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IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted. Research assistance is provided by Yelena Altman, Seth Gray, John Andrew Jones, Anna Nevo, and Daniel Painter. IIPER accepts outside submissions.

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Recent Changes in the Caucasus Emirate’s Leadership and Structure

CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov made official the changes to the CE’s leadership he announced in late July at the shura that ended last year’s schism within the CE’s Chechnya network, the Nokchicho Vilaiyat (NV), of which Umarov is also the amir. He issued decrees (omras) appointing his naibs (deputy amirs) as NV amir as well as a new amir and vali (wali or governor) for the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya, and Karachai (OVKBK), which is the CE’s network in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya (KBR) and the Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya. In Omra No. 27 Umarov appointed amir ‘Khamzat’ Aslan Byutukaev to the position of NV naib (deputy amir) for the NV’s Western Front (napravleniye). Byutukaev also holds the positions of CE military amir and amir of the Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs Brigade (RSMB). Umarov appointed Hussein Gakaev, one of those amirs who broke with Umarov last year, as his naib in the NV for its Eastern Front.¹ Khamzat and even Gakaev are likely to be members of the CE’s ruling Madzhlisul Shura.

When the schism was patched up in late July Umarov announced the same NV appointments and reorganization of fronts. He abolished the NV’s Eastern and Southwestern Fronts and divided the NV into two fronts or directions, referred to in one CE posting as “military sectors” (voennyie sektora) and in another as fronts or directions (napravlenie).² Then as now, it also remains unclear why Gakaev’s fellow splitters Aslanbek Vadalov and Tarkhan Gaziev have not been made NV naibs or sector amirs. It also remains unclear why Gaziev was not present or mentioned at the Shariah Court session or anywhere else in the videos and reports on the NV since the split was ended.

In Omras (decrees) 28 and 29, Umarov appointed ‘Ubaid’ Alim Zankishev as amir of the “Armed Forces” of the OVKBK.³ Zankishev’s previous position is unknown. One Kamanat Zankishev was an amir of an unidentified sector or jamaat and killed last year. The entire OVKBK leadership, including previous amir ‘Abdullah’ Askar Dzhappuev and his naibs, was killed in spring. As a result of these changes, the CE’s top leadership is now as follows:

CAUCASUS EMIRATE’S TOP LEADERSHIP


CE Amir’s Naib – unknown.

CE Shariah Court Supreme Qadi – Ali Abu Mukhammad al-Dagistani.


MADZHLISUL SHURA: Ex Officio Members (adapted from Umarov’s 12 May 2009 Omra).


- CE Naib – unknown.

- Qadi of the CE Shariah Court – Ali Abu Mukhammad ad-Dagistani.

- CE Military Amir, RSMB amir, and NV naib for the NV Western Front – ‘Khamzat’ Aslan Byutukaev.

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- Dagestan Vilaiyat amir/vali – ‘Salikh’ Ibragimkhalil Daudov.
- NV naib for the NV Eastern Front – Hussein Gakaev.
- G’ialg’aiche Vilaiyat (Ingushetiya and North Ossetiya) amir/vali – Adam Ganishev.
- OVKBK amir/vali – ‘Ubaid’ Alim Zankishev.

VILAIYATS’ LEADERSHIPS

Nokchicho (Chechnya) Vilaiyat (NV)
Amir/Vali – CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov
Naib – ‘Khamzat’ Aslan Byutukaev
Naib – Hussein Gakaev
Qadi – unknown.

Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV)
Amir/Vali – ‘Salikh’ Ibragimkhalil Daudov
First Naib – Abu Mukhammad (simultaneously amir of the DV’s Central Sector)
Qadi – Sheikh Muhammad Abu Usman Al-Gimravii (simultaneously amir of the DV’s Mountain Sector)

G’ialg’aiche Vilaiyat (GV, Ingushetiya and North Ossetiya)
Amir/Vali – Adam Ganishev.
Naib – unknown.
Qadi – Abu Dudzhan

United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya & Karachai (OVKBK)
Amir/Vali – ‘Ubaid’ Alim Zankishev
Naib – unknown.
Qadi – unknown.

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TRIPLE SUICIDE ATTACK IN GROZNY, CHECHNYA, 30 AUGUST

On August 30th, three suicide bombers detonated bombs in the Lenin district of downtown Grozny, the
capitol of the Republic of Chechnya, killing 9 and wounding 22. According to police, the first explosion
occurred when police attempted to detain a suspicious man. Two more suicide bombers then detonated their
bombs when police rushed to the scene of the first detonation. Among the 9 killed were 7 police, 1 Emergency
Ministry worker, and 1 civilian. Both police personnel and civilians were among the 22 wounded.\(^4\) This was the third time in Grozny this year that mujahedin detonated grenades, IEDs, or suicide belts when police or security forces attempted to apprehend mujahedin. In Grozny on February 15\(^{th}\), two mujahedin detonated bombs when security forces attempted to apprehend them in one of the mujahedin’s homes. On April 25\(^{th}\), two fighters did the same when they reportedly ran out of ammunition in a firefight with security forces during a special counter-terrorist operation against them. No one was injured in either of these cases.\(^5\) On the other suicide bombings this year see below and for more detail see IIPERs, No. 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43.

THE CE’S QADIS: IDEAS AND GROWING POWER

CE qadis continue to issue policy propaganda statements. The frequency of such statements is far greater than just a year or so ago and marks the intensifying role of these self-appointed shariah court judges and self-described Islamic scholars in the CE movement. However, this phenomenon is by far most pronounced among the Dagestani mujahedin, who have at least six qadis at various levels. The most prolific are the CE’s Shariah Court qadi, Ali Abu Mukhammad al-Dagistani, who is from Dagestan, and the qadi of the CE’s Dagestani mujahedin, the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV), Sheikh Muhammad Abu Usman Al-Gimravi, who is also the amir of the DV’s Mountain Sector (Gornyi Sektor). Dagistani’s and Gimravii’s lectures and fatwas are distinctly Salafist, takfirist, and jihadist in character.

In June, Gimravii issued a missive in which he tied the present jihad to the Dagestan tradition of resisting Russian and infidel rule ostensibly inherited from Imam Shamil, Ghazi Muhammad and other imams who led the fight against Russia’s conquest of the North Caucasus in the late 18\(^{th}\) and early 19\(^{th}\) centuries. Gimravii’s missive came in video and transcribed text and was translated from Avar into Russian by one Aby Akhmed ad-Dagistani.\(^6\)

Gimravii began as he most often does with the Islamic salutation: “I run to the defense of Allah and from cursed Satan.” He then discussed jihad through the prism of Dagestan’s tradition of producing imams to lead the fight against infidel rule inherited from the 19\(^{th}\) century resistance to Russian rule: “The Dagestan land brought up 5 imams. This is the land on which these imams declared war against the infidel, fought against infidels, and many martyrs (shakhidy) here spilled their blood. This is the land on which, going against the infidels for the raising of Allah’s Word, they fought for years in a row without interruption. We have forgotten our history. Why have the names of these imams remained in our hearts? Because these imams made jihad on Allah’s path, and they tried to raise Allah’s Word.”\(^7\)


\(^7\) “Kadii Abu Usman al’-Gimravi: Obrashenie k narodu Dagestanu” and “Obrashenie kadiya i amira gornogo sektora VD, sheikha Mukhammad Abu Usmana al’-Gimravi, k narodu Dagestan.”
Citing verses from the Koran 2:183 and 5:24, Gimravi emphasizes that, like fasting for Ramadan, fighting jihad and “establishing rule by Shariah law” are an obligation for “each Muslim,” given that the infidel Russian has entered a land of Islam. In addition, he cites the 19th century’s Ghazi Muhammad in order to remind the Caucasus’s Muslims that they should renounce not just Russian law but the North Caucasus’s *adat* (local custom) in favor of Shariah law: “Imam Ghazi-Muhammad went (to jihad) summoning: ‘Leave your adats (local customs) and defend Allah’s shariah.’” He then references Ghazi-Muhammad’s own missive “Clear Evidence of the Apostasy of the Peoples of Dagestan” (“Yasnyie dokazatel’stva o veroostupnichestve narodov Dagestana”) to note that at times Dagestanis have adhered to *adat* and “following custom and leaving shariah” they become “apostates.” This is why “Allah obliged us to fight against the man-made laws (*taghut*). The decision regarding jihad serves as this today. Allah knows our obligations better than us, you see, He says: ‘…Allah knows, and you do not know’.”

Gimravi then details the kind of submission ‘to Allah’s will’ from whence this obligation emerges with each obligation of this submission being equally mandatory:

Allah created us for submission and one of the types of submission is jihad on Allah’s path – battle with the infidel. Do we ask Allah why He obliged us to jihad? We are not those who argue with Allah; we are Allah’s slaves and the position of Allah’s slaves is the fulfillment of His orders.…

When All-High Allah was convinced that they all had resettled and fulfilled His Will, then He instructed them to return to Mecca and do battle with their fellow tribesmen and relatives. They fulfilled this instruction of Most High Allah. Among them there was even a person who cut off the head of his father-infidel who did battle against the Prophet, and Allah blessed and greeted him saying ‘O, Messenger of Allah, this is the head of the sheikh of the infidels.’ I swear to Allah if they had not fulfilled this instruction of the Highest One, then from the previous evidence of the fulfilled five-time daily prayer and resettlement would not any favor have been brought to them. …

Even from the jihad committed by them there would not have been any favor. Allah became aware of the purity of their hearts, and He ordered them to pay the Muslim tithe (*zakyat*) from their property. They fulfilled this too. And if they had not fulfilled it, then they would not have had any kind of favor from the previous submission. And Allah, having become convinced in their sincerity and the fulfillment by them of His instruction, sent this verse to the Koran: ‘…Today I perfected your religion for you, completed My mercy towards you, and approved you the quality of the religion of Islam for you…’ (5:3).

That is, the faith had been perfected. And when was it perfected? When they fulfilled all of Allah’s orders. Is it sufficient for a person, having witnessed (this), to fulfill some orders? No, not in any way. It is necessary to fulfill all of Allah’s orders.

Having understood the above mentioned Koranic verses and hadiths, our ancestors and imams fought against the infidels. We know against who they fought. They fought against Russian infidels. Their opponents in war were people among the infidels as well as those who helped them. Allah instructed us: ‘Do battle on Allah’s path and know that All is All-Hearing and All-Knowing.’

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8 “Kadii Abu Usman al’-Gimravi: Obrashenie k narodu Dagestana” and “Obrashenie kadiya i amira gornogo sektora VD, sheikha Mukhammad Abu Usmana al’-Gimravi, k narodu Dagestan.”
9 “Kadii Abu Usman al’-Gimravi: Obrashenie k narodu Dagestana” and “Obrashenie kadiya i amira gornogo sektora VD, sheikha Mukhammad Abu Usmana al’-Gimravi, k narodu Dagestan.”
This is a rare occasion when the contemporary jihadist discussion of the obligation of Muslims to go to jihad is married to the local past of resistance to infidel rule. However, the imperative is defined exclusively in terms of the religious obligation to fulfill that which is required by Allah and Islam. The national past is invoked incidentally to add further legitimacy to Gimravi’s call. But perhaps more important is the power of the amirs and qadis like Gimravi to interpret Allah’s will for the rest of the mujahedin, which is surreptitiously implied in such recountings of the lessons of the Koran and the need to submit to ‘Allah’s will.’

In another lecture, Gimravi addresses the flash cards being sent by the mujahedin to the rich demanding money for the jihad. According to Gimravi’s interpretation of Allah’s will, inherited or acquired property can be seized from the rich if it has not been “earned in a permitted way.” The permitted ways are narrowly and speculatively defined, and Gimravi sums up by noting that not to give money or property for “the path of Allah” and “the needs of the people of faith and jihadi” constitutes “robbing from the religion of Allah” and “a sign of hypocrisy.” Gimravi also address the issue of dhimmis and dhimmitude, noting that there are two circumstances under which it is impermissible to kill or take the property of infidels: (1) if the dhimmi pays the tax required of infidels living among Muslims and (2) if an infidel has entered into a Muslim land with a guarantee for his security from Muslims.10

In takfiri fashion, Gimravi asserts that Muslims who apply or enforce taghut (man-made infidel law) are infidels themselves and can be divided into three groups, each subject to a different status and Shariah ruling: (1) those who are openly and secretly with the infidels – they themselves are infidels; (2) those who are with the infidel but secretly so – they cannot be known to Muslims and are left untouched; (3) those who are with the infidels but whose souls reject them – these are divided into two groups. One includes those who are afraid to break with the infidels and can be forgiven by Allah. The other includes those who remain with the infidels because they love their job, status, and property; these are rendered as infidels. All those deemed to be infidels according to the above rules are infidels, and therefore neither their blood or property is protected.11

Gimravi also has given a series of five lectures on the book Al-Umda fi I’dadil’ ‘Udda on the obligation to participate in jihad.12 In August, Dagistani began what is at present a two-part series on the same, and in September he issued another video lecture, this time on the age at which participation becomes an obligation for Muslims.13 Dagistani also recently issued a video lecture on Gimravi’s theme on the permissibility of seizing infidels’ blood and treasure.14

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Gimiravii and Dagistani have been especially prolific in producing video and text lectures on various aspects of Islam from the Salafist-jihadist perspective. But other qadis have done so as well. In May, one Usama, the qadi of the DV’s Kizlyar Sector, which has been especially active of late, issued a video lecture. The Shariah Committee of the CE’s Ingushetiya network, the Galgaiche Vilaiyat, also issued a fatwa in August on the obligation of Muslims to pay the zakat tax to a legitimate Muslim authority - the mujahedin. Presumably it was written by the GV’s qadi Abu Dudzhan.

The OVKBK mujahedin, whose first amir ‘Seifullah’ Anzor Astemirov was also the CE’s first qadi, has not announced a new qadi, and the NV has never identified its own qadi. The latter may have been the case as the CE qadi was doing double duty for the CE and NV much as CE amir Umarov was doing double duty by leading the CE and the Chechen mujahedin simultaneously. However, now that Umarov has officially assumed the post of NV amir while remaining CE amir, a NV qadi may also emerge. In fact, we may have already seen him. When the Shariah Court resolved the schism, a video excerpt released by the CE showed an unidentified qadi hold court and reading from the Koran as the session proceeded. As I noted in IIPER, No. 44, through the hazy video, the prospective NV qadi somewhat resembled and perhaps was CE qadi Ali Abu Mukhammad Al-Dagistani, but he also seemed to resemble an Arab or even African. The qadi spoke in Arabic, and his words after some time were translated into Russian by a hooded mujahed seated to the qadi’s immediate left. It would certainly be shocking if the NV qadi was a foreigner or even that the schism would have been overcome with the assistance of one.

Regardless, the qadis are playing a growing role within the CE and especially in the Dagestani DV. In turn, the DV is playing a growing role within the CE, with each of the latter’s last two qadis having been Dagestani. The deeper penetration of Islam in Dagestan and its thin, albeit, inherited Salafi tradition heralds a further Salafization and radicalization of a movement that was once, now many years ago, predominantly Chechen and ethno-nationalist.

ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF JIHADI ATTACKS, JIHADI-RELATED INCIDENTS, AND ATTENDANT CASUALTIES IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2011

The first half of 2011 saw at least approximately 342 jihadi insurgent and terrorist attacks and jihad-related violent incidents in Russia driven by the Caucasus Emirate (see Table 1). This marks an unprecedented
Table 1. Estimated Number of Jihadi Terrorist Incidents and Casualties in Russia during the First Six Months of 2011. Estimate is Based on Average of the Jihadi-Reported Figures and the Average Between the Minimum and Maximum Figures from the Non-Jihadi Reports, from Data Compiled by the Author. IIPER’s data for the first quarter of 2011 is in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Attacks/ Violent Incidents</th>
<th>State Agents Killed</th>
<th>State Agents Wounded</th>
<th>Civilians Killed</th>
<th>Civilians Wounded</th>
<th>Jihadists Killed</th>
<th>Jihadists Wounded</th>
<th>Jihadists Captured/Surrendered</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>40(12)</td>
<td>15(9)</td>
<td>35(25)</td>
<td>6(4)</td>
<td>2(0)</td>
<td>24(20)</td>
<td>2(0)</td>
<td>93(no data)</td>
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<td>Ingushetia</td>
<td>36(14)</td>
<td>6(5)</td>
<td>12(4)</td>
<td>5(0)</td>
<td>3(0)</td>
<td>22(17)</td>
<td>7(0)</td>
<td>8(0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td>208(88)</td>
<td>78(18)</td>
<td>110(65)</td>
<td>44(21)</td>
<td>55(24)</td>
<td>87(36)</td>
<td>3(0)</td>
<td>49(36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabardino-Balkaria</td>
<td>51(33)</td>
<td>23(20)</td>
<td>38(30)</td>
<td>8(6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other North Caucasus</td>
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<td>4(4)</td>
<td>3(3)</td>
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<td>3(3)</td>
<td>1(0)</td>
<td>4(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>North Caucasus Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>340(150)</strong></td>
<td><strong>129(61)</strong></td>
<td><strong>199(127)</strong></td>
<td><strong>64(31)</strong></td>
<td><strong>62(26)</strong></td>
<td><strong>180(95)</strong></td>
<td><strong>15(1)</strong></td>
<td><strong>222(38)</strong></td>
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<td>2(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest of Russia***</td>
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<td>0(0)</td>
<td><strong>38(37)</strong></td>
<td>(180)</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>0(0)</td>
<td>0(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>344(151)</strong></td>
<td><strong>129(61)</strong></td>
<td><strong>199(127)</strong></td>
<td><strong>102(68)</strong></td>
<td><strong>242(206)</strong></td>
<td><strong>183(99)</strong></td>
<td><strong>15(1)</strong></td>
<td><strong>226(45)</strong></td>
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</table>

* The data that forms the base for this table’s figures were researched by Gordon M. Hahn as well as Seth Gray, Leonid Naboishchikov, Anna Nevo, and Daniel Painter.

** It remains somewhat unclear whether the incidents in Astrakhan this year are connected to the CE.

*** We have included the assassination of Col. Yuri Budanov but retain reservations about CE amir Dokku Umarov’s claim of responsibility. The mujahed killed in Moscow was the January 24th Moscow Domodedovo Airport suicide bomber. We removed the would-be suicide bomber who died
on New Year’s Eve when she was preparing her suicide vest for the failed plot targeting Moscow’s holiday celebrations because her death occurred before midnight. Also included is an explosion in Volgograd carried out by Chechen and ethnic Russian jihadis tied to the Astrakhan Jamaat. See Vladimir Mal’tsev, “Vtoroi front terroristicheskoi voiny,” Nezavisimaya gazeta – Religia, 6 July 2011, http://religion.ng.ru/problems/2011-07-06/5_terror.html.

Methodology: The data in this table are estimates. The estimates represent where possible the average of the minimum jihadi-reported figures and of the average of the minimum and maximum figures from non-jihadi sources. The logic behind this methodology is based on the tendency of Russian and local government and non-jihadi Russian and local media (often tied to or dependent on government reporting) to underreport the number of terrorist incidents and their resulting casualties as well as the tendency of jihadist sources to exaggerate the jihadists’ capacity by sometimes claiming responsibility for attacks carried out by others for criminal, ethnic, or clan purposes and exaggerating the numbers of casualties caused by their own attacks. Data for mujahedin killed comes from averaging figures reported by the CE-affiliated IslamUmma website and the human rights organization Memorial’s website Kavkaz-uzel.ru. Data for mujahedin captured and surrendered typically come from non-jihadi sources (“Vooruzhennyi konflikt na Severnom Kavkaze: 656 zhertv za yanvar’ – iyun’ 2011 goda,” Kavkaz uzel, 4 August 2011, 16:44, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/190265/). Incidents include not only attacks carried out, but also counter-terrorist operations and successful and attempted arrests. They do not include prevented attacks (deactivated bombs, etc.). The estimated number of CE attacks and jihadi-related violent incidents was derived from an average between the number of attacks/incidents as reported individually on CE websites (178) and IslamUmma.info’s summary count (220) equalling 199 attacks/incidents, according to jihadi sources. An average between this number from jihadi sources and the number of attacks as reported in non-jihadi sources was used to derive our estimated number of CE attacks and jihadi-related violent incidents. Where possible a similar methodology is used to derive the figure for the number of mujahedin killed, wounded, and captured.


number of attacks by this time of year. This estimate for the first half of 2011 nearly equals IIPER’s estimate of 373 such violent incidents for the entire year of 2008. For further comparison, during the first six months of 2010 and 2009, IIPER estimated there were approximately 213 and 236 attacks/incidents, respectively. Thus, this half-year’s 342 attacks marks a more than 50 percent increase over IIPER’s estimated number of attacks/incidents in 2009 and 2010 each.

This year’s 344 attacks/incidents so far included approximately 55 special counter-terrorist operations undertaken by law enforcement that led to the killing, wounding, or capture of mujahedin or of security forces. These same 344 attacks/incidents led to at least approximately 129 state agents (civilian officials and military, police and intelligence personnel) being killed and 199 wounded in addition to 102 civilians killed and 241 wounded. For comparison, the number of state agents killed in the first half of 2009 was 173; in the first half of 2010 there were 104, compared to 126 this year. The number of state agents wounded was 244 in the first half of 2009 and 195 in the first half of 2010, compared to 199 in this year’s first six months. Thus, jihadi attacks have become much less effective this year, with 50 percent more attacks, but considerably fewer killings than in 2009’s first half and about the same as in 2010’s first six months. However, the numbers
of civilians killed and wounded year-on-year have increased again. In the first six months of 2009 there were some 14 civilians killed, 66 in the first half of 2010, and now 104 in 2011’s first six months. In terms of civilians wounded, there were some 14 in the first half of 2009, 209 in the first half of 2010, and now 242 in the first half of this year. These figures represent the CE’s shift away from targeting only state agents and towards targeting civilians.

Looking at the individual regions for this year, the CE’s Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV) and mujahedin continue, as it has since spring 2010, to be the jihad’s center of gravity. Its 208 attacks comprise nearly 60 percent of the jihadists’ 344 attacks in the first half of 2011. The Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR) is still seeing the second highest level of jihadi violence with approximately 51 attacks/incidents in the first half of 2011.

There have been only some two attacks so far this year in Karachai-Cherkesia (KChR), which along with the KBR, is considered by the CE mujahedin to be the territory of their United Vilaiyat of Kabardia, Balkaria, and Karachai (OVKBK). By contrast, Ingushetia’s mujahedin of the so-called Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV) have been responsible for only some 37 attacks/incidents (36 in Ingushetia and perhaps 1 in North Ossetiya), falling behind Chechnya for the first time in many months, with Chechnya’s Nokchicho Vilaiyat mujahedin having carried out three more attacks (40) in Chechnya in the first six months of 2011. This modest change occurred prior to the Nokchicho Vilaiyat’s return to the CE’s fold and renewal of the its amirs’ loyalty bayats to CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov in late April, as reported in IIPER, No. 44.

Dagestan is by far the most dangerous and deadly North Caucasus republic for state agents and civilians alike. Only Moscow, with the high casualty rate from the January Moscow Domodedovo Airport suicide bombing outpaces Dagestan in terms of jihadi-inflicted casualties. Approximately 78 state agents were killed and 110 were wounded in Dagestan through June of this year. Thus, the Dagestani mujahedin outpaced the some 49 state agents killed and 89 wounded by the OVKBK (KBR and KChR) and the Chechnya and Ingush mujahedin taken together. Civilian casualties have been highest in Dagestan as well (except for Moscow), with at least approximately 99 (44 killed, 55 wounded) in the first half of this year, followed in descending order by 10 civilian casualties in the KBR (8 killed, 2 wounded), and 8 in Chechnya (6 killed and 2 wounded) and Ingushetia (5 killed, 3 wounded) each. Thus, in the North Caucasus republics overall casualties were highest in Dagestan with approximately 266 (122 killed and 144 wounded), followed by 71 (31 killed, 40 wounded) in the KBR, 58 in Chechnya (21 killed, 37 wounded), and 26 in Ingushetia (11 killed, 15 wounded). Dagestan is now experiencing 60 percent of the overall number of casualties in the four main Muslim republics (Dagestan, Chechnya, the KBR, and Ingushetia) where almost all jihadi activity occurs, 266 out of 419 or 63.5 percent. Dagestan has seen 58.8 percent (266 of the 452) of all casualties inflicted by jihadi attacks and related violent incidents in the entire North Caucasus and 39.7 percent (266 of 670) of all casualties so inflicted across Russia in the first half of 2011.

From the first quarter compared with the first half of 2011, the Chechen mujahedin’s attacks remained the most efficient, producing approximately 1.45 casualties per attack, but they became less efficient, declining from nearly 2 casualties per attack in the first quarter of the year. Ingushetia’s Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV) mujahedin remained the least efficient in their attacks, continuing to inflict less than one (.72) casualty per attack. The OVKBK is inflicting 1.39 casualties per attack; the DV - 1.38 casualties per attack.

Mujahedin Losses

IIPER’s methodology for deriving the figure for the number of mujahedin killed in any given time period is to average CE-affiliated website IslamUmma’s figure with that found in reporting by Kavkaz-uzel.ru, the website of the Russian human rights group ‘Memorial’. Using this methodology, an estimated total of 183 mujahedin were killed (including suicide bombers) and 226 were captured or surrendered across Russia in the first half of 2011. Here, especially in the category of captured/surrendered mujahedin, Chechnya’s place
as an outlier leading the other republics is likely a reflection of the Chechnya President Ramzan Kadyrov’s aggressive and often brutal pursuit of mujahedin as well as some de facto padding of the figures by including among the actual mujahedin a few innocent civilians, relatives of mujahedin subjected to extrajudicial reprisals, and assumed mujahedin.

For comparison, the estimated 183 mujahedin killed in the first six months of this year marks another increase compared to the same period in recent years. In the first six months of 2009, there were approximately 137 mujahedin killed, and in 2010 approximately 175. Captures and surrenders of mujahedin increased as well. Even using the old methodology of averaging the jihadi and non-jihadi sources figures, we would get 113 mujahedin captured which would exceed the similarly derived estimates for the first six months 2009 and 2010 of 93 and 47, respectively.

According to Kavkaz-uzel, the losses among the mujahedin or “armed underground” in the first six months of 2011 were very high: 228 were killed in combat or as a result of suicide bombings they carried out in the North Caucasus in the first half of this year. Accordingly, Dagestan’s mujahedin saw 96 of their number killed. The OVKBK had 58 killed: 53 in the KBR and 5 in the KChR. The GV saw 46 killed: 31 in Ingushetia and 15 in North Ossetiya. Chechnya’s NV had 27 killed, and one mujahedin was killed in Stavropol Krai, which along with Krasnodar Krai and Adygeya, is the territory of the CE’s still largely virtual Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat.  

Kavkaz-uzel counted 214 detained or surrendered mujahedin charged with participation in the “armed underground”: 93 in Chechnya, 60 in the KBR, 49 in Dagestan, 8 in Ingushetia, and 4 in the KChR.

Suicide Attacks

Despite CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov’s threats earlier this year to raise hundreds of suicide bombers and some recent Russian media reports regarding a supposed cadre of some 50 or 60 suicide bombers trained and ready to be deployed, 2011 is on a pace to fall short of the 14 suicide bombings of 2009 and the 16 of 2010. There were six successful suicide bombings in the first six months of 2011. There were three successful suicide bombings in the first quarter of 2011: the January 24th suicide attack carried out by the 20-year old ethnic Ingush Magomed Yevloev at Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport which killed 37 and wounded 180 and the two February 14th suicide bombings by the ethnic Russian couple and mujahedin Vitalii Razdobudko and Maria Khorosheva in Gubden, Dagestan hours apart. The former killed 1 and wounded 22; the latter killed 1 MVD police and wounded 5 MVD police. The fourth suicide attack of 2011 occurred on March 4th when 30-year old Khamzat Korigov exploded a bomb when police tried to check his documents. The explosion only wounded one officer. These 4 successful attacks left 3 suicide bombers dead and killed 39 (2 state agents and 37 civilians) and wounded 207, at least 6 of which were state agents. Thus, after the four suicide attacks carried out by CE-tied jihadists during the first quarter of this year compared to just one in the same period in 2010, it seemed that Umarov might be in a position to approach realizing his threats.

However, there were no suicide bombings in April. The fifth such attack of this year occurred on May 10th when 32-year old Abakar Aitperov detonated a bomb as he apparently tried to enter a military hospital in Dagestan’s capitol Makhachkala. Russia’s MVD chief Ruslan Nurgaliev was there at the time visiting with police and soldiers wounded in a recent battle with mujahedin in Kizlyar, Dagestan. The attack killed the
A policeman who stopped Aitperov to check his papers as he tried to enter the hospital and wounded another and several a passers-by. However, there would not be another successful attack for almost four full months.

The sixth attack occurred on August 30th when three suicide bombers detonated bombs in the Lenin district of downtown Grozny, the capital of the Republic of Chechnya, killing 9 and wounding 22. According to police, the first explosion occurred when police attempted to detain a suspicious man. Two more suicide bombers then detonated their bombs when police rushed to the scene of the first detonation. Among the 9 killed were 7 police, 1 Emergency Ministry worker, and 1 civilian. Both police personnel and civilians were among the 22 wounded. This was the third time in Grozny this year that mujahedin detonated grenades, IEDS, or suicide belts when police or security forces attempted to apprehend mujahedin. There have been two such cases this year in Ingushetia as well: one successful as mentioned above and one unsuccessful, producing no casualties other than that of the bomber himself. In Grozny, on February 15th two mujahedin detonated bombs when security forces attempted to apprehend them in one of the mujahedin’s homes. On April 25th, two fighters did the same when they reportedly ran out of ammunition in a firefight with security forces during a special counter-terrorist operation against them. No one was injured in either of these cases.

This year’s six attacks and the two failed, interdicted attacks in Grozny in February and April, respectively, have expended the lives of 12 suicide bombers: 11 men and one woman. Chechnya has seen 1 successful attack and 8 suicide bombers 2011. Dagestan has seen 3 successful attacks and 3 suicide bombers. Ingushetia has seen 1 successful attack and 1 suicide bomber. Moscow has seen 1 successful attack (the January 24th Domodedovo Airport attack) utilizing a single suicide bomber from Ingushetia. Excluding the 22 wounded in the recent Grozny attack for which we have no breakdown between state agents and civilians, the six successful attacks have killed 11 and wounded at least 28 state agents and killed 38 and wounded at least 184 civilians. Counting the 22 wounded in the recent Grozny attack, there have been a total of 283 casualties, including 234 wounded.

The geography of jihadi suicide bombing in the first half of 2011 looks as follows. As in the case of conventional attacks this and last year as well as in the case of suicide bombings last year, Dagestan continued to lead in suicide bombings in the first half of 2011. Three of the six suicide attacks were perpetrated in Dagestan by Dagestanis as well as the two ethnic Russians with ties to Stavropol and perhaps Dagestan, who carried out the February attacks in Gubden. One occurred in Ingushetia involving an apparently unplanned attack, and one occurred in Chechnya and involved three Chechen suicide bombers. Another occurred in Moscow and was committed by an ethnic Ingush recruited by Ingushetiya’s GV and prepared by the CE’s Riyadus-Salikhin Martyrs’ Brigade. There still has never been a suicide bombing in any Russian region other than the four mentioned above.

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DATA OF RUSSIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION ‘MEMORIAL’ ON JIHADI-RELATED VIOLENCE IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2011

The Russian oppositional human rights organization ‘Memorial’ has put out through its website, Kavkaz-uzel, its own summary data on jihadi-related attacks and casualties for the first half of the year.24 This data include on explosions (vzryvy), “terrorist attacks” (terakty) and “clashes” (stolknoveniya); “terrorist attacks” seem to include only suicide bombings. For the first half of the year, Kavkaz-uzel’s data showed “93 explosions and terrorist attacks.” These were not broken down by republic. In addition, there were 110 violent clashes for a total of 203 attacks and jihadi-related violent incidents, in IIPER’s terminology. Of the violent clashes, 61 were in Dagestan, 23 in Chechnya, 11 in Kabardino-Balkariya, 10 in Ingushetiya, 2 in the Karachaevo-Cherkessiya and North Ossetiya each, and 1 in Stavropol. Of the 110 violent clashes, there were 24 counter-terrorist operations carried out by the siloviki: 18 in Dagestan, 3 in Kabardino-Balkariya, 2 in Ingushetiya, and 1 in Chechnya.25

Kavkaz uzel’s data showed that the armed conflict produced a total of “no less than” 653 casualties during the first half of 2011: 293 killed and 260 wounded. Dagestan led with more than half of the casualties – 353, including 204 killed and 149 wounded. The KBR followed, with 105 casualties, including 77 killed and 28 wounded. It was followed by Chechnya’s 100 casualties, including 43 killed and 57 wounded, and then Ingushetiya’s 55 casualties, including 40 killed and 15 wounded. Stavropol had five casualties, including 2 killed and three wounded. Kavkaz uzel’s figures diverge sharply from IIPER’s and the mujahedin’s regarding North Ossetiya (which along with Ingushetiya is part of the GV’s writ) and the KChR (which along with the KBR is part of the OVKBK’s territory). Kavkaz uzel claims there were 20 casualties in North Ossetiya, including 16 killed and 4 wounded, but this data seems to derive from the accidental explosion of propane gas at a wedding and perhaps the May 26th beheading of a poet by an Islamist. Kavkaz uzel claims there were 15 casualties, including 11 killed and 4 wounded, which exceeds our data by approximately a factor of three.26

Regarding casualties among state agents due to armed clashes, Kavkaz uzel did not include casualties among civilian officials but included only casualties among siloviki. That data showed 87 siloviki killed in the North Caucasus: 54 in Dagestan, 15 in the KBR, 7 in Chechnya, 6 in Ingushetiya, 4 in the KChR, and 1 in North Ossetiya. Another 167 siloviki were wounded in the North Caucasus: 74 in Dagestan, 51 in Chechnya, 23 in the KBR, 8 in Ingushetiya, 4 each in North Ossetiya, and the KChR, and 3 in Stavropol.27

The explosions and terrorist attacks killed a total of 43, including 4 “siloviki” (personnel of the military, FSB, and MVD), 12 members of the “armed underground,” and 27 civilians. A total of 93 people were wounded in these 93 attacks, including 36 siloviki, 56 civilians, and one member of the armed underground (not including the suicide bombers themselves). Seven “self-explosions” (apparently including both planned and spontaneous intentional as well as accidental detonations of explosions killing oneself) killed 14 including one silovik, 10 “militants” (boeviki), and 3 civilians. These suicide explosions wounded 29, including one silovik and 28 civilians. Four of the seven ‘self-explosions’ were said to have occurred during attempts to detain the militants. The casualties due to explosions and terrorist attacks again were not broken down by republic.28

Adding up Kavkaz-uzel’s various figures for casualties among state agents, we get a total of at least 91 state agents killed and 260 wounded in the North Caucasus in the first half of 2011. Kavkaz-uzel reports at least 78 civilians killed in the first half of 2011 in the North Caucasus: 54 in Dagestan, 9 in

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
Chechnya, 9 in the KBR, 3 in Ingushetiya, 2 in the KChR, and 1 in Stavropol. There were 89 wounded: 75 in Dagestan, 6 in Chechnya, 5 in the KBR, and 3 in Ingushetiya.  

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MORE EVIDENCE OF CE TIES TO GLOBAL JIHADIST ‘ISLAMIC JIHADI UNION’

According to the official website of the CE’s Dagestani network, the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV) VDagestan.info, a praised Dagestani mujahed fighting with the CE’s Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV), ‘Abu Khattab’ Magomed Bagilov, underwent training with the AQ-tied global jihadist organization Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) based in northern Waziristan, Pakistan after receiving religious education in Egypt. This “knight of martyrdom,” according to VDagestan was “great over the infidels and modest among believers” and “a unique personality in jahiliya (the condition of pre-Islamic or non-Islamic ignorance and darkness) as well as in Islam.” Like a significant number of other violent extremists of all stripes, Bagilov was an athlete and a leader before his conversion. According to VDagestan.info, after hearing of Bagilov’s qualities, Rasul Makasharipov, the amir of the jihadist Jannat and then Shariat Jamaats in 2003-2005 pursued Bagilov and brought him to Islam himself. He then began fighting with Murad Lakhiyalov, a well-known Dagestani mujahed, who was killed circa 2006-2007. Bagilov was arrested and almost convinced to give up jihad until he heard his jailers celebrating Makasharipov’s death in 2006. However, the article also claims he was tortured by Dagestan MVD chief Magomed Khamilgereev, and therefore Bagilov wanted to carry out a suicide operation against him.30 The mujahedin claim they carried out the assassination of Khamilgereev in June 2009.31

Bagilov’s fellow prisoners began to teach him more about Islam. After his release from prison, he went to Egypt to receive Islamic “knowledge” and then went to Waziristan, Pakistan and trained with the IJU, an offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), both having close ties with the Taliban and Al Qa’ida. After returning to his homeland he became the naib of the Makhachkala Jamaat’s amir Khalid and, according to the site, made “a large contribution in the change of tactics of urban fighting as well as the general strategy of jihad in Dagestan.” Bagilov was killed on 29 September 2010.32

This is hardly the first piece of evidence that the CE and IJU have developed a working relationship. Some analysts even assert that the IJU’s formation had a connection with developments involving the North Caucasus and the Taliban. The Norwegian Defense Research Institute, for example, has suggested that the Taliban were pressured by various countries to withdraw jihadists from Xinjiang, Pakistan, and the North Caucasus, who ended up with the IMU fighters who had fled from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan into northern Afghanistan. This mixing helped to ‘de-Uzbekisize’ and ‘de-territorialize’ the movement and establish the conditions that would eventually lead to the breakaway and founding of the global jihadi-oriented IJU.33 Over the last eight years the IJU has carried out operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, and Western

29 Ibid.
30 “Neskol’ko slov o brate Khattabe (Magomed Bagilov),” VDagestan.info, 31 July 2011, http://vdagestan.info/2011/07/31/%d0%bd%d0%b5%d1%81%d0%ba%d0%be%d0%bb%d1%8c%d0%ba%d0%be-%d1%81%d0%bb%d0%be%d0%b2%d0%be-%d0%b1%d1%80%d0%b0%d1%82%d0%b5-%d1%85%d0%b0%d1%82%d1%82%d0%b0%d1%8d-%d0%bc%d0%b0%d0%b3%d0%be%d0%be%d0%b5-%d2/.
32 “Neskol’ko slov o brate Khattabe (Magomed Bagilov).”
Europe. The Libyan Abu Laith al-Libi, an important field commander of Osama bin Laden, functioned as the Central Asian envoy of Al Qa’ida and often facilitated communication between the IJU, Al Qa’ida, and other jihadi groups, probably including the CE.34

In May 2007, the IJU’s then amir Najmuddin Jalolov (aka Ebu Yahya Muhammad Fatih), killed in a CIA drone strike in Mir Ali, northern Waziristan on September 14, 2009, confirmed in an interview that the IJU had been in contact and had “also been working on our common targets together with Caucasian mujahedeens.”35 In March 2011 the IJU’s media department ‘Badr At-Tawhid’ sent a seven-minute video message to the CE mujahedin from the IJU’s amirs in the 'land of Horosan', Afghanistan. Three IJU amirs in the video – Abu Abdallah first, followed by Salahudin, and finally Ubaydullah – praised the CE mujahedin praising for joining the global jihad and noted: “In our jamaat, there are many brothers who were trained or fought on the lands of the Caucasus Emirate.” Abu Abdallah first and Salahudin greeted the Muslims of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan explicitly in calling upon all of Russia’s Muslims to join the CE’s jihad.36

For its part, the CE’s websites regularly cover and provide propaganda support to Central Asia’s leading jihadi organizations, including the IMU and IJU much as it does for Al Qa’ida, its affiliates and the Taliban, among other jihadi groups. For example, the CE reported extensively on the series of suicide, IED, and ambush attacks and skirmished carried out by the IMU, IJU and/or a possible subunit thereof, the “Jamaat ‘Ansarullah’ in Tajikistan,” during autumn 2010 in Hujand, Sogdo Oblast’ and elsewhere in Tajikistan.37

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ALLEGED HISZ UT-TAHRIR ISLAMI CELL UNCOVERED IN BASHKORTOSTAN

An alleged Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami cell in Sterlitamak was raided and three members of the organization were arrested. Security officials accused the three terrorists of establishing clandestine terror cells, distributing propaganda and recruiting members of the local population. Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami was designated by Russia as a terrorist group in 2003, and all activities associated with the group are illegal in Russia.38

34 Guido Steinberg, Die Islamische Ji had-Union: Zur Internationalisierung des usbekischen Jihadismus, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Deutsches Institut fuer Internationale Politik und Sicherheit), March 2008.
38 “Cell of banned Islamist group shut down in Russia’s Bashkortostan,” BBC News, 16 September 2011.
NINE ALLEGED WAHHABIS ARRESTED IN BASHKORTOSTAN

A group of nine alleged Wahhabis Islamists were arrested in Baimak, Bashkortostan. They were charged with possession of illegal arms and explosives. They were also charged with assaulting several imams in Baimak. In one incident, the group allegedly drove an imam out of a mosque with force and declared that legitimacy of a new imam from the Islamic University of Medina.39

CENTRAL ASIA

ALLEGED JIHADISTS ARRESTED IN KAZAKHSTAN

Beginning this past May, when a security compound was attacked, Kazakhstan joined the ranks of the rest of Central Asia in experiencing terror attacks and fearing an underground terrorist movement. This past week, 18 people were arrested on September 9th and accused of plotting a terrorist attack.40 Although the government has claimed that these are stand-alone acts, the arrests suggest a continued jihadi presence if not a growing jihadist movement.

JAMAAT ANSARULLAH IN TAJIKISTAN RELEASES VIDEO

Jamaat Ansarullah (JA), the organization responsible for the attacks on the Tajik police station on 3 September 2010, released a video calling for all Tajik citizens to wage Jihad against the secular government.41 The 15-minute video urged Tajik citizens to support the group and live up to the ideals of all Muslims. Currently, Jamaat Ansarullah is not listed as a terrorist organization by the Tajik government.

HIZB UT-TahrIR ISLAMI RECRUITIN WOMEN IN KYRGUZSTAN

A significant number of women are being targeted to join Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan, according to local reports. Their male relatives and those influential in their lives are even encouraging this engagement because they lack proper religious education.42 Often, the relatives are members of the extremist group. These women often provide safe houses and other accommodations for the male members.

39 “Group of Wahhabs detained in Bashkortostan,” Russia and CIS Military Newswire, 28, September 2011.
ABOUT IIPER

Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER) is a project of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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IIPER welcomes submissions on any aspect of Islamic, Islamist, or Jihadist politics in Eurasia as well as financial contributions to support the project. For related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact:

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