

# **Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER)**

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## **CE AMIR UMAROV DECLARES MORATORIUM ON ATTACKS TARGETTING CIVILIANS**

CE amir Dokku 'Abu Usman' Umarov issued a video statement posted on the official CE website Kavkaz tsentr on February 3<sup>rd</sup> calling on the CE mujahedin for a moratorium on attacks targeting civilians in Russia. The four-minute video, titled 'The Order of the Amir of the Caucasus Emirate Dokku Abu Usman Regarding the Question of the Status of the Civilian Population of Russia' ('Prikaz Amira Emirata Kavkaz Dokku Abu Usman po voprosu o statuse grazhdanskogo naseleniya Rossii'), shows Umarov with two unidentified mujahedin sitting on each side of him.<sup>1</sup> After his opening prayer, Umarov states:

The present events in Russia show that the civilian population does not support Putin's chekist regime, does not support those dark forces and that the peaceful population is the hostage of the same regime that is brutally fighting against Islam on the territory of the Caucasus. Given these ongoing events we are obliged to protect the civilian population because our Our Prophet teaches us that if the peaceful population does not take part in the war against Muslims or does not support those dark forces who fight against Islam, then it is really a peaceful population. And

<sup>1</sup> "Amir IK Dokku Abu Usman izmenil status naselenie Rossii i ot dal prokaz izbegat atak na grazhdanskies tseli," *Kavkaz tsentr*, 3 February 2012, 01:06, [www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml](http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml).

therefore our religion orders us to protect that peaceful population and not to touch that peaceful population.<sup>2</sup>

Because Russia's civilian population is supposedly held "hostage" by the Russian government, Umarov announces that he is "ordering all special groups that are conducting or are preparing to conduct special operations on the territory of Russia to limit them if the peaceful population of Russia could suffer in those operations and to carry out special operations precisely against the siloviki, against special services, and against those dark forces who serve as bureaucrats and by their words and deeds do harm to Islam and are enemies of Islam, and against national traitors."<sup>3</sup>

The text accompanying the video supposedly provided by the "Press Service of the Amir of the Caucasus Emirate" elaborated somewhat on Umarov's declaration. It read as follows:

*Caucasus Emirate's Amir Dokku Abu Usman changed the status of civilian population in Russia and gave an order to avoid attacks on civilian targets due to a process of civil protest that began in Russia and the fact that the people no longer accept Putin's policy.*

*This may mean that the citizens of Russia - among other things - no longer support the barbarous methods of war used in the Caucasus Emirate and authorized by Putin and his clique.*

*In this case, the civilian population of Russia is to be left outside the category of aggressor.*

*This means that the population of Russia has a choice:*

*Either to support the regime or to choose another (new or old) one, which will continue the previous policy in the Caucasus and [in this case] to fall again in the category of aggressor with the corresponding consequences, or to act resolutely against the policy of murder and terror perpetrated against innocent civilians in the Caucasus.*

*In this case, the civilian population of Russia will protect itself from Mujahedin attacks. This moratorium does not apply to military and political structures of the belligerent state.*

*Similarly, this moratorium does not apply to the belligerent state itself, which will not be safe from the Mujahedin's attacks until [there is] a truce.*

*Dokku Abu Usman made a special statement in this regard. The CE Amir promulgated an order binding for all subunits of the Mujahedin forces, including special-operational groups operating inside Russia.*

*Amir Dokku Abu Usman ordered the Mujahedin to attack selective targets in Russia, law enforcement structures, the military, intelligence services and political leadership of Russia.*

*If, after the promulgation of this order, an attack takes place against civilian targets, then it will be regarded as a provocation from the dying KGB regime.<sup>4</sup>*

Umarov's move is a clear attempt to make common cause with the Russian 'white revolution' opposition movement against the Russian government in the hope that some opposition elements might take up arms against the regime in effect alongside the CE mujahedin. This move might also have been undertaken in

<sup>2</sup> "Amir IK Dokku Abu Usman izmenil status naselenie Rossii i otdal prokaz izbegat atak na grazhdanskies tseli," *Kavkaz tsentr*, 3 February 2012, 01:06, [www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml](http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml).

<sup>3</sup> "Amir IK Dokku Abu Usman izmenil status naselenie Rossii i otdal prokaz izbegat atak na grazhdanskies tseli," *Kavkaz tsentr*, 3 February 2012, 01:06, [www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml](http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml).

