

PAKISTAN: VIOLENCE VS. STABILITY

A National Net Assessment

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Executive Summary

As the events surrounding the death of Osama Bin Laden make all too clear, Pakistan is passing through one of the most dangerous periods of instability in its history. This instability goes far beyond Al Qa'ida, the Taliban, and the war in Afghanistan. A net assessment of the patterns of violence and stability indicate that Pakistan is approaching a perfect storm of threats, including rising extremism, a failing economy, chronic underdevelopment, and an intensifying war, resulting in unprecedented political, economic and social turmoil.

The Burke Chair at CSIS has developed an working draft of a net assessment that addresses each of these threats and areas of internal violence in depth, and does so within in the broader context of the religious, ideological, ethnic, sectarian, and tribal causes at work; along with Pakistan's problems in ideology, politics, governance, economics and demographics.

The net assessment shows that these broad patterns of violence in Pakistan have serious implications for Pakistan's future, for regional stability, and for core US interests. Pakistan remains a central node in global counterterrorism. Osama Bin Laden was killed deep inside Pakistan in an area that raises deep suspicion about what Pakistani intelligence, senior military officers and government officials did and did not know about his presence – and the presence of other major terrorists and extremist like Sheik Mullah Omar and the “Quetta Shura Taliban.”

Pakistan pursues its own agenda in Afghanistan in ways that provide the equivalent of cross-border sanctuary for Taliban and Haqqani militants, and that prolong the fighting and cause serious US, ISAF, and Afghan casualties. This assessment shows, however, that Al Qa'ida and the Taliban are only part of the story. There are many other movements and tensions that feed violence and extremism in Pakistan, and which grow out of a government that has consistently failed to meet the needs of Pakistan's people over a period of decades.

There are tremendous shortfalls in the Pakistani government's capacity and willingness to provide for its citizens in ways that discourage a rising tide of violence and separatist movements. These failures interact with a growing wave of Sunni-Deobandi radicalization that manifests in anti-state violence and sectarian intolerance. A significant resulting uptick in terrorist violence has been accompanied by a gradual perversion of the Pakistani social fabric, intimidating secularism at the expense of militant Islam.

Despite these dangers, Pakistan is not a hopeless case. The country is not yet in terminal decline, if only because of its vigorous civil society and its talented secular elite. Nevertheless a wide gap exists between Pakistan official rhetoric and reality, and between its goals and its real-world performance.

Entrenched organizational interests including those of political, and security elites, as well as religious radicals, resist effective reform. Successful reform efforts require a far better planned and managed stabilization strategy that addresses all of the various causes of extremism and violence and actually executes such plans in ways that implement real, large-scale reforms.

As this analysis shows, the links between Pakistan's conflicts and their causes also mean that selective attempts to redress grievances cannot fundamentally alter or reverse Pakistan's problems and cannot hope to bring its people security and stability. Pakistan cannot succeed if its civilian leaders, senior officers, and security forces rely on internal security, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency – important as improvement in these activities remain. Pakistan's leaders must also focus on investing in its people's welfare and addressing their core grievances.

Pakistan also needs to give priority to its internal needs over dealing with external threats. Pakistan continues to give priority to strategic competition with India, and in ways that create growing problems in Afghanistan as well as strengthen internal extremists. It devotes an inordinate amount of its attention and resources to this struggle, and does so at the direct expense of the welfare and future of its people.

The Challenges of Internal Violence

This net assessment shows that these needs are becoming steadily more urgent because Pakistan faces the convergence of various localized conflicts that were once insulated from each other. A massive growth in militancy has spilled over from the periphery into the heartland of the Punjabi and Sindhi interior, and the impact of the war in Afghanistan has moved al-Qaeda into Pakistan along with the Taliban, Haqqani network, and Hekmatyar's forces. At the same time, Pakistan faces a combination of separatist pressures in Baluchistan and the Sindh and foreign and domestic neo-Salafi threats that have growing ties to al-Qaeda.

These threats include the continuing violence in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) and the neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Insurgent momentum shows few signs of having been decisively reversed despite increasingly robust Pakistani military (PAKMIL) operations. Improved counterinsurgency efforts have had some successes in certain tribal agencies, but gains are likely to be ephemeral, as many of the root causes of militancy remain unaddressed, including political, administrative and economic stagnation.

A diverse array of militant actors, including core command nodes of al-Qaeda, continues to operate inside the tribal areas. They maneuver in support of distinct organizational priorities, including the global jihad, regional jihads in Afghanistan and Kashmir, as well as more domestic anti-state and sectarian agendas, but often collaborate on operational, ideological and fundraising axes.

Their combined activities have uprooted many of the traditional modes of tribal governance, complicating efforts to restore stability. Pakistani military operations too have not been ideal from the US context. The selective counterinsurgency approach adopted by the military has attempted to delineate between groups actively hostile to Pakistani interests, and those – like the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban -- that may have future strategic utility in reestablishing Pakistan's sphere of influence and helping contain its external enemies.

As senior US officials and officers have made all too clear – along with some Afghan counterparts – this means some elements of the Pakistani governance and forces are supporting groups that are actively at war with the United States and Afghanistan. This strategy is causing a steady deterioration in Pakistani and US relations, and complicating the prospects for future US aid. It also is helping to strengthen extremists who ultimately may become an active threat to Pakistan.

These conflicts have been augmented by violence and tensions inside the rest of Pakistan. In south Punjab, a historical hotbed of militancy, various groups once firmly tethered to state policy have begun to splinter and migrate to the tribal areas. These groups have considerable experience in combat and knowledge of the weapons and technologies needed for asymmetric warfare. They have joined tribal militant groups, and assisted them in bringing terrorist violence into the previously insulated urban centers of the Punjab and the Sindh.

In Karachi, a key economic engine of Pakistan, ethno-sectarian violence has risen to new levels with the real danger of a slide back into the communal violence of the early 1990s. Such a reversal would be catastrophic for stability, exacerbating already chronic economic woes, whilst providing fodder for the sectarian and ethnic drivers of conflict in Pakistan.

In Baluchistan, a fifth separatist insurgency has become more active since 2004, and is closely linked and influenced by regional geopolitics. The Baloch insurgency is distinct from other conflicts, primarily in that Sunni-Deobandi philosophies play little role, but it nonetheless benefits from many of the same drivers, including widespread impoverishment, chronic underdevelopment and alienation from mainstream Pakistan.

The Challenges of External Relations

Pakistan's focus on the challenge from India affects virtually every aspect of its external relations. This plays out in Afghanistan in the form of a competition for influence over the Afghan government where Pakistan attempts to use its ties to the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, and other movements to ensure its influence over the future of Afghanistan and to limit any threat of Pashtun independence movements.

The end result is a fundamentally different perception of Pakistan's national interest from the US focus on Afghan security and stability. It is the reality behind the rhetoric of "ally" and "strategic partner" that has led to constant tension with the US. Cross-border violence into Afghanistan is a major irritant, and has resulted in deteriorating US-Pakistani relations.

Similarly, the Indo-Pakistani border is one of the most tense on the planet, and secured on both sides by nuclear weapons. Cross-border violence into India can greatly escalate the prospects of large-scale war. Many Kashmiri militant groups have splintered, as in south Punjab, and the growing risk of militant proxies operating autonomously cannot be discounted, particularly to divert Pakistani military attention away from the tribal areas.

The end result is that a concern with self-defense, and a threat from India, diverts massive amounts of resources and security forces away from far more serious internal problems and threats. Pakistan's current policies not only feed a major arms race with India, and tensions with Afghanistan and the US, they waste so many critical resources in the name of security that they have become a threat to the state and the future of the Pakistani people.

Instability as a Self-Inflicted Wound

This becomes clearer from the detailed analysis of violence in Pakistan in the full text of this net assessment. This violence is driven by a mix of ideology, religion, politics, governance, economics, and demographics that have all of the ingredients that have caused instability in Middle Eastern regimes. The drivers of conflict are shaped by a systemic malaise that includes weak and underdeveloped governance institutions hobbled by the omnipresent specter of a military coup that incentivize the maximization of rents instead of efficient representation.

Economic mismanagement and chronic underdevelopment in building up the human capital base have perpetuated deep inequalities and assisted in the alienation of large segments of the population. Demographics are an additional problem, and population pressures are compounded by a severe and growing "youth bulge." Social services, including the provision of core goods such as education, employment and health are already inadequate, and integrating increasing population figures has worrying implications for future instability.

Other key underlying causes of violence and instability include a dysfunctional civilian government that is all too often mired in internecine squabbling and willing to exploit ethno-sectarian divides for political gain. Strong organizational resistance continues to impede reform. Corruption, service politics, nepotism and favoritism, power brokers, entrenched feudal interests, and a marked civil-military imbalance continue to lead Pakistani elites to give their interests priority over those of the population, and help institutionalize entrenched patronage networks, widespread corruption and significant structural distortions in tax collections.

Pakistan has made some efforts to rectify these shortfalls in governance. The 18th Amendment package of constitutional reforms passed by the new civilian government in August 2010 included dilution in the powers of the executive and an expansion in the autonomy and representation of provincial interests. A greater emphasis on human security has also led to increased allocations to critical sectors such as education and employment.

Yet, these efforts have faltered. Far too many reform programs end up remaining rhetoric and exercises in political opportunism, with the government making only superficial attempts to rectify many of its deep-rooted structural problems. Where it has spent money, it has placed too much emphasis on allocating resources with too little emphasis on ensuring a meaningful outcome.

Money alone is no guarantee of success, particularly when entrenched corruptions and inefficiencies in the bureaucratic system provide diminishing returns to investments. Developing a focused set of metrics to accurately capture progress will be essential, and should reorient focus away from quantity to quality. Simply building schools in the tribal regions for example, has no bearing on the number of educated graduates if the schools lack capable teachers, better curriculums and more relevance to the labor market.

The Impact of Pakistani Instability

Pakistan is a pivotal regional player, whose problems affect the security of other countries in the region, and that of the United States. It has the potential to be either a major disruptive force or a major source of stability, in assisting end to violence in Afghanistan, in assisting in the peaceful rise of India, and helping constrain Iran's bid for Middle Eastern hegemony.

At present, Pakistan seems to be on a downward course. Its leadership is not adequately addressing either the causes of Pakistan's internal violence, or the needs of its people. Its politics are corrupt and self-serving, and far too many indicators reflect its failure to adopt policies that serve popular needs or meet popular expectations. It is playing a form of the "great game" which forces it to confront India on a region-wide basis and into a nuclear arms race. It has unleashed levels of religious extremism that not only threaten its Shi'ite minorities but also its moderate Sunni majority. At the same time, it continues a long history of shifting the blame for its own actions to other states, and relying on political rhetoric as a substitute for effective action.

This presents major problems for the United States both in finding some favorable outcome to the Afghan conflict, and in helping to create some form of regional stability in South Asia – a greater US strategic interest than the future of Afghanistan and Central Asia. However, US options are limited. US military intervention inside Pakistan is deeply resented by both the Pakistani people and its leadership elite. US military assistance has so far won only grudging and limited support and economic assistance has failed to win broad support or achieve any major

objectives. Cross-border sanctuaries -- which are tolerated by at least some elements of the Pakistani security establishment -- remain significant havens for Taliban insurgents

At the same time, the US, its allies in ISAF, and the Afghan government need every bit of military, and counterterrorism cooperation from Pakistan they can get. Even limited Pakistani intelligence support is crucial in providing them with an understanding of militant dynamics. They are also dependent on a logistic tail that keeps them reliant on a transit route through Pakistan.

Pakistan's leverage in dissuading American pressure is further increased by the fact that the US is deeply unpopular in Pakistan. This creates major problems for both the US and Pakistan in finding some practical way to create a truly effective strategic relationship, as well as making the success of economic and military aid uncertain, and sharply restricting the future ability for the US to transform its role from one of constant pressure on Pakistan to that of a real strategic partner.

The fundamental realities of Pakistan's external relations are all too similar to those of its internal problems. Only Pakistan can save Pakistan. This can never happen as long as its leadership elite pursues policies where their definition of "victory" really means defeat.

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SECTION I: SETTING THE STAGE

It is all too easy to focus on Pakistan's political problems or internal violence, but these are as symptomatic of the nation's problems as they are cause. Pakistan's growing patterns of terrorism, insurgency and violence must be considered in the context of its overall political landscape, key problems like poverty and employment, challenges like demographics and education, and limits to the quality of governance and the reform of the security sector.

Pakistan's Political Landscape

Instability in Pakistan is shaped by a dysfunctional political structure, which has been a three-way battle between the generals, the mullahs and the civilians. Today, a new civilian government is in power, but has increasingly lost its luster with its inability to leverage its popularity and success in replacing military rule in 2008. An inability to register improvements in the lives of ordinary Pakistanis or to reform political corruptions long deemed acceptable, have led to its increasing unpopularity, and reinforced by the government's absence during flood relief operations in 2010.

Today, Pakistan's population appears to be increasingly in middle of tensions and violence between its military and religious radicals – although regional, ethnic, and sectarian tensions are also a growing source of violence. The military continues to have primacy in national affairs, and control key aspects of foreign and security policy. It also has a major impact on the federal budget, forcing Pakistan to limit civil expenditures and development.

Religious extremism is on the rise. This is increasingly manifested in acts of violent terrorism, but also by a far more insidious radicalization of society. This rise of fundamentalism was vividly illustrated by the assassinations of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer and Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti in early 2011, in reaction to their attempts to reform Pakistan's highly controversial blasphemy laws. The outpouring of support for these assassinations shocked and intimidated secular progressive elements in Pakistan, and showed how much impact the religious parties' could have on the 'street' despite their previous failures to win broad support in elections.

Civilian Governance with Military "Preeminence"

Various analysts have paraphrased Voltaire to declare that while many states have an army, Pakistan's army has a state.¹ The Army has primacy in Pakistan; it has ruled Pakistan for over half its existence and has never yet allowed a civilian government to complete its term. It acts as the primary guarantor of Pakistan's stability and remains the country's most powerful institution, with its power largely untouched despite the rise of a new civilian government.

Many analysts continue to believe that the Army is the glue holding Pakistan together – without which Pakistan would disintegrate into anarchy.² However, its preeminence is also widely regarded to have greatly restricted the growth of democratic institutions as well as ensured that the narrow interests of military elites drive foreign and security policy.

¹ Anatol Lieven, "All Kayani's Men," *National Interest*, May 1, 2010.

² Dr. Suba Chandran, "Reading Pakistan: Is the Military the Only Glue?" *Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies*, April 7, 2011. Available at <http://www.eurasiareview.com/reading-pakistan-is-the-military-the-only-glue-analysis-07042011/>

Despite this overarching power, under Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani, the Army has shown some deference to the civilian government, and Kayani has consistently voiced his opposition to military intervention in domestic politics. The Pakistani military is run from General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, and is the most organized and functional organization in Pakistan today. It is far more than a large and well-equipped fighting force. It maintains extensive landholdings and a significant business portfolio from factories to bakeries, which may comprise as much as 3 – 10 percent of the entire economy.³

The armed forces seem to have de facto control of key budgetary allocations, and its defense expenditure in FY 2010-2011 officially made up as much as 13.5 percent of all budget outlays for the period.⁴ These significant burdens on the economy are exercised without any transparency. 2008 marked the first year where the armed forces broke down their annual requirements⁵, instead of submitting a single, incontestable line entry for their annual demands.⁶

In July 2010, Kayani was offered a three-year extension in his tenure of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) beginning November 2010 by the civilian government. The event, while unprecedented, was hardly a reflection of improving civil-military relations. The military high command is likely to have deemed continuity in a time of war essential, rendering civilian opinions irrelevant, while the US is believed to have strongly backed the extension.⁷

In addition to reinforcing the army's preeminence to many observers, the extension is also believed to have important effects in enhancing military control over civilian politics. The extension now means that Kayani's term will include overseeing the National Assembly elections, which are likely to be held in early 2013, an effect that necessitates that both major political parties, the incumbent PPP and the opposition PML-N stay in the army's good graces.⁸

Shuja Nawaz, a leading analyst on the Pakistani military also comments on its effects on the military high-command. He points out that nearly a dozen three-star generals will now retire before the expiration of Kayani's term, leading to an "the age and service gap between Kayani and his corps commanders in another two years will be quite large as he digs down the rank orders," exacerbating Pakistan's already steep pyramidal command structure, as "few junior officers will be willing to challenge the views of such a senior chief."⁹

The Army is widely popular amongst Pakistanis, and its shortcomings are often forgotten. It has intervened almost exclusively with popular support of Pakistanis eager to seek relief from

³ Ayesha Siddiqua, "Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy," (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

⁴ Jon Grevatt, "Pakistan increases defense budget by 17%," *Janes*, June 9, 2010. Available at http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdi/jdi100609_1_n.shtml

⁵ Nirupama Subramanian, "Pakistan: Debate on Defense Spending," *The Hindu*, June 17, 2008. Available at <http://www.hindu.com/2008/06/17/stories/2008061755610900.htm>

⁶ Irfan Husain, "The Heart of the Matter," *Dawn*, January 22, 2011. Available at <http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/22/the-heart-of-the-matter.html>

⁷ "Kayani's extension good news for US admin," *AFP*, July 25, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/30884/kayanis-extension-good-news-for-us-admin/>

⁸ R. Banerji, "Kayani and His Generals," *Center for Land Warfare Studies*, December 29, 2010. Available at http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=712&u_id=36

⁹ Shuja Nawaz, "Kayani and Pakistan's Civil-Military Relations," *Atlantic Council*, July 23, 2010. Available at http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/kayani-and-pakistans-civil-military-relations

kleptocratic civilian elites, as during the 1999 Musharraf takeover. Despite unpopular military rule, the Army appears to have restored its prestige by mid-2010, with a full 94% of polled Pakistanis believing that the military was a positive influence on Pakistan's direction.¹⁰

The current head of the army, General Kayani, is often lauded as a "quiet, professional soldier... [with] a policy of keeping the army out of politics..."¹¹ This is a view believed to be shared by his US military counterparts, including General David Petraeus, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen.¹²

This helps explain why the US has placed high value on its military-to-military relationships in Pakistan, believing them to be its surest bet for long-term continuity in Pakistan's volatile political landscape. Under Kayani, the Pakistani Army has also increasingly focused on operations in the tribal areas, although Kayani himself has reiterated his continued intention to ensure that the Pakistani Army remains "India-centric."¹³

At the same time, the US government and military have shown a growing frustration with the Pakistani Army's inability (or failure) to hold cleared territory against the militants they claim to defeat; and at the continuing collusion of the Pakistani Army and its *Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence* (more commonly known as *Inter-Services Intelligence* or *ISI*) with Taliban, Haqqani and other militants that use Pakistan as a sanctuary in attacking Afghanistan.¹⁴

This frustration is matched on the Pakistan side. Kayani has made it clear that he neither is, nor wants to be seen, as an American proxy, and has recently displayed increasing impatience with US criticism, condemning a drone attack in March 2011, which killed 41 alleged civilians, in unusually strong language as "intolerable and unjustified... [and] in complete violation of human rights."¹⁵

The Uncertain Role of the ISI

Military intelligence is a key component of the military's strength and has a major political and foreign policy role. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is the 'deep state' in Pakistan tasked with the overarching remit to ensure that Pakistan remains a "security state."¹⁶ Recognition of the organization's central importance in advancing military strategy has been reflected in the

¹⁰ "Asif Ali Zardari fares poorly, Kayani more popular: poll," *Pakistan Daily*, August 2, 2010. Available at <http://www.daily.pk/asif-ali-zardari-fares-poorly-kayani-more-popular-poll-19394/>

¹¹ Shuja Nawaz, "Kayani and Pakistan's Civil-Military Relations," *Atlantic Council*, July 23, 2010. Available at http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/kayani-and-pakistans-civil-military-relations

¹² Masood Haider, "US sees Gen Kayani as safer bet," *Dawn*, March 21, 2009. Available at <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/90920>

¹³ "Pakistan Army will remain India-centric: Kayani," *Economisc Times*, February 4, 2010. Avialable at <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/pakistani-army-will-remain-india-centric-kayani/articleshow/5535827.cms>

¹⁴ "Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 2011," *White House*,

¹⁵ "Pakistan Army Chief in US Drone Outburst," *BBC News*, March 17, 2011. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12779232>

¹⁶ "South Asia: On the High Ground," *Financial Times*, February 28, 2011. Available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d6cfaac-4377-11e0-8f0d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Iu0eTPCw>

unusual, but complementary one-year extension in tenure granted to Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha in March 2011.¹⁷

Pasha, along with Kayani dominated Pakistani strategic thinking, including the military's continued India-centric focus, its increased interest in combating the Pakistani Taliban, while maintaining its relationships with the Afghan Taliban to retain as strategic proxies of continuing utility. The ISI also maintains an extensive network of informants, pervasive across society and ranging from upper echelons of governance to "lowly informants watching the lobbies of the country's hotel."¹⁸

From its headquarters in Aapbara, in Islamabad, the ISI operates both internally to resist civilian control, and externally to project the military's power across its borders. Its internal influence is generally considerably higher, during periods of military rule, such as during the Musharraf and Zia era, when it was the primary conduit to organize religious political coalitions to hedge against mainstream parties, and militant groups to conduct proxy war on its behalf. Allegations of ISI complicity in various terrorist attacks continue today, most often on coalition forces in Afghanistan and on Indian interests.

The ISI is best known for its links to militant groups, although there is considerable uncertainty as to the magnitude of these relationships. The ISI itself, and its supporters inside Pakistan, allege that is an intelligence agency just like any other that works only to ensure the defense of Pakistan.¹⁹ US intelligence officials have alleged close ties between the ISI and Taliban elements,²⁰ but there is likely some truth to a senior Pakistani official's frustrated retort that "honestly, they see ISI behind every bush."²¹

These actions have also led some to allege that the ISI operates as a rogue organization, answerable to no-one. Former US ambassador to Pakistan William Milam disagrees, stating that, "I do not buy the thesis that the ISI is a rogue organization. It is a disciplined army unit that does what it is told, although it may push the envelope sometimes."²²

Some element of collusion between the Army, ISI, and Afghan insurgents is almost certain, although estimates vary greatly. Recent developments have also raised new concerns in Washington. The circumstances surrounding the successful US attack on Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011 have led many analysts to ask how Bin Laden was able to find sanctuary in the

¹⁷ Jane Perlez, "Spy Chief in Pakistan to Stay on Another Year," *New York Times*, March 11, 2011. Available through Lexis Nexis.

¹⁸ "South Asia: On the High Ground," *Financial Times*, February 28, 2011. Available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d6cfaac-4377-11e0-8f0d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Iu0eTPCw>

¹⁹ "South Asia: On the High Ground," *Financial Times*, February 28, 2011. Available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d6cfaac-4377-11e0-8f0d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Iu0eTPCw>

²⁰ Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, "CIA outlines Pakistan Link with Militants," *New York Times*, July 30, 2008. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/world/asia/30pstan.html>

²¹ Julian Barnes, Matthew Rosenberg and Habib Khan Totakhil, "Pakistan Urges on Taliban," *Wall Street Journal*, October 5, 2010. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704689804575536241251361592.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEFTTopStories

²² Jayshree Bajoria, "The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations," *Council on Foreign Relations*, July 26, 2010. Available at <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/isi-terrorism-behind-accusations/p11644>

garrison city of Abbottabad. This city is the location of Pakistan's most prestigious military academy, and home to at least three Army regiments and thousands of troops.²³

In fact, a week before Bin Laden was killed, Kayani spoke of breaking the "back of terrorism," he spoke within a mile of where Bin Laden was hiding.²⁴ The scale of Bin Laden's compound is also cause for worry, consisting of 12 foot high walls and two security gates, increasing skepticism that it could have existed particularly within the upscale Bilal Town colony of Abbottabad without the Pakistani military and ISI having some knowledge of his location.²⁵ Some analysts feel it either demonstrated extreme incompetence on the part of the ISI, or is evidence that key elements in the Army and government cooperate with a much wider range of Islamist extremists than just the Afghan Taliban.²⁶

Matt Waldman, a researcher with the London School of Economics has also alleged extensive cooperation at both the operational and strategic level between the ISI and the Afghan Taliban, including ISI representation as observers during meetings of the Quetta Shura, the senior most leadership council.²⁷ Given the long relationships cultivated from the Soviet jihad, it is also believed that some, or many, ISI officers, both retired and serving continue to maintain a close sense of identification with their proxies.

Retired ISI chief Hamid Gul is an example. In a recent interview he reiterated his various beliefs, including allegations that the Mossad perpetrated 9/11, that the US actively seeks to destabilize Pakistan "because it is a Muslim nuclear state," as well as advocacy for an Islamist state – "a global village under divine order" – presumably led by the Taliban, who "represent Islam in its purest form."²⁸ Anatol Lieven, another Pakistani military researcher, recounts the multitude of stories in 2007-08 of individual ISI officers intervening to rescue Taliban militants from arrest, "too many, and too circumstantial, for these all to have been invented."²⁹

Military Rule, Semi-Rule, and Military Autonomy

On another front, many feel Kayani is doing his best to limit military intervention in civil governance, and to limit the risk of a military coup. Kayani has sought to refocus the Army away from politics, and reversed many of Musharraf's policies, including barring officers from

²³ Jane Perlez, "Bin Laden's death likely to deepen suspicions of Pakistan," *New York Times*, May 2, 2011. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/world/asia/03pakistan.html>

²⁴ Tim Lister, "Abbottabad: The Military Town where Bin Laden Hid in Plain Sight," *CNN*, May 2, 2011. Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/bin.laden.abbottabad/>

²⁵ Bill Dedman, "US tracked couriers to elaborate Bin Lade compound," *MSNBC*, May 2, 2011. Available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42853221/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/

²⁶ Chris Allbritton and Rebecca Conway, "In Pakistan, en embarrassed silence on killing of Bin Laden," *Reuters*, May 2, 2011. Available at <http://reut.rs/jZMXxK>

²⁷ Matt Waldman, "The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan Insurgents," *LSE Crisis States Center*, June 2010. Available at <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/Home.aspx>

²⁸ Arnaud de Bochgrave, "UPI Commentary With Hamid Gul," *United Press International*, July 28, 2010. Available at http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/de-Borchgrave/2010/07/28/UPI-interview-with-Hamid-Gul/UPI-60031280349846/

²⁹ Anatol Lieven, "All Kayani's Men," *National Interest*, May 1, 2010.

meeting with politicians without express permission, and ordering all officers who hold posts in civilian agencies to immediately resign their positions.³⁰

At the same time, some of his statements provide a warning that the army may still feel it is the ultimate option whenever civil governance falters or fails. Kayani has likened past military coups to “temporary bypasses that are created when a bridge collapses on democracy’s highway. After the bridge is repaired, then there’s no longer any need for the detour.”³¹

These words are disturbing precisely because the rhetoric has been so far from the past reality. Each previous period of military rule further weakened civilian institutions, and conditioned political elites to maximize rents during their brief tenures instead of focusing on governance. Similarly, military rulers have often staffed civilian institutions with military officers to ensure control, as during the Musharraf-era when the bureaucracy was heavily militarized. While Zia is often seen as the symbol of a destructive military intervention, Musharraf introduced quotas for military representation in the civil service, appointed army officials to key civilian positions including agriculture, education and medicine, and created army monitoring teams for oversight and evaluation purposes.³²

Despite some positive moves to limit the army’s role in civilian governance and politics, it continues to have primacy in many sectors of decision-making, most notably in all levers of security and foreign policy. Upon his election, and in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in 2008, the Zardari government made improving relations with India a central strategy, an effort the army sharply undercut.

It severely limited Zardari’s attempts to exercise greater control over security institutions such as the ISI. Hours after PM Gilani issued a decree ordering the ISI to be brought under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, his government was forced to rescind the order after the Army signaled its displeasure.³³ The Army similarly rebuffed Zardari’s offer to send the ISI to India to collaborate with the Mumbai investigation, and refused to reduce the nuclear-alert status as a goodwill gesture to reduce tensions with India.³⁴

An embassy cable released by Wikileaks dated one day before the Mumbai attacks, also noted that Kayani was the sole obstacle preventing an Indo-Pakistan deal on Kashmir, claiming that “Zardari and Singh were ready, and there was text on paper”³⁵ The army also publicly campaigned against the Kerry-Lugar Bill, a US economic assistance package, because it felt the

³⁰ Mark Sappenfield, “Musharraf Successor Kayani Boosts Pakistan Army’s Image,” *Christian Science Monitor*, February 5, 2008. Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2008/0205/p04s02-wosc.html>

³¹ Christine C. Fair, Why the Pakistan Army is Here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance? (February 1, 2011). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1753766>

³² Griff Witte, “Musharraf’s Military Reaches Deep Into Pakistani Society,” *Washington Post*, June 27, 2007. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/26/AR2007062601826.html>

³³ Saeed Shah, “Gilani’s Humiliating About Face,” *The National*, July 28, 2008. Available at <http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-asia/gilanis-humiliating-about-face?pageCount=0>

³⁴ “Zardari agrees to send ISI chief to India after 26/11,” *NDTV*, December 2, 2010. Available at <http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/zardari-agreed-to-send-isi-chief-to-india-after-26-11-70035>

³⁵ “Kayani last obstacle to Kashmir deal,” *Hindustan Times*, April 4, 2011. Available at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/newdelhi/Kayani-last-obstacle-to-Kashmir-deal/Article1-681212.aspx>

bill had conditions hostile to its interests that were tied to the flow of US aid.³⁶ The Army also played a key role shaping talks with the US in Islamabad in March 2010, including setting the agenda, summoning heads of civilian institutions to Army headquarters to discuss details, and presiding over meetings with federal secretaries.³⁷

There also seem to have been an increasing number of cases in recent years when the army has begun to more actively interfere in domestic affairs in reflection of its frustration with the civilian government. There have also been persistent rumors of Kayani's disdain for leading civilian politicians. A Wikileaks cable dated from 2009 included an account of Kayani informing the US embassy of his willingness to force the ouster of President Zardari, a move the embassy seemingly believed was obstructed solely by the fact that "Kayani dislikes Nawaz far more than he mistrusts Zardari."³⁸ There have also been reports that senior politicians operate in fear of army intervention, including President Zardari himself who recounted to former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown his fears that Kayani might "take me out."³⁹

This military frustration with the civil government has had all too many causes. Before the floods, Kayani found it necessary to intercede during the March 2009 political standoff between the incumbent Zardari-led PPP government, and the opposition PML-N party led by the Sharif brothers. Large-scale protests by the PML-N paralyzed Pakistan, leading Kayani to personally get involved and push Zardari to accept key opposition demands, including the reinstatement of the widely popular Chief Justice Chaudhry.⁴⁰ Such interventions appeared to be welcomed by the population, with Kayani's approval ratings reaching 61% in mid-2010, compared to a mere 20% for Zardari.⁴¹

The situation grew worse during and after massive floods later in 2010. During relief efforts, General Kayani was the most visible public figure, and the Army was conspicuously involved in relief efforts in the field. In contrast, President Zardari initially continued a visit to his chalet in France, and the civil aid effort was often ineffective or corrupt and gave priority to the wealthy and power brokers..⁴²

Poor civil performance in the reconstruction phase that followed caused considerable additional popular anger with the government. It may have been the reason Kayani intervened in September

³⁶ "Kayani Behind Conflict on Kerry-Lugar: Wikileaks," *Dawn*, November 30, 2010. Available at <http://www.dawn.com/2010/11/30/gen-kayani-pitched-conflict-on-kerry-lugar-bill-wikileaks.html>

³⁷ Janes Perlez, "Army chief driving Pakistan's agenda for Washington talks," *New York Times*, March 22, 2010. Available through Lexis Nexis.

³⁸ "Wikileaks: Punjab, ISI and a Distracted President Trouble Pakistan," *NDTV*, December 2, 2010. Available at <http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks:-india-cables/wikileaks-punjab-isi-and-a-distracted-president-trouble-pakistan-69960>

³⁹ "Wikileaks US Diplomatic Cables: Key Pakistan Issues," *BBC*, December 1, 2010. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-south-asia-11886512>

⁴⁰ Zahid Hussain and Matthew Rosenberg, "Pakistan Military Chief Tries to Mediate Standoff," *Wall Street Journal*, March 14, 2009. Available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123695719691520181.html>

⁴¹ "Asif Ali Zardari fares poorly, Kayani more popular: poll," *Pakistan Daily*, August 2, 2010. Available at <http://www.daily.pk/asif-ali-zardari-fares-poorly-kayani-more-popular-poll-19394/>

⁴² "Zardari visits French Chateau as Floods Rage," *The Nation*, August 4, 2010. Available at <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/04-Aug-2010/Zardari-visits-French-chateau-as-floods-rage>

2010 to demand that President Zardari trim his cabinet, including several key loyalists.⁴³ Zardari's cabinet included several members facing corruption and criminal charges and was widely perceived as emblematic of government waste and corruption, despite which Zardari maintained a politely defiant stance. The civil government initially responded by maintaining that the Army's demands were unconstitutional⁴⁴, but within a few months, it had begun moves to trim the cabinet, although it framed it as a cost-cutting exercise to foster better governance.⁴⁵

Stability Problems Within the Army

There are reasons to question the long-term internal unity and cohesion of the Army. It is not immune to the wave of religious radicalization sweeping the Pakistani social structure – although it was Zia who did much to trigger the forces that led to such movements. There have been serious instances where the security forces showed the impact of such radicalization, notably the assassination of Punjab governor Salman Taseer by a member of his own elite counterterrorist police force. Similarly Faisal Shahzad, the would-be “Times Square bomber” was associated with a major in the Pakistani Army who allegedly served as a go-between for Shahzad and the Taliban.⁴⁶

The Army has attempted to deal with the fact it was increasingly Islamized during the Zia-era. Subsequent leaders have reversed many of his policies, although some continue. For example, today one Islamic chaplain, or “long beard” is attached to every battalion, a holdover since the 1980s.⁴⁷ The Army is also believed to increasingly consist of more religious elements amongst its rank and file, although as retired moderate-Islamist Colonel Abdul Qayyum attempts to explain, “At heart the vast majority of the army are nationalists, and take whatever is useful from Islam to serve what they see as Pakistan's interests. The Pakistani Army has been a nationalist army with an Islamic look”⁴⁸

In aggregate, most observers agree that the Pakistani Army remains a professional and well-disciplined force that follows orders in spite of isolated incidents. Some describe the Army as a “breed apart,” composing a “military family different from (and vastly superior to) civilian society... [with] contempt for the “feudal” political class.”⁴⁹ They feel that the loyalty and camaraderie that exists inside the army is a reflection of the unprecedented social mobility it offers to members of the lower and middle classes, from where it recruits for its enlisted men. Anatol Lieven has examined the personal histories of the various COASs' in Pakistani history, and summarizes their history by saying that, “some were rich, others poor, some secular others

⁴³ Declan Walsh, “Pakistan Army Chief Demands Removal of Zardari Loyalists,” *Guardian*, October 1, 2010. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/01/pakistan-army-chief-zardari-loyalists>

⁴⁴ Junaid Qaiser, “President Zardari Rejects Unconstitutional Demand by the Army Chief,” *LUBP*, October 11, 2010. Available at <http://criticalppp.com/archives/25592>

⁴⁵ Karen Bruilliard, “Pakistan Cabinet Resigns in Cost-Cutting,” *Washington Post*, February 9, 2011. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/09/AR2011020903368.html>

⁴⁶ “Faisal Shahzad Probe Earns Pakistan CIA Visit,” *CBS News*, May 19, 2010. Available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/19/world/main6499127.shtml>

⁴⁷ Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Gulled by Gul,” *United Press International*, December 3, 2009. Available at http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/de-Borchgrave/2009/12/03/Commentary-Gulled-by-Gul/UPI-90901259850600/

⁴⁸ Anatol Lieven, “All Kayani's Men,” *National Interest*, May 1, 2010.

⁴⁹ Anatol Lieven, “All Kayani's Men,” *National Interest*, May 1, 2010.

religious and some conspiratorial others loyal. Yet all have been first and foremost military men.”⁵⁰

Despite these bonds, the Army’s limited cooperation with the American in Afghanistan has reflected significant problems. The initial operations in the FATA were widely interpreted in the ranks as subservience to the US, which caused deep consternation. Low willingness to fight fellow Muslims led to several humiliating incidents, including the surrender of over 200 soldiers to a small group of militants in September 2007.⁵¹ Similarly earlier operations in 2004 led to desertions amongst the paramilitary Frontier Corps, and helicopter pilots refused to bomb targets.⁵²

Some soldiers found themselves dishonored in their local communities, which is not surprising given the fact that the army and the militants recruit from the same areas, particularly in the Punjab. Lieven points to this trend as one of the most dangerous, pointing out that when men from a high-status institution such as the army have trouble finding suitable brides, it points to a significant change in its perceived role in society.⁵³ The military has made a concerted effort to address these issues, and has been helped by the growing alienation of many Pakistanis from militants after their brutalities in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) in 2007-08. Unfortunately, the successes of 2009, gave way to a war of attrition in 2010, which led many of those in combat zones or displaced by the fighting to feel the Army had failed them and has caused at least some renewal of the tension between the Army and the people.

The United States’ role in counterterrorism and in the Afghan War contributes to these problems. No internal actor, including the Taliban, is strong enough to take on the military, and no regional actor, including India, is either capable of or willing to take on and destroy the army in an extended campaign. As Lieven notes, the tipping point is only likely to come “if Washington ever undertakes actions that persuade ordinary Pakistani soldiers that their only honorable course is to fight America, even against the orders of their generals and against dreadful odds, the armed forces would crumble.”⁵⁴

This helps explain why Pakistani military officials may tolerate some aspect of the drone campaign in the FATA area, and find it useful in dealing with militants and extremists that pose a threat to the Army and Pakistan’s ruling elite. At the same time, it helps explain why they want far more direct control over every aspect of US operations in Pakistan, limit the role of US trainers and special forces, oppose any expansion of US military activity into the rest of Pakistan, including Balochistan or the KPK, which would constitute a red line for many in the army.

The Army also strongly opposes any cross-border incursions by US and ISAF ground forces and helicopters into Pakistan. An alleged incursion in September 2008 incurred great anger in

⁵⁰ Anatol Lieven, “All Kayani’s Men,” *National Interest*, May 1, 2010.

⁵¹ Bill Roggio, “Taliban Parade Captured Pakistani Soldiers in South Waziristan,” *Long War Journal*, October 11, 2007. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/taliban_parade_captu.php

⁵² “Pakistan Crisis Hits Army Morale,” *BBC News*, September 13, 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6978240.stm

⁵³ Anatol Lieven, “All Kayani’s Men,” *National Interest*, May 1, 2010.

⁵⁴ Anatol Lieven, “All Kayani’s Men,” *National Interest*, May 1, 2010.

Pakistan, and resulted in the issuing of orders for soldiers to open fire on any NATO forces attempting to cross the border according to a military spokesman.⁵⁵ A similar helicopter-borne raid in end September 2010 ended up killing 3 Pakistani border guards and injuring another three, which resulted in fierce condemnation of the attack, and the closure of border crossings to NATO supply trucks.⁵⁶ The Pakistani government did not express similar opposition to the US raids on the Bin Laden compound in May 2011, but it is clear that this is seen as an embarrassment by both senior Army leaders and leaders in the Pakistani government.

Semi-Dysfunctional Civilian Government

In over 60 years of independence, no democratically elected Pakistani civilian government has yet served out its full term, and been replaced by another. This history underlines the challenges facing President Zardari's Pakistan People's Party (PPP)-led incumbent government, and any US-supported democratization strategy. It also helps explain the deep damage that has been wreaked upon civilian institutions by repeated periods of military rule.

The military, however, cannot fully be blamed for many of its past actions. It responded to a failing and dysfunctional civil governments and politics, and took power with extensive popular support, driven by the population's disenchantment with its civilian rulers.

No modern political leader of Pakistan has consistently put the nation's interests before family, party, and power. Civilian political elites have been conditioned to focus on maximizing rents during their brief tenures, instead of focusing on issues of governance, and today corruption and entrenched feudal interests remain strong. Access to political and economic power continues to rest in the hands of the urban middle-classes of Punjab (and the Sindh) breeding provincial alienation, particularly in the periphery.

Class, ethnicity and religion continue to be instruments of marginalization. Despite all these problems, it should not be ignored that Pakistan's civilian government is still in its infancy, yet has registered several important strides in recent years including constitutional reforms to empower civilian institutions and encourage provincial autonomy.

A Continuing History of Civil Collapse?

The military would and could not have seized power so repeatedly, if it were not for the consistent failure of civilian governments to better the welfare of their citizens. For example, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif presided over the "lost decade" of the 1990s, their tenures marked by plummeting economic growth, rising poverty levels and widespread allegations of corruption, all of which helped usher in the military government of Pervez Musharaff.

A decade later, the trend may be repeating. Three years into the PPP-led coalition civilian government, and many Pakistanis are already fed up. In mid-August 2010, a poll conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that only 14% of Pakistanis were satisfied with national

⁵⁵ Bill Roggio, "Pakistani Forces Ordered to 'Open Fire' on US Forces Crossing the Border," *Long War Journal*, September 16, 2008. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/pakistani_forces_ord.php

⁵⁶ Zeeshan Haider, "Pakistan Halts NATO Supplies After Border Attack," *Reuters*, September 30, 2010. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/30/us-pakistan-security-idUSTRE68T1SQ20100930?pageNumber=1>

conditions.⁵⁷ 71% had an unfavorable impression of the civilian government, in contrast to the military, which had recovered its national standing as the most trusted institution, with an 84% favorability rating.⁵⁸

On the surface, these polling results seem unfair. Halfway through its term, the civil government has made important reforms. The independence of the judiciary has improved, the media has grown freer and more vibrant, constitutional amendments have removed the concentrated powers Musharraf put in the hands of the executive, the provinces have gained greater autonomy, and some important electoral reform initiatives have been implemented.⁵⁹

However little has changed for the average Pakistani, particularly Pakistani youth and those outside the relatively small middle class. Dysfunctional transitional democracy may be favorable to military rule for many of the more affluent urban secularists who make up Pakistan's chattering class, but not all Pakistanis have that luxury when their everyday life grows worse by the day.

Attempts to calculate the wealth of political elites illustrate their distance from the poor. In 2010, income and asset declarations proved to be little more than a tragic joke, appearing to show that many powerful senators are no richer than ordinary Pakistanis. This provoked a Pakistani newspaper to sarcastically lament, "We never knew that those who travel in expensive vehicles and live in royal palace like homes are actually so poor!"⁶⁰ A study by PILDAT, a local transparency group, in 2002-03 instead estimated that the average net worth of a member of the National Assembly was PKR199.83 million (roughly US\$2.7 million), and the richest Senator at the time was worth a whopping PKR590 billion (roughly US\$700 million). Since 2002-03, declared assets have declined precipitously.⁶¹

Taxes are another issue. Pakistan has one of the world's lowest tax-to-GDP ratios and it is estimated as few as 2% of Pakistan's 170 million people pay tax.⁶² Political elites routinely escape paying taxes on their significant incomes, while poorer people have fewer avenues to escape the tax collector. Many Western politicians, including British Foreign Minister David Cameron, and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have noted that such graft severely complicates external assistance. Clinton, in particular stated, "This is one of my pet peeves... Pakistan cannot have a tax rate of 9 percent of GDP when landowners and all the other elites do

⁵⁷ "Mid-Term Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan: March 25, 2008 – September 24, 2010," *Pakistan Institute of Legislative Democracy and Transparency*, September 2010. Available at <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/SDR/PILDATMidTermDemocracyAssessmentReportSeptember2010.pdf>

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Sikander Shaheen, "Pakistan's 'penniless' ruling elites," *The Nation*, March 12, 2011. Available at <http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Regional/Islamabad/12-Mar-2011/Pakistans-penniless-ruling-elites/1>

⁶¹ "How Rich are Pakistan's MNAs?" *PILDAT*, August 2007. Available at http://www.pildat.org/%5Cevents%5C07-11-15%5Cpdf%5CRich_Pakistani_MNAS.pdf

⁶² Sabrina Tavernise, "Pakistan's Elite Pay Few Taxes, Widening Gap," *New York Times*, July 18, 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/world/asia/19taxes.html>

not pay or pay so little its laughable. And when there's a problem, everybody expects the US to come in and help."⁶³

The PPP rose to power on the platform of "Food, clothing, shelter to every poor family in Pakistan," but food shortages, energy crises, and price increases are all everyday realities that exacerbate the divides between the population and their unaccountable and kleptocratic civilian overlords who live in luxury.⁶⁴ 70 percent of people today believe that the current civilian government is more corrupt than its military-run predecessor,⁶⁵ partly stemming from the low regard with which many Pakistanis hold President Zardari. Known as "Mr. Ten Percent," for the widespread allegations of corruption during his wife's tenure as Prime Minister, Zardari once jokingly commented that he only lives in two places in Pakistan - "the prime minister's house or a prison cell."⁶⁶

As a result few Pakistanis have faith in democratic governance. The country has the lowest voter turnout in South Asia, and in July 2010, only 3% of Pakistanis with a post-graduate education expressed an interest in politics as a career.⁶⁷

The underlying causes of popular disaffection are reinforced by the dysfunctional character of Pakistani civil politics. Political competition is fierce in Pakistan and focuses on family, party, and service politics in ways which often complicates the ability to rule and which can make Pakistan appear to lurch from one crisis to another. The two major political parties, the incumbent PPP, and the opposition Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group (PML-N) run by the Sharif brothers from Punjab, constantly vacillate between professions of undying unity, and aggressive, often violent competition.

Pakistani political parties remain divided along ethnic and linguistic lines. Only the PPP and PML-N can truly be regarded as national parties, and they too have the majority of their powers concentrated in the Sindh and the Punjab respectively. Others, such as the Awami National Party (ANP) are popular only amongst the Pashtuns, and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) amongst the Mohajirs of Karachi. These divisive politics have often necessitated weak political coalitions, with various actors accountable only to narrow constituent interests. This greatly complicates the ability to govern, particularly on the many controversial issues that divide Pakistanis today. Vicious turf battles are also common for political parties, as seen in the violence in Karachi today.

In March 2009, the army had to intervene to mediate between the Sharifs and President Zardari, after large-scale protests by the PML-N paralyzed Pakistan, and threatened to topple the government. General Kayani himself is believed to have pressed Zardari to fulfill key opposition demands including lifting the recent ruling on Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif's ineligibility for

⁶³ "Clinton warns Pakistan to make the rich pay," *AFP*, September 30, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/56061/pakistan-must-tax-its-elite/>

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ "Global Corruption Report 2010," *Transparency International*, Available through <http://www.transparency.org/>

⁶⁶ Owen Bennett-Jones, "Zardari's Heavy Political Baggage," *BBC News*, August 6, 2010. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/9056/8889000/8889056.stm>

⁶⁷ "Mid-Term Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan: March 25, 2008 – September 24, 2010," *Pakistan Institute of Legislative Democracy and Transparency*, September 2010. Available at <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/SDR/PILDATMidTermDemocracyAssessmentReportSeptember2010.pdf>

electoral office nationally and in the Punjab, as well as reinstating the popular Chief Justice Ifitikhar Chaudhry.⁶⁸

The ban, which ostensibly was caused by the Sharifs' previous criminal convictions, was regarded as a political move orchestrated by Zardari, while on the Chief Justice, Zardari had vacillated for fears that the Supreme Court may choose to prosecute him on corruption charges.⁶⁹ In January 2011, the government almost collapsed again, when the MQM, a junior coalition partner, briefly withdrew from the government over opposition to the phasing out of fuel subsidies, a move demanded by the IMF.⁷⁰

These forces may well be significant obstacles to the government's ability to complete its term in 2013. In early April 2011, the Zardari government continued to face blistering criticism by opposition leaders over the release of suspected American spy, Raymond Davis.⁷¹ It is unclear how the US attack on Bin Laden will affect this situation, but the government has still been relatively ineffective in dealing with the aftermath of the flood, and with the impact of local fighting on civilians. It faces a major crisis from rising food and fuel prices, and faces a very uncertain global economy, and problems in ensuring the flow of foreign aid. Governance does not seem to be improving relative to the pressures caused by population growth and the nation's youth bulge, and party politics remain as self-seeking and destructive as in the past.

A Background of Modern Feudalism

Pakistan's political elites are unpopular for other reasons. Some leaders and power brokers are regarded as extensions of predatory local power structures, which include a form of near feudalism. President Zardari, Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif, and various members of the National Assembly are of this feudal class,⁷² many of who operate locally with undisputed political and economic control over vast swathes of Pakistan. The disparities between these wealthy landowners and the landless peasantry whose lives they dominate is often shocking, the magnitude best conveyed in the fact that 2% of Pakistanis control 45% of land in a country where the majority of people, particularly in rural areas are involved in agriculture.⁷³

So far, change is limited. The Jatoti clan in rural Sindh for example now owns 30,000 acres of prime agricultural land, having lost 45,000 acres in the 1958 land-redistribution program, but still

⁶⁸ Dean Nelson and Javed Siddiq, "Pakistan Faces New Political Crisis as Nawaz Sharif Banned from Office," *The Telegraph*, February 25, 2009. Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/4808128/Pakistan-faces-new-political-crisis-as-Nawaz-Sharif-banned-from-office.html>

⁶⁹ Cyril Almeida, "MQM Withdrawal: Tactical Ploy or Change in Strategy?" *Dawn*, December 29, 2010. Available at <http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/29/mqm-withdrawal-tactical-plot-or-change-in-strategy.html>

⁷⁰ Nancy Birdsall, Wren Elhai and Molly Kinder, "Pakistan's Political Crisis: The Limits of US Leverage," *Foreign Policy*, January 20, 2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/20/pakistan_s_political_crisis_the_limits_of_us_leverage

⁷¹ Omer Farooq Khan, "Uproar in Pakistan Over Release of CIA Contractor Raymond Davis," *Times of India*, March 17, 2011. Available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-17/pakistan/29138210_1_raymond-davis-ppp-led-lahore-high-court

⁷² Mahjabeen Islam, "Could Pakistan Floods Wash Away Feudalism?" *New American Media*, September 27, 2010. Available at <http://newamericamedia.org/2010/09/could-pakistan-floods-wash-away-feudalism.php>

⁷³ "Pakistan: Priorities for Agriculture and Rural Development," *World Bank*, <http://go.worldbank.org/KQ3CN500J0>

retains the allegiance of 400-500 lesser landlords and an estimated 1200 “armed loyalists.”⁷⁴ In contrast, it is estimated only 37% of Pakistan’s rural residents own the land they farm, and those too, mostly in small family plots barely enough for subsistence farming.⁷⁵ Most of the rest, including an estimated 1.8 million people estimated to be in debt bondage, work the fields for no pay,⁷⁶ while others are engaged in classic sharecropping, where two thirds or more of their revenues go to landlords in debt and accrued interest repayments.⁷⁷

Feudal lords have often been accused of abuses, including systematic attempts to deprive the peasantry of education, to keep them shackled in poverty, as well various other forms of coercion including maintaining armed militias and operating private prisons.⁷⁸ According to many reports, this predatory behavior was on display during the 2010 floods. Some 400,000 acres were flooded in Muzzaffargarh, in the Punjab. According to various reports, 51 people killed, 1.5 million displaced and 337 schools destroyed when the Indus River overflowed because the local government refused to follow protocols and blow up a barrage designed to divert water to a designated flood basin. Local feudal elites – in this case the Hinjra and Khosa clans – were surreptitiously farming the basin and pressured the government to protect their crops.⁷⁹ Relief teams operating deep in rural areas also found large incidences of malnutrition unrelated to the flood’s impact,⁸⁰ an example of the extreme poverty many landless peasants continue to face.

