Iraq and the Challenge of Continuing Violence

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It is all too clear that the US intervention in Iraq has not produced the level of effective representative government that US policymakers sought between the invasion of 2003 and the departure of US combat forces at the end of 2011. It is equally clear that over $182 billion worth of Iraq, US, and other reconstruction spending failed in many of its goals, and left Iraq with security forces that face major problems in dealing with insurgency, and have little capability to act as a deterrent and defense against a neighbor like Iran.

The key question is where does Iraq stand, and what level of threats and violence does it currently face? There are no simple answers to this question, and many different ways to answer it. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) has, however, just issued a new report that provides an unclassified US view of recent trends. At the same time, the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) database on global acts of terrorism and their human impact -- called the *Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS)* – provides a basis for making comparisons of the levels of violence during 2009-2011.

Tracing the History and Sources of Violence

These sources are summarized in graphic and map form in this analysis, and provide the following insights:

- **Figure 1 updates the classic trend data on attack numbers and estimates of casualties**. These estimates hide a great deal more than they reveal. The peak in violence during 2006-2008 is so great that it hides all of the trends after that time. They also reflect a downward trend at the end of 2011 that may be as much the result of the loss of collection by USF-I, and definitional problems in counting attacks and casualties using the same statistic base as a decline in violence. The SIGIR test does update the key figures, but there is no way to know the pattern of violence from 2009 onwards from the graph.

- **Figures 2-4 provide an introduction to a different kind of unclassified count that includes a much wide range of violence**.

- **Figure 2 shows an NCTC count of a much broader range of acts of violence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq during 2009-2011. It shows that Iraqi violence was not that much lower than in the war in Afghanistan during 2009-2011, and attack numbers remained very significant.**

  o An NCTC email notes that, "Security Incidents: At WIT, we do not use the term "security incidents" in our database. We catalog terrorist incidents that meet the statutory criteria of the US Code, Title 22, Section 2656, that defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." Within the terrorist incidents that we catalog, we have different fields of information on related subject matter, such as type of victim, location, type of attack, weapon, facility targeted etc. The WIT team utilizes a comprehensive methodology in selecting the open source information that will populate each data field. For example, we catalog total hostages taken."

- o The data for 2004 are not used because, while the WITS database does include data from 2004, WITS strongly urges users to conduct searches from the year 2005. WITS does this because the US Code defining terrorism changed in 2005 and its methodology changed significantly to reflect this change and to include a wider category of terrorist incidents.

- **Figure 3 shows an NCTC count of the total number of victims in Iraq.** These data include dead wounded and hostages, and portray Iraq as a far more violent place in recent years according to this metric than Afghanistan and Pakistan. (These numbers should be kept in perspective because Iraq has a population that the CIA estimates as 30.4 million versus 28.8 million for Afghanistan (roughly the same as Iraq) and 187.3 million for Pakistan, or more than six times Iraq). *At the same time, it is important to note that the levels of violence in Iraq have not been so high that they mean political and business activity cannot function in much of the country, or that it is on the edge of a new sectarian or ethnic conflict. The underlying level of violence is disturbing, but not one that a more unified government and use of its security forces would be unable to deal with.*

- **Figure 4 shows the breakout of "victims" by type of attack. It is clear that the number of killed in Iraq is lower than in Afghanistan, but the number of wounded – while declining over time – has been far higher.** This illustrates why a focus on "killed" is a poor estimate of violence and perceptions of violence, particularly in struggles where insurgents and factions use lower levels of violence to threaten and intimidate the population. The dictionary definition of "casualty" includes wounded, and the official, medical, and NGO emphasis on killed that ignores this represents a major failure to address the human cost and intensity of conflict.

- **Figure 5 summarizes UN and NGO estimates of civilians "killed." While the Iraq Body Count estimates track closely with official sources and seem credible, the other estimates do not.** These numbers vary so much in methodology, definition, and credibility that they are largely a warning against using unproven methodologies with data inputs of uncertain quality. Official estimates are uncertain enough, and the US had to correct some of its earlier estimates to use better Iraqi figures. Once again, the data become steadily more uncertain after 2008.

- **Figures 6-10 track a growing pattern of carefully targeted violence against Iraqi officials and forces, and growing numbers of bombings that seem to be targeted to produce a new round of violence between Shi'ites and Sunnis by focusing on Shi'ite targets**.

  - o This kind of violence can be as critical as much higher levels of unfocused violence because it is designed to produce specific effects in weakening the government and pushing Iraq back towards civil war.

  - o There is no indication as yet that such efforts will succeed, but media reporting shows they have steadily intensified since the departure of the final elements of US forces in December 2011.

  - o It should be noted that the mapping of violence is another critical aspect of reporting accurately on developments. National totals and averages do nothing to

show the patterns in violence, areas where terrorists and insurgents are most active, and areas that they are more peaceful.

o The danger in such reporting is that it does not reveal areas of terrorist or insurgent sanctuaries, supply lines, and where the government lacks control or faces challenges in terms of shadow governments, low level insurgent/terrorist violence, and other problems in establishing security and control. *Two critical indicators are lacking from these data: Areas of insurgent/terrorist influence and control, and areas where the government lacks effective ability to govern.*

- **Figure 11 is a warning that governments are often as much their own enemy as terrorists or insurgents.** Iraq's steadily more divisive government – with growing splits between Arab Sunni and Arab Shi'ite, and with growing pressure on the Kurds – is failing the nation and creating a potential power vacuum that threatens Iraq's stability and unity. While the US has made many mistakes that have contributed to Iraq's current problems, the constant sectarian and ethnic struggles in a grossly over-centralized government structure have prevented effective efforts at economic development, and have a critical impact on security.

  It is also important to remember the "legacy" effect of US efforts that brought exiles into power and disbanded Iraqi security forces, the early elections (particularly in 2005) which most Sunnis boycotted, the lack of basic political and governance capability when Iraq encountered a budget crisis in 2008 because of drops in oil prices, and the fact that the current power struggle at the top of Iraq's government began in 2009 – long before the election in March 2010.

  There has been no effective unity in dealing with economic development or creating effective security forces since the current struggle between Ayad Allawi and his Sunni supporters and Nouri al-Maliki in forming an effective government began after the March 2010 election. This leadership struggle increased sectarian and ethnic tension, helped create economic and social conditions that can encourage violence, and sharply reduced the effectiveness of the security forces.