<sup>4</sup> "Amir IK Dokku Abu Usman izmenil status naselenie Rossii i otdal prokaz izbegat atak na grazhdanskies tseli," *Kavkaz tsentr*, 3 February 2012, 01:06, [www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml](http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml).

the hope that some might convert to Islam and join the CE's jihad and that the opposition might make concessions to the mujahedin should the white revolution remove the present leadership and come to power. This is suggested by his reference to the Prophet teaching that mujahedin should 'protect the peaceful population' if it does not support Islam's opponents. This would contrast with any violent crackdown on the opposition protests that could possibly occur.

In addition to being a political and propaganda ploy, Umarov's move could also be driven by necessity. Although Umarov promised tens of suicide bombings in the wake of the January 2011 suicide bombing of Moscow's Domodedovo Airport that he ordered, the number of successful suicide attacks fell precipitously in 2011. There were only 6 successful attacks, the last one occurring on August 30<sup>th</sup> in Chechnya's capitol Grozny. By comparison, there were 16 successful attacks in 2009 and 14 in 2010. The sharp decline in the number of suicide bombings could be due to a dearth of recruits willing to terminate their lives on Umarov's orders in order to kill innocent civilians. The gap between Umarov's words of threat and this year's actual deeds of *istishkhad* (jihadi martyrdom) might have prompted Umarov to cover up this failure by calling what would be in effect a moratorium on *istishkhad* attacks until such time as the political situation in Russia resolves itself one way or another. In the meantime, the mujahedin can work on replenishing the ranks of the CE's suicide bombing brigades, especially the notorious Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs' Brigade resuscitated in spring 2009 after a hiatus of several years.

The reference in the *Kavkaz tsentr* commentary that accompanied the video statement's posting that any attack that occurs targeting civilians will be a "KGB" provocation is perhaps an attempt to make an opportunity out of necessity. In the event that one or more CE vilaiyat, sector, or jamaat undertakes such an attack, the Russian administration's opponents both in Russia, the West, and the Muslim world will have a ready-made argument to back up the inevitable charges that the Russians were behind the attacks. It cannot be excluded that this is precisely the purpose of the statement, and a provocation targeting the white revolution demonstrations would be ideal from the point of view of destabilizing Russia; this would play right into the hands of the mujahedin. Indeed, if the demonstrations should fail to change Russia's political scene or bring an opportunity for the CE, Umarov can use any old or newly acquired ethnic Russian mujahedin to help circumvent security measures and infiltrate a demonstration. The last two years' several successful and would-be ethnic Russian suicide bombers who have joined the CE jihad testify to this risk.

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## MAJOR CLASH BETWEEN MUJAHEDIN AND SILOVIKI IN VEDENO, CHECHNYA

In Chechnya, the year 2012 began with an open battle between the mujahedin of the CE's Chechen network, the Nokchicho Vilaiyat (NV), and Chechen Republic MVD police and security forces in the republic's Vedeni Raion. This was the largest attack in Chechnya since the 19 October 2010 attack on the Chechen parliament. According to official reports, 4 MVD police and special force troops were killed and 16 were wounded during the three day battle on 8-10 January. At least 5 mujahedin were killed in what the security forces called a 'special operation.' One law enforcement official conjectured that the mujahedin were the same who carried out the combined suicide bombing/conventional insurgent attack on Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov's residence in Gudermes on 29 August 2010.<sup>5</sup> CE websites regarded the clash as an attack initiated by

<sup>5</sup> "Siloviki soobshchayut o zavershayushchei stadii operatsii v Chechne," *Kavkaz uzal*, 10 January 2012, 12:40, [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/199005/](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/199005/).

the mujahedin and claimed that casualties among the law enforcement organs amounted to 10 killed and 20-25 wounded.<sup>6</sup>

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## AMIR OF CE'S GALGAICHE VILAIYAT KILLED IN JANUARY

On January 27<sup>th</sup> Russia's National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAK) claimed security forces had killed the amir of the CE's Ingushetiya network, the Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV). GV amir 'Adam' Dzhamaleil (Jamaleil) Mutaliev was killed on January 27<sup>th</sup> in Ekazhevo, Ingushetiya. Two other mujahedin were killed in the same special operation, including 23-year old Bekhhan Ganiev, the alleged "right hand" – likely meaning naib – of the amir of the GV's Malgobek Jamaat or Sector, who is unknown.<sup>7</sup> Mutaliev succeeded GV amir and CE military amir 'Magas' Ali Taziyev, who was captured by Russian security forces in June 2010. According to NAK, Mutaliev was part of the inner circle of Shamil Basaev, the notorious Chechen terrorist, and is wanted for involvement in several terrorist attacks, including the 9 September 2009 attack on the open air market in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetiya that killed 20 and wounded at least 240.<sup>8</sup> It was Basaev, of course, who allied himself and other Caucasus and Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya (the CE's predecessor organization) mujahedin with Al Qa`ida and played a major role in the transformation of the ChRI as a largely Chechen national separatist movement into the CE as an explicitly jihadist one allied with the global jihadi revolutionary alliance's network of networks.