Appeasement in the Face of Extremism

Pakistan’s political leadership has shown far too little courage in the face of radical extremism, often choosing appeasement, over principle. The silence in the aftermath of the assassinations of two prominent liberal lawmakers - Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, and Shahbaz Bhatti, the Minorities Minister – has been deafening and has allowed the intimidation of all but the most courageous of progressive politicians and activists. Few government officials attended the funerals,⁸¹ and some such as Interior Minister Rehman Malik have publicly sided with the religious right, including Malik’s declaration that, “I will shoot a blasphemer myself.”⁸² In the

⁷⁴ John Lancaster, “Pakistan’s Modern Feudal Lords,” *Washington Post*, April 8, 2003. Available at <http://www.landandfreedom.org/news/040803.htm>

⁷⁵ Kamran Haider, “Pakistan feudalism boosts Taliban cause,” *Reuters*, October 25, 2010. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/25/us-pakistan-land-idUSTRE69O1MA20101025>

⁷⁶ “Absence of land reform entrenches poverty – activists,” *IRIN*, September 28, 2009. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=86319>

⁷⁷ Kamran Haider, “Pakistan feudalism boosts Taliban cause,” *Reuters*, October 25, 2010. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/25/us-pakistan-land-idUSTRE69O1MA20101025>

⁷⁸ Nicholas Kristof, “Feudalism in Pakistan,” *New York Times*, August 1, 2009. Available at <http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/01/feudalism-in-pakistan/>

⁷⁹ Issam Ahmed, “Pakistan Floodwaters Subside as a Tide of Allegations Rise,” *Christian Science Monitor*, September 10, 2010. Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0910/Pakistan-floodwaters-subside-as-a-tide-of-allegation-rises>

⁸⁰ “Floods uncover evidence of feudalism’s impact on the poor,” *IRIN/Reuters Alert Net*, February 17, 2011. Available at <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/pakistan-floods-uncover-evidence-of-feudalisms-impact-on-poor/>

⁸¹ Declan Walsh, “A Divided Pakistan Buries Salmaan Taseer and a Liberal Dream,” *The Guardian*, January 6, 2011. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/05/pakistan-salman-taseer-liberal>

⁸² Ahsan Butt, “The Shahbaz Bhatti Assassination: Have We Already Crossed the Crossroads,” *Asian Correspondent*, March 3, 2011. <http://asiancorrespondent.com/49508/the-shahbaz-bhatti-assassination-what-if-weve-already-crossed-the-crossroads/>

aftermath of the assassination too, it now appears that the Minorities Ministry post that Bhatti headed will be abolished, in another blow against religious minorities.⁸³

Even before their assassinations, Salman Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti and another legislator Sherry Rehman, were some of the only supporters of reform. They were afforded virtually no support from their own parties,⁸⁴ and today, Sherry Rehman, the last still alive, remains bunkered down in her Karachi home and has since withdrawn her amendment proposal.⁸⁵

Many politicians have chosen to pander to radical Islamist extremists, or the criminal underworld for political advantage. President Musharraf recently labeled Nawaz Sharif a “closet Taliban,”⁸⁶ in reference to his Islamist leanings, a perception shared in some circles in Washington. The Sharifs in Punjab for example have links to various Sunni Islamist groups, which have influence in their voting districts.

They have been linked to the rapidly anti-Shia SSP, and have extensive dealings with the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), the humanitarian arm of the notorious terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, both of which are designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the US government, and the United Nations.⁸⁷ In fact, in FY2010-11, the provincial government under Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif is reported to have allocated more than 82 million rupees to the JuD, including PKR79 million to its headquarters in Muridke and another 3 million to schools run by the organization in Punjab.⁸⁸

Faltering Progress Towards Reform

The civil government has achieved some progress towards reform. One of the greatest obstacles to national democratic governance in Pakistan is the fact that “Pakistan has failed to establish an effective federal covenant between its constituent units.”⁸⁹ Much of this is driven by the unequal benefits of citizenship across various provinces that have led to fragile associations with the state, a problem that recent reforms have sought to address.

The 7th National Finance Commission Award was a step forward in increasing the resource control of provinces, and more equitably distributing the federal divisible pool by increasing the shares of neglected provinces, such as Baluchistan and the KPK.⁹⁰ Similarly the 18th Amendment

⁸³ “Government ministry protecting minorities to be abolished,” *Spero News*, April 30, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/j2KDYd>

⁸⁴ Karin Brulliard, “Salmaan Taseer Assassination Points to Pakistan Extremists’ Mounting Power,” *Washington Post*, January 5, 2011. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/04/AR2011010400955.html>

⁸⁵ Alex Rodriquez, “Pakistan Handles Religious Extremism with Kid Gloves,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 29, 2011. Available at <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-pakistan-fear-20110330.0.389866.story>

⁸⁶ “Musharraf calls Nawaz Sharif a closet Taliban,” *Indian Express*, January 7, 2011. Available at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/musharraf-calls-nawaz-sharif-closet-taliban/734685/>

⁸⁷ Bill Roggio, “UN declares Jamaat-ud-Dawa a Terrorist Front Group,” *Long War Journal*, December 11, 2008. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/un_declares_jamaatud.php; “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” *US Department of State*, November 24, 2010. Available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>

⁸⁸ Huma Imtiaz, “Illusions in Punjab,” *Foreign Policy*, June 19, 2010. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/19/illusions_in_punjab

⁸⁹ Raza Ahmad, “The Endemic Crisis of Federalism in Pakistan,” *Lahore Journal of Economics*, Vol. 15, (September 2010), pp. 15-31. Available at <http://tiny.cc/78fk4>

⁹⁰ Mahmood Zaman, “Victory for Democracy,” *Pakistan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting*, ” <http://www.infopak.gov.pk/Victoryfordemocracy.pdf>

of 2010, trimmed the various excessive powers of the presidency, but also included many reforms to improve the social contract between the state and its citizenry. It abolished the concurrent legislative list that allowed federal legislation to override provincial legislation, devolved various federal ministries, cut the size of the cabinet, and empowered the Council of Common Interests, a constitutional body to help resolve conflicts between the provinces and the government.⁹¹

However, these reforms remain selective, and in many instances are far from having been implemented. Provincial autonomy is also discussed primarily in the context of the four major provinces. It excludes the federally administered areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, Azad Kashmir and the FATA, all of which suffer various discriminations.

The FATA for example remains governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation Act, a legislative holdover from colonial times, under which, the legal protections afforded to most Pakistanis do not apply.⁹² Again, moves have been made to repeal the FATA and extend the same governance enjoyed by the rest of Pakistan, but progress has been halting. Today, the Punjab (and Sindh) remains dominant in national affairs, a matter that is resented by many other provinces.

Weak Rule of Law and Over-Reliance on Repression

As the following analysis of the security problems in given areas makes clear, these problems are compounded by an over-reliance on repression and the security services. Far too often, reform fails to go far beyond rhetoric. The Army may show restraint in counter-insurgency operations, but it tends to rely on clearing operations, seeking to destroy insurgent or extremist elements, and leaving the aftermath to civil reconstruction efforts that do not materialize. Day-to-day security operations do seem to be slowly improving, but the lack of effective reform makes every problem a more serious cause of tension and future violence.

Human-rights reporting is often controversial, and various NGOs are sometimes accused of exaggerating their case. The US State Department, however, provided the following official summary of the problems in Pakistan's security apparatus in its country report on human rights released in April 2011:⁹³

The major human rights problems included extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture. Although the government initiated an investigation into an Internet video showing men in military uniforms apparently committing extrajudicial killings, a failure to credibly investigate allegations, impose disciplinary or accountability measures, and consistently prosecute those responsible for abuses contributed to a culture of impunity. Poor prison conditions, instances of arbitrary detention, lengthy pretrial detentions, a weak criminal justice system, insufficient training for prosecutors and criminal investigators, a lack of judicial independence in the lower courts, and infringements on citizens' privacy remained problems. Harassment of journalists, some censorship, and self-censorship were problems. There were some restrictions on freedom of assembly. Corruption was widespread within the government and lower levels of the police forces, and

⁹¹ "Impact of the 18th Constitutional Amendment on Federation-Provinces Relationship," *PILDAT*, July 2010. Available at <http://tiny.cc/hm2go>

⁹² Wren Elhai, "Yes, Governance Matters in Pakistan's Tribal Areas," *Center for Global Development*, May 24, 2010. Available at <http://blogs.cgdev.org/mca-monitor/2010/05/yes-governance-matters-in-pakistan%E2%80%99s-tribal-areas.php>

⁹³ US State Department, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights*, "Pakistan, April 2011," <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/>

the government made few attempts to combat the problem. Rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment, honor crimes, abuse, and discrimination against women remained serious problems. Religious freedom violations, as well as violence and discrimination against religious minorities continued. Child abuse and exploitive child labor were problems. Widespread human trafficking, including exploitation of bonded laborers by land owners; forced child labor; and commercial sexual exploitation of children remained problems, as did lack of respect for worker rights.

The State department and other sources show there has been progress over time, but any review of the security problems in Pakistan, and its stability, must consider the impact of the police, the courts, and the rule of law. The same State Department report provided the following detailed assessment of security operations and the legal system:⁹⁴

Police have primary internal security responsibilities for most of the country. By law control of local police falls under the Ministry of Interior. The Rangers are a paramilitary organization under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, with branches in Sindh and Punjab. The armed forces are responsible for external security. At times during the year they also were assigned domestic security responsibilities.

Law and order in FATA is administered under the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) through a political agent, who reports to the president through the KP governor. In lieu of police, multiple law enforcement entities operated in FATA. These included the paramilitary Frontier Scouts, which report to the Ministry of Interior in peacetime and the army in times of conflict; the Frontier Constabulary, which patrols the area between FATA and the KP; levies, which operate in FATA and report to the political agent; khassadars (hereditary tribal police), which help the political agent maintain order; and lashkars (tribal militias), which are convoked by tribal leaders and political agents to deal with temporary law and order disturbances. Police effectiveness varied greatly by district, ranging from reasonably good to ineffective.

Police often failed to protect members of religious minorities, including Christians, Ahmadis, and Shia Muslims, from attacks (see section 2.c.). Some members of the police committed human rights abuses or were responsive to political interests. Frequent failure to punish abuses created a climate of impunity. Police and prison officials frequently used the threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and their families. The inspectors general, district police officers, district nazims (a chief elected official of a local government or mayor equivalent), provincial interior or chief ministers, federal interior minister, prime minister, or courts can order internal investigations into abuses and order administrative sanctions. Executive branch and police officials can recommend, and the courts can order, criminal prosecution. These mechanisms were sometimes used. The court system remained the only mechanism available to investigate abuses by security forces.

There were improvements in police professionalism during the year. As in previous years, the Punjab provincial government conducted regular training and retraining in technical skills and protection of human rights for police at all levels. In March the Islamabad Capital Police established a human rights cell to encourage persons to report cases of human rights violations either in person, through a telephone hotline, or via e-mail. Islamabad police also decided to appoint human rights officers (HROs) and members of the community at all police stations. HROs could visit police stations at different times and had authority to interview arrested individuals. If a police officer was reported to be involved in torturing or detaining persons at police stations without justification, HROs could recommend disciplinary action against the officer involved. Provincial and federal law enforcement officers also attended a training course that included human rights, victims' rights, and women's rights. Since 2008 SHARP has provided training to more than 2,000 police officers in human rights.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention

A FIR is the legal basis for any arrest. For certain crimes the police may initiate an FIR. Police ability to initiate an FIR is limited. Often a different party must file the FIR, depending on the type of crime, not

⁹⁴ US State Department, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights*, "Pakistan, April 2011, Available at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/>

whether there is reasonable proof of a crime. An FIR allows police to detain a suspect for 24 hours, after which a magistrate can order detention for an additional 14 days if police show that such detention is material to their investigation. In practice some authorities did not observe these limits on detention. There were reports that authorities filed FIRs without supporting evidence to harass or intimidate detainees or did not file them when adequate evidence was provided unless the complainant paid a bribe. There were reports that some police detained individuals arbitrarily without charge or on false charges to extort payment for their release. There were reports that some police also detained relatives of wanted individuals to compel suspects to surrender.

Police routinely did not seek a magistrate's approval for investigative detention and often held detainees without charge until a court challenged the detention. Some women in detention were sexually abused. When requested, magistrates approved investigative detention without determining its cause. In cases of insufficient evidence, police and magistrates sometimes colluded to issue new FIRs, thereby extending detention beyond the 14-day period.

Courts appointed attorneys for indigents only in capital cases. Individuals frequently had to pay bribes to visit a prisoner. Foreign diplomats could meet with prisoners when they appeared in court and could usually meet with citizens of their countries in prison visits.

The district coordination officer may recommend preventive detention for as long as 90 days to the provincial home department and, with the approval of the Home Department, can extend it for an additional 90 days. The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within 30 days of their arrest. Under both the Hudood Ordinance and standard criminal codes, there are bailable and nonbailable offenses. The Hudood Ordinance was a law enacted in 1979 by the then military ruler Zia-ul-Haq to implement Islamic Sharia law by enforcing punishments mentioned in the Qur'an and Sunnah for zina (extramarital sex), qazf (false accusation of zina), offense against property (theft), and prohibition (the drinking of alcohol).

Bail pending trial is required for bailable offenses and permitted at a court's discretion for nonbailable offenses with sentences of less than 10 years. Judges sometimes denied bail at the request of police or the community or upon payment of bribes. In some cases trials did not start until six months after the FIR, and in some cases individuals remained in pretrial detention for periods longer than the maximum sentence for the crime with which they were charged. In detention facilities, individuals frequently had to pay bribes to visit a prisoner. SHARP estimated that approximately 55 percent of the prison population was awaiting trial. This situation remained unchanged due to lack of change in the judicial system. The high number of inmates awaiting trial remained a large burden on the country's jails. In some cases detainees were informed promptly of charges brought against them.

Special rules apply to cases brought to court by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), which under the 2009 NAB Ordinance established courts for corruption cases. Suspects may be detained for 15 days without charge (renewable with judicial concurrence) and, prior to being charged, may be deprived of access to counsel. During the year the NAB rarely exercised this power. All offenses under the NAB are nonbailable, and only the NAB chairman has power to decide whether to release detainees. In 2009 the government removed the NAB's authority to prosecute politicians on new charges.

Under the FCR in FATA, political agents have legal authority to impose collective punishment, preventively detain individuals for as long as three years, and require "bonds" to prevent undesired activity. Assistant political agents, overseen by political agents and supported by tribal elders of their choosing, are legally responsible for justice in FATA and conduct hearings according to Islamic law and tribal custom.

Accused persons have no right to legal representation or bail, and relatives or members of the same tribe sometimes were detained. Under section 40 of the FCR, even minors can be detained for up to three years. The FCR assigns collective punishment without individual rights, contrary to accepted judicial principles of individual responsibility. Militants in FATA and briefly in Swat imposed their version of Sharia law in makeshift courts; their punishments included public beheadings, stonings, lashings, and fines (see section 1.g.). Antiterrorism courts had the discretion not to grant bail for some charges if the court had reasonable grounds to believe the accused was guilty.

In FATA and the less-governed areas of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), security forces may, under the FCR, restrict the activities of terrorism suspects, seize their assets for up to 48 hours, and detain them for as long as one year without charges. Human rights and international organizations reported

that an unknown number of individuals allegedly affiliated with terrorist organizations were held indefinitely in preventive detention and were tortured and abused. In many cases these prisoners were held incommunicado and were not allowed prompt access to a lawyer of their choice; often times family members were not allowed prompt access to detainees.

On January 16, the government filed a petition challenging the Supreme Court's 2009 decision to rule the 2007 National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) unconstitutional. Then president Musharraf promulgated the NRO to provide an amnesty mechanism for public officeholders who were charged, but not convicted, in cases filed between 1986 and 1999. During the year the hearing of the review petition against the judgment, as well as petitions challenging the NRO, continued.

Denial of Fair Public Trial

The law provides for an independent judiciary; in practice the judiciary was often subject to external influences, such as fear of reprisal in terrorism cases. In nonpolitical cases, the media and the public generally considered the high court and the Supreme Court credible.

There were extensive case backlogs in the lower and superior courts, as well as other problems that undermined the right to effective remedy and the right to a fair and public hearing. According to the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, as of May more than 1.1 million cases were pending with the country's lower courts, 150,000 cases awaited the four provincial high courts, and 17,500 cases awaited the Supreme Court. Delays in justice in civil and criminal cases arose due to antiquated procedural rules, weak case management systems, costly litigation to keep a case moving in the system, and weak legal education.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the high courts does not extend to several areas that operated separate judicial systems. In FATA, under the FCR accused persons have no right to legal representation or bail. In specific areas noted in the Nizam-e-Adl regulation (often informally called the Sharia law) in PATA, Sharia law is imposed, and judges, known as qazis, are assisted by religious scholars. Azad Kashmir has its own elected president, prime minister, legislature, and high court. The Gilgit-Baltistan Self Governance Order of 2009 instituted a separate judiciary, legislature, and election commission for the region. Informal justice systems that lack the legal protections of institutionalized justice systems continued, especially in rural areas, and often resulted in human rights violations. Lower courts remained corrupt, inefficient, and subject to pressure from prominent wealthy, religious, and political figures.

The politicized nature of judicial promotions increased the government's control over the court system. Unfilled judgeships and inefficient court procedures continued to result in severe backlogs at both the trial and appellate levels. Feudal landlords and other community leaders in Sindh and Punjab and tribal leaders in Pashtun and Baloch areas continued to hold local council meetings (known as panchayats or jirgas), at times in defiance of the established legal system. Such councils settled feuds and imposed tribal penalties on perceived wrongdoers, including fines, imprisonment, or even the death penalty.

Women often were sentenced to violent punishments or death for honor-related crimes....In Pashtun areas such councils were held under the outlines of the FCR. Under the code a man, his family, and his tribe are obligated to take revenge for wrongs, real or perceived, to redeem their honor. Frequently disputes arose over women and land and often resulted in violence. The traditional settling of family feuds in tribal areas, particularly those involving killing, could result in giving daughters of the accused in marriage to the bereaved. Many tribal councils instituted harsh punishments, such as the death penalty, "honor killings," or watta-satta marriages (exchange of brides between clans or tribes). The Sindh minister for human rights, Nadia Gabor, called for a ban on jirgas in July. Over the past few years, there were a growing number of reports of militants running their own courts in several tribal agencies and briefly in Swat, dispensing quick justice with little due process or transparency in their deliberations.

The AHRC reported that since 2002 more than 4,000 individuals, two-thirds of them women, have died by order of jirga courts in the country. Although the superior courts declared these rulings illegal, the AHRC reported that some of those involved in implementing jirgas were members of parliament. Militants in the Malakand Division enforced their own form of Islamic justice until the start of military operations in April.

Trial Procedures

...The civil, criminal, and family court systems provide for public trial, presumption of innocence, cross-examination by an attorney, and appeal of sentences. There are no jury trials. Defendants have the right to be

present and to consult with an attorney. Defendants bear the cost of legal representation in lower courts, but a lawyer can be provided at public expense in session and appellate courts. Defendants can confront or question witnesses brought by the prosecution and present witnesses and evidence on their behalf. Defendants and attorneys have legal access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases. Due to the limited number of judges, a heavy backlog of cases, lengthy court procedures, frequent adjournment, and political pressure, cases routinely took years, and defendants had to make frequent court appearances.

The Anti-Terrorism Act allows the government to use special streamlined courts to try persons charged with violent crimes, terrorist activities, acts or speech designed to foment religious hatred, and crimes against the state. After arrest, suspects must be brought before the antiterrorism courts within seven working days, but the courts were free to extend the period. Under normal procedures, the high court and the Supreme Court heard appeals from these courts. Human rights activists criticized the expedited parallel system, charging it was more vulnerable to political manipulation.

Cases under the Hudood Ordinances are first appealed in the Federal Shariat Court. The Supreme Court has ruled that in cases in which a provincial high court decides in error to hear an appeal in a Hudood case, the Shariat courts lacks authority to review the provincial high court's decision. The Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court is the final court of appeal for Shariat court cases. A 2005 ruling allows the Supreme Court to bypass the Shariat bench and assume jurisdiction in such appellate cases. The Shariat courts may overturn legislation it judges inconsistent with Islamic tenets, but such cases are appealed to the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court and ultimately may be heard by the full bench of the Supreme Court.

Under the FCR in FATA, residents may appeal judgments within the civil bureaucracy. Some observers faulted the procedures for not allowing cases to be heard on appeal by the judiciary. Human rights NGOs expressed concern about the concept of collective responsibility, as authorities used it as a pretense to detain members of fugitives' tribes, demolish their homes, confiscate or destroy their property, or lay siege to a fugitive's village pending his surrender or punishment by his own tribe in accordance with local tradition.

Courts routinely failed to protect the rights of religious minorities. Judges were sometimes pressured to take strong action against any perceived offense to Sunni orthodoxy. Laws prohibiting blasphemy continued to be used discriminatorily against Muslims, Christians, Ahmadis, and members of other religious groups. Lower courts often did not require adequate evidence in blasphemy cases, which led to some accused and convicted persons spending years in jail before higher courts eventually overturned their convictions or ordered them freed. During the year an Ahmadi man, Iqbal, was acquitted of charges of blasphemy after spending six years in prison. NGOs reported that bail was sometimes denied in blasphemy cases under the premise that, because defendants faced the death penalty, they were likely to flee.

...There were many changes in PATA's judicial administration during the year. PATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including parts of the former princely states of Swat, Dir, and Chitral, are governed under Sharia law. Due to the country's military intervention in Swat, religious extremists and militants were no longer administering parallel judicial and administrative processes in the Malakand Division (which encompasses the district of Swat.) In addition, in 2009 the country's parliament and president formally enacted the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009. The interpretation and enforcement of the law was sufficiently flexible that it was criticized by the Taliban that was formerly located in Swat. Contrary to Taliban desires, judges were appointed from the existing cadre of the country's judiciary and not from among "religious scholars."

In combination with a new judicial policy originated by the Supreme Court, which provided strict time frames for the initiation of both criminal and civil prosecutions, as well as significant efforts by lawyers and judges to meet the new time lines, the backlog of cases in the Malakand Division was reduced dramatically, in some areas up to 90 percent. In turn this reduced the amount of time that accused individuals spent in jail without benefit of active court process. Azad Kashmir has a court system independent of the country's judiciary. Gilgit-Baltistan (formerly known as the Northern Areas) also has a separate judicial system. The Gilgit-Baltistan Self-governance Order 2009 instituted a separate judiciary, legislature, and election commission for the region. Formerly the laws of the country were extended to the Gilgit-Baltistan at the discretion of the Ministry for Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. The Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court did not have all the powers of a high court.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

Some Sindhi and Baloch nationalist groups claimed that their members were marked for arrest and detained based on their political affiliation or beliefs. Under the November 2009 Aghaz-e-Huqooqe Balochistan package (which addressed the province's political, social, and economic problems), the government announced a general amnesty for all Baloch political prisoners, leaders, and activists in exile as well as those allegedly involved in "antistate" activities, dropping all cases against Baloch leaders. Despite the amnesty some Baloch groups claimed that the illegal detention of nationalist leaders by state agencies continued. The Karachi-based Baloch Rights Council claimed that as of September, there were 1,600 Baloch political prisoners in the custody of security and intelligence agencies.

Some nationalist parties in Sindh, including the JSQM, claimed that their members remained in the custody of government agencies. In a statement issued in August, the Asian Legal Resource Center claimed that in Sindh Province, more than 100 Sindhi nationalists had been arrested or had disappeared and were believed to be held by the military.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Persons may petition the courts to seek redress for various human rights violations, and courts often take such actions. Individuals may seek redress in civil courts against government officials, including on grounds of denial of human rights in civil courts. Observers reported that civil courts seldom, if ever, issued official judgments in such cases, and most cases were settled out of court. Although there were no official procedures for administrative redress, informal reparations were common.

The State Department report also warned that the Army and Frontier Corps present additional problems:

During the year extrajudicial killings from 2009 came to light, including in September a video posted on the Internet of men in military uniforms executing six young men in civilian clothes. The young men were shown blindfolded and lined up with their hands tied behind their backs. On October 8, Chief of Army Staff General Kayani issued a statement ordering the establishment of a board of inquiry to determine the identities of the uniformed personnel seen in the Internet video.

By the end of the year, the military had not publicly announced the conclusions of its investigation into the video, and no one had been held accountable. The video appeared to have been taken in the Swat Valley during the 2009 military counterinsurgency campaign.

Days after this video surfaced on the Internet, another video emerged on the Internet showing men in military uniforms beating prisoners in a remote location. The HRC and HRW reported that the army was responsible for more than 200 extrajudicial killings in the Swat region during the past year. The HRC reported that residents described mass graves in Kukarai village and in areas between the villages of Daulai and Shah Dheri.

In total, according to the HRC, approximately 2,600 suspected militants were detained in Swat during the military's operational phase, but none of them were charged or produced before a court. The HRC also believed that an additional 2,800 cases were lodged against suspected terrorists after the military operation in Swat concluded, but they also were not brought before a court of law.

There were no developments in the April 2009 killings of Baloch National Movement (BNM) President Ghulam Muhammad Baloch and Baloch Republican Party (BRP) members Sher Muhammad Baloch and Lala Munir Baloch in Turbat, Balochistan. They were abducted by men in civilian clothing from their lawyer's office on the same day that the antiterrorism court cleared them of charges of causing unrest. They were reportedly taken away in Frontier Corps vehicles. They were later found dead on April 8. On August 23, in Uthal, Balochistan, assailants abducted and killed Central Joint Secretary of the BNM Rasool Bakhsh Mengal. According to the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), the BNM and other nationalist groups suspected that armed Frontier Constabulary or intelligence officials abducted Mengal and tortured him in military cells. His body was found hanging from a tree in Bela on August 31, with signs of apparent torture, including cigarette burns and words carved into his skin. His death sparked violence in Khuzdar and Makshay.

HRW reported that in November 2009 the army picked up Ayub Khan at his home in Lunday Kase, Mingora (Swat), beat him in front of his family, and took him away in a military vehicle. In December

2009 local residents reportedly heard a shot, found his body covered with marks of torture, and saw an army vehicle driving away.

HRW also reported that in October 2009 Islam Khan was picked up from his house in Imam Dheri, Swat, in an army raid. His body was found 15 days later near the Swat River with extensive marks of torture. His hands and legs were broken. Reportedly, shortly after the body was recovered, a team of soldiers and police came to his house, told his family not to mention the incident or their house would be demolished, and took the body away.

According to the media, in August 2009 the corpses of individuals who had been killed extrajudicially began appearing in Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). According to Dawn, on August 24, residents found 15 bodies in a town east of Mingora, and on August 15, residents discovered 18 more bodies in different parts of Swat. At year's end responsible parties had not been identified.

Politics and governance cannot be separated from the practical conduct of the rule of law. Similarly, security and counterinsurgency operations cannot be assessed simply in terms of their impact on extremists, insurgents, and terrorists. The overall impact of the legal system, and the respect the security services and military show for human rights is critical in shaping the level of support for the government or for its violent opposition. A good metric highlighting the current disconnect is the case of a Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) leader arrested and charged with over 70 murders, yet found not guilty by the courts. In another case, the ISI resorted to kidnapping 11 suspected terrorists from a police jail for fear the courts were about to set them free.⁹⁵ Unfortunately, in Pakistan's case, security operations and legal system are still a cause of security problems as well as a cure.

Rise of Religious Extremists

Sectarian, ethnic, and regional groups are, however, another major source of Pakistan's problems. Pakistan's religious groups have played a role in politics since the inception of the state and have often benefited from periods of strong state support. While they pursue distinct agendas in terms of both religious and civil goals, most share the same fundamental objective – to increase the role of Islam in all aspects of the state.

Pakistan is 96% Muslim, most of whom are Sunnis, divided into four broad categories, the Barelvis, Deobandis, Ahle-Hadith, and the revivalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) movement.⁹⁶ The Deobandis and Ahle-Hadiths share a disdain for the shrine idolatry and the Sufi tenets of Pakistan's majority Barelvis, who comprise between 80-85% of Pakistani Muslims.⁹⁷ Similarly the JI also seeks to pursue a more pristine form of Islam.

Over time “these divergent Sunni religious organizations have evolved over time into pressure groups, political parties and extremist organizations.”⁹⁸ Deobandi groups are generally perceived to be the primary drivers of extremist violence in Pakistan today, but various groups including

⁹⁵ “A Great Deal of Ruin in a Nation,” *The Economist*, April 2, 2011.

⁹⁶ “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,” *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No. 95, April 18, 2005. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/095_the_state_of_sectarianism_in_pakistan.ashx

⁹⁷ R. Upadhyay, “Barelvis and Deobandis: ‘Birds of the Same Feather,’” *South Asia Analysis Group*, January 28, 2011. Available at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers44%5Cpaper4302.html>

⁹⁸ “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,” *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No. 95, April 18, 2005. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/095_the_state_of_sectarianism_in_pakistan.ashx

the JI and factions within Bareilvi organizations, have had long associations with militants, from the times of the Soviet jihad.

The two largest religious parties in Pakistan include the JI, which seeks to impose Islamic law through elections, and the Deobandi Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), notably the Fazl ur-Rehman faction (JUI-F), both of which maintain large networks of madrassas across Pakistan.⁹⁹ Other religious-political parties and groups include humanitarian service providers such as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which is closely linked to the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group. Various other political parties and groups also maintain contacts with militant groups, for example - the JI to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HM), the JUI-F to the Afghan Taliban, the JuD to the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Millat-e-Islami to the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan.¹⁰⁰

These movement reflect the fact that Pakistan's problems are not being caused by anything approach mainstream Islam, but rather by deviant Islamist extremists. Religion has always been central to Pakistan's identity as a secular nation founded on the basis of Islam. While the average Pakistani continues to take his religion extremely seriously, and is believed to want to see it play a major role in social justice in the public domain, he or she also sets pragmatic goals and want to "look progressive in a conservative framework."¹⁰¹ Pakistan's mainstream religious groups are distinguished from extremist groups and movements like the Pakistani Taliban by the fact that they pursue a largely peaceful attempt to Islamize the state, in contrast to the cultural revolution being waged by the Taliban, which decries any coexistence or collaboration with the state.

Extreme movements are very different. A study by the International Crisis Group notes that, "Pakistan's puritanical clergy is attempting to turn the country into a confessional state where the religious creed of a person is the sole marker of identity."¹⁰² Their growing political role in 2010 and early 2011, has heightened fears of their revival, and of a growing radicalization of Pakistani society. As has been noted earlier, this was manifested in the assassinations of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti, the only Christian member of the Pakistani cabinet, over their support for a Christian woman sentenced to death under Pakistan's notorious blasphemy laws.

The Grim Legacy of Zia

The rise in the power of the 'religious right' is generally traced back to the Zia-era during the 1980s. General Zia, himself steeped in radical Islam, relied upon the Jamaat-e-Islami and Deobandi interpretation of religion to help impose his will upon Pakistan. His tenure witnessed the "forceful entry of extremist organization into the political life of Pakistan."¹⁰³ State sanction brought with it massive increases in funding and resources, including money from the state,

⁹⁹ "Factbox: Pakistan's anti-American Islamist bloc firming up," *Reuters*, March 9, 2011. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/09/us-pakistan-islamists-factbox-idUSTRE72825H20110309>

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ "Radicalization in Pakistan: Understanding the Phenomenon," *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies*, June 6, 2010. Available at www.sans-pips.com

¹⁰² "The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No. 95, April 18, 2005. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/095_the_state_of_sectarianism_in_pakistan.ashx

¹⁰³ Dr. Umbreen Javid, "Genesis and Effects of Religious Extremism in Pakistan," *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, Vol. 2, No. 7, April 2011. Available at <http://www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol. 2 No. 7; Special Issue April 2011/30.pdf>

through zakat, and from external donors, which over thirty years has allowed religious parties to become well-armed and better developed in their financing, organization and propaganda capabilities.¹⁰⁴

Zia, however, was scarcely exclusive in supporting (and trying to use) extremist religious groups. Civilian elites, including Z.A. Bhutto in the 1970s, and Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s have made various compromises to the religious parties, but for today's context it is the Musharraf-era that is the primary accelerant. To legitimize his military dictatorship, Musharraf backed a religious coalition of five major religious parties under the banner of the Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).

A pan-Islamic grouping, including Deobandis, Barelvis and Shias, the MMA swept into power in the 2002 elections, garnering an unprecedented 59 seats in the National Assembly, and controlled two of the four provinces – the NWFP (now the KPK) and Balochistan.¹⁰⁵ However, during their tenure, religious parties wholly failed to deliver on their promises for change, and were soon seen to be just as corrupt and inefficient as the previous government, and solely concerned with Islamizing state institutions.¹⁰⁶ By the 2008 elections, they had registered a precipitous fall in support to a mere 7 seats in the National Assembly.¹⁰⁷

Many observers have used these results to limit concern about the rise of the religious right, pointing out that secular forces have always controlled Pakistan, and that religious parties remain at margins of mainstream politics, rarely sharing more than 10% of the vote.¹⁰⁸ However, this may understate their true influence.

Pervez Hoodhboy, a prominent Pakistani commentator notes that the religious parties represent popular discourse noting that their low share of the popular vote is because “the mullah parties... are geared for street politics, not electoral politics.”¹⁰⁹ Hoodhboy recounts an increasingly familiar personal anecdote to support his theory noting that in a debate between him and spokesmen from the JI and the Sunni Tehreek, the audience composed of presumably well-educated university students thunderously supported the clerics and loudly praised Mumtaz Qadri.¹¹⁰ Similarly, even with low official representation, the mullahs are able to heavily influence Pakistani public life, including strong influence in dictating the contents of school curriculums, and enforcing acceptable dress and food codes.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴ Salman Masood, “Zeal gives religious right in Pakistan the upper hand,” *The National*, March 3, 2011. Available at <http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-asia/zeal-gives-religious-right-in-pakistan-the-upper-hand>

¹⁰⁵ Suba Chandran and Rekha Chakravarthi, “Return of the Democrats: Pakistan After Elections,” *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, No. 61, March 2008. Available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/IPCS_returnofthedemocrats.pdf

¹⁰⁶ Carlotta Gall, “In Tribal Pakistan, Religious Parties are Foundering,” *New York Times*, February 14, 2008. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/world/asia/14pstan.html>

¹⁰⁷ Suba Chandran and Rekha Chakravarthi, “Return of the Democrats: Pakistan After Elections,” *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, No. 61, March 2008. Available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/IPCS_returnofthedemocrats.pdf

¹⁰⁸ Omar Waraich, “Pakistan’s Pols Paralyzed by Religious Extremism,” *Time Magazine*, January 13, 2011. Available at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2042522,00.html>

¹⁰⁹ Farooq Sulehria, “Pervez Hoodhboy: Miracles are Needed to Rescue Pakistan,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XLVI, No. 5, January 21, 2011. Available at http://beta.epw.in/static_media/PDF/archives_pdf/2011/01/C012911_Pervez_Hoodbhoy_Farooq_Sulehria.pdf

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

Others feel this radicalization has furthered a “growth of intolerance... has forged an extreme, murderous, antipathy to freedom of expression”¹¹² Various incidents have been reported across Pakistan, including at the prestigious University of Punjab, where a radical student group has been clamping down on anything deemed un-Islamic, and violently beat a professor with metal rods and sent him into critical condition after he had some of their members expelled.¹¹³ But most strikingly, the growing radicalization of Pakistan has been illuminated during the furor over proposed amendments to the blasphemy laws, and by the subsequent assassinations of Taseer and Bhatti.

During the crisis over the blasphemy laws, rallies by religious parties brought thousands onto the streets, including an estimated 40,000 even in secular MQM-controlled Karachi.¹¹⁴ In the aftermath of the assassination, “hundreds of thousands” more rallied to demand the Qadri’s release and demand the withdrawal of the blasphemy law. The government complied.¹¹⁵ In February 2011, a rally by the JuD, the political wing of the notorious Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group in Lahore drew a crowd of over 20,000 to hear speakers urge the government to establish a ministry for jihad.¹¹⁶

Their organized and large presence is in contrast to Pakistan’s weakened progressive rights activists. Most progressive legislators are now bunkered down, fearing for their lives, while activists are increasingly confined from the streets to pockets of the Internet and social media platforms,¹¹⁷ understanding fearful of their security if they assemble on the streets.

The Wrong Kind of Movement Towards Political Unity

The end result appears to be that Pakistanis find themselves “squeezed between a liberal and distant elite on one side, and the religious right on the other – and it is the right’s offering of an egalitarian populism on earth and just rewards in the afterlife that is winning converts.”¹¹⁸

The growing unity of religious movements under the banner of radical Islam presents may make these problems worse.. Pakistan’s majority Barelvi faith had generally been regarded as the antidote to Deobandi Islam, which is attributed to be at the heart of religious extremism. Barelvis have often warred violently with Deobandis, particularly in Karachi, and have lost influential

¹¹² Madhia Satter, “Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws: A History of Violence,” *Foreign Policy*, March 2, 2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/02/pakistans_blasphemy_laws_a_history_of_violence

¹¹³ Alex Rodriguez, “Pakistan Handles Extremism with Kid Gloves,” *New York Times*, March 29, 2011. Available at <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-pakistan-fear-20110330.0.389866.story>

¹¹⁴ Rob Crilly, “Pakistan’s Religious Divide on Display,” *The Telegraph*, January 9, 2011. Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8248942/Pakistans-religious-divide-on-display.html>

¹¹⁵ “Mammoth rally demands Taseer assassin’s release, Blasphemy Bill Withdrawn,” *One India News*, January 10, 2011. Available at <http://news.oneindia.in/2011/01/10/mammothpak-rally-demands-taseer-assassins-releaseblasphe.html>

¹¹⁶ Alex Rodriguez, “Pakistan Handles Extremism with Kid Gloves,” *New York Times*, March 29, 2011. Available at <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-pakistan-fear-20110330.0.389866.story>

¹¹⁷ Salman Masood, “Pakistanis Rally in Support of Blasphemy Law,” *New York Times*, December 31, 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/01/world/asia/01pakistan.html>

¹¹⁸ “Pakistan: The Rising Dangers,” *Pakistan Conflict Monitor*, January 25, 2011. Available at <http://www.conflictmonitors.org/search/post/pakistan-research/2011/01/25/Pakistan-The-Rising-Dangers>

clerics to Deobandi suicide bombings.¹¹⁹ However in the aftermath of the assassination, religious parties were vocal in their support for Qadri.

A statement from Jamaate Ahle Sunnat Pakistan, one of the largest Barelvi organizations representing over 500 mullahs read, “No Muslim should attend the funeral or even pray for Salmaan Taseer. We pay rich tributes and salute the bravery, valor and faith of Mumtaz Qadri.”¹²⁰ They included clerics from the Sunni Tehreek, which lost their leader Maulana Sarfaraz Naeemi to a Taliban suicide bombing in June 2009 after he spoke out against suicide bombings.¹²¹ Leaders of other religious groups, including the powerful Jamaat-e-Islami party loudly declared that, “Salmaan Taseer was himself responsible for his killing. Any Muslim worth the name could not tolerate blasphemy of the Prophet, as had been proved by this incident.”¹²²

Veteran New York Times journalist Carlotta Gall has in part attributed radicalization to the “Zia generation” having come of age.¹²³ The young lawyers movement for example, seen as the vanguards of the democratic movement to overthrow former President Musharraf have also enthusiastically embraced Qadri’s cause, demonstrating on the streets for his release and garlanding him with rose petals before his court appearance.¹²⁴

The fear of radicalization amongst the security forces was also revitalized in the assassination. Qadri was a member of the “Elite Force,” specially vetted and trained police commandoes, and while he alone pulled the trigger, there were indications that he had discussed the issue with his colleagues prior to the act, and furthermore was able to empty an entire magazine into the Governor without any apparent intervention.¹²⁵

Similarly just recently, during anti-Christian violence across Pakistan following the burning of a Quran by Florida “pastor” Fred Phelps, six gunmen attacked a church near Islamabad, located inside a high-security zone that includes a large ammunition dump and is heavily garrisoned by the military, suggesting that the attackers may have come from inside.¹²⁶

¹¹⁹ Salman Siddiqi, “The Widening Split,” *The Express Tribune*, April 26, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/9155/the-widening-split/>

¹²⁰ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/05/pakistan-religious-organisations-salman-taseer>

¹²¹ Farooq Sulehria, “Pervez Hoodhboy: Miracles are Needed to Rescue Pakistan,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XLVI, No. 5, January 21, 2011.

¹²² Saeed Shah, “Mainstream Pakistan religious organizations applaud killing of Taseer,” *The Guardian*, January 5, 2011. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/05/pakistan-religious-organisations-salman-taseer>

¹²³ Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Faces a Divide of Age on Muslim Law,” *New York Times*, January 10, 2011. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/world/asia/11pakistan.html>

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ “Elite Force cop shot down Governor Taseer,” *South Asia News Agency*, January 5, 2011. Available at <http://www.sananews.net/english/2011/01/05/elliot-force-cop-shot-down-governor-salman-taseer/>

¹²⁶ Jibran Khan, “Third church attacked as Pakistani extremists declare war over Florida Quran burning,” *Asia News*, March 29, 2011. Available at <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Third-church-attacked-as-Pakistani-extremists-declare-war-over-Florida-Koran-burning-21147.html>

But, Extremists Remain a Threat to Extremists

Despite all the support religious groups have extended to militants, both tangibly and ideologically, they are not immune from the violence sweeping Pakistan, nor threats from hardline factions of the Taliban, who decry any perceived affiliation with the state. Recent event that was startling to even veteran Pakistani observers, were the dual assassination attempts on the life of Fazl ur-Rehman, the JUI-F leader, in two days. Rehman was generally considered quite pro-Taliban. He rarely condemned suicide bombings in the FATA or KPK,¹²⁷ and had two decades of history with militant groups, including supplying thousands of recruits from his madrassas for the jihad.¹²⁸

Rehman has, however, also been considered to be first and foremost a pragmatist who has built diverse relationships with all stakeholders in Pakistan. Wikileaks cables dated September 2007 reported Musharraf urging the US to support the inclusion of the JUI into the governing coalition and described Rehman as “moderate and pliable,”¹²⁹ and also revealed how Rehman, despite his publicly anti-American posture had reached out to the US ambassador for help with a failed bid to become Prime Minister in 2007.¹³⁰

Attacks on religious party leaders are rare, but the trend is escalating. In April 2010, a suicide bomber in Peshawar killed a local JI leader, although there is some confusion as to whether he or a Shia police officer was the primary target.¹³¹ In mid-April 2011, another JI leader narrowly escaped when police discovered and safely detonated an IED outside his house.¹³² Various theories have been floated on the attackers, but the most convincing has been the argument that such targeting is a function of jihadist power politics, and a result of the disapproval by hardline factions of Rehman’s attempts to engage the US and negotiate a political settlement to the war in Afghanistan.¹³³

These intra-jihadi splits are increasingly common in Pakistan’s complicated landscape. Earlier in the year, Colonel Imam, a retired ISI officer often regarded as the ‘godfather of the Taliban,’ for his role in the Soviet jihad, was executed by the TTP despite personal pleas by both Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani for his release.¹³⁴ Similarly today, the attack on Rehman appears to

¹²⁷ Daud Khattak, “Talks with the Taliban in Pakistan?” *Foreign Policy*, April 7, 2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/07/talks_with_the_taliban_in_pakistan

¹²⁸ Salman Masood and Carlotta Gall, “Suicide Attack on Politician Fails Again,” *New York Times*, March 31, 2011. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/world/asia/01pakistan.html?partner=rss&emc=rss>

¹²⁹ Issam Ahmed, “Pakistan attacks reveal widening split between religious parties and militants,” *Christian Science Monitor*, March 31, 2011. Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0331/Pakistan-attacks-reveal-widening-split-between-religious-parties-and-militants>

¹³⁰ Masood and Gall, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/world/asia/01pakistan.html?partner=rss&emc=rss>

¹³¹ Sabrina Tavernise and Pir Zubair Khan, “Bomber Strikes Near Pakistan Rally; Police Officer Seen as Target,” *New York Times*, April 19, 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/world/asia/20pstan.html>

¹³² Manzoor Ali, “JI leader targeted in failed bomb plot,” *The Express Tribune*, April 12, 2011. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/147969/ji-leader-targeted-in-failed-bomb-plot/>

¹³³ “Attacks on Pro-Taliban Politician Point Towards Intra-Jihadi Divide,” *The Pakistan Policy Blog*, March 31, 2011. Available at <http://pakistanpolicy.com/2011/03/31/attacks-on-pro-taliban-politician-point-toward-intra-jihadi-divide/>

¹³⁴ “Pak Taliban confirms murder of Col. Imam,” *Circling the Lion’s Den*, February 19, 2011. Available at <http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2011/02/pak-taliban-confirms-murder-of-colonel.html>; “Unity among North Waziristan groups crumble,” *New York Times*, April 28, 2011. Available at <http://nyti.ms/mN00w5>

have occurred without unanimous consent inside the Taliban. Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a senior Taliban commander based out of North Waziristan has issued a statement condemning the attacks and vowing to punish the culprits.¹³⁵

Extremism and the Impact of the Failure of Secular Politics and Governance

Religious groups have grown because their ideologies are increasingly attractive to the ordinary Pakistani. They have adopted a highly popular anti-US stance, and are distinct from the cocooned urban secularists whose lives are worlds apart from those in the rural villages. Religious groups are also often visible providers of aid and humanitarian relief, particularly in the aftermath of disasters, all of which has earned them significant reservoirs of goodwill.

The JuD is at the forefront of this trend, with its powerful political and military wings increasingly leading to its resembling Lebanese Hezbollah. During the 2010 floods, activists and militants from the JI, the JuD and SSP were some of the first responders in heavily affected districts. The head of the JI social welfare wing claimed a deployment of “100,000 activists... across the country,” over 60 ambulances, and the establishment of medical camps and water purification plants to ease drinking water shortages.¹³⁶

The JuD claimed “3,000 people deployed in Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan” operating 16 mobile medical camps with doctors, 13 relief camps, 40 ambulances, and activists clearing blocked roads, providing relief and directing traffic.¹³⁷ The president of the SSP also declared that, “As you know we have been listed as an ‘especially’ banned organization... But we feel this is a disaster, which needs the efforts of all Pakistanis. Therefore, I have instructed our activists to carry out relief activities without identifying themselves.”¹³⁸

Anti-American Populism

The anti-US platform of religious groups is often seen as a unifying force,¹³⁹ as seen in the large rallies held to demand the continued imprisonment and execution of presumed CIA spy Raymond Davis.¹⁴⁰ They also have little reason to negotiate with the US, and previous attempts at engagement have had little effect. For example, in mid-2009 a former special envoy Richard Holbrooke met with leaders of religious parties including Liaquat Baloch, leading member of JI, and Fazl-ur-Rehman, the leader of the JUI-F. They met inside the fortified US embassy compound in an attempt to dispel rumors of a large Marine presence inside the compound. Holbrooke later called the meeting the “most intellectually sustained debate I’ve ever had in this

¹³⁵ Pazir Gul, “Militant leader to investigate attack on Fazl,” *Dawn*, April 5, 2011. Available at <http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/05/militant-leader-to-investigate-attacks-on-fazl.html>

¹³⁶ Syed Shoaib Khan, “Hardline groups step in to fill Pakistan aid vacuum,” *BBC News*, August 10, 2010. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10925400>

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ “Factbox: Pakistan’s anti-American bloc firming up,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/09/us-pakistan-islamists-factbox-idUSTRE72825H20110309>


¹⁴⁰ “Protests across Pakistan over Raymond Davis’ release,” *Press Trust of India*, March 19, 2011. Available at <http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/protests-across-pakistan-over-raymond-davis-release-92684>

country.” Nevertheless, Baloch and his allies promptly took to the streets in an anti-US protest immediately after the meeting.¹⁴¹

Demographics, Economics, and Education

These various political and religious tensions are only part of the forces shaping modern Pakistan and its future. Like most of the developing world, demographics are a key issue. As **Figure 1.1**, shows, Pakistan’s population has made massive increase since 1950, and is more than four times larger in 2010 than it was then. Its rate of population has slowed, but its population is still estimated to nearly double Between 2000 and 2030, and Pakistan’s population is projected to grow to 335 million, making it one of the world’s most populous countries.¹⁴²

Figure 1.1: Trends in Pakistani Population (1950-2050)



(United Nations World Population Database, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>)

Analysts do point out that the rate of Pakistani population growth is now down to around 1.6%, and is projected to decline, but every aspect of Pakistani politics, governance, and stability is still shaped by Pakistan’s massive “youth bulge,” and will be for decades to come. The size of


¹⁴¹ “US reaches out to Islamist parties in Pakistan,” *RFE/RL*, April 19, 2009. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Reaches_Out_To_Islamist_Parties_In_Pakistan/1802816.html

¹⁴² “Human Development Report 2010,” *United Nations Development Programme*. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf

Pakistan youth is also show in **Figure 1.2** and it is clear just how much the need to create jobs and acceptable careers, governance, and social conditions for youth is critical Pakistan's stability

The CIA estimates that Pakistan's mean age is only around 21 years of age, and that some 2,238,000 males and 2,105,000 females will reach the age where they will enter the labor force in 2010.¹⁴³ Other estimates indicate that half of its population of over 187 million is under 20 years of age, and 66 percent is under 30,¹⁴⁴

Figure 1.2: Pakistan's Youth Bulge in 2010



(Source: US Census Bureau, International Database, <http://www.census.gov/ipc>)

No nation could easily adapt to such pressures, and Pakistan has made far too little effort to try. Pakistan may sometimes have had good nominal growth for its entire gross domestic product (GDP), as estimated in PPP terms, but this says nothing about its underlying stability. Its political and business elite focuses on its own wealth and privileges with little regard for the overall population, the impact of favoritism, nepotism, and corruption. It seems insensitive to the impact of growing disparities in income distribution, the continued existence of massive semi-feudalism in the agricultural sector, and the steady growth of massive urban slums. It does not meet the most basic needs of its youth, and - as the following analysis shows - it has failed to come to grips with a single major regional, ethnic, and sectarian problem.

¹⁴³ CIA World Factbook. Accessed 16 April 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>.

¹⁴⁴ "Pakistan: The Next Generation," *British Council*, November 2009. Available at <http://www.britishcouncil.pk/pakistan-Next-Generation-Report.pdf>

Reliable data on the scale of these problems is not available, and no estimates can as yet fully reflect the impact of Pakistan's massive floods, but the CIA estimates that even if one ignores Pakistan's massive disparities in income distribution, its per capita income is only \$2400 – which ranks 179th in the world.

The CIA also estimates that the present Pakistani labor force is around 55.8% of the total population -- a relatively low number for so large a population, in spite of extensive exportation of labor to regions like the Middle East. It has an unusually high percentage working in very low productivity agriculture and service jobs (agriculture: 43%, industry: 20.3%, services: 36.6% (2005 estimate).

Direct unemployment is at least 15%, and under and disguised unemployment almost certainly raise this figure closer to 30% in terms of meaningful productivity gain. At least 24% of the entire population (and probably now closer to 30%) is at or below the poverty line, and the wealthiest 10% of the population is responsible for some 27% of all domestic consumption versus less than 4% for the poorest 10%.¹⁴⁵

Educating a Nation for Failure

There is still some possibility that Pakistan's youth bulge could be an opportunity to build a more prosperous and capable Pakistan, but this can only begin to occur if the growth is adequately harnessed to steady economic development, adequate education, and job creation. What is now far more likely is that a continued failure to prepare or integrate large numbers of youth into the labor market is likely to be catastrophic and a key source of conflict risk.

Massive increases in investment in the Pakistani education system are one of the most crucial components of any successful stabilization strategy. Increased education is necessary for enhancing the political legitimacy of the civilian government, for expanding the human capital available for economic growth, and as an important tool in the counterinsurgency arsenal. At present, the education sector suffers from chronic shortfalls in access and quality, as seen in **Figure 1.3** leaving a massive shortfall between education demand and government supply. Funding for education has lagged far behind need, languishing at between 2-3% of GDP, as seen in **Figure 1.4**, behind that of comparable regional countries.

Pakistan cannot begin to address its economic and social needs – as well as move solidly towards political stability - until it first addresses the dire state of the existing educational sector. Pakistan is one of the only countries in the world where the number of illiterates is rising.¹⁴⁶ Some 6.8 million of its children are out of school¹⁴⁷ and only 16.8% of Pakistanis have a secondary education.¹⁴⁸

Worse, Pakistan does not have an adequate base of merit-based education or employment. Corruption and nepotism in hiring is an every-day phenomenon and large disparities continue to exist between provinces and communities on the basis of political, communal and ethnic biases

¹⁴⁵ CIA, World Factbook, accessed 16 April 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>.


¹⁴⁶ "Financing Quality Basic Education for All in Pakistan," *Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency*, June 2010. Available at <http://tiny.cc/y4auy>

¹⁴⁷ Pakistan Ministry of Education, 2008

¹⁴⁸ Human Development Report 2010, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf


as seen in **Figure 1.5**. For example, the UNDP calculated that over 50 percent of Baluchi speakers are likely to have less than four years of education, in contrast to 10 percent of Urdu speakers.¹⁴⁹ Despite these chronic problems, the Pakistani demand for quality education does not seem to have abated judging from the massive increase in private-education.

Figure 1.3: Key Educational Statistics




(UNDP, Human Development Report 2010)

¹⁴⁹ Human Development Report 2010, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf

Figure 1.4: Education Funding (2005-2010)

(Pakistan Ministry of Education, <http://www.moe.gov.pk/Pakistan%20Education%20Statistics%202007-08.pdf>; Pakistan Ministry Of Finance, http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_10/10_Education.pdf)

Figure 1.5: Educational Institutions by Province

(Pakistan Education Report 2008-09)

Madrassa Education versus Secular Failure as a Threat to the Nation

The importance of religious schools or madrassas must be kept in perspective. They are sometimes popularized as ‘terrorist incubators.’ However, some recent studies have shown that the share of madrassas in the total size of Pakistani education is low. (See Figure 1.1d) Estimates vary greatly, but most concur that madrassas represent less than 10 percent of the education sector.¹⁵⁰ Their importance seems to lie far more in their impact on Pakistani society and politics than the size of their share of the education system

The Pakistani Ministry of Education counted 12,448 madrassas in 2008/2009, with 97% in the private sector, and a total enrollment of 1.603 million (approximately 4 percent).¹⁵¹ This count is, however,, likely to be conservative. The consecutive failures by Pakistani governments to exercise greater control over the madrassa sector, including Musharraf’s failed attempts at extending regulation, have meant that many such schools remain unregistered.

A study conducted by Brookings in the Ahmedpur district of the Punjab found that only 39 out of 363 madrassas were registered with the government but also that in the same district, 13 percent of the 465 government schools were closed for lack or absence of teachers.¹⁵² As worrying has been the content of madrassa curriculums. The propagation of intolerance is the most obvious worry, but the emphasis on traditional Islamic learning risks leaving graduates without any of the skills required to engage with the modern labor market – including core skills such as reading, writing, critical thinking or exposure to the sciences.

There is also evidence challenging the link between madrassas and direct militancy. Some analysts, including Peter Bergen, have concluded that madrassas do not contribute to anti-Western terrorism asserting that unsophisticated madrassa graduates have few technical or language skills appropriate for the operational requirements of such attacks. Bergen’s study of the 75 terrorists implicated in the five largest attacks against Western targets in modern history, found that only 12 percent attended madrassas in contrast to 53% who had at least some university study.¹⁵³

Yet madrassas are undoubtedly part of the cause of Pakistani violence. It was the storming of the radical Lal Masjid mosque, and its attached madrassas in Islamabad, that ignited the insurgency. Furthermore in the tribal regions, the levels of technical sophistication required for most operations is not high, and even in Pakistani urban areas, militants can quite easily blend in, particularly amongst IDP and migrant communities. The same applies for the war in

¹⁵⁰ Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrassas: Assessing the Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan,” *Center for Universal Education at Brookings Institute*, June 2, 2010. Available at <http://tiny.cc/v8x1n>

¹⁵¹ “Pakistan Education Statistics 2007-2008,” *Pakistan Ministry of Finance*. Available at <http://www.moe.gov.pk/Pakistan%20Education%20Statistics%2007-08.pdf>

¹⁵² Saleem H. Ali, “Pakistan’s Madrassas: The Need for Internal Reform,” *Brookings Doha Center*, August 2009. Available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/BROOKINGS_Pakistan_NeedForInternalReform_RoleOfInternationalAssistance.pdf

¹⁵³ Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassa Scapegoat,” *The Washington Quarterly*, (Spring 2006). Available at http://www.twq.com/06spring/docs/06spring_bergen.pdf

Afghanistan, and indeed large numbers of militants from the Haqqani network in North Waziristan are believed to double as madrassa students.¹⁵⁴

Small but radical fractions of the madrassa population have, and continue to, maintain close links with militant and terrorist groups, and have played a role in sectarian and anti-Western violence across Pakistan. These trends however do not detract from the fact that many madrassas, perhaps a large majority, have few direct associations with violence and work towards the noble purpose of attempting to provide education in areas the government has all but abandoned.

Figure 1.6: Central Boards of Madrassas in Pakistan

Name	Doctrinal Affiliation	Headquarters	Date Established
Wafaq-ul-Madaris	Deobandi	Multan	1959
Tanzim-ul-Madaris	Barelwi	Lahore	1960
Wafaq-ul-Madaris Shia	Shia	Lahore	1959
Rabitatul-Madaris-al-Islamia	Jamaat-e-Islami	Lahore	1983
Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Salafia	Ahl-e-Hadith	Faisalabad	1955

SOURCE: Offices of the respective madrasa boards.

(National Bureau of Asian Research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Preview/PR09_IslamEd.pdf_pg.3)

Symptoms of a Failed State: Forcing Private as the Substitute for Public

The main problem is not the madrassa but the government failure to provide an effective alternative. Government-provided public schooling continues to be of low quality, characterized by overcrowding, poor teaching quality and low educational achievement. A metric highlighting the extent of failure has been the astronomical growth in alternative private education. In 1983, the share of private schooling was about three percent; by 2008-09 it had risen to 33 percent,¹⁵⁵ as seen in **Figure 1.7**.

This entrepreneurial reaction, mainly comprising small “mom and pop operations” and small village educational communes is believed to have had a net positive result. It has improved access, with even the poorest segments of the population digging deep to participate. In Lahore for example, 37% of children in the lowest income-group attend private schools.¹⁵⁶

A large study conducted by the World Bank also found that despite government teachers being paid almost five times as much, private-education significantly outperformed government counterparts whose students required as much as two and a half years to catch up.¹⁵⁷ LEAPS also

¹⁵⁴ Corinne Graff and Rebecca Winthrop, “Busting Pakistan’s Madrassa Myth,” *Foreign Policy*, July 1, 2010. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/01/busting_pakistans_madrassa_myth

¹⁵⁵ “Pakistan Education Statistics 2008-2009,” *Pakistan Ministry of Education*.

¹⁵⁶ “Human Development Report 2010,” *UNDP*.

¹⁵⁷ Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, Tara Vishwanath and Tristran Zajonc, “Pakistan: Learning and Educational Achievements in Punjab Schools (LEAPS),” *LEAPS*, February 20, 2007. Available at http://www.leapsproject.org/assets/publications/LEAPS_Report_FINAL.pdf

had interesting observations on regulatory prospects. Much like the madrassa sector, large swathes of the private-sector remains wholly unregulated. Despite this, the LEAPS Project found that parental ability to choose enhanced competition, forced minimum quality standards, and prevented the emergence of monopolistic pricing.¹⁵⁸

Pakistan has unveiled ambitious schemes to correct this situation, but even if they work, they will come too late to help at least 20% of the present population, and promise of reform have uncertain credibility. In the second half of 2009, Pakistan unveiled its National Education Policy, which seeks to increase educational investment from 2 to 7 percent of GDP.¹⁵⁹ The country has also benefited from an influx in foreign educational aid. These infusions hardly guarantee success.

A sustainable and successful policy will require a focus on outcomes, stringent monitoring and evaluation, alongside a concerted attempt to increase not just access, but also the quality and content of educational options. It will also require doing so in an equitable manner that does not breed inflame grievances. Balochistan for example, already home to a long-running low-intensity insurgency, suffers chronic neglect, with the worst education statistics from across the country.

More than 90 percent of its rural women have no education at all.¹⁶⁰ Government curriculums have also not been without problems. A study by Brookings noted poor learning and citizenship skills development at government schools with only two-thirds of students able to subtract single digit numbers and a small proportion able to multiply or divide by the 3rd grade.¹⁶¹ Similarly the study pointed to lack of relevance of schooling to the marketplace, with few graduates equipped to compete in the growing areas such as telecommunications, information technology or financial services.¹⁶² The content of government textbooks also is often parochial or prejudiced,, particularly pertaining to India,

More generally, mismanagement, political manipulation and corruption have been severe obstacles. ‘Ghost schools’ that exist only on paper are not uncommon. Ad for those schools that actually exist, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan’s 2007 report estimated that of 63,000 state schools in Punjab, 5,000 were declared dangerous, 26,000 had no electricity and 16,000 no toilets.¹⁶³ Reform in education encounters further problems because Pakistan operates primarily on the federal structure, and district governments are primarily responsible for schooling. This creates added layers of complexity, both in terms of leakages to corruption as well as overcoming the opposition of landed feudal elites who remain wary of empowering the poor.

Furthermore, throwing money at the problem without a focus on actual implementation, quality of effort, and matching efforts at national economic reform and job creations may end up doing little. In the 1990s, the World Bank and other international donors spent hundreds of millions of

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ “National Education Policy 2009,” *GoP Ministry of Pakistan*, November 2009. Available at http://www.moe.gov.pk/nepr/NEP_2009.PDF

¹⁶⁰ “Pakistan Education Statistics 2008-2009,” *Pakistan Ministry of Education*.


¹⁶¹ Winthrop and Graff, “Beyond Madrassas: Assessing the Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan.”

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ “State of Human Rights in 2007,” *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan*. Available at <http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Archives/Reports/AR2007.pdf>

dollars in Pakistan's educational sector with little to show for it. In fact, during the same period, enrollment for boys declined, teachers were still not hired on the basis of merit and little evidence appeared of any improved attainment standards.¹⁶⁴ Without a focus on outcomes, instead of a reliance on inputs, this could repeat itself.

Figure 1.7: Provincial Public-Private Breakdowns in Educational Sector



Note: "FANA" refers to the Federally Administered Northern Areas; "ICT" refers to the Islamabad Capital Territory; "AJK" refers to Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Source: Drawn from a presentation by the Institute for Social and Policy Sciences (Islamabad), shared with the authors by the institute.

(Center for Universal Education, Brookings Institution, <http://tiny.cc/rcjqm>)

¹⁶⁴ Nancy Birdsall and Molly Kinder, "The US Aid Surge to Pakistan: Repeating a Failed Experiment? Lessons for US Policymakers from the World Bank's Social-Sector Lending of the 1990s," *Center for Global Development*, March 17, 2010. Available at <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1423965/>


SECTION II: THE CURRENT CRISIS: PATTERNS OF MILITANCY AND VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan is a far more complex state than can be summarized in short introduction, but it is clear even from this overview that the present patterns of violence in Pakistan have deep underlying causes. It is also clear that they are national, and not simply concentrated in the FATA or near the Balochi border with Afghanistan. A variety of militant groups operate across Pakistan, with complex modes of interaction, with varying targeting scopes, and varying degrees of affiliation with the state.

The State of Militancy

Violence in Pakistan has been extensive, and has witnessed a steady escalation in the past few years. As can be seen in **Figure 2.1**, 2010 has been an extremely bloody year for Pakistan.

Figure 2.1: Attacks in 2010 by Type




(Source: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, "Pakistan Security Report 2010")

Figure 2.2 breaks down this data further to highlight national trends in violence. It shows that the bulk of violence has been concentrated in the FATA and KPK, but that the Baloch separatist insurgency is a significant independent source of violence. Militant attacks in the Pakistani heartland, in the Punjab, in the financial capital of Karachi, and in the rest of Sindh province, are also on the rise, with dangerous implications for Pakistani stability. There has been a significant

drop off in violence in the KPK in 2010, perhaps as a result of successful Pakistani military operations in the area through 2009, but it remains to be seen if these gains will be sustainable.


Figure 2.2: Militant Attack Levels by Province: 2008-2010



(Source: Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Reports 2010, 2009, 2008)

As seen in **Figure 2.3**, attacks in 2010 have wreaked significant casualties across the country. Attacks in Punjab and Karachi have been particularly deadly.

Figure 2.3: Militant Attacks by Province in 2010



(Source: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Monthly Security Reports, Jan-Dec 2010)

Violence has had a wide range of causes: religious, anti-state, sectarian, ethno-political and criminal axes. The delineations in **Figure 2.4** are not absolute but are best estimates given

current trends. Various conflicts are being waged within, or from Pakistan. The armed groups populating these conflicts often overlap, and many groups are engaged. Some operate with single-minded focus on a certain objective, while others have hybridized their targeting scopes, often participating in several conflicts simultaneously.

The Pakistani state has varying degrees of tolerance for violent groups operating within its territory. Some groups serve Pakistani strategic interests and are afforded a high degree of tolerance, others have attacked the state, been identified as a threat and ruthlessly pursued. Some groups, particularly the Kashmiri jihadis may simultaneously participate in multiple conflicts, that can impact Pakistani security and insecurity simultaneously. In this case, security forces are likely to attempt to delineate between factions within the organization, target those arrayed against it, and seek to split those amenable to its interests away from the rest.

Figure 2.4: Militant Groups in Pakistan

Confederations	Militant Groups	Targeting Scope	Pakistani Tolerance
Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) and affiliates	Collection of semi-autonomous regional networks across FATA under emir Hakimullah Mehsud. Constituent groups include Mehsud factions; TSNM; Lashkar-e-Islam; Wazir factions, and other local groups Affiliates include Punjabi Taliban (splinter elements of Kashmiri jihad and sectarian groups); Ghazi Force	Pakistani state Anti-Shia Western interests Criminal activity	None
Global Jihadis	Al-Qaeda; Brigade 313; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ); Lashkar-e-Taiba; Tahrik-i-Taliban	Pakistani state Western interests Indian interests Afghan interests (low capacity) ¹⁶⁵	Low to medium
Afghan Taliban	Quetta Shura Taliban (QST); Haqqani Network (HQN); Hizb-i-Islami;	Western interests Afghan Security Forces Criminal activity	Medium to High
Sectarian	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP); Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ); al-Qaeda; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); Jaish-e-	Anti-Shia Intra-Sunni Anti-Sufi (limited)	Medium

¹⁶⁵ “Panetta: There may be fewer than 50 Al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan,” *Huffington Post/AP*, June 27, 2010. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/27/leon-panetta-there-may-be_n_627012.html

	Mohammad (JEM); Sipah-e-Mohammad (SMP)	degree) ¹⁶⁶ Anti-Sunni (only SMP)	
Kashmir Jihadis	Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET); Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM); Harkat-al-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI); Harkat-al-Mujahideen (HUM)	Indian interests	High
Baloch Separatists	Baloch Liberation Army (BLA); Balochistan Student Organization (BSO); Balochistan Republican Army (BRA); Balochistan People's Liberation Front (BPLF); Popular Front for Armed Resistance (PFAR)	Pakistani state Anti-Punjabi Criminal activity	None
Ethno-political	Muttahida (MQM); Awami National (ANP); Peoples (PPP); JUI; JI	Three way Pashtun-Sindhi-Mohajir conflict Religious versus Mainstream	Medium to High

The following chapters will investigate these trends in more depth, focusing on provincial and external conflicts.

¹⁶⁶ Max Fisher, "Who Attacked Pakistan Sufi Landmark and Why," *The Atlantic Wire*, July 2, 2010. Available at <http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/Who-Attacked-Pakistan-Sufi-Landmark-and-Why-4207>

SECTION III: THE PASHTUN BELT AND BEYOND

The Pashtuns are the second largest ethnic group in Pakistan and are concentrated in the Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KPK) province (formerly the North West Frontier Province) and the seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In between them are six 'Frontier Regions,' which provide a buffer to separate the 'settled' KPK from the tribal FATA. There is also a significant Pashtun migrant population inside the Punjab and the Sindh, particularly in Karachi.

The KPK marks the beginning of Pakistan's periphery, and is thus a magnified version of the various ills affecting Pakistan, including being under-developed, under-policed and mismanaged. Many Pashtuns in Pakistan perceive these problems to be a result of historical discrimination leveled against them by a Punjabi-Mohajir alliance that dominates the government, the bureaucracy, and civil-sector. Pashtun nationalism is feared by the Pakistani state for its separatist potential, and security planners have often used religious radicals to hedge against its rise. The Pashtuns of the KPK are however not nearly as alienated or excluded from the state as other minority groups such as the Baloch, and many enjoy high positions within the government.

The aftermath of Islamabad's storming the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad in 2007 has catalyzed a domestic insurgency that is now manifested in a war against all symbols of the Pakistani state, including high-profile terrorist attacks in the urban centers of the interior. The insurgency has spread rapidly across the KPK. By 2008-09, militants had gained unprecedented territorial control across the FATA and the KPK, although since then Pakistani military offensives have blunted, and in some cases, reversed militant momentum. Various other groups, including global jihadis such as al-Qaeda, continue to find refuge in the ungoverned spaces of the FATA.

Some aspects of the FATA are little changed from colonial times. It has never been integrated into the Pakistani mainstream and colonial forms of governance and law enforcement serve as administrative mechanisms. National identity is particularly weak, with many FATA Pashtuns looking to their kin across the border in Afghanistan, instead of towards Islamabad.

Tribal identity is strong, and if were it not for the Durand Line and a smattering of border outposts, it would be impossible to tell where Pakistan ends and Afghanistan begins. Tribes are represented on both sides of the border, and they show little regard for its formal niceties, resulting in largely unmonitored flows of people and goods. The FATA is strategically located as the launch pad for Pakistani influence into Afghanistan, and the Pakistani security establishment resents any domestic or external intrusion into its affairs in the area.

The region is awash in arms from nearly three decades of unremitting war. In the wake of the 2001 US-led invasion it has also hosted an exodus of Taliban militants fleeing US forces. Many have since recuperated, and used the FATA as a rear staging area, and as sanctuary for their key command nodes.

The Shattered Political and Economic Landscape

Political and economic factors have been critical drivers of resentment and conflict in the Pashtun belt, particularly inside the FATA. Under the conventions of the Frontier Crimes Legislation (FCR) of 1901, the Pashtuns of the FATA are essentially some of the last subjects of colonialism. Under its tenets, FATA residents are disenfranchised from the bureaucratic, legal

and judicial conventions of the rest of Pakistan. ‘Political Agents (PA),’ senior civilian bureaucrats wield inordinate judicial and executive power and are vested with large unaudited pools of money to secure tribal loyalties.¹⁶⁷ No regulatory mechanism exists to check the power of the PAs; the courts cannot challenge their orders, and they are under no requirement to obey the recommendations of tribal jirgas.¹⁶⁸

Administrative Systems

To entrench this ruling structure, hereditary tribal maliks (elders) have been selected and employed as intermediaries, using all funds and resources channeled through them under the ‘nikat’ system. Theoretically designed to represent and advocate for the betterment of their tribes, maliks are not always well perceived by their tribes, who see them as servile and corrupt with all the trappings of feudal overlords.¹⁶⁹

The archaic nature of the ‘nikat’ system compounds these problems, with resource shares often unchanged in almost a century. In South Waziristan for example, despite the proportions of Mehsud and Wazir tribesmen largely leveling out by the end of the century, the Mehsuds continue to receive 3/4ths of resources and development funds as per the demographic patterns of the early 20th century.¹⁷⁰

The structure also ensures a top-down decision-making process that fails to include democratic inputs from tribes, and fosters patronage networks and clientelism.¹⁷¹ The system has been further undermined by the growing independence of mullahs (religious leaders) since the 1970s. Traditionally mullahs were subservient to the maliks, depending on them for income and protection, but since the Soviet jihad and the influx of Wahabbist petrodollars from the Gulf, they have grown to become an increasingly independent source of power.¹⁷²

The FCR, which began as a tool of colonial subjugation, includes various other provisions that deny FATA residents the basic rights of other Pakistanis, including any semblance of an independent judiciary, leading a lawyer to proclaim that the system permits “no wakeel (lawyer), no daleel (argument) and no appeal.”¹⁷³ The FCR also permits the use of collective punishment as a law enforcement mechanism, in violation of both the Geneva Convention and the Pakistani constitution. The punishment meted out can range from blockades, demolitions of houses and villages as well as fines, all of which can be invoked with little, if any, oversight.

¹⁶⁷ Mehreen Farooq, Hedieh Mirahmedi and Waleed Ziad, “Developing FATA: A White Paper for USAID,” *World Organization for Resource Development*, December 14, 2009. Available at <http://www.worde.org/files/WhitePapers/WORDEWhitePaper-DevelopingFATA-MehreenFarooqMirahmediWaleed.pdf>

¹⁶⁸ “FATA: The Dark Region of Pakistan,” *Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network*. Available at <http://www.aitpn.org/IRQ/vol-II/Issue-02/issue06.htm>

¹⁶⁹ Ibid

¹⁷⁰ Shuja Nawaz and Arnaud de Bochgrave, “FATA: A Most Dangerous Place,” *CSIS*, January 2009. Available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf

¹⁷¹ Mehreen Farooq, Hedieh Mirahmedi and Waleed Ziad, “Developing FATA: A White Paper for USAID.”

¹⁷² Mehreen Farooq, Hedieh Mirahmedi and Waleed Ziad, “Developing FATA: A White Paper for USAID.”

¹⁷³ Ziad Haider, “Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Tribal Belt: A Human Rights and Security Imperative,” *Belfer Center*, January 2009. Available at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/xstandard/Student%20discussion%20paper%200901.pdf>

In May 2008 for example, during Operation Zalzalā in South Waziristan, in retribution for the supposed harboring of militants, as per the FCR army bulldozers and demolition teams systematically destroyed the town of Spinkai, including its bazaars, hospital, shops and petrol station.¹⁷⁴ Brigadier Ali Abbas claimed this was lenient, “As per the frontier crimes regulations, I should have destroyed everyone’s house but I didn’t. Call it my weakness. Call it kindness.”¹⁷⁵ Similarly journalist Imtiaz Gul recounts an anecdote, where in retribution for a militant attack on the phone system, a Political Agent demanded US\$178,000 in payment. The fee was later negotiated down to US\$12,000, but nonetheless constituted a hefty sum.¹⁷⁶ Such severe punishments are particularly resented today, when communities often have little control over the actions of militants.

A political vacuum further undermines any representation for FATA residents. Political parties are legally banned; there is no representation at the provincial level and the limited representation in the federal National Assembly is little more than a façade since acts of Parliament are not recognized in the FATA without direct Presidential approval.¹⁷⁷

The Weakening of Traditional Structures

Trends in the neighboring KPK have also helped empower militants at the expense of traditional governance structure. During 2002-2008, the KPK was governed by a religious coalition, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which is a collection of five major Islamist parties, most, if not all of which have links to militant groups.¹⁷⁸ Rising on a platform that promised to eradicate nepotism, corruption and incompetence, MMA rule was marked by a continuation of all three, focusing instead on restricting civil liberties and Islamizing the public sphere.¹⁷⁹ Most notorious amongst their edicts was the 2005 Hisba Bill, which amounted to a strict implementation of sharia across the KPK.

The Musharraf government tolerated the MMA and its various agendas in exchange for a captive voting bloc to legitimize the military government.¹⁸⁰ The MMA also showed little inclination to tackle growing radicalism in the KPK, and largely turned a blind eye to the Talibanization of the province, helping contribute to growing radicalization inside the FATA.¹⁸¹ The end result was that Taliban militants increasingly found space within the KPK to operate, dramatically increasing their presence, both through terrorist attacks such as the June 2009 attack on the Pearl Intercontinental Hotel in Peshawar, and through indirect control of vast swathes of territory, such as the TTP control of large parts of the KPK’s Malakand Division in 2008.

¹⁷⁴ Declan Walsh, “Demolished by the Pakistani Army: The Frontier Village Punished for Harboring the Taliban,” *The Guardian*, May 20, 2008. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/20/pakistan>

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Imtiaz Gul, “*The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier*,” (London: Penguin Books, 2010), Chapter 5.

¹⁷⁷ Ziad Haider, “Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Tribal Belt: A Human Rights and Security Imperative.”

¹⁷⁸ Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal,” *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 3, (2007). Available at http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/August_2007/Norell.pdf

¹⁷⁹ Hassan Abbas, “Inside Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province,” *New America Foundation*, April 2010. Available at http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/abbas_0.pdf

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal.”

The convergence of these trends has helped ‘tribal entrepreneurs’ in the Taliban to challenge the existing structure.¹⁸² In a concerted campaign, they killed at least 600 maliks by 2009, and forced many others into hiding, all but uprooting the traditional tribal structure.¹⁸³ Even after Pakistani military operations inside the FATA, many are reluctant to return. One malik for the Mamond tribe was assassinated on his way to a meeting with the Prime Minister in July 2008,¹⁸⁴ and a *Time Magazine* article details how, even after a robust offensive in South Waziristan and the assurances of the army, a group of maliks from the Mehsud tribe arrived at the office of COAS Kayani in a car with blacked out windows to prevent the Taliban from identifying them.¹⁸⁵

In part, the Taliban assault has been successful because its narrative has harnessed elements of class struggle. Pitting the “kashars” (the young, poor with minor lineages) against the “mashars” (the privileged), they have successfully depicted the agent-malik nexus as a predatory and privileged class unto themselves.¹⁸⁶

The Taliban have also benefited from the fact that the tribal system has been in decline since the 1970s with elders increasingly losing ground to new generations of young and brash militants. Such a trend is hardly surprising under the onslaught of near constant war, and accompanying waves of drug money and advanced small arms. Additionally, the entrance of the Army and its direct dealings with tribes and militants has also dealt a further blow to the legitimacy and relevance of local maliks.¹⁸⁷

Chronic Underdevelopment

Class divides are exacerbated by the chronic underdevelopment of the FATA, making it an easy recruiting ground for militant and criminal groups. On virtually all human development metrics, the FATA ranks well below neighboring KPK and the rest of Pakistan, as can be seen in **Figures 3.1 to 3.3**. Some 60% of the population is below the poverty line,¹⁸⁸ while the education and health sectors can best be described as abysmal. Literacy rates lie well below the national average and female literacy in particular languishes at a mere 3 percent.¹⁸⁹

Significant discrepancies exist between agencies. Upper Dir, a hotbed of militancy, for example has a population-hospital bed ratio of 6909 compared to 550 for Peshawar.¹⁹⁰ Much of this

¹⁸² See Antonio Giustozzi for an example in Afghan context; Antonio Giustozzi, “*Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pg. 16.

¹⁸³ Safdar Sial, “Taliban on the March: Threat Assessment and Security Implications for the Region,” *Peace and Security Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2nd Quarter, 2009. Available through ProQuest,

¹⁸⁴ Anwarullah Khan, “Pro-Govt Tribal Leader Killed in Ambush,” *Dawn*, July 22, 2008. Available at <http://archives.dawn.com/dawnftp/72.249.57.55/dawnftp/2008/07/22/top6.htm>

¹⁸⁵ Tim McGirk, “Pakistan’s Taliban War: Bringing Back the Music,” *Time Magazine*, March 3, 2010. Available at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1968704,00.html>

¹⁸⁶ Shuja Nawaz and Arnaud de Boichgrave, “FATA: A Most Dangerous Place.”

¹⁸⁷ Rahimullah Yusufzai, “An Agenda for Change in FATA,” *The News*, July 27, 2010. Available at <http://www.cssforum.com.pk/general/news-articles/36731-agenda-change-fata-rahimullah-yusufzai.html>

¹⁸⁸ Mehreen Farooq, Hedieh Mirahmedi and Waleed Ziad, “Developing FATA: A White Paper for USAID.”

¹⁸⁹ “FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2007-2015,” *Civil Secretariat FATA*. Available at http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/documents/Booklet_on_FATA_SDP_2006_-_15.pdf

¹⁹⁰ “District Wise Statistics,” *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bureau of Statistics*. Available at <http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Departments/BOS/nwfpdev-statis-health-tab-109.php>, accessed 4/21/2011

underdevelopment has been due to the significant historical under-allocation of development resources. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in funding allocations, as seen in **Figure 3.4**, rising from a mere 1.18 billion rupees in FY2001-2002 to 15 billion rupees allocated for FY2010-2011.

Both the US and Pakistan have identified the communications sector as a critical sector to help counter extremist voices inside the FATA.¹⁹¹ It has seen a major expansion of funding allocations, which is shown in **Figure 3.4**. These are immensely positive trends but may still be inadequate. The 6.6 billion rupees allocated for 2008 represented a per capita investment of 905 rupees per person compared to the Pakistani average of 2,044 rupees,¹⁹² thus the present investment may only lifted the FATA to parity with the rest of the country. Inputs alone are no guarantor of success, and furthermore given decades of chronic underinvestment, any development strategy will require a sustained period of commitment.

Gainful employment opportunities are scarce, which has forced a substantial portion of the population to migrate to Pakistan's settled areas or to the Gulf, or rely upon the criminal and parallel economies to survive. In 2007, the official unemployment rate was around 25%¹⁹³, although the real number is likely much higher. Subsistence agriculture that has held together other impoverished parts of South Asia is difficult at best in the FATA's terrain, with only 18 percent of land available for cultivation, of which only 44% is irrigated. As a result 44 people farm every irrigated hectare, compared to the national average of 9.¹⁹⁴

The little industry that exists inside the FATA has come under significant strain in recent years, with a recent government study estimating that of all business closures between 1987 and 2009, 67.03% occurred within the militancy prone years of 2007-2009.¹⁹⁵ Problems facing industries have included a severe deterioration of law and order, unavailability of sustainable sources of raw materials or skilled labor, frequent power breakdowns, problems in acquiring credit, lack of legal protections and high transportation costs. A few examples emphasize these challenges; only 0.94% of businessmen were able to acquire bank loans, over 42% of the workforce is estimated to be illiterate and over 92% of workers had no skills when they started working.¹⁹⁶

Today the FATA remains a precarious state, with little forward progress on essential reforms. Despite various promises it remains in an ambiguous political state. Various politicians including President Zardari have promised significant reforms, including reforming the FCR, curtailing the

¹⁹¹ "Pakistan Communications Plan," *Office of the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs*, Available at <http://publicintelligence.info/PakistanComPlan2010.pdf>

¹⁹² "Cost of Conflict in FATA," *Planning and Development Department, FATA Secretariat*, April 2009. Available at <http://fata.gov.pk/files/costconflict.pdf>

¹⁹³ "District Wise Statistics," *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bureau of Statistics*. Available at <http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Departments/BOS/nwfpdev-statis-health-tab-109.php>, accessed 4/21/2011

¹⁹⁴ Habibullah Khan, "Social Sector Agenda and Post Crisis Needs Assessment," *FATA Secretariat*, Available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PAKISTANEXTN/Resources/FATAPresentation-EAD.pdf>

¹⁹⁵ "Survey Enumeration of Industries, Service Sector Entities, Labor Force and Identifying Constraints in FATA," *CAMP and FATA Development Authority*, October 2010. Available at <http://fatada.gov.pk/Docs/Industries/IndustriesSurveyReport.pdf>

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

power of PAs, and allowing political parties to function¹⁹⁷, although to date little, if any, progress has been made. Such reform will be essential for any sustainable counter-militancy strategy.

Pakistani military operations, no matter how robust, cannot tackle these underlying causes of militancy and can provide little more than a temporary stopgap. Similarly an influx of development activity, while welcome, will be channeled through the maliks, and often may do little more than benefit a small number of politically connected and influential elites who already dominate the official economy and can control who benefits from new inputs. Furthermore the overbearing focus on inputs is not ideal. In an illustration of its inadequacies, the FATA actually has a better student-to-teacher ratio of 31:1, when compared with the rest of Pakistan and its 47:1.¹⁹⁸ Yet, the quality of education remains much lower.

Reform will require combating the entrenched interests of powerful opponents, including the civilian bureaucrats and local elites who benefit from the status quo, and also the military which is averse to any civilian oversight over this strategically vital area. Furthermore, the social dynamics of the FATA themselves cannot be discounted including the conservatism of tribes and their deeply held (and often accurate) suspicions of interventions from the center being little more than Punjabi attempts to further their control over the Pashtuns.

A comprehensive recent assessment by the New America Foundation polled FATA residents on issues that were “very important” to them, and found that FATA residents overwhelmingly identified human services; 81.4% identified lack of jobs, 67.3% cited lack of schools and education, 70.8% lack of roads and good transportation and 70% cited poor healthcare.

In contrast, while highly unpopular, only 60% cited the U.S. drone program as “very important.”¹⁹⁹ Similarly when asked about future strategies, human development investments such as new jobs (90%), building new schools (80.3%), improving healthcare (82.3%), and improving the economy (82.9%) significantly outpolled security issues such as defeating Taliban fighters (52.3%) or expelling foreign fighters (58.9%).²⁰⁰ Even in controversial social arenas such as female education, 61.3% of those polled thought building new government schools for girls was “very important.”²⁰¹


¹⁹⁷ <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/40897>

¹⁹⁸ FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2007-2015


¹⁹⁹ “Public Opinion in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions,” *New America Foundation*, September 2010, Available at <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagesft/FATApoll1.pdf>

²⁰⁰ Ibid


²⁰¹ Ibid

Figure 3.1: Literacy Rates


(Source: Pakistan Ministry of Finance; FATA Secretariat)

Figure 3.2: Educational Enrollment

(Source: FATA Secretariat; Government of NWFP; Pakistan Ministry of Education)

Figure 3.3: Population Per Hospital Bed

(Source: Government of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bureau of Statistics; National Institute of Population Studies, <http://bit.ly/km324c>)

Figure 3.4: Annual Development Program (ADP) Funding Allocation for FATA (in PKR billion)

(Source: Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bureau of Statistics; Brookings Institution, <http://bit.ly/diYWxi>; One Pakistan News; <http://bit.ly/mcGFvA>)

The Militant Landscape

The militant landscape in the Pashtun belt is diverse and dynamic, and incorporates at least three major militant conglomerations, including the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban and transnational outfits. The large number of actual sub-groupings within these conglomerations renders it virtually impossible to adequately illuminate every local dyadic conflict. Rather the aim is to highlight and expose the trends in how groups interact and the many variables that affect their relationships. Militancy in the FATA, as in Afghanistan, is a “complex adaptive system,” i.e. one with multiple interconnected elements that change and adapt,²⁰² with opportunism and overlapping interests often informing collaboration.

Several separate but overlapping conflicts are taking place on various axes and playing out on international, regional and domestic planes; they include a global jihad by groups such as al-Qaeda, regionally focused jihads in Afghanistan and Kashmir and various domestic wars including religious struggles to replace local cultures and traditions with hardline Deobandi tenets, a sectarian war pitting Sunnis against Shias, as well as an entrenched militant-criminal nexus that is not a war in the strict sense, but is a key driver for all the above.

A diverse array of militant and terrorist groups has emerged, and grown inside the FATA and the KPK. Some of these groups are focused solely on one war, others are engaged in multiple, and nearly all use criminal activities to fund operations. Opportunism and overlapping interests often inform cooperation, while tribal identities, their leadership abilities, and historical relations with the Pakistani state, all may complicate or facilitate interactions with other actors. Furthermore most groups have distinct agendas that they prioritize above others, and cooperation is often predicated on advancing each group’s objectives, although priorities may change with time and experience.

The vast majority of these groups adhere to hardline Deobandi and extremist puritanical tenets which help inform and guide their actions. Groups operating inside the tribal belt include the “Pakistani Taliban” and “Afghan Taliban” conglomerations along with a host of other smaller militants who can operate independently, embed fully or selectively cooperate with the larger conglomerations for specific purposes. They can be force multipliers for certain missions, ideological guides, operational facilitators or mediators, or a combination of the above. Other militant groups may be little more than criminals in militant garb.

In broader context, attempts at delineation may be inconsequential given growing radicalization and convergence of militant groups as a result of their associations inside the FATA. Terrorism expert Steven Tankel offers some instructive analysis, noting that “the more entrenched Lashkar becomes in the NWFP/FATA, the more robust these connections and collaborations become.”²⁰³ His comments allude specifically to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) but have broader applicability, particularly for groups that have entered the FATA in more recent years.

²⁰² Seth Jones, “In the Graveyard of Empires,” (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2010). pg. 224.

²⁰³ Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” *New America Foundation*, February 2010. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Lashkar-e-Taiba_in_Perspective.pdf

The Pakistani Taliban

The Pakistani Taliban, or the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a key threat to Pakistan's stability. Its reach has vastly expanded since 2007, and despite fairly robust recent military offensives, it remains a potent force that is able to displace and resurrect quite rapidly, as seen in Mohmand, where PAKMIL is now conducting its third major clearing operation in two years.²⁰⁴ The TTP is essentially a conglomeration of various local networks that simultaneously cooperate and compete with each other.

The charismatic militant leader Beitullah Mehsud created the TTP in 2007, and it was organized around a 40 personal council with representatives from all seven agencies of the FATA, and several districts of the NWFP.²⁰⁵ The Mehsud tribe of South Waziristan has been a key leadership node, spawning both emirs as well as senior commanders such as Waliur Rehman and Qari Hussain Mehsud.²⁰⁶

Initially Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a senior Taliban commander of the Uthumai Wazir tribe in North Waziristan, was nominated as second-in-command, but in an example of the dynamism in militant relationships, Gul Bahadur has increasingly moved his organization away from the Mehsuds to prioritize his war in Afghanistan,²⁰⁷ and in conjunction with Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan formed a rival counterbalancing faction called the Muqami Tehrik-i-Taliban (Local Taliban).²⁰⁸

Known as a pragmatist, Gul Bahadur has diverged from Mehsud TTP strategy and forged complex relationships with a variety of actors. He has opposed battling Pakistani troops, yet occasionally mounted attacks such as that on a military convoy in 2009.²⁰⁹ Similarly, he has signed peace deals with the Pakistani military, yet allowed Mehsud fighters to displace into his territory while fleeing Pakistani military operations in other agencies.²¹⁰ Other internal schisms within the TTP are often more violent and less nuanced. In 2008 for example, Omar Khalid, the

²⁰⁴ "Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan March 2011," *The White House*, April 5, 2011. Available at <http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/UNCLASS%20Report%20on%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf>

²⁰⁵ Brian Fishman, "The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict across the FATA and NWFP," *New America Foundation*, April 2010. Available at <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/fishman.pdf>

²⁰⁶ Mansur Khan Mahsud, "The new, new face of the Pakistani Taliban?" *Foreign Policy*, April 30, 2010. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/30/the_new_new_face_of_the_pakistani_taliban

²⁰⁷ Charlie Szrom, "The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis," *American Enterprise Institute*, April 6, 2009. Available at <http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/survivalist-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis>

²⁰⁸ Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman, "Faces of Pakistan's Militant Leaders: In-Depth Profiles of Major Militant Commanders," *Center for American Progress*, July 22, 2009. Available at <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/07/talibanleaders.html>

²⁰⁹ Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud and Brian Fishman, "Inside Pakistan's Tribal Frontier: North Waziristan," *Foreign Policy*, April 23, 2010. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/23/inside_pakistans_tribal_frontier_north_waziristan

²¹⁰ Ibid.

Mohmand leader of the TTP, launched an attack on a rival camp, killing its leaders and taking over 70 prisoners.²¹¹

Figure 3.5: Tribes and Insurgent Groups in the FATA

Border agency/ province	Main tribes	Main AGE groups (non-exhaustive)	Cross-border representation and linkages in Afghanistan
Khyber	Shinwari, Afridi	Lashkar I-Islam, Ansar ul Islam, HIG, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan	Shinwari
Kurram	Turi, Mangal, Bangash, Jaji, Moqbil	HIG, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Jaji, Mangal, Moqbil
Bajaur	Mamunds, Salarzais, Uthman Khel	Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al Qaeda, Jaish-e-Islami, Karwan-e-Niamatullah, HIG	Mamunds, Salarzais
North Waziristan	Uthmanzai Wazirs, Gurbuz	Al-Qaeda, IMU and Uzbek splinter groups (e.g. Islamic Jihad Union), Haqqani network, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Uthmanzai Wazirs, Gurbuz
South Waziristan	Ahmadzai Wazirs, Mehsuds	Al-Qaeda, IMU, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Ahmadzai Wazirs
Mohmand	Mohmand, Safis	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda	Mohmand, Safis
Orakzai	Orakzai, Afridi	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	
Balochistan province	Ashaqzai, Alizai, Kakar, Baluch	Afghan Taliban, Balochi separatist groups, Jundullah	Ashaqzai, Alizai, Kakar, Baluch

Source: UNAMA, UNODC, UNDSS, Jamestown Foundation, CTC Sentinel, The Long War Journal.

Nevertheless, the TTP has displayed more continuity than change. Its primarily domestic agenda has made it a key powerbroker in the FATA, emerging in terrain where once only the government and the tribes existed. Today both are on the retreat, as the TTP moves to replace the local tribal and cultural codes with its own religious one, and it has all but destroyed the traditional jirga system with a systematic campaign of assassination against tribal maliks.

The TTP has often used dysfunctional local governance as a recruiting tool. It has offered a system based on sharia as an alternative model, and has benefited from parallel sharia courts and inter-tribal conflict resolution mechanisms that are seen as more effective than their government counterparts. The TSNM, a TTP constituent in the Malakand Division of the KPK, rose in large part due to these reasons. Similarly in Mohmand in 2008, the TTP resolved a dispute between different clans of the Safi tribe, which the government's FATA Development Authority had been unable to achieve.²¹² In this case such resolution gave the TTP local prestige as well as partial control over a major quarry in the area.

Many networks within the TTP are motivated first and foremost by their parochial interests, arising from local conditions. These can include marginalized tribes seeking to expand their

²¹¹ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "A Who's Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province: Part One – North and South Waziristan," *Jamestown Foundation*, September 22, 2009. Available at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=5169&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=167&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5169&tx_ttnews[backPid]=167&no_cache=1)

²¹² Pir Zubair Shah and Jane Perlez, "Pakistan Marble Helps Taliban Stay in Business," *New York Times*, July 14, 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/world/asia/14taliban.html?_r=1

influence, as in Khyber, where Mangal Bagh's Lashkar-e-Islami draws strength mainly from the Sipah sub-clan, the least influential of the Afridi tribe.²¹³

Others may join as a means to rectify social and economic inequalities. Many Taliban militants come from poor socio-economic backgrounds. Mangal Bagh himself was a bus driver before he was a commander.²¹⁴ Faiysal Ali Khan, the founder of an NGO in the KPK also notes the ages of militants stating that, "there is no militant leader over 30 or 35 years old, and their foot soldiers are even younger."²¹⁵ The madrassa sector, which militants have helped expand, is also particularly unregulated in the FATA, and is believed to be a key driver for recruitment.²¹⁶

Other smaller groups that are not native to the FATA have begun to gravitate towards the tribal areas, seeing ideological similarity with the TTP, as well as deriving enhanced support to conduct their own core objectives, such as sectarian war. The Punjabi Taliban are the best known, and are composed of members of several state-supported Kashmiri jihadi groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), as well as sectarian outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).²¹⁷

All these groups have participated in sectarian violence in Kurram and other agencies.²¹⁸ With their enhanced operational expertise, these groups, the LeJ in particular, have been force multipliers for the TTP, helping expand its reach into major urban centers. The Punjabi Taliban have been implicated with several of the most high-profile TTP attacks including the siege of PAKMIL's GHQ in Rawalpindi in 2009, and an attack on Ahmadi mosques in Lahore in 2010, to name but a few.

Others such as the Ghazi Force are less known. Ghazi Force is composed of relatives of individuals killed in the Pakistani storming of Islamabad's Lal Masjid in 2007, and is motivated by its sectarian inclinations and its desire for revenge.²¹⁹ Largely headquartered in Orakzai, it is believed to have a close working relationship with Hakimullah Mehsud's faction in the TTP, and has mounted several attacks in 2009, including a suicide bombing in June 2009 on an office of the World Health Organization.²²⁰ Nicholas Schmidle, an expert on Pakistan who has close knowledge of the Ghazi Force, also expounds on the radicalization effect that comes with militant associations noting that its former leader killed in during the storming of the Lal Masjid

²¹³ "The Status of the Taliban in Khyber Agency," *Politact*, November 18, 2010. Available at <http://politact.com/south-central-asia/the-status-of-taliban-insurgency-in-khyber-agency.html>

²¹⁴ Azhar Masood, "Mangal Bagh Badly Injured, But Alive," *Foreign Policy Journal*, July 3, 2009. Available at <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/07/03/pakistan-mangal-bagh-badly-injured-but-alive/>

²¹⁵ "Relief Leader Says Tribal Youth Need Not Be Lost to the Taliban." *Creative Associates*, June 2010. Available at <http://creative-associates.us/?p=531>

²¹⁶ "The Militant Jihadi Challenge," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report 164. Available at www.crisisgroup.org

²¹⁷ Hassan Abbas, "Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network," *Harvard Belfer Center*, Vol. 2, Issue 4, April 2009. Available at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss4.pdf>

²¹⁸ Mariam Abou Zahab, "Sectarianism in Pakistan's Kurram Tribal Agency," *Jamestown Foundation*, march 19, 2009. Available at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=34730&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=26&cHash=ac2e288618](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34730&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=ac2e288618)

²¹⁹ Kathy Gannon, "Pakistani Authorities warn of new hardline Islamic force out to avenge 2007 deaths," *AP*, July 1, 2010. Available at http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/07/pakistan_authorities_warn_of_n.html

²²⁰ Animesh Roul, "Little Known Ghazi Brigade Now a Major Player in the Punjab Jihad?" *Jamestown Foundation*, July 16, 2010. Available at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=36621&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=457&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36621&tx_ttnews[backPid]=457&no_cache=1)

“was not a suicidal dude” but had “built up the jihad... and surrounded himself with some bad-ass fighters from Pakistan's most elite jihadi organizations, that when it came down to the final showdown, he left no room for himself to back down.”²²¹

More recently the TTP has more actively participated in sectarian violence against Shias, which may have resulted in as many as 22,000 people being killed between 1999 and 2009, according to statistics collected by the WHO.²²² Some aspects of this killing provide an example of personality driving conflicts; sectarian war grew with the rise of Hakimullah Mehsud as the new emir of the TTP, after his predecessor Beitullah was killed in a drone strike in 2009.

Hakimullah's distaste for Shias²²³ into escalated sectarian violence, particularly in Kurram and Orakzai agencies, which have large Shia populations and have become the focal point for sectarian struggle. Nine mini-wars have been waged since 2001 and in Kurram over 2,000-3,000 people have been killed and over 3,500 wounded in the last four years.²²⁴

The conflict has been made worse by tribal dynamics. The Shias in Kurram largely belong to the Turi tribe that has historically warred with the Sunni Mangal and Bangash tribes in the region, who grew in power in recent years with the influx of militants displacing from other provinces.²²⁵ The Turis have also compounded their apostasy in Taliban eyes by their historical decisions, including refusing to participate in the Soviet jihad in the 1980s and then again refusing shelter to fleeing Taliban fighters after the U.S. invasion in 2001.²²⁶ The Turis also sit astride strategically vital territory, particularly the Bodki-Kharlachi border crossing into Afghanistan that is only 50 kilometers from Kabul.²²⁷

The Haqqani network has recently been reported to have brokered a truce between Sunnis and Shias, presumably to help facilitate transit across Turi lands.²²⁸ The truce is a good example of how groups prioritize their conflicts and relationships. The Haqqanis have never demonstrated any particular warmth towards Shias, but Turi territory is a strategically vital intersection between Loya Pakiya and North Waziristan, particularly as the Haqqanis find themselves being pressured around their traditional routes.

²²¹ Russ Wellen, “The Red Mosque was Pakistan's Waco,” *FPIF*, July 2, 2010. Available at http://www.fpiif.org/blog/the_red_mosque_was_pakistans_waco

²²² “Multi Cluster Rapid Assessment: District Kohat,” WHO Pakistan, Available at <http://www.whopak.org/idps/documents/assessments/Multi%20Cluster%20Rapid%20Assessment%20-%20District%20Kohat.pdf>

²²³ Mukhtar A. Khan, “A Profile of the TTP's New Leader: Hakimullah Mehsud,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 2, Issue 10, October 2009. Available at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss10.pdf>

²²⁴ Qaiser Butt, “Kurram Tribal Region: Peace accord signed to end years of bloodshed,” *Express Tribune*, February 4, 2011. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/113889/kurram-tribal-region-peace-accord-signed-to-end-years-of-bloodshed/>

²²⁵ See “Tribes in FATA,” *Naval Postgraduate School Culture and Conflict Review*. Available at http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Pakistan_Index.html, last accessed 4/22/2011

²²⁶ B. Raman, “Kurram Agency Continues to Bleed,” *South Asia Analysis Group*, September 3, 2008. Available at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2829.html>

²²⁷ Tom Hussain, “Truce ends blood feud in Pakistan that has killed 3,000,” *The National*, January 21, 2011. Available at <http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-asia/truce-ends-blood-feud-in-pakistan-that-has-killed-3-000?pageCount=0>

²²⁸ Daud Khattak, “A Haqqani-brokered peace in Kurram agency?” *Foreign Policy*, February 16, 2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/16/a_haqqani_brokered_peace_in_kurram_agency

Kurram, however, is just one of many local sectarian dyadic conflicts within the FATA and KPK. Sectarian war has raged in various other agencies too, notably Khyber and the Frontier Regions of Dera Ismail Khan, Hangu and Kohat,²²⁹ Neither has this violence been restricted to Shias. In the Khyber agency, the local militant group Lashkar-e-Islam has waged intra-Sunni struggle with the Ansar-ul-Islam, a Barelvi group over competing sharia courts.²³⁰ Sufi shrines have also been attacked across the FATA/KPK, as well as across the rest of Pakistan, marking another unprecedented shift in the militant calculus. The first recorded attack occurred in March 2008 on the 400-year old shrine of Hazrat Abu Saeed Baba in the outskirts of Peshawar, and has been followed by several others in Hangu, Nowshera and Buner in the KPK, as well as three major attacks in 2010, in Lahore, central Punjab and Karachi, a significant expansion.²³¹

The TTP has various ties to the Afghan jihad. Various militant leaders within the conglomeration such as Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir prioritize Afghanistan, some fighters may double between the two wars, while other networks contribute largely through attacks on NATO supply convoys, although this may as profit-driven as ideological. They have also forged links with other Afghan-oriented foreign militants such as the IMU, although this particular alliance may have been driven more by the personal relationships between Beitullah Mehsud and then IMU leader Toher Yudashev, than any concerted strategic decision.²³²

The alliance appears to have broken, with the death of Mehsud and Yuldashev, and the expulsion of the IMU from South Waziristan by the Wazirs. Closer relationships with global jihadists such as al-Qaeda have also assisted the TTP in its first foray into the global jihad with the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate a homemade explosive device in New York's Times Square in May 2010.²³³ Daniel Benjamin, the U.S. State Department's coordinator for counter-terrorism assessed that the "TTP draws ideological guidance from al-Qaida while al-Qaida relies on the TTP for safe haven."²³⁴

The Afghan Taliban

The Afghan nationalists of the "Afghan Taliban" are quite distinct from the Pakistani Taliban, primarily in that they have disavowed attacks against or inside Pakistan, are by and large focused solely on Afghanistan, and work largely in concert with Pakistani grand strategy. It is a matter of great contention the extent to which they receive tangible support from Pakistani intelligence services.

²²⁹ International Crisis Group, "The Militant Jihadi Challenge."

²³⁰ Ibid

²³¹ Erum Haider, "That Colorless Life: Attacking Shrines and the 'Other' Islam," *Jinnah Institute*, December 9, 2010. Available at <http://www.jinnah-institute.org/programs/strategic-security-program/190-policy-brief-that-colorless-life>

²³² David Witter, "Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan's Tribal Regions," *Institute for the Study of War*, January 27, 2011. Available at http://www.understandingwar.org/files/BackgrounderIMU_web.pdf

²³³ Anne Komblut and Karin Bruillard, "US blames Pakistan for Times Square bomb plot," *Washington Post*, May 10, 2010. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR2010050901143.html>; Bill Roggio, "Times Square Bomber Faisal Shahzad seen on video with Pakistani Taliban commander Hakeemullah Mehsud," *Long War Journal*, July 23, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/times_square_bomber_1.php

²³⁴ Charlie Savage, "US adds legal pressure on Pakistani Taliban," *New York Times*, September 1, 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/world/asia/02talib.html>

Some analysts such as Matt Waldman have indicated collaboration of “astonishing magnitude,” including direct representation on the highest Taliban command echelons and the extensive provision of funding, munitions, supplies and sanctuary.²³⁵ Regardless of the veracity of this information, it is clear that “Afghan Taliban” groups and Pakistan’s invisible establishment share a symbiotic relationship that is founded on mutual benefit, with reciprocity for sanctuary and supplies usually centering on assistance in containing Indian influence in Afghanistan.

By and large Afghan Taliban groups are not native to the FATA; the Quetta Shura Taliban is also known as the Kandahari Taliban since its center of gravity is in Kandahar,²³⁶ while the Haqqanis hail from the Afghan Zadran tribe in Loya Paktiya²³⁷ and use their Pakistani strongholds most importantly as sanctuary for key command nodes. Pakistan’s sprawling Afghan refugee camps (particularly in Balochistan) also provide fertile recruiting ground.

Over the past three decades, they have increasingly become permanent fixtures in the FATA under the codes of Pashtunwali that dictates sanctuary to all who ask, as well as the prestige they have accumulated in the jihadi universe due to operations against both the Soviets in the 1980s and Western forces today. They have grown increasingly intertwined into local structures through decades of interactions inside the FATA, but nonetheless remain a largely alien force.

On the face of it, the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) should be at the center of the militant universe. Its leader Mullah Omar, is the Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful) and nearly all groups, Afghan and Pakistani swear at least superficial allegiance to his rule.²³⁸ In fact some argue that the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are “Siamese twins... two heads of the same body,”²³⁹ which may be accurate in that both groups operate autonomously, yet collaborate when their needs dictate.

Mullah Omar himself is likely more an arbitrator between the disparate networks that subscribe to his authority, than a hierarchical leader. Recently for example, despite Omar’s personal call to release Colonel Imam, a former member of the ISI who helped organize mujahideen forces and train Omar in the 1980s,²⁴⁰ Hakimullah Mehsud, the emir of the Pakistani Taliban appeared on a video to personally order and oversee the execution of Imam.²⁴¹ This is believed to have strained relations between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban.