- **Figure 12 reinforces the Iraqi government threat to the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people.** This threat goes beyond failures in leadership. It includes major problems in effective governance, and problems that threaten the development, effectiveness, and unity of the Iraqi Security Forces. It is also a key factor behind the fact that Iraqi military forces now have many senior leaders chosen more for their loyalty to the Prime Minister than their effectiveness. The lack of strong Ministers of Defense and the Interior may also help explain why the Iraqi military and police have reverted to widespread corruption in selling places and promotion, and the police are increasingly under local control and reverting to a confessions-based justice system.

- **Figure 13 lists the key sources of terrorist and insurgent violence using declassified data developed by SIGIR.** It should be noted that these non-governmental groups include a mix of Sunni and Shi'ites, some of which have ties to Iraq's political leaders. It is also striking that al-Qa'ida in Iraq – which did not exist before the US-led invasion – remains an active threat.

- **Figure 14 highlights the ethnic and sectarian divisions that are the target of much of the current terrorist and insurgent violence in Iraq.** The CIA estimates that the makeup of Iraq's population of 30.4 million is 97% Muslim (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), and 3% Christian or other. CIA estimates also note that while there has been voluntary relocation of many Christian families to northern Iraq, recent reporting indicates that the overall Christian population may have dropped by as much as 50 percent since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, with many fleeing to Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. The estimate of the ethnic structure of the population is Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, and Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5%.

- **Figure 15 shows the disputed areas that are sources of conflict and potential tension between Arabs and Kurds.** It is important to note that the fear that Arabs and Kurds would start a new cycle of violence was a key reason for the failed US effort to keep some troops in Iraq after the end of 2011. At the same time, Kurd leaders have recently played an important mediating role in trying to end the conflicts and tension between Maliki and key Sunni leaders.

- **Figure 16 provides another major indicator of violence: The steady flight of many smaller minority groups.** It shows that the US invasion of Iraq had the unintended impact of driving many Christians and Turcomans out of the country, and threatening Iraqi Muslims that are not orthodox Sunni or Shi'ite.

- **Figure 17 shows the casualty patterns for the Iraqi Security Forces.** It shows that the police remain especially vulnerable, but that the largely Sunni Sons of Iraq that play a critical role in fighting al-Qa'ida and other Sunni insurgent and terrorist groups after 2006 have become a target. This reflects both Sunni insurgent and terrorist group efforts to restore their influence in Anbar and Diyala, and the fact the Iraqi government is doing little to protect former Sons of Iraq, and sometimes treats them as an active or potential threat.

- **Figure 18 shows Iraqi perceptions of the situation in Iraq and a sharp growth in the number of Iraqis that describe themselves as "suffering."** These data are deeply disturbing and highlight the fact that the political conflicts at the top of the Iraqi government threaten Iraq's people, its democracy, and its economy. They also highlight the growing risk that terrorists and extremists may eventually be able to exploit the fears and anger of Iraqis through their attacks on sectarian targets and government officials and security forces.

- **Figure 19 shows the critical lack of support for the government at the provincial as well as the central level.** These data are taken from US government polls and judgments and make it clear that the statements about the success and stability of the Iraqi government at the time of Maliki's visit to the US as the last US forces were withdrawing were essentially specious and made for political effect.

- **Figure 20 highlights the lack of security and quality of living in Baghdad, which has been a key center of violence since 2003, and is critical to the success of Iraqi governance and security efforts.** The CIA estimates that Baghdad now has a population of 5.8 million, or roughly 19% of Iraq's total population of 30.4 million. It is the center of

Iraq's transport routes, communications, media, and government, and – as a mixed Sunni and Shi'ite city – a key center of sectarian tension.

- **Figure 21 shows the acute population pressure that acts to help encourage violence.**

  Data on Iraq's population and key figures like unemployment and income distribution are uncertain and often dated. The CIA estimates, however, that the impact of rapid growth is compounded by the following facts:

  - Total current population is 30.4 million.
  - 38% of population is 14 years of age or younger.
  - Median age is only 20.9 years.
  - Population growth is a high 2.4%.
  - 3.67 children are born on an average to each woman.
  - Labor force is 8.5 million.
  - More than 332,000 males and 322,000 women reach the age where they need jobs each year = 7.7% of total work force, or 3.7% if only males are included.
  - Unemployment rate cannot currently be measured, but is well over 15% -- with youth unemployment much higher.
  - 25% of population was below poverty line in 2008.

- **Figure 22 shows these forces interact with a high level of poverty and an average per capita income far lower than that in the other Gulf states.** Iraq's per capita income ranks 159th in the world – a ranking roughly half that of the next poorest Gulf state measured in terms that affect its people. As later figures show, these problems are compounded by an economy with major structural problems, gross overdependence on government spending and oil revenues, and massive corruption. There is no direct correlation between such pressure and violence, but they unquestionably add to Iraq's problems.

- **Figure 23 provides an overview drawn from SIGIR reporting in January 2012 and highlights some of the critical economic pressures that contribute to Iraqi instability and violence.** One set shows the major barriers to private sector activity, economic development, and job creation. Another shows the level of corruption that not only affects the civil government, but increasingly the security forces and particularly their promotion process.

- It also reflects the crippling over-dependence on government spending as a percent of GDP – compounded by the government's extreme dependence on oil export revenues. (Iraq's economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides over 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings.) This interacts with an inefficient and non-competitive mix of state-owned enterprises to sharply reduce job creation and an emphasis on productive output for jobs that do exist.

- Finally the infant mortality data show that Iraq now lags badly behind other Gulf states in health care. If data were available on education quality, they would reflect equal problems, and the same is true of data housing quality and quantity. Iraq has failed to create a climate of security and development that acts as a barrier to extremism and violence.

- **Figure 24 highlights the extraordinary level of corruption in Iraq.** As unrest in other parts of the Arab world has shown, perceptions of corruption, and of an unfair and unresponsive government, encourage violence, tensions between key elements of society, and sometimes sudden political upheavals.

Putting Iraqi Violence in Perspective

It is important to keep Iraq's current levels of violence in perspective. Iraq no longer faces an active civil war, many areas in Iraq are comparatively calm, and the current level of overall risk is not materially different from that in high risk countries in Africa and Latin America. The main causes of violence also are not the strength of terrorist or would-be insurgent groups, but the failures in Iraqi politics and governance – which grossly exacerbate the economic, security, and social pressure on most of the population. Iraq is not a failed state, but it does have a failed political leadership and that leadership's power struggles, corruption, and inability to govern are the main threat to Iraq's future.

As far too many SIGIR, CBO, GAO, and CRS reports document, the US must take the blame for many of Iraq's current problems. US military successes were offset by a series of failures in nation building that helped trigger the current weaknesses in Iraq's politics and governance, and seriously limited the impact of US and other international aid efforts. This compounded decades of failure by Iraq's previous political leaders, and the impact of periods of war and internal conflict and repression that began in 1979.

The end result is a mix of political, security, economic, sectarian, ethnic, and demographic problems that are both key causes of violence and create a situation that will take at least a decade to fully overcome. At the same time, World Bank and SIGIR reporting make it clear that such recovery is possible, and Iraq could move towards a much higher level of wealth and development.

This leaves Iraq with three main near to mid-term futures:

- *A leadership that continues to be divided and to conduct power struggles at the expense of the nation without creating open conflict within the Iraqi government.* This future would continue the grinding, on-going power struggle between Maliki and his rivals but not so divide the country along sectarian and ethnic lines that it leads to critical some new form of broad ethnic and sectarian violence. This would continue to cripple Iraqi development, make effective governance impossible, leave major gaps in security, make Iraq vulnerable to pressure from Iran, hurt investment, and create the constant risk that the tension at the top would suddenly explode into serious violence, a coup, or give rise to another Iraqi strong man.

- *Power struggle in the leadership that divides Sunnis and Shi'ites, and possibly Arabs and Kurds, and triggers a new round of ethnic and sectarian violence.* The charges and countercharges between Maliki and his rivals since the end of 2011 have reached the point where they could so divide Sunni and Shi'ite that they trigger a new round of civil conflict, or create a Maliki regime that is so tied to Shi'ite factions that Sunnis (and possibly Kurds) will not accept it as legitimate. This could lead to much higher levels of violence, if not a return to civil conflict. It would have all of the drawbacks of the future described above in terms of failed governance, security, and development.

- *Creation of a stable compromise between Iraq's political factions that focuses on the country's needs and effective governance.* It is unclear that Iraq's political leaders can reach the point where they can work together to produce effective governance, use Iraq's resources to deal with its problems and needs for development, and work together to *create effective security forces*. It is clear, however, that Iraq has the petroleum and other resources to support effective governance and vast future potential. It is equally clear that much of the violence in Iraq today would end if the government could focus on making the security forces effective, and reducing the causes of violence.

Figure 1: Iraqi Monthly Security Incidents and Civilian Fatalities: 1-2004 to 12-2011

Note: Data not audited. Totals for December 2011 include data through December 6. "U.S. Surge" denotes period when at least 150,000 U.S. troops were in Iraq.

Sources: USF-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/4/2011, 4/12/2011, 7/1/2011, 10/5/2011, and 1/3/2012; Brookings Institution, *Iraq Index*, 6/30/2010, pp. 3–4.

While about 6,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel and contractors were killed in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn, more than 100,000 Iraqis are estimated to have been killed during that same, almost nine year period.

Iraq's death toll from violence in 2011, however, fell sharply from previous years, with nearly 1,000 fewer people killed than in either 2009 or 2010.

Figures compiled by the GOI show that 2,645 Iraqis were killed in attacks in 2011— 1,578 Iraqi civilians, 609 police personnel, and 458 soldiers—and more than 4,400 Iraqis reportedly were wounded in the violence. The number of Iraqis killed in December 2011 (155) marked one of the lowest monthly tolls since 2003.

Targeted killings of civilian and military GOI officials also continued, with at least 23 assassinations from October 15, 2011, to January 14, 2012. This is down from the almost 40 assassinations that occurred during a similar three-month period from mid-July to mid-October. Some high-profile assassination attempts this quarter were unsuccessful, as the Ministers of Finance, Science and Technology, and the Environment all survived IED attacks.

Attacks on infrastructure also continued. On December 13, explosions damaged three parallel pipelines carrying crude oil from Iraq's al-Rumaila field to a storage facility at al-Zubair. The explosions shut down al-Rumaila South field—which produces about half of al-Rumaila's 1.4 million barrels per day (MBPD)—for just over 24 hours. One week before the pipeline attack, four towers on a power transmission line in Diyala were downed by sabotage, resulting in the temporary loss of up to 400 megawatts (MW) of power.

SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2012, p. 65

Figure 2: Estimate of Comparative Attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan: 2009-2011

	Afghanistan 2009	Afghanistan 2010	Afghanistan 2011	Iraq 2009	Iraq 2010	Iraq 2011	Pakistan 2009	Pakistan 2010	Pakistan 2011
Attacks	2124	3346	2083	2458	2687	1682	1916	1332	1136

Source: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) data, accessed January 18, 2012. Available at: https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0

Figure 3: Estimate of Comparative Victims in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan: 2009-2011

	Afghanistan 2009	Afghanistan 2010	Afghanistan 2011	Iraq 2009	Iraq 2010	Iraq 2011	Pakistan 2009	Pakistan 2010	Pakistan 2011
■ Victims	7588	9035	6874	16869	15108	9342	11984	7097	5378

Victims By Number (y-axis)

Source: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) data, accessed January 18, 2012. Available at:
https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0

Figure 4: Estimate of Comparative Security Incidents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan by Category: 2009-2011

|	Afghani stan 2009	Afghani stan 2010	Afghani stan 2011	Iraq 2009	Iraq 2010	Iraq 2011	Pakista n 2009	Pakista n 2010	Pakista n 2011
■ Hostages	617	953	755	47	56	84	3366	422	367
■ Wounded	4192	4877	3625	13168	11689	6948	5948	4522	3265
■ Dead	2779	3205	2494	3654	3363	2310	2670	2153	1746
■ Attacks	2124	3346	2083	2458	2687	1682	1916	1332	1136

Source: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) data, accessed January 18, 2012. Available at:
https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0

Figure 5: Other Estimates of Iraqi Civilian Fatalities: 3-2003 to 12-2011

Iraqi civilian deaths March 2003 - July 2010

Source: Iraq Body Count

- **Iraq Body Count has been collating civilian deaths using cross-checked media reports and other figures such as morgue records. According to IBC there have been between 97,461 and 106,348 civilian deaths up to July 2010. The bloodiest period for civilian deaths was the month of invasion, March 2003, in which IBC says 3,977 ordinary Iraqis lost their lives. A further 3,437 were killed in April of that year. The group says the difference between its higher and lower total figures is caused by discrepancies in reports about how many deaths resulted from an incident and whether they were civilians or combatants.**

- **Other reports and surveys have resulted in a wide range of estimates of Iraqi deaths. The UN-backed Iraqi Family Health Survey estimated 151,000 violent deaths in the period March 2003 - June 2006.**

- **Meanwhile, The Lancet journal in 2006 published an estimate of 654,965 excess Iraqi deaths related to the war of which 601,027 were caused by violence. This estimate used an extremely uncertain methodology and seems far too high.**

- **Both this and the Family Health Survey include deaths of Iraqi combatants as well as civilians.**

- **An unknown number of civilian contractors have also been killed in Iraq. iCasualties publishes what it describes as a partial list with the figure of 467.**

Source: BBC, December 26, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11107739

Figure 6: Significant Security Incidents: 4/15/2011 to 7/16/2011

5/19/2011
2 bombs targeting police kill more than 25 in Kirkuk

4/30/2011
Suicide attack in Mosul kills 8 and wounds 19

6/3/2011
Bombing of Tikrit hospital kills several

6/10/2011
2 bombs kill at least 5 and injure more than 50 in Mosul

5/10/2011
Car bomb targeting a police patrol in Tikrit kills at least 11

4/28/2011
Bomb attack on police convoy kills 6 in Kirkuk

6/14/2011
Attack on government buildings kills 9 in Ba'quba

5/22/2011
Multiple bombs kill at least 16 in Baghdad

6/23/2011
4 bombs kill at least 40 in Baghdad

5/3/2011
Bomb attack on Baghdad cafe kills at least 16

5/5/2011
Suicide car bomb attack on police building in Hilla kills 16

6/2/2011
3 bombs targeting GOI buildings kill at least 10 in Ramadi

7/15–16/2011
3 bombs kill 13 and injure more than 100 in Kerbala

6/21/2011
2 suicide bombers kill more than 20 and injure more than 30 near GOI compound in Qadissiya

6/13/2011
Car bomb kills 5 and injures more than 25 in Basrah

Map labels: DAHUK, NINEWA, ERBIL, SULAYMANIYAH, Kirkuk, TAMEEM, Tikrit, SALAH AL-DIN, Samarra, Ramadi, ANBAR, Baghdad, DIYALA, Kerbala, KERBALA, WASSIT, MISSAN, QADISSIYA, NAJAF, THI-QAR, MUTHANNA, BASRAH

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, July 30, 2011, p. 8

Figure 7: Significant Security Incidents: 7/15/2011 to 10/15/2011

7/15–7/16
3 bombings in Kerbala kill 13 and injure more than 100

7/28
2 bombings kill 12 ISF troops and injure 25 as they await paychecks outside a bank in Tikrit

8/2
Bombing of church in Kirkuk injures at least 14

8/7
Bombing in Iskandariyah kills 6 and injures 14

8/15
2 bombings in Najaf kill 4 and injure more than 15

8/15
Multiple bombings in Kut kill more than 30 and injure at least 60

8/24
Suicide bombing at a police checkpoint near Ramadi kills 7 and injures several

8/25
Car bombing kills 3 police officers and 1 civilian near Falluja

8/28
Suicide bombing at a Sunni mosque in Baghdad kills at least 28 and injures dozens

9/12
Hijackers kill 22 Shia pilgrims on a bus in Anbar province

9/14
Car bombing near a restaurant frequented by local police in Hilla kills 15 and injures dozens

9/25
Multiple bombings in Kerbala kill at least 17 and injure several

9/29
Bombing in Kirkuk kills 3 and injures more than 70

9/30
Bombing of a funeral in Hilla kills 10

10/3
Terrorists kill 3 at a police station in Anbar province

10/6
Multiple attacks kill 7 and injure more than 30 in Baghdad

10/10
2 IEDs kill 13 and injure 22 in Baghdad

10/12
Multiple attacks in Baghdad, mostly targeting ISF troops, kill 19 and injure more than 70

10/13
2 bombings in Sadr City kill at least 10 and injure more than 30

Note: All casualty data based on best-available information at time of publication.

Source: SIGIR analysis of GOI and U.S. government documents and open-source information in Arabic and English, 7/2011–10/2011.

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011, p. 8.

Figure 8: Selected Acts of Apparent Target Violence Against Senior Officials 20-7-2011 to 15-10-2011

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011, p 60

Figure 69: Iraqi Security Incidents: 10-12-2011 to 1-15-2012

SIGNIFICANT SECURITY INCIDENTS, 10/12/2011–1/15/2012

10/12
Multiple bombings in Baghdad kill
at least 28 and injure dozens more

10/27
2 bombings in Baghdad kill more
than 30 and injure more than 70

11/19
Attack on a checkpoint in Ramadi
kills 5 police officers and injures
several more

11/18
Bombing north of Falluja kills 5 and injures 3

11/24
Bombing in Basrah kills 50 and injures
more than 50 others

11/26
Multiple bombings in Baghdad kill
7 and injure more than 25

11/28
Car bomb detonates near a prison in
Taji, killing at least 11 and injuring
more than 25

12/1
Car bomb kills 9 and injures more
than 20 in northern Diyala province

12/5
Multiple bombings targeting Shia
pilgrims in Kerbala kill at least 20
and injure dozens more

12/22
Multiple bombings in Baghdad kill
more than 60 and injure almost 200

12/26
Car bomb outside MOI
headquarters in Baghdad kills at
least 4 and injures almost 40

1/5
Multiple bombings targeting Shia
pilgrims in Nassiriya and Shia
neighborhoods in Baghdad kill more
than 60 and injure more than 100

1/14
Bombing targeting Shia pilgrims in
Basrah kills at least 50 and injures
more than 130

1/15
Multiple attacks in Ramadi, including the bombing and storming of a police
headquarters, kill at least 7 and injure more than 20

Note: All casualty data based on best-available information at time of publication.

Source: SIGIR analysis of open-source documents in Arabic and English, 10/2011–1/2012.

 "MOD and MOI personnel continued to be targeted with disturbing regularity in 2011. For the year,
about 40% of Iraqis killed were ISF members, including 609 Iraqi police personnel and 458 soldiers"

Sectarian violence and targeting have become a pattern: "On December 22, 2011, and again on January 5,
2012, insurgents launched a series of mass-casualty attacks. The December 22 incidents killed more
than 60 people and injured more than 200. The January 5 attacks targeted mostly Shia neighborhoods
in Baghdad and Shia pilgrims traveling toward the holy city of Kerbala. The attacks killed at least 67 people and injured
well more than 100. Shia pilgrims were again targeted on January 14, when a bombing in Basrah killed at least 50 people.

So have assassinations: "In late November, a bomb exploded near the CoR building inside the International Zone, killing
one person and injuring at least two others, including a member of the CoR. (As of mid-January, the GOI investigation into
the attack on the CoR had not been completed, but initial reports suggested that the bomb's target was either the Prime
Minister or the CoR Speaker.) On December 1, the Minister of the Environment escaped unharmed when an improvised-
explosive device (IED) detonated near the car in which he was traveling. In early January, Minister of Finance (and former
Deputy Prime Minister) Rafi al-Eissawi escaped unharmed when an IED detonated near his convoy. Overall, at least 23
senior GOI officials were assassinated between October 16, 2011, and January 14, 2012, down from about 40 killed from
mid-July to mid-October 2011. "

SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2012, p. 8

Figure 10: Selected Acts of Apparent Targeted Violence, 10/16/2011–1/10/2012: Security Officials

TARGETS/VICTIMS	LOCATION	DATE	CIRCUMSTANCES	RESULT
MOI official	●	10/15		Killed
MOI lieutenant colonel	●	10/19		Unharmed; driver injured
Iraqi Army colonel	●	10/20		Killed
ISF general	●	10/27		Injured
Intelligence official	●	11/1		Unharmed
Iraqi police senior commander	●	11/12		Killed
Iraqi Police chief	●	11/17		Killed; three bodyguards injured
Iraqi police colonel	●	11/26		Injured; daughter killed
Kurdish Asaesh official	●	11/27		Injured; wife injured
Iraqi police lieutenant colonel	●	11/27		Killed; two bodyguards killed
Iraqi Army general	●	12/3		Killed; wife killed
Iraqi police general	●	12/5		Unharmed, at least one person injured
Ministry of National Security official	●	12/7		Injured
Intelligence official	●	12/8		Killed
Iraqi police colonel	●	12/14		Injured
Iraqi Army lieutenant colonel	●	12/15		Injured
Retired intelligence official	●	12/16		Injured
Kurdish Asaesh official	●	12/18		Killed
Civil defense director	●	1/2		Killed
Iraqi police lieutenant colonel	●	1/10		Killed; two bodyguards killed

Legend:
- ✹ IED/VBIED
- Gunfire
- Gunmen ambushed convoy
- Gunmen attacked residence
- Gunmen attacked vehicle with silenced weapons
- Gunmen attacked with silenced weapons
- Gunmen attacked vehicle
- Residence bombed
- Sticky bomb attached to vehicle

TARGETS/VICTIMS	LOCATION	DATE	CIRCUMSTANCES	RESULT
Local council official	●	10/16		Injured; three others injured
Judge	●	10/19		Killed; driver killed
Ministry of Oil official	●	10/23		Injured; driver killed
Bar Association chairman	●	10/24		Unharmed
Mayor	●	10/25		Killed
Representative of Ayatollah al-Sistani	●	10/25		Injured; son injured; two relatives killed
CoR employee	●	11/2		Killed
Anbar Governor	●	11/7		Official unharmed; three bodyguards injured
Mayor	●	11/8		Unharmed
Mayor	●	11/9		Unharmed
Head of journalist association	●	11/14		Injured
Human rights activist	●	11/20		Killed
Telecom company director	●	11/20		Killed
Professor	●	11/20		Killed
Youth and sports official	●	11/21		Killed; companion injured
CoM official	●	11/26		Killed
Mayor	●	11/26		Injured; bodyguard killed

TARGETS/VICTIMS	LOCATION	DATE	CIRCUMSTANCES	RESULT
Senior GOI official(s)	●	11/28		At least one person killed; another injured
Ministry of Oil official	●	11/29		Injured
Minister of the Environment	●	12/1		One bodyguard injured
Prosecutor	●	12/7		Killed
Railroad director	●	12/7		Injured
North Oil Company official	●	12/7		Killed
Ministry of Education IG official	●	12/11		Killed
HJC officials	●	12/13		Killed; several other HJC officials killed and injured
Judge	●	12/17		Injured
Judge	●	12/18		Unharmed; three others injured
Judge	●	12/21		Killed; several others injured
Central Bank of Iraq official	●	12/22		Unharmed; several others injured
Minister of Science and Technology	●	12/25		Unharmed; two bodyguards injured
Passport official	●	12/29		Unharmed
Mayor	●	12/30		Injured; at least one other person injured
Minister of Finance	●	1/1		Unharmed; several injuries reported

Note: This table provides examples of assassinations, attempted assassinations, and other small-scale acts of violence that appear to have been aimed at specific persons or groups this quarter.
It does not purport to be all-inclusive, nor presume to imply the attackers' respective motives.
Source: SIGIR analysis of open-source documents in Arabic and English, 10/2011–1/2012, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2012, pp. 66-67

Figure 11: Power Struggles Ethnic and Sectarian Lines

PROMINENT IRAQI POLITICAL LEADERS' COMMENTS ON ALLEGATIONS
MADE AGAINST VICE PRESIDENT TARIQ AL-HASHEMI

	President **Jalal Talabani** Party: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	"It is true that Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi has been accused, but he hasn't been proven guilty yet, and as such, by definition of the law, he's still innocent."
	Prime Minister **Nuri al-Maliki** Party: Dawa	"We don't want to escalate the situation, but at the same time, we won't show any leniency when it comes to the blood of our civilians."
	3rd Deputy Prime Minister–Services **Salih al-Mutlaq** Party: Iraqi National Dialogue Front	"When flurries of accusations are hurled against the leaders of al-Iraqiya, especially in the case of Tariq al-Hashemi, and the results of the investigation were announced before the court trial was even completed, then it's clearly being politicized."
	CoR Speaker **Osama al-Nujaifi** Party: al-Hadba	"I implore the parties involved in the political process to embrace the spirit of tolerance and harmony and to utilize the language of dialogue and understanding to help resolve all their disputes and conflicts."
	Head of al-Iraqiya **Ayad Allawi** Party: Iraqi National Accord	"Producing many different confessions in such a manner is an alarming matter. It personally reminds me of what Saddam Hussein used to do, since he too used to accuse his political opponents of being conspirators and terrorists."
	Head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) **Ammar Al-Hakim** Party: ISCI	"We have to contain the current political crisis through constructive dialogue and a commitment to pledges and agreements away from public escalations in the media."

Coalition Affiliation:

| Kurdistani Alliance | State of Law coalition | Al-Iraqiya bloc | Iraqi National Alliance |

SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2012, p. 6

Figure 12: Divided and Uncertain Governance

Shortly after the final U.S. military contingent left Iraq in mid-December 2011, a political crisis erupted when an arrest warrant was issued for Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, a member of the al-Iraqiya bloc and a prominent Sunni Arab. al-Hashemi stands accused of complicity in assassinations allegedly conducted by his bodyguards, who implicated him in their televised statements. This controversy came at the end of a quarter that also saw Shia-Sunni tensions flare over the mass arrests of alleged Ba'athists by the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the moves made by several provinces toward greater autonomy from Baghdad. This quarter marked the first anniversary of the so-called Erbil Agreement, which ended the nine-month post-election standoff between Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition and its main rival, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's al-Iraqiya bloc. The Erbil Agreement secured a second term in office for Prime Minister al-Maliki, despite his coalition winning two fewer seats than al-Iraqiya in the March 2010 Council of Representatives (CoR) elections.

The agreement also provided for the formation of a National Council for Higher Policies (NCHP), a high-level policy body with unspecified powers over economic and security matters. The presumed leader of the NCHP was to have been Allawi. But little progress has been made on forming the NCHP, and this quarter several GOI officials told SIGIR that they doubted whether it would ever be formed.

Under the presumed terms of the non-public Erbil Agreement, a Sunni drawn from an al-Iraqiya approved list of candidates is to lead the MOD, and a State of Law-allied Shia official is to lead the MOI. As of mid-January, however, both ministries remained without permanent leaders because of persistent disagreements between State of Law and al-Iraqiya over proposed candidates.

Although the MOD and MOI continue to conduct regular operations, the lack of permanent ministers has slowed some ministry functions.

In November, the Chief of OSC-I, General Robert Caslen, informed SIGIR that MOI and MOD budget execution has been delayed because decisions on major contracts must be made by the Prime Minister. Describing the process as challenging, General Caslen cited some of the problems with the GOI's purchase of U.S.-built naval patrol craft as an example of how the absence of a Minister of Defense has affected the MOD's modernization efforts.

SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2012, p. 6

## Figure 13: Key Sources of Political Violence

- **al-Qa'ida in Iraq**: Since 2010, terrorist attacks have primarily targeted Iraqi security forces and government officials, but they have also been aimed at stirring ethnic tensions. AQI has been operating primarily in regions with majority Sunni Arab populations, particularly focusing its efforts in and around Baghdad and Ninewa, but appears unable to command territory or population centers. The degradation of AQI's capacities is expected to continue under the pressure of an ISF now more capable of targeting, capturing, and detaining terrorists and disrupting their networks. However, according to DoS, AQI has adapted to the changing security conditions, and remains capable of coordinated mass-casualty attacks and assassinations.

- Other Sunni terrorist groups remain active, as well. **Ansar al-Islam**, with both Kurd and Arab membership, operates in northern Iraq. The group has claimed responsibility for the second-largest number of Sunni terrorist attacks in Iraq (only behind AQI). Another group operating in northern and central Iraq, the **Jayish Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi**, emphasizes what it claims to be the religious justifications for its attacks. Shia extremist groups—backed by Iranian funding, training, and weapons—also present a threat to Iraqi and U.S. military forces. DoS reported that attacks by these groups have decreased this year, but their Iranian-supported networks continued to operate throughout Iraq's southern provinces.

- Shia militias in Iraq: Jayish **al-Mahdi (JAM)** and its successor, the **Promised Day Brigade**. This is the militant arm of the Sadrist movement led by cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Since the militia's inception in 2003, JAM has engaged in countless attacks on U.S. forces, Iraqi forces, and Sunni civilians. The group was responsible for some of the most gruesome sectarian violence in Iraq. Early in 2007, at the beginning of the U.S. military surge, al-Sadr ordered his followers to stand down, and shortly thereafter, he left for Iran. Following the military campaign in Basrah, Sadr City, and al-Amarah in the spring of 2008, al-Sadr disbanded his militia. Several months later, he announced the transition of his movement into a non-violent organization called the Munahidoon, but he maintained a small group of Iranian-supported militants called the Promised Day Brigade.

- **Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH, or League of the Righteous)**. Having emerged in 2006 AAH, led by Qais al-Khazali, who broke with al-Sadr and was officially named the leader of the Iranian backed AAH. Khazali's fighters traveled to Iran for special training by the Revolutionary Guards and members of the Lebanese Hezbullah. They received four to six weeks of training in the camps in the use of mortars, rockets, sniper tactics, intelligence gathering, kidnapping operations, and explosively-formed penetrators. AAH conducted attacks on Coalition forces from as early as the summer of 2006 and continues intermittently, also engaging in kidnappings and sectarian violence.

- **Kata'ib Hezbullah (KH, or the Hezbullah Brigades).** Active in Iraq since 2007, KH operates mainly in Shia areas of Baghdad, such as Sadr City, and throughout southern Iraq. Like AAH and the Promised Day Brigade, it is supported by Iran. KH is independent from Muqtada al-Sadr and has operated separately since its inception, albeit with some cooperation and operational overlap. Since 2007, KH members have conducted multiple attacks against U.S. forces using rocket-propelled grenades and improvised rocket-assisted mortars. Since the beginning of 2011, the majority of Iranian-backed attacks have occurred in southern Iraq, with sporadic incidents taking place in northern provinces and in Baghdad. Toward the end of the quarter, Iran-sponsored attacks in northern provinces appeared to be subsiding, although USF-I officials reported that these networks still possess the capacity to conduct such operations.

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011, pp. 41, 56-57

Figure 14: Ethnic and Sectarian Tensions Contributing to Violence

REGIONALISM IN IRAQ

Note: The map is not intended to indicate uniformity of opinion in any province. This quarter, some politicians in Ninewa and Thi-Qar also spoke in favor of obtaining greater autonomy from Baghdad.

Source: SIGIR analysis of open-source documents in Arabic and English, 2008–2012.

SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2012, p. 5

Figure 15: Kurdistan Region and Disputed Territories

KURDISTAN REGION AND THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES

Note: All locations approximate and do not imply endorsement or acceptance.

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011, p 89

Figure 16: The Impact of Violence on Smaller Minorities

POPULATION ESTIMATES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ, 2003 AND 2011

		2003	2011
Christians	Predominantly Assyrian, Chaldean, Armenian, and Syriac; most live in or around the Kurdistan Region; a small number of Armenians live in Basrah.	1.4 million	400,000 to 600,000
Turkmen	Descendants of Ottoman Empire-era soldiers and traders, about 60% of Turkmen are Sunni Muslim and the rest are Shia.	800,000	200,000
Sabaeans	Gnostics who follow John the Baptist, Sabaeans do not accept converts and must live near a river to observe religious rites; concentrated in southern Iraq.	60,000 to 70,000	5,000 to 10,000
Yazidis	Ancient group with religious traditions drawn from Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism; Yazidis do not accept converts or marry outside the faith; concentrated around Sinjar Mountain west of Mosul.	600,000 to 700,000	Less than 500,000
Shabaks	Most identify as Shia and the rest as Sunni, but do not observe all pillars of Islam and draw religious traditions from Yazidis and Sufism. Shabaks have lived along the Ninewa Plains since 1502.	400,000 to 500,000	200,000 to 500,000
Feyli Kurds	Ethnically Kurdish Shia, the Feyli live mainly in Diyala province along the Iranian border, in Baghdad, and in Iran. Under Saddam Hussein's regime, they were stripped of Iraqi citizenship.	1 million to 1.5 million	100,000 to 120,000
Kaka'is	Kurds who speak their own dialect, Kaka'is draw religious traditions from Yazidis, Zoroastrianism, and Shia Islam. They live primarily in Kirkuk and Mosul.	200,000	60,000 to 70,000

Note: Some population estimates were obtained from community leaders who met with the Minority Rights Group International; others were taken from SIGIR interviews with community leaders and U.S. government reports.

Sources: DRL, *International Religious Freedom Reports, 2006 and 2010*, www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/2010/148821.htm, accessed 6/5/2011; SIGIR interviews with members of Sabaean community, 6/29/2011; Minority Rights Group International Report, "Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of Iraq's Minorities," 2010; Minority Rights Group International, information provided to SIGIR, 10/18/2011.

Figure 17: SOI & Family, Iraqi Police, and Iraqi Army Casualties, 10/2011–12/2011


Source: GOI, MOI, Information provided to SIGIR, 1/22/2012.

Over the last several years, Awakening/ Sons of Iraq (SOI)-affiliated personnel and their family members have been targeted for assassination. This quarter, at least 91 were killed and 54 wounded in a series of violent attacks.

The SOI program began as a U.S.-funded effort to pay former (mostly Sunni) insurgents to support the U.S. military and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in providing security services in their communities. Many SOI members were drawn from the ranks of the *Sahwa* (or "Awakening") movement, which turned against al-Qa'ida-backed terrorists beginning in late 2006 and early 2007. The GOI assumed full responsibility for the program in April 2009

SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2012, pp. 65-68

Figure 18: Iraqis Perceptions of Their Lives: 2008-2011

Percentages of Iraqis Who Say They Are "Suffering" or "Thriving"

Note: Survey was taken of Iraqi adults (age 15 and older).

Source: Stafford Nichols, Gallup, "'Suffering' in Iraq Highest Since 2008," 1/9/2012, www.gallup.com/poll/151940/Suffering-Iraq-Highest-2008.aspx, accessed 1/12/2011.

The results of two surveys, both taken in 2011 before the final drawdown of U.S. troops, portray a relatively high level of discontent among the people of Iraq. One survey found that 25% of the 1,000 Iraqis interviewed in September considered themselves to be "suffering" (as opposed to "thriving" or "struggling"), up from 14% less than a year earlier).

According to Gallup, the percentage of Iraqis who rate their lives this poorly is among the highest in the Middle East and North Africa region. The percentage who said they were "thriving"—just 7%—is among the lowest in the region.

The number of Iraqis who reported experiencing stress during much of the day preceding their survey doubled between June 2008 and September 2011, rising from 34% to 70%. The percentage experiencing anger increased from 38% to 60% over the same period.

Earlier in the year, a more comprehensive survey of the 28,875 Iraqi households provided additional details on specific areas of concern. The Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) survey is part of a socioeconomic monitoring system being developed by the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC). Its aim is to provide reliable data for planning and improving government services. Partial results of the survey were released in December and included the following:[211]

> • Almost 8 out of 10 households rated electricity service as "bad" or "very bad," and 6 out of 10 rated their sanitation facilities in one of those, categories.
>
> • 57% of adults (age 15 and older) said they were neither working nor looking for work.
>
> • More than half felt that corruption had become more prevalent in the previous two years.

SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2012, p. 62

Figure 19: Provincial Governance: Dissatisfaction with Basic Services as a Potential Cause of Civil Unrest by Province

Very Stable

Stable

Moderately Stable

Moderately Unstable

Very Unstable

Note: Rankings are from U.S. Embassy-Baghdad's Stability Development Roadmap, an assessment model that analyzes public opinion about several areas of concern, including basic services, to estimate the potential for civil unrest resulting from these perceptions.

Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 7/5/2011.

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, July 30, 2011, p. 94

Figure 20: Iraqi Perceptions of Their Lives: 2008-2011

Mercer Survey Ranking Quality of Living and Safety in Vaghdad Relative to Other Countries Around the World

Quality of Living

RANKING	CITY	COUNTRY
1	Vienna	Austria
29	Honolulu[a]	United States
74	Dubai[b]	United Arab Emirates
126	Amman	Jordan
135	Cairo	Egypt
157	Riyadh	Saudi Arabia
170	Beirut	Lebanon
179	Damascus	Syria
187	Tehran	Iran
221	**Baghdad**	**Iraq**

[a] Highest-ranking U.S. city
[b] Highest-ranking Middle East city

Personal Safety

RANKING	CITY	COUNTRY
1	Luxembourg	Luxembourg
23	Abu Dhabi[a]	United Arab Emirates
39	Dubai	United Arab Emirates
53	Chicago[b]	United States
123	Amman	Jordan
145	Riyadh	Saudi Arabia
176	Cairo	Egypt
191	Damascus	Syria
203	Beirut	Lebanon
221	**Baghdad**	**Iraq**

[a] Highest-ranking Middle East city
[b] Highest-ranking U.S. city

Sources: Mercer, press releases, "2011 Quality of Living Worldwide City Rankings—Mercer Survey," 11/29/2011, www.mercer.com/ press-releases/quality-of-living-report-2011, accessed 1/4/2012, and Mercer, "Mercer 2011 Quality of Living Survey Highlights—Defining 'Quality of Living,'" www.mercer.com/articles/quality-of-living-definition-1436405, accessed 12/1/2011.

SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2012, p. 63

Figure 21: Demographic Pressures as a Source of Violence

Iraqi Population (Historical and Projected)

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Iraqi Population (Historical and Projected)	5,163	6,822	9,414	13,233	18,140	22,679	29,672	36,889	43,831	50,455	56,316

Y-axis: Iraqi Population (in thousands)

Figure 22: Iraqi Per Capita Income vs. Other OPEC Countries

	Algeria	Libya	Iran	Iraq	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Yemen
Per Capita Income	7,300	14,000	10,600	3,800	48,900	25,600	179,000	24,200	49,600	2,700
World Ranking	127	83	104	159	10	54	1	55	9	172
Per Capita Oil Export Income										
2010	1,540	6,837	1,085	1,686	21,416	0	38,281	7,685	13,508	0
January-July 2011	1,169	1,339	826	1,335	16,702	0	33,400	6,081	11,120	0

Source: Per Capita income data are taken from the CIA, World Factbook, 2012, accessed 31.1.2012;

The petroleum export income per capita data are taken from the EIA, OPEC Revenue Factsheet, updated as of August 2011. The 2011 data cover only the first six months of 2011.

Figure 22: Iraqi Per Captia Income vs. Other OPEC Countries

|	Algeria	Libya	Iran	Iraq	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Yemen
☐ Per Capita Income	7,300	14,000	10,600	3,800	48,900	25,600	179,000	24,200	49,600	2,700
☐ World Ranking	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
☐ Per Capita Oil Export Income										
☐ --2010	1,540	6,837	1,085	1,686	21,416	0	38,281	7,685	13,508	0
☐ --Jan-Jul 2011	1,169	1,339	826	1,335	16,702	0	33,400	6,081	11,120	0

Source: Per Capita income data are taken from the CIA, World Factbook, 2012, accessed 31.1.2012;

The petroleum export income per capita data are taken from the EIA, OPEC Revenue Factsheet, updated as of August 2011. The 2011 data cover only the first six months of 2011

## Figure 23: Material Indicators

Shaping Iraqi Perceptions: Iraq vs. Other Countries


WORLD BANK RANKINGS, IRAQ VS. OTHER COUNTRIES

Source: World Bank, "Doing Business 2012," www.doingbusiness.org/rankings, accessed 12/12/2011.

WORLD BANK MEASURE OF THE ABILITY TO CONTROL CORRUPTION, IRAQ VS. OTHER COUNTRIES

Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp, accessed 12/12/2011.

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, PROJECTED FOR 2012, IRAQ VS. OTHER COUNTRIES

CHILD MORTALITY RATE, IRAQ VS. OTHER COUNTRIES
Deaths per 1,000 Live Births

SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2012, pp. 76, 92, 96

Figure 24: The Corruption Factor: Region's Worst

Estimate of Comparative Levels of Middle Eastern Corruption for 2010

World Rank	Regional Rank	Country	CPI 2010 Score	90% Confidence Interval Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Surveys Used
19	1	Qatar	7.7	6.6	8.6	7
28	2	UAE	6.3	5.4	7.3	5
30	3	Israel	6.1	5.7	6.6	6
41	4	Oman	5.3	4.1	6.4	5
48	5	Bahrain	4.9	4.1	5.7	5
50	6	Jordan	4.7	4.0	5.5	7
50	6	Saudi Arabia	4.7	3.3	6.0	5
54	8	Kuwait	4.5	3.3	5.9	5
59	9	Tunisia	4.3	3.0	5.6	6
85	10	Morocco	3.4	2.9	3.9	6
91	11	Djibouti	3.2	2.1	4.7	3
98	12	Egypt	3.1	2.9	3.4	6
105	13	Algeria	2.9	2.6	3.2	6
127	14	Lebanon	2.5	2.0	2.9	4
127	14	Syria	2.5	2.1	2.8	5
146	16	Iran	2.2	2.0	2.4	6
146	16	Yemen	2.2	2.0	2.5	4
175	**19**	**Iraq**	**1.5**	**1.2**	**1.9**	**3**

Note: 1.0 = most corrupt; 10 = least corrupt   Source: Transparency International, *Corruptions Perceptions Index 2010.*
Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. This definition encompasses corrupt practices in both the public and private sectors. The *Corruption Perceptions Index* (CPI) ranks countries according to perception of corruption in the public sector. The CPI is an aggregate indicator that combines different sources of information about corruption, making it possible to compare countries.

The 2010 CPI draws on different assessments and business opinion surveys carried out by independent and reputable institutions. It captures information about the administrative and political aspects of corruption. Broadly speaking, the surveys and assessments used to compile the index include questions relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts.
For a country or territory to be included in the index a minimum of three of the sources that TI uses must assess that country. Thus inclusion in the index depends solely on the availability of information. Perceptions are used because corruption – whether frequency or amount – is to a great extent a hidden activity that is difficult to measure. Over time, perceptions have proved to be a reliable estimate

Perceptions are used because corruption – whether frequency or amount– is to a great extent a hidden activity that is difficult to measure. Over time, perceptions have proved to be a reliable estimate of corruption. Measuring scandals, investigations or prosecutions, while offering 'non-perception' data, reflect less on the prevalence of corruption in a country and more on other factors, such as freedom of the press or the efficiency of the judicial system. TI considers it of critical importance to measure both corruption and integrity, and to do so in the public and private sectors at global, national and local levels.2 The CPI is therefore one of many TI measurement tools that serve the fight against corruption.