The 35-year old Mutaliev had maintained a rather low profile, with the GV's qadi Abu Dzhudzhan (Jijan) taking the lead in public communications and propaganda efforts on the GV's website Hunafa.com.

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## DAGESTAN VILAIYAT'S KIZLYAR SECTOR HIT HARD

January saw the very active Kizlyar Sector of the CE's Dagestan Vilaiyat hit hard. On January 14<sup>th</sup> Kizlyar Sector (KS) mujahed Ruslan Sagidkhadzhev (Sagidhajiev) was killed and his brother Mukhtar Sagidkhadzhev was captured. Ruslan was said by the authorities to be Kizlyar mujahedin's chief explosives expert.<sup>9</sup>

On January 27 the CE DV KS was hit hard again when 5 of its mujahedin were killed in a shootout with Dagestan MVD police, in which three policemen were killed and two were wounded. The five mujahedin were said by Russia's National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAK) of having been involved in numerous jihadi

<sup>6</sup> "Vilaiyat Nokchicho". V boyakh v Vedenskom raione unichtozheno 10 i raneno ot 20 do 25," *Kavkaz tsentr*, 10 January 2012, 19:35, [www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/01/10/88035.shtml](http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/01/10/88035.shtml).

<sup>7</sup> "NAK: V Ingushetii ubit odin iz liderov 'Imarata Kavkaz', preemnik 'Magas'," *Kavkaz uzal*, 27 January 2012, 15:52, [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/200013/](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/200013/); "V khode spetsoperatsii v Ingushetii ubit glavav" 'Imarata Kavkaz'," *Polit.ru*, 27 January 2012, 12:24, <http://polit.ru/news/2012/01/27/killed/>; and "Vilaiyat G'alg'aiche. Kafiry soobshchayut o Shakhade trekh mudzhakhedov v Ekazhevo," *Kavkaz tsentr*, 27 January 2012, 11:50 and 16:55, [www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/01/27/88433.shtml](http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/01/27/88433.shtml).

<sup>8</sup> "NAK: V Ingushetii ubit odin iz liderov 'Imarata Kavkaz', preemnik 'Magas'," *Kavkaz uzal*, 27 January 2012, 15:52, [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/200013/](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/200013/).

<sup>9</sup> "Ustanovlena lichnost' ubitogo v khode spetsoperatsii v Dagestane," *Kavkaz tsentr*, 14 January 2012, 19:40, [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/199260/](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/199260/).



attacks in Kizlyar on peaceful citizens and Islamic clergy and in extorting money for their jihad from businessmen. The names of the mujahedin have not yet been released.<sup>10</sup>

## CE-AFFILIATED REPORTS TOTAL FIGURES ON JIHADI ATTACKS AND RESULTING CASUALTIES IN 2011

The Caucasus Emirate-affiliated website UmmaNews.com continues to issue monthly reports on the number of attacks carried out by the CE mujahedin and the casualties that have resulted from those attacks (and presumably Russian counter-terrorism operations) among both Russian state agents and on the side of the mujahedin as well in the North Caucasus. The data jihadi does not include either the 24 January 2011 Moscow Domodedovo Airport suicide bombing carried out by the CE, its Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs' Brigade (RSMB) and ethnic Ingush suicide bomber and Ingushetiya native Magomed Yevloev or the bomb detonated next to Moscow's FSB Academy for which the RSMB claimed responsibility. IIPER adds those two attacks and the resulting casualties to the mujahedin's official data below. The data does include the two 14 February 2011 coordinated suicide bombings carried out in Gubden, Dagestan by the ethnic Russian couple of Vitallii Razdobudko and Maria Khorosheva. Also, since the reports continue to divide fatalities and wounded into the categories of *kafiry* (infidels) and *murtady* or *marionetki* (apostates or puppets), we are unable to delineate between casualties among state agents and those among civilians from the jihadi sources, as we do for our own estimate. Therefore, we are including the total number of fatalities and wounded.

The jihadists' data for 2011 show 741 attacks: 739 carried out in the North Caucasus and 2 in Moscow (see Table). The largest number of CE attacks continues to be carried out by the

**Table 1. CE Data on Number of Attacks and Casualties in 2011 (the figure in parentheses is the figure for November 28 – December 31, 2011).**

| Vilaiyat of the Caucasus Emirate             | Attacks/Incidents | "Infidels"/<br>"Apostates" | "Infidels"/<br>"Apostates" | Mujahedin      |
|----------------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|
|                                              |                   | Killed                     | Wounded                    | Killed         |
| <b>Nokchicho Vilaiyat or NV (Chechnya)</b>   |                   |                            |                            |                |
|                                              | <b>81 (7)</b>     | <b>104 (1)</b>             | <b>182 (1)</b>             | <b>26 (1)</b>  |
| <b>Galgaiche Vilaiyat or GV (Ingushetia)</b> |                   |                            |                            |                |
|                                              | <b>101 (3)</b>    | <b>36 (1)</b>              | <b>46 (3)</b>              | <b>15 (0)</b>  |
| <b>Dagestan Vilaiyat or DV (Dagestan)</b>    |                   |                            |                            |                |
|                                              | <b>458 (29)</b>   | <b>275 (8)</b>             | <b>443 (0)</b>             | <b>100 (4)</b> |
| <b>OVKBK*</b>                                |                   |                            |                            |                |
|                                              | <b>94 (0)</b>     | <b>63 (5)</b>              | <b>58 (1)</b>              | <b>48 (10)</b> |

<sup>10</sup> "NAK: ubityie v Dagestane boeviki vkhodili v kizlyarskuyu gruppirovku," *Kavkaz uzal*, 27 January 2012, 18:50, [www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/200039/](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/200039/).

|                                |                 |                 |                |                 |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| <b>Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat**</b> | <b>5 (0)</b>    | <b>6 (0)</b>    | <b>7 (0)</b>   | <b>0 (0)</b>    |
| <b>Moscow***</b>               | <b>2 (0)</b>    | <b>38 (0)</b>   | <b>180 (0)</b> | <b>1 (0)</b>    |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                   | <b>741 (39)</b> | <b>522 (15)</b> | <b>916 (5)</b> | <b>190 (15)</b> |

\*OVKBK – the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya and Karachai, the CE’s jihadi network the North Caucasus republics of Kabardino-Balkariya and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya. There appears to be a problem with the reporting on the OVKBK’s attacks, since the same CE source reported that the OVKBK had carried out 108 attacks by the end of November – 14 more than the final annual total. Moreover, the OVKBK’s websites reported several attacks undertaken by OVKBK mujahedin in December.

\*\* Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat covers the North Caucasus regions of Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai for the CE.

\*\*\* These two attacks and the attendant casualties include the high-casualty 24 January 2011 suicide bombing at Moscow’s Domodeovo Airport and a bomb detonated near the FSB Academy that resulted in no casualties. These two attacks were not included in the mujahedin’s numbers on operations in the North Caucasus.

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SOURCE: “Itogovaya svodka Dzhikhada v Imarate Kavkaz za 1432 god (2011 g.),” *Kavkaz tsentr*, 5 January 2012, [www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/01/05/87934.shtml](http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/01/05/87934.shtml).

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CE’s Dagestani mujahedin, the so-called Dagestan Viliayat (DV) mujahedin. This has been the case for nearly two years, since April 2010. Now, according to the mujahedin’s data, 62 percent of the jihadi attacks carried out in Russia this year have occurred in Dagestan. The Chechen mujahedin of the CE’s Nokchicho (Chechnya) Vilaiyat (NV) continue to be the laggards, according to the CE’s data. The CE’s Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV) covering Ingushetiya and North Ossetiya remained ahead of Chechnya. The OVKBK, covering Kabardino-Balkariya and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, continues to be the second most active vilaiyat, as it has been since spring of 2010. In sum, the CE’s own data continues to show that the Caucasus jihad remains largely a Dagestani effort.

IIPER will be coming out with its data for 2011 in one of the next few issues.

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## ANNOUNCEMENT

The CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program published a special report in August by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn, “Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right” which IIPER readers may find of interest. It can be downloaded at [http://csis.org/files/publication/110930\\_Hahn\\_GettingCaucasusEmirateRt\\_Web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/110930_Hahn_GettingCaucasusEmirateRt_Web.pdf).

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## ABOUT IIPER

Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER) is a project of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It focuses on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam, Islamism, and Jihadism in Russia and Eurasia writ large. All issues of IIPER will soon be permanently archived at <http://csis.org/program/russia-and-eurasia-program>. All back issues temporarily remain archived at: [www.miis.edu/academics/faculty/ghahn/report](http://www.miis.edu/academics/faculty/ghahn/report).

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IIPER welcomes submissions on any aspect of Islamic, Islamist, or Jihadist politics in Eurasia as well as financial contributions to support the project. For related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact:

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