²³⁵ Matt Waldman, “Between the Sun and the Sky,” *LSE Crisis States*, June 2010. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/100613_20106138531279734lse-isi-taliban.pdf

²³⁶ Carl Fosberg, “The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar,” *Institute for the Study of War*, December 2009. Available at http://www.understandingwar.org/files/The_Talibans_Campaign_For_Kandahar.pdf

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Amir Mir, “Pakistani Taliban form new alliance with Mullah Omar as their Supreme Leader,” *Hudson New York*, February 24, 2009. Available at <http://www.hudson-ny.org/333/pakistani-taliban-form-new-alliance-with-mullah-omar-as-their-supreme-leader>

²³⁹ Qandeel Siddique, “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An attempt to deconstruct the umbrella organization and the reasons for its growth in Pakistan’s north-west,” *Danish Institute for International Studies*, 2010. Available at http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2010/RP2010-12-Tehrik-e-Taliban_web.pdf

²⁴⁰ “Mullah Omar sends Jirga to negotiate Col Imam’s release?” *Daily Times*, May 2, 2010. Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010/05/02/story_2-5-2010_pg1_4

²⁴¹ Bill Roggio, “Video: Pakistani Taliban execute Colonel Imam,” *Long War Journal*, February 20, 2011. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/02/video_pakistani_tali.php

The QST may have less influence over the TTP in that it is somewhat geographically separated from the FATA, with its main presence felt in eastern Balochistan around the city of Quetta. The QST has also been attempting to brand itself as a legitimate alternative to the government of Hamid Karzai, and has repeatedly stated, most recently in January 2011, that it is a “responsible force” that wants to “assure all regional countries that we will maintain good relations with them... following our independence.”²⁴²

The Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network, a constituent member of the “Afghan Taliban” conglomeration is similarly at the heart of the Afghan jihad, particularly in its Loya Paktiya stronghold, and is viewed by American officials as one of the most proficient and dangerous networks.²⁴³ As a result it has been subjected to an intense drone barrage²⁴⁴, and American officials have strongly urged PAKMIL action against the group in North Waziristan. Haqqani leaders, notably patriarch Jalaluddin, and his son and current operational commander Sirajuddin Haqqani, are widely respected in the militant universe and have close links to the Pakistani state.²⁴⁵

Such relationships have made them effective interlocutors between militant groups, and between militants and the state, and have participated in various mediation efforts, most recently helping implement a ceasefire for the sectarian war in Kurram. However Haqqani relations with the TTP have come under strain in recent months. Against the backdrop of Hakimullah’s defiance and execution of Colonel Imam, Mehsud-appointed commanders have also begun violating the terms of a Haqqani negotiated ceasefire to end sectarian war in Kurram. A Haqqani affiliate is said to have commented, “Haqqani has said some very strong words to Hakimullah; Stop it or my men will make you stop it.”²⁴⁶ Issues in Kurram are very important for the Haqqanis, offering alternative cross-border routes in the event of military operations in North Waziristan.

Similarly, even though the Haqqanis have resolutely stated that they fully submit to the diktats of Mullah Omar, they are believed to operate with considerable autonomy within the network. They operate a separate command network called the Miram Shah Shura,²⁴⁷ and in areas where the influence of the QST and the Haqqanis overlap such as Logar province, they compete for influence.²⁴⁸ On certain occasions, the Haqqanis have mounted attacks that contravene official

²⁴² “New Statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Response in reaction to Senator Lindsey Graham Remarks to maintain US permanent bases in Afghanistan,” *Jihadology*, January 4, 2011. Available at <http://jihadology.net/2011/01/04/new-statement-from-the-islamic-emirate-of-afghanistan-response-in-reaction-to-senator-lindsay-graham-remarks-to-maintain-us-permanent-bases-in-afghanistan/>

²⁴³ “US still views silent Haqqani network as most dangerous of Taliban fighters,” *One India News*, December 27, 2010. Available at <http://news.oneindia.in/2010/12/27/usstill-views-silent-haqqani-network-as-most-dangerous-of-t.html>

²⁴⁴ Katherine Tiedemann, “Spotlight on North Waziristan,” *Foreign Policy*, March 18, 2010. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/18/spotlight_on_north_waziristan

²⁴⁵ Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud and Brian Fishman, “Inside Pakistan’s Tribal Frontier: North Waziristan,” *Foreign Policy*, April 23, 2010. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/23/inside_pakistans_tribal_frontier_north_waziristan

²⁴⁶ Zia Khan, “Kurram Agency: Haqqani warns Hakimullah not to ‘sabotage’ peace deal,” *Express Tribune*, May 2, 2011. Available at http://parachinar616.blogspot.com/2011_05_02_archive.html#

²⁴⁷ Bill Roggio, “The Afghan Taliban’s Top Leaders,” *Long War Journal*, February 23, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/the_talibans_top_lea.php

²⁴⁸ Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud and Brian Fishman, “Inside Pakistan’s Tribal Frontier: North Waziristan.”

Afghan Taliban (i.e. QST) rules of engagement and strategy, including an attack on a UN guest house in 2009.²⁴⁹

The Haqqanis also maintain links with a host of Pakistani and transnational terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, the TTP, the LeT, the IMU, the SSP, and the LeJ to name but a few. Geographic realities have dictated a close relationship with Wazir factions of the “Pakistani Taliban,” notably Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s group that controls the territory between Haqqani strongholds in North Waziristan and the Afghan border.²⁵⁰

The Haqqanis shares a symbiotic relationship with Al-Qaeda, exchanging shelter for resources, including access to Gulf funding networks, links to other militant organizations, training and personnel.²⁵¹ Al-Qaeda has had a relationship with the Haqqanis dating back to the 1980s, and it believed that this symbiosis has increased in recent years due to the influence of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is regarded as more amenable to global jihadists than his father.²⁵²

Punjabi Taliban groups such as the SSP, LeJ, LeT and others have also found sanctuary in Haqqani territory. The SSP in particular is also believed to supply a considerable number of the suicide bombers used by the Haqqanis for attacks in Afghanistan,²⁵³ and the LeT, which like the Haqqanis is very close to Pakistani intelligence agencies, has collaborated on high-profile attacks against Indian targets in Afghanistan, including the dual attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009.²⁵⁴

The LeT may also be influencing Haqqani tactics, as seen in the February 2011 Jalalabad bank attack, which essentially mimicked the LeT’s fidayeen style.²⁵⁵ The IMU too is believed to have reconstituted itself in North Waziristan after its expulsion from South Waziristan. Its Uzbek character is handy for “Afghan Taliban” strategy, allowing them to penetrate Uzbek areas in northern Afghanistan, and burnish their credentials as nationalist forces representing the entire Sunni conservative movement, rather than merely a Pashtun insurgency.

Transnational Groups and Al-Qaeda

Various other axes of conflict, including the “global jihad,” have attracted other groups and elements, particularly in North Waziristan. Many of these groups often have defined and known agendas, but their maneuvering and actions on the scene -- particularly in the tribal areas -- are less transparent. In fact, both Osama Bin Laden, and Indonesian terrorist Umar Patek were both

²⁴⁹ Bill Roggio, “Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda, behind attack on UN guesthouse in Kabul,” *Long War Journal*, November 1, 2009. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/11/haqqani_network_al_q.php

²⁵⁰ Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan,” *Institute for the Study of War*, October 2010. Available at http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Haqqani_Network.pdf

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid

²⁵⁴ “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Afghan Connection,” *Bellum Stanford Review*, June 16, 2010. Available at <http://bellum.stanfordreview.org/?p=2546>

²⁵⁵ Bill Roggio, “Afghan intel links Jalalabad bank attack, other suicide attacks to Pakistan,” *Long War Journal*, February 27, 2011. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/02/afghan_intel_links_j.php

uncovered not inside the tribal areas, but deep into settled Pakistan, in the garrison city of Abbottabad.²⁵⁶

Despite the exact location of its remaining command nodes, Al-Qaeda core is a crucial presence in the tribal areas and plays a significant role in helping shape militant dynamics. It has been significantly weakened operationally by relentless American pressure,²⁵⁷ but has nonetheless reconstituted itself as an inspirational resource to provide direction for aspiring global jihadists.²⁵⁸ As Christine Fair put it, “Bin Laden’s become the next Che Guevera... an icon for the rage of all kinds of people with all sorts of causes.”²⁵⁹ It is uncertain to what extent this will continue after Bin Laden’s death, but most analysts agree that it will have important, yet limited material impact on the group’s operational capabilities, and is unlikely to decapitate the organization, particularly today when it has grown to become an inspirational resource.²⁶⁰ The effects of Bin Laden’s death are still to be felt but already, the TTP has accused the government of complicity in the attack and issued a statement elevating Pakistan to “number one enemy,” now ahead of even the US itself.²⁶¹

Inside the tribal areas, AQ has helped shape and ‘internationalize’ a variety of jihadi groups including the TTP, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), by providing religious justification, acting as a force multiplier in specific violent acts and serving as a mediator and coalition builder.²⁶² The AQ core has also been careful in not repeating the same mistakes its Iraqi affiliate made and is cognizant of the fact that despite inter-marriages and considerable integration, it remains a foreign force.

As such it has carefully calibrated its strategy to support or work within local structures, rather than setting up own governance systems. Recently it also set up ‘Shura Al-Mujahideen’ to help resolve TTP disputes over tactics and ideology.²⁶³ As a result it has sidestepped the problems faced by other foreign groups such as the IMU, whose presence in South Waziristan angered elements of the Wazir tribe, by being an economic drain on scarce resources, by attracting retaliatory strikes by PAKMIL forces, and by independently engaging in local struggles without local guidance.²⁶⁴

²⁵⁶ Niniek Karmini, “How Umar Patek’s Road Came to an End in Pakistan,” *Jakarta Globe*, April 15, 2011. Available at <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/how-umar-pateks-road-came-to-an-end-in-pakistan/435584>

²⁵⁷ Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper, “Biden says Al Qaeda in Pakistan is weaker,” *New York Times*, December 19, 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/world/middleeast/20yemen.html>

²⁵⁸ Rick Nelson and Thomas Sanderson, “A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2010.” *CSIS*, February 2011. Available at http://csis.org/files/publication/110203_Nelson_AThreatTransformed_web.pdf

²⁵⁹ Praveen Swami, “Baby Bin Ladens posing new threat to the West,” *The Telegraph*, January 6, 2011. Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/8243747/Baby-bin-Ladens-posing-new-threat-to-West.html>

²⁶⁰ Anthony Cordesman, “The Death of Osama Bin Laden, and the Shape of Threats to Come,” *CSIS*, May 2, 2011. Available at <http://csis.org/publication/death-osama-bin-laden-and-shape-threats-come>

²⁶¹ Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan has a price to pay,” *Asia Times*, May 4, 2011. Available at http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME04Df03.html

²⁶² Don Rassler, “Al Qa’ida’s Pakistan Strategy,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 2, Issue 6, June 2009. Available at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss6.pdf>

²⁶³ Javed Mahmood, “Shura-ul Mujahideen tries to unite TTP,” *Central Asia Online*, December 2, 2010. Available at http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/pakistan/2010/12/02/feature-03

²⁶⁴ David Witter. “Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions.”

In recent years, the IMU has relocated to North Waziristan, where its growing association with al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network has developed its internationalist inclinations. Today it has a tripartite agreement with the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaeda and itself to assist in the Taliban's penetration of Uzbek areas in northern Afghanistan and burgeon its nationalist credentials. The IMU has also hosted anti-Western militants in its camps, including a group of Germans who plotted attacks in Hamburg, before being killed in a drone strike.²⁶⁵

Ilyas Kashmiri -- who commands Brigade 313, an operational al-Qaeda cell -- is a key facilitator who has helped build coalitions between al-Qaeda, Kashmir-oriented groups and the Pakistani tribal militants, as his name suggests, Kashmiri cut his teeth in the Kashmir jihad, and as an alleged former Army commando is an experienced tactician and operator.²⁶⁶ Brigade 313 is also believed to have at least some element of overlap in the tribal provinces with the 'Punjabi Taliban' who are similarly composed of former Kashmiri-oriented militants. Kashmiri and his organization are prime examples of force multipliers, assisting various groups on various attacks across conflict axes. In November 2010, Brigade 313 was reported to have jointly carried out an attack with the TTP against a police headquarter in Karachi, and he has also been linked to the TTP attack on the Army's GHQ in October 2009.²⁶⁷

Kashmiri has been linked to various international plots, most notably a plot to attack the offices of the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*,²⁶⁸ and may have provided tactical guidance to attacks in the north Caucasus.²⁶⁹ The CIA has commented that "the footprints of Brigade 313 are now in Europe,"²⁷⁰ although Kashmiri has continued his anti-Indian jihad. Brigade 313 has claimed to have conducted an attack against a German bakery in the Indian city of Pune in February 2010, has been linked to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and has issued threats against Indian targets, including during the Commonwealth Games in 2010.²⁷¹ The group may have also lent its tactical expertise for high profile attacks in Afghanistan, including the suicide bombing on FOB Chapman in Khost that killed seven senior CIA officials.²⁷²

²⁶⁵ Jeffrey Dressler and David Witter, "Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy," *Small Wars Journal*, February 14, 2011. Available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/676-dressler.pdf>

²⁶⁶ Tom Lister, "Ilyas Kashmiri: Most Dangerous Man in the World?" *CNN*, November 10, 2010. Available at http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-10/world/kashmiri.profile_1_ilyas-kashmiri-david-coleman-headley-mumbai-attack/3?s=PM:WORLD

²⁶⁷ Bill Roggio, "Brigade 313 and Taliban team up for Karachi assault," *Long War Journal*, November 12, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/11/joint_al_qaedataliba.php

²⁶⁸ "United States of America vs. Ilyas Kashmiri, Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed, David Coleman Headley, Tahawwur Hussain Rana," *US District Court Illinois*. Available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1164.pdf

²⁶⁹ Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Ilyas Kashmiri behind Dagestan blasts," *Asia Times*, April 2, 2010. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LD02Ag01.html

²⁷⁰ "Al Qaeda plans infiltrations," *United Press International*, January 18, 2011. Available at http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/01/18/Al-Qaida-plans-infiltrations/UPI-19401295378531/

²⁷¹ "Al Qaeda exploits Kashmir conflict to expand operations to India," *Jamestown Foundation*, October 28, 2010. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4cd12aa02.html>

²⁷² Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Drones ever-closer to Pakistan militants," *Asia Times*, October 27, 2010. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LJ27Df02.html

The Growing International Role of Lashkar-e-Taiba

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is another group that has increased its presence in the tribal regions, and has grown ‘internationalized,’ in part due to its growing association with al-Qaeda and other groups in the tribal areas. It is distinct from other groups in that its Ahle-Hadith faith and close relationship with the Pakistani state has resulted in a rocky relationship with other Deobandi groups, who don’t entirely trust its motives.²⁷³ In May 2011, after the death of Osama Bin Laden, LeT leader Hafeez Saeed held prayers along with 1,000 of his followers to mourn Osama’s “martyrdom.”²⁷⁴

In recent years however, the LeT has found itself torn between its traditional Kashmiri jihad and its growing internationalist inclinations -- in part due to a growing relationship with al-Qaeda, and a growing presence in the tribal belt. As its freedom of movement in Kashmir has grown constricted, the LeT has grown increasingly involved in Afghanistan, particularly in Kunar province, where it has a close ally in the Jamiat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Sunna in Korengal Valley, and in high-profile attacks against Indian interests in Afghanistan.²⁷⁵

The group has also expanded its targeting scope to include Western targets, as seen in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, although the LeT continues to prioritize its anti-Indian struggle above other conflict axes.²⁷⁶ Some elements of the LeT have also been included in the ‘Punjabi Taliban,’ although it is unclear whether this constitutes renegade elements freelancing for other groups, or a deliberate tweaking of strategy.

As one of the most proficient militant groups in Pakistan, no doubt the LeT’s technical expertise is valued, although as noted earlier, its integration into Deobandi militancy has not been seamless. 15 activists from its humanitarian arm, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa were executed by TTP militants in Swat in 2008, and in the same year Mohmand TTP leader Omar Khalid attacked a camp run by its front organization, capturing and executing at least 10 leaders.²⁷⁷

Criminal Groups

The criminal element is often obscured but is vital in providing funding for virtually every militant group in the FATA. A Pakistani newspaper recently estimated that as much as half of the tribal economy may be undocumented, indicating the extent of potential for militant involvement in organized crime, both in protecting criminal operations and participating in them to accumulate power.²⁷⁸

²⁷³ Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” *New America Foundation*, February 2010. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Lashkar-e-Taiba_in_Perspective.pdf

²⁷⁴ Zeeshan Haider, “Islamist militants hold prayers for Bin Laden in Pakistan,” *Reuters*, May 3, 2011. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-binladen-pakistan-prayers-idUSTRE7421UT20110503>

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ “The Next Al Qaeda,” *Newsweek*, February 26, 2010. Available at <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/02/25/the-next-al-qaeda.html>

²⁷⁷ Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat.”

²⁷⁸ Muhammed Amir Rana, “The Flow of Funds,” *Dawn*, February 14, 2011. Available <http://www.dawn.com/2011/02/14/the-flow-of-funds.html>

As noted by Gretchen Peters, an analyst who has closely examined this issue, organized crime and militancy are symbiotic where “criminal profits fund the insurgency and terrorist violence helps militants to coerce and exert a level of control over local communities.”²⁷⁹ A large-scale drug economy in southern and eastern Afghanistan is a key part of the problem, and there are real fears that counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan may push cultivation into the FATA.²⁸⁰

Pakistan is less a point of origination, than a key transit route and a processing center. Smuggling of consumer goods, luxury vehicles, timber, minerals, drugs and weapons is another key revenue source for Taliban on both sides of the border. According to a trader, militants charge between 2,000-5,000 rupees per truck, with payments made even by NATO transporters. The same individual also claimed that the Afghan Taliban charge more than their Pakistani comrades.²⁸¹ Kidnappings for ransom are another key revenue source.

Various groups specialize in various criminal activities, often with significant overlaps. The TTP for example through the territory it controls is able to charge ‘toll taxes’ and charge protection money for various businesses inside the FATA, including mineral extraction.

²⁷⁹ Gretchen Peters, “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan,” *Combating Terrorism Center West Point*, October 15, 2010. Available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_CrimeandInsurgencyintheTribalAreasofAfghanistanandPakistan.pdf

²⁸⁰ Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Drug-Conflict Nexus in South Asia: Beyond Taliban Profits and Afghanistan,” *Brookings*, May 2010. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2010/05_regional_counternarcotics_felbabbrown/05_regional_counternarcotics_felbabbrown.pdf

²⁸¹ Qaiser Butt, “India-Afghan trade: New corridor promises high returns for the Taliban,” *Express Tribune*, December 3, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/85246/india-afghan-trade-new-corridor-promises-high-returns-for-taliban/>

Pakistani Military Operations and Counterinsurgency

In July 2002, the Pakistani military (PAKMIL) entered the Tirah Valley in its tribal regions for the first time in Pakistan's history. Particularly since 2009-10, PAKMIL has demonstrated considerable resolve in tackling tribal militancy. It has significantly increased its force presence as seen in **Figure 3.6**, and conducted a variety of operations in the past few years as shown in **Figure 3.7**. In August 2010, Pakistan's shadowy intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) declared publicly that the Taliban constituted a greater threat to Pakistan than the Indian Army.²⁸²

The Pakistani military has made redeployments away from the Indo-Pakistani border, and has suffered considerable casualties in anti-militant operations. 2,348 soldiers have been killed and another 6,710 injured according to government statistics as of January 2011.²⁸³ Casualty trends are further explored in **Figure 3.8** and **3.9**. Lessons learned from expanded operations have allowed the Pakistani military to refine, hone and showcase an improved ability to act tactically on the battlefield. These successes, particularly in the NWFP's Malakand Division have resulted in a significant decrease in militancy in NWFP between 2009 and 2010, but violence in the FATA continues to rise, increasing 28 percent in 2010.²⁸⁴

Tactical Success; Questionable Strategic Impact

The longer-term strategic picture is less clear. The Pakistani military has traditionally viewed militants in the FATA as strategic proxies to advance its ambitions in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir, and there is evidence that it continues to see their utility for the future. This has informed a selective approach to targeting, where the best result for the Pakistani military is not an eradication of all militant and terrorist groups, but rather an attempt to selectively target groups that have targeted the Pakistani state.

The best result for the Pakistani military may not be the whole-scale destruction of militancy in the FATA (and broader Pakistan), but to improve its ability to manipulate it for its own use. The US continues to have reservations about the Pakistani military initiatives in the FATA; a recently published White House report in March 2011 grimly declared that "there is no clear path toward defeating the insurgency in Pakistan," and noted how the current Mohmand offensive is the third major operation in the agency in two years, a demonstration of the inability for the Pakistani military to hold cleared territory.²⁸⁵

Pakistani grand strategy places key constraints impeding a doctrinal shift towards counterinsurgency (COIN). For the entirety of its history, the Pakistani military's organizational essence has been towards a single purpose, being prepared for conventional war with India. Weakening the force balance along the eastern border is no small matter, and the extent of

²⁸² Tom Wright and Siobhan Gorman, "Militants overtake India as top threat, says Pakistan ISI," *Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 2010. Available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703908704575433433670192748.html>

²⁸³ Rick Westhead, "Pakistan's wounded soldiers fight uphill battle for attention," *The Star*, January 28, 2011. Available at <http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/930040--pakistan-s-wounded-soldiers-fight-uphill-battle-for-attention>

²⁸⁴ "Pakistan Security Report 2010," Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies.

²⁸⁵ "Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan March 2011," *White House*, April 5, 2011.

redeployments, including the entire XI Corps, as seen in **Figure 3.9**, are indicative of the severity of the tribal insurgency.

Indian Military Intelligence has also estimated that as much as 35 percent of the Pakistani force deployment along the eastern border may have shifted to the FATA, particularly in the strategically important Shakargarh sector.²⁸⁶ Despite this considerable stiffening of resolve, the Pakistanis remain cognizant that extended COIN operations have substantial tradeoffs in conventional preparedness and compound already considerable resource limitations and capacity shortfalls, making it an unattractive option. As a result, Pakistan has stubbornly refused to budge from the vernacular of “low intensity conflict,” implying its preference for enemy-centric targeted operations.

Inadequate Initial Performance

Unfortunately, the firepower intensive campaigns that marked Pakistani military operations prior to 2008/2009, achieved little, since they were comprised of transient multi-unit clearing operations that rarely caught militants by surprise, and were followed by peace agreements regardless of any tangible change in the security environment.

The 2004 offensive into South Waziristan for example, utilized 8,000 soldiers backed by air and armor assets. Despite causing considerable collateral damage, they failed to dislodge militants, resulting in heavy fighting particularly around Wana.²⁸⁷ The operation ended with over two hundred dead soldiers, numerous desertions by the Frontier Corps, and a peace agreement that bolstered the Taliban.²⁸⁸ Army commanders travelled to a Deobandi mosque near Wana to sign the peace agreement with Nek Mohammad, a move that was interpreted by militants as a tacit surrender by the Pakistani military.²⁸⁹ Such haphazard operational art, often ending with little to show was devastating on army morale, especially when combined with a growing perception that they were acting as American guns for hire.

As a result of these failures, the Pakistani military has mounted a concerted effort to rethink the tactical prosecution of the war. More attention has been paid to incorporating population-centric COIN principles and creating a hybrid doctrine that is distinctive from the Western-style “hearts and minds” strategy,²⁹⁰ yet follows many of its tenets, including sensitivity to public opinion, care in the application of force and an orientation towards a more presence-oriented approach.²⁹¹

²⁸⁶ Suman Sharma, “Pakistan removes third of army’s border deployment,” *Daily News and Analysis*, June 2, 2010. Available at http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_pakistan-removes-third-of-army-s-border-deployment_1390778

²⁸⁷ Dr Suba Chandran, “Military Operations in South Waziristan: Issues and Implications,” *Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies*, No. 17, January 2004. Available at http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/903900182IB17-SubaChandran-MilitaryOperationsInSouthWaziristan.pdf

²⁸⁸ Sameer Lalwani, “Pakistan’s COIN Flip,” *New America Foundation*, April 2010. Available at <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/lalwani.pdf>

²⁸⁹ Seth Jones and Christine Fair, “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,” *RAND*, (2010). Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf

²⁹⁰ Haider Mullick, “The Pakistani Surge: The Way Forward for Counterinsurgency in Pakistan,” *Australian Strategic Policy*, June 2010.


²⁹¹ Shuja Nawaz, “Learning by Doing: The Pakistani Army’s Experience with Counterinsurgency,” *Atlantic Council*, February 1, 2011. Available at http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/020111_ACUS_Nawaz_PakistanCounterinsurgency.pdf

While positive, these steps have been shaped by a tactically focused mindset. As Ashley Tellis succinctly notes, “what we are really talking about is the selective refinement of a preexisting model to address some negative externalities,”²⁹² namely groups such as the Pakistani Taliban that have openly defied the writ of the state.

The use of militancy as a tool of statecraft has served Pakistan well in the past, and it continues to have utility, both in tying down Indian forces on the eastern border and in preserving influence in Afghanistan. As a result, care has been taken to distinguish between militant groups, targeting those that have openly defy state authority, and tolerating others that work in lockstep with Pakistani strategic objectives.

The Haqqanis in North Waziristan have been a particular source of contention with Washington. Pakistan continues to see them as a reconcilable network, facilitated in no small part by their assistance in anti-Indian operations in Afghanistan²⁹³, their considerable influence in Afghanistan’s Loya Paktiya, and their steadfast refusal to engage in violence against Pakistani forces and institutions. Such informal strategic symbiosis has guided Pakistani reluctance to conduct any large-scale operations into North Waziristan. Hopes were raised in October 2010, when Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi indicated that 35,000 troops were ready to launch an operation,²⁹⁴ but military officials have since walked back such hopes indicating that they are not yet ready to consider launching such an operation given existing commitments.²⁹⁵

Figure 3.6: Growth in Force numbers in FATA (2002-2010)



(Source: Haider Mullick, “The Pakistani Surge,” Available at <http://bit.ly/fICQTQ>)


²⁹² Ashley Tellis, “Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency Strategies: What’s Working and What’s Not,” *Carnegie Endowment*, February 24, 2010. Available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=2810>

²⁹³ “ISI’s Haqqani ploy against India irks US,” *Economic Times*, October 4, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/fkTmKm>

²⁹⁴ Majeed Babar and Charles Recknagel, “In Pakistan Uncertainty Grows Over North Waziristan operation,” *RFE/RL*, October 29, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/b8oJ46>

²⁹⁵ “N. Waziristan offensive may see further delays,” *Express Tribune*, December 28, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/fduGUo>

Figure 3.7: Major PAKMIL Offensives: 2008-2011



Note: These do not constitute the sum total of PAKMIL offensives in the FATA. Various smaller-scale operations have been mounted in response to local conditions

Figure 3.8: Force Deployments in the FATA

REGULAR ARMY FORMATIONS IN FATA/KPK


Corps Formation	Location	Subordinate Units employed in LIC/COIN
I Corps	Mangla	Elements of 8 th Independent Armored Brigade 37 th Mechanized Division 17 th Infantry Division
II Corps	Multan	14 th Infantry Division (Okara)
X Corps		19 th Infantry Division (Jhelum)
XI Corps	Peshawar	7 th Infantry Division (Mardan) 9 th Infantry Division (Kohat)
XXXI Corps	Bahawalpur	Elements of 35 th Infantry Division (Bahawalpur) Elements of 26 th Mechanized Division (Pano Aqil)
SSG (Special Forces)		Zarrar Battalion

(Source: IISS Military Balance 2010, 2011; "Pakistan," *Janes Sentinel Report*; Chris Harnisch, Charlie Szrom and Ashley Lohmann, "ORBAT: Pakistani Military in FATA and Northwest Frontier Province," *AEI Critical Threats Project*, August 15, 2009. Available at <http://bit.ly/hicz3Y>; Malik Ahmed Jalal, "Why Pakistan Can't," *Harvard National Security Journal*, August 6, 2010. Available at <http://harvardnsj.com/2010/08/why-pakistan-cant/>)


PARAMILITARY AND LOCAL SECURITY FORCES IN FATA/KPK

Force	Number	Remarks
Khassadars	Approximately 17,000	First line of law enforcement Poorly trained, equipped, enlisted from tribes Loyal to maliks who employ them, tribes who get them employed Easily targeted, intimidated by Taliban
Levies	Approximately 4,000 – 6,800	Second line of law enforcement Recruited on merit, better trained/equipped Used as deterrent force against tribal disputes
Frontier Corps	34,000 – 50,000	Primary historical force in FATA Substantial improvements in training and equipment
Frontier Constabulary	22,817	Paramilitary police force Tasked with border security for settled areas and preventing ingress of criminal tribal elements
KPK Police	55,000 – 78,000	Suffers from same problems as wider police sector Unable to function alone against insurgency Recent U.S. support, included equipment and vehicles worth \$13.5 million
Lashkars (Militias)	Approximately 30,000	“Anti-Taliban” tribal forces Provided weaponry and support by PAKMIL Outsources security to non-state providers and enhances fragmented tribal structure

(Source: “Security Apparatus” in Imtiaz Gul, *The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier*, (London: Viking Adult, 2010); “Pakistan,” *Janes Sentinel Report*; “Pakistan,” *Janes World Armies*; “Facts and Figures,” *Pakistan Conflict Monitor*, <http://bit.ly/tUX1eu>; “US donates vehicles, equipment to NWFP police,” *Daily Times*, March 2, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/eBKgiO>; Hassan Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure,” *US Institute for Peace*, February 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/hhT4rM>; “Pakistan to strengthen paramilitary levies to secure tribal frontier,” *Jamestown Foundation*, February 26, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/edCKhx>)

Figure 3.9: Pakistani Security Force Casualties in 2010

(Source: PIPS Pakistan Security Reports, Jan 2010 – Dec 2010)

Figure 3.10: Security Forces to Militant Casualty Ratio in 2010

(Source: PIPS Pakistan Security Reports, Jan 2010 – Dec 2010)

Growing Tactical Capabilities

Despite these strategic disconnects, the Pakistani military has grown increasingly proficient in tactically prosecuting the war. Some Western sources initially believed that the Pakistani military had lost over 70 percent of its engagements prior to early 2009,²⁹⁶ and indeed early military activity demonstrated considerable deficiencies in Pakistani equipment, training and operational art. At the time of 9/11, the Frontier Corps (FC), the primary force tasked with guarding the FATA had devolved into a backwater force commanded by the dregs of the Army's officer corps²⁹⁷, with many units operating with bolt-action rifles of WW1 vintage.²⁹⁸

They found themselves outmatched by well-armed insurgents, causing considerable embarrassment to the military, particularly in August 2007, when about 200 soldiers surrendered to militants after failing to take the high ground and getting themselves trapped in a valley against a vastly inferior force.²⁹⁹ Even the considerably better-trained and equipped regular army ran into problems. The first augmentation of local forces in the FATA came from the XI Corps based out of Peshawar, notably the 7th and 9th Division, due to their proximity to the theater. Unfortunately they were trained for conventional war against India and had little knowledge or familiarity with the physical and human terrain of the tribal areas and suffered from a lack of translators, rendering them an alien Punjabi army operating in Pashtun territory.³⁰⁰

Considerable focus has now been placed on creating adequate training regimens that prepare soldiers for operations in the tribal terrain. At least three major LIC training facilities have been built at Jharri Kas, Mangla and Pabbi Hills, and new requirements mandate all incoming officers undergo LIC combat training.³⁰¹ The FC has also benefited from U.S. and British SOF training,³⁰² and monetary support, including a sizeable chunk of U.S. military assistance. The U.S. has also assisted in addressing Pakistan's helicopter deficit that impeded troop mobility and battlefield flexibility. Only 19 helicopters were initially forward-deployed to the FATA, of which only 12 were operational.³⁰³ The US has provided Pakistan with 26 Bell-412, 10 Mi-17 and 20 Cobra attack helicopters, as well as armored vehicles and night-vision capabilities.³⁰⁴

The Pakistani military has made more extensive use of increasing mobility and blocking forces to prevent militants from conducting tactical withdrawals, and utilizing the SOF Special Services Group (SSG) extensively for both blocking operations and targeted raids against high-value

²⁹⁶ Sameer Lalwani, "Pakistan's COIN Flip."

²⁹⁷ Shuja Nawaz, "Learning by Doing."

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Bill Roggio, "Pakistan frees over 100 South Waziristna "tribesmen"," *Long War Journal*, September 13, 2007. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/09/pakistan_frees_over.php

³⁰⁰ Shuja Nawaz, "Learning by Doing."

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, "Distrust slows US training of Pakistanis," *New York Times*, July 11, 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/world/asia/12training.html>; "British forces to train Pakistan's Frontier Corps to fight al-Qaeda," *Times Online*, March 21, 2009. Available at <http://thetim.es/foUE2l>

³⁰³ David Kilcullen, "Terrain, Tribes and Terrorists: Pakistan 2006-2008," *Brookings Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series*, No. 3, September 2009. Available at <http://bit.ly/dOYqja>

³⁰⁴ "Islamist militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region and US policy," *Congressional Research Service*, November 21, 2008. Available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34763_20081121.pdf

targets (HVTs).³⁰⁵ Kinetic elements such as artillery and air-power have been used more carefully to minimize collateral damage, and have been followed by ground forces advancing along multiple thrust axes and employing better route clearance techniques to combat IEDs.³⁰⁶ A more favorable troop ratio has also been employed with Operation Rah-e-Nijat, the 2009 incursion into South Waziristan employing between 30,000-66,000 troops, a dramatic increase from the 8,000 used in 2004.³⁰⁷ Clearing operations have also been followed by retention of forces in theater instead of immediately transferring back to civilian authority, in an attempt to stabilize peace through a longer-term presence and a dispersal of forces into small bases amongst the population.³⁰⁸

The Pakistani military has increasingly acknowledged and adapted to the challenging human terrain it faces. It has attempted to offset the cultural and linguistic divides between the Punjabi-dominated army and the Pashtuns of the FATA/KPK by placing greater emphasis has been placed on expanding the Pashtun representation in the Army's officer corps to 14.5% by 2011, up from the existing 13.5%, and significantly increasing the market share of Pashtuns from the NWFP amongst enlisted personnel.³⁰⁹

Operation Sher Dil, the "Bajaur Experiment" under Major General Tariq Khan, also worked to refine procedures and protocols, becoming the first major operation to extensively raise and employ pro-government lashkars, work closely with local jirgas, and to encourage Pashtun-Punjabi cooperation and interaction within the army.³¹⁰

Far more diligent preparations have also been conducted prior to operations, including embedding intelligence assets to intercept communications, establishing blockades to prevent re-supply or reinforcements from materializing and utilizing fire-power to soften targets before employing ground forces.³¹¹ Similarly in a more nuanced application of its divide and rule tactics, the Pakistani military has also engaged in diplomatic negotiations with militant factions prior to launching operations. For Operation Rah-e-Nijat, for example, powerful North Waziristani militant commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur, was induced through aid and peace agreements, to offer guarantees on not interfering with Pakistani military operations against the TTP, or offering retreating militants shelter within his territory.³¹²

³⁰⁵ Shuja Nawaz, "Learning by Doing."

³⁰⁶ Bill Roggio, "Taliban escape South Waziristan offensive," *Long War Journal*, November 26, 2009. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/11/taliban_escapes_sout.php

³⁰⁷ Sameer Lalwani, "The Pakistani Military's Adaption to Counterinsurgency in 2009," *New America Foundation*, January 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/dqlymO>

³⁰⁸ Shuja Nawaz, "Learning by Doing."

³⁰⁹ Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Officer Corps," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, July 12, 2010. Available at http://www.spearheadresearch.org/pages/documents/The_Changing_Pakistan_Army_Officer_Corps.pdf

³¹⁰ Haider Mullick, "Pakistan's Emerging Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, July 15, 2009. Available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65200/haider-ali-hussein-mullick/lions-and-jackals>

³¹¹ Sameer Lalwani, "The Pakistani Military's Adaption to Counterinsurgency in 2009."

³¹² Amy Levine, "Get to Know a Militant: Hafiz Gul Bahadur," *Center for Advanced Defense Studies*, October 22, 2010. Available at <http://www.c4ads.org/global-security-monitor/get-know-militant-%E2%80%93-hafiz-gul-bahadur>

Despite these successes, IEDs continue to exert a toll on Pakistani military forces. The M113 armored personnel carriers used by the regular Army are highly vulnerable to RPGs and IEDs, while the 46 UR-416 armored cars utilized by the Frontier Corps are more applicable for riot control than the threat environment they operate in.³¹³ Similarly for dismounted patrols, Pakistani military troops continue to use Chinese-manufactured wand detectors of dubious quality, and visual identification continues to be the best available defense.³¹⁴ Similarly despite improvements in troop mobility, the Pakistani military has continued to clamor for more helicopters, although high operational costs and a worsening economy have grounded even those already deployed in theater.³¹⁵

A major Pakistani tactic has been the forced resettlement of the civilian population prior to operations, in order to minimize civilian collateral damage and make targeting easier. This strategy is however far from ideal and inherently short-term in that extended or repeated displacements merely expand the trust deficit between the military and the people.

Furthermore while PAKMIL has gotten considerably better at providing for the displaced that make their way to its relief camps, the magnitude of displacements has often overwhelmed its capabilities as seen in **Figure 3.11**. Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat for example, saw almost two million people displaced, the largest refugee exodus since Rwanda³¹⁶

It has been estimated that scarcely 15 percent of the displaced have used official camps, with the rest moving to urban centers, including Karachi and Islamabad in search of employment.³¹⁷ Their influx has often exacerbated existing tensions, by compounding ethnic security dilemmas and straining already weak social and economic services.³¹⁸

While the closed nature of the theater makes accurate verification extremely difficult, the Pakistani military has become better at conducting itself in populated areas. Mingora, the site of fierce urban fighting between militants and the army in 2009 for example showed minimal damage after operations.³¹⁹ Another decent metric has been the public polling done in the FATA that shows a significant increase in public support for operations, after the 2008 Bajaur operation, even among those who were forcibly displaced as seen in **Figures 3.13 – 3.15**.

³¹³ IISS Military Balance 2011

³¹⁴ Shuja Nawaz, "Learning by Doing."


³¹⁵ Kamran Yousaf and Zia Khan, "Fighting against Militancy: Gunships grounded over high costs," *Express Tribune*, January 26, 2011. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/109026/fighting-against-militancy-gunships-grounded-over-high-costs/>

³¹⁶ Declan Walsh, "Swat Valley could be worst refugee crisis since Rwanda, UN warns," *The Guardian*, May 18, 2009. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/18/swat-valley-pakistan-refugee-crisis>

³¹⁷ "IRC Assessment in Pakistan shows "shocking" conditions for many displaced people living outside camps," *International Rescue Committee*, June 26, 2009. Available at <http://bit.ly/dE6wzY>

³¹⁸ "Behind Political Uncertainty in Pakistan: Pashtuns, Petrol and Musharraf," *South Asia Analysis Group*, January 3, 2011. Available at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers43%5Cpaper4259.html>

³¹⁹ Adam Ellick, "Back Home in Pakistan but Feeling Under Siege," *New York Times*, July 26, 2009. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/world/asia/27swat.html>

Figure 3.11: Percentage of Population Displaced Per Agency

(Source: Community Appraisal and Motivation Program, “Understanding FATA: Volume IV,” 2010)

Success at resettling displaced IDPs has not been uniform. The Swat/Malakand operation, which displaced over 2.8 million people, the largest refugee flow since Rwanda, also saw rapid returns of the population leading Frontier Corps Head Major General Tariq Khan to trumpet that “in no other counterinsurgency operation in the world have residents gone back so soon.”³²⁰ Despite General Khan’s optimism, 2010 saw the displacement of another 400,000 IDPs, resulting in a total of at least 980,000 people still displaced as of December 2010.³²¹

As the International Crisis Group details in a report on the IDP crisis, resettling the displaced from the FATA has been much less successful than the Swat operation. Camps are less accessible to outside observers and NGOs due to tight military control, and there are allegations that the military has strongly coerced and pressured people into returning, rather than allowing them a voluntary decision.³²²

An assessment by the ‘Save the Children’ NGO on IDP camp conditions in DI Khan noted that the average household of eight individuals was supporting itself on less than \$2.30 a day!³²³ The vast majority of children (55% of boys and 71% of girls) were out of school and over 57% of people had no access to health services.³²⁴ Some IDPs have criticized government assistance

³²⁰ “Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis,” *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report 111, September 16, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/eH13JG>

³²¹ “Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2010,” *Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Center*, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/gjPL1H>

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Assessment Report of IDPs Residing in District D.I. Khan Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,” *Save the Children*, April 2010. Available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/STC_AssessmentReportOfIDPsResidingInKhyberPakhtunkhwa.pdf

³²⁴ Ibid.

money as vastly inadequate for the costs they have had to bear³²⁵ and COAS Kayani himself admitted to General Petraeus in early 2009, that he had no capacity to compensate those who had been injured or lost their property due to budgetary pressures.³²⁶ Many others have stayed away from returning to their homes for fear that militants will soon return as admitted by an international aid worker who noted that, “We know the return to Mohmand agency was voluntary because so few IDPs actually participated.”³²⁷

The Strategic Future

The increased lethality of the Pakistani military remains a poor indicator of long-term strategic success. Data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal counts over 17,000 militants killed in PAKMIL operations since 2008, as seen in **Figure 3.15**, and targeted attacks have killed several high-ranking Taliban leaders, including TTP founder Beitullah Mehsud and senior commander Nek Mohammad.³²⁸ Despite these successes, the insurgency has shown more signs of continuity than of exhaustion or defeat. Furthermore while clearing operations may have degraded Taliban presence, eliminating them remains in the distant future.

Only recently in February 2011, a suicide bomber was able to enter the heavily guarded Mardan cantonment near Peshawar and kill over 30 cadets and injure 42 others.³²⁹ Similarly in December 2010, over 150 Taliban fighters mounted a coordinated assault against five FC checkpoints in Mohmand, where the Pakistani Army has now twice claimed success.³³⁰ Furthermore there is still no clear evidence that more effective clearing operations have done anything to change the “balloon” nature of the insurgency, i.e. merely displacing militancy into neighboring provinces. In October 2010, a White House assessment also criticized Pakistani efforts at stabilizing areas in South Waziristan saying, “the military largely stayed close to the roads and did not engage against those [TTP] militants who returned after fleeing into North Waziristan.”³³¹ The military has declared operations in South Waziristan to be over and is now pressuring IDPs to return.³³²

The sustainability of these hard-won gains is undermined by the lack of a civilian counterpart to a strategy defined and dominated by the military to best serve its own organizational and strategic interests.³³³ Even though the Pakistani military has gravitated towards a more presence-

³²⁵ “IDPs from South Waziristan begin hesitant return,” *IRIN*, December 9, 2010. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=91331>

³²⁶ “US embassy cables: Pakistan army chief explains fate of lost millions,” *Guardian*, December 1, 2010. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/188670>

³²⁷ “The Worsening IDP Crisis,” *International Crisis Group*.

³²⁸ “Pak takes out tribal leader Nek Mohammad,” *Times of India*, June 19, 2004. Available at <http://bit.ly/f8DH14>; Declan Walsh, “Air strike kills Taliban leader Beitullah Mehsud,” *The Guardian*, August 7, 2009. Available at <http://bit.ly/2FJ1N6>

³²⁹ Riaz Khan, “Suicide bomber kills 31 soldiers in NW Pakistan,” *AP*, February 10, 2011. Available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110210/ap_on_re_as/pakistan

³³⁰ Bill Roggio, “Taliban assault Pakistani military checkpoints in Mohmand,” *Long War Journal*, December 24, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/12/taliban_assault_paki.php

³³¹ Adam Entous and Siobhan Gorman, “US slams Pakistani effort on militants,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 6, 2010. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703298504575534491793923282.html?mod=WSJ_World_LeadStory

³³² “The Worsening IDP Crisis,” *International Crisis Group*.

³³³ Ayesha Siddiqua, “Pakistan Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 34, No. 1, (Winter 2011). Available at http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Siddiqua.pdf

oriented strategy, retaining forces in theater after operations for population security, it continues to focus heavily on the more brute elements of coercion. It has shown interest or capacity to engage in large-scale developmental activities to reform socioeconomic disparities, and has focused on the local version of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) as tools to re-empower tribal maliks and build links with society.³³⁴

However, a prolonged garrison atmosphere created by an extended military presence in the FATA has its own dangers in evoking resentment from fiercely independent tribes who may see as a Punjabi intrusion. Along these lines, a poll of 400 villages in the FATA conducted by a respected NGO working in the tribal areas highlighted growing public trust in the regular army but still expressed preferences for localized forces, notably the Frontier Corps, but also the Levies and Khassadars, as seen in **Figure 3.13**.

If the Pakistani military and government are to achieve lasting effects, the military will need to demonstrate more diligence in partnering with civilian institutions and local law-enforcement agencies to transition security and governance responsibilities. At present, police capacity in the Pashtun belt remains vastly inadequate for the task at hand.³³⁵ Law enforcement in the FATA is tiered ranging from local tribal police, to the paramilitary Frontier Corps, as seen earlier in **Figure 3.8**.

The FC, having been the army's primary partner in conducting operations has benefited considerably and has evolved into a much more professional and capable fighting force.³³⁶ At its present size however it is unlikely to be able to cope with the current levels of militant violence, without regular army support. This may incentivize growing the force as a dedicated counterinsurgency force akin to the Indian Army's Rashtriya Rifles raised to counter Pakistan-sponsored militancy in Kashmir.³³⁷

In the meantime, efforts to rectify manpower shortfalls has led to the rapid proliferation of non-government tribal lashkars (militias) which are now believed to constitute an end-strength of about 30,000. Such a strategy runs significant long-term risks. It essentially transfers the responsibility of the state onto non-state actors of dubious loyalty and competence who may grow disillusioned with the state and defect to the Taliban with their government-provided weaponry. The International Crisis Group has also been critical of these groups, noting that in some localities they have been derisively referred to as the "government Taliban," for the impunity with which they operate, and the dubious characters who fill their ranks, including former Taliban fighters.³³⁸

Lashkars have had mixed successes. They have had successes in the more settled areas of the KPK and in Bajaur where the Taliban presence was initially weak, but in other areas have found

³³⁴ Shuja Nawaz, "Learning by Doing," *The Atlantic Council*, February 2011.

³³⁵ Hassan Abbas, "Reforming Pakistan's Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure," *US Institute for Peace*, January 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/hhT4rM>

³³⁶ Seth Jones and Christine Fair, "Counterinsurgency in Pakistan," *RAND*, 2010.

³³⁷ Moeed Yusuf and Anit Mukherjee, "Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: Learning from India," *American Enterprise Institute*, September 2007. Available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070928_YusufNSOg.pdf

³³⁸ "Countering Militancy in the FATA," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 178, October 21, 2009, pg. 18. Available at <http://bit.ly/hypgdx>

themselves outgunned, outmanned and subject to vicious Taliban retaliation.³³⁹ Lashkars share ethnic and often tribal bonds with the Taliban, and are sometimes reluctant to mobilize against Taliban forces, and even when they do it is primarily in pursuit of specific localized goals. Over the long-term, their loyalties are uncertain too. In an indication of the problems Pakistan continues to face, in March 2011, a 4,000 strong lashkar raised near Peshawar in 2007 ended government support after inadequate governmental support, and a spate of targeted attacks by the Taliban, including a suicide attack that killed 38 people in an attack on a funeral procession for the wife of a tribal leader.³⁴⁰

Similarly law-enforcement in the KPK suffers chronic shortfalls. It is estimated that police in the KPK only possessed 17,000 automatic rifles, 7,500 bulletproof vests and three armored personnel carriers for a presumed end-strength of about 50,000-55,000.³⁴¹ Furthermore as is common of the police sector across Pakistan, the majority of the police are ill equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized and chronically corrupt with little chance of functioning as a paramilitary force capable of surviving an insurgency.³⁴²

Hassan Abbas estimates that an average of 400 police officers were being killed annually in encounters with militants between 2005 and 2009, whereas 700 out 1737 police officers deserted or resigned their posts in Swat in 2006/07 upon receiving militant threats.³⁴³ The sector has also suffered low levels of external support; out of \$731 million of military assistance allocated by the U.S., only \$4.7 million has found its way to police forces.³⁴⁴ Recently, more attention has been focused upon the police. Recruitment has increased substantially, reaching an end-strength of 78,320 in 2010-11, up from 55,450 in 2009-10, but availability of funds continues to be an issue in effectively scaling up capacity.³⁴⁵

Finally, no sustainable “hold” strategy can take root without adequate governance. Over the last decade, governance has steadily deteriorated in the FATA. Loosely controlled the best of times, today the feudal and colonial dynamics of the agent-malik governing structure lie in ruins. It has been discredited as a governing mechanism and has served as a key driver for the insurgency. Religious radicals have used it to play on anti-government grievances, and promote a narrative that brands sharia as synonymous with a fair and equal justice system. The TTP’s campaign of

³³⁹ Michael Kugelman, “Tread Lightly with Pakistan’s Lashkars,” *The Wilson Center*, July 16, 2009. Available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1462&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=542689

³⁴⁰ “Pakistan anti-Taliban militia ends government support,” *BBC News*, March 10, 2011. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12697126>

³⁴¹ Sameer Lalwani, “Pakistan Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment,” *New America Foundation*, September 2009. Available at <http://www.newamerica.net/files/NAFPakistanSept09.pdf>

³⁴² Hassan Abbas, “Role of Pakistan Police in Counterinsurgency,” *Brookings Institution*, June 2009. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2009/06_counterinsurgency_abbas/06_counterinsurgency_abbas.pdf

³⁴³ Hassan Abbas, “Police and Law Enforcement in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success,” *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding*, April 2009. Available at <http://bit.ly/etW6QI>


³⁴⁴ Hassan Abbas, “Role of Pakistan Police in Counterinsurgency.”

³⁴⁵ Hassan Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure,” *US Institute for Peace*, February 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/hhT4rM>

assassinations against maliks further degraded the administrative structure, driving many into hiding, from where not all have returned.³⁴⁶


Addressing these legitimate grievances will require implementing long-overdue reforms, including repealing the Frontier Crimes Regulation, and better integrating the FATA into the mainstream Pakistani political structure. Combining territorial gains with an integrated effort to deepen public trust in national security institutions, and more deeply involving the Pakistani civilian government in building human infrastructure and local institutions, is essential. For better or for worse, PAKMIL is a key political player, and particularly for an integrated national-security strategy such as this, it retains enormous influence to pressure for a speedier implementation of reforms.

Figure 3.12: Perceptions of Powerbrokers in FATA (New America Foundation Poll)




(Source: New America Foundation/Terror Free Tomorrow, <http://bit.ly/fUrNw1>)


³⁴⁶ Tim McGirk, "Pakistan's Taliban War: Bringing Back the Music," *Time Magazine*, March 3, 2010. Available at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1968704,00.html>

Figure 3.13: Opinion on who should take responsibility for security in FATA

(Source: Community Appraisal and Motivation Program, “Understanding FATA Vol. IV)

Figure 3.14: FATA Public Support for Military Operations

(Source: Community Appraisal and Motivation Program, “Understanding FATA Vol. IV, Vol. III, Vol. II)

Figure 3.15: Pakistan Security Force to Militant Casualty Ratio (2007-2010)

Note: Pakistani military casualty figures are contested. South Asia Terrorism Portal (utilized here) for example notes 469 Security Forces killed in action in 2010, whereas Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies counts 641

(Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, <http://bit.ly/cQfzw1>)

SECTION IV: THE SITUATION IN BALOCHISTAN

Balochistan is another serious challenge to Pakistani security and the Pakistani government and military. It makes up 44% of Pakistan's landmass but only has 5% of its population. Any security effort faces major challenges because of the province's vast expanse and low population density – although the population of Balochistan is projected to increase from 7.8 million in 2005 to 11 million by 2025.³⁴⁷

Balochistan does have substantial natural resources, yet remains the poorest province in Pakistan with abysmal human welfare rankings that help sustain the population's alienation from state institutions. Balochistan is also strategically located. Its porous borders neighbor some of Afghanistan's most volatile provinces including Kandahar, Helmand and Zabul, in all of which coalition troops are heavily engaged. To the west it also borders Iran while its coastline extends out to the Arabian Sea, making it a potentially vital trade intersection to connect the Middle East with South, Central and East Asia. Its locational advantage also has had unintended consequences; the province is now one of the world's largest opiate smuggling and processing routes.

The Threats

Baloch separatists, Taliban Islamists and Islamabad all compete for control of the province, each posing distinct security challenges. Roughly speaking, to the north and east of Quetta, the provincial capital, the Pashtun belt continues from the FATA and the KPK. To the south and west are the ethnic Balochs, who compose about 45% of the population,³⁴⁸ and many of whom are today engaged in bitter campaign for autonomy or independence from the Pakistani state.

The Balochs have traditionally had a weak sense of identification with the Pakistani state and its institutions, which many perceive as an extension of Punjabi power. A tribal chief summarized the prevailing sentiment quoting a common Baloch saying, "I have been a Baloch for several centuries. I have been a Muslim for 1400 years. I have been a Pakistani for just over fifty."³⁴⁹ Today, the Balochs are fighting their fifth separatist rebellion after an interlude of almost three decades. It has been marked by a significant escalation in brutality and attacks against the civilian populace. Many Baloch grievances are driven by the abject underdevelopment of the province and biased allocations of resources.

The most prominent group among the Taliban, in Balochistan is the Quetta Shura Taliban, the command node of the Afghan Taliban. Named for the city of Quetta, it is believed that senior leaders, including Mullah Omar, Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful) for all Taliban, are believed to be hiding in its urban sprawl.

The province is strategically crucial for the Afghan insurgency. Its long porous border renders it an ideal transit route for insurgent fighters, particularly into Kandahar and Helmand, where some

³⁴⁷ "Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report," *World Bank/Asian Development Bank/Government of Balochistan*, May 2008. Available at <http://bit.ly/bXH1DC>

³⁴⁸ "Human Rights Violations: Conflict in Balochistan: December 2005-January 2006," *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan*, August 2006. Available at <http://hrqp-web.org/pdf/Conflict%20in%20balochistan--%20Complete.pdf>

³⁴⁹ Alexander Atarodi, "Insurgency in Balochistan and Why it is of Strategic Importance," *Swedish Defense Research Agency*, January 2011. Available at <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir3110.pdf>

of the toughest coalition battles are currently being waged. The province is close to key insurgent centers in the FATA, including North and South Waziristan. The province is also a critical NATO logistical transit artery. About 40-80% of non-lethal NATO supplies are believed to transit through Pakistan,³⁵⁰ 34% of which travels through Balochistan's Chaman border crossing.³⁵¹

Efforts at Reform

Once again, Islamabad is doing more in rhetoric than in reality. The November 2009 Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package of reforms has promised to address many of the core grievances of ethnic Balochis, but to date, few of the promises have been implemented. Similarly the military has indicated his support for political and economic reforms, but continues to conduct a systematic campaign of intimidation through torture and extrajudicial killings. Force continues to be the dominant mode of competing against a movement that is essentially political in nature, and Islamabad remains far more concerned with suppressing the separatists than rooting out Taliban sanctuaries or bettering border security.

Balochistan is one Pakistan's poorest province, when on paper it should be one of the richest. It has an abundance of mineral and petrochemical resources, including large natural gas deposits, extensive mineral deposits including coal, copper, lead and gold, a long unexploited coastline and its location on the trade intersection of South and Central Asia and the Middle East. Despite this abundance of resources, Balochistan has the nation's highest poverty rate and scores the lowest in ten key social indicators including education, literacy, access to health, and water and sanitation in 2006/07 according to a study conducted by the World Bank.³⁵² 92% of its districts continue to be classified as 'high deprivation areas,'³⁵³ and 80% of its population is rural, with most engaged in subsistence agriculture.³⁵⁴ Balochistan also has one of the country's worst records on gender equality.

A report by the World Bank recommended that "Balochistan should pursue a development agenda around generating growth, delivering services and financing development."³⁵⁵ With regards to economic growth, it recommended exploiting Balochistan's locational advantage to build it as a regional transit hub, to better exploit its natural resource base, to help encourage an economic transformation from agriculture to services and industry, and to increase the business environment and encourage the development of the private sector.³⁵⁶ Delivering services should center on improving basic human welfare by improving access and the quality of basic services such as education, while financing development should focus on upgrading the province's fiscal

³⁵⁰ James Wray, "Pakistan NATO supply attack," *Monsters and Critics*, October 6, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/dhA1e5>

³⁵¹ Andrew Kuchins, Thomas Sanderson and David Gordon, "The Northern Distribution Network and the Modern Silk Road," *CSIS*, December 2009.

³⁵² "Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report," World Bank/Asian Development Bank/Government of Balochistan

³⁵³ Salman Zaidi, "Making Sense of Violence in Balochistan in 2010," *Jinnah Institute*. Available at <http://www.jinnah-institute.org/programs/strategic-security-program/212-policy-brief-making-sense-of-violence-in-balochistan-2010>

³⁵⁴ "Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report," World Bank/Asian Development Bank/Government of Balochistan

³⁵⁵ "Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report," World Bank/Asian Development Bank/Government of Balochistan

³⁵⁶ Ibid


management, including upgrading revenue collections and better prioritizing and allocating public expenditures.³⁵⁷ To date progress towards these goals has been sporadic.

Chronic underdevelopment is the norm, and human welfare statistics are little short of abysmal, even in the Pakistani context as seen in **Figure 4.1**. The education sector is in particularly poor condition. The provincial literacy rate languishes at 34%, a full 23 percentage points, below the national average, whereas the female literacy rate of 15% is about half the national average. I

n rural areas, these numbers are even more pronounced; Amnesty International found that in rural Balochistan only 8% of females over the age of 10 have finished primary school.³⁵⁸

Educational infrastructure too is in bad shape. According to Pakistani government statistics, 10.9% of schools have no building, 33.9% have no access to drinking water, 36.9% are without latrines, and 59.6% have no electricity.³⁵⁹ Amnesty International's statistics deem these to be unduly optimistic; their own figures found that 36% of primary schools were either classified as "dangerous" or requiring "major repair" and that 81% of schools had no access to electricity.³⁶⁰

Figure 4.1: Human Development Statistics for Balochistan



(Source: Pakistan Ministry of Finance, <http://bit.ly/ewrgsd>; "Balochistan Economic Report," *Asian Development Bank*, <http://bit.ly/dK1pvA>)

Poverty and underemployment are other major problems, and significant contributors to instability and violence, particularly when considering that Balochistan has a greater youth bulge, than the rest of Pakistan, with 49.5% of Balochis under the age of 15, in contrast to the

³⁵⁷ Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report," World Bank/Asian Development Bank/Government of Balochistan

³⁵⁸ "Their Future is at Stake: Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province," *Human Rights Watch*, December 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/fmz3Fo>

³⁵⁹ "Education," *Pakistan Ministry of Finance*. Available at <http://bit.ly/ewrgsd>, accessed April 26, 2011.

³⁶⁰ "Their Future is at Stake: Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province," *Human Rights Watch*.

national average of 43.3%.³⁶¹ In 2008, the World Bank estimated poverty in Balochistan at 47%, which might be conservative.³⁶² The number of poor people in the province has increased considerably between 1998/99 and 2004/5, rising from 1.5 million to 2.1 million,³⁶³ in large part as a result of the five-year drought between 1997 and 2002, which caused famine, and decimated over 43% of the livestock population.³⁶⁴

A severe water crisis is another concern for many Balochis. Only 5% of Balochistan is connected to the Indus River basin, enhancing scarcity in a country that is expected to be water-scarce between 2020 and 2035.³⁶⁵ In and around Quetta, it is believed that the mining of groundwater has reached such levels, that the water table has dropped by 3.5 meters annually and it is believed the entire aquifer will be lost within 5-10 years.³⁶⁶ This scarcity deeply complicates the difficulties for the rural agriculture sector, which has few irrigation mechanisms to help provide consistent or adequate yields.

Most economic sectors in Balochistan have suffered from decades of underinvestment, and low productivity is a key obstacle impeding an economic transformation up the value chain. Basic agriculture is the mainstay for most Balochis, with 40% farming minor crops and 33% raising small herds of livestock.³⁶⁷ Seeking to increase agricultural efficiency, or encourage a move towards more productive enterprises will require combating many problems, including a lack of rural access to electricity, limited access to financial capital and inadequate transportation infrastructure that led to poorly connected and segmented communities.³⁶⁸ The same is also true outside the agricultural sector. Fisheries, which are touted as a growth industry for Balochistan's undeveloped coastline, are a good example, possessing over 70% of Pakistan's coast but less than 30% of its landed catch.³⁶⁹

The petroleum sector is also suffering infrastructure degradation after decades of underinvestment in exploration and development, resulting in declining output from 355bcf in 1994/5 to 336bcf by 2005.³⁷⁰ Educational gaps impede any move towards skill-intensive industries. At the moment, out of 2.3 million provincial workers, 1.4 million have no schooling at all.³⁷¹ Mineral exploitation too may have considerable latent potential. The recently discovered Reko Diq copper mine in Chagai district was valued at \$260 billion,³⁷² but is

³⁶¹ "White Paper on Budget 2010-11," *Finance Department Government of Balochistan*. Available at <http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/documents/WhitePaperonBudget2010-11.pdf>

³⁶² "Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Balochistan Economic Report," *Asian Development Bank*, December 2005. Available at <http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/PAK/39003-PAK-TAR.pdf>

³⁶³ Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report," World Bank/Asian Development Bank/Government of Balochistan

³⁶⁴ "Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Balochistan Economic Report," *Asian Development Bank*

³⁶⁵ Michael Kugelman and Robert Hathaway, "Running on Empty: Pakistan's Water Crisis," *Wilson Center*, 2009. Available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ASIA_090422_Running%20on%20Empty_web.pdf

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report," World Bank/Asian Development Bank/Government of Balochistan

³⁶⁸ Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report," World Bank/Asian Development Bank/Government of Balochistan

³⁶⁹ "Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Balochistan Economic Report," *Asian Development Bank*

³⁷⁰ Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report," World Bank/Asian Development Bank/Government of Balochistan

³⁷¹ Pakistan Balochistan Economic Report," World Bank/Asian Development Bank/Government of Balochistan

³⁷² Salman Zaidi, "Making Sense of Violence in Balochistan in 2010," *Jinnah Institute*.

symptomatic of the resource curse in Balochistan, where the government has tried to forcibly arrange for exploitation without Baloch consent.³⁷³

The floods of 2010 have compounded the problems. About 2 million residents of Balochistan are believed to have been affected according to figures collected by UNHCR, including about 600,000 people displaced from the Sindh.³⁷⁴ 13 districts were affected, including Jafarabad, Naseerabad, Kohlu, Barkhan, Kachchi, and Harnai, and in some districts such as Jafarabad, limited infrastructure such as irrigation channels were washed away, while district administration largely ground to a complete halt.³⁷⁵

Some 700,000 acres of land were also destroyed in the province's agricultural belt, resulting in food shortages, which causes not only the obvious hunger, but also leaves farmers with no cash to prepare for the next season.³⁷⁶ A UNHCR employee also noted that the region had been largely overlooked in relief efforts, and commented that, "I have worked in humanitarian situations globally and worked in refugee camps in Africa during emergencies, but to be honest I had never seen a situation as devastating as I saw in Balochistan."³⁷⁷

The Struggle over Natural Gas

Unequal allocations in the distribution of natural resource revenues have also been a major source of contention. Natural gas was discovered in Balochistan in 1952 and was soon made available to the Punjab and the Sindh, but Quetta, the provincial capital, failed to receive any piped gas until the 1980s, and even today only 4 out of 21 districts have access to piped gas.³⁷⁸ Similarly Dera Bugti, home to the Sui gas fields has the richest endowment of resources in all of Balochistan, yet has the nation's worst HDI ranking.³⁷⁹

The same is true in the minerals sector. The Saindak copper and gold mines are extracted by a Chinese company, and out of revenues worth \$633.6 million, 48% went to Islamabad, 50% to Beijing and a paltry 2% to Balochistan itself.³⁸⁰ This trend is also true of the province as a whole. In 2007, Balochistan contributed PKR87 billion in gas revenues for state but received only PKR7 billion for the province.³⁸¹ Such small allocations have been justified by the government which points to Balochistan's small population, but recently as part of recent reforms, progress has been

³⁷³ Sanaullah Baloch, "Exploitation of mineral wealth," *Dawn*, November 25, 2010. Available at <http://www.dawn.com/2010/11/25/exploitation-of-mineral-wealth-by-sanaullah-baloch.html>

³⁷⁴ "UNHCR warns of grave conditions in Balochistan," *UNHCR*, September 3, 2010. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/4c80cb3f9.html>

³⁷⁵ Bari Baloch, "Major human crisis looms in Balochistan," *The Baloch Hal*, August 22, 2010. Available at <http://www.thebalochhal.com/2010/08/major-human-crisis-looms-in-balochistan/>

³⁷⁶ "Flood Crisis: Balochistan's Silent Suffering," *Express Tribune*, September 5, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/46843/flood-crisis-balochistans-silent-suffering/>

³⁷⁷ "Unprecedented humanitarian crisis in flood-hit Balochistan," *One World South Asia*, September 3, 2010. Available at <http://southasia.oneworld.net/todayshadlines/crisis-unfolding-in-flood-hit-balochistan-unhcr>

³⁷⁸ Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation Author(s): Adeel Khan Source: *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49, No. 6 (November/December 2009), pp. 1071-1091

³⁷⁹ Sen. Sanaullah Baloch, "The Balochistan Conflict: Towards a Lasting Peace," *Pakistan Security Research Unit*, March 1, 2007. Available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/38662095/Instability-in-Balochistan>

³⁸⁰ Sanaullah Baloch, "Exploitation of mineral wealth."

³⁸¹ Sen. Sanaullah Baloch, "The Balochistan Conflict: Towards a Lasting Peace."

made on increasing Balochistan's share of gas revenues from PKR4 billion to PKR7 billion, out of the total pool of PKR16 billion.³⁸²

Uncertain and Unstable Politics

The Pakistani state is often blamed for Balochistan's situation. Certainly it deserves a large measure of blame, but Balochistan's indigenous political system is also a major driver. Much of rural Balochistan is controlled by local sardars (leaders), and like the maliks of the FATA, the sardars are hereditary leaders with considerable power over their people, including the implementation of taxes, control over local security apparatuses, and considerable say in the channeling and implementation of resources, including development aid.³⁸³

The Pakistani government often alleges that it is their fear of losing their positions to economic advancement that has ensured that Balochis stay impoverished, an assessment that is in part acknowledged by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan that agreed that tribal sardars "have no interest in advancing a modern form of governance."³⁸⁴ Having said that, the Pakistani government, particularly manifested through its Punjabi-dominated omnipresent security forces, and the inefficient provincial government cannot be excused of culpability.

To its credit, Pakistan has made commitments in the past year to resolve Baloch grievances. The Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package of reforms is roughly translated as "beginning of rights in Balochistan" and true its name included significant reforms, including promises to increase Baloch employment in the civil-sector, to offer Baloch a greater share of resource industry revenues, and to compensate communities displaced by violence.³⁸⁵

The package nearly doubled Balochistan's share of the federal divisible pool from 5.11% to 9.09%,³⁸⁶ while in 2010, about PKR 12 billion was released to the Baloch government the beginning of repayments for outstanding debts from natural gas revenues.³⁸⁷ Various mega-development projects are also in the process of being built including the Gwadar port, which is touted as the key to bringing investment and prosperity to Balochistan, and other less high-profile initiatives such as the US\$1.2 billion 500-kilometer Kacchi canal being built to pass through Punjab and Balochistan³⁸⁸

Despite these initiatives, Balochs remain skeptical and for good reason. Balochi leaders have rightly pointed out that as important stakeholders they are excluded from the decision-making procedure, leading to an external model of development that is coercively imposed upon them.³⁸⁹

³⁸² Syed Fazl-e-Haider, "End of Deadlock over Gas Revenue Sharing," *Dawn*, October 19, 2009. Available at <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/154530>

³⁸³ "Status of the Sardars," *Global Security*. Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/baloch-sardars.htm>, accessed April 26, 2011.

³⁸⁴ "Human Rights Violations: Conflict in Balochistan: December 2005-January 2006," *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan*, August 2006. Available at <http://hrqp-web.org/pdf/Conflict%20in%20balochistan--%20Complete.pdf>

³⁸⁵ "Their Future is at Stake: Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province," *Human Rights Watch*.

³⁸⁶ Noor ul-Haq, "Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan." Available at <http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff118.pdf>

³⁸⁷ "Their Future is at Stake: Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province," *Human Rights Watch*.

³⁸⁸ Michael Kugelman and Robert Hathaway, "Running on Empty: Pakistan's Water Crisis.

³⁸⁹ Malik Siraj Akbar, "Judiciary, Parliament silent on Baloch issues," *Viewpoint*, January 4, 2011. Available at <http://www.viewpointonline.net/judiciary-parliament-silent-on-baloch-issues.html>

More tangibly, despite sixteen months having passed since the passage of the bill, by March 2011, only 11 out of the 61 reforms had been implemented, the committee chairman had resigned in frustration at the slow pace of implementation, and critical components such as measures to review the role of security agencies, electricity generation projects, political engagement with Baloch stakeholders and increasing Baloch control of natural resources and broadcasting infrastructure, were still languishing in the “draft phase.”³⁹⁰

The key problem will be one of implementation in Balochistan’s vast and rugged terrain. Security and violent incidents continue to hamper any development agenda, as do entrenched institutional biases, particularly amongst security agencies that have resisted any dilution of their presence and operational freedoms. Endemic corruption and nepotism continue to persist and development strategies have failed to be coupled with any real attempts at political engagement. There is little evidence of outreach to nationalist groups, of any attempts to address the status of extrajudicial killings and unlawful detentions, and of attempts to reduce the security presence in Balochistan. This is particularly disconcerting, as the most immediate and visible grievances of Balochis relate to security issues, and economic redress by itself is unlikely to quell the depths of anger Balochis feel towards the Punjabi-dominated center.

Mega-projects designed to alleviate economic concerns can themselves be drivers of conflict. Various projects such as the construction of the Gwadar port are built largely with Chinese and Punjabi labor, largely excluding ethnic Balochs. As a result many projects are presumed to be inconsequential to the welfare of Balochs, and continue to be perceived as a Punjabi plot to expand control and influence over Baloch resources. Separatist insurgents have mounted several attacks against construction workers and security personnel guarding these installations, including on March 22, 2011 when gunmen killed 10 road construction workers near Gwadar,³⁹¹ and a month earlier when between 3 and 10 FC soldiers were killed in a remotely detonated blast.³⁹² Given their historical interactions with the state, Balochs have little faith that the benefits of these projects will ever trickle down to assist in improving their condition.

The Separatist Rebellion

The scale of the violence affecting Balochistan must be kept in the perspective of its relatively small population of 7.8 million people, of which about half are ethnic Balochs. This means that the effects of violence are felt deeply across the population. The Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies counted 600 fatalities in 2010 across in 737 attacks³⁹³ mounted across a population about the size of Virginia, and which in the Pakistani context would equate to about 6,800 fatalities in the Punjab. Attacks in Balochistan have also significantly increased in quantity and lethality over the past few years as seen in **Figure 4.2**. It is however too early to tell if the 55% spike in deaths in 2010 over 2009 is a temporary phenomenon or the start of a significantly bloodier phase of the insurgency.

³⁹⁰ Zahid Gishkori, “Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan: Reform package stopped in tracks,” *Express Tribune*, March 7, 2011. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/128835/aghaz-e-haqooq-e-balochistan-reform-package-stopped-in-its-tracks/>

³⁹¹ “Security Developments in Pakistan, March 22,” *Reuters Alert Net*, March 22, 2011. Available at <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-pakistan-march-22/>

³⁹² Ahmar Mustikhan, “Baloch freedom fighters kill 10 Pak troops in battle over Gwadar ownership,” *Baltimore Foreign Policy Examiner*, February 23, 2011. Available at <http://tiny.cc/aog9m>

³⁹³ “Pakistan Security Report 2010,” Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies.

The present nationalist insurgency is the fifth in its kind. Previous insurgencies took place in 1948, 1958-59, 1962-63, 1973-77, and were bloody affairs with the last two claiming about 3,000 and 2,000 lives respectively. The current rebellion began in earnest around 2004, and intensified in January 2005, after the rape of a female oilfield doctor. Key drivers have included the usual package of grievances, including heavy militarization, the impunity and brutality with which security forces operate, continued alienation from political and economic modernization, and perceived growing Punjabi encroachment and suppression of the Baloch culture. The insurgency has however witnessed several new trends, notably the growing viciousness of insurgent tactics, and the increasing support insurgents have received amongst the educated and middle-class Balochs.

The state response, as in each previous uprising, has been heavy-handed, particularly during the Musharraf era. Musharraf's warning to insurgents in 2005 was indicative of his attitude towards the separatists; "Don't push us. It isn't the 1970s where you can hit and run and hide in the mountains. This time you won't even know what hit you."³⁹⁴ Despite this in December 2005 during a visit by Musharraf to highlight government successes, separatists fired rockets near where he was speaking.³⁹⁵ Follow on FC-led PAKMIL operations were severe.

The closed nature of the theater, where international NGOs such as the International Red Cross are forbidden, makes exact casualty figures difficult, but it is believed that at least 3,000 people have been killed, and over 200,000 displaced as a result of military operations.³⁹⁶ Conditions in camps have been particularly bad. In 2007, when IDP numbers ranged around 85,000, UNICEF estimated that 28% of five-year olds in makeshift refugee camps were severely malnourished, and noted that 80% of recorded deaths were children under five³⁹⁷ -- facts which incensed the Musharraf regime, and led to the expulsion of the UNICEF head in Pakistan.³⁹⁸ Today UNICEF estimates 116,210 IDPs in Balochistan and parts of Sindh³⁹⁹, many from the Kohlu and Dera Bugti districts, the tribal heartland of the Marri and Bugti tribes.

This use of force has done little more than consolidate Baloch anger, which was intensified by the targeting of key Baloch leaders, particularly the highly respected 79-year old Bugti tribal leader, Nawab Akbar Bugti. Bugti, who had been prominent in voicing his opposition, found his house mortared by security forces, killing 60 of his people. He then returned to the mountain ranges of Dera Bugti, his tribal lands, with 5,000 of his tribesmen.⁴⁰⁰ PAKMIL offensives

³⁹⁴ "Balochistan: Pakistan's Broken Mirror," *The National*, March 25, 2010. Available at <http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/balochistan-pakistans-broken-mirror?pageCount=0>

³⁹⁵ Sarfaraz Ahmed, "Musharraf Kohlu visit not a wise move," *Daily Times*, December 20, 2005. Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2005\12\20\story_20-12-2005_pg7_52

³⁹⁶ Peter Tatchell, "The Baloch People have a Right to Self-Determination," *Open Democracy*, April 27, 2010. Available at <http://www.opendemocracy.net/peter-tatchell/baloch-people-have-right-to-self-determination>

³⁹⁷ "The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No. 69, October 22, 2007. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/b69_pakistan_the_forgotten_conflict_in_balochistan.ashx

³⁹⁸ Malik Siraj Akbar, "Balochistan's unattended IDP crisis," *The Baloch Hal*, February 1, 2010. Available at <http://www.thebalochhal.com/2010/02/balochistan%E2%80%99s-unattended-idp-crisis-%E2%80%94malik-siraj-akbar/>

³⁹⁹ "UNICEF Fortnightly Situation Report 3-18 March 2011," *UNICEF*. Available at <http://www.pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=F48G917oJQQ%3D&tabid=87&mid=578>

⁴⁰⁰ "Musharraf will not know what has hit him – Akbar Bugti," *Newsline*, January 14, 2006. Available at <http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJan2006/cover1jan2006.htm>

mounted a fierce punitive campaign in the area, and on August 26, 2006, helicopter gunships killed Bugti in his hideout.⁴⁰¹

The killing soon proved to be a grave miscalculation that catalyzed Baloch anger and led to widespread rioting, strikes and protests across Baloch areas, including in Karachi's Lyari sector.⁴⁰² Soon after the killing, Baloch nationalist forces held a Jirga that was attended by more than 380 leaders, including 85 sardars, who petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to end the military occupation, a strong rebuff to Musharraf's assertions that he controlled the loyalty of all but three sardars.⁴⁰³

Criticism also came from non-Baloch sectors, including segments of the Army who feared a repeat of the 1971 East Pakistan experience, and from political opponents such as Punjab's Nawaz Sharif who branded Musharraf a "killer."⁴⁰⁴ Since then Pakistan, has also killed other senior separatist leaders including Mir Balach Marri, purported leader of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in November 2007.⁴⁰⁵

The end of the Musharraf era has not altered the situation. Government forces continue to be consistently heavy-handed. Against the Baloch rebels, there is no evidence that the lessons learned in the FATA are being applied in any earnest manner for more sensitive tactical prosecution of kinetic operations, or that PAKMIL, and its local arms, notably the much-hated Frontier Corps (FC), believe anything but complete suppression is the solution.⁴⁰⁶

The Security services, particularly the FC and intelligence agencies, are often accused of extrajudicial killings, under a 'kill and dump policy' where individuals are abducted or 'disappeared,' often reappearing dumped on the streets with a bullet in the forehead and marks of torture on their bodies. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan counted at least 117 incidents of targeted killings in 2010,⁴⁰⁷ and a *Guardian* investigation revealed that 1/3rd of all 'kill and dump' victims belonged to the Baloch Student's Organization (BSO).⁴⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch also estimated that 1,100 people were 'missing,'⁴⁰⁹ with many taken into custody by uniformed personnel.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰¹ "Balochistan: Pakistan's Broken Mirror," *The National*.

⁴⁰² Abdul Sattar, "Riots grow over tribal chief's death," *AP*, August 27, 2006. Available at <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/world/4145024.html>

⁴⁰³ "The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan," *International Crisis Group*.

⁴⁰⁴ "The Geo-Strategic Implications of the Baloch Insurgency," *Jamestown Foundation*, November 16, 2006. Available at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=973&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=181&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=973&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1)

⁴⁰⁵ "Counterinsurgency in Balochistan: Pakistan's Strategy, Outcome and Future Implications," *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies*, July 15, 2008. Available at san-pips.com/download.php?f=pvt0004.pdf

⁴⁰⁶ "Balochistan Atrocities Continue to Rise," *Amnesty International*, February 23, 2011. Available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/pakistan-balochistan-atrocities-continue-rise-2011-02-23>

⁴⁰⁷ Ahmed Rashid, "Why We Should Worry about Balochistan," *BBC News*, January 19, 2011. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12215145>

⁴⁰⁸ Declan Walsh, "Pakistan's Secret Dirty War," *BBC News*, March 29, 2011. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/29/balochistan-pakistans-secret-dirty-war>

⁴⁰⁹ "Their Future is at Stake: Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province," *Human Rights Watch*.

⁴¹⁰ "Balochistan Atrocities Continue to Rise," *Amnesty International*.

Between October 2010 and February 2011, Amnesty International counted the disappearance or murder of at least 90 Baloch activists, teachers, journalists and lawyers.⁴¹¹ Retaliations against civilians for separatist attacks are also often severe. A 2006 HRCP fact-finding mission in Balochistan found that in response for a bombing which killed three FC soldiers, the FC raided and burnt a nearby hamlet, executed 12 men and then demanded male members of the village come to collect bodies, the two who came were then also shot.⁴¹²

Insurgent dynamics too have changed, differentiating the conflict today from both the one in 2004, and from previous insurgencies. Most notable is the increasing diversity of nationalist fighters. A 2007 International Crisis Group reported that Marri and Bugti tribesmen who had dominated the early phases of the insurgency, were now augmented by educated middle-class youth, and concluded that the insurgency “now crosses regional, ethnic, tribal and class lines”⁴¹³

This is particularly true of certain groups such as the Baloch Liberation Front, most of whose members are educated and ideological.⁴¹⁴ This is a marked change from previous conflicts, where tribal sardars provided insurgent leadership. Tribal dynamics too are changing. In the 1970s, the 180,000-strong Bugti tribe⁴¹⁵ largely sat out a Marri-dominated insurgency; today both, representing the two largest tribes in Balochistan, have joined hands in the struggle, along with other tribes such as the Mangals.⁴¹⁶

The convergence of tribes and the educated middle class is a significant escalation in the depths of Baloch anger and their inability to conceive of a role for themselves in the Punjabi development model.

The mix of separatist groups operating in Balochistan has demonstrated signs of growing radicalization. The insurgency is now increasingly youth-led, in contrast to earlier sardari-led movements⁴¹⁷, and popular demands now increasingly focus on all-out independence, instead of the earlier more reasonable “autonomy minus defense, currency, communications and foreign affairs.”⁴¹⁸ Separatist groups include the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which draws many of its fighters from the Bugti and Marri tribes⁴¹⁹, the Balochistan Liberation Front, (BLF), the Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan and Jhawan Baloch Tigers.⁴²⁰

⁴¹¹ “Victims of Reported Disappearances and Alleged Extrajudicial and Unlawful Killings in Balochistan: 24 October 2010 – 20 February 2011,” *Amnesty International*, March 1, 2011. Available at <http://tiny.cc/n89la>

⁴¹² “Human Rights Violations: Conflict in Balochistan December 2005 – January 2006,” *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan*, August 2006. Available at <http://hrcp-web.org/pdf/Conflict%20in%20balochistan--%20Complete.pdf>

⁴¹³ “The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan,” *International Crisis Group*.

⁴¹⁴ Talat Hussein, “Separatist Sketches,” *Newsline*, April 21, 2010. Available at <http://www.newsline.com.pk/2010/04/separatist-sketches/>

⁴¹⁵ “Tribes and Rebels: The Players in the Balochistan Insurgency,” *Jamestown Foundation*, April 3, 2008. Available at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=4830&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=167&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4830&tx_ttnews[backPid]=167&no_cache=1)

⁴¹⁶ “Musharraf will not know what has hit him – Akbar Bugti,” *Newsline*, January 14, 2006. Available at <http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJan2006/cover1jan2006.htm>

⁴¹⁷ “The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan,” *International Crisis Group*.

⁴¹⁸ “Counterinsurgency in Balochistan: Pakistan’s Strategy, Outcome and Future Implications,” *PIPS*

⁴¹⁹ “Balochi Liberation Army (BLA),” *Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism*, April 21, 2011. Available at <http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Balochi-Liberation-Arm-BLA-Pakistan.html>

⁴²⁰ Khurram Iqbal, “Counterinsurgency in Balochistan: Pakistan’s Strategy, Outcome and Future Implications,” *PIPS*

Militant groups have grown increasingly hardline, targeting even fellow Balochs they suspect of collaboration or appeasement of the state.

Persistent rumors have suggested that the assassination of prominent moderate Baloch leader, Habib Jalib Baloch in August 2010, may have been committed by separatist groups, in response to his emphasis on peaceful struggle.⁴²¹ Similarly the August 2010 assassination of Balochistan education minister Shafiq Khan Ahmed was despite his public lobbying for Baloch rights, and criticism of Pakistani military operations.⁴²²

Separatists have also begun to expand their targeting scopes from government targets to all they perceive as collaborating with the state. Punjabi civilians, and educational facilities and personnel, have both come under severe attack from militants who see them as tools to expand Punjabi hegemony and dilute Baloch culture. Human Rights Watch detailed the killings of 22 teachers and education personnel between January 2008 and October 2010, and how separatist violence allowed schools to open for only 120 days in 2009, and resulted in 200 fleeing the province and many others requesting transfers.⁴²³ A further 1,600 government officials have also requested transfers out of Balochistan, further burdening the already worst governance system in the country.⁴²⁴

Despite military suppression, separatists continue to have considerable operational reach inside the province. On December 7th, 2010 the Baloch Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani barely survived a bomb blast on his motorcade,⁴²⁵ and on March 22, 2010, the BLF killed 11 Punjabi road construction workers in the heavily guarded Gwadar district.⁴²⁶ The insurgency has also consistently targeted energy facilities, indicating that Pakistan's outreach efforts, including the Aghaz-e-Haqooq package, have only had limited impact.

In the period of about a month between January 9th and February 13th in 2011, at least 25 gas pipelines were blown up in the eastern districts, and there were attacks on an additional 7 gas facilities, 9 electricity pylons and a power plant.⁴²⁷ The BLA took responsibility for many of the attacks, which decimated the power sector, reducing available electricity from 1150 MW to 60-

⁴²¹ Cyril Almeida, "Two Extremes Digging in their Heels," *The Baloch Hal*, July 25, 2010. Available at <http://www.thebalochhal.com/2010/07/two-extremes-digging-in-their-heels/>

⁴²² Rahimullah Yusufzai, "The Baloch Insurgency is no Bluff," *Jang*, November 3, 2009. Available at <http://thenews.jang.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=206519&Cat=9&dt=11/3/2009>

⁴²³ "Their Future is at Stake: Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province," *Human Rights Watch*.

⁴²⁴ Vikram Sood, "Balochistan: Behind an Iran Curtain," *Vikram Sood (Blog)*, August 3, 2010. Available at http://soodvikram.blogspot.com/2010_08_03_archive.html


⁴²⁵ "Chief Minister escapes suicide attack in SW Pakistan," *Xinhua*, December 7, 2010. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-12/07/c_13638659.htm

⁴²⁶ "Gunmen kill 11 road workers in attack on FWO camp in Gwadar," *Daily Times*, March 22, 2011. Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\03\22\story_22-3-2011_pg1_5

⁴²⁷ Madhia Sattar, "Pakistan's Other War," *Foreign Policy*, February 15, 2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/15/baluchistan_pakistans_other_war

70MW.⁴²⁸ HRCP also estimates that separatist attacks caused the Water and Power Development Authority at least PKR 1.5 billion in losses in 2007.⁴²⁹

Figure 4.2: Violence in Balochistan



(Source: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan)

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ “Annual Report: State of Human Rights in 2007,” *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan*. Available at <http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Archives%20Reports/AR2007.pdf>

Figure 4.3: Force Composition in Balochistan

Force	Number	Remarks
PAKMIL XXII Corps (Quetta) 33 rd Infantry Division 16 th Infantry Division Infantry Brigade Armored Brigade		Lt. General Javed Zia Primarily tasked with securing border with Iran and Afghanistan COAS Kayani (Feb 2011): Only one battalion in interior, restricted to Sui cantonment
Frontier Corps	35,000-45,227	Primary paramilitary force for combating separatists Highly unpopular due to heavy-handed tactics, complicity in extra-judicial killings, non-indigenous composition and complicity in criminal activities
Coast Guards	1,200	
Levies	11,153 - 13,357	
Balochistan Police	16,120 - 36,000	

Note: Due to scarcity of available data, figures are best range estimates

(Source: "XII Corps," *Global Security*; "Police Organizations in Pakistan." *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan*; Janes Sentinel Country Risk Assessment Pakistan; Pakistan Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee, <http://bit.ly/lyhqFf>)

Reconciliation Attempts Fail to Address Core Grievances

On paper, Pakistan has made strides towards reconciliation with the Balochs. The Aghaz-e-Haqooq package of reforms is such a 1 step forward, although as noted earlier, it remains stalled with large sections nowhere near implementation. The end result is that many Baloch nationalists now call for independence, a considerable advancement from earlier demands for autonomy. One of the most pointed of Baloch grievances has been the militarization of their province, particularly through the much-despised paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC).

Islamabad has long been manifested its authority in Balochistan through the military. The Quetta Cantonment houses the Command and Staff College, one of PAKMIL's oldest and most prestigious military institutions, a reflection of the military's historical presence. Today, the security presence remains severe. The 35,000 strong FC -- which has Pashtun majority and only 24% Balochs -- mans 493 checkpoints, while the 1,200 strong Coast Guards man another 87.⁴³⁰ The Musharraf-era construction of cantonments is another source of anger, particularly as many are situated in the interior, clearly serving little defensive purpose, and oriented solely towards subduing Baloch dissent and better controlling natural resources.⁴³¹

Under the stewardship of General Kayani, the Pakistani military made some progress in Balochistan. The Sui cantonment, the most contentious of all constructions, has now been reversed and converted into a military college to ease Baloch anger.⁴³² In February 2011, Kayani also declared that except one battalion restricted to the Sui cantonment, all other regular army forces were deployed away from the interior,⁴³³ and voiced his support for a more equitable distribution of revenues from natural resource extraction.⁴³⁴

The Pakistani military is also engaged in a recruiting drive in Balochistan, with the intention of recruiting 10,000 Balochs by 2012.⁴³⁵ By March 2011, 1,673 Balochs had already been trained. Kayani has also emphasized the military's positive role, pointing to its 47 army-run educational institutions that provide for over 23,000 students.⁴³⁶

Yet, despite these concessions, the preeminence of the security services remains untouched, and the issue of missing and detained Balochs is a key hurdle for the government. Even the Chief Minister of Balochistan has criticized the military's zero-tolerance policies, and accused security services of running a "parallel government" that sabotages outreach efforts.⁴³⁷ This is despite the

⁴³⁰ "Human Rights Violations: Conflict in Balochistan," *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan*, April 2006, <http://hrcp-web.org/pdf/Conflict%20in%20balochistan--%20Complete.pdf>

⁴³¹ "The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan," *International Crisis Group*.

⁴³² Saleem Shahid, "Sui Cantonment Turned into Military College," *Dawn*, January 4, 2011. Available at <http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/04/sui-cantonment-turned-into-military-college-2.html>

⁴³³ Saleem Shahid, "No army operation in Balochistan: Kayani," *Dawn*, February 22, 2011. Available at <http://www.dawn.com/2011/02/22/no-army-operation-in-balochistan-kayani.html>

⁴³⁴ "Baloch people has right on resources of province," *South Asian News Agency*, February 21, 2011. Available at <http://www.sananews.net/english/2011/02/21/baloch-people-has-right-on-resources-of-province-kayani/>

⁴³⁵ "Balochistan Assessment – 2011," *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/index.html>

⁴³⁶ Saleem Shahid, "Sui Cantonment Turned into Military College," *Dawn*, January 4, 2011.

⁴³⁷ Tom Hussain, "Pakistan's security forces accused of sabotaging 'hearts and minds' campaign," *The National*, February 2, 2010. Available at <http://tiny.cc/aje9q>

judicial activism shown by Pakistan's Supreme Court under Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, who himself grew up in Quetta.

In one incident the courts threatened to arrest the director of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), if it did not produce people missing at the hands of intelligence agencies. As a result of their efforts two people were released.⁴³⁸ While these examples are encouraging, overall they have been insufficient to restrain the intelligence agencies. In 2009, Amnesty International identified 1,102 disappearances⁴³⁹ and the Pakistani Interior Ministry itself estimated that over 1,100 Balochs had "disappeared" during the Musharraf era.⁴⁴⁰

Pakistan continues to deflect its responsibility for such problems by laying the blame on external powers, particularly India, which it accuses of assisting and arming separatist rebels. Little tangible evidence exists of such collusion. Certainly there is ample motive, and Pakistan often accuses Bramdagh Bugti of the BRA in particular as having links to India.⁴⁴¹ However if such Indian desire to foment insurgency exists, all evidence suggests to date it is more aspirational than real.

Baloch leadership is fragmented among both insurgents and political parties, and this has further complicated outreach efforts. A variety of factors have driven this trend, including the growing disillusionment of Baloch youth with their elder's abilities to deliver, continued and persistent tribal divides among nationalist forces, the deliberate targeting of senior Baloch leaders by paramilitary government forces, and the attempts by intelligence agencies to keep the Balochs divided and weakened. A May 2010 meeting between Prime Minister Gilani and senior Baloch nationalist leader Sardar Attaullah Mengal for example, was hailed as a major breakthrough, but quickly broke down as strong internal Baloch divides between the Mengals and the Marris surfaced.⁴⁴² Personal attacks were leveled against rival leaders, significantly raising the potential for inter-tribal feuding.

Veteran Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai points to the "proliferation of splinter factions, far more radical, and led by younger and more emotional men," and noted the influence that the diaspora exerts on setting the agenda.⁴⁴³ Jamil Bugti, the son of deceased Nawab Akbar Bugti, alluded to the same splintering effect when he noted, "the next generation is all in the mountains. And they're not willing to talk to anyone. People like me, and others, like the different nationalist parties that are in Parliament, they don't have any role to play. They look good on TV. That's it."⁴⁴⁴ 'Pakistan Murdabad' (Death to Pakistan) is now a common opposition chant, and many Baloch political parties have adapted to reflect the hardline demands of their constituents.

⁴³⁸ "The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report 69, October 22, 2007.

⁴³⁹ "2009 Annual Report for Pakistan," *Amnesty International*, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2009&c=PAK>

⁴⁴⁰ "Their Future is at Stake: Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan's Balochistan Province," *Human Rights Watch*.

⁴⁴¹ Nirupama Subramaniam, "Iran backing Baloch insurgency," *The Hindu*, July 26, 2008. Available at <http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/26/stories/2008072653741400.htm>

⁴⁴² Malik Siraj Akbar, "Baloch nationalism gone wrong," *Express Tribune*, May 20, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/14519/baloch-nationalism-gone-wrong/>

⁴⁴³ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "The Baloch Insurgency is no Bluff," *The News*, November 3, 2009.

⁴⁴⁴ "Balochistan: Pakistan's Broken Mirror," *The National*, March 25, 2010.

Dr. Abdul Hakeem Lehri, leader of the Balochistan Republican Party, purported to be the political face of the BRA, stated unequivocally, “We’re not interested in living with the corrupt Pakistani elite any more. We want freedom.”⁴⁴⁵ Moderate nationalist parties all boycotted the 2008 elections⁴⁴⁶, and many continue to dismiss the Afghaz-e-Haqooq reforms, expressing their mistrust of Islamabad’s ability to deliver and anger at the veto power central authorities continue to wield over their destinies.⁴⁴⁷ Growing radicalization has further threatened ordinary Balochs who find themselves increasingly trapped between radical nationalists who punish any hint of collusion with the state, and security forces who have similarly no tolerance for association with separatism.

Strong Military; Weak Police and Governance

The role of the military and its paramilitary and intelligence arms is partly to blame for the growing radicalization of the Baloch national agenda. After almost a decade of intensified suppression, security forces quite simply have tortured, murdered and detained many moderate Baloch nationalists into radicalization.⁴⁴⁸

Many leaders killed by the military had been from the earlier more moderate guard, including the Oxford-educated Nawab Akbar Bugti and Balach Marri, who had been open to dialogue with the state.⁴⁴⁹ Alongside intelligence agencies have worked hard to exploit tribal divisions, for example attempting to elevate the Kalpar and Masori factions of the Bugti tribes to dilute the traditional dominance of the Rahijas, who have accounted for the majority of tribal leaders, including Akbar Bugti.⁴⁵⁰

These problems are compounded by weak local law-enforcement capacity that prevents a return of the FC to its barracks. The province has traditionally been divided into ‘A’ and ‘B’ areas, with B areas comprising over 95% of territory, and A areas focused largely on urban centers. Levy forces, which traditionally policed the ‘B’ areas were disbanded by President Musharraf, who saw them as private sardari armies, and forcibly integrated them into the formal police force. Such a policy did much to degrade local police capacity, particularly due to the resentment of sardars with the move.⁴⁵¹

Levy forces have since been resurrected and Balochistan’s police force is now focused largely on policing urban areas.⁴⁵² Salaries too have risen 100% for levies and formal police forces.⁴⁵³

⁴⁴⁵ Qurratulain Zaman, “Balochistan: Too Small an Olive Branch,” *Open Democracy*, November 27, 2009. Available at <http://www.opendemocracy.net/qurratulain-zaman/balochistan-too-small-olive-branch>

⁴⁴⁶ Qurratulain Zaman, “Inside Balochistan’s Ravaged Heartland,” *Tehelka*, October 31, 2009. Available at http://www.tehelka.com/story_main43.asp?filename=Ne311009inside_balochistan.asp

⁴⁴⁷ Shahzad Baloch, “Future Imperfect: Balochistan’s Reaction to Bill,” *Express Tribune*, April 10, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/4980/future-imperfect-balochistans-reaction-to-bill/>

⁴⁴⁸ Qurratulain Zaman, “Inside Balochistan’s Ravaged Heartland,” *Tehelka*, October 31, 2009.

⁴⁴⁹ “The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan,” *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report 69, October 22, 2007.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid

⁴⁵¹ Ibid

⁴⁵² “Police Organizations in Pakistan,” *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan/Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative*, May 2010. Available at http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Police_Organisations_in_Pakistan%5B1%5D.pdf

⁴⁵³ “Balochistan raises 100% of salaries of police, Levies, BC,” *Geo TV*, June 22, 2010. Available at <http://www.geo.tv/6-22-2010/67107.htm>

Despite this aggregate increase, there is no indication that the significant disparity in funding between levies and the police has been rectified. Levies receive 24% of overall funding, despite comprising 41% of the overall law enforcement force, and policing 59% of the population.⁴⁵⁴ Complementary prison capacity too remains weak, with Quetta District Jail suffering 131% overcapacity.⁴⁵⁵

The Taliban Sanctuary and Its Impact on NATO

Pashtuns make up the other half of Balochistan, and Balochistan has been increasingly etched into the coalition's consciousness in recent years as a critical sanctuary for Afghan Taliban insurgents. Balochistan is an ideal rear staging area for Taliban insurgents, with long porous borders neighboring Afghanistan's Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul provinces, in all of which coalition forces are heavily engaged.

Furthermore eastern Balochistan is not easily separated from the FATA or the KPK, and is extremely close to critical militant centers such as South and North Waziristan. The Quetta Shura Taliban is the primary force in the region, with its leadership council believed to be based in the provincial capital of Quetta. In recent years, particularly since 2007, attacks against NATO convoys traversing Balochistan have increased in quantity and lethality, marking a significant escalation in overt Taliban presence.

The Musharraf era did much to facilitate the rise of Islamization in Balochistan, by state-sponsorship of the religious political coalition, the Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to counter secular Pashtun and Baloch nationalism. As in the FATA, MMA rule did little to address core grievances, focusing instead on embedding religion into the social structure, and facilitating in the Talibanization of local culture. With the end of the Musharraf era, the MMA was swept out of power in the 2008 elections although it retains seats in the provincial parliament.

The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the primary Afghan Taliban group, has been the key source of concern. The majority of Taliban in Balochistan are believed to be Afghans, who use the province as a rear staging area and safe haven and are scattered in and around Quetta and its nearby refugee camps.⁴⁵⁶ Balochistan, by virtue of its geography, is ideally suited for Afghan infiltration. Quetta, the provincial capital is only a 10-hour drive from Kabul, and only 3 hours from the main Chaman border crossing, and the province's long and porous borders allow for easy cross-border movement.

A 2006 UNODC investigation found no border posts along the long Chagai-Nimroz border, leaving open 300 kilometers.⁴⁵⁷ Frontier Corps sources also claimed that today there are only two posts along in the Chagai and Nushki districts, two districts with the longest borders with

⁴⁵⁴ "Report on the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan," *Senate of Pakistan*, November 2005. Available at http://www.foreignaffairscommittee.org/includes/content_files/Parliamentary%20Committee%20on%20Baluchistan.pdf

⁴⁵⁵ "Annual Report: State of Human Rights in 2007," *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan*. Available at <http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Archives%20Reports/AR2007.pdf>

⁴⁵⁶ "Afpak Behind the Lines; Southern Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy*, July 12, 2010. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/12/afpak_behind_the_lines_southern_afghanistan

⁴⁵⁷ "2009: Addiction, Crime and the Transnational Threat of Opium," UNODC, pg. 134

Afghanistan.⁴⁵⁸ As a result, it infiltration into Helmand, Kandahar, Nowshera and Shorawak is relatively easy, and it is believed that Afghan fighters sometimes use hospitals in the cross-border town of Dalbandin in Chagai.⁴⁵⁹

The capital of Balochistan, Quetta is a warzone, populated by a lethal mix of extremist nationalists, political separatists, religious fanatics, narcotics and weapons smugglers, as well as international terrorists and foreign intelligence agencies.⁴⁶⁰ Sectarian violence and ethnic target killings are an almost daily occurrence as are attacks against government forces and institutions.

Quetta has been a historical staging ground for war in Afghanistan, and is believed to be the command node for the Quetta Shura Taliban, including Mullah Omar. Senior leaders such as now deceased Mullah Dadullah openly maintained residences and hosted parties, including a September 2003 family wedding, at which JUI leaders, military officers and government officials were prominent guests.⁴⁶¹ It is often suggested that the ISI plays a critical role in facilitating Taliban sanctuary and logistics, but a report by analyst Matt Waldman goes further and suggests that ISI observers are actually represented at the meetings of the Quetta Shura as observers.⁴⁶²

Quetta has over a million Afghan refugees⁴⁶³ and various Afghan neighborhoods in the city are outside the government's writ including Pastunabad, Khrotabad and Kuchlak.⁴⁶⁴ Veteran Pakistani analyst Ahmed Rashid recounts how after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the JUI "virtually handed over Pashtunabad to the Afghan Taliban," which soon treated it as its new capital.⁴⁶⁵ Rashid also counted 50 JUI-run madrassas in 80-mile trip between Quetta and Chaman.⁴⁶⁶

Indeed Maulana Noor Mohammad, who is also a senior leader in the JUI, runs indeed the main madrassa in Pashtunabad, and openly admits to participation and support for the Afghan jihad.⁴⁶⁷ Quetta is however not fully controlled by Pashtuns; various neighborhoods are Baloch dominated, such as Sariat Road, Huddah, Brohi Road, and the Eastern and Western Bypasses

⁴⁵⁸ Ghani Kakar, "Afghan Taliban reappearing in Balochistan," *Central Asia Online*, November 15, 2010. Available at http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/main/2010/11/15/feature-02

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid

⁴⁶⁰ Vikram Sood, "Balochistan: Behind an Iron Curtain," *Vikram Sood (Blog)*, August 3, 2010. Available at http://soodvikram.blogspot.com/2010_08_03_archive.html

⁴⁶¹ Ahmed Rashid, "Descent into Chaos: The US and the Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan," (London: Penguin, 2008). pg. 250.

⁴⁶² Matt Waldman, "As Clear as the Sun in the Sky," *LSE Crisis States Center*, June 2010. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/100613_20106138531279734lse-isi-taliban.pdf

⁴⁶³ "On the trail of the Taliban in Quetta," *BBC News*, January 25, 2010. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8472740.stm>

⁴⁶⁴ <http://therearenosunglasses.wordpress.com/2009/10/14/afghan-refugee-camps-in-balochistan-are-taliban-breeding-ground/>

⁴⁶⁵ Ahmad Rashid, "Descent into Chaos," pg. 249

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid

⁴⁶⁷ Susanne Koelbl, "Headquarters of the Taliban," *Der Spiegel*, November 24, 2006. Available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,450605,00.html>

and are no-go areas for other ethnic groups, particularly Punjabis, but also Pashtuns and Hazaras.⁴⁶⁸

US officials have increasingly flagged Quetta as the command headquarters for the Afghan insurgency. In October 2009, a *Financial Times* report cited a leaked report prepared for General McChrystal that cited the Pashtunabad suburb of Quetta as the most likely hiding spot for the 12-15 members of the Quetta Shura, and described the area as the “Taliban’s post-office in Balochistan,” from where messages are relayed between the field and senior commanders.⁴⁶⁹

The Institute for the Study of War concurs that senior leadership is based out of Quetta, whose sanctuary “allows Quetta-based leadership to identify its priorities to Afghan-based leaders, who might need resolution at higher command echelons.”⁴⁷⁰ This does not equate to direct field control, but rather directions and guidance including instructions at the start of fighting season, and strategic adjustments such as calling in reinforcements as the situation requires. US military officials have increasingly voiced a desire for more aggressive action in Balochistan. The *New York Times* reported in mid-2009 of the Obama Administration’s desire to extend drone operations into Balochistan,⁴⁷¹ but it is clear that such activity constitutes a clear red line for Pakistani government and military officials.

In a break from the relatively low profile of the Taliban presence in Balochistan, since 2007 attacks on NATO convoys have become increasingly regular as seen in **Figure 4.5**. Balochistan is a critical transit route for NATO non-military supplies, transiting from Karachi’s port, around Quetta to the Chaman border crossing. According to journalists, the Inspector General of the FC Balochistan claimed there were 159 attacks in 2010, which destroyed 194 trucks.⁴⁷²

These attacks are not crippling, as 27,073 trucks are believed to have passed through the Chaman border crossing in 2010 according to government officials.⁴⁷³ The lack of reliable data also complicates matters as media reports suggest that in the space of one week in October 2010, over 150 NATO fuel tankers were destroyed in more than six attacks.⁴⁷⁴ As of March 25, 2011, at least 16 such attacks have already been recorded in Balochistan out of a total of 28, according to

⁴⁶⁸ Qarratullah Zaman, “Inside Balochistan’s Ravaged Heartland,” *Tehelka*, October 31, 2009; Ejaz Haider, “Immediate action needed in Balochistan,” *Express Tribune*, November 1, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/70492/immediate-action-needed-in-balochistan/>

⁴⁶⁹ “US focuses on Taliban’s ‘post office’ at border,” *Financial Times*, October 13, 2009. Available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9a63322c-b78e-11de-9812-00144feab49a.html#axzz1HnZpiVjt>

⁴⁷⁰ Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Fosberg, “The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan,” *Institute for the Study of War*, December 21, 2009. Available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/25156509/Quetta-Shura-Taliban-ISW>

⁴⁷¹ Alex Spillius, “US to expand Pakistan air strikes targeting al-Qaeda and the Taliban,” *The Telegraph*, March 19, 2009. Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/5012693/US-to-expand-Pakistan-air-strikes-targeting-al-Qaeda-and-the-Taliban.html>


⁴⁷² Kathy Gannon, “Low Pay, Big Risks for Fuel Haulers in Afghan War,” *AP*, February 26, 2011. Available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110226/ap_on_re_as/afghan_taliban_vs_tankers

⁴⁷³ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁴ “NATO loses 150 tankers in Pakistan,” *Siyasat Aur Pakistan*, October 10, 2010. Available at <http://siyasipakistan.wordpress.com/2010/10/10/nato-loses-150-tankers-in-pakistan/>


statistics collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal.⁴⁷⁵ Responsibility for these attacks is often claimed by the TTP, although they are less active in the province than the Afghan Taliban.

Figure 4.4: NATO Supply Routes through Pakistan



(Source: BBC News)

Figure 4.5: NATO Related Attacks



(Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal)

⁴⁷⁵ "NATO Related Incidents 2008-11," *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/natoattack.htm>, accessed April 27, 2011.

Growing Sectarian Violence

Growing sectarian violence has been another source of concern, as sectarian groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) are believed to have traveled to the province.⁴⁷⁶ On Quds Day, in September 2010, over 50 people were killed and over 150 injured when suicide bombers dispatched by the LeJ attacked a Shia procession in Quetta.⁴⁷⁷

Both Deobandi fundamentalists and Baloch nationalists have targeted the Shi'ite Hazara community.⁴⁷⁸ Jundullah, a rabidly anti-Shia group also operates out of Balochistan, mainly into neighboring Iran. Despite the capture and execution of its leader Abdolmalek Rigi, its rumored death was premature. In July 2010, two of its suicide bombers struck the Grand Mosque in Zahedan, killing 27 and injuring 300 including two senior members of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). Again on December 15, 2010, Jundullah suicide bombers attacked the Imam Hussein mosque in Chabahar, killing 38 and injuring over one hundred.⁴⁷⁹ Jundullah's presence is a key source of irritation in Tehran, which greatly fears cross-border spillover inflaming its own restive Baluch population.

Balochistan is also a critical funding platform for Taliban insurgents and its intersections with criminal networks are extensive. Indeed it was the Quetta transport mafia that in the late 1980s encouraged the Taliban to advance on Kandahar to help secure some modicum of road security for their business interests,⁴⁸⁰ and today key population centers such as Quetta host major fundraising networks for the Taliban, including narcotics smuggling, donations, and participation in other illicit enterprises as detailed below.

Drugs and Interactions with Criminal Networks and Powerbrokers

Balochistan's strategic location and lack of functioning economy has helped deeply entrench organized crime into the security landscape. Criminal enterprises help fund the coffers of the Taliban, the Baloch separatists, powerful political interests, powerful criminal as well as segments of the security services. The scale of activity too is considerable, with virtually everything smuggled across the border from drugs and guns, to fuel, cosmetics, vehicles, cattle as well as migrants and trafficked humans.

The regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran comprise the Golden Crescent, one of the world's largest opiate gateways. Balochistan sits at the intersection of all three. The province offers transit into Iran, as well as access to coastal routes, including the Makran coast, and the Gwadar and Karachi ports.

⁴⁷⁶ "Lahskar-e-Jhangvi claims responsibility for suicide attack on DIG's residence," *The Baloch Hal*, April 9, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/gt3Fbp>

⁴⁷⁷ Salman Masood, "Suicide bomber kills 53 at Shiite Protest," *New York Times*, September 3, 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world/asia/04pstan.html?_r=1

⁴⁷⁸ Ishaq Mohammadi, "Reasons for the Target Killing of Hazaras in Balochistan, Pakistan," *Hazara Net*, August 22, 2010. Available at http://www.hazara.net/downloads/Hazara_Ethnic_Cleansing_Pakistan.pdf

⁴⁷⁹ Chris Zambelis, "Back With a Vengeance: The Baloch Insurgency in Iran," *Jamestown Foundation*, January 14, 2011. Available at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=37365&cHash=8e6dc60bd4](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37365&cHash=8e6dc60bd4)

⁴⁸⁰ Pepe Escobar, "Life in Talibanistan – Married to the Mob," *Huffington Post*, September 3, 2010. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pepe-escobar/post_793_b_705130.html

Narcotics have been a key source of concern, with UNODC's 2010 World Drug Report estimating that 40% of all Afghan heroin passed through Afghanistan,⁴⁸¹ and that 72% of total opium seizures between 2004 and 2007 were in Balochistan.⁴⁸² In 2010 too, the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) seized PKR 782.63 million worth of narcotics in 103 raids.⁴⁸³ Details are hard to come by, but it appears that significant overlaps exist between militancy and crime in Balochistan, including the sharing of cross-border routes, and the potential for militants (both Baloch and Taliban) to double between criminal and militant enterprises. A map of potential cross border smuggling routes identified by UNODC is shown in **Figure 4.6**.

UNODC identified the major Baloch routes as transiting from southern Afghanistan over the Chaman border crossing, or other unregulated cross-border points, towards Quetta or Dalbandin, and then moving either towards Iran for export to Turkey and Europe or down to fishing villages along the Makran coast and major Pakistani ports for transit to various international destinations.⁴⁸⁴

In addition to narcotics smuggling, various other criminal enterprises including prostitution and forced labor are also rife with the prevalence of refugee camps rendering the province fertile recruiting ground. Balochistan is also a key launch pad for migrants, particularly Afghans, seeking to enter Europe.⁴⁸⁵ Various other simpler and more local enterprises also continue to flourish such as the smuggling of cattle into Afghanistan, which is depleting livestock levels in Pakistan.⁴⁸⁶

The Taliban have extensive involvement in the criminal trade. Dennis Blair, the US director of national intelligence, estimated that the Afghan Taliban made \$100 million in revenue from the drugs trade in 2008, while a former DEA official estimated the number to be closer to \$300 million.⁴⁸⁷ After all, the original Kandahari Taliban began their journey in the early 1990s, at the behest of, and with the backing of an "unholy alliance of drug smugglers, traders and trucking groups."⁴⁸⁸ Today, analysts such as Gretchen Peters have speculated on the Taliban becoming more of a sophisticated drug cartel than a political movement,⁴⁸⁹ either directly participating in, or sanctioning criminal activity.

⁴⁸¹ "World Drug Report 2010," UNODC, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/gkS5xX>

⁴⁸² United Nations, "Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium," (NY: United Nations Publications, 2009), pg. 57

⁴⁸³ "Drugs worth Rs 728.63 mln seized in 2010," *The News*, January 16, 2011. Available at <http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=9477>

⁴⁸⁴ "World Drug Report 2010," UNODC, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/gkS5xX>

⁴⁸⁵ "Pakistan Country Profile," UNODC, Available at <http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/country-profile.html>, accessed April 27, 2011.

⁴⁸⁶ Shahzad Baloch, "Thousands of cattle smuggled daily," *Express Tribune*, September 21, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/52453/thousands-of-cattle-smuggled-daily/>

⁴⁸⁷ Catherine Collins and Ashraf Ali, "Financing the Taliban," *New America Foundation*, April 2010. Available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF_FinancingtheTaliban_TracingtheDollars.pdf

⁴⁸⁸ Gretchen Peters, "How Opium Profits the Taliban," *US Institute for Peace*, August 2009. Available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/taliban_opium_1.pdf

⁴⁸⁹ Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, "Taliban's Cash Grows from Heroin Trade, Crime," *NPR*, December 20, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/hK4ZCf>

Major traffickers pay directly to Taliban leaders such as Haji Juma Khan, an ethnic Baloch who ran one of the region's largest drug trafficking rings, with enough opium and laboratory capacity to supply the entire US market for two years. Khan who was arrested by US DEA agents, based his operations out of Quetta, and paid substantial sums to the Taliban for protection of its labs and supply routes.⁴⁹⁰ Traffickers are also billed for medical expenses incurred by Taliban fighters injured on the battlefield, with a USIP report detailing one major dealer who runs his own health clinic in Quetta, which is reportedly filled with wounded Taliban fighters at any given time.⁴⁹¹ Various Taliban affiliated tribes, particularly the Afridis and Shinwaris are also involved in the narcotics trade and straddle the border, along the FATA as well as Balochistan.⁴⁹²

A 2010 CRS report on transnational crime examined various criminal syndicates and concluded that they already possess the capabilities to commit terrorist attacks and "can easily transfer this apparatus towards politically motivated ends."⁴⁹³ This is likely particularly true in Balochistan, where the delineations between criminals and militants are often blurred. Various transnational syndicates have an institutionalized presence in Balochistan, and activities include the trafficking of drugs, weapons, humans and migrants.⁴⁹⁴

Although Pakistan was declared drug-free in 2001, various indicators suggest that limited cultivation has resurfaced in Balochistan, as well as the FATA/KPK.⁴⁹⁵ There are no indications that cross-border efforts have diminished the flow of narcotics through Pakistan. In February 2011 alone, official figures from Pakistan's Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), revealed the seizure of 2,590 kilograms of hashish and opium in Quetta alone.⁴⁹⁶ In recent years increased scrutiny along the Afghan-Iranian border has further increased the utility of the Baloch route,⁴⁹⁷ and today it is believed that ethnic Balochs are particularly prominent in the narcotics trade and "run the dominant smuggling networks heading southwest from Afghanistan."⁴⁹⁸

Large segments of the opiate supply chain are based in Balochistan. In addition its primary role as a smuggling route, the Pakistani side of the border hosts many of the processing facilities that convert raw Afghan opium into heroin. The Chagai district, particularly near the smuggling hub of Baramcha in Helmand, "serves as a mega-heroin producing center, with capabilities of producing industrial quantities of morphine base and heroin."⁴⁹⁹ In 2006 for example, a relatively

⁴⁹⁰ Catherine Collins and Ashraf Ali, "Financing the Taliban," *New America Foundation*, April 2010.

⁴⁹¹ Gretchen Peters, "How Opium Profits the Taliban," *US Institute for Peace*, August 2009.

⁴⁹² "World Drug Report 2010," *UNODC*, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/gkS5xX>

⁴⁹³ John Rollins, "International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, US Policy and Considerations for Congress," *Congressional Research Service*, March 18, 2010. Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf>

⁴⁹⁴ "Pakistan Country Profile," *UNODC*, Available at <http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/country-profile.html>, accessed April 27, 2011.

⁴⁹⁵ "Drug Abuse Control Master Plan 2010-2014," *Ministry of Narcotics*, February 2010. Available at <http://www.anf.gov.pk/content/Drug%20Abuse%20Control%20Master%20Plan%202010-14.pdf>

⁴⁹⁶ "Major Seizures," *Anti-Narcotics Force*, <http://www.anf.gov.pk/majorsz.php>, accessed April 27, 2011.

⁴⁹⁷ "World Drug Report 2010," *UNODC*, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/gkS5xX>

⁴⁹⁸ United Nations, "Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium," (NY: United Nations Publications, 2009), pg. 133

⁴⁹⁹ "Heroin Production in Afghanistan: Helmand, Nangarhar and Badakhshan," *Naval Postgraduate School Culture & Conflict Studies*, April 14, 2009. Available at <http://bit.ly/e7gien>

rare government raid netted two tons of morphine and eight mobile heroin factories.⁵⁰⁰ Balochistan is also a relatively large end-user of opiates with the highest consumption rate in Pakistan at 1%, according to government statistics.⁵⁰¹ The smuggling of precursor chemicals, used in heroin production, is a large smuggling racket in Balochistan that further impedes counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency efforts.

Criminal enterprises often operate with the complicity of high-ranking government officials. It was recently revealed that a large cache of weapons, including Kalashnikovs, RPG's, 107mm anti-aircraft guns, antipersonnel and antitank mines, had been linked to a member of the state cabinet.⁵⁰² Similarly Imam Deen, the #1 most wanted man for the Anti-Narcotics Force is believed to live without fear in the city of Mand, and is reputed to move around freely in Quetta, with access to high-ranking politicians including the Chief Minister.⁵⁰³

The ANF is similarly hamstrung. A senior US law enforcement official complained of the ANF, saying, "They pick up the low lying fruit. We give them leads on targets. We give them phone numbers of traffickers they should be interested in. We are constantly doing that. We get smiles, a decent cup of tea, occasional reheated sandwiches and assertions of progress, and we all leave with smiles on our faces."⁵⁰⁴ Baloch militant groups and nationalist leaders are also believed to be complicit. Just recently, Shahzain Bugti, a leading Baloch nationalist leader was arrested by the FC near Chaman, allegedly with a large arms cache hidden in his convoy.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰⁰ "Pakistan busts major heroin lab," *BBC News*, June 11, 2006. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5069828.stm


⁵⁰¹ "Drug Abuse Control Master Plan 2010-2014," *Ministry of Narcotics*, February 2010.

⁵⁰² Ghani Kakar, "Guns smuggling on the rise in Balochistan," *Central Asia Online*, April 9, 2010. Available at http://www.centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/pakistan/2010/04/09/feature-01

⁵⁰³ "The Golden Route: Opium's Journey from Afghanistan into Pakistan," *Opioids*, September 2, 2005. Available at <http://opioids.com/opium/golden-route.html>

⁵⁰⁴ "Afghanistan's Narco War: Breaking the Link between Drug Traffickers and Insurgents," *Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, (111th Congress), August 10, 2009. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/afghan.pdf

⁵⁰⁵ Bari Baloch, "Shahzain Bugti, 27 others held with huge arms cache," *The Nation*, December 23, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/dEIBUj>

Figure 4.6: Major Pakistani Drug Trafficking Routes

(Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)

SECTION V: THE SOUTH PUNJAB AND THE RISE OF THE PUNJABI TALIBAN

The Punjab is the “heart” of Pakistan. It is the most populous province, with 90 million of Pakistan’s 173 million people. It is the country’s political, economic and cultural center, and the heartland of its military and intelligence agencies. It is arguable that violence in the FATA or in Balochistan is only an irritant at Pakistan’s periphery, but violence inside Punjab is critical and the surest way to destabilize the state. Ethnic Punjabis mostly populate the province. They are the most privileged ethnic group in Pakistan with strong representation at the upper echelons of decision-making and the military high command.

The Army primarily recruits from the province and it contains several strategically important cities, including the garrison city of Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan and Gujranwala.⁵⁰⁶ The Punjab has traditionally been relatively insulated from the violence in the periphery, but in recent years, particularly since the 2007 storming of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid, regular terrorist violence has plagued the province’s major urban centers.

The Punjab is also the nerve center for a number of militant groups including the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Many of these groups were raised and nurtured since the Zia era in service of the Pakistani state’s strategic interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Much of their influence and infrastructure is concentrated in the impoverished and underdeveloped areas of south Punjab that have seen little state investment or attention. Human welfare metrics diverge sharply from the rest of the Punjab, and state capacity and legitimacy are weak. This has allowed considerable freedom of action for militants, including the open operation of various radical madrassas for recruitment and training.

Today in one of the most dangerous trends in Pakistan’s domestic insurgency, many former state-sponsored militant groups have broken ranks with Pakistan’s invisible establishment to actively target the state and collaborate with tribal militants in the FATA and KPK.

Making Militants into a Self-Inflicted Wound

In the past, the government tolerated, even encouraged, militants to serve in Kashmir. But the end results threatened Pakistan as much as India. As the International Crisis Group has concluded, today these same “violent Deobandi networks in Punjab lie at the root of Pakistan’s militancy problem.”⁵⁰⁷ In June 2010, Interior Minister Rehman Malik claimed, “out of 1,764 persons associated with the two banned religious outfits Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Muhammad, 726 belonged to South Punjab”⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁶ Raheel Khan, “Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 3, Issue 3, March 2010. Available at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss3.pdf>

⁵⁰⁷ “The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 164, March 13, 2009, pg. 6. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/164_pakistan_the_militant_jihadi_challenge.ashx

⁵⁰⁸ “Militants hiding in South Punjab come out,” *The News*, May 31, 2010. Available at <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/31-May-2010/Militants-hiding-in-South-Punjab-come-out>

Many of these groups have forged operational links with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the group primarily responsible for the insurgency in the NWFP and the FATA, and have commonly come to be referred to as the ‘Punjabi Taliban.’ They have been implicated in a number of prominent attacks in recent years, both inside and outside Pakistan, including the formerly inconceivable storming of the Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi in October 2009.

Punjab is divided into eight divisions and the three southern divisions of Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan and Multan, with their eleven districts, are most commonly considered to constitute south Punjab. Some districts from the Faisalbad and Sargodha divisions may also occasionally be incorporated as part of south Punjab. On aggregate the region suffers considerable disparities relative to the rest of Pakistan, including endemic poverty, rampant corruption, ineffective governance or policing and poor provision of basic services.

Failing the People While Playing Self-Destructive Games

The south Punjab scores lower, often significantly lower, on virtually all human-welfare metrics, than the state average which is seen in **Figure 5.1** which is adapted from data provided by the Punjab Government for 2010. These problems have arisen as the result of government neglect, and the southern provinces have received far less state development funding than is their due, as seen in **Figure 5.2**. In the last few years, funding has trended upwards towards a more equitable distribution, but it remains to be seen if this will be sustained for the long-term. State institutions too remain fewer and less resourced than their northern counterparts, as seen in **Figure 5.3**.


Although data provided by the state government shows institutional quantity that is relatively proportional to the population, it obscures the full picture. Quality remains suspect on all levels, including substandard quality of teachers, a lack of resources and poor financial management. ‘Ghost’ schools and hospitals are not uncommon and those that exist are often in a state of considerable disrepair.⁵⁰⁹

An investigative report by a Pakistani newspaper in 1998 uncovered over 4,000 ghost schools and 20,453 fake teachers⁵¹⁰, and there is no indication that these systemic problems have been tackled since. Little capital investment has also meant that the vast majority of Punjab’s industrial base is located in the north – seen in **Figure 5.4** - and of what little exists; the majority is concentrated in urban centers, excluding large segments of the populace. In Faisalbad for example, out of 1096 factories in 2008, 768 were located within Faisalbad City.⁵¹¹


⁵⁰⁹ Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “Southern Punjab’s Troubles,” *SWADO*, April 19, 2010. Available at <http://waseb.wordpress.com/2010/04/19/southern-punjab%E2%80%99s-troubles-%E2%80%94-by-rasul-bakhsh-rais/>

⁵¹⁰ Sushant Sareen, “*Pakistan’s Islamic Revolution in the Making*,” (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2005), pg. 39.

⁵¹¹ “Development Statistics 2010,” *Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab*, Available at <http://www.pndpunjab.gov.pk/page.asp?id=65>

Figure 5.1: Human Welfare in South Punjab as Compared to State Average

(Source: Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab)

Figure 5.2: State Development Funding in South Punjab


(Source: Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab; Pakistan Institute for Legislative Democracy and Transparency, <http://bit.ly/lxxPPm>)

Figure 5.3: Government Investment in South Punjab relative to Province

	% of population	% of police stations	% of hospital beds	% govt. run primary schools
Bahawalpur	10.65	10.87	9.12	13.55
DG Khan	9.36	8.66	4.40	11.70
Multan	11.48	11.18	7.95	9.12
Sargodha	7.40	9.45	5.90	11.47
Faisalbad	13.06	10.24	11.55	11.97
South Punjab	31.49	30.71	21.47	34.37
South Punjab Plus	51.96	50.39	38.93	57.80

Note: Population figures are based on December 31, 2010 estimates provided by the GoP

(**Source:** Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab)

Figure 5.4: Industrial Base of South Punjab (# of Factories)

(**Source:** Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab)

Feudal landowners, in large part Shia, have been the traditional powerbrokers in south Punjab, allowing for both class and sectarian issues to fuse and complement each other. These problems and frustrations played a significant role in facilitating the rise of the rabidly anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan in the southern district of Jhang in the 1980s⁵¹², and today they continue to provide succor for the various hardline Sunni groups in the region. The militant presence in southern Punjab has flourished over the past decades as they grew into a state-sponsored enterprise.

President Zia ul-Haq used radical Sunni groups to suppress the minority Shias and to advance the anti-Soviet resistance in neighboring Afghanistan, while his successors used them to foment a proxy war in Indian Kashmir. Consequently today, a variety of militant groups are firmly entrenched in south Punjab including the JeM, which maintains its headquarters in Bahawalpur, and the LeT, which has a strong presence across Pakistan, particularly through its humanitarian arm, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD).⁵¹³

The floods of 2010 have done little to change this ongoing dynamic. As has become common in the wake of natural disasters in Pakistan, militant groups, notably the JuD, are often some of the fastest and most effective humanitarian response units, winning both goodwill and legitimacy amongst the population. In 2010, it was estimated that over 2,200 JUD relief workers were engaged in relief efforts in south Punjab and the tribal areas.⁵¹⁴

Militant groups have also firmly established their infrastructure in south Punjab, in particularly their madrassas, as key vehicles for recruitment and financing. The madrassa sector in general has registered a considerable increase in recent years. Tamir Kamran, a Pakistani historian noted that the number of madrassas across the Punjab increased from 1,320 in 1998 to 3,153 by 2000.⁵¹⁵

A significant proportion of these madrassas have been in the south. A 1996 report counted 883 Deobandi mosques in Bahawalpur, outnumbering even Lahore, with another 361 in Dera Ghazi Khan, 325 in Multan, 149 in Sargodha. Ahle-Hadith and Bareilvi mosques were excluded from the count.⁵¹⁶ By 2008, the Intelligence Bureau counted 1,383 mosques in Bahawalpur division alone enrolling over 84,000 students.⁵¹⁷ While the increase in madrassas is not synonymous with radicalism, it is unlikely that such an expansion in the madrassa sector came without a similar spike in those affiliated with violent militant groups.

The Punjabi Taliban

The Punjabi Taliban, as they have come to be known, are generally believed to include the JeM, SSP, HuJI and the LeJ, or at the very least their splinter elements. The LeT, perhaps the most

⁵¹² Tahir Kamran, "Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy: A Case Study of Jhang," *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (2009).

⁵¹³ "Pak arrests 167 Jamaat-ud Dawa operatives, seals over 50 offices," *One India News*, December 13, 2008. Available at <http://news.oneindia.in/2008/12/13/pak-arrests-167-jamaat-ud-dawa.html>

⁵¹⁴ Amir Mir, "After the Deluge," *Outlook*, September 6, 2010. Available at <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?266873>

⁵¹⁵ Ayesha Siddiqua, "Terror's Training Ground," *Newsline*, September 9, 2009. Available at <http://www.newsline.com/2009/09/terror%E2%80%99s-training-ground/>

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

operationally prolific, is occasionally included in this grouping but it is markedly distinct from the others in that it has conscientiously avoided any violence within Pakistan. The ‘Punjabi’ term may also be an imprecise label in that these groups also contain Sindhis and Urdu-speakers.⁵¹⁸ Traditionally all these groups worked in tandem with state strategy. The SSP was born in President Zia-ul-Haq’s Sunni fundamentalist era, where its rabidly anti-Shia inclinations were welcome, and it later splintered to also form the even more hardline LeJ. Similarly the LeT, JeM and HuJI were three of the most active groups inside Indian Kashmir, and have been implicated in various high-profile terrorist attacks inside India, including the joint JeM-LeT attack against the Indian Parliament in 2001 or the LeT attack on Mumbai in 2008.

Since then, Pakistani government support is believed to have diminished. State-sponsored sectarianism is no longer seen as a core objective, but yet it took until 2002 for the SSP and LeJ to be officially banned by President Musharaff.⁵¹⁹ Similarly Pakistan’s shift in focus from Kashmir towards Afghanistan, particularly in the aftermath of the 2004 Composite Dialogue with India, caused disaffection in militant ranks and incentivized their split away from the state.⁵²⁰ The 2007 storming of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid further catalyzed this anger, and is widely seen as the turning point in the Pakistani insurgency, that led many militant groups to turn their weapons against the state.

Under intensifying pressure and scrutiny from the Pakistani government and Western nations, these groups (barring perhaps the LeT) have increasingly gravitated away from the state and towards the tribal militants of the KPK/FATA. Prior to 9/11, many groups maintained some presence in Afghanistan. Some such as the SSP and LeJ do so due to crackdowns under Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1998-1999, and virtually all had links to Afghanistan from the time of the Soviet jihad.⁵²¹

The U.S. invasion in 2001 deprived these groups of their Afghan bases, while the subsequent scrutiny and pressure from the U.S., pushed them to relocate many of their training camps from the Punjab into the relatively lawless tribal areas, while leaving their mosque and madrassa networks in Punjab and the Sindh intact.⁵²² Punjabi militant groups have also increasingly converged with the TTP. They have mounted joint attacks such as the 2009 attack on the GHQ, the 2010 attack on Ahmadi mosques in Lahore, and many others.⁵²³ In fact, it is alleged that cooperation is now so extensive that leaders of the Punjabi Taliban network are believed to now be represented on the TTP’s leadership shura.⁵²⁴

The geographical position of south Punjab has helped assist this trend. The district of Dera Ghazi Khan for example borders both South Waziristan and Balochistan, and thus has a strong militant

⁵¹⁸ “Behind the Lines: Punjab’s Growing Militant Problem,” *Foreign Policy*, June 22, 2010. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/22/afpak_behind_the_lines_punjabs_growing_militant_problem

⁵¹⁹ Suba Chandran, “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,” *Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies*, August 2003. Available at http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1614934887IB09-SubaChandran-SectarianViolencePak.pdf

⁵²⁰ Raheel Khan, “Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 3, Issue 3, March 2010.

⁵²¹ “The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 164, March 13, 2009

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ Raheel Khan, “Al Qaeda, TTP and Punjabi Taliban forge strong connection,” *Central Asia Online*, March 1, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/lrx3vK>

⁵²⁴ Raheel Khan, “Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 3, Issue 3, March 2010.

presence.⁵²⁵ Between March 2005 and March 2007 over 2,000 militants from southern and northern Punjab reportedly moved to South Waziristan to develop logistical networks.⁵²⁶ Similarly in 2007 Maulvi Nazir's feud with Uzbek militants in the FATA was aided in no small part by a sizeable contingent of Punjabis from banned militant groups.⁵²⁷

Today, the Punjabi Taliban is growing to become one of Pakistan's gravest security challenges and has mounted some of Pakistan's most notorious terrorist attacks, as seen in **Figure 5.5**. It has excellent knowledge of security dynamics in the urban heartland, unrivaled operational sophistication and greater capacity to disrupt domestic, regional and even global stability. It has benefited from years of state patronage and ISI training, assisting in its operational development. Tariq Pervez, head of Pakistan's National Counterterrorist Authority (NACTA) asserts that "ideas, logistics, cash [comes] from the Gulf. Arab guys, mainly Egyptians and Saudis, are on hand to provide the chemistry. Veteran Punjabi extremists plot the attacks, while the Pakistan Taliban provides the martyrs."⁵²⁸

Constituent groups within the Punjabi Taliban have also developed closer inspirational and operational ties to al-Qaeda. For example former HUJI commander Ilyas Kashmiri, so known for loyal service in Kashmir, is now reputed to be a senior military commander for al-Qaeda, perhaps leading the shadowy Lashkar-al-Zil (Shadow Army) cell, and has been implicated in various terrorist plots against Pakistani and Western targets.⁵²⁹

Similarly the LeJ today is regarded as the lynchpin of alignment between al-Qaeda, the TTP and domestic sectarian outfits,⁵³⁰ and has been implicated in numerous high-profile anti-Western and sectarian attacks including the 2008 Marriott bombing in Islamabad, possibly the 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and most recently the 2010 attack on Ahmadi mosques in Lahore.⁵³¹

The International Crisis Group has alleged that SSP and LeJ madrassas, mosques and training camps are extensively used as "conduits for foot soldiers, arms and funds from Punjab to other parts of the country, including NWFP and FATA"⁵³² The Punjabi Taliban as a collective organization has been implicated in various attacks targeting military and law enforcement institutions, a significant break from the past, including the 2009 attack against the Army's

⁵²⁵ Sabrina Tavernise, Richard Oppel and Eric Schmitt, "United Militants Threaten Pakistan's Populous Heart," *New York Times*, April 13, 2009. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/asia/14punjab.html>

⁵²⁶ Hassan Abbas, "Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 2, Issue 4, April 2009. Available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18978/defining_the_punjabi_taliban_network.html

⁵²⁷ Ibid

⁵²⁸ Ibid

⁵²⁹ Bruce Riedel, "A Jihadist is Promoted," *Daily Beast*, August 9, 2009. Available at <http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-08-09/al-qaedas-mohammad-ilyas-kashmiri-makes-a-terror-list/>

⁵³⁰ "The Militant Jihadi Challenge," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 164, March 13, 2009

⁵³¹ "Lashkar-e-Jhangvi," *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm>, accessed April 27, 2011.

⁵³² "The Militant Jihadi Challenge," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 164, March 13, 2009, pg. 7

General Headquarters in Rawalpindi,⁵³³ which demonstrated its operational reach as well as displayed the fidayeen tactics that came into vogue on the Kashmiri battlefield.

Lack of Law Enforcement Capability and Political Will

The inability of Pakistani internal security agencies to cope with the Punjabi Taliban threat is as much a result of shortfalls in law enforcement capacity and related government services as it is a lack of political will. Admittedly security forces are under-strength and often outmatched and outgunned by militants. The entirety of Punjab has an end-strength of 160,000-180,000 police officers, which amounts to one officer for every 520-585 people.⁵³⁴

According to a study by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, out of 180,000 officers, only 40,000 are actually permanently stationed in police stations, whereas the rest are used for VIP protection and traffic policing.⁵³⁵ A staggering 6,000 officers are said to be guarding the four residences of Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif alone!⁵³⁶ With such endemic shortfalls in manpower availability, mirrored in equipment, training procedures and professionalism, law enforcement personnel are often outmatched and easily intimidated by militants.

For example, in 2009 an attempt to arrest a hospitalized JeM commander in Bahawalpur was called off after militants threatened to blow up police stations and schools if the arrest went ahead. The commander was then given safe haven by a local JeM madrassas.⁵³⁷ In Bahawalpur city, the JeM also openly maintains madrassas in the center of town, as well as over six acres outside the city, that many believe is a training facility.⁵³⁸ It is no wonder then that the volatile borders of south Punjab are left “almost unguarded from cross-border infiltration”⁵³⁹

In addition, political rivalries, between the federal and state governments and between civilian and military agencies, have often led to blame casting, disrupting effective intelligence coordination and sharing. Filing these capacity shortfalls will be essential. The Army recruits heavily in the Punjab, and consequently any army deployment is highly unlikely. So far no obvious large-scale efforts have been implemented, although recently Prime Minister Gilani recently offered the deployment of paramilitary Rangers to assist law enforcement personnel in south Punjab.⁵⁴⁰

⁵³³ Jane Perlez, “Pakistani Police Had Warned Army about a Raid,” *New York Times*, October 11, 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/world/asia/12pstan.html?_r=1

⁵³⁴ “Punjab Development Statistics 2010,” *Planning and Development Department, Government of the Punjab*. Available at <http://bit.ly/l6thks>; Paul Petzschmann, “Pakistan’s Police between Centralization and Devolution,” *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/jltpmz>; “Reforming Pakistan’s Police,” *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No. 157, July 14, 2008. Available at <http://bit.ly/kHCZDb>

⁵³⁵ Paul Petzschmann, “Pakistan’s Police between Centralization and Devolution,” *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/jltpmz>

⁵³⁶ Ibid

⁵³⁷ Ahmad Majidiyar, “Could the Taliban Take Over Pakistan’s Punjab Province?” *American Enterprise Institute*, June 2010. Available at <http://www.aei.org/docLib/02-MEO-June-2010-g.pdf>

⁵³⁸ Saeed Shah, “Al-Qaeda allies build huge base,” *The Telegraph*, September 13, 2009. Available at <http://tiny.cc/6szqzb>

⁵³⁹ Ibid

⁵⁴⁰ “Pakistan PM offers Rangers’ help to S. Punjab,” *The News*, February 13, 2011. Available at <http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?sec=1&id=17393>

Other analysts, such as Ayesha Siddiqua, have suggested that the roots of Pakistani reluctance to confront the Punjabi Taliban groups lies deeper, and includes an unwillingness to accept (or attract U.S. attention to) anti-state militancy inside “mainstream Pakistan.”⁵⁴¹ This ‘state of denial’ is often evident in government statements, and until recently most Pakistani government and security officials adamantly denied any significant pocket of militancy in south Punjab.⁵⁴²

Moreover Pakistani security and intelligence agencies apparently continue to believe that despite the ongoing structural changes in militant dynamics, they can continue to exert control and influence over their erstwhile strategic proxies, particularly after the volatility caused by the American presence in South Asia abates. They seem to believe that should any group completely fall out of line, they will be dealt with in the manner of Al-Furqan, another former Punjabi-based militant group. Having fallen out of favor with the security establishment, the group was quickly discarded and its emir killed in Bahawalpur in 2009.⁵⁴³

The constituent groups of the Punjabi Taliban however are considerably larger, more organized, and more entrenched than Al Furqan, and it seems unlikely they would prove as easy a task. Most groups within the Punjabi Taliban network – less so the SSP and LEJ, and more so the LET – continue to enjoy a level of state toleration in the hopes of retaining the potential future utility against India. The leaders of JeM and LeT, Maulana Masood Azhar and Hafeez Saeed, have been implicated in anti-Indian terrorist attacks, and both groups are on the U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.⁵⁴⁴ Yet they have faced little more than a revolving door of arrests, with Saeed holding public rallies as late as December 2010.⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴¹ Ayesha Siddiqua, “Terror’s Training Ground,” *Newsline*, September 9, 2009.

⁵⁴² “No Need for Operation in S Punjab: IG Punjab,” *Geo*, June 22, 2010. Available at <http://www.geo.tv/6-22-2010/67160.htm>

⁵⁴³ Ayesha Siddiqua, “Terror’s Training Ground,” *Newsline*, September 9, 2009.

⁵⁴⁴ “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” *Office for Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State*. Available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>, accessed April 27, 2011.

⁵⁴⁵ “Hafeez Saeed makes public appearance, alongside ex-PM, in Islamabad after over 2 years,” *Press Trust of India*, December 15, 2010. Available at <http://criticalppp.com/archives/33609>

Figure 5.5: Attacks inside the Punjab

Date	Suspected Responsibility	Details
April 3, 2011	Unknown	Two suicide bombers attack Sufi shrine in Dera Ghazi Khan, killing at least 41, and injuring over 85.
March 3, 2011	TTP/Punjabi Taliban	Bomb blast at gas station in Faisalabad near ISI offices kills 32, injures over 125
March 2, 2011	AQ/Punjabi Taliban	Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti assassinated
Sep 1, 2010	Punjabi Taliban (specifically LeJ)	Three bombings in Lahore target Shia processions, killing 25, and injuring 170
July 1, 2010	Unknown	Two suicide bombers in Lahore attack Sufi shrine, the Data Darbar Complex, killing at least 50, and injuring over 200.
May 28, 2010	TTP/Punjabi Taliban	Coordinated attacks on minority Ahmadi mosques kill 86 and injure 120 in Lahore
March 8, 2010	TTP/Punjabi Taliban	Suicide VBIED targets Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) building in Lahore,
March 12, 2010	TTP	Suicide attack in RA Bazaar, within a military cantonment area of Lahore kills 62, including several soldiers
December 8, 2009	TTP	Militants attack ISI office in Multan killing at least 12
December 4, 2009	TTP and “allied” groups	Taliban suicide bombers mount complex attack against mosque in Rawalpindi frequented by Army officers and their families. 40 are killed including two senior generals, and 83 wounded
October 10, 2009	TTP/Punjabi Taliban	Militants storm Army GHQ in Rawalpindi. Attackers killed several, including a Brigadier and took hostages. Military storms building.
May 27, 2009	TTP	Suicide VBIED targets offices of ISI and city police in Lahore, killing 27, injuring 326 and destroying building of Rescue 15 police service
March 30, 2009	TTP	Attackers overran police training compound in outskirts of Lahore, killing over 50 cadets
March 3, 2009	AQ/TTP/Punjabi Taliban*	A bus carrying members of the Sri Lankan cricket team is attacked in Lahore. At least six security personnel were killed.
August 21, 2008	TTP	Suicide bombing outside Wah cantonment kills at least 70. Wah is rumored to be a major nuclear weapons assembly site.

Note: This list is not exhaustive, and is intended to be representative

(Source: LWJ, BBC, CNN, The News, Washington Post, Wired Danger Room, Al Jazeera, South Asia Terrorism Portal, Sify News, CTC Sentinel, Times of India, The Telegraph, Express Tribune, Dawn)


SECTION VI: KARACHI - THREATENING THE ECONOMIC ENGINE

Karachi is the economic engine of Pakistan. It generates over 60% of Pakistan's total revenues and accounts for more than half of its GDP. It is strategically vital for US interests, housing Pakistan's only functioning international port and serves as the prime transit route for NATO materiel to Afghanistan. Despite this fundamental importance to long-term Pakistani stability, Karachi faces steadily escalating levels of violence, including a 228% spike in violence in 2010 according to the Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies, as seen in **Figure 6.1**. Violence in 2011 has continued its upward trend.

The Citizens Police Liaison Committee, a state-funded watchdog agency, noted that casualty figures in Karachi have been the highest since 1995, the peak of the ethnic warfare in the early 1990s that devastated Karachi. Entrenched feuding between ethnic and sectarian factions for power and resources in Karachi has intensified considerably. The city's dense network of madrassas is a jihadi cradle that sustains much of the militancy in Pakistan, by providing ideological inspiration, and in some cases funding, training and recruits.

Many madrassas in Karachi maintain links to various militant groups including Al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Simultaneously, as fighting and drones strikes have mounted in the FATA/KPK, a growing number of al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and TTP members have migrated to the urban invisibility of Karachi's sprawling Pashtun slums, and occasionally mounted deadly attacks against high-value targets in Karachi. The risk of these trends merging runs the very real risk of destabilizing Karachi, and in turn Pakistan.

Figure 6.1: Terrorist Violence in Karachi (2008-2010)



(Source: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies)

The Internal Sources of Violence

Karachi also sits astride a vicious ethnic fault-line, pitting the growing Pashtun minority against the dominant Mohajir community and their loosely confederated Sindhi partners. Each ethnic

base represents its interests through its political party – the MQM for the Mohajirs, the ANP for the Pashtuns and the PPP for the Sindhis. Despite being allied on the provincial level, on the streets of Karachi their well-armed politico-militant forces have waged bloody warfare in competition over local political power and resources.

The MQM is particularly well organized having been the predominant force in Karachi for numerous decades and today is indispensable to the ruling coalition. By threatening to quit the government in opposition to a fuel subsidy reform bill in end 2010, it demonstrated its power as a kingmaker in Pakistani politics.⁵⁴⁶ In recent years, an exodus of Pashtun refugees fleeing fighting in the FATA/KPK has panicked the MQM, which fears any alternation in the demographics (and by extension, political power) within the city.

Already Pashtuns in Karachi number 3.5 million including half a million Afghans, a number rivaling Peshawar.⁵⁴⁷ Increased incidence of terrorism and crime has not helped and violence in Karachi has registered a significant increase. “Targeted killings,” a common euphemism for political violence, claimed over 1,132 lives in 2010 by end November according to the CLPC. In fact this may be more than the number of people killed in suicide bombings across the country during the same period.⁵⁴⁸

Figure 6.2 shows two different estimates for violence in Karachi. These are the worst figures since 1995, a period of widespread ethnic strife that provoked “Operation Cleanup,” a 2-year intervention by the regular Army and resulted in large-scale low-intensity urban warfare. Even today the city remains awash in weaponry, with many groups retaining access to sophisticated urban warfare equipment including RPGs, laser-sighted automatic rifles and phosphorus grenades.⁵⁴⁹

In the first quarter of 2011, this trend continued and escalated. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan counted 260 people killed in Karachi in the first quarter of 2011, almost the same as the entirety of 2008. Even conservative estimates by the Karachi police counted at least 109 deaths.⁵⁵⁰ In March 2011, over 50 people were killed in less than a fortnight of violence.⁵⁵¹ Hospitals and doctors are reported to be under pressure to not treat opposition sects in the aftermath of turf battles.⁵⁵²

There also has been a growing convergence in political and sectarian violence. The ruling MQM for example, now alleges that its workers are being targeted by not just political competitors, but

⁵⁴⁶ Ben Arnoldy, “What is Pakistan’s MQM?” *Christian Science Monitor*, January 4, 2011. Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0104/What-is-Pakistan-s-MQM>

⁵⁴⁷ Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, *Afghans in Karachi: Migration, Settlements and Social Networks*, Center for Social Science Research, (March 2005)

⁵⁴⁸ Hassan Asif, “Karachi target killings, highest in 15 years,” *Express Tribune*, October 29, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/69491/karachi-target-killings-highest-in-15-years/>

⁵⁴⁹ Tom Hussain, “Karachi Crime Gangs Protected by Politicians,” *Human Rights Commission South Asia*, May 25, 2009. Available at <http://alaiwah.wordpress.com/2009/06/14/karachi-crime-gangs-protected-by-politicians/>

⁵⁵⁰ Salman Siddiqui, “Target Killings: Karachi Deaths Exceed 109 in First Quarter of 2011,” *Express Tribune*, April 2, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/fxQLBk>


⁵⁵¹ Imram Ayub, “Orangi Town in grip of violence,” *Dawn*, March 25, 2011. Available at <http://www.dawn.com/2011/03/25/orangi-town-in-grip-of-violence-five-more-targeted-killings-arson-attack-on-bus.html>

⁵⁵² “Sectarianism infects hospital wards,” *IRIN*, October 24, 2010. Available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=90865>

also sectarian group such as the LeJ and the SSP, in reaction to both Shia representation inside the MQM, as well as its strong public stance against religious extremism.⁵⁵³ In September 2010, the violence reached London, where one of the founding members of the MQM was assassinated, compounding rioting and violence.⁵⁵⁴ The criminal element is also believed to play a large role, in which many hits are just another form of gang warfare in turf battles over protection rackets, land grabs and other monetary drivers.⁵⁵⁵

To date, police capacity has proven far too inadequate to combat the threat. The usual problems of training, equipment and morale come into play, but Karachi's police are further constrained by the influence of politicians who often interfere in police work to protect their own party loyalists.⁵⁵⁶ Police raids also often arrest people based solely on their ethnicity, another trigger for discontent.⁵⁵⁷ In April 2011, Prime Minister Gilani promised an additional 5,000 police for Karachi,⁵⁵⁸ but in the interim the onus has fallen upon the better-trained paramilitary Rangers. The Rangers have been given expanded policing powers, and priority access to funding and equipment, yet have failed to constrain the violence.⁵⁵⁹

Figure 6.2: “Targeted Killings” in Karachi



(Source: Human Rights Commission Pakistan, Citizens Police Liaison Committee)

⁵⁵³ Salman Siddiqui, “Target Killings: Grey Areas,” *Express Tribune*, April 19, 2011. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/149390/target-killing-gray-areas/>

⁵⁵⁴ Farkhan Bokhari, “Politician’s Killing Sparks Karachi Violence,” *Financial Times*, September 17, 2010. Available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/14a2da78-c207-11df-9d90-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Kjltw4nm>

⁵⁵⁵ Gibran Peshimam, “Extortion Rackets squeezing the trigger in target killings,” *Express Tribune*, October 23, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/66319/extortion-rackets-squeezing-the-trigger-in-target-killings/>

⁵⁵⁶ Tom Hussain, “Karachi crime gangs protected by politicians,” *The National*, May 26, 2009. Available at <http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-asia/karachi-crime-gangs-protected-by-politicians>

⁵⁵⁷ Saba Imtiaz, “Karachi Awash With Blood,” *Afpak Channel*, March 28, 2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/28/karachi_ash_with_blood

⁵⁵⁸ Farsahat Mohiuddin, “Karachi to get 5,000 new cops: PM,” *The News*, April 23, 2011. Available at <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=43075&Cat=4&dt=4/23/2011>

⁵⁵⁹ Syed Ali Raza Abidi, “Karachi Doesn’t Need Rangers,” *Welcome to Pakistan (Blog)*, September 24, 2010. Available at <http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/1800/karachi-doesnt-need-rangers/>

Vulnerability to Taliban Militants

This mounting ethnic tension makes the rise of Taliban militants even more troubling, particularly given their potential to fuse with legitimate Pashtun economic and social grievances. Karachi's Pashtun slums, notably the sprawling slums of Sohrab Goth, provide ample urban sanctuary where drones, and security forces, cannot follow.

Financing and Operational Hub

Karachi's cosmopolitanism allows for resources to finance and equip the insurgencies including hawala networks, medical facilities, safe houses and access to organized transnational crime syndicates. A spate of arrests in 2010 confirmed this migratory trend. In February, an early morning raid netted Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Afghan Taliban's second in command and top-ranking military commander.⁵⁶⁰

A few days later, Agha Jan Mohtasim the former Finance Minister of the Taliban regime and another ranking member of the Quetta Shura was also arrested in Karachi.⁵⁶¹ In fact, some suggested that the "Quetta Shura" was actually a smokescreen, and that Afghan Taliban leaders had in fact been sheltered in Karachi by the Pakistani security establishment under the ultra-secret "Karachi Project."⁵⁶²

Many low ranking members of the TTP are believed to be moving to into Karachi to evade Pakistani military operations in the FATA. They have targeted pro-government leaders who fled to Karachi, including members of peace committees, former heads of lashkars and anti-Taliban maliks.⁵⁶³ This has not come without retribution as it is also believed that occasionally Taliban militants are themselves killed by Pashtun IDPs in retaliation for their plight.⁵⁶⁴

Transnational terrorists, and al-Qaeda are also believed to have a strong presence inside Karachi. In fact recently released evidence from interrogations of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay reveal the importance of Karachi for al-Qaeda, which served as a "workshop for its media and financial operations, strategic planning and it served as a reliable hideout."⁵⁶⁵ Various al-Qaeda leaders have also been arrested in Karachi.⁵⁶⁶ In December 2010 security forces arrested over 400 people in the city on suspicions of terrorism.⁵⁶⁷ Karachi has also been used as an operational hub for

⁵⁶⁰ Scott Shane and Eric Schmitt, "In Pakistan Raid, Taliban Chief was an extra prize," New York Times, February 18, 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/world/asia/19intel.html>

⁵⁶¹ Bill Roggio, "Pakistan detains senior Afghan Taliban leader," Long War Journal, March 4, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/pakistan_detains_sen.php

⁵⁶² Ali K Chisti, "The Karachi Project," *Foreign Policy*, November 3, 2010. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/03/is_pakistan_finally_cracking_down_on_al_qaeda

⁵⁶³ Zia Ur Rehman, "Karachi targeted killings of Pashtuns tied to militant groups," *Central Asia Online*, April 1, 2011. Available at <http://tiny.cc/n2kh3>

⁵⁶⁴ Salman Siddiqui, "A Different Kind of Target," *Express Tribune*, April 18, 2011. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/149389/a-different-kind-of-target/>

⁵⁶⁵ Saba Imtiaz, "Al Qaeda Central: All Roads Lead to Karachi," *Express Tribune*, May 1, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/ijAP8p>

⁵⁶⁶ Bill Roggio, "Al Qaeda operatives detained in Karachi," *Long War Journal Threat Matrix*, November 19, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/11/al_qaeda_operatives_detained_i.php

⁵⁶⁷ "TTP network busted in Mangochir, 400 held," *Geo*, December 7, 2010. Available at <http://geo.tv/12-7-2010/75454.htm>

global terrorism. It has been linked to various plots and a long list of terrorists including the shoe-bomber Richard Reid, the 9/11 hijackers Muhammad Atta and Zacarias Moussaoui have passed through it before executing their attacks.

Karachi become the “revenue engine” for the Taliban according to Karachi mayor Syed Mustafa Kamal.⁵⁶⁸ CBS similarly reported that Mohtasim’s presence in Karachi was an attempt to tap into wealthy donors in the city and “draw a significant amount of money into the organization” by reaching out to his “direct contacts” in Karachi.⁵⁶⁹ Hawala networks and banking systems in Karachi also allow militants to launder money. A 2009 police investigation revealed \$17mn of militant funds, suspected to have been transferred to the tribal provinces from one bank in Karachi alone.⁵⁷⁰

Rising Levels of Taliban Violence

While groups such as the Afghan Taliban have relied on such ‘peaceful’ assets, the Pakistani Taliban and its sectarian partners have been considerably more violent. During the reign of Beitullah Mehsud, organized crime, including bank robberies, kidnappings and extortion, were a key means to finance the insurgency. In 2009, 80% of bank robberies in Karachi were suspected to be jihadi related and kidnappings reached their highest levels in decades⁵⁷¹ with ransom payments believed to be Beitullah’s single largest revenue stream. Other activities include skimming off Pashtun-dominated businesses such as the earth-excavating business off which the Mehsud tribe allegedly took 40% of earnings.⁵⁷²

Militants have shown a greater willingness to attack strategic targets within Karachi as the insurgency has grown more vicious. Karachi houses numerous high-value targets including the port which is the entrance point for 75% of NATO supplies, the city’s oil terminal which stores most of Pakistan’s imported oil and the Super Highway, the main thoroughfare for NATO materiel which transits right by the largest Pashtun slum of Sohrab Goth. As early as a year ago, Karachi was relatively insulated from the insurgency, and to a degree it still is, but attacks are increasing. In November 2010, an anti-terrorist police compound was hit by a VBIED and small arms fire killing 18 and injuring more than 100, and may have been an attempt to break out some arrested LeJ militants.⁵⁷³ The TTP took credit for the attack, although security agencies also claim the involvement of the LeJ.⁵⁷⁴ Other attacks have included an attack on a NATO convoy in

⁵⁶⁸ Faisal Aziz and Robert Birsell, “Pakistan’s Karachi the Taliban revenue engine – mayor,” Reuters, December 2, 2009. Available at <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ISL5193.htm>

⁵⁶⁹ “Pakistan: Top Taliban leader arrested,” CBS News, March 4, 2010. Available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/04/world/main6266995.shtml>

⁵⁷⁰ Imran Khan, “Karachi’s War on the Taliban,” *Al Jazeera*, July 1, 2009. Available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/07/20097174112823610.html>

⁵⁷¹ Sabrina Tavernise, *Organized Crime in Pakistan Feeds Taliban*, New York Times, 08/28/2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/29/world/asia/29karachi.html?pagewanted=1>

⁵⁷² Associated Press, *Taliban Fleeing to Pakistani Metropolis to Escape U.S. Airstrikes*, Associated Press, 03/16/2009, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520398,00.html>

⁵⁷³ “Karachi CID building hit by bomb and gun attack,” *BBC News*, November 11, 2010. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11737402>

⁵⁷⁴ Owais Tahid, “Pakistan Taliban go for the jugular with attack on Karachi police compound,” *Christian Science Monitor*, November 11, 2010. Available at <http://tiny.cc/i6c6i>

Baldia on January 28, 2010,⁵⁷⁵ a failed attack on the oil terminal in September 2009,⁵⁷⁶ and an attempted assassination on Benazir Bhutto when she returned from exile that killed 139 people.⁵⁷⁷ The LEJ also mounted an attack on Shia pilgrims in December 2009, fusing both sectarian and anti-state violence, a worrying combination.⁵⁷⁸

These attacks have not abated. In one week in April 2011, suspected militants mounted three attacks against Navy personnel in the city, bombing buses carrying personnel to work.⁵⁷⁹

The Madrassa Factor

Karachi's crowded madrassa landscape does support fundamentalist Sunnis and added to bloody, and ongoing, rounds of sectarian violence. Many Karachi-based madrassas have ties to sectarian, regional and global jihadist groups and represent nearly all South Asian Islamic sects include the Wahabbi-influenced Sunni Deobandis and Ahle-Hadiths, the Shias, the more Sufi-influenced Barelvis, and those run by the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami.

The official 2004 Ministry of Education figure lists 979 madrassas in Karachi, a figure that is universally scoffed at. The Deobandis alone claim over 1,500 and new ones appear with alarming regularity.⁵⁸⁰ This high concentration has helped develop a jihadi cradle that has sustained insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir, but also resulted in considerable spillover of sectarian violence. Three major aggressor-target alignments have emerged over the years, each with significant overlap; the Sunni-Shia rivalry, the intra-Sunni Deobandi-Barelvi conflict and anti-Western terrorism.

Ultra-puritanical Deobandis run a large majority of Karachi's madrassas, and have benefited from Wahhabist petrodollars and state patronage in reward for significant involvement in the Soviet jihad. The most prominent, and notorious Deobandi madrassa is the Jamia Uloom Islamia, informally known as Binori Town after its location. As the birthplace of the Afghan jihad, it carries the mantle of Deobandi leadership in Pakistan and has made little secret of its support for the Taliban.⁵⁸¹ It established and has close links to some of the best-known Pakistani jihadi outfits, including the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the rabidly anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁵ Huma Yousef, "Rare Afghanistan Convoy Attack in Normally Safe Pakistani City," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 28, 2010. Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0128/Rare-Afghanistan-convoy-attack-in-normally-safe-Pakistan-city>

⁵⁷⁶ Zahid Hussein, *Pakistani Police Thwart Attack*, Wall Street Journal, 09/15/2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125302461090612089.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

⁵⁷⁷ Carlotta Gall and Salman Masood, "Bhutto says she warned of plotting days before attack," *New York Times*, October 20, 2007. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/20/world/asia/20Pakistan.html>

⁵⁷⁸ Bill Roggio, "Suicide bomber kills 30 Shia mourners in Karachi," *Long War Journal* December 28, 2009. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/12/suicide_bomber_kills_24.php

⁵⁷⁹ "Militants bomb Pakistani navy bus," *The Guardian*, April 28, 2010. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/28/militants-bomb-pakistani-navy-bus>

⁵⁸⁰ "Karachi's Madrassas and Violent Extremism," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 130, March 29, 2007. Available at <http://tiny.cc/lj1la>

⁵⁸¹ Ibid.

⁵⁸² Imtiaz Ali, "Karachi becoming a Taliban Safe Haven?" CTC Sentinel, Volume 3, Issue 1, January 2010.

Former head cleric Maulana Nizamuddin Shamzai was believed to have been Osama Bin Laden's spiritual mentor and the founder of the notorious anti-Indian Jaish-e-Mohammed, Maulana Masood Azhar was both a student and a teacher at Binori Town.⁵⁸³ **Figure 6.3** highlights other Deobandi madrassas cited for concern including the Jamia Darul Uloom Karachi, Darul Uloom Halafia and the Jamia Binoria, which also operates a branch in New York.⁵⁸⁴

The Jamia Binoria International madrassa, the largest in Karachi, while touted as more moderate, also caters to "several hundred students from 29 countries," including Somalia, the Philippines and Indonesia and many according to the Associated Press are admitted with no security clearance.⁵⁸⁵ Recently Mohammed Rehan an associate of the failed New York Times Square car bomber, Faisal Shahzad was arrested when he left the Bathha Mosque in Karachi run by the Jaish-e-Mohammed.⁵⁸⁶

The Ahle-Hadiths are a Salafi sect that receive the lion's share of Saudi funds⁵⁸⁷ and offer some of the most radical and puritanical interpretations of all Pakistani Sunni sects. Despite having a relatively small number of madrassas in Karachi, 36 by the ICG's count, they are large and prominent, particularly the Jamia Abu-Bakr al-Islamia madrassa that is closely linked to the Lashkar-e-Taiba.⁵⁸⁸

Ahle-Hadith madrassas are also considered more international in their outlook, rarely turning away foreigners unlike many of the Deobandi madrassas.⁵⁸⁹ As a result numerous foreign students are enrolled at their campuses including the brother of the leader of Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiya, responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings.⁵⁹⁰ Other Karachi Ahle-Hadith madrassas include the Darsatul Islamia run by the Jamaat-ud-Dawaa, the charitable arm of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and is often frequented by LET leader Hafeez Saeed.

The Jamaat-e-Islami as the oldest religious political party in Pakistan has approximately 97 mosques with over 8000 students in Karachi, including the Markaz Uloom-e-Deeniya's Alfalah Academy in Sarjani Town, Jamiatul Ikhwan madrasa in New Karachi, and Jamia Darul Islam in Gizri Town.⁵⁹¹ Madrassas belong to the Jamaat have supported jihad across the globe and their alumni have been found on global battlefields, including Afghanistan, Kashmir and Bosnia.

⁵⁸³ William Dalrymple, "Myths and Madrassas," Asia Times, November 25, 2005. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GK24Df01.html

⁵⁸⁴ "Karachi's Madrassas and Violent Extremism," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 130, March 29, 2007.

⁵⁸⁵ Chris Brummit and Ashraf Khan, "Hard-line Pakistani schools a draw for foreigners," *Associated Press*, December 14, 2009. Available at <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9327809>

⁵⁸⁶ Kathy Gannon and Ashraf Khan, "Karachi mosque draws investigators into NY bombing," *Associated Press*, May 6, 2010. Available at <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5inrGSMstmEyCykTPn1iLKC8fyvEAD9FHISKO0>

⁵⁸⁷ Sushant Sareen, "The Jihad Factory: Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making," (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2005), pgs. 281-282

⁵⁸⁸ "Karachi's Madrassas and Violent Extremism," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 130, March 29, 2007, pg. 9

⁵⁸⁹ "Karachi's Madrassas and Violent Extremism," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 130, March 29, 2007.

⁵⁹⁰ Kaushik Kapisthalam, "Learning from Pakistan's madrassas," Asia Times, June 23, 2004. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FF23Df05.html

⁵⁹¹ "Karachi's Madrassas and Violent Extremism," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 130, March 29, 2007. pg. 10-11

As a result madrassas belonging to the Jamaat-e-Islami have often been accused of having some of the most visible ties to international jihadi organizations. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, a senior Al-Qaeda figure, was arrested at the Karachi apartment of a Jamaat member⁵⁹² The Jamaat is also heavily connected to the political pulse of Karachi, and has often been drawn into violent political turf battles and street riots.

The Bareilvi madrassas, while thought to be the most moderate, are not free of their share of radical militant elements. Most connected to Sufi traditions, the Bareilvis are large and organized, but are not trained for war like their Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith counterparts.⁵⁹³ They fight largely to dilute Deobandis and Ahle-Hadith control of Sunni mosques and urban spaces to raise funds and followers. In recent years, they have found themselves in the cross hairs of Deobandi militant groups and have suffered severe blows as a result.

In 2006, 47 Bareilvis, including the entire leadership structure of their militant wing, the Sunni Tehreek, was decapitated in a suicide bombing in Karachi's Nishtar Park.⁵⁹⁴ The attack was blamed on militants from the Lashkar Jhangvi and the SSP. On June 12, 2009, Sarfraz Naeemi, a prominent Bareilvi cleric, was killed by a Taliban suicide bomber in retaliation for his outspokenness against Taliban extremism.⁵⁹⁵

Bareilvis in Karachi have grown increasingly agitated in response to these attacks against their leaders, renewing worries of sectarian violence. In April 2010, Bareilvis in Karachi burnt effigies of Mufti Naeem, the chief cleric at the Deobandi Jamia Binoria, and chanted slogans equating all Deobandis with the Taliban.⁵⁹⁶ More recently in the aftermath of the assassination of Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer and the release of CIA-contractor Raymond Davis, they have jointly protested with the Deobandis, but it is unsure if this will hold.

⁵⁹² Gretchen Peters, *Al Qaeda-Pakistani Ties Deepen*, Christian Science Monitor, 03/06/2003, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0306/p01s04-wosc.html>

⁵⁹³ Arif Jamal, "Sufi Militants Struggle with Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan," *Jamestown Foundation*, February 24, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/IP02Wc>

⁵⁹⁴ Mehreen Zahra-Malik, "In Pakistan, Sunni against Sunni," *Indian Express*, May 25, 2006. Available at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/in-pakistan-sunni-against-sunni/5054/0>

⁵⁹⁵ Pamela Constable, "Cleric's slaying signifies a shift," *Washington Post*, June 16, 2009. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/16/AR2009061603413.html>

⁵⁹⁶ Salman Siddiqui, "The Widening Split," *The Express Tribune*, April 26, 2010. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/9155/the-widening-split/>

Figure 6.3: Radical Madrassas in Karachi⁵⁹⁷

Note: This list is intended to be representative, rather than exhaustive

Name	Sect	Militant Affiliations	Remarks
Jamia Uloom Islamia, Binori Town	Deobandi	Al Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba, Afghan Taliban, Harkat-ul-Ansar	Played crucial role in anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan
Jamiatul Rasheed Ehsanabad	Deobandi	Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba	
Madrassa Khalid Bin Walid	Deobandi	Harkat Jihad-i-Islami, Lashkar-e-Taiba	
Jamia Ehsanul Uloom	Deobandi	Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba	
Darul Uloom Rehmania	Deobandi	Harkat Jihad-i-Islami	
Jamia Anwarul Quran	Deobandi	Harkat-ul-Mujahidin	
Jamia Abu Bakar	Ahle-Hadith	Jemaah Islamiya (Indonesia)	Police uncovered “sleeper cell” of 19 JI cadres in 2003 ⁵⁹⁸
Darasitul Islamia	Ahle-Hadith	Lashkar-e-Taiba	Regular venue for speeches by LET leader Hafeez Saeed,
Madrassa-e-Arabia Faizanul Quran		Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan	Heavy weapons and explosive materials recovered in 2010 ⁵⁹⁹
Jamia Darasat al-Islamia	Ahle-Hadith	Lashkar-e-Taiba	
Madrassa Hussein Bin Ali	Ahle-Hadith	Lashkar-e-Taiba	
Jamia Farooqia	Deobandi	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan	Various militants including TTP leader Qari Hussein Mehsud ⁶⁰⁰
Darul Ifta-e-Wal Irshad	Deobandi	Al Qaeda, Harkat-al-Ansar	Operated by the Al Rashid Trust, ⁶⁰¹ which is accused by the State Department for links with Bin Laden and the JEM.

⁵⁹⁷ A **significant** proportion of this data is taken from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/130_pakistan_karachi_s_madrasas_and_violent_extremism.ashx and Imtiaz Ali, CTC Sentinel

⁵⁹⁸ <http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=4§ion=0&article=32605&d=26&m=9&y=2003>

⁵⁹⁹ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\09\16\story_16-9-2010_pg12_1

⁶⁰⁰ http://www.australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=725:qari-hussain-ahmed-mehsud&catid=73:oped&Itemid=125

Vulnerable Shi'ites

The minority Shia community is the most vulnerable in Karachi and is numerically dwarfed by their Sunni counterparts. The ICG counted about 132 Shia mosques in Karachi with only 36 having attached madrassas.⁶⁰² These are believed to have close links with the Shia militant wing, the Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP). The SMP is a reactionary counterpart to the SSP and is considerably more active in the Punjab and tribal areas than in Karachi, although they are known to travel to the city in times of religious strife.⁶⁰³

In December 2009, on the holy Shia day of Ashura, a suicide bomber attacked a Shi'ite religious procession killing at least 40 and injuring dozens more.⁶⁰⁴ In February 2010 on the next major Shi'ite festival, a double bombing once more targeted Shi'ite pilgrims killing an additional 22.⁶⁰⁵ The Shia response has been relatively more muted and covert.

Some theories believe that the torching of thousands of shops in the aftermath of the Ashura bombing was enraged Shi'ites venting their fury against Pashtun traders whom they equated with the anti-Shia Taliban and SSP. Attacks on prominent Sunni clerics including Maulana Haideri, a senior leader of the SSP and Mufti Jalalpuri, head of a hardline anti-Shia Sunni organization have also been attributed to Shi'ite retribution.⁶⁰⁶

⁶⁰¹ "Al-Rashid Trust," *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, Available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Al-Rashid_Trust.htm

⁶⁰² "Karachi's Madrassas and Violent Extremism," *International Crisis Group*, Asia Report No 130, March 29, 2007

⁶⁰³ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁴ "Bomb attack on Shia march in Pakistani city of Karachi," *BBC News*, December 28, 2009. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8432409.stm>

⁶⁰⁵ "22 killed as bombs hit Karachi," *The Independent*, February 5, 2010. Available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/22-killed-as-bombs-hit-karachi-1890478.html>

⁶⁰⁶ "Funeral held for Karachi Sunni Muslim Cleric," *BBC News*, March 12, 2010. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8563873.stm

SECTION VII: EXTERNAL RELATIONS: THE UNITED STATES

Pakistan is core to U.S. strategic interests including global counterterrorism, Afghan stabilization efforts and efforts to reduce the risk of violent conflict in the region. Increasingly however, the US has found that its influence in Pakistan is extremely limited, despite almost a decade of unprecedented aid and attention, including \$4.34 billion in 2010.⁶⁰⁷

In December 2009, President Obama unveiled an ambitious strategy for Pakistan.

“In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear.

America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan's democracy and development. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistan people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.

These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.”⁶⁰⁸

President Obama's vision has not come to pass. The military retains primacy, civilian institutions remain weak and dysfunctional, and economic prospects have worsened. By December 2010, in the Obama Administration's Afghanistan-Pakistan Review, the US had substantially scaled down the scope of its ambition:

“Pakistan is central to our efforts to defeat al-Qa'ida and prevent its return to the region. We seek to secure these interests through continued, robust counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency cooperation and a long-term partnership anchored by our improved understanding of Pakistan's strategic priorities, increased civilian and military assistance, and expanded public diplomacy.”⁶⁰⁹

Uncertain US Goals and Progress

Unfortunately even these goals will be difficult to achieve. Overall today, in April 2011, the relationship may be on its lowest ebb since 9/11. Pakistan has grown increasingly disillusioned with Washington, which has been manifested in a series of intensifying crises including the closing of a vital border crossing to NATO supply convoys in September 2010, and the

⁶⁰⁷ K. Alan Kronstadt, “Direct Overt US Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan FY2002-FY2011,” *Congressional Research Service*, January 4, 2011. Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf>

⁶⁰⁸ “Transcript of President Obama's West Point Address on Afghanistan,” *White House*, December 1, 2009. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan>

⁶⁰⁹ “Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review,” *White House*, December 16, 2010. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/overview-afghanistan-and-pakistan-annual-review>

unprecedented hardline stance taken by the PAKMIL and the ISI against the CIA presence inside Pakistan in early 2011, including the “covert” US-drone campaign in the FATA.⁶¹⁰

Yet, the US is cognizant of Pakistan’s central role in securing US interests as noted above by President Obama himself. Recent events in 2010 have only amplified this need. The failed NYC Times Square bombing of May 2010 by Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad reiterated Pakistan’s placement as the central node of global terrorism, while in January 2011, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen acknowledged that, “We cannot succeed in Afghanistan, without shutting down those safe havens [in Pakistan].”⁶¹¹ With such strategic divergence, it is hardly surprising that operationally and tactically, Pakistani and US forces have increasingly rubbed up against each other.

It has grown increasingly obvious that the US and Pakistan have very different national and strategic interests that are often in direct conflict with each other, particularly as Pakistan loses faith in the US’s ability to execute sustainable change in Afghanistan, and grows increasingly suspicious of Washington’s pro-Indian lean. Outpolling India in unpopularity is no small feat in Pakistan, but the US has managed to achieve it, a highly worrying indicator.⁶¹²

Pakistani Hostility to the US

The Pakistani populace is one of the most anti-American in the world, which pre-dates 9/11 and is seen in **Figure 7.1**. This trend imposes severe limitations on the ability for Pakistani political actors to be seen as working in collusion with American interests, or worst yet subservient to them. This severe trust deficit is seen at all levels of society, leading to Pakistan often grudgingly pursuing American-backed policies, even if they are in its own interest. Militancy in the FATA for example has gravely impacted internal Pakistani security, yet collaboration with the US against militancy remains difficult. An ISI official touched upon a narrative of national pride and anti-Americanism, explaining, “By appearing as America’s mercenaries, our army’s acceptance level goes down.”⁶¹³

This resentment not only flows from divergent national interest, but also emotion. There is an understandable perception amongst Pakistanis that US interventions in Pakistan, while highly influential in shaping their national destiny, are largely conducted in secrecy. The US has consistently seen the generals of Rawalpindi as more reliable than the civilians and Islamabad, and has relied on strong-men such as Musharraf and now Kayani to secure their interests in the short-term, even if it means damaging the long-term goal of promoting more stable civil-military relations. Today US mistrust with even Rawalpindi is peaking, and the US is increasingly moving to independently secure its interests in Pakistan through covert and contractor personnel, and has deeply chilled relations.

⁶¹⁰ “Pakistan demands deep cuts in CIA presence,” *MSNBC*, April 12, 2011. Available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42550898/ns/us_news-security/

⁶¹¹ Eric Schmitt, “Pakistan’s Failure to Hit Militant Sanctuary has Positive Side for US,” *New York Times*, January 17, 2011. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/world/asia/18terror.html>

⁶¹² “Interview: For Holbrooke, Situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan is ‘Dim and Dismal,’” *New York Times*, January 29, 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/slot3_20090128.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all

⁶¹³ David Ignatius, “At Odds on North Waziristan,” *Real Clear Politics*, December 16, 2010. Available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/12/16/at_odds_on_north_waziristan_108259.html

Yet, US military assistance continues to be heavily weighted towards the military. The GAO calculated that between 2002 and 2008, roughly 70.4% of US disbursements were deployed towards the support of the military, 26.7% towards economic, 2.6% for law enforcement and 0.3% for diplomacy.⁶¹⁴ Appropriations between 2009 and 2010 rectified this disparity somewhat with security-related assistance falling to just under 60% and economic-related assistance rising to compose 40% of the total, according to figures provided by the Congressional Research Service.⁶¹⁵ This prioritization of the military is seen in various incidents, including during the Davis affair in 2011. When it became apparent that the civilian government could not secure Davis' release, the US quickly sidestepped Islamabad in favor of Rawalpindi, and on February 22nd COAS Gen Kayani met with senior US military officials in Oman to discuss his release.⁶¹⁶

Pakistan strongly resents being seen solely as a US strategic asset, and resents what it feels is a lack of gratitude from the US in acknowledgement of the large human and social costs it has borne in service to various US campaigns in the region. Pakistan feels it was abandoned after serving as a frontline ally that was heavily involved in successfully prosecuting a war on America's behalf. The war and the resulting Afghan exodus into Pakistan distressed vast swathes of tribal Pakistan, sprawling refugee camps severely tested Pakistani capacity and a pipeline of weaponry and narcotics weaponized and magnified virtually every internal security threat, from anti-state separatists and insurgents to politico-militant groups and criminal syndicates.

Similarly, many Pakistanis blame US failures in Afghanistan for the spillover of violence into Pakistan. They decry the perceived ingratitude of the US in continuing to pressure and malign Pakistan, even as the country has lost more soldiers in battle than the entire coalition force across the border.⁶¹⁷ Pakistanis do not feel that the US is benevolent in offering aid – many see financial support as a poor replacement for the violence and economic hardships they have endured, which are commonly attributed as a consequence of US actions, leading to a tendency to “see US financial support as an entitlement.”⁶¹⁸ The covert US military program inside Pakistan particularly rankles, and is seen as unaccountable to any local authority and perceived as causing wanton civilian collateral damage.


⁶¹⁴ “Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan's Border with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” *Government Accountability Office*, February 2009. Available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09263sp.pdf>

⁶¹⁵ K. Alan Kronstadt, “Direct Overt US Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan FY2002-FY2011,” *Congressional Research Service*, January 4, 2011. Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf>

⁶¹⁶ Huma Yusuf, “Dealing with Davis: Inconsistencies in the US-Pakistan Relationship,” *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, Number 103, March 28, 2011. Available at <http://tiny.cc/gz7rf>

⁶¹⁷ Indira A.K. Lakshmanan, “Pakistan will move on North Waziristan without US help, Ambassador says,” *Bloomberg*, January 12, 2011. Available at <http://tiny.cc/1bi4r>

⁶¹⁸ Christine Fair, “Spy for a Spy: The CIA-ISI Showdown over Raymond Davis,” *Afpak Channel*, March 10, 2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/10/spy_for_a_spy_the_cia_isi_showdown_over_raymond_davis

Figure 7.1: U.S. Approval Rating in Pakistan (2000-2010)

(Source: Pew Global Attitudes Report 2010)

The Indian Factor

Pakistanis are also worried that the US is improving its relationship with India. In South Asia's zero-sum security environment, any such rapprochement is viewed with alarm. In recent years, it has gained a new dimension as New Delhi extracts major concessions from the US, most notably the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal, and President Obama's backing of India for a Security Council seat.⁶¹⁹ The growing Indo-US military nexus has not gone unnoticed, with US companies bidding for various high-end Indian arms procurements, and increasing joint military exercises between the two in recent years.⁶²⁰ Pakistan also resents Indian influence in Afghanistan, which it sees as being directly facilitated and protected by Washington, and assisting in Pakistan's encirclement by Indian forces.

Gen Kayani made Pakistan's priorities clear in February 2010, when he stated that the Pakistani military would remain "India-centric" and continue to "plan on adversaries' capabilities, not intentions."⁶²¹ Kayani has helped to halt the progress made by Musharraf on reaching a settlement on a Kashmir settlement.⁶²² As the Director General (DG) of the ISI between 2004 and 2007, he is well aware of the utility of strategic proxies in combating India. As such

⁶¹⁹ "Obama backs India on permanent UN Security Council seat," *BBC News*, November 8, 2010. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11711007>

⁶²⁰ Gurmeet Kanwal, "Take Indo-US Ties to New Level," *Defense News*, February 14, 2011. Available at <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5699477>

⁶²¹ "Pakistan Army will remain India-centric: Kayani," *Economic Times*, February 4, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/mez2A4>

⁶²² Apoorve Shah, "Pakistan's Time in the Shadows," *Wall Street Journal*, April 15, 2011. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704116404576262364187189694.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

Washington's recent aggressive pursuit of two of the most important – the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e-Taiba – is unlikely to have sat well. It is also likely that as the Indo-US relationship continues to warm, the stronger the Sino-Pakistani bond will get, as Islamabad looks to Beijing for support in maintaining some level of strategic parity with India.

The Impact of Pakistani and Indian Competition for Influence in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a major axis of Indo-Pakistani strategic competition. The US now seems committed to remaining in Afghanistan till 2014, at the earliest, but Pakistan (and other regional actors), remain skeptical of its ability to execute any sustainable change, in either decisively reversing the Taliban's battlefield momentum, or in building up an adequate governance and security structure that will not fragment immediately upon US departure.

As a result, with the Afghan endgame nearing, Pakistan increasingly prioritizes its ability to shape the post-war structure, and maneuvers to assure itself a central, and preferably preeminent, role. The Karzai government does not suit Pakistan, which it sees as dominated by a Tajik-Uzbek coalition that is hostile to Pakistan. Pakistan particularly resents the Panjshiri factions, many of whom dominate the ANA today,⁶²³ and who in the 1990s as the Northern Alliance, drew support from India (and Iran and Russia) to resist the Pakistani-backed Taliban.

As a result, Pakistan continues to retain various strategic proxies, particularly the Afghan Taliban, to hedge against any post-war Afghan settlement that does not adequately account for its interests, a matter that arouses deep anger in Washington. Pakistan has also largely sidelined Indian influence in Afghanistan, which remains primarily composed of 'soft power' assets that are unlikely to survive without a coalition military shield, ensuring that Pakistan and the US are the only two dominant external powerbrokers in Afghanistan.

To further hedge its interests, Pakistan has sought to exploit the Karzai government's growing disenchantment with its US relationship. In June 2010, it secured the removal of the strongly anti-Pakistani Afghan spy chief Amrullah Saleh and Interior Minister Hanif Atmar in,⁶²⁴ and the Pakistani military made an offer to train ANA forces.⁶²⁵ In April 2011, it was reported that senior Pakistani officials, including Prime Minister Gilani, urged Karzai to disengage from the US relationship, and instead forge better ties with China.⁶²⁶ I

It is reported that Pakistani demands included urging Kabul to oppose long-term US bases in Afghanistan, to reduce the number of Indian consulates, to expel Baloch separatist leaders, to allow the Haqqanis a role in the Afghan government, to reduce the influence of the Northern Alliance in the government and assure Pakistan a role in the appointment of key security ministries, including defense and intelligence – in return for which Pakistan would pressure

⁶²³ Antonio Giustozzi, "The Afghan National Army: Unwarranted Hope?" *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, No. 6, 2009, pp. 36-42.

⁶²⁴ Jonathan Burch and Hamid Shalizi, "Afghan ex-intel chief says opposed Karzai peace plan," *Reuters*, June 8, 2010. Available at <http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/06/07/idINIndia-49116020100607>

⁶²⁵ "India, Pakistan and the Afghan Army," *Reuters (blog)*, March 11, 2010. Available at <http://blogs.reuters.com/afghanistan/2010/03/11/india-pakistan-and-the-afghan-army/>

⁶²⁶ Jill Dougherty, "Source: Pakistan's PM urged Afghans to seek other allies besides US," *CNN*, April 28, 2011. Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/04/28/pakistan.afghan.meeting/>

Taliban militants towards political reconciliation with the Karzai government.⁶²⁷ Whether these details are correct or not, the above list is a good encapsulation of the desired Pakistani vision for a post-American Afghanistan.

It is often assumed that “the United States is subject to Pakistani leverage as long as Washington maintains massive combat forces in Afghanistan.”⁶²⁸ To a large extent this is true. Given geography, history and calculated Pakistani action, the fates of Afghanistan and Pakistan are heavily intertwined. However this risks understating the US’s own leverage, as well as the exaggeration that Pakistan itself has fostered.

Since the 9/11 “ultimatum” by then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage,⁶²⁹ the US apart from occasional fits of pique has rarely tested Pakistan, and despite various Pakistani initiatives contrary to its interests has never stopped the flow of extensive military and civilian assistance. The US has however taken limited steps to reduce its dependence on Pakistan, notably by initiating the Northern Distribution Network, an alternative transit route for NATO supplies.

“Victimhood”

It is also important to note, that in as much as there are legitimate grievances on the Pakistani side, there is also an institutionalized “narrative of national victimhood”⁶³⁰ that is pervasive across Pakistan and prefers to deflect all of the country’s societal ills on external powers, instead of addressing its own complicity in perpetuating their rise. Conspiracy theories, many ludicrous, and mostly centered around the nefarious plots of India, the US, Israel and Blackwater, are a staple of Pakistani discourse, leading prominent Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal to rename Pakistan, “Paranoidistan.”⁶³¹

Many conspiracy theories, even if not grounded in reality, provide a valuable window into Pakistani perceptions. A favorite focuses on the US’s alleged role in assisting India to seize Pakistani nuclear weapons, others exaggerate US influence by pontificating on the building of a secret US nuclear bunker underneath the embassy in Islamabad,⁶³² while others still note the apparent collusion between the US and terrorist groups, including the TTP and al-Qaeda.⁶³³

The Pakistani media, whose development the US encourages, is an important disseminator of many of these theories. Prominent newspapers and magazines, including English language ones, are not averse to including sometimes the most outlandish speculations as fact. As Ahmed

⁶²⁷ Ahmad K. Majidyar, “Pakistan Tells Afghanistan: Expel the Americans,” *American Enterprise Institute*, April 28, 2011. Available at <http://www.aei.org/article/103534>

⁶²⁸ Paul Staniland, “Caught in the Muddle: America’s Pakistan Strategy,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 134-148.

⁶²⁹ “We’ll bomb you to the Stone Age,” *Times Online*, September 22, 2006. Available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article647188.ece

⁶³⁰ Sabrina Tavernise, “US is top villain in Pakistan’s conspiracy talks,” *New York Times*, May 25, 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/world/asia/26pstan.html>

⁶³¹ Arnaud De Borchgrave, “Paranoidistan,” *Washington Times*, February 2, 2010. Available at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/2/paranoidistan/>

⁶³² “American embassy in Islamabad building nuclear bunker,” *Siyasat Pakistan (Urdu)*, January 17, 2011. Available at <http://www.siasat.pk/forum/showthread.php?54089-American-embassy-in-Islamabad-building-nuclear-bunker>

⁶³³ Sultan Hali, “CIA’s multinational interests in Pak,” *Pakistan Observer*, <http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=79119>

Rashid, the doyen of studies on Pakistani radical Islam describes, the explosive growth in media outlets post-Musharraf's repressive media restrictions, has led to "large numbers of largely untrained, semi-educated and unworldly TV talk show hosts and journalists" alongside "pundits – often retired hardline diplomats, bureaucrats or retired ISI officers who sport Taliban-style beards and give viewers loud, angry crash courses in anti-Westernism and anti-Indianism, thereby reinforcing views already held by many."⁶³⁴

These include influential media personalities such as Hamid Mir, who was recorded assisting the Taliban on deciding whether a hostage held by them was a CIA spy or not,⁶³⁵ and others such as Zaid Hamid whose one noteworthy accomplishment is coining the phrase "Hindu-Zionists" to help explain who 'perpetrated' the 2008 Mumbai attacks.⁶³⁶

US Military Involvement in Pakistan

The United States has had a long military-to-military relationship with Pakistan that has gone through various phases over the past decades. Ties were particularly strong during the days of the Soviet jihad, when the US worked closely with General Zia. By the 1990s, the relationship had largely splintered, in part due to diminished attention as a result of the end of the Cold War, and due to the sanctions triggered by Pakistan's nuclear program.

The Pressler Amendment of 1985 that came into force in 1990 was as a major driver of alienation between the two forces. The Amendment denied aid to Pakistan contingent on annual certifications that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear weapon. Pakistani military officials saw such pressure as a tremendous betrayal after its loyal service during the Soviet jihad, and the halting of weapons transfers, in particular several F-16s that were seen by US as having dual applicability as a nuclear delivery system⁶³⁷ deeply chilled relations.

The subsequent result was a decade of isolation, which led to the rise of a generation of Pakistani officers, denied any contact with their US counterparts, allowing widespread anti-American sentiment to permeate the ranks. In a speech to Pakistan officers in Islamabad, then US Secretary of Defense Gates admitted that US policy during the period had been a "grave strategic mistake,"⁶³⁸ and admitted that, "one of the reasons that the Pakistanis have concerns about us is that we walked away from them twice... first after the Soviets left... [and then] through the 1990s because of the Pressler Amendment."⁶³⁹ However, as Christine Fair notes the break in

⁶³⁴ Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan conspiracy theories stifle debate," *BBC News*, November 27, 2009. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8369914.stm>

⁶³⁵ "Hamid Mir's terrifying indiscretions," *The News*, May 16, 2010. Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\05\16\story_16-5-2010_pg1_6

⁶³⁶ "Brass Tacks 73.5 – Mumbai Attacks Analysis – Zaid Hamid," *Youtube*, November 29, 2008. Available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Sn-kV9yR6U>

⁶³⁷ "The Pressler Amendment and Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program," *Federation of American Scientists*, July 31, 1992. Available at <http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1992/920731.htm>

⁶³⁸ "Military to Military Relationships: The Ties That Bind," *Economist*, February 24, 2011. Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/18227542>

⁶³⁹ "Pakistani mistrust of Americans legitimate, says Gates," *Dawn*, August 15, 2009. Available at <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/100758>

relationship was not entirely one-sided as Pakistan made a deliberate “strategic choice to develop nuclear weapons at the expense of taking ownership of the fleet of F-16s.”⁶⁴⁰

The impact of 9/11 changed the equation and soon President Musharraf had signed on to President Bush’s war on terrorism. By 2004 Pakistan had been declared a major non-NATO ally,⁶⁴¹ and major arms sales and extensive military assistance and links sought to re-forge the relationship. Chairman of the JSC Adm. Mike Mullen in particular has been a key point-person for the Obama Administration. In the past three and a half years, he has flown to Pakistan for over 20 meetings with COAS Gen Kayani,⁶⁴² and has often commented that he is now on his ‘third cup of tea’ with Kayani.⁶⁴³ This reputed friendship has however not always benefited the US; relations remain fraught with tension.

Drone Strikes

The use of unmanned aerial aircraft (UAV, or colloquially drones) over Pakistan is a relatively new phenomenon that has escalated exponentially under the Obama Administration. **Figure 7.2** uses data provided by the *Long War Journal* to demonstrate how US drone strikes have increased substantially since 2008, rising to a high of 117 by 2010. The US has also shifted its targeting scope to more aggressively pursue fighters belonging to the Haqqanis, and to Hafiz Gul Bahadur, two groups that make up the bulk of fighting strength in North Waziristan.

The vast majority of US drone strikes have focused on North and South Waziristan. As LWJ details, over the past two years, there has been a significant shift in the location of strikes. In 2009, 42% of strikes targeted North Waziristan and 51% targeted South Waziristan, but in 2010, the balance shifted drastically with 89% of all strikes taking place in North Waziristan, and only 6% in South Waziristan.⁶⁴⁴

This focus on North Waziristan is not unsurprising; it remains one of the only FATA agencies in which PAKMIL forces have not conducted operations, and the agency houses some of the most effective Afghan insurgent syndicates, including the Haqqani network and fighters loyal to Hafiz Gul Bahadur, both of whom actively target coalition forces in Afghanistan. American officials have also indicated their desire to expand the drone campaign into Balochistan, to target the Quetta Shura, but have been met with firm denials to date.⁶⁴⁵ FATA is a particularly unusual case, in that it has always been an ancillary component of the state; Balochistan is not.

⁶⁴⁰ Christine Fair, “The US-Pakistan F-16 Fiasco,” *AfPak Channel*, February 4, 2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/03/the_f_16_fiasco


⁶⁴¹ “Bush names Pakistan major ally,” *BBC News*, June 17, 2004. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3814013.stm>

⁶⁴² “Military to Military Relationships: The Ties That Bind,” *Economist*, February 24, 2011.


⁶⁴³ Dan Ephron, “Try A Little Tea and Sympathy,” *Newsweek*, February 28, 2009. Available at <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/02/27/try-a-little-tea-and-sympathy.html>

⁶⁴⁴ Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Charting the Data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2011,” *Long War Journal*. Available at <http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php>, accessed April 27, 2011.

⁶⁴⁵ Muhammad Zamir Assadi, “The United States may expand drone strikes in Pakistan,” *New American*, December 13, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/m0Euzz>

Figure 7.2: US Drone Strikes by Targeted Militant Groups (April 12, 2011)

(Source: Long War Journal)

Figure 7.3: Militant to Civilian Casualties in US Drone Strikes

(Source: New America Foundation, "The Year of the Drone")

This use of drones has been a source of tension between the US and Pakistan. Any US military activity within Pakistan is unpopular with the Pakistani people, and the drone campaign has been no exception.

Part of the reason for this anger has been the civilian casualties such attacks cause, although many Pakistanis -- including many officers and officials simply oppose any outside military presence or use of force, and see the US as anti-Islamic and as destabilizing Pakistan through the war on terrorism and Afghan conflict. Many of the Pakistani complaints about casualties, however, seem to be exaggerated for political purposes and in an effort to gain leverage over the US by exploiting popular anger.

Officers and officials often frame their opposition to the use of drones in the form of complaints about inaccurate US targeting, excessive civilian casualties, and a claimed inability to strike senior militant leaders. In the process, Pakistani officials have often exaggerated the casualty impact of drone strikes, feeding the general perception inside Pakistan that US raids heavily target civilians. This has a major impact on Pakistani media and politics. A poll conducted of a sample of Pakistani journalists, where 76% of those polled voiced positive perceptions of the American people, found that 87% felt that US forces should not be allowed to operate on Pakistani soil, and 67% defined US drone strikes as terrorist attacks.⁶⁴⁶ Political opponents, recently including Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, have seized on the drone issue to embarrass the ruling PPP-coalition.⁶⁴⁷

There is some merit to Pakistani complaints. Some independent US analysts suggest that only about a dozen of those killed in drone strikes in the past year were militant leaders -- lending credence to the Pakistani argument that these strikes do little more than inflame public anger.⁶⁴⁸ It should be noted, however, that senior US officials disagree. There have been numerous reports from the US and ISAF about successful strikes on militants, and Michael Hayden, former CIA-director, claims that such strikes have been a "very strong significant force in making the al Qaeda senior leadership spend most of their waking moments worrying about their survival."⁶⁴⁹

In practice, detailed estimates of both total civilian casualties, and the ratio of such casualties relative to the number of militants killed, seem remarkably low for the number of strikes involved. They certainly seem far lower than would result from other ways of using force to strike at the same targets and achieve the same objectives.

The comparative impact of drone strike on militant and civilian casualties is shown in **Figure 7.3**, which is adapted from data provided by the *New America Foundation*. These data contain somewhat higher civilian casualties than similar estimates in the *Long War Journal*. Even so, the figures provided (utilizing "high estimates" of civilian casualties) clearly show a marked improvement in US targeting. Civilian collateral damage fell as low as 6% in 2010, even though drone strikes more than doubled between 2009 and 2010.

⁶⁴⁶ Huma Yusuf, "Fallout of the Davis case," *Dawn*, February 24, 2011. Available at <http://www.dawn.com/2011/02/21/fallout-of-the-davis-case.html>

⁶⁴⁷ "Drone strikes giving rise to extremism," *Express Tribune*, April 13, 2011. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/148736/drone-strikes-giving-rise-extremism-cm-punjab/>

⁶⁴⁸ Peter Bergen, "Pakistan wants to cut CIA drone strikes, personnel," *CNN*, April 13, 2011. Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/04/12/pakistan.cia.drones/?hpt=T2>

⁶⁴⁹ "Ex-CIA Head praises drone warfare," *Homeland Security Newswire*, March 22, 2011. Available at <http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/ex-cia-head-praises-drone-warfare>

Moreover, drone attacks are not always unpopular, and the 2009 killing of TTP emir, Beitullah Mehsud, was widely welcomed by the Pakistani military.⁶⁵⁰ Moreover, Major General Ghayur Mehsud, the Pakistani military commander in North Waziristan, told reporters that, “a majority of those eliminated are terrorists” – although Meshud’s comments then received blistering public criticism. An official paper issued by the Pakistani 7th Division claimed that 164 drone strikes between 2007 and 2011 killed 964 terrorists, including 171 foreigners, supporting US insistence that drones targeted and killed far more militants.⁶⁵¹

Popular anger over the use of drones did abated in 2008 and 2009, as Pakistanis grew more sensitive to the dangers of radical militancy emanating from the tribal areas. However, but Pakistani anger resurfaced in 2010, in part because of other tensions with the US. Moreover, a US drone strike killed over 40 people in March 2011, including many civilians. This was in the worst case of civilian collateral since potentially 2006. This led I COAS Kayani to issue an unusually strong statement terming the attack “unjustified and intolerable.”⁶⁵²

Intelligence Cooperation and Conflict

Intelligence cooperation should be a hallmark of the US-Pakistani relationship, but relations between the ISI and CIA have significantly deteriorated since 2009 – partly because of the very different conceptions each nation has of what a post-war Afghanistan should be. The ISI and CIA have always had a difficult relationship, given persistent rumors of the ISI’s continued ties to militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, most notably the Afghan Taliban (both Quetta Shura and Haqqani factions). Tensions between the two agencies have risen steadily in recent years, particularly through the end of 2010, which may be a function of their concern with the “possibility of some form of transition or reconciliation in the Afghan conflict.

The US questions Pakistan’s willingness to actively pursue several jihadi groups that work against US interests, in Afghanistan and abroad, and as a result has increasingly moved to independently manage intelligence activity inside Pakistan. Such a move has naturally infuriated the ISI, which resents any dilution of its monopoly on intelligence operations inside Pakistan, and has been reflected in a series of public crises. In December 2010 for example, the CIA station chief in Pakistan was publicly outed and forced to leave the country after being publicly identified in a legal complaint, a matter US authorities strongly believed was orchestrated by the ISI.⁶⁵³

The US, and Pakistan also scaled up operations in ways that increasingly infringed on each other’s “red lines.” Previous US operations affecting Pakistan generally followed the “Reagan Rules;” they centered on a light US military footprint, and put a heavy reliance on the ISI and PAKMIL to do the bulk of heavy lifting on their own terms. In the 1980s for example, “fewer

⁶⁵⁰ Pir Zubair Shah, Sabrina Tavernise and Mark Mazzetti, “Taliban leader in Pakistan is reportedly killed,” *New York Times*, August 7, 2009. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/world/asia/08pstan.html>

⁶⁵¹ Brian Glynn Williams, “Accuracy of the US drone campaign: The Views of a Pakistani General,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 4, No. 3, March 2011. Available at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss3.pdf>

⁶⁵² “Pakistan army chief Kayani in US drone outburst,” *BBC News*, March 17, 2011. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12779232>

⁶⁵³ Salman Masood, “Pakistan Says it Didn’t Tell Spy’s Identity,” *New York Times*, December 18, 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/world/asia/19pstan.html>

than 100 officers ran the entire program in Washington, Islamabad and Riyadh – and never threatened Pakistani sovereignty or dignity.”⁶⁵⁴

The Raymond Davis affair in early 2011 also highlighted the tensions in CIA-ISI relations. Davis, a CIA contractor shot and killed two men allegedly trying to rob him in Lahore, and was denied diplomatic immunity, held for 47 days, allegedly questioned for 14 days by the ISI, and then finally released after intense American pressure, and \$2.3 million paid to the families of the deceased as “blood money.”⁶⁵⁵ As Christine Fair points out, the public furor surrounding these events suggests direct attempts by the ISI to manufacture public outrage. Earlier in 2010 for example, when a US diplomat drunkenly got into his car and hit a young man, the ISI quickly downplayed the incident and the diplomat was ferreted out of the country, and little of the incident made the newspapers.⁶⁵⁶

In mid-April 2011, ISI chief Shuja Pasha travelled to Washington to meet with his counterparts. Recent press reports suggest that on direct order for COAS General Kayani himself, during the trip, Pakistani military officials allegedly demanded the withdrawal of 335 American personnel, a number they claim constitutes about 25-40% of the American CIA and SOF presence inside Pakistan,⁶⁵⁷ a number US officials label “vastly inflated.”⁶⁵⁸ The Pakistani government is also believed to have demanded the suspension of the CIA drone program, which Pakistan’s Foreign Minister labeled a “core irritant,”⁶⁵⁹ until “new rules” and “formalized terms” could be established.⁶⁶⁰

It is a symbol of the anger on both sides, that even -- as this incident was playing out -- a drone struck in South Waziristan, the first strike in almost a month.⁶⁶¹ A senior Pakistani intelligence official bitterly exclaimed, “If the message was that business will continue as usual, it was a crude way of sending it.”⁶⁶²

Some of this anger from the Pakistani military and may be a result of more aggressive US pursuit pursuing of groups that Pakistan see as its strategic proxies. US officials have repeatedly urged an expansion of theater into North Waziristan to target the Haqqani network, and in recent months senior US military officials have more explicitly labeled the Lashkar-e-Taiba as a threat

⁶⁵⁴ Bruce Riedel, “No Return to ‘Reagan Rules,’” *New York Times*, April 12, 2011. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/04/12/when-pakistan-says-no-to-the-cia/no-return-of-reagan-rules>

⁶⁵⁵ Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan, “Pakistan tells US it must sharply cut CIA activities,” *New York Times*, April 11, 2011. Available at <http://nyti.ms/m1MEuf>

⁶⁵⁶ Christine Fair, “Spy for a Spy: The CIA-ISI Showdown over Raymond Davis,” *AfPak Channel*, March 10, 2011.

⁶⁵⁷ Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan, “Pakistan tells US it must sharply cut CIA activities,” *New York Times*, April 11, 2011.

⁶⁵⁸ Pam Benson, “Official: Frank Discussion between US, Pakistan Intelligence Chiefs,” *CNN*, April 12, 2011. Available at <http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/04/11/us.pakistan.intelligence.talks/>

⁶⁵⁹ “US missiles hit Pakistan despite request to limit,” *AP*, April 13, 2011. Available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110413/ap_on_re_as/as_pakistan

⁶⁶⁰ Peter Bergen, “Pakistan wants to cut CIA drone strikes, personnel,” *CNN*, April 13, 2011. Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/04/12/pakistan.cia.drones/?hpt=T2>

⁶⁶¹ Chris Allbritton, “US strike kills 6 in Pakistan, first since March,” *Reuters*, April 13, 2011. Available at <http://reut.rs/hlZghs>

⁶⁶² Eric Schmitt, “New CIA drone attack draws rebuke from Pakistan,” *New York Times*, April 13, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/world/asia/14pakistan.html?_r=1&src=twrhp

to US interests.⁶⁶³ Given the Pakistani resistance to actively combating these groups, it is believed that the CIA has independently stepped up its efforts, through the use of agency and contracted personnel. Davis for example, was rumored to be working in conjunction with a covert CIA-led cell in Lahore that among other things, sought to track members of the LeT and their madrassa networks in the city.⁶⁶⁴

The covert US presence inside Pakistan has been a key source of resentment, and includes American intelligence personnel, US military trainers and contracted personnel. US officials acknowledge a 300-strong SOF contingent inside Pakistan to serve as trainers.⁶⁶⁵ A Wikileaks cable from October 2009 indicated their presence in both South and North Waziristan, with a “fusion cell” embedded with PAKMIL’s XI Corps in Peshawar to jointly conduct ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) operations.⁶⁶⁶ At least in the public domain, senior Pakistani military officials have expressed their worries that these forces might be tasked with spying and collecting information on the military, particularly its nuclear weapons,⁶⁶⁷ although this appears rather far-fetched, since they work closely with their Pakistani counterparts and are no doubt closely watched.

Information on covert CIA personnel is scarce, although there is evidence, that contractor personnel, who are deeply unpopular in Pakistan, are extensively employed in support of US operations. Contractors offer plausible deniability, as well as increase the US’s freedom of action inside Pakistan, a move Pakistan might be mirroring. Christine Fair reported that the two men Davis shot in Lahore were ISI-contracted personnel themselves, leading to the violence being less “spook-on-spook” as “spook-contractor on spook-contractor.”⁶⁶⁸

In end-2009, it was reported that US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was running a covert cell in Karachi to collect intelligence, as well as execute raids against high-value targets, all apparently manned by Blackwater (now Xe) personnel.⁶⁶⁹ Similarly while the CIA flies the drones, it has been reported that at one point Blackwater and other contractor personnel provided local security, and loaded weapons.⁶⁷⁰ The US State Department’s Bureau of International

⁶⁶³ “Lashkar-e-Taiba expanding, has global ambitions: US General,” *Reuters*, April 13, 2011. Available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-13/india/29413070_1_militant-group-holy-war-maldives

⁶⁶⁴ Mark Mazzetti, Ashley Parker, Jane Perlez and Eric Schmitt, “American held in Pakistan worked with CIA,” *New York Times*, February 21, 2011. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html>

⁶⁶⁵ Bradley Klapper, “US, Pakistan negotiate CIA, special forces numbers,” *Forbes*, April 12, 2011. Available at http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/04/12/general-us-us-pakistan_8404913.html

⁶⁶⁶ Chris Allbritton, “Pakistan request for fewer US trainers reflects spying fear,” *Reuters*, April 12, 2011. Available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20110412/pl_nm/us_pakistan_usa

⁶⁶⁷ Julie McCarthy, “Conspiracy theories ‘stamped in DNA’ of Pakistanis,” *NPR*, December 24, 2009. Available at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121880229>

⁶⁶⁸ Christine Fair, “On a Collision Course,” *New York Times*, April 12, 2011. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/04/12/when-pakistan-says-no-to-the-cia/the-us-and-pakistan-on-a-collision-course>

⁶⁶⁹ Jeremy Seahill, “The Secret US War in Pakistan,” *The Nation*, November 23, 2009. Available at <http://www.thenation.com/article/secret-us-war-pakistan>

⁶⁷⁰ “CIA cancels Blackwater drone missile-loading contract,” *BBC News*, December 12, 2009. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8409358.stm>

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs counter-narcotics program similarly relies upon DynCorp personnel to fly its 17 helicopters inside Pakistan.⁶⁷¹

The CIA is believed to operate a network of local Pashtun informants from eastern Afghanistan to help infiltrate militant networks in Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan.⁶⁷² These forces have also recently have been accused of also executing cross-border ground raids into Pakistan.⁶⁷³ One such organization, the Paktika Defense Force, is reported to have executed at least two cross-border raids, including one that destroyed a Taliban ammunition depot.⁶⁷⁴

The Pakistani military's control and influence over media organizations in Pakistan has also been utilized to communicate the ISI's displeasure and to mobilize public anger against the US. Aamer Ahmed Khan, former editor of the Pakistani news magazine Herald, claims that the military's media arm, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) maintains a sophisticated apparatus that overshadows the civilian Information Ministry, and is able to use its influence to selectively shape the stories they desire, for example downplaying violence in Balochistan or highlighting US abuses in the FATA; "They [the media] are not ignoring it. They are very clearly being told to ignore it. And that speaks for the extent of influence that the current military media machine has over the Pakistani media."⁶⁷⁵ Various "leaked" documents have highlighted this trend, in particular one in February 2011 that highlighted an 'internal assessment' of how the Davis case was fracturing relations with the CIA.⁶⁷⁶

The CIA and US military may make modest compromises to enhance intelligence sharing and ease tension with Pakistan and the ISI. There are limits to such compromises, however, given worries about the ISI's reliability, reports the ISI revealed sensitive issues such as drone targets prior to strikes, and handed over information on covert US personnel.⁶⁷⁷ The CIA has denied any plans to suspend the drone campaign with a senior US official saying, "[CIA director] Panetta has been clear with his Pakistani counterparts that his fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, and he will not halt operations that support that objective."⁶⁷⁸

Ground Force Raids Backlash

NATO has occasionally used helicopter gunships and heliborne troops to conduct cross-border strikes usually in 'hot pursuit' of fleeing militants. While the Pakistani military tolerates some

⁶⁷¹ "The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Air Wing Project in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Program Audit," *US Department of State*, March 2010. Available at <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/139642.pdf>

⁶⁷² Spencer Ackerman, "CIA snitches are Pakistan drone spotters," *Wired Danger Room*, September 23, 2010. Available at <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/09/cia-snitches-are-pakistan-drone-spotters/>

⁶⁷³ Spencer Ackerman, "CIA's Afghan kill teams expand US war in Pakistan," *Wired Danger Room*, September 22, 2010. Available at <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/09/cias-afghan-kill-teams-expand-u-s-war-in-pakistan/>

⁶⁷⁴ Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, "US military seeks to expand raids into Pakistan," *New York Times*, December 20, 2010. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/world/asia/21intel.html>

⁶⁷⁵ Abubakar Siddique and Abdul Hai Kakar, "Pakistani Media Still Seen as on a Tight Leash," *RFE/RL*, April 8, 2011. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/pakistan_media_controlled_by_military/3551125.html

⁶⁷⁶ James Lamont, Farhan Bokhari, "Analysis: South Asia: On the High Ground," *Financial Times*, February 28, 2011. Available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d6cfaac-4377-11e0-8f0d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Iu0eTPCw>

⁶⁷⁷ Nicholas Schiffrin and Jake Tapper, "CIA 'Considering' Intelligence Deal with Pakistan: Officials," *Washington Post*, April 13, 2011. Available at <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cia-share-pakistan-agent-info-reveal-drone-targets/story?id=13365231>

⁶⁷⁸ "CIA will not halt operations in Pakistan: official," *AFP*, April 14, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/hDBu6I>

aspects of the US drone campaign, it has vociferously denounced any ground incursions by US or NATO forces.

Some of these raids have resulted in vociferous Pakistani denouncements. In September 2008, US forces conducted the first publicly acknowledged cross-border ground raid into Pakistan, killing 20 Pakistanis, which led COAS Gen. Kayani to issue a strongly worded statement declaring, "The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country will be defended at all cost and no external force is allowed to conduct operations inside Pakistan... There is no question of any agreement or understanding with the Coalition forces, whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border."⁶⁷⁹

US SEAL Team 6 is believed to have raided a suspected AQ compound at Damadola in 2006.⁶⁸⁰ On September 27th, 2010, ISAF commanders confirmed that NATO helicopters had crossed the border in 'hot pursuit,' and killed 49 militants, a move they claimed did not violate ISAF rules of engagement.⁶⁸¹ Three days later on September 30, 2010, another ground raid was reported that killed three Frontier Corps soldiers, leading various politicians including Interior Minister Rehman Malik to express fury and demand that next time Pakistan go "beyond protest."⁶⁸²

Ground force raids are one of the most sensitive of Pakistani 'red lines.' Violations deeply strain US-Pakistani relations, and have led to strong countermeasures by the Pakistani military. During the 2008 raid, Pakistani forces opened fire on US helicopters providing support,⁶⁸³ and after the September 2010, Pakistan moved immediately moved to close the Torkham border crossing in the Khyber Pass, which is said to account for over 66% of non-lethal NATO supplies transiting to Afghanistan through Pakistan.⁶⁸⁴ The closure of the crossing point for over a week led to a severe backlog of trucks, making them easy targets for insurgents who mounted several attacks during the period, amid accusations that the Pakistani military had 'green-lighted' such attacks.⁶⁸⁵

Pakistan's failure to act, however, has led the US to continue to consider such attacks. In December 2010, there was increased open source reporting on the US military's desire to conduct more such raids, although senior military officials including Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, the deputy chief of staff for communications for NATO, claimed in late December 2010 that there was "absolutely no truth" to such reports.⁶⁸⁶ Since the September attacks, ISAF and

⁶⁷⁹ K. Alan Krondstadt, "Pakistan-US Relations," *Congressional Research Service*, february 6, 2009. Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf>

⁶⁸⁰ Noah Shachtman, "US commandoes hit Pakistan; Islamabad howls," *Wired Danger Room*, September 4, 2008. Available at <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/09/us-special-oper/>

⁶⁸¹ "NATO choppers cross into Pakistan chasing insurgents," *CNN*, September 27, 2010. Available at http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-27/world/afghanistan.pakistan.raid_1_nato-forces-isaf-insurgents?_s=PM:WORLD

⁶⁸² Issam Ahmed, "NATO helicopter strike on Pakistan shows new strategy of 'hot pursuit,'" *Christian Science Monitor*, September 30, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/d1YRrY>

⁶⁸³ "US, Pakistan exchange shots at volatile border," *CNN*, September 25, 2008. Available at http://articles.cnn.com/2008-09-25/world/pakistan.helicopters_1_pakistani-troops-warning-shots-pakistani-afghan?_s=PM:WORLD

⁶⁸⁴ Andrew C. Kuchins and Thomas M. Sanderson, "The Northern Distribution Network and the Modern Silk Road," *CSIS*, December 2009.

⁶⁸⁵ Bill Roggio, "Taliban torch 35 more NATO tankers in Pakistan," *Long War Journal*, October 6, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/10/taliban_torch_another_1.php

⁶⁸⁶ Laura King, "NATO denies that US plans ground raids into Pakistan," *Los Angeles Times*, December 22, 2010. Available at <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/22/world/la-fg-pakistan-raids-20101222>

NATO also strongly denied any reports that their forces crossed the border, including twice in November 2010.⁶⁸⁷

This situation very publicly changed in May 2010. On May 1, 2011, a team of 20-25 US Navy SEALs mounted a raid against a compound in the city of Abbottabad that killed Osama Bin Laden. At the time of writing, details are extremely murky, but it appears the raid was coordinated between the US Joint Special Operations Command and the CIA, and involved several US helicopters, including one that may have encountered mechanical difficulties was forced to land, and subsequently destroyed.⁶⁸⁸ There are strong indications that Pakistan was not informed prior to the raid, and that their involvement remained minimal and largely restricted to the aftermath of the operation.

Given the nature of the target, any Pakistani anger has not yet been publicly voiced. The Pakistani government did issue a statement on May 3, 2011, however, that is an indication that tensions are unlikely to diminish.⁶⁸⁹

The Government of Pakistan categorically denies the media reports suggesting that its leadership, civil as well as military, had any prior knowledge of the US operation against Osama bin Laden carried out in the early hours of 2nd May 2011.

...Abbottabad and the surrounding areas have been under sharp focus of intelligence agencies since 2003 resulting in highly technical operation by ISI which led to the arrest of a high value Al Qaeda target in 2004. As far as the target compound is concerned, ISI had been sharing information with CIA and other friendly intelligence agencies since 2009.

...It is important to highlight that taking advantage of much superior technological assets, CIA exploited the intelligence leads given by us to identify and reach Osama bin Laden, a fact also acknowledged by the US President and Secretary of State, in their statements. It is also important to mention that CIA and some other friendly intelligence agencies have benefitted a great deal from the intelligence provided by ISI. ISI's own achievements against Al Qaeda and in War on Terror are more than any other intelligence agency in the world.

...Reports about US helicopters taking off from Ghazi Airbase are absolutely false and incorrect. Neither any base or facility inside Pakistan was used by the US Forces, nor Pakistan Army provided any operational or logistic assistance to these operations conducted by the US Forces. US helicopters entered Pakistani airspace making use of blind spots in the radar coverage due to hilly terrain. US helicopters' undetected flight into Pakistan was also facilitated by the mountainous terrain, efficacious use of latest technology and 'map of the earth' flying techniques.

...This operation was designed to minimize the prospects, the chances of engagement with Pakistani forces. It was done very well, and thankfully no Pakistani forces were engaged and there were no other individuals who were killed aside from those on the compound."

...There has been a lot of discussion about the nature of the targeted compound, particularly its high walls and its vicinity to the areas housing Pakistan Army elements. It needs to be appreciated that many houses

⁶⁸⁷ Bill Roggio, "ISAF denies helicopters struck inside Pakistan," *Long War Journal*, November 26, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/11/isaf_denies_helicopt.php

⁶⁸⁸ "Latest on Osama Raid: Tricked Out Choppers, Live Tweets, Possible Pakistani Casualties," *Wired Danger Room*, May 2, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/lu6V56>; "Osama Bin Laden Killed by Navy SEALs in Firefight," *ABC News*, May 2, 2011. Available at <http://abcn.ws/j4keh>

⁶⁸⁹ ABC News, May 3, 2011.

occupied by the affectees of operations in FATA / KPK, have high boundary walls, in line with their culture of privacy and security. Houses with such layout and structural details are not a rarity.

...Notwithstanding the above, the Government of Pakistan expresses its deep concerns and reservations on the manner in which the Government of the United States carried out this operation without prior information or authorization from the Government of Pakistan. This event of unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule. The Government of Pakistan further affirms that such an event shall not serve as a future precedent for any state, including the US. Such actions undermine cooperation and may also sometime constitute threat to international peace and security.

On May 5, 2011 at the 138th Corp Commanders Conference at GHQ Rawalpindi, the Pakistani military released a statement warning that any future attempts at "violating the sovereignty of Pakistan, will warrant a review on the level of military / intelligence cooperation with the United States" and that there was a decision to "reduce the strength of US military personnel in Pakistan to the minimum essential."⁶⁹⁰

Military Sales and Assistance

The US sees military assistance is seen as an important tool in inducing Pakistani cooperation, and Pakistan is one of the world's largest recipients of US military assistance. US military assistance to Pakistan consists of four major programs - Foreign Military Financing (FMF) sales, Coalition Support Funds (CSF), Section 1206 Funds and the newer Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) – as well as various other smaller ones, primarily devoted to counter-narcotics. The scale of US military assistance to Pakistan is extensive, rising to \$2.7 billion in 2010, compared to an official defense budget of \$5.2 billion.⁶⁹¹ \$1.65 billion has been requested so far for 2011, not accounting for what Pakistan will require for operational reimbursements through CSF.

This assistance reached \$13.3 billion between 2002 and 2010, as seen in **Figure 7.4**. As has been outlined earlier, however, it has had limited results largely in that it has failed to induce the desired levels of cooperation and been wasted or misused. As the chapter on Pakistani military chapter operations in the FATA details, equipment and training aid have assisted Pakistan in improving its troop mobility and in becoming more effective in tactical operations in the FATA. In practice, however, the Pakistani military remains reluctant to expand operations for fear of overstretching its forces, to pursue groups that are tacitly recognized as strategic proxies, and to wind down its hostility towards India.

Other US critics feel Pakistan diverts counterinsurgency assistance towards the acquisition of conventional equipment best suited for conflict with India, and this has also has concern in New Delhi. In July 2010, Indian military officials alleged that a mere 15% of funding was being directly utilized in the war on terrorism, and over 80% going towards the modernization of Pakistani armed forces, including major defense purchases from China, Germany and France.⁶⁹² Pakistan now produces its own battle tanks and combat aircraft, including the JF-17 aircraft, a

⁶⁹⁰ "Statement of Pakistan Army over US troop reduction," *NDTV*, May 5, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/imuur6>

⁶⁹¹ IISS Military Balance 2011.

⁶⁹² "Pak using US funds for war on terror to bolster military might," *Times of India*, July 24, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/l5eo4G>

joint development project between Beijing and Islamabad.⁶⁹³ Despite this, US military assistance remains an essential component of Pakistani defense revenues.

Coalition Support Funds

The Coalition Support Funds (CSF) program, which reimburses the operational costs of PAKMIL operations against Taliban insurgents, accounts for the bulk of assistance. CSF was established in 2001 to support 27 countries, but now Pakistan alone accounts for 70% of total disbursements across the world.⁶⁹⁴ CSF funding for Pakistan has registered an astonishing increase as the Afghan war has progressed, rising 50,000% from \$9.1 million in the three years preceding 9/11 to \$4.7 billion in the three years after.⁶⁹⁵ Today it comprises the bulk of US military assistance to Pakistan, having reached a total of \$8.8 billion since 2002, and comprising 55% of all military assistance in 2010 as seen in **Figure 7.4**.

CSF funding has been used to reimburse a broad range of PAKMIL operations, including for maritime patrols and interdiction operations; for combat air patrols, reconnaissance, close air support missions, airlift support and air traffic control; and for PAKMIL operations in the FATA and increased management activity at Joint Staff Headquarters.⁶⁹⁶

Various lawmakers have been skeptical of PAKMIL claims of reimbursement, and a GAO report published in February 2011 reiterated its previous recommendations on the “need to improve planning, monitoring, documentation and oversight of US assistance to Pakistan... [And] the need to increase oversight and accountability for Pakistan’s reimbursement claims for Coalition Support Funds.”⁶⁹⁷ Various incidents have supported this skepticism including the billing of \$1.5 million repair Navy vehicles that had not been used, \$45 million for the construction of bunkers and roads of which no evidence exists, and \$80 million per month in support of operations, even during ceasefire periods, when troops were in their barracks.⁶⁹⁸

Pakistani officials have sometimes complained of the slow pace of disbursements, particularly during the 2011 Davis affair, when disbursements were temporarily suspended.⁶⁹⁹

⁶⁹³ “Sino-Pak joint venture JF-17 enters serial production stage,” *IBN Live*, February 8, 2011. Available at <http://ibnlive.in.com/generalnewsfeed/news/sinopak-joint-venture-jf17-enters-serial-production-stage/570898.html>

⁶⁹⁴ K. Alan Kronstadt, “Direct Overt US Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan FY2002-FY2011,” *Congressional Research Service*, January 4, 2011. Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf>


⁶⁹⁵ Nathaniel Heller, Sarah Fort and Marina Walker Guevera, “Pakistan’s \$4.7 billion ‘blank check’ for US military aid,” *Center for Public Integrity*, March 27, 2007. Available at <http://projects.publicintegrity.org/MilitaryAid/report.aspx?aid=831>

⁶⁹⁶ “Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan’s Border with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” *Government Accountability Office*, February 2009. Available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09263sp.pdf>

⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁸ Azeez Ibrahim, “US Aid to Pakistan – US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption,” *Harvard Belfer Center*, July 2009. Available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf

⁶⁹⁹ Shaiq Hussain, “CSF delay impacting terror war, US told,” *Pakistan Today*, March 6, 2011. Available at <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/pakistan-news/National/07-Mar-2011/CSF-delay-impacting-terror-war-US-told>

Figure 7.4: Direct Overt US Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY-2001-FY-2011

(Source: Congressional Research Service, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf>)

Foreign Military Financing

In 2006, Pakistan signed arms transfer agreements with US worth \$3.5 billion,⁷⁰⁰ which nearly matched the entire value of all Foreign Ministry Sales (FMS) program purchases by Pakistan from 1950-2001. FMF financing to Pakistan, which has increased exponentially in the past decade, has occasionally drawn criticism for the heavy prevalence of conventional equipment that has little bearing on counterinsurgency operations. After the third “strategic dialogue” held between US and Pakistani officials in October 2010, US Secretary of State announced an additional five-year \$2 billion package that was essentially interpreted as increasing current financing for the FMF program by about a third.⁷⁰¹ The US also announced its intention to cut off aid and training to units accused of conducting extrajudicial killings.⁷⁰² Major post-2001 defense

⁷⁰⁰ Richard F. Grimmett, “U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan,” *Congressional Research Service*, August 24, 2009.

⁷⁰¹ Karen DeYoung, “Administration to ask for more Pakistan aid,” *Washington Post*, October 23, 2010. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/22/AR2010102206607.html>

⁷⁰² Huma Yusuf, “US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue,” *Atlantic Council*, October 25, 2010. Available at http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/us-pakistan-strategic-dialogue

acquisitions through FMF and Pakistani national funding are detailed below, and include major conventional platforms with limited COIN applicability.⁷⁰³

8 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft (at least 2 delivered)

- 36 F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft for \$1.4 billion
- Variety of missiles and bombs for F-16 platform worth \$640 million
- 1 ex-Oliver Hazard Perry class missile frigate
- Mid-Life Update Modification Kits to upgrade existing F-16A/B inventory for \$890 million
- 115 M109A 155mm self-propelled howitzers for \$52 million
- 20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters
- Six C-130E transport aircraft
- 6,312 TOW anti-armor missiles (at least 2,007 delivered)
- 5,600 military radio sets
- 300 PVS-7 night-vision devices
- 600,000 cartridges of 20mm ammunition

Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip) Funds and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCF/PCCF)

Section 1206 Funds are used primarily to assist partner nations build up their counterterrorist capabilities. Pakistan is the second largest recipient of 1206 funding, receiving \$203.4 million, or 15% of all 1206 disbursements, including \$113.5 million in 2009 alone.⁷⁰⁴ 1206 funding has been used primarily to increase PAKMIL capabilities for operations inside the FATA, but has been phased out since FY2010 with transfer of responsibility to PCF/PCCF. Key elements of support included:⁷⁰⁵

- Building up Rotary Aviation Assets: 4 Mi-17s transferred, in addition to spare parts, night vision, aviation body armor, technical support and limited training
- Build up Special Forces Capabilities: Variety of equipment transferred to Pakistani SSG units, and the Pakistani Army's 21st Aviation Squadron, including communications equipment, night-vision goggles, GPS systems and other field gear
- Build up ground based ISR capabilities and transfers of counter-IED kits

⁷⁰³ K. Alan Krondstadt, "Major US Arms Sales and Grants to Pakistan Since 2001," *Congressional Research Service*, April 1, 2011. Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakarms.pdf>; "Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan's Border with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," *Government Accountability Office*, February 2009.

⁷⁰⁴ Nina M. Serafino, "Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206" Background and Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service*, February 11, 2010. Available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22855_20110211.pdf

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

In 2009, Congress responded by creating two new vehicles in response to the Pentagon's request for additional funding to build up Pakistani military capabilities; PCF run by the Department of Defense received \$400 million in FY2009-10 funding, while PCCF run by the Department of State received \$700 million for FY2010-11 funding.⁷⁰⁶ In April 2011, as a result of budget cuts at the Department of State, it was decided to return PCCF to DOD for the year; an additional \$1 billion has been requested for next year's budget, but it is unsure if the money will flow to DOD or the Department of State.⁷⁰⁷ These programs will continue to provide targeted assistance to PAKMIL in the transfer of weapons, equipment and training.

Economic Aid and Civilian Assistance

Pakistan is the world's second largest recipient of US economic and development assistance after only Afghanistan, details of which are included in **Figure 7.5**. In October 2009, Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (EPPA), or the Kerry-Lugar bill after the names of its main backers, which authorized \$1.5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan annually between 2010 and 2014.

The Act focused on three principal objectives including upgrading critical infrastructure needs, helping address basic needs and economic opportunity in militancy-prone areas, and strengthening the civilian government's institutional capacity to pursue political and economic reforms.⁷⁰⁸ \$3.5 billion of the \$7.5 billion is designated towards "high-impact, high-visibility" infrastructure programs, especially in energy and agricultural sectors, with the remaining \$4 billion is split evenly between funding health, education and aid programs and the building up government capacity.⁷⁰⁹

However, much of this US civilian aid continues to be hampered by bureaucratic constraints, inefficiency and waste. According to figures provided by the GAO, in FY2010, only \$179.5 million of the allocated \$1.51 billion was actually disbursed.⁷¹⁰

The GAO claimed that over half of US assistance pledged for Pakistan is spent on administrative costs, including paying foreign experts.⁷¹¹ USAID has similarly admitted that, "One year after the launch of the civilian assistance strategy in Pakistan, USAID has not been able to demonstrate measurable progress."⁷¹²

⁷⁰⁶ Rebecca Williams, "PCF and PCCF – Similar but Different," *The Will and the Wallet, Stimson Center (Blog)*, October 12, 2009. Available at <http://thewillandthewallet.org/2009/10/12/pcf-and-pccf-similar-but-different/>

⁷⁰⁷ Josh Rogin, "Budget deal delays State Department takeover of Pakistan fund," *Foreign Policy*, April 12, 2011. Available at http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/12/budget_deal_delays_state_department_takeover_of_pakistan_fund

⁷⁰⁸ "Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan's Border with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," *Government Accountability Office*, February 2009.

⁷⁰⁹ K. Alan Krondstadt, "Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments," *Congressional Research Service*, June 1, 2010. Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41307.pdf>

⁷¹⁰ "Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan's Border with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," *Government Accountability Office*, February 2009.

⁷¹¹ K. Alan Krondstadt, "Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments," *Congressional Research Service*, June 1, 2010.

⁷¹² "Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan as of December 31, 2010," *USAID/US Department of State*, 2011. Available at <http://bit.ly/lpWyVJ>

In the FATA for example, where the US had allocated at least \$728 million by the end of fiscal year 2009, the GAO found that in general long-term development programs did not achieve their targets.⁷¹³ Of 115 schools USAID promised to build in Swat, none have been completed, and only 14-20 have even been started.⁷¹⁴ Problems encountered included inadequate partnering between the US and the government of Pakistan (GoP), fears of corruption and leakages, as well as inadequate measures to report, monitor or evaluate the performance of development programs.⁷¹⁵

Under former special envoy to Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, more emphasis was placed on moving away from foreign contractors towards partnerships with local agencies. However such a policy, while well intentioned suffers from various problems, including Pakistan's inability to absorb such a large influx of funds, and a dearth of suitable human capital.⁷¹⁶

Detractors -- including an USAID official -- have argued that, "Directing an immediate shift away from US contractors already on the ground to local implementers without an appropriate transition period will seriously compromise the more important requirements for quick counterinsurgency and economic impacts."⁷¹⁷ USAID is significantly understaffed, and its embassy in Islamabad suffers from a 20% shortfall in filled positions.⁷¹⁸ However, US officials have urged a measure of understanding, noting that 2010 funds were only appropriated by April, delaying implementation, and that "the floods last year changed the Pakistani landscape, literally and figuratively, and required us to take a step back and reexamine all of our plans," according to Senator John Kerry's spokesman.⁷¹⁹

Various other problems have plagued US development assistance. Violence in many areas has restricted the ability of aid agencies to operate, while various requirements such as prominently displaying US government logos to increase visibility, has led international groups to pull out, for fear of being targeted.⁷²⁰ US personnel engaged in civilian development activities are often also equated with deeply unpopular security contractors. Corruption has been an endemic problem. Fueled in part by the magnitude of US aid flows, there is worry that aid may actually end up being destabilizing by flowing to corrupt and violent powerbrokers.

A portion of aid is also believed to flow to insurgents, paid in protection money by donor-funded contractors. An unnamed US official in Kabul estimated this portion could run as high as ten

⁷¹³ "Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan's Border with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," *Government Accountability Office*, February 2009.

⁷¹⁴ Jane Perlez, "US Aid Plan for Pakistan Falling Short, Officials Say," *New York Times*, May 2, 2011.

⁷¹⁵ "Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan's Border with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," *Government Accountability Office*, February 2009.

⁷¹⁶ Tom Wright, "Setbacks plague US aid to Pakistan," *Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 2011. Available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703583404576080113980804354.html>

⁷¹⁷ K. Alan Krondstadt, "Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments," *Congressional Research Service*, June 1, 2010.

⁷¹⁸ Sebastian Abbott, "\$4bn in aid to Pakistan called ineffective," *Boston Globe*, February 9, 2011. Available at http://articles.boston.com/2011-02-09/news/29345448_1_civilian-aid-usaid-pakistan

⁷¹⁹ Josh Rogin, "Most US Aid to Pakistan still in US hands," *Foreign Policy*, March 1, 2011. Available at http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/01/most_us_aid_to_pakistan_still_in_america_s_hands

⁷²⁰ Tom Wright, "Setbacks plague US aid to Pakistan," *Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 2011. Available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703583404576080113980804354.html>

percent.⁷²¹ Many Pakistanis also view US aid as insufficient given the costs they have borne. An analysis conducted by Pakistan's Finance Ministry calculated that the conflict had cost Pakistan about \$43 billion in economic losses between 2001 and 2010, including damaged infrastructure, diversion of budgetary resources, lost exports, capital and human flight, and other metrics.⁷²²

US assistance during the 2010 floods was touted as an opportunity to showcase US efforts. The US was the largest donor and was involved in most aspects of the relief efforts, including contributing \$595 million in disaster aid by January 2011, according to figures provided by USAID.⁷²³ The US also contributed 26 helicopters and tons of food and medical aid. Unfortunately, as in the aftermath of the earthquake, any improvement in the US's public image has been temporary and continues to be overshadowed by its military involvement in the country.⁷²⁴

In some other arenas, notably in improving GoP's institutional capacity, US security policies have presented problems. An important component of the EPPA was its intention to condition assistance on improving civil-military relations, including civilian oversight over promotions. This met with fierce resistance by the Pakistani military. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the US tended to sideline the civilian government in favor of the military when expedient. A Wikileaks cable noted then US ambassador Anne Patterson reassured senior Pakistani military officials, including COAS Kayani and DG ISI Pasha, that the conditions on the EPPA package were largely superfluous, that waivers were included and would be exercised, but most importantly that civilian assistance did not affect the level of military funding.⁷²⁵

Various suggestions to improve this situation have been put forward. Nicholas Shmidle for example argues that US civilian aid should prioritize the provinces of Punjab and the Sindh, instead of the FATA where returns on investment are low, and are unlikely to change public perceptions.⁷²⁶ This may be helpful advice; mirroring a changing strategy in Afghanistan that focuses on districts and areas that have pockets of support that can be consolidated.

Some feel the US must make less use of development to support warfighting. Other, in contrast, feel there is little evidence, especially in the Pakistani context, that aid changes perceptions or wins 'hearts and minds,' especially in the short-term.⁷²⁷

This debate may reflect the that the lag time between the implementation aid and the results the US is seeking will often be considerably longer than the US wants. What does seem clear is that

⁷²¹ Andrew Wilder, "Testimony on US Aid to Pakistan and Accountability," *House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs*, December 9, 2009. Available at <http://hvrld.me/1VtJPX>

⁷²² Shahbaz Rana, "Myth vs. Reality: US Aid to Pakistan dwarfed by economic cost of war," *Express Tribune*, march 20, 2011. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/135156/myth-vs-reality-us-aid-to-pakistan-dwarfed-by-economic-cost-of-war-business/>

⁷²³ "Pakistan Floods: Factsheet #9, Fiscal Year 2011," *USAID*, January 23, 2011. Available at <http://1.usa.gov/1wZqhZ>

⁷²⁴ Claire Truscott, "US flood aid 'not enough' to win over Pakistanis," *AFP*, August 28, 2010. Available at <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hPhJwSueNtARGSSDQTpcIpyc551g>


⁷²⁵ "US embassy cables: Pakistan army angry at US aid bill but helping Israel," *The Guardian*, December 1, 2010. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/228747>

⁷²⁶ Nicholas Schmidle, "How to Save Pakistan," *Slate Magazine*, April 27, 2009. Available at <http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2216991>

⁷²⁷ Andrew Wilder, "Testimony on US Aid to Pakistan and Accountability," *House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs*, December 9, 2009.

if the US is to provide aid at all, it will be essential to avoid the “feast or famine” approach, the US has traditionally employed in Pakistan.⁷²⁸ Some experts feel that the US also should put more focus must also be put on employing an outcome-centric approach to aid, including metrics that measure progress, coupled to an ongoing an evaluation process that makes changes as situations dictate.⁷²⁹

Figure 7.5: Civilian Assistance to Pakistan



(Source: Congressional Research Service, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf>)

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ Nancy Birdsall, “US Development Assistance to Pakistan (Open Letter to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke),” *Center for Global Development*, March 29, 2010. Available at <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424036>

US Leverage

The US does have leverage. Pakistan derives many benefits from the US, none of which it is likely to want to lose. The US has been a critical supplier of advanced equipment since 9/11, including conventional platforms Pakistan can use to combat India, and has provided large amounts of fairly unregulated funds, including \$2.7 billion in military assistance in 2010 alone, and is a critical restraining influence on India in crisis situations, as evidenced after the Mumbai attacks in 2008.

Ending this support would have a serious impact on Pakistani security. A strong relationship with Beijing might offset some of these losses, but Pakistan is a nation that has always traditionally ‘borrowed’ power to resist India, and is unlikely to be ecstatic about losing a key layer of its deterrence and funding. This can be a useful coercive mechanism; attaching greater conditionality on aid, particularly military aid, and tying disbursements to outcomes.

More broadly, the task ahead for the US is difficult, but not insurmountable. There are key overlaps in interest, particularly in the shared desire to eradicate militancy in the FATA, although the US would prefer an expansion of theater into Afghan Taliban strongholds of North Waziristan and northern Balochistan, a matter Pakistan continues to resist. It is also possible, given the dramatic change in the militant landscape since the 1990s that in the longer-term Afghanistan could end up being a haven for not just anti-Western and anti-Indian terrorist groups, but also anti-Pakistani elements who already straddle the border. This could hypothetically create overlaps for cooperation.

It may also help to have a more empathetic understanding of the political difficulties that collaboration with the US entails in the eyes of the public. An ISI operative acknowledged as much in the wake of the Davis affair; “There were just too many CIA movements and operations going on without our knowledge. It made us look as if we were not in charge.”⁷³⁰

⁷³⁰ Ron Moreau, “Why US-Pakistan relations are not as bad as they seem,” *The Daily Beast*, April 15, 2011. Available at <http://www.businessinsider.com/why-us-pakistan-relations-are-not-as-bad-as-they-seem-2011-4>

SECTION VIII: THE COST TO PAKISTAN OF ITS CONFLICT WITH INDIA

The dynamics of the Indo-Pakistani conflict are all too well known: two nuclear-armed powers face off along a heavily militarized and contested border with a long history of armed aggression. The heart of the conflict, as always, is Kashmir, which remains disputed and guides tensions between the two countries. Pakistan has played a key role in the Kashmiri insurgency, as have Indian failures in efficient and respectful governance. Violence in Kashmir is at its lowest ebb since the start of the insurgency, although there are fears that violence could resurface if Indo-Pakistani talks and a ceasefire break down.

Terrorism in major Indian urban centers has increased in recent years, most notably the November 2008 terrorist attacks, although cross-border support for the insurgency in Kashmir has overtly decreased leading to a significant decline in this violence. The end result is that tensions between India and Pakistan remain strong, with the potential for military escalation, particularly in the aftermath of high-profile terrorist or resurgence of militant violence directed against India and originating from Pakistan.

India has so far exercised restraint in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, in large part due to the potential consequences of escalation, and likely also due to strong US pressure which fears a collapse of Pakistani support in anti-Taliban operations along the Afghan border. It is uncertain that this restraint will be assured in the future.

The 2008 Mumbai attack in particular deeply damaged any progress in the Composite Dialogue, and greatly embarrassed the Indian government as it sought to project itself as a stable rising global power, and a safe haven for foreign investment. Future attacks are likely to include calls for retaliation and various domestic factors including nationalist sentiment, political pressures from opposition parties, and a media clamor for an adequate response, can easily lead to an escalation in tensions, particularly given the trust deficit between New Delhi and Islamabad

The Conventional and Nuclear Military Balance

The more than 2,000-mile long India-Pakistan border is one of the most heavily militarized in the world. The two countries have fought three major wars with each other, in 1947, 1965 and 1971, as well as a limited war in India's Kargil district in 1999. These are in addition to the various asymmetric conflicts, ranging from a proxy insurgency in Kashmir to the covert sponsorship of terrorist attacks against the Indian heartland. Both countries have nuclear capabilities, and maintain sizeable arsenals directed at one another.


Given the historical context, India and Pakistan have seen an unprecedented calm in relations over the past decade. A bilateral Composite Dialogue formally resumed in 2004, and has "realized some modest, but meaningful successes, including a formal ceasefire... and some unprecedented trade and people-to-people contacts across the Kashmiri Line of Control (LoC)."⁷³¹ Since 2008, however tensions have again significantly increased, particularly after the November 2008 terrorist 'fidayeen' attack in Mumbai, which killed 165 people, including 22 foreigners.

⁷³¹ K. Alan Krondstadt, Paul Kerr, Michael Martin and Bruce Vaughn, "India-US Relations," *Congressional Research Service*, October 27, 2010.

The conventional military balance is tilted in India's favor as seen in **Figures 8.1 and 8.2** India maintains numerical superiority in manpower and all forms of high-power equipment. Despite this imbalance, the Pakistani Armed Forces constitute a major military force, and any large-scale conventional engagement will be far from bloodless from India.

Pakistan also retains significant deterrence capacity through its nuclear arsenal, although the 1999 Kargil war demonstrated both countries' willingness to fight a limited conventional war under the threat of nuclear escalation. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine remains undeclared although it has refused to state a 'no-first use' policy, most likely to maximize deterrence against India.⁷³² Both countries lack sophisticated early warning and command-and-control systems, heightening the risks of unintended escalation.⁷³³ Tensions have risen in recent years due to rumors over India's Cold Start doctrine, an ambitious attempt to break with India's traditional posture of strategic restraint towards an offensive one designed to rapidly mobilize and occupy portions of Pakistan in a limited war. In April 2011, there were reports that in response Pakistan intends to field tactical nuclear weapons, including the new Nasr surface-to-surface ballistic missile, close to the LoC, which could substantially raise tensions.⁷³⁴

Figure 8.1: Indo-Pakistani Military Manpower




(Source: IISS Military Balance 2011)

⁷³² "Pakistan Profile," *NTI*, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/index.html, accessed April 28, 2011.

⁷³³ Gaurav Kampani, "Seven Years After the Nuclear Test: Appraising South Asia's Nuclear Relations," *NTI*, June 2005. Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_64a.html

⁷³⁴ Michael Mazza, "Pakistan's Strategic Myopia," *Wall Street Journal*, April 28, 2011. Available at <http://www.aei.org/article/103525>

Figure 8.2: Indo-Pakistan Military Balance

(Source: IISS Military Balance 2011)

The 2010 SIPRI yearbook estimated that the Indian arsenal constituted 60-80 warheads.⁷³⁵ India is also now believed to produce about 20-40kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually, and probably has an accumulated stockpile of 280-600kg of plutonium, enough for 40-120 weapons.⁷³⁶

Details on the Pakistani arsenal are less clear. In early 2011, US intelligence officials estimated that Pakistan had increased its deployed nuclear weapons to more than 110, compared to about 75-80 at the time President Obama took office.⁷³⁷ Additionally, the International Panel on Fissile Materials noted in its 2010 report that Pakistan had stockpiled about 2.6 tons of highly enriched uranium, and had sufficient fissile material to produce 40-100 additional nuclear devices.⁷³⁸ Pakistan is generally believed to be ahead on the evolution of a nuclear command and control system and operational planning for their tactical use.⁷³⁹ As mentioned earlier, this may be reinforced by the current rumors of Pakistan's imminent decision to field tactical nuclear-tipped SSBMs.

⁷³⁵ Shannon N. Kile, Vitaly Fedchanko, Bharath Gopalaswamy, and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces," *SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security*, (Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010)

⁷³⁶ "India Profile," *NTI*, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Nuclear/index.html, accessed April 28, 2011.

⁷³⁷ David Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Pakistani nuclear arms pose challenge to US policy," *New York Times*, January 31, 2011. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/world/asia/01policy.html>

⁷³⁸ "Pakistan Profile," *NTI*

⁷³⁹ Gaurav Kampani, "Seven Years After the Nuclear Test: Appraising South Asia's Nuclear Relations," *NTI*, June 2005.

The “Endless” Kashmir Issue

Kashmir has primacy in Indo-Pakistani strategic relations. One of the world’s most intractable territorial disputes, the disputed former princely kingdom has been at the heart of the dissent and mistrust between India and Pakistan since their inception, as President Musharraf declared in 2000; “We have been trying all kinds of bus diplomacy and cricket diplomacy and everything. Why has all of it failed? It has failed because the core issue was not being addressed...because there is only one dispute, the Kashmir dispute...others are just aberrations, minor differences of opinion which can be resolved.”⁷⁴⁰

Large-scale wars have been fought over the region in 1948 and 1965, and since the 1990s, a proxy war has been waged by Pakistan in Indian-administered Kashmir, utilizing a diverse array of militant and terrorist proxies. In 1998, a mass-infiltration of militant jihadis and regular Pakistani Army soldiers in mufti led to the occupation of several strategic mountain peaks, and necessitated large-scale Indian military operations to repel them.

In 2001, a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi greatly heightened tensions and led to a full-scale mobilization of Indian and Pakistani forces along the LoC. Today tensions have diminished, but remain high, particularly since 2008.

The Kashmiri Jihad

Pakistan is not the sole source of violence in Kashmir; the insurgency began and grew in large part due to a deep Kashmiri resentment to the Indian administration and militarization of their region. Today Kashmiris have largely swapped violence for relatively peaceful mass protests and demonstrations, although the scale of unrest in 2010 has belied Indian claims of successful reconciliation. Over the past decade, indigenous Kashmiri groups have mostly laid down their arms and it is believed that today Pakistan increasingly monopolizes organized violence.

According to figures provided by the Indian Home Ministry, the region has seen over 55,000 violent incidents between 1988 and 1994, and as of 2010, 13,800 civilians and 4,730 security personnel had lost their lives.⁷⁴¹ The first period of violence which roughly extends from 1988 until 2004 when the peace process began, resulted in everyday violence across J&K as seen in **Figure 8.3**, and included the 1999 Kargil mini-war and the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament.

Since June 2004, when India and Pakistan engaged in their most wide-ranging and comprehensive peace negotiations, violence has registered a dramatic decrease. In 2010, for example, only 36 civilians were killed in militant violence, compared to 1,067 in 2001. Matters in Kashmir however remain tense, and many Indian security officials fear a resurrection of the insurgency should American efforts in Afghanistan fail, Pakistan more actively choose to subvert growing rapprochement, or local Kashmiri youth once more grow frustrated enough to pick up weapons.

Pakistan has increasingly monopolized the militant component of the Kashmiri struggle. The composition of foreign fighters increased considerably in the mid-1990s taking the insurgency in

⁷⁴⁰ Malini Parthasarathy, “India must trust me, says Gen. Musharraf,” *The Hindu*, January 17, 2000. Available at <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2000/01/17/stories/01170001.htm>

⁷⁴¹ “Annual Report 2010-2011,” *Indian Ministry of Home Affairs*, http://www.mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=288

a much more brutal direction, ever since which India has been particularly aggressive in alleging rampant collusion between the ISI and militant groups. During his 2005 Independence Day address, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared his dissatisfaction with Pakistani efforts, “I am aware that the government of Pakistan has put some checks on the activities of terrorists from its soil. However, it is not possible to achieve success through half-hearted efforts. It is necessary that the entire infrastructure of terrorism is totally dismantled.”⁷⁴²

There is considerable evidence that Pakistan has provided extensive training, weapons, funding and sanctuary. Pakistan has officially denied any involvement but many observers including Human Rights Watch, an impartial NGO, believe that the “real decision-making authority and management of the “Kashmir struggle” has long rested with the Pakistani military and its ISI agency.”⁷⁴³

Certainly, the causes of tension vary with the success of diplomacy. The beginning of Indian and Pakistani talks led were followed by a dramatic decrease in infiltrations across the LoC decreased from 2,417 incidences in 2001 to 342 by 2008 -- although the number increased to 489 in 2010, as seen in **Figure 8.4**. The period was marked by progress towards cross-border cooperation, including the resumption of a bus service between Srinagar and Muzzafarabad in April 2005 for the first time in nearly six decades.


The Indian and Pakistani militaries also set up crisis ‘hot lines’ to manage conflict, regular flag meetings to discuss ceasefire violations, and in October 2005, the opening of five major border crossings for humanitarian relief after the 2005 earthquake.⁷⁴⁴ In January-March 2011, attacks registered a further 45% decline over the same period the previous year, according to the J&K police chief.⁷⁴⁵

⁷⁴² “India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilizing a Cold Peace,” *International Crisis Group* Asia Briefing No 51, June 15, 2006. Available at <http://bit.ly/mmng8O>


⁷⁴³ “Everyone lives in fear: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir,” *UNHCR*, September 12, 2006. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,HRW,,PAK,,4517c9ca4.0.html>

⁷⁴⁴ “The Military Balance in 2006,” *IISS*, (London: Routledge, 2007).

⁷⁴⁵ “45% decline in militancy in state,” *Hindustan Times*, April 1, 2011. Available at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/45-decline-in-militancy-in-state/Article1-680137.aspx>

Figure 8.3: Trends in Violence in J&K

(Source: Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, www.mha.nic.in)

Figure 8.4: Cross-Border Infiltrations

(Source: Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, www.mha.nic.in)

Four major factors facilitated this shift. They include the rapprochement of the composite dialogue, significant pressure on the Musharraf government by the United States, the 700-kilometers of fencing along the LoC, and a pronounced decrease in Kashmiri support for violent militancy.⁷⁴⁶

⁷⁴⁶ "Indian Administered Kashmir," *Janes Sentinel Report*.

Indian capabilities have increased at border-control and counterinsurgency and it is now estimated that only 15-20% of infiltrators are able to get across the border.⁷⁴⁷ However since 2008, the ceasefire has come under pressure. Pakistani initiated attacks across the LoC with mortars and small arms fire sporadically resumed, largely in the Poonch and Rajouri districts, and on July 28, 2008, Pakistani troops crossed the LoC for the first time since 1999.⁷⁴⁸

In August of the same year, Defense Minister AK Anthony reported 20 ceasefire violations by the Pakistani military,⁷⁴⁹ which are occasionally attempts to provide covering fire for infiltrating militants. Matters were further complicated by the terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, which killed 54, as well as an unprecedented surge in terrorist attacks on major Indian urban centers that raised cross-border tensions.

Trends have been mixed. Violence has registered a definite decline, which was reflected in end 2009, when India announced a drawdown of two infantry divisions totaling 30,000 men to reflect an improved security situation in J&K.⁷⁵⁰ In January 2011, partly in response to the mass civilian unrest of the previous year, India further announced its intention to draw down forces by as much as 25 percent, although it offered no hard figures.⁷⁵¹

At the same time, the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai left a powerful legacy. A Wikileaks cable from 2010 recounted a growing consensus in the Indian defense establishment that “cross-border terrorists are regrouping and preparing to launch a new wave of attacks.”⁷⁵² In support of this, Lt. General S. Hasnain, the commander of the IA’s XV Corps declared in March 2011, that 600-700 militants were waiting at various cross-border launch pads to infiltrate into J&K.⁷⁵³

Similarly the Indian Defense Ministry’s annual report to parliament in 2010-11 stated that, “The continued infiltrations across the Line of Control and the existence of terrorist camps across the India-Pakistani border demonstrate the continuing ambivalence of Pakistan in its attitude and approach to terror organizations.”⁷⁵⁴ Some high-profile attacks have compounded this fear, notably the January 2, 2010 fidayeen attack on a hotel in Srinagar’s Lal Chowk, the first attack in

⁷⁴⁷ “US embassy cables: Pakistan home to 43 terrorist camps – Indian army chief,” *Guardian*, December 10, 2010. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/214316>

⁷⁴⁸ “The Military Balance in 2009,” *IISS*, (London: Routledge, 2010).

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁰ “India announces major troop drawdown in Kashmir,” *Channel News Asia*, December 18, 2009. Available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1025664/1/.html

⁷⁵¹ Rupam Jain Nair, “India to cut Kashmir forces by 25 percent,” *Defense News*, January 14, 2011. Available at <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5457717&c=ASI&s=TOP>

⁷⁵² “India fears cross-border terrorism is increasing,” *The Hindu*, March 18, 2011. Available at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/the-cables/article1547843.ece>

⁷⁵³ “Target India: 700 militants waiting at Pak launchpads,” *Indian Express*, March 17, 2011. Available at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/target-india-700-militants-waiting-at-pak-launchpads/763894/>

⁷⁵⁴ “Pak ambivalent in attitude towards terror groups: India,” *Outlook*, March 16, 2011. Available at <http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?715375>

Srinagar since 2007.⁷⁵⁵ Lal Chowk, being the central square of Srinagar is an extremely sensitive target that belied Indian claims at having decisively reversed militant momentum.⁷⁵⁶

The Militant Landscape – The Pro-Independence and Pro-Pakistan Split

Kashmiri militant groups have always been demarcated along two broad groupings; the pro-Pakistan groups, which favor secession to Pakistan, and the pro-independence groups that favor secession from both India and Pakistan. Their character has changed considerably since the start of the insurgency.

At present, the pro-independence groups have largely been marginalized within the armed struggle, and pro-Pakistani groups including the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) have a near monopoly on organized militant violence. The ‘pro-Pakistan’ label itself comes with problems these days, as many of these groups that traditionally grew and operated with state support, have either splintered or defected whole-scale to join the ranks of the Punjabi Taliban, and have moved fighters, resources and infrastructure into the FATA. Their consequent involvement in many high-profile terrorist attacks inside Pakistan has implications on their current relationship with Pakistani intelligence agencies, notably the ISI.

Pro-independence militant groups have increasingly fallen by the wayside, most notably because of ethnic Kashmiris’ rejection of violence as a means to achieve their objectives. In the early days of the jihad it is believed over 150 separate militant groups sprung up to combat Indian forces.⁷⁵⁷ The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was one of the largest and most organized indigenous militant groups, and is largely credited with beginning the insurgency. By 1994 however, the JKLF had renounced violent armed struggle, announcing its intention to peacefully advocate for a separate Kashmiri state. Declining ethnic Kashmiri support for violence, increasingly competent Indian security forces, and the internal marginalization of pro-independence groups to pro-Pakistani groups facilitated this.

The JKLF is one of the most vocal critics of pro-Pakistani groups, particularly the LeT and its JUD political arm. In September 2010, it accused them of “subverting the indigenous movement” from a legitimate nationalist struggle into an Islamic movement.⁷⁵⁸ However the JKLF, and other pro-independence groups that retain a presence inside Pakistan-administered Kashmir but have given up armed struggle, have found themselves under increasing pressure in recent years and been subjected to a campaign of arrests and torture by the ISI.⁷⁵⁹

Pro-Pakistani groups largely monopolize the armed struggle. Their presence began to be felt soon after the violence began in 1988-89, when the ISI after having been caught unawares

⁷⁵⁵ “Jammu and Kashmir Assessment,” *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/index.html>, accessed April 28, 2011.

⁷⁵⁶ Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” *Jamestown Foundation*, February 4, 2010. Available at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=36005&cHash=1c4ef28fa3](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36005&cHash=1c4ef28fa3)

⁷⁵⁷ Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” *Jamestown Foundation*, February 4, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/1G4daS>

⁷⁵⁸ Zulfiqar Ali, “Pakistani militants ‘hijacking’ Kashmir Cause,” *BBC News*, September 28, 2010. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11425831>

⁷⁵⁹ “The Kashmiri fighters who lost their cause,” *BBC News*, February 23, 2011 Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12492173>

moved quickly to gain greater strategic control over Kashmiri militancy. It introduced several pro-Pakistani groups into the theater, first the Hizbul Mujahideen in mid-1989⁷⁶⁰, and later various others including the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI). The trend began in earnest in 1994, when Pakistan established the United Jihad Council to coordinate the activities of 13 militant groups including the HuM and the LeT.⁷⁶¹

Many of these groups drew their cadres from non-Kashmiri groups, including other Pakistani ethnicities, and were more amenable to the incorporation of foreign fighters. By 1993, the Economist estimated about 300-400 foreign fighters inside Kashmir, whereas the Director General of the Indian Border Security Force estimated 2,300 in the same year.⁷⁶² By 2003 Indian government officials were claiming that over 75% of militants in Kashmir were foreign-fighters.⁷⁶³ Indian officials have incentive to overplay this trend, which may explain the divergence in numbers.

Yet, it is quite evident that by the turn of the century, the Kashmiri jihad increasingly relied on foreign fighters staging from Pakistan. This was in part due to increased Indian counterinsurgency capabilities that ensured that by 1999, only about 4-5 of the original 13 members of the United Jihad Council were still militarily effective.⁷⁶⁴

The entrance of Pakistani and foreign fighters greatly changed the color of the insurgency, from a secular nationalist struggle driven by the legitimate grievances of Kashmiris in Indian-administered Kashmir to a religious struggle increasingly informed by jihadist Deobandi tenets and privatized by Pakistan. By the mid-1990s, Kashmir had become a full-blown proxy war and was “the primary zone for foreign jihadi fighters in Eurasia”⁷⁶⁵

Ethnic Kashmiris paid the highest price in the conflict with the Mumbai-based International Center for Peace Initiatives estimating that nearly 85% of those killed in the conflict were Kashmiri Muslims.⁷⁶⁶ The Sufi Kashmiri Muslims also found little ideological compatibility with the Deobandis, whose brutalities, fundamentalism and lack of accountability to local communities soon alienated and alarmed them.⁷⁶⁷

By 2002, a poll estimated that 69% of J&K residents opposed the presence of foreign fighters,⁷⁶⁸ and a 2010 poll conducted by Chatham House found that only 20% of Kashmiris supported violence as a tool to resolve the conflict.⁷⁶⁹ The violence that Pakistan unleashed may also have

⁷⁶⁰ Murtaza Shibli, “Kashmir: Islam, Identity, and Insurgency,” *Kashmir Affairs*, 2009.

⁷⁶¹ “Everyone lives in fear: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir,” *UNHCR*, September 12, 2006.

⁷⁶² Murtaza Shibli, “Kashmir: Islam, Identity, and Insurgency,” *Kashmir Affairs*, 2009.

⁷⁶³ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁴ “Everyone lives in fear: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir,” *UNHCR*, September 12, 2006.

⁷⁶⁵ Brian Glynn Williams, “On the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’: Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1980-2010,” *Orbis*, Volume 55, Issue 2, 2011, pgs. 216-239

⁷⁶⁶ “Everyone lives in fear: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir,” *UNHCR*, September 12, 2006.

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid

⁷⁶⁹ Robert W. Bradnock, “Kashmir: Paths to Peace,” *Chatham House*, May 2010. Available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16664_0510pp_kashmir.pdf

permanently ended any Indian Kashmiri sense of affiliation with Pakistan; the 2010 poll found that while 43% of J&K residents expressed a desire for independence, only 2% supported secession to Pakistan.⁷⁷⁰ Today, most militant groups are believed to maintain camps inside Pakistani administered Kashmir, including the regions of 'Azad Kashmir' (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan. In a leaked Wikileaks cable from June 2009, Indian Army chief Deepak Kapoor informed US National Security Advisor James Jones of 43 terrorist training camps inside Pakistan, including 22 in Pakistani-administered Kashmir.⁷⁷¹

The Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), once the most preeminent group in Kashmir, is believed to have substantially weakened by 1998. Today it has only about 500 active militants in its ranks, and has increasingly relied upon IED attacks instead of direct-fire engagements in a reflection of its weakened position.⁷⁷² Part of this weakness stemmed from the HM's attempts to insert itself into the political process and declare a unilateral ceasefire in 2000.

While the ceasefire soon broke down, its gestures were seen as a betrayal by hardliners, many of who make up other competing militant groups.⁷⁷³ Similarly another old-guard militant group, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) has lost ground to the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which was founded by Maulana Masood Azhar, a former General Secretary of the HuM. Azhar was released from Indian prison after the HuM's fifth attempt to secure his release, in this case by hijacking Indian Airlines flight IC814 from Kathmandu and forcing it down in Kandahar. A free Azhar, soon founded his own group, the JeM, which is believed to have weaned away many HuM resources and foot-soldiers.⁷⁷⁴

Militant dynamics have also changed since 2004, and some analysts today such as Shuja Nawaz for example firmly believe that the ISI "has certainly lost control" of Kashmir militant groups.⁷⁷⁵ Historically speaking, virtually all Kashmiri groups grew out of the Soviet jihad, and some formed links to al-Qaeda. Today, several Kashmiri militant groups, in particular the HuJI and the JeM are believed to have either splintered or defected whole-scale to form the Punjabi Taliban, and assist tribal militants in their terrorist attacks across Pakistan.

Ilyas Kashmiri, the emir of the HuJI, and now also al-Qaeda's operational commander in Pakistan is the best example. As his name suggests Kashmiri grew out of the Kashmir jihad, but has recently been best known for attacks against Pakistani and international targets. In April 2011, the US announced a \$5 million reward for information leading to his arrest, and implicated him for a 2006 attack on its consulate in Karachi.⁷⁷⁶

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁷¹ "US embassy cables: Pakistan home to 43 terrorist camps – Indian army chief," *The Guardian*, December 10, 2010. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/214316>

⁷⁷² Murtaza Shibli, "Kashmir: Islam, Identity, and Insurgency," *Kashmir Affairs*, 2009.

⁷⁷³ Murtaza Shibli, "Kashmir: Islam, Identity, and Insurgency," *Kashmir Affairs*, 2009.

⁷⁷⁴ "Harkat-ul-Mujahideen," *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkatul_mujahideen.htm, accessed April 28, 2011.

⁷⁷⁵ Jayshree Bagoria, "The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations," *Council on Foreign Relations*, July 26, 2010. Available at <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/isi-terrorism-behind-accusations/p11644>

⁷⁷⁶ "US offers \$5m reward for Ilyas Kashmiri," *Hindustan Times*, April 7, 2011. Available at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/5-mn-reward-for-Ilyas-Kashmiri-s-arrest/Article1-682231.aspx>

Kashmiri has also been linked to various other attacks including an attempted assassination attempt on President Musharraf's life in 2003, as well as implemented and planned attacks, in Chicago, India, Denmark, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.⁷⁷⁷ Kashmiri is now regarded as one of the most dangerous terrorists in the region, in part due to his sophisticated operational knowledge as a former army commando, but also due to his vast jihadi relationships. As a veteran US intelligence official put it, "This guy ties everybody together."⁷⁷⁸

Various other leaders have ties to al-Qaeda. The long-time leader of the HuM Fazlur Rehman Khalil was a signatory to al-Qaeda's 1998 declaration of war against America and its allies, while Maulana Masood Azhar is believed to have traveled to meet Bin Laden several times and has received funding from the group.⁷⁷⁹ A Center for Public Integrity Report on the execution of American journalist Daniel Pearl found seamless cooperation between al-Qaeda, sectarian groups and several Kashmiri groups including the HuM and the HuJI.⁷⁸⁰ The JeM is also believed to have close links with the Taliban and grown increasingly internationalist in its scope. The JeM's reported links include Faisal Shahzad, the would-be NYC Times Square bomber, and its fighters are reported to be active alongside the TTP in Pakistan's tribal areas.⁷⁸¹

Despite these trends, at present, Pakistan is believed to continue to retain influence over the Kashmiri insurgency. In October 2010, Indian intelligence alleged that Syed Salahuddin, chief of the HM, visited three training camps in Azad Kashmir to allegedly help resurrect the insurgency, while accompanied by ISI officials.⁷⁸² Pakistan also exerts a strong influence on the extent to which Kashmiri separatist leaders can engage in reconciliation measures with New Delhi.

As yet, talks between separatist leaders in Srinagar and New Delhi have broken down, in part due to a systematic campaign of assassinations leveled against reconciling or moderating leaders by Pakistani-backed terrorist groups. In particular leaders of the All-Parties Hurriyet Conference (AHPC), a coalition of Kashmiri separatist parties, have found themselves in the crosshairs of militant gunmen.

In 2002, Abdul Gani Lone, an AHPC leader was gunned down by a LeT hit squad⁷⁸³, and in 2003 Abdul Majid Dar, a former commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM) who had advocated for an end to violence, was gunned down by his own former colleagues.⁷⁸⁴ More recently in December 2009, Fazl-ul-Haq Qureshi, another influential leader favoring peace with

⁷⁷⁷ Sami Yousafzai, Ron Moreau and Christopher Dickey, "The New Bin Laden," *Newsweek*, October 23, 2010. Available at <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/10/23/is-ilyas-kashmiri-the-new-bin-laden.html>

⁷⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁹ Jamal Afridi, "Kashmir Militant Extremists," *Council on Foreign Relations*, July 9, 2009. Available at <http://www.cfr.org/kashmir/kashmir-militant-extremists/p9135#p3>

⁷⁸⁰ Thomas Jocelyn, "New investigation into the murder of Daniel Pearl released," *Long War Journal*, January 21, 2011. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/01/new_investigation_in.php

⁷⁸¹ Faisal Aziz and Zeeshan Haider, "Factbox: Major Militant Groups in Pakistan," *Reuters Alert Net*, May 30, 2010. Available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-85Y2RD?OpenDocument>

⁷⁸² "Security agencies fear spike infiltration ahead of winter," *The Times of India*, October 11, 2010. Available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-10-11/india/28240126_1_training-camps-infiltration-kashmir-valley

⁷⁸³ Siddharth Varadajaran, "Who fired on Qureshi, Hurriyat asked Pakistani Foreign Secretary," *The Hindu*, March 1, 2010. Available at <http://www.hindu.com/2010/03/01/stories/2010030155251000.htm>

⁷⁸⁴ Md Sadiq, "The Assassination of Hizbