The LeT trains not only its own but members of other groups as well. The organization also collaborates on infiltrating fighters into Afghanistan and on other logistic matters. The LeT has helped to recruit young Pakistani men to train at camps led by the HQN and the TTP (Tankel 2010, 3–4).

62. For a more detailed account of the LeT's collaboration with al Qaeda, see Tankel's book, *Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

63. These include reports of bin Laden's involvement in the initial founding of the LeT; the capture of an al Qaeda senior field commander from an LeT safe house in Faisalabad; the LeT's suspected involvement in the 2005 London bombings; LeT militants receiving training in Afghan camps run by al Qaeda; and bin Laden's jihadist network and D-company. They have collaborated with the LeT in the 2008 Mumbai attack (Chalk 2010, 8).

evidence of the LeT recruiting from among SIMI cadres but also of collaboration on logistics in staging attacks within and beyond India (Clarke 2010, 402–5; Swami 2009).⁶⁴

The LeT has been known to collaborate with crime syndicates such as D-company. This is a symbiotic relationship dependent on the provision of arms to carry out insurgencies for the LeT and a cover for the crime syndicate. The LeT's primary collaboration has been with Dawood Ibrahim's D-Company (see Sharma 2006; Emerson 2006). This involvement with crime syndicates gives the LeT a degree of independence from the ISI as its primary provider of weapons.

Finally, the pressing concern regarding the LeT's threat potential is its expanding transnational network. First, the LeT has an elaborate network of underground cells in the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and United States. Even though these cells have primarily served to raise funds and run proselytization campaigns, they can prove to be detrimental to Pakistani efforts to rein in the LeT. Second, these transnational networks make the LeT an ideal "global *jihadi* facilitator" (Tankel 2009c, 5). Since the 1990s the LeT has been recruiting and involved in fund-raising within the Pakistani expatriate community. As a result, the LeT has trained operatives poised to potentially stage attacks in the West.⁶⁵ Third, and perhaps of most concern is that these cells may choose to act independently because the LeT may be unable to exercise control over its network.⁶⁶

Barelvi Militants in Pakistan

An ICG report (2002) has made the observation that mainstream Sunni Barelvis are conspicuous in their absence from the militant jihadi terrain of Pakistan, even though ideologically Barelvis have defined themselves in opposition to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith schools of thought. Similarly, in documenting the ideologies of South Asian jihadi groups, Haqqani (2005a) and Howenstein (2008) have not even mentioned the Barelvis or recognized that this school of thought has spawned jihadi groups. This seems odd given that the majority of the Sunni population in Pakistan identify themselves as being Barelvi Muslims. Rana (2007, 353) has listed 43 Barlewi organizations that exist in Pakistan, of which 6 are political parties, 21 are sectarian groups, 12 are jihadi groups, 2 are Tablighi organizations, and 2 are educational.

Barelvi interests have been represented in mainstream politics by the JUP and Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT). The former was a member of the MMA, which formed the provincial government in the KPK and Balochistan from 2002 to 2007. The JUP like its Deobandi counterpart, the JUI, has also been prone to factionalization. Rana lists at least five different factions of the JUP that have been formed around individual personalities.

The Barelvi sect also has a quietist apolitical movement by the name of Da'wat-e-Islami that was created as a reaction to the Deobandi-oriented TJ by Maulana Ilyyas Qadri. Finally, to offset the dominance of the SSP as a Deobandi-oriented, anti-Shi'a, group, the Barelvis established the Sunni Tehrik.

64. For a full account of the LeT's operations in India, see Swami (2008).

65. For example, Tankel (2009a, 5) has documented circumstantial evidence that suggests that the LeT provided logistic and perhaps financial support through its network in Paris to Richard Reid, the al Qaeda "shoe-bomber," to blow up American Airlines Flight 63 in 2001.

66. See Tankel (2010, 5–6) for a description of the David Headley case, which illustrates this particular dynamic.

Sunni Tehrik (Movement for the Sunnis)

Origins: Very little has been written about the Sunni Tehrik, perhaps because it is a smaller sectarian group that has limited its operations within Pakistan against other Sunni sects and does not have explicit anti-Western interests. The Sunni Tehrik was created by Mohammad Saleem Qadri in 1990 to counter the growing influence of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith groups. Saleem Qadri was a member of the Da'wat-e-Islami and the JUP before he created the Sunni Tehrik. Unlike other sectarian groups that have been reviewed here, the Sunni Tehrik has not been banned, but its activities have been closely monitored by the Pakistani government since January 2002.

Objectives: The Sunni Tehrik claims to be a nonpolitical organization working to protect the interests of the Ahl-e-Sunnat, which is how the followers of the Barelvi sect refer to themselves. In its manifesto the Sunni Tehrik also states that “it will protect Ahl-e-Sunnat mosques and the believers from a distortion of their faith” (Rana 2007, 374). Sunni Tehrik objectives stem from an opposition to the prevalence of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith sects and the belief that Ahl-e-Sunnat can demand their rights only if they respond to the threat posed by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith sectarian groups in a similar manner (374).

Strategies and Tactics: The Sunni Tehrik emerged as a sectarian organization but its main targets were not the members of the Shi'a community but the Deobandi SSP and the Ahl-e-Hadith LeT. The main tactic used was to take control of mosques that were thought to have been wrongfully taken away from the Ahl-e-Sunnat sect. These episodes resulted in violence, rioting, and aggressive occupation of mosques (Rana 2007, 375).

Recruitment and Training: It is believed that the Sunni Tehrik recruits belong to a network of Barelvi madrassas called Zia-ul Quran who had refused to join the JUP (Khan, A.A. 1994, 36). This account of the Sunni Tehrik's composition is in competition with the generally held view that Sunni Tehrik was an organization that cropped up in Karachi under the leadership of Saleem Qadri (Rana 2007, 373).

Funding: The Barkati Foundation was set up to manage the finances of the Sunni Tehrik. Members of Sunni Tehrik contribute monthly donations. Money is also collected through the Milad fund, Jahez (dowry) fund, and Tahafuz Ahl-e-Sunnat (protection of Ahl-e-Sunnat) fund (Rana 2007, 377).

Organization: After his murder in 2001, Saleem Qadri was replaced by Ghulam Abbas Qadri. The organization does not have a provincial structure; instead, conveners of 14 divisional centers are directly accountable to the amir.⁶⁷ The main hub of Sunni Tehrik activities is in Karachi (Rana 2007, 376–77).

Shi'a Militants in Pakistan


Efforts to organize representative groups for the Shi'a community began after the Zia government's Islamization campaign during the 1980s. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jaffriya (Movement for the Implementation of Jaffriya Law, orTNFJ) was formed in April 1974 under the leadership of Allama

67. These 14 divisional centers include Hyderabad, Sukkur, Nawabshah, Multan, Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, Lahore, Sahiwal, Mian Chunnun, Sialkot, Gujrat, Turbat, Quetta, and Jaffrabad.

Mufti Jaffer Hussain.⁶⁸ Hussain was succeeded by Allama Arif Al Hussaini. Hussaini was murdered in 1988, leading to a split in the TNFJ. The disagreements within the TNFJ centered around two issues: one, the nomination of Sajjid Naqvi as Hussaini's successor; and two, whether the TNFJ should change its name to Tehrik-e-Jaffriya Pakistan (Movement of the Jaffriya Fiqh in Pakistan, or TJP). By changing the name it was hoped that the TJP could distance itself from the image of trying to impose Shi'a law on a Sunni population (Rana 2007, 407-10). However, within the TJP some members had a clear preference for militant activism leading to the creation of Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (Soldiers of Muhammad, or SMP). The TJP was proscribed by the Musharraf regime in 2002 after which the organization was renamed Islami Tehrik Pakistan (Islamic Movement of Pakistan, or ITP). It participated in the 2002 election as one of the six members of the MMA.

According to the organization profile on the SATP, the TJP has several affiliated organizations, including Sipah-e-Abbasi, Sipah-e-Ahl-Bait and youth bodies like the Imamia Students Organization (ISO) and the Imamia Organization.⁶⁹ The ISO is a nationwide organization of the Shi'a sect that endeavors to bring Shi'a students together on one platform. The ISO has a central office located in Lahore but it manages a vast network all over Pakistan. Members of the ISO have reportedly played an active role in the Shi'a resistance against Sunni domination (see figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6. Shi'a Groups in Pakistan



Source: Author, using data from Amir Rana, 2007, *A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore, Pakistan: Mashal Books), 405–410.

68. An alternative account of the TNFJ's origins is that it was born following the major success of the Shi'a protest against the institution of zakat laws by the Zia regime. The party subsequently split into a moderate wing and pro-Khomeini wing. See Aamer Ahmed Khan, "The Rise of Sectarian Mafias," *Herald*, June 1994: 27–37.

69. See <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/TJP.htm>, accessed on January 5, 2011.

Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (Soldiers of Muhammad, or SMP)

Origins: Allama Ghulam Raza Naqvi announced the creation of the SMP in 1993. However, there seem to be conflicting accounts of the SMP's origins. The profile of the SMP on the SATP claims that Maulana Mureed Abbas Yazdani created the group in 1993 because the TJP was averse to letting its young cadre to engage directly with Sunni militants of the SSP and the LeJ.⁷⁰ In a cover story of the *Herald*, A.A. Khan (1994, 37) writes that the SMP was formed after the "ISO became too violent for its own good" and wanted to avenge the large number of activities that it had lost to the SSP. A third account is given by Rana (2007, 414). Apparently Asif Ali Zardari was threatened by the SSP and had the SMP created to counter the threat by providing the SMP with seed money and arms. Common to all these accounts is the inherent desire of the SMP activists to counter the rise of the SSP and the belief that the TJP's leadership was unable to do this adequately. Between 1993 and 2001, the SMP was accused of involvement in some 250 incidents of terrorism and was proscribed by the Pakistani government in 2001.⁷¹

Strategies and Tactics: The SMP is not very different in its strategies and tactics from the SSP. It maintains a network of mosques and madrassas to exert and extend its influence. It has also used its publications and party pamphlets as a way to spread its message and carry out anti-Sunni propaganda. Both have also used publications and pamphleteering as a way to disseminate their creed. According to Zaman (1998), "each group blames the violent activities of the other as the reason for its own existence" (699).

Recruitment and Training: The SATP estimates that the SMP has approximately 30,000 cadres, mostly based in Punjab and led by Allama Rai Jaffer Raza. The organization has no training facilities outside of Pakistan and their cadres do not operate outside Pakistani territory. Zaman (1998, 698) describes the sociological profile of an SMP recruit: "rural or small-town, some education in the government-school system, religious studies at *madrassas* in Punjab or elsewhere in Pakistan and, not infrequently, in Iran and participation in the war in Afghanistan."

Organization: The SMP's central organization is based in Thokkar Niaz Baig in the suburbs of Lahore, but it has an elaborate network that allowed it to operate in Karachi as well.

Overview of Militant Groups in Afghanistan

The major Afghan militant groups in the border areas are generally portrayed as falling into one of three categories: the original Taliban who are now resurgent; Hizb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HiG); and the HQN. However, these categories do not represent the totality of militant groups operating within Afghanistan because they ignore the presence of foreign militant groups of Central Asian and Arab origin that also operate in the region (Dale 2009; Kronstadt and Katzman 2008).

Instead of establishing categories of insurgents, the ICG (2006) explains that the situation is far more complex, because "the interlocking agendas of anti-government insurgents and self-interested spoilers are fuelling the violence" (8). It is obvious that the Taliban are operating from within

70. See <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SMP.htm>, accessed on January 5, 2011.

71. See the SMP's profile on the SATP for a list of incidents in which it was implicated. <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SMP.htm>.

Pakistan. But less obvious is the role of the criminal networks, while a corrupt and weak government is providing an enabling environment to act with near impunity. Apart from the Taliban, the report has also identified the HQN, the HiG, and “spoilers, who for reasons of personal power have no desire to see central authority spread ” (12).

Seth Jones (2008, 38) presents a more complete sketch of the Afghan militant landscape. In addition to these three, he also includes foreign fighters of Arab and Central Asian origin, Pakistani and Afghan tribes, and criminal networks. He further claims that there is evidence of coordination among these groups at the tactical and strategic levels. But because there is no unified leadership each group ought to be examined separately. Jones has categorized these groups according to their local bases of support. He claims that there are three loose fronts of militant groups:

1. The northern front is dominated by HiG’s presence based in the Afghan provinces of Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar as well as across the border in Pakistan. Other groups such as the LeT, TNSM are also active on this front.
2. The central front consists of a loose network of foreign fighters of Central Asian and Arab descent. They are located across the territory from Bajaur in Pakistani FATA to Khost, Paktia and Paktika in Afghanistan. The HQN has been active on this front as well.
3. Finally, the Taliban dominate the southern front. This includes Balochistan and FATA in Pakistan and Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan and Zabol provinces in Afghanistan (38).

It is difficult to categorize militant groups in Afghanistan as we have done in figure 4.1 for Pakistani groups. This is because ideological distinctions are less clear. It is certainly true that the Deobandi stream is the largest component of the insurgent militant groups in Afghanistan. The Taliban leadership that emerged from Deobandi madrassas located along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is certainly inspired by this religious doctrine. The HQN, which swears allegiance to the Taliban even though it appears to operate independently, can also be said to be Deobandi. It is important to recall that Jalaluddin Haqqani was a member of Hizb-e-Islami (Khales), an Islamist group during the 1980s, which was closely linked to the Deobandi-trained clergy of the Harakat-Inqilab-e-Islami. Foreign fighters of Arab (al Qaeda) and Central Asian (IMU, IJU) origin are influenced by Wahabism and the ideology of global jihad. These groups have had a significant impact on the insurgency because they act as force multipliers but have also influenced the Taliban ideologically. Finally, the insurgency in Afghanistan is also fueled by nonreligious elements as well, the crime syndicates relating to the drug economy and the tribal networks dominated by warlords. Therefore, in this review of Afghan militant organizations, we include all the organizations mentioned in Jones’s typology that have a religious orientation.

The Taliban

Origins: After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the mujahideen fought among themselves in “rapidly fluctuating coalitions” (Dorronsoro 2005, 4). It is at this point in time that the networks of madaris that had been established during the 1980s to provide mujahideen fighters and support to Afghan refugees “achieved some autonomy and transmuted into a politico-religious movement under the charismatic leadership of Mullah Omar with the direct

support from the Pakistani government” (Zahab and Roy 2004, 13). The men who joined this movement called themselves the Taliban (literally, students).⁷²

The capture of Herat in 1995, Kabul in 1996, and most of the North in 1998, consolidated the control of the Taliban over 90 percent of Afghanistan’s population. Only Ahmed Shah Masoud⁷³ helped by the Russians and Iranians, resisted the Taliban in northeastern Afghanistan. The death of Masoud on September 9, 2001, marked the complete success of the Taliban. But the events of September 11 brought about the rapid downfall of the Taliban when the United States launched a military operation in Afghanistan after Mullah Omar refused to hand over bin Laden.

Since then the Taliban have regrouped in south and southeast Afghanistan along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and reemerged as a more sophisticated group often referred to as the “neo-Taliban” (Giustozzi 2008). Factors explaining the resurgence of the Taliban include the “reestablishment of their logistical base, external support, and the return of militants supporting their cause from abroad and funds from the narcotics trade” (Karzai 2007, 63). The insurgency in Afghanistan today is being driven by Taliban commanders from sanctuaries based in Pakistan.

Objectives: The Taliban movement had a twofold agenda. According to Zahab and Roy (2004) on the one hand, “the Taliban were a puritan-religious movement, of a fundamentalist nature but with no political project beyond the implementation of the *sharia*” (13). On the other hand, it was “a movement sustained by Pashtun nationalism, which sought to reestablish the Afghan state, the traditional fief of the Pashtuns that was appropriated in 1992 by Masoud’s Northern Alliance” (14). The Taliban believe that the implementation of sharia law is the means by which such a state could be constructed because it would overcome tribal and ethnic differences.

However, after 9/11 a different set of objectives based on personal backgrounds, experiences, and circumstances motivated the objectives of the Taliban. Matt Waldman (2010, 3–4) has listed five different motivations that encouraged insurgent behavior: first, retaliating against military action by foreign forces; second, resisting the invasion by these forces that threaten Afghan culture; third, resisting corruption in the government; fourth, attempting to gain leverage in the struggle of power which is a consequence of being excluded; and fifth, exploiting the insurgency for criminal purposes such as extortion, narcotics, or self-aggrandizement. Based on these motivations, the primary goal of the neo-Taliban is the withdrawal of foreign troops and the establishment of Sharia, which has been equated with law and order, access to justice, and alternate form of government and an Islamic society.

Strategies and tactics: Previously, the Taliban strategy was to forcefully implement Sharia to reestablish the Afghan state. Hekmat Karzai (2007, 63) has documented that the resurgent Taliban have a different strategic aim: “to overthrow the Afghan government and break the political will of the U.S. and NATO forces.” In keeping with this aim, the neo-Taliban have adopted a different range of strategies. First, the Taliban have realized that they cannot “face U.S. military with force on force so they have shifted their strategy toward a defensive posture by attacking soft targets, such as government officials, aid workers, and civilians” (63). Second, the neo-Taliban have been organizing vanguard teams of about 20–25 members, who prepare the ground for later escalation of militant activity. These teams are responsible for establishing a base among the local population, identifying those members of the population who would be sympathizers and supporters, and

72. For the most complete and accurate account of the origins of the Taliban see Rashid (2000) and Maley (1998).

73. See Davies and Shariat (2004) for a biography of Masoud.

engaging in propaganda to disseminate the Taliban message. On occasion these teams have also carried out terrorist and guerrilla activities like attacking police-posts, ambushes, and bombings (Giustozzi 2008a, 175). The third strategy and arguably the most effective one is to “demoralize the enemy through relentless attacks against the same targets” (2008a, 176). Suicide attacks have commonly been used as part of this strategy. Tactically, the neo-Taliban are characterized by improvements in telecommunications and by the use of more sophisticated weapons and fighting tactics.

In comparison to the “old Taliban,” the neo-Taliban have distinguished themselves by developing a media strategy (Giustozzi 2008; Karzai 2007). This is interesting since the Taliban had initially banned music and television. The Taliban now use media technologies to disseminate their message and worldview. The neo-Taliban also have a media committee that is responsible for propaganda. This committee also corresponds with major radio stations and news channels. In fact, the Taliban also post their videos and publications online that encourage Muslims to join the Taliban and wage jihad. Karzai (2007, 67) lists five main objectives of the media strategy—“recruitment, indoctrination, funding, propaganda and psychological warfare.”

Recruitment and training: William Maley (1998, 15–16) lists three defining characteristics of the Taliban movement in the 1990s. First, its leadership was drawn from former mujahideen, many of whom were affiliated with Harakat-e-Inqilaab-e-Islami during the 1980s. Second, many of the members were secular Pashtuns. Third, the Taliban accommodated armed Pashtuns who aligned themselves with the Taliban for reasons of expediency. The fact that the Taliban overlooked ideological inclinations when recruiting Pashtuns, has led some political analysts to conclude that the Taliban represent a tribal movement (Johnson and Mason 2007). Zahab and Roy (2004) point to the madrassa network that was mobilized for recruitment purposes. Students from madrassas situated between Ghazni and Kandahar formed a major core of the Taliban movement. These madrassas had been linked since well before the war with Soviet to the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam. Based on these recruitment patterns, Michael Semple (2009, 36) describes a typical Talib recruit as being poor, with limited exposure to urban life, having conservative views and educated in a madrassa.

Giustozzi (2008a, 170) explains that post-9/11, the middle and lower ranks of the resurgent Taliban have been composed of new recruits, giving the movement a new face. He acknowledges that the leadership is still made up of the same men who formed the Taliban under Mullah Omar. Between 2002 and 2007, there are four major sources that have been tapped for recruitment:

1. Pakistani-based madrassas (2)
2. Villagers who have joined out of sheer expediency with financial incentives playing an important role in their motivation to be a part of the Taliban⁷⁴
3. Members of the population who find the Taliban ideology appealing
4. Members of “disenfranchised and alienated communities” (170) who did not agree with the Taliban in principle but, disheartened by the current government’s poor performance, consider the Taliban to be a viable alternative.

74. The Taliban have sometimes paid villagers (US\$15.00–\$55.00 per day) to harass foreign and government troops with rocket attacks and shooting. Core members are paid (US\$100.00–\$350.00 per day) as indemnity for their families.

The most important training camp used by the Taliban prior to the U.S. operation in Afghanistan was the Darunta Complex located near Jalalabad (Karzai 2007, 62). Today, the neo-Taliban have established themselves on the Pakistani side of the border, and there are reports to suggest that the Taliban are sharing the training camps run by Pakistani militant groups such as the HuJI.

Funding: Financially, the Taliban have had access to numerous sources of external funding including wealthy patrons in Saudi Arabia and Middle East and the Pakistani government. But other creative means to generate funds have also included tolls levied on the transport industry. Intuitively, analysts claim that the narcotics economy has hugely funded the Taliban, but this remains a bit of a controversy. It is not clear how much revenue is generated from the narcotics trade and whether it is a primary source of income for the Taliban.⁷⁵ Guistozzi (2008a, 174) cites a number of sources that claim that field commanders are not involved in fund-raising. This is an important organizational point because it implies that field commanders are not completely autonomous because they have to rely on the central leadership for resource allocation.

Organization: Karzai (2007, 61) has described the Taliban organization as being made up of four components: the Amir-ul-momineen (Commander of the Faithful), the title given to Omar as the leader of the Taliban; the Supreme Shura, the highest decisionmaking body, with ten members and based in Kandahar; the Military Shura, which planned strategy and implemented tactical decisions though it had no authority to enforce its plans; and the Kabul Shura, which dealt with the daily governance in Kabul. This organization had been observed to become gradually centralized with Mullah Omar, making unilateral decisions without consulting the various shura, and was destroyed by the U.S.-led military onslaught post-9/11.

Today the organization of the Taliban involves two main tiers. Jones (2008, 40–41) describes the top tier as including the leadership dominated by Omar and his key associates, many of whom are based in Quetta and together compose the Quetta Shura. He also includes in this tier a second shura based in Pakistan's FATA revolving around the HQN.⁷⁶ The second tier is made up of Taliban fighters.

Semple's (2009, 33) analysis of the new Taliban organization is perhaps the most illuminating. He explains that the resurgent Taliban are a loose conglomeration of different networks that for reasons of convenience and to project a semblance of unity are known as the Taliban and consider Omar to be their leader. Therefore, it is better to understand the organization of the resurgent Taliban as "commander-solidarity networks that are based on comradeship, shared backgrounds and patronage links with the commander figure in the network" (33). The networks seemed to be united in their opposition to the "Karzai regime, willingness to wage *jihad* and a desire to establish an Islamic system" (33).⁷⁷ The reason why these commander-solidarity networks seem to have been so successful is because they are somewhat "familiar, accessible and reliable" (33) and because bonds of trust have been built over a number of years. Semple also points out that although the number of combatants has decreased from when the Taliban were in power, there is still a large number of men who are willing to join because association with the Taliban is about belonging to a network that has access to resources.

75. On this issue, see Peters (2009), Senlis Group (2006), Koehler (2005), and Goodhand (2008).

76. I have treated the HQN or the Miran Shah Shura as a separate entity to be analyzed within the structure of the insurgency in Afghanistan.

77. Examples of commander-solidarity networks would include the HQN, where Jalaluddin Haqqani is the commander figure, or the Mansur Network in which Latif Mansur is the commander.

Networks and Affiliations: Al Qaeda is viewed as having played a major role in the development of the Taliban. It is during the Taliban regime in the 1990s that al Qaeda established itself as a transnational network with terrorist capabilities. In return for this safe haven in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has provided the Taliban with funding, training facilities, and militants to fight its battles. Most importantly, al Qaeda's global jihadist ideology has had the affect of rendering the ideological vision of the Taliban leadership more extreme. Post-9/11, however, an ideological divergence between al Qaeda and the Taliban has been noted, with the latter attempting to project itself as a responsible alternative to the Afghan government and being unwilling to attack the Pakistani state.

Table 4.1. Differences between the Taliban and the Neo-Taliban

Type of Difference	"Old" Taliban	Neo-Taliban
Objectives and ideology	Motivated by Sunni, Deobandi Islam, and Pashtun nationalism, the Taliban wanted to implement Sharia in Afghanistan	Overthrowing the Afghan government and the withdrawal of foreign troops
Strategies	Forcefully implement Sharia to reestablish the Afghan state	Demoralizing U.S. and NATO forces
Tactics	Guerrilla warfare	Proficient use of advanced weapons; suicide attacks and developing an effective media and telecommunications strategy
Recruitment	Ex-mujahideen; students from Pakistani madrassas	Pakistani madrassas; local population who are ideological sympathizers; disenfranchised and alienated communities who see the Taliban as a viable alternative government
Funding	Extortion and donations from wealthy benefactors in the Middle East	Opium trade; donations and extortion
Organization	An amir presides over the operations of three Shura—Supreme Shura; Military Shura; Kabul Shura	Organization comprises two tiers, with the top tier including the Quetta Shura and the HQN and the lower tier made up of Taliban fighters organized into decentralized cells (Jones 2008) and commander-solidarity networks (Semple 2009).
Affiliations	Pakistani ISI and Saudi government	al Qaeda, TTP, ISI

Source: Author, with data from various sources consulted for this chapter.

With the end of the Afghan war and the Pakistani government realizing that their key player in Kabul, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was not of any use, the Pakistani ISI began to support the Taliban.⁷⁸ As a consequence, there exists a pro-Taliban lobby in Pakistan consisting of army officers and Deobandi clerics. Pakistan is one of two countries that diplomatically recognized the Taliban

78. Pakistan's minister of interior, Naseerullah Babar, visited the Taliban in October 1994, and helped the Taliban effort to take the city of Herat in 1995 (Zahab and Roy 2004, 55).

government during the 1990s.⁷⁹ However, after 9/11 the Pakistani government, while lending support to the Taliban has simultaneously aided the counterinsurgency efforts led by the United States.

The Haqqani Network (HQN)

Origins: Surprisingly little has been written about the HQN, an organization contributing significantly to the insurgency in Afghanistan.⁸⁰ Two reasons explain the lack of information available on the group: One, it is a secretive organization that has revealed little about itself; and two, it is widely believed to be subsumed under the umbrella of the Afghan Taliban movement.⁸¹ The origins of the HQN are traced to Jalaluddin Haqqani,⁸² whose achievements as a military commander during the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan have given the HQN immense popularity in Loya Paktiya (Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces) and its base of operations in Miran Shah, North Waziristan. Jalaluddin Haqqani relinquished power to the Taliban in the mid-1990s and agreed to his appointment as the minister for borders and tribal areas in the Taliban government. But he has not fully accepted the authority of the Taliban and has remained an "independent but allied force" (Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman 2010, 4). Currently, Jalaluddin Haqqani's son Sirajuddin is the most senior commander of the HQN and manages the day-to-day affairs of the HQN.

After the U.S. attacks, Jalaluddin Haqqani and his forces retreated to their base in Miran Shah, North Waziristan in the FATA where a network of Haqqani-run madaris is located. Even though widely respected for their role in anti-Soviet jihad, the Haqqanis have faced a lack of acceptance from the tribal leaders in North Waziristan because Jalaluddin Haqqani originally belongs to the Zadran tribe from Khost Province in Afghanistan.

Objectives: The HQN's primary objective is to carry out what commonly is termed a "*jihadi-aligned resistance*"⁸³ to rid Afghanistan of international and government influence. It can also be argued that due to the success the HQN has had in benefiting from foreign assistance from ISI and CIA, a motivating factor to be part of insurgent activity may also be to maintain their position of privilege and influence in Loya Paktiya (Ruttig 2009, 88).

Strategies and tactics: Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend (2009, 9) in their interviews with UN and ISAF sources, have found that the HQN has "demonstrated greater imagination, intent and capability for complex attacks than regular Taliban commanders." One of the factors explaining their effectiveness is their relationship with al Qaeda leaders, who facilitate the HQN's activities.

79. For instance, in 1997–1998 Pakistan provided the Taliban with an estimated US\$30 million in aid including 600,000 tons of wheat, diesel, petroleum, and kerosene which was partly paid for by Saudi Arabia. The Pakistani government also helped with the repair and maintenance of arms and ammunition left behind from the Soviet era (Rashid 2000, 183–95).

80. In the course of this research only three sources provided information about the structure of the HQN and its relations with other actors within the insurgency. See Ruttig (2009); Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman (2010); and Mili and Townsend (2009, 8–9).

81. See Jones (2008), who lists the HQN as a separate group contributing to the insurgency in Afghanistan but who discusses the organization under the heading of the Taliban. Even Fishman (2010) defines the "Afghan Taliban" as being composed of the Quetta Shura and the HQN.

82. See Ruttig (2009, 63–65) for a detailed background of Jalaluddin Haqqani.

83. See, for example, Mili and Townsend (2009, 8).

The HQN has also been implicated in an increasing the number of roadside and suicide bombings in both urban and rural Afghanistan.⁸⁴ Its military tactics include the use of “asymmetrical warfare, and guerrilla warfare using IEDs and mines” (Ruttig 2009, 74).

Recruitment and training: According to Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman (2010), the HQN broadly consists of four types of members: “those who served under Jalauddin Haqqani during the Soviet era, those from Loya Paktia who joined the network since 2001, those from North Waziristan who have been associated with Haqqani *madaris*, and foreign (non-Pashtun) militants including Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks . . . the vast majority of HQN fighters belong to the Zadran tribe in particular from Haqqani’s Mezi clan and its allies.”(6)

Whether the HQN ought to be considered a tribal network or not, is a debatable question. Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman (2010) are quick to point out that the HQN’s recruitment from within their own tribal network does not imply that only those who are closely related can enter the upper ranks of the leadership. Mili and Townsend (2009) agree with this point of view, claiming that the HQN is an excellent example of a movement that has exploited its Pashtun identity to win support for itself. Thomas Ruttig (2009, 72–73) takes on a broader perspective in which he shows how the tribal base of the HQN is a fault line in the Afghan insurgency led by the Taliban. While the HQN only recruits from Paktia Pashtun tribes, the Taliban leadership has recruited mainly from the Kandahari Pashtuns. This cleavage is important because the Paktiwal Pashtuns have openly resisted what is perceived as Kandahari dominance in the past.

Funding: The HQN’s funds come from a variety of sources listed by Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman (2010, 5–6): First, contacts that were formed during the Afghan war are known to contribute to the HQN. Second, field commanders are expected to raise their own funds through donations, extortion, and taxation of cross-border trade. Third, the HQN has been implicated in a number of kidnappings for ransom schemes like that of the reporter David Rohde.

Organization: The leadership of the HQN is based in Miran Shah, North Waziristan, and is often known as the “Miran Shah Shura.” Sirajuddin Haqqani heads the shura, overseeing the group’s political and military activities. He also established a liaison with Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura, TTP, and al Qaeda. Sirajuddin is aided by his deputy commander (who coordinates militant activities) and political deputy (who is in charge of finances and weapons and ammunition acquisitions) in carrying out this leadership role (Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman 2010, 6). The organization of the Miran Shah Shura can be described as tiered with a number of Haqqani family members that form the inner circle of leadership (6). The middle tier of the HQN’s organization is composed of field commanders who typically recruit the groups’ lower tier—the rank and file—and ensure that HQN fighters are properly trained and indoctrinated in the HQN’s religious ideology at Haqqani-run madrassas (7).

Networks and Affiliations: The HQN has the capacity to operate as an independent entity. Ruttig (2009, 88) has noted that the HQN has links to Arab funding, al Qaeda, and the ISI such that if it chose, it could be autonomous of the Taliban. But the HQN has been prevented from taking such a step because it does not have a clearly defined area of control in Afghanistan. Its dominance in Loya Paktiya is questionable, which is why most HQN activities are launched from Miran Shah. Here too, the HQN’s links with the ISI are resented by the local population, which has an anti-Pakistani government stance (88).

84. Burch, “Q+A: Who Are the Haqqanis?” Reuters, March 23, 2009.

Jalaluddin Haqqani holds a position in the Quetta Shura of the Taliban, while his son Sirajuddin is the Taliban's senior military commander for Loya Paktia. Hence, one may conclude that the HQN is very much under the command of Omar. Yet its activities demonstrate that the network is often at odds with the policies of the Taliban. This is because the Taliban wants to avoid attacks that hurt its image of a respectable alternative to the present government. Hence, it seems that the relationship between the HQN and the Taliban may be strained in some instances, but is generally one of mutual benefit. While the HQN provides the Taliban with the foothold in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan, the Taliban provide the HQN with access to operate in areas beyond its local influence (Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman 2010, 9–12).

The relationship between the HQN and the TTP is similarly complicated. Within North Waziristan, the HQN has been at odds with the local tribes, but has been closely allied with ex-TTP commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur. This alliance is useful because Bahadur has a tribal base which the HQN lacks, but more importantly, Bahadur, unlike the TTP has avoided a direct confrontation with Pakistani troops (Fishman 2010, 17–18). Maintaining a neutral posture toward the Pakistani state is especially important because of HQN's links with the ISI (Ruttig 2009, 75–77; Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman 2010, 12–13). Jalaluddin Haqqani was favored by both the ISI and the CIA during the anti-Soviet jihad.⁸⁵ The ISI's support to the HQN in terms of funding or training is not overt. But there is evidence to suggest that the HQN found a safe haven on Pakistani soil because of ISI help.

The HQN's interaction with foreign militants is also interesting. More recently, the HQN has received help from al Qaeda, which has facilitated the HQN's military operations by providing training, weapon expertise, arms, and funding. In return, the HQN has voluntarily provided shelter to al Qaeda militants and hid their weapons in Miran Shah (Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman 2010, 10–11). But apart from tactical cooperation, ideologically the HQN is at odds with al Qaeda. Its Pashtun profile lends the HQN a distinct nationalist rhetoric, which it exploits to retain influence in Loya Paktia and the FATA. It also does not agree with al Qaeda's global jihad or anti-Pakistan rhetoric. Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman (11) have made the observation that it is not clear whether these complicated relationships with al Qaeda and Quetta Shura Taliban are a source of tension among the HQN's leaders and field commanders.

Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, or HiG)

Origins: The Hizb-e-Islami of Afghanistan was formed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in the mid-1970s after it broke off from Jamiyat-e-Islami led by Rabbani. At the time, the HiG was one of the predominant Islamist parties in Afghanistan that was revolting against the Daud regime in Kabul. In the 1980s, the HiG became involved in resisting the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. It was patronized by the Pakistani ISI and the United States to carry out its activities against the Soviet forces. After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the HiG attempted to forge a number of unsuccessful political alliances in a bid to capture power in Kabul. The HiG eventually reconciled and joined the Afghan government in 1996 instead of trying to take control itself. However, this was short-lived as HiG was soon driven from Kabul with the rise of the Taliban and Hekmatyar was

85. The U.S. State Department has described Jalaluddin Haqqani as “more socially moderate” (Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman 2010, 8). Wilson referred to him as “goodness personified” (Mili and Townsend 2009, 8); Coll has documented how the CIA considered him “a unilateral asset” (Ruttig 2009, 73).

forced into self-exile in Iran.⁸⁶ After the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Iran expelled Hekmatyar, who reportedly returned to Afghanistan in February 2002. Although Hekmatyar did not formally ally himself with either the Taliban or al Qaeda, he did pledge his support in the fight against U.S. and NATO forces. On February 19, 2003, the United States designated Hekmatyar a Specially Designated Global Terrorist but the HiG was not designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. However, the activities of the group are closely monitored because it remains an active threat. The HiG's main area of operation is in the northeastern provinces of Afghanistan and on the outskirts of Kabul. It also maintains a presence on a strategic highway connecting Afghanistan to Pakistan.

Organization: During the Soviet occupation, the ISI and the CIA preferred to work with Hekmatyar because the HiG was perceived to be the most organized guerrilla force “in terms of its communist-style, tightly-controlled hierarchical structure, superior recruitment pattern and religious zeal” (Ahmad, I. 2004, 18). Post-9/11, the HiG is still led by Hekmatyar but is considerably weaker, operating a loosely hierarchical organization that is two-tiered. The first tier is concerned with logistic, financial, and political support, while the second tier is made up of fighters and field commanders (Jones 2008, 41–42). According to Matthew DuPee and Anand Gopal (2010, 21) the U.S. military has estimated that HiG forces number between 400 and 600 fighters, although experts believe this number to be closer to 1,500.

The HiG split in the late 1970s, with Maulvi Mohammad Yunes Khalis's faction breaking away from the dominant group led by Hekmatyar. Similar factionalization of the party has continued, with a group led by Khalid Farooqi splitting from the parent organization and choosing to support the transitional regime of Hamid Karzai (Isby 2004).

Networks and affiliations: The Taliban and the HiG have operated in separate areas, but since Hekmatyar pledged his support to the Taliban, tactical cooperation between the two groups has been reported. However, the nature of the relationship between the Taliban and the HiG has been one of suspicion and competition. Tensions between the Taliban and the HiG have worsened in the past year as reported by DuPee and Gopal (2010). The Taliban has made aggressive inroads in the HiG's stronghold in northeastern Afghanistan. DuPee and Gopal (21) claim that even though the HiG stood its ground, the Taliban have now surpassed the HiG as the dominant insurgent force in the region. Furthermore, there are reports that this tension between the HiG and the Taliban has been exploited by the Karzai government, which has repeatedly made overtures to HiG members to form pro-government militias to resist further Taliban expansion. The HiG has conditionally chosen to side with the government against the Taliban to prevent further loss of its influence in the region. But these negotiations have reached a stalemate because of Hekmatyar's insistence on U.S. troop withdrawal. The HiG's attempts to leverage its position have thus far been unsuccessful (23).

Foreign Militants in Afghanistan

Foreign fighters assisting the Afghan insurgency are an amalgam of Muslim extremists, including the al Qaeda forces. According to Jones (2008, 43) the ranks of “foreign fighters operating in this region are made up of two types of individuals: those from the Caucasus and Central Asia, such as the Chechens, Uzbeks, and Tajiks; and those who are Arab, such as the Egyptians, Saudis, and Libyans.”

86. See Ahmad, I. (2004) for a biographical account of Hekmatyar's life.

Al Qaeda (AQ)

Origins: Al Qaeda's roots in Afghanistan can be traced back to the days following the Soviet invasion. During the war, the Saudi government, in collaboration with the ISI and CIA, began transferring volunteers to Afghanistan to help the jihad effort. It was here that bin Laden encountered other militant fighters who would form the future leadership of the Taliban. In 1989, as the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, foreign militant fighters returned to their homes to launch Islamic campaigns there. One of them was bin Laden who went back to Saudi Arabia and returned to Afghanistan in 1996, which is when al Qaeda took shape as an organization promoting a violent jihad.

Since 9/11 numerous books have been written on al Qaeda detailing its ideology, incentive structures, and organizational network (Bergen 2001; Burke 2003; Hoffman 2006; Gunaratna 2003; Gunaratna and Rana 2007). One of the most useful texts on al Qaeda is by Gunaratna (2003) titled *Inside al Qaeda* because the level of detail it provides.

Objectives: The fatwa that was issued by bin Laden on February 23, 1998, conveyed his worldview and objectives. Dorronsoro (2005, 305) notes that his grievances were "precise and political," namely the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, the destruction of Iraq through sanctions, and the occupation of Palestine. In the name of jihad, bin Laden launched an attack on Americans. Gunaratna (2003, 119) states that bin Laden defined short-term, mid-term, and long-term goals for the group. Before 9/11, its immediate goal was the post-Gulf War withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia. The mid-term goal was the removal of apostate rulers of the Middle East and the creation of Islamic states that followed sharia law. The long-term goal was to unite these Islamic states to wage war on the United States and its allies. Bin Laden's agenda was original in advocating pan-Islamic unity, thereby functioning as a catchall group and attracting the widest possible support.

Strategies and tactics: Al Qaeda's success lies in the way it has spread its network transnationally by cultivating agents who infiltrate Muslim communities to recruit, gather intelligence, and conduct operations (Gunaratna 2003, 102). Every al Qaeda operation makes use of the extensive network that it has in place. It does so in three phases: First, intelligence teams carry out surveillance and the attack team rehearses the operation in a training camp. Second, safe houses, transportation, and ammunition are organized close to the target area through local agents. Finally, the strike team arrives and carries out the attack, after which it either withdraws or commits suicide (103).⁸⁷

Suicide is a preferred tactic of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda devotes much time and effort to "programming its fighters for death" (Gunaratna, 122) exploiting the "willingness of its fighters to die to drive fear into the enemy" (122). It has the capacity to engage an enemy on several fronts simultaneously. This is because al Qaeda operates in a holistic way by politicizing and radicalizing Muslim societies. Al Qaeda therefore poses an ideological challenge that cannot be wiped away through military action (123).

Recruitment and training: The military committee, which is a part of al Qaeda's high command, is responsible for both recruitment and training (Gunaratna 2003, 77). While there is no formal procedure for recruitment, it is usually done by appointed agent-handlers outside Afghanistan. Gunaratna (98) lists 14 mandatory qualifications required to be admitted as a member of al

87. For detailed accounts of al Qaeda's strategies, see Gunaratna (2003), Hoffman (2006), and Burke (2003).

Qaeda and its associate groups: “knowledge of Islam, ideological commitment, maturity, self-sacrifice, discipline, secrecy, good health, patience, unflappability, intelligence, caution and prudence, truthfulness and wisdom, the ability to observe and analyze, and the ability to act.”

Al Qaeda’s training program is contained in several training manuals that make up the multivolume 7,000-page *Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad* (Gunaratna 2003, 93–101). The curriculum taught (basic, advanced, or specialized) in a training program varies depending on the mission that has been assigned to a recruit (95).

Funding: Al Qaeda has developed a very complex financial network. Philanthropists, businesses, and other foundations in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are the primary sources of funding for al Qaeda. It operates legitimate institutions, including state and private charities, banks, and companies as front organizations to move funds through the hawala system of banking that evade government scrutiny. Al Qaeda also has a wide network of investments and small businesses so they can generate funds (Gunaratna 2003, 90).

Organization: The most detailed account of al Qaeda’s organization is provided by Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg (2010). Al Qaeda is characterized by, “a broad-based ideology, novel structure, robust capacity for regeneration, and a very diverse membership cutting across ethnicity, class, and national boundaries” (Gunaratna 2003, 72). “A set of vertical and horizontal linkages make it possible for al Qaeda to maintain its extensive organizational network. A high command with a vertical leadership structure provides direction and tactical support to a horizontal network of compartmentalized cells and associate organizations.” (73)

The utility of such an organization for al Qaeda is twofold: (1) it provides mobility and capacity to regenerate (Zaidi 2010); and (2) it allows for both “direct and indirect control over a far-flung network” (Gunaratna 2003, 75).

Al Qaeda’s high command is led by the amir, who presides over a majlis-e-shura (consultative council) and four operational committees—military, fatwa and Islamic study, finance and business, and media and publicity. Members of the majlis-e-shura are appointed by the amir and rotate from time to time. There is no set method of appointment and promotion within the organization. Such decisions are made on merit, ability, and performance, although Gunaratna (2003, 76) notes that family friendships and nationality may also be taken into consideration.

Networks and Affiliations: While al Qaeda’s network is extensive and transnational in nature, for the purposes of this review, we are interested in documenting al Qaeda’s network in Afghanistan and Pakistan only. Al Qaeda’s contribution to the Afghan insurgency since 2001 has been limited to the southeastern and eastern provinces of the country. This is due to geography and to long-standing ties to local militants in these regions.

It is difficult to examine the nature of the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda because both are complex organizations made up of militants that are variably held accountable by the central leadership. Prior to 9/11, al Qaeda and Taliban had a cooperative relationship, but more recently a strategic divergence has been observed. Anne Stenersen (2010) cites two reasons for this development. First, al Qaeda’s core organizational infrastructure has relocated from Afghanistan to the FATA where it has come to ideologically align itself more closely to Pakistani militant groups. Second, al Qaeda’s objectives in the region are not just to resist U.S. and NATO forces, but also to attack the Pakistani government, which is viewed as apostate for allying itself with the U.S.-led War on Terrorism.

Stenersen (2010, 2) argues that there is a consensus in the literature that al Qaeda functions as a “force multiplier” for local groups, supporting them with manpower, training, and propaganda skills. She cites the example of al Qaeda’s relationship with the TTP in the FATA. Ideologically, both groups employ the doctrine of takfir to justify their activities against the Pakistani state. Moreover, the global jihadi ideology resonates with both groups.

In the FATA, al Qaeda has also attempted to cooperate with other foreign militant groups—namely, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and a faction of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU, called the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).⁸⁸ These groups do not necessarily share al Qaeda’s vision and promote their own interests. In fact, due to their divergent goals and objectives, these groups compete over access to funding, weapons, and safe houses in the FATA and Balochistan (Gunaratna and Nielsen 2008, 784–85).

88. The IMU includes Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbors. The group was cofounded by a former Soviet soldier who served in the Soviet-Afghan war. IMU militants fought alongside the mujahideen during the Afghan war, which brought them closer to radical Islam (START TOPs). The Islamic Jihad Union, a splinter group of the IMU, is led by the Nadzhmiddin Kamilidinovich Janov. Their base is in North Waziristan in the Mir Ali area, from which they direct operations in Pakistan and Central Asia.

5

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

In an attempt to sum up the extensive review of religious militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, this chapter briefly discusses the overarching themes and trends that have emerged from examining the ideological diversity and organizational capacity of the active Islamic militant groups in the region.

Ideological Dimensions of Militancy

Ideology provides the shared set of values, beliefs, and worldview for the cadre of a militant group. In Pakistan, ideological differences among the various militant groups play an important role in determining the primary focus of the militant activity. Ideological differences over the issue of Prophet Muhammad's descendants between the Shi'a and Sunni sects have led to sectarian strife domestically. Similarly, differences over the principle sources of religious authority have led to conflict among the various streams in Sunni Islam. Common to all militant groups that are active in Kashmir and Afghanistan is the idea that defensive jihad against non-Muslims and apostates is considered an obligation on all "true believers." However, we have observed ideological disagreements at the strategic and tactical levels. Strategically, there is disagreement over whether the Pakistani state may be considered a near enemy and therefore a legitimate target. Tactically, there is disagreement on the excommunication and the killing of Muslims. We have found that these strategic and tactical differences have been exacerbated by exogenous political factors.

In Afghanistan, the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam has dominated the Islamic movement and hence sectarian differences have not shaped the present insurgency. Although the Taliban are mostly Deobandi, they are supported by Afghan tribes that are less interested in the ideological motivations of the Taliban, than fulfillment of their own interests by allying with the Taliban. Second, the Taliban movement has not functioned as a homogeneous actor. Rather, it is a conglomeration of different networks, and this weakens the role of ideology as a source of unity. What keeps the different groups affiliated with the Taliban united is a shared past and a shared vision of establishing an Islamic state in Afghanistan. In this case Islam is an end in itself. This is very different from Pakistan, where Islam provides the justification for the goals of the militant groups.

Fluidity in Organizational Structure

The fluidity observed in the organizational structures of militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan can be seen in a number of ways. First, this literature review reveals that there is no reliable information on the network of offices run by the militant groups across Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Furthermore, there is much disagreement over the correct number of individuals who make up the total membership of a militant group and the number of active operatives in this cadre. This is perhaps the case because these organizations are extremely secretive and do not reveal their true strength.

Second, two organizational strategies have been observed in our study of militant groups (see table 5.1):

- highly centralized and hierarchical organizations that are typically led by amirs who preside over majlis-e-shura and oversee the functions of the different departments; and
- decentralized organizations that are made up of cell-based structures.

Increasingly, militant groups, especially those that have a presence in more than one area of operation, are adopting the latter organizational structure because it offers several advantages (see table 5.5). A cell-based structure offers increased security, enables a more rapid response, and reduces the need for close geographic proximity.

Table 5.1. Types of Organizations

	Militant Group	Type of Organization
Deobandi	HuJI/HuM/HuA	Highly centralized and hierarchical
	JeM	Highly centralized and hierarchical
	SSP	Highly centralized and hierarchical
	LeJ	Decentralized and cell-based
	TTP	Decentralized; loose network
Ahl-e-Hadith	LeT	Highly centralized and hierarchical
Modern Islamist	HM	Highly centralized and hierarchical
Barelvi	Sunni Tehrik	Centralized
Shi'a	SMP	Centralized
Afghan groups	Taliban	Decentralized; loose network
	HQN	Decentralized; loose network
	al Qaeda	Decentralized, trans-national, cell-based
	HiG	Highly centralized and hierarchical

Third, after the Pakistani government allied itself to the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism, it was compelled to follow certain counterinsurgency tactics, one of which has been to ban particular militant groups from operating in Pakistan. To ensure their survival, these groups adopted different names to be able to continue their activities unabated (see table 5.2).

Table 5.2. Banned Militant Groups in Pakistan

	Militant Group	Date Banned in Pakistan	Front Name
Deobandi	HuM	2001	Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Alami; Jamiat-ul-Ansar
	HuA	N/A	Al Faran
	JeM	2002	Tehrik-ul-Furqaan; Khudaam-e-Islam
	SSP	2002	Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan
	LeJ	2002	—
	TTP	N/A	N/A
Ahl-e-Hadith	LeT	2001	Jamaat-ud-Da'wa
Modern Islamist	HM	N/A	
Barelvi	Sunni Tehrik	N/A	N/A
Shi'a	SMP	2001	—

Fourth, the fluidity in organizational structures is demonstrated by the highly fractious nature of militant groups. It has been observed that splinter groups are often more violent and radical than their parent organization (e.g., the LeJ splitting off from the SSP and the SMP splitting from the TJP). The linkages between the splinter groups and parent organizations have been described as ambiguous. However, more recently analysts are claiming that splinter groups tend to remain under the parent organizations until they have developed independent capabilities (Zaidi 2010b).

Howenstein (2008, 17) and Joshua T. White (2008, 40) have analyzed the frequent splits among Islamic political parties as the result of political rivalries grounded in personality politics, ideological differences, and differences over strategy and tactics. We have also observed that splits have often occurred for the sake of convenience (e.g., Islamist groups like the JI and the JUI sponsoring militant groups as separate entities with which they retain no formal affiliation, allowing them to continue as mainstream political parties). Some analysts have also referred to the role played by the Pakistani ISI in purposely engineering splits within militant groups to undermine their influence, to control them better, and/or to cover the tracks left by its operations (e.g., the JeM was used to counterbalance the LeT's influence in Kashmir) (Zahab and Roy 2004, 54). Other schisms among militant groups have been caused over allegiance to the Pakistani state. In general, we are seeing that younger generations of militants have aligned themselves with al Qaeda and the TTP and turned against the Pakistani state (Brandt 2010).

Fifth, in addition to the fractionalization experienced by militant groups, we have also observed a fair amount of collaboration and merging of agendas. This nexus between militants has evolved significantly after 2006. For example, since the Lal Masjid crisis, al Qaeda, the TTP, and the Punjabi Taliban have been observed collaborating over attacks on Pakistan. Militant groups also seem to be sharing training facilities and information with each other that is seen to strengthen and improve the capacity of the militant groups (e.g., the LeT and the HiG) (Khan, Raheel

2010). While this displays increased strategic, operational, and tactical levels of collaboration, ideologically these groups remain quite disparate. For instance, the SSP and the LeJ are sectarian groups that are mostly anti-Shi'a and are not interested in waging a global jihad like al Qaeda. In Afghanistan, al Qaeda and the Taliban also appear to be diverging strategically and ideologically.

Patterns in Recruitment

In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the primary recruitment grounds for militant groups are mosques and madrassas (see table 5.3). Militant groups, depending on whether they are Shi'a or Sunni in orientation, and within Sunni Islam whether they adhere to Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, or Barelvi schools of thought, either have their own mosques or are affiliated with other groups of the same ideological persuasion that have such control. In a mosque, recruitment of members occurs through interaction with imams and other mosque members.

Table 5.3. Sources of Recruitment

	Militant Group	Sources of Recruitment
Deobandi	HuJI/HuM/HuA	Deobandi madrassas; Tableghi Jamaat
	JeM	Deobandi madrassas; public schools and colleges
	SSP	Madrassas; mosques
	LeJ	Madrassas; mosques
	TTP	Deobandi madrassas; unemployed youth; criminals
Ahl-e-Hadith	LeT	Madrassas; public schools and colleges
Modern Islamist	HM	JI-affiliated madrassas; IJT
Barelvi	Sunni Tehrik	Barelvi madrassas; mosques
Shi'a	SMP	Mosques; madrassas
Afghan groups	Taliban	Deobandi madrassas
	HQN	Haqqani-owned madrassas
	al Qaeda	—
	HiG	Madrassas

Two strategies are used by militant groups to recruit members through the network of mosques. First, imams may encourage parents to send children to particular madrassas for exposure to Islam. These students may later be influenced to seek military training from a militant group that is ideologically linked to the madrassa. Second, speakers from the various militant groups may mobilize Muslims by addressing congregations at mosques toward jihad. Subsequently the pool of recruits may be narrowed through individual meetings (Fair 2004a, 494).

Supra-sectarian groups such as the JI and its affiliated militant groups that do not have control over specific mosques rely on other means to attract recruits. Fair (2004, 494) explains that the JI uses its extensive organizational infrastructure and party-related networks to provide social services in poverty-stricken areas to identify and lure recruits. For example, the Al-Khidmat Foundation provides social services through JI funds. Other militant groups have also adopted a similar strategy for recruitment. For example, the Ahl-e-Hadith establishes support networks for itself through the charitable work done by the JuD, known to be a front for the banned LeT.

The literature on militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan has focused most of its attention on madrassas as the most major source of militant manpower (see, e.g., ICG 2002; 2007a; Stern 2000). However, Fair (2004a, 494) asserts that this link between madrassas and militancy is “hugely over-stated and poorly conceptualized” for three reasons:

- Estimates of the number of operational madrassas vary tremendously.
- It is not completely known whether military training is being conducted at madrassas.
- The emphasis on madrassas has reduced the attention paid to the role of public schools and colleges in recruitment.

Scholars such as Jessica Stern (2000) have emphasized that religious schools are responsible for religious indoctrination and military training and are akin to “*jihadi* factories.” On the other hand, scholars have also addressed the role played by madrassas without jumping to the conclusion that all madrassas provide military training (Singer 2001; Sageman 2004; Evans 2006). These scholars have argued that it is plausible to consider that the madrassa network simply represents an alternative education system running parallel to the state (Candland 2006).

Fair’s (2008, 5–6) critique of the way in which the literature on madrassas has developed is that analysts do not back up their qualitative findings despite the availability of numerous surveys carried out by the Pakistani government and by other national household surveys. She also states that this literature has used only one kind of analytical lens and has not built on the well-developed literature on madrassas in Pakistan including more culturally sensitive and historically accurate works by scholars such as Jamal Malik (2008), Mumtaz Ahmad (2001), Zaman (1999), Metcalf (1982), and Francis Robinson (2002). Fair’s (2008) study of the link between militancy and madrassa suggests that the madrassas are not the most important places for recruitment of militants but that militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan do come from the madrassas.

Patterns in Funding

Table 5.4 summarizes the various sources of funding for militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Donations and contributions from wealthy benefactors are the most common mechanism of funding. Increasingly these groups are engaging in criminal activities such as extortion, smug-

gling, and kidnapping to fund their operations. The criminalization of funding has been aided by criminal elements such as networks of drug-traffickers and crime syndicates like the D-company. Another common way to avoid government scrutiny of finances, these organizations establish legitimate, small businesses that serve as “fronts” to generate a profit for the militant group.

Table 5.4. Sources of Funding

	Militant Group	Sources of Funding
Deobandi	HuJI/HuM/HuA	Donations; sale of small arms to other militant groups
	JeM	Trusts (Al-Rashid; Al-Akhtar); donations; sale of sacrificial animals
	SSP	Donations; Saudi government
	LeJ	Donations
	TTP	Donations; extortion; smuggling; kidnapping
Ahl-e-Hadith	LeT	Donations; wealthy benefactors; Internet; front businesses
Modern Islamist	HM	JI foundations; donations
Barelvi	Sunni Tehrik	Trusts (Barkati Foundation)
Shi’a	SMP	Donations; Iranian government
Afghan groups	Taliban	Opium trade; extortion and donations
	HQN	Smuggling; kidnapping and extortion
	al Qaeda	Donations; front businesses; trusts
	HiG	—

Militant Strategies and Tactics

In both Pakistan and Afghanistan militant Islamic groups differ over strategy and tactics. We have found that strategically the primary difference is over establishing who the near enemy and far enemy is, and the secondary difference is over deciding whether or not the near enemy is a legitimate target of militant attack. In Pakistan, the far enemy is determined by the group’s area of operation. Hence, the far enemy is seen as either the Indian forces in Kashmir or the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan (see table 5.5).

Table 5.5. Pakistani Militant Groups and Their Areas of Operation

	Militant Group	Type of Conflict	Primary Area of Operation
Deobandi	HuJI/HuM/HuA	Jihad	Afghanistan; Kashmir
	JeM	Jihad	Kashmir; FATA; Pakistan
	SSP	Sectarianism	Pakistan
	LeJ	Sectarianism	Pakistan, FATA
	TTP	Jihad	FATA; Pakistan
Ahl-e-Hadith	LeT	Jihad	Kashmir
Modern Islamist	HM	Jihad	Kashmir
Barelvi	Sunni Tehrik	Sectarianism	Pakistan
Shi'a	SMP	Sectarianism	Pakistan

During the 1980s the far enemy was seen to be the Soviet forces. More recently, militant Islamic groups have also begun to attack the near enemy, which in this case is the Pakistani government. Hence, groups like the JeM, the LeJ, and the HuM have been implicated in attacks against the Pakistani government. For sectarian groups in Pakistan the near enemy are members of the Shi'a community because they are viewed as ideologically and politically threatening to Sunni Islam. In Afghanistan, the main difference between the Taliban and the HQN is the debate over whether or not the Afghan government led by Karzai is a legitimate target for militant violence. However, there is a widespread agreement among all the insurgents that the far enemy is the U.S. and NATO forces (see table 5.6).

A range of tactics are used by militant groups to fulfill their objectives. In Afghanistan suicide bombing is the most commonly used tactic. Although more recently, the Taliban have become more discerning in the attacks so that the fewest civilians are victimized. The HQN, on the other hand, is less careful because unlike the Taliban, this organization is not interested in projecting itself as a viable alternative to the present Afghan government. Al Qaeda, like the HQN does not consider the number of Muslims killed in their attacks. In Pakistan, the most noteworthy tactic used by groups like the LeT and the JeM is the fidayeen attack in which the perpetrator must complete the mission even if death is imminent. Pakistani sectarian groups tend to attack mosques as their most common modus operandi. This is an interesting tactical choice because not only is it an attack on a place of worship but also completely indifferent about the number of Muslims who are injured or killed in the attack. This is because the takfiri doctrine justifies the killing of the near enemy (see table 5.6).

Table 5.6. Militant Strategies and Tactics

	Militant Group	Strategy (Near Enemy/Far Enemy)	Tactics
Deobandi	HuJI/HuM/HuA	USSR in Afghanistan, Indian targets in Kashmir, United States, Pakistani government, civilians	Bombings; kidnappings
	JeM	Indian targets in Kashmir, Pakistani government	Assassinations; suicide bombings; fidayeen attacks
	SSP	Shi'a Muslims; Iranian targets in Pakistan	Attacks on mosques; assassinations
	LeJ	Shi'a Muslims; Iranian targets in Pakistan; Pakistani government	Assassinations; attacks on mosques; female and male suicide bombings
	TTP	Pakistani government and U.S. and NATO forces in FATA	Bombings and assaults
Ahl-e-Hadith	LeT	Indian targets in Kashmir	Hit and run operations; assaults using land-mines and incendiary devices; fidayeen attacks
Modern Islamist	HM	Indian targets in Kashmir	Torture; assassinations; raids and ambushes
Barelvi	Sunni Tehrik	Shi'a Muslims; Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith believers	Attacks on mosques
Shi'a	SMP	Sunni Muslims	Attacks on mosques; assassinations
Afghan groups	Taliban	U.S. and NATO forces	Cross-border raids; attacks using long-distance rocket launchers; suicide bombings
	HQN	U.S. and NATO forces; Afghan government	Assaults on urban and rural areas; kidnappings; suicide bombings; guerrilla warfare with IEDs and mines
	al Qaeda	U.S. and NATO forces	Suicide bombings and terrorist attacks
	HiG	USSR; U.S. and NATO forces	—

Service Provision and Militancy

An effective organization is necessary to carry out the day-to-day operations of the group including recruitment, training, and raising funds. Moreover, these groups may also be responsible for the provision of certain services to the general populace beyond their militant goals. There is a well-developed literature which claims that nonmilitant activities, especially in the social sector, has helped to build a positive image of a number of nationally and transnationally focused Islamist militant groups and political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah in the Middle East (Wickham 2002, Clark 2004; Sivan 1990).

Usually two motives are cited in the literature for the provision of charitable services by radical Islamic groups. The first motive is purely rational: extremist religious groups provide charitable services in order to expand their constituency and to recruit new blood into the organization. The second motive is ideological and contained in the principle of da'wa conceived as religious revival. However, the target of da'wa is not just the non-Muslim but also the ordinary Muslim. This is because Islam is seen as both an individual faith and a comprehensive way of life that includes the idea of social welfare activism—to improve the provision of social services where they might be ineffective or nonexistent. Muslims are obligated not only to heed God's call but also to attempt to redress social injustices and inequalities. Whatever the motive, there seems to be a consensus in the literature that some insurgent groups and their affiliated charities fill a void in the provision of state services, especially in the social sector. In the case of Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is not clear the extent to which these groups provide these services because they want to appear superior to the state (in the case of the Taliban) or whether the purpose is to simply provide citizens with an alternative means of access to services.

Policymakers and scholars of religious extremism have expressed the concern that the end result of this nonmilitant, charitable activity is that members of a community may be swayed in the direction of radicalism. Intuitively, this causal mechanism makes sense, but no qualitative or quantitative research has been carried out in Afghanistan or Pakistan to prove this line of thinking. Moreover, an additional concern for counterinsurgency efforts is that citizens who benefit from the charitable activity of militant groups would be unwilling to testify against the terrorist acts of said organizations. But again, it is not clear whether the reluctance to speak up is because citizens feel obliged to these groups or whether they fear retribution in the form of violent attacks in their neighborhoods.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury (no date) has also expressed concern of “terrorist abuse and diversion of charitable funds, assets and services” (1) that may occur as a result of social service provision by Islamist militant groups. According to an open source report issued by the Treasury Department, this can take many different forms:

- (1) establishing front organizations or using charities to *raise funds* in support of terrorist organizations;
- (2) establishing or using charities to *transfer funds, other resources, and operatives* across geographical boundaries;

(3) defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to *divert funds* to support terrorist organizations; and

(4) leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to *recruit members and foster support* for terrorist organizations and their ideology.¹

In South Asia, many of these concerns were aired in the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan's northwest when many militant Islamist groups were reported to have provided immediate relief to the victims, and aided in the management of displacement camps and providing health services in many instances.

Barring a few studies (Wilder 2008; Andrabi and Das 2010; Iqbal and Siddiqi 2008) we have found very little research that examines this particular aspect of militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These studies include a survey of faith-based organizations in Pakistan (Iqbal and Siddiqi 2008); and two reports that were written in the wake of the 2005 earthquake to assess the implications of terrorism and counterterrorism for humanitarian action. To our knowledge no such studies exist for Afghanistan. This lack of research may be attributed to three reasons. First, such research would require extensive fieldwork in South Asia and the funding and resources to do so are quite limited. Moreover, the environment is particularly unstable and insecure, making it extremely challenging to travel within Pakistan and Afghanistan. Second, research priorities have been shaped by the Global War on Terrorism and by counterinsurgency operations; hence, knowledge of the militant activities of extremist religious groups has been prioritized over the nonmilitant activities, the major exception being the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. The third reason is the challenge of actually researching a militant group and its affiliated organizations. These groups are not only inaccessible and secretive, but it is often very difficult to uncover their affiliations with trust funds that collect money for nonmilitant activities. However, it has become abundantly clear that a more holistic approach toward understanding Islamic militancy is required for effective policymaking. Therefore, we have identified the nonmilitant activities of extremist groups as an important area that needs further primary research.

The following are some of the nonmilitant activities that we have come across while carrying out a review of radical Islamic groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is important to mention that we limited ourselves to only the militant groups, even though there are numerous apolitical and nonmilitant groups of similar ideological orientations that carry out extensive charitable work that could perhaps indirectly encourage populations to support militancy in the name of Islam.

Education: A basic service that has been provided over the years on both sides of the border is religious education, typically at a madrassa. Most madrassas do not charge a fee. They are attractive options for impoverished families because children receive free tuition, food, clothing and books (Fair 2008; Candland 2006). According to a study by Asif Iqbal and Saima Siddiqi (2008) madrassas dominate the Islamic faith-based sector. They cite the National Education Census of Pakistan (Ministry of Education, 2006), which states that there are 12,153 madrassas in Pakistan. The census estimates that the share of madrassa enrollment in total school enrollment is 4.6 percent, a number that is disputed by other reports (Andrabi et al. 2005), which claim that it is only 1 percent.

1. See U.S. Department of Treasury, *Typologies and Open Source Reporting on Terrorist Abuse of Charitable Operations in Post-Earthquake Pakistan and India*, n.d., 1–10, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/charities_post-earthquake.pdf.

Table 5.7. Known Publications of Radical Islamist Groups in Pakistan

	Militant Group	Name of Publication
Deobandi	JeM	<i>Islah; Shamshir; Binat-e-Ayesha</i>
	SSP	<i>Khilafat-e-Rashida</i>
	HuM	<i>Sada-e-Mujahid and Al Hilal</i>
Ahl-e-Hadith	LeT	<i>Al Da'wa; Al Jihad; Gazwa; Voices of Islam; Al Rabat; Muja-la-e-Tuleba</i>
Barelvi	Sunni Tehrik	No monthly publications but party pamphlets
Shi'a	SMP	No monthly publications but party pamphlets

Health: According to Rana (2007, 165) Deobandi-influenced organizations that ostensibly are apolitical and nonmilitant provide medical aid to far-flung areas by setting up medical camps. For example, Anjuman-e-Khudamuddin (Organization of Servants), which is affiliated with a faction of the JUI, claims to do Rs 5 billion, or US\$(2007) 80 million, worth of charity on an annual basis. Similarly, the Al Falah group linked to Tanzeem-ul-Ikhwan (Organization of Brothers) is similarly identified. The Ahl-e-Hadith-inspired MDI located at Muridke, in Punjab, is said to have a convoy of mobile clinics and blood banks (John 2005). The Barelvi Barkati Trust is also known to run a hospital in Karachi (Rana 2007, 377)

Rule of Law: In Pakistan and Afghanistan there is evidence of insurgent groups being involved in the adjudication of disputes and provision of justice. The reality is that insurgent groups have exploited the dissatisfaction of citizens over having to wait several years for cases to be heard, by providing speedy justice.² Sharia courts located in the Pakistan FATA region and Swat valley bypass the regular judicial process, basing decisions on Islamic law. ICG (2009) found that those who sought judgments to Taliban-run courts were not necessarily keen on Sharia law or Islamization but instead rejected the judicial structure (jirgas) of a tribal society as slow, ineffective, and unable to provide justice.³

Youth Activities: In Pakistan there seems to be link between student organizations and militant groups. For example, the IJT, which is affiliated with the JI, is known to provide recruits to the HM; or the ISO, which has provided recruits to the SMP. Clearly these youth organizations serve as recruitment pools and as opportunities for talent-spotting by militant groups. But beyond that they have an explicit religio-educational purpose as well.

Media: One of the most common and subversive activities by most militant groups is the dissemination of their message through monthly or weekly publications (see table 5.7).

Trust Funds: We have observed that most militant organizations in Pakistan are either affiliated with or have set up trust funds that are responsible for the generation and collection of funds for nominally charitable activities. The largest charitable operation is carried out by the JI's Al Khidmat Foundation, which is headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed and according to its 2000 yearly

2. Shah, "Shariah Courts Popular in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province," *Asia Calling*, October 16, 2008, at <http://asiacalling.kbr68h.com/index.php/archives/2064>.

3. Also see Haider, "Desperate for Reform," *Daily Times*, August 27, 2008.

report, funded a host of social programs ranging from educational and health-related programs, to relief work (Rana 2007, 428).⁴ Similarly, the Al-Khair Foundation is linked to the Deobandi JUI and the Barkati Trust to the Barelvi Sunni Tehrik.

Trust funds have also been used as front organizations of banned terrorist groups in Pakistan. For example, the JuD is viewed as the charitable front for the LeT, which was banned by the Pakistani government and has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. government. Although the founders of the JuD insist that the group engages in only charitable activity, the concern is that it also provides a cover for LeT operations, collects funds to support the LeT, and serves as a recruiting ground for militants.

In addition to raising funds for terrorists, the U.S. Department of Treasury has observed that terrorist organizations may also use charitable organizations as fronts to cover their tracks. They may also exploit these institutions to move both financial and human resources across international borders in a clandestine manner free of government scrutiny. For example, “JeM is known to have set up two humanitarian aid agencies: *Al Akhtar Trust* and *Elkhart Trust*. Al Akhtar Trust maintains a network of medical centers in numerous city centers in Pakistan and in Spin Baldak, Afghanistan. These organizations were used to deliver arms and ammunition to their members under the guise of providing humanitarian aid to refugees and other needy groups. These efforts included providing financial and logistical support as well as arranging travel for Islamic extremists.”⁵

Since 2003, these trusts have been placed on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists by the U.S. Department of Treasury for financing and supporting a network of Islamist terrorist groups including al Qaeda.

Another such trust fund that also subscribes to Deobandi thinking is the Karachi-based Al Rashid Trust founded in 1996 by Mufti Abdul Rashid.⁶ The Al Rashid Trust describes itself as a welfare organization that has undertaken a number of projects across Pakistan using funds collected through public donations in the Middle East and Pakistan. According to its profile on the SATP, in 2001 when the organization was identified as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist outfit, it had a network of twenty-one branches operating across Pakistan and was carrying out relief activities in Chechnya, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.⁷ Al Rashid Trust’s controversial linkages with al Qaeda and the Taliban have also been unearthed. For example, it is claimed that the Al Rashid Trust coordinates its activities with Afghan NGO Wafa Kharia, which was founded by bin Laden. Furthermore, many of Al Rashid’s activities have functioned as fronts for the Taliban, the JeM, and the HuA.

The Al Rashid Trust is also responsible for the publication of the Urdu newspaper *Zarb-e-Momin*, which has strongly endorsed the Taliban and engages in anti-American propaganda. JeM leader Masood Azhar is a regular contributor to this newspaper. Al Rashid Trust has also been

4. See <http://www.alkhidmatfoundation.org> for more information on the organization’s network of charities.

5. See Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury (October 14, 2003), available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js899.htm>. Also quoted in U.S. Department of Treasury. n.d., *Typologies and Open Source Reporting on Terrorist Abuse of Charitable Operations in Post-Earthquake Pakistan and India*, 4, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/charities_post-earthquake.pdf.

6. It is also known to operate under the name Al-Amin Trust.

7. See more details on this at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Al-Rashid_Trust.htm.

involved in organizing madrassas across Pakistan. The founder of Al Rashid Trust is also a teacher at Darul-Ifta Wal Irshad in Karachi. The organization runs the largest seminary Arabia Islamia in Mansehra, which has been reported to be a major recruiting ground for militants.⁸

Apart from general social service provisions, these trust funds also look into the financial affairs of martyred cadres. For example, one of the JeM's organizational departments provides up to Rs 15,000, or US\$(2007)250, in financial aid and a monthly stipend to the families of martyrs (Rana 2007, 227). Similarly, the SSP has set up a welfare trust to meet the expenditures of its workers who are in jail and those who were martyred.

Relief Work: Three major natural disasters in Pakistan, two earthquakes in 2005 and 2008, and the floods in 2010 have drawn attention to the relief and reconstruction efforts of some Islamic charities and their affiliations with militant groups. In the days following the 2005 earthquake there was heavy coverage of this event in the international and local media that identified the earliest providers of relief as jihadi and Islamist groups such as the JuD, Al Rashid Trust, the HM, and the Al Khidmat Foundation.⁹

According to a briefing by the ICG, these groups conducted rescue operations, established medical camps and dispensaries for earthquake victims, and sent assessment teams to isolated areas (Qureishi 2006). The remote location of the affected areas and weak to nonexistent presence of the government made it very difficult for local and international relief agencies to reach the victims. In contrast, groups like the JuD and the HM drew on their existing infrastructures in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and familiarity with the terrain to reach the victims swiftly. Jawad Hussain Qureishi (2006) explains that these organizations were also at an advantage because they were independently funded through private donations, well organized, used to harsh surroundings and had a large cadre of volunteers at their disposal.

Andrew Wilder's (2008) report confirms these findings but another angle explored by the report was that the humanitarian imperative to save lives led to cooperation between these groups with jihadi ties and NATO. The U.S. government initially suppressed its concerns that funds raised for the earthquake response would be subject to terrorist abuse and that the positive impression of the militant groups created by the relief effort would be a potential recruitment opportunity. Later, however, as media coverage of the events became widespread, Wilder (51) notes that the imperatives of the War on Terror did undermine the humanitarian principles of "neutrality and impartiality of provision of assistance." For example, the Al Rashid Trust was not given food supplies because it was identified as a terrorist organization. There were other reports of Islamist groups discouraged from attending cluster meetings (51–52).

Similar concerns were echoed in the aftermath of the July 2010 floods in Pakistan. For example, *The Jang* (August 11, 2010) reported that a Taliban spokesperson had announced that if Pakistan returned the American aid the Taliban were willing to pay US\$20 million as a substitute fund.

8. This information presented on the Al Rashid Trust is available at the SATP website, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Al-Rashid_Trust.htm. Also see Mir, "UNSC Ban on Pakistani Charities to Cripple Jaish," *News*, December 15, 2008.

9. See, for example, John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "Extremists Fill Aid Chasm after Quake: Group Banned in Pakistan Dispenses Relief," *Washington Post* (October 16, 2005); Laila Bokhari, *Political Struggle Over Earthquake Victims*, Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (November 23, 2005); Declan Walsh, "Pakistani Extremists Take Lead on Earthquake Disaster Aid: International Relief Agencies Are Only Beginning to Arrive," *Chronicle Foreign Service* (October 17, 2005).

And if the Pakistan government assured security, the Taliban were ready to do charity and rescue and relief work in the flood-affected areas. Fair (2010) strongly contested this media coverage by claiming that these reports were not based on concrete and robust data. She cited a study by Tahir Andrabi and Jishnu Das (2010) to support her claims that the involvement of jihadi outfits in relief and reconstruction efforts ought not to be exaggerated. Andrabi and Das surveyed 28,297 households from 126 villages in the affected regions of the 2005 earthquake. They asked respondents which groups were involved in providing relief. More than 25 percent of the households reported that an international organization directly provided assistance to them. Another 7 percent of the households identified legitimate Islamic charities. Only 1 percent (268) of the households recalled groups tied to Islamist militancy such as the JuD being involved in relief efforts.

The main point of this discussion is that even though militant groups have been tied to relief and reconstruction efforts, concerns regarding the terrorist abuse of charitable activity should not obscure the fact that these groups did in fact reach victims efficiently. But that once the initial advantage of proximity to the affected areas was over, the ability of these groups to provide further relief was minimized. The efforts of these groups need not be exaggerated and neither should the consequences of their humanitarian action for the War on Terror.

6

REFERENCE LIST

- Abbas, Hassan. 2004. *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, Army and America's Global War on Terrorism*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- . 2007. "Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan's 7 Tribal Agencies." *Terrorism Monitor* 5, no. 18: 1–5.
- . 2008. "A Profile of Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistan." *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 2: 1–5.
- . 2009. "Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network." *CTC Sentinel* 2, no. 4: 1–4.
- Aboul-Enein, Youssef. 2010. *Militant Islamist Ideology*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press.
- Acharya, Arabinda, Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, and Sadia Sulaiman. 2009. "Making Money in the Mayhem: Funding the Taliban Insurrection in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32 (2): 95–108.
- Ahmad, Ishtiaq. 2004. *Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: Afghan Trail from Jihad to Terrorism*. Islamabad: Society for Tolerance and Education, Pakistan (STEP).
- Ahmad, Mumtaz. 2001. "Continuity and Change in Traditional System of Islamic Education." In *Pakistan 2000*. Edited by Charles Kennedy and Craig Baxter. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Andrabi, Tahir Jishnu Das, A. Khwaja, and T. Zajonc. 2005. *Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan*. Policy Research Paper, Working Paper No. 3521. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Andrabi, Tahir, and Jishnu Das. 2010. "In Aid We Trust: Hearts and Minds and the Pakistan Earthquake 2005." Draft Paper available at http://cerp.org.pk/files/wp/wp_4d3406dce7450.pdf.
- Baweja, Harinder. 2002. "Maulana Masood Azhar: Jaish-e-Muhammad." In *Most Wanted: Profiles of Terror*. Edited by Harinder Baweja. New Delhi: Roli Books. 38–55.
- Bergen, Peter. 2001. *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Brachman, Jaret M. 2008. *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge.
- Brandt, Ben. 2010. "The Punjabi Taliban: Causes and Consequences of Turning against the State." *CTC Sentinel* 3 (7): 6–9.
- Brown, Vahid J. 2007. *Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al Qaeda 1989–2006*. West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center.
- Burke, Jason. 2003. *Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Burki, Shireen K. 2011. "The Creeping Wahabization in Pukhtunkhwa: The Road to 9/11." *Comparative Strategy* 30, no. 2: 154–176.

- Candland, Christopher. 2006. "Religious Education and Violence in Pakistan." In *Pakistan 2005*. Edited by Charles Kennedy and Cynthia Botteron. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chalk, Peter. 2010. "LeT's Growing International Focus: Its Links with Al Qaeda." *Terrorism Monitor* 8, no. 30: 6–9.
- Clark, Janine A. 2004. *Islam, Charity and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Clarke, Ryan. 2010. "Laskar-e-Taiba: Roots, Logistics, Partnerships and the Fallacy of Subservient Proxies." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22: 394–417.
- Coll, Steve. 2005. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, bin Laden, from Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2011*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Collins, Catherine, and Ashraf Ali. 2010. *Battle for Pakistan: Financing the Taliban*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- Cook, David. 2005. *Understanding Jihad*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Crenshaw, Martha 1985. "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism." *Orbis* 29 (3): 466.
- . 2000. "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century." *Political Psychology* 21 (2): 405–20.
- Dale, Catherine. 2009. *War in Afghanistan: Strategies, Military, Operations and Issues for Congress (R40156)*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
- Davies, Will, and Abdullah Shariat. 2004. *Fighting Masoud's War*. South Melbourne, Australia: Lothian Books.
- Devji, Faisal. 2005. *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality and Modernity*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Dorronsorro, Gilles. 2005. *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- DuPee, Matthew, and Anand Gopal. 2010. "Tensions Rise between Hizb-e-Islami and the Taliban in Afghanistan." *CTC Sentinel* 3, no. 8: 20–23.
- Emerson, Steve. 2006. *Jihad Incorporated*. New York: Prometheus Books.
- Esposito, John. 1998. *Islam and Politics*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.
- Evans, Alexander. 2000. "The Kashmir Insurgency: As Bad as It Gets." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 11 (1): 69–81.
- . 2006. "Understanding Madrasahs: How Threatening Are They?" *Foreign Affairs* 85 (1): 9–16.
- Fair, Christine C. 2004. *Urban Battle Fields in South Asia*. Arlington, Va.: RAND.
- . 2004a. "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27: 289–504.
- . 2008. *The Madrasah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan*. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press.

- . 2008a. “Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20: 49–65.
- . 2009. Antecedents and Implications of November 2008 LeT Attack upon Several Targets in the India Mega-City of Mumbai. Testimony prepared for Congressional Hearing of House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Transportation, Security and Infrastructure.
- . 2010. “Not at the Forefront of Flood Relief.” *The AfPak Channel*. September 20, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/20/not_at_the_forefront_of_flood_relief.
- Fair, Christine, and Peter Chalk. 2002. “Lashkar-e-Taiba: At the Vanguard of Kashmir Insurgency.” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* 14, no. 11.
- . 2006. *Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance*. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press.
- Fair, Christine, and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2010. “Understanding Support for Islamic Militancy in Pakistan.” *International Security* 34, no. 3: 79–118.
- Fair, Christine, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2010. “Islam, Militancy and Politics in Pakistan: Insights from a National Sample.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22: 495–521.
- Fair, Christine, and Seth Jones. 2009. *Securing Afghanistan*. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press.
- . 2010. *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*. Arlington, Va.: RAND National Security Division.
- Felter Joseph, Jeff Bramlett, Bill Perkins, Jarrett Brachman, Brian Fishman, James Forest, Lianne Kennedy, Jacob Shapiro, and Tom Stocking. 2006. *Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al Qaeda’s Organizational Vulnerabilities*. West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center.
- Fishman, Brian. 2010. *The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict across the FATA and NWFP*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- Fishman, Brian, and Assaf Moghadam. 2010. *Self-inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions in Al Qaeda’s Periphery*. West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center.
- Fradkin, Hillel, and Hussain Haqqani. 2005. “Islamism and Terrorism: The Ideological Dimension.” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 1: 1–4.
- Gerges, Fawaz A. 2005. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giustozzi, Antonio. 2008. *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 2008a. “The Neo-Taliban Insurgency: From Village Islam to International Jihad.” In *Afghanistan: Transition under Threat*. Edited by Geoffrey Hayes and Mark Sedra. Waterloo, Ontario: Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Wilfred Laurier University Press.
- . 2009. *Empires of Mud: War and Warlords in Afghanistan*. London: C. Hurst and Co.
- . 2010. “Afghanistan.” In *Guide to Islamist Movements*. Edited by Barry Rubin. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

- Goodhand, Jonathan. 2008. "Poppy Politics and State-building." In *Afghanistan: Transition under Threat*. Edited by Geoffrey Hayes and Mark Sedra, 51–88. Waterloo, Ontario: Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Wilfred Laurier University Press.
- Gopal, Anand, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman. 2010. *Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- Green, Niles. 2011. "Emerging Approaches to the Sufi Traditions of South Asia: Between Texts, Territories and the Transcendent." In *Islam in South Asia*. Edited by David Taylor. London: Routledge.
- Gunaratna, Rohan. 2003. *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. New York: Berkley Books.
- . 2005. "Al Qaeda's Ideology." *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 1: 59–68.
- Gunaratna, Rohan, and Anders Nielsen. 2008. "Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31: 775–801.
- Gunaratna, Rohan, and Aviv Oreg. 2010. "Al Qaeda Organizational Structure and Its Evolution." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33: 1043–78.
- Gunaratna, Rohan, and Amir Rana. 2007. *Al Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistan's Tribal Areas*. Lahore: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies.
- Halverson, Jeffrey. 2010. *Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam*. New York: Palgrave.
- Haqqani, Hussain. 2005. *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- . 2005a. "Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups." *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 1: 12–26.
- . 2008. "Insecurity along the Durrand Line." In *Afghanistan: Transition under Threat*. Edited by Geoffrey Hayes and Mark Sedra, 219–40. Waterloo, Ontario: Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Wilfred Laurier University Press.
- Haroon, Sara. 2007. *Frontiers of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Border*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hayes, Geoffrey, and Mark Sedra, editors. 2008. *Afghanistan: Transition under Threat*. Waterloo, Ontario: Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Wilfred Laurier University Press.
- Helfstein, Scott, Nassir Abdullah, and Muhammad al-Obaidi. 2009. *Deadly Vanguard: A Study of Al Qaeda's Violence against Muslims*. West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center.
- Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Howenstein, Nicholas. 2008. *The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir*. Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Research Report 1. Bradford: PSRU.
- Hussain, Talat. 2009. Live with Talat, Aaj TV, April 21, 2009 (recording).
- Hussain, Zahid. 2007. *Frontline Pakistan*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hyder, Afak. 1993. "The Politicization of Shia and the Development of the TNFJ in Pakistan." In *Pakistan 1992*. Edited by Charles Kennedy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

- ICG (International Crisis Group). 2002. *Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism and the Military*. Asia Report 36.
- . 2005. *State of Sectarianism in Pakistan*. Asia Report 95.
- . 2006. *Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants*. Asia Report 125.
- . 2006a. *Countering Afghan Insurgency*. Asia Report 123.
- . 2007. *Discord in the Northern Areas*. Asia Report 131.
- . 2007a. *Karachi's Madrassas and Extremism*. Asia Report 130.
- . 2008. *Taliban Propaganda*. Asia Report 158.
- . 2009. *Pakistan's Militant Jihadi Challenge*. Asia Report 164.
- . 2009a. *Countering Militancy in FATA*. Asia Report 178.
- Iqbal, Asif, and Saima Siddiqui. 2008. *Mapping the Terrain: The Activities of Faith-based Organizations in Development in Pakistan*. Religions and Development Working Paper Series No. 24. London: UK Department for International Development.
- Isby, David C. 2004. "Trojan Horse or Genuine Schism? The Hezb-e-Islami Split." *Terrorism Monitor* 2 (11), [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=387&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=179&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=387&tx_ttnews[backPid]=179&no_cache=1).
- Jalal, Ayesha. 2008. *Partisans of Allah*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Jalazai, Musa Khan. 2003. *Taliban and the Post-Taliban Afghanistan*. Lahore, Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publications.
- Jamal, Arif. 2009. *Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir*. New York: Melville House Publishing.
- . 2009a. "A Profile of Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Jhangvi." *CTC Sentinel* 2 (9): 11–14.
- . 2009b. "The Growth of Deobandi Jihad in Afghanistan." *Terrorism Monitor* 8 (2): 8–11.
- . 2010. "A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir." *Terrorism Monitor* 8 (5).
- Jane's Intelligence Review. 2009. "Tribal Tribulations: The Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan."
- John, Wilson. 2005. "Lashkar-e-Toiba: New Threats Posed by an Old Organization" *Terrorism Monitor* 3 (4), [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=314](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=314).
- Johnson, T. H., and M. C. Mason. 2007. "Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan." *Orbis* 51 (1): 71–89.
- Jones, Seth. 2008. *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*. Arlington, Va.: RAND.
- Karzai, Hekmat. 2007. "Strengthening Security in Contemporary Afghanistan: Coping with the Taliban." In *Building a New Afghanistan*. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg. Cambridge, Mass.: World Peace Foundation.
- Kennedy, Charles H. 1996. *Islamization of Laws and Economy: Case Studies on Pakistan*. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies.
- Kepel, Gilles. 2006. *Jihad: Trail of Political Islam*. London: I.B. Tauris.

- Khan, Aamer Ahmed. 1994. "The Rise of Sectarian Mafias." *Herald*. 27–37.
- Khan, Mukhtar. 2009. "A Profile of Militant Groups in Bajaur Tribal Agency." *Terrorism Monitor*; [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=34729&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=412&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34729&tx_ttnews[backPid]=412&no_cache=1).
- Khan, Raheel. 2010. "Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network." *CTC Sentinel* 3 (3): 7–9.
- . 2010a. *Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Khyber*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- Khan, Raza. 2010. *Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Mohmand*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- Khattak, Daud Khan. 2010. *The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Swat Valley*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- Koehler, Jan. 2005. *Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan*. Jalalabad, Afghanistan: Project for Alternative Livelihoods.
- Kronstadt, K. Alan, and Kenneth Katzman. 2008. *Islamist Militancy in the Pak Afghan Border Region and U.S. Policy*. CRS Report for Congress RL34763. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
- Labévière, Richard. 2000. *Dollars for Terror: The United States and Islam*. New York: Algora Publishing.
- Lahoud, Nelly. 2010. "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Jihadist Ideology." *CTC Sentinel* 3 (10): 1–3.
- Lunn, Jon, and Ben Smith. 2010. *Armed Militant Groups Based in Pakistan's Border Areas*. London: International Affairs and Defense Section, Library House of Commons.
- Magnus, Ralph H., and Eden Naby. 1998. *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- Mahsud, Mansur Khan. 2010. *Battle for Pakistan: Militancy in Conflict in South Waziristan*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- . 2010a. *Battle for Pakistan: Militancy in Conflict in Kurram*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- Maley, William. 1998. *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*. London: C. Hurst and Co.
- Malik, Jamal. 1996. *Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan*. New Delhi: Manohar.
- . 2008. *Madrassas in South Asia: Teaching Terror*. New York: Routledge.
- Marsden, Peter. 2002. *The Taliban*. New York: Zed Books.
- Meraj, Zafar. 2002. "Syed Salahuddin: Hizb-ul-Mujahideen." In *Most Wanted: Profiles of Terror*. Edited by Harinder Baweja. New Delhi: Roli Books.
- Metcalf, Barbara. 1982. *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- . 2004. *Islamic Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mili, Hayder, and Jacob Townsend. 2009. "Tribal Dynamics of Afghanistan and Pakistan Insurgencies." *CTC Sentinel* 12 (8): 7–10.
- Ministry of Education. 2006. *National Education Census, Pakistan*. Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Academy of Education, Planning and Management, Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics.
- Mir, Amir. 2002. "Hafiz Muhammad Saeed: LeT." In *Most Wanted Profiles of Terror*. Edited by Harinder Baweja. Delhi: Roli Books.
- . 2004. *True Face of Jehadis*. Lahore, Pakistan: Mashal Books.
- . 2008. *Fluttering Flag of Jihad*. Lahore, Pakistan: Mashal Books.
- Moghadam, Assef. 2004. "The Shi'i Perception of Jihad," *Al-Nakhlah*, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/fall2003/moghadam.pdf.
- . 2008. "The Salafi Jihad as a Religious Ideology." *CTC Sentinel* 1 (3): 14–16.
- Mufti, Mariam, and Mohammad Waseem. 2009. *Religion, Politics and Governance in Pakistan*. Religions and Development Working Paper Series No. 27. London: UK Department for International Development.
- Nasr, S.V.R. 1992. "Students, Islam, and Politics: Islami Jami'at-i Tulaba in Pakistan." *Middle East Journal* 46 (1): 59–76.
- . 1994. *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2000. "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics." *Modern Asian Studies* 34 (1): 139–80.
- . 2002. "Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan." In *Pakistan: Nation, Nationalism and the State*. Edited by Christophe Jaffrelot. Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Publishers.
- Palmer, Monte, and Princess Palmer. 2008. *Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity and Challenges*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Paris, Jonathan. 2010. *Prospects for Pakistan*. London: Legatum Institute.
- Paz, Reuven. 2010. "Global Jihad." In *Guide to Islamist Movements*. Edited by Barry Rubin. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Peters, Gretchen. 2009. "The Taliban and the Opium Trade." In *Decoding the Taliban*. Edited by Antonio Giustozzi. London: C. Hurst & Co.
- . 2009a. *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bank-rolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books.
- Pipes, Daniel. 1983. *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Pirzada, Sayyid A.S. 2000. *The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, 1971–77*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Qureishi, Jawad Hussain. 2006. *Earthquake Jihad: The Role of Jihadis and Islamist Groups after the October 2005 Earthquake*. International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 46.
- Rahmanullah. 2010. *Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Bajaur*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- Rana, Amir. 2007. *A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan*. Lahore, Pakistan: Mashal Books.
- . 2008. “Counter-Ideology: Unanswered Questions and the Case of Pakistan.” *Perspectives on Terrorism* II (3): 3–5.
- Rashid, Ahmed. 2000. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . 2008. *Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism Is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Rassler, Don. 2009. “Al Qaida’s Pakistan Strategy.” *CTC Sentinel* 2 (6): 1–4.
- Robinson, Francis. 2002. *The Ulema of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia*. Lahore, Pakistan: Ferozesons.
- Rotberg, Robert I. 2007. *Building a New Afghanistan*. Cambridge, Mass.: World Peace Foundation.
- Roul, Animesh. 2005. “SSP: Fomenting Sectarian Violence in Pakistan.” *Terrorism Monitor*, 3 (2).
- . 2005a. “LeJ: Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Ties to International Terrorism.” *Terrorism Monitor* 3 (11).
- . 2010. “LeT and the Strategy of Encircling India.” *Terrorism Monitor* 8 (38).
- Roy, Olivier. 1986. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1996. *Failure of Political Islam*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1998. “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” In *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*. Edited by William Maley. Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books.
- . 2002. *Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan*. WRITENET Paper No. 06/2001. Geneva: UNHCR.
- Rubin, Barnett. 2002. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rubin, Barry. 2010. “An Introduction to Assessing Contemporary Islamism.” In *Guide to Islamist Movements*. Edited by Barry Rubin. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Ruttig, Thomas. 2009. “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity.” In *Decoding the Taliban*. Edited by Antonio Giustozzi. London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Sageman, Mark. 2004. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- . 2008. *Leaderless Jihad*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sahni, Ajai. 2010. “Pakistan.” In *Guide to Islamist Movements*. Edited by Barry Rubin. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

- Salvatore, Armando. 1997. *Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity*. Reading, United Kingdom: Garnet Publishing.
- Sanyal, Usha. 1996. *Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Bareilvi and His Movement, 1870–1920*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Semple, Michael. 2009. *Reconciliation in Afghanistan*. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press.
- Senlis Group. 2006. *Helmand at War: The Changing Nature of the Insurgency in Southern Afghanistan and Its Effects on the Future of the Country*. London: Senlis Council.
- Shafqat, Saeed. 2002. "From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of LeT and Da'watul Irshad." In *Pakistan: Nation, Nationalism and the State*. Edited by Christophe Jaffrelot. Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Publishers.
- Shah, Tayyab Ali. 2010. "Pakistan's Challenges in Orakzai Agency." *CTC Sentine* 3 (7): 12–14.
- Sharma, Rajeev. 2006. *Global Jihad*. New Delhi: Kaveri Books.
- Siddique, Qandeel. 2010. *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for its Growth in Pakistan's North West*. Report 12. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).
- Sikand, Yoginder. 2007. "Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of Lashkar-e-Taiba." In *The Practice of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence*. Edited by Aparna Rao, Michael Bollig, and Monika Bock. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Singer, Peter. 2001. *Pakistan's Madrasas: Ensuring a System of Education and Not Jihad*. Brookings Institution Analysis Paper 41. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Singh, Ajit. 2010. "LeT: Spreading Menace." *South Asia Intelligence Review* 8 (52).
- Sivan, Emanuel. 1990. "The Islamic Resurgence: Civil Society Strikes Back." *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (2/3): 353–64.
- Solomon, John. 2008. "The Funding Methods of FATA's Terrorists and Insurgents." *CTC Sentinel* 1 (6): 4–6.
- SATP (South Asian Terrorism Portal). Terrorist Group Profiles, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm.
- Sreedhar, K. Santharam, and Sudhir Saxena Manish. 2003. *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Stanley, Trevor. 2005. "Definition: Kufr-Kaffir-Takfir-Takfiri." *Perspectives on World History and Current Events*, <http://www.pwhce.org/takfiri.html>.
- START (Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism). Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/.
- Stenersen, Anne. 2010. *Al Qaeda's Allies: Explaining the Relationship between Al Qaeda and Various Factions of the Taliban after 2001*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- Stern, Jessica. 2000. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture." *Foreign Affairs* 79 (6): 115–26.
- . 2003. *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*. New York: HarperCollins.

- Sutton, Philip, and Stephen Vertigans. 2005. *Resurgent Islam: A Sociological Approach*. Malden, MA: Polity.
- Swami, Praveen. 2008. "The well-tempered Jihad: The Politics and Practice of Post-2002 Islamist Terrorism in India." *Contemporary South Asia* 16(3): 303–22.
- . 2009. "The Indian *Mujahideen* and LeT's Transnational Networks." *CTC Sentinel* 2 (6): 7–10.
- Talbot, Ian. 2005. "Understanding Religious Violence in Pakistan: Themes and Theories." In *Religion, Violence and Political Mobilization in South Asia*. Edited by Ravinder Kaur. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Tankel, Stephen. 2009. *LeT from 9/11 to Mumbai*. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR).
- . 2009a. "Lashkar-e-Taiba: One Year after Mumbai." *CTC Sentine* 2 (11): 1–5.
- . 2010. *Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat*. Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation.
- Tellis, Ashley. 2008. U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability and Future of U.S. Policy. Testimony prepared for the Hearing of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
- U.S. Department of Treasury. n.d. *Typologies and Open Source Reporting on Terrorist Abuse of Charitable Operations in Post-Earthquake Pakistan and India*. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/charities_post-earthquake.pdf.
- Valentine, Simon Ross. 2008. "Sayyid Qutb: Terrorism and the Origins of Militant Islam." *Islam Daily*, December 14, <http://www.islamdaily.org/en/islam/6965.sayyid-qutb-terrorism-and-the-origins-of-militant-.htm/>.
- . 2009. *The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: Ideology and Beliefs*. Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Brief 49. Bradford, UK: University of Bradford PSRU.
- Vertigans, Stephen. 2009. *Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes and Consequences*. New York: Routledge.
- Voll, John O. 1982. *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- Waldman, Matt. 2010. *Special Report: Dangerous Liaisons with the Afghan Taliban*. Washington, D.C.: USIP.
- Waseem, Mohammad. 2010. "Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan." In *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia*. Edited by Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik, and Robert G. Wirsing. Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
- Weiss, Anita. 1987. *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State*. Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books.
- White, Joshua T. 2008. *Pakistan's Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan's North-West Frontier*. Washington, D.C.: Center on Faith and International Affairs.
- Wickham, Carrie R. 2002. *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Wilder, Andrew. 2008. *Perceptions of the Pakistan Earthquake 2005 Response*. Medford, Mass.: Tufts University, Feinstein International Center.
- Yusufzai, Rahimullah. 2008. "A Who's Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan's NWFP: Part 1—North and South Waziristan." *Terrorism Monitor* 6 (18), [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=5169&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=167&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5169&tx_ttnews[backPid]=167&no_cache=1).
- . 2009. "A Who's Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan's NWFP: Part 2—FATA." *Terrorism Monitor* 7 (4), [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=34574](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34574).
- Zahab, Mariam Abou, and Olivier Roy. 2004. *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Zahab, Mariam Abou. 2005. "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan." In *Pakistan: Nation, Nationalism and the State*. Edited by Christophe Jaffrelot. Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Publishers.
- . 2007. "I Shall Be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise': The Pakistani Martyrs of the LeT Army of the Pure." In *The Practice of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence*. Edited by Aparna Rao, Michael Bollig, and Monika Bock. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Zaidi, Syed Manzar Abbas. 2010. "The Role of Lashkar-e-Islam in Pakistan's Khyber Agency." *CTC Sentinel* 3 (10): 4–6.
- . 2010a. "The Ghazi Force: A Threat to Pakistan's Urban Centers." *CTC Sentinel* 3 (7): 10–11.
- . 2010b. "Geographic Trajectories of Al Qaida and Taliban Terrorist Groups in Pakistan." *Journal of Strategic Security* 3 (1): 1–18.
- Zaman, Qasim. 1998. "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'a and Sunni Identities." *Modern Asian Studies* 32 (3): 689–716.
- . 1999. "Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrassah in British India and Pakistan." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41 (2): 294–323.
- . 2002. *The Ulema in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change*. New York: Oxford University Press.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND PROJECT DIRECTOR

Robert D. Lamb is a senior fellow and director of the Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (C3) at CSIS and a research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland (CISSM). Dr. Lamb studies governance and development amid conflict, with recent field research in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Pakistan. His current research touches on complex violence, hybrid political orders, nonstate-controlled territories, political transitions, international intervention, absorptive capacity, and alternatives to state building.

Dr. Lamb has presented his work to policymakers and experts in Afghanistan, Colombia, Germany, Greece, India, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; has appeared on CNN, NPR, and NBC News; and has been quoted in *USA Today*, the *Los Angeles Times*, Reuters, Bloomberg, and other media outlets. He lived for nearly a year in Medellín, Colombia, studying gang governance and legitimacy and joined CSIS as a visiting scholar after returning to Washington in late 2009. As a strategist in the Defense Department's Strategy office in 2006 and 2007, he advised defense policymakers on terrorist, criminal, and insurgent networks and comanaged an interagency study of "ungoverned" areas and illicit havens. He earned a PhD in policy studies in early 2010 from the University of Maryland School of Public Policy in a program combining security, economics, and ethics. He received a BA in interdisciplinary studies from Gettysburg College in 1993, spent half a year in Nicaragua with a microdevelopment project, then worked for nine years as an editor and journalist, winning a National Press Club award in 2001, before changing careers after 9/11.

Mariam Mufti is an assistant professor in the Department of International and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma. A comparative political scientist by training, she works on regime change and political participation in hybrid regimes. In particular, her research focuses on the role of the military and political parties in the processes of recruitment and selection of the political elite in Pakistan as a way to understand the behavior of political leadership and regime dynamics. Mariam Mufti teaches courses on domestic and international politics in South Asia and U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan and Afghanistan. She received a PhD (2011) and an MA (2006) in political science from the Johns Hopkins University.



1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199
E-mail: books@csis.org | Web: www.csis.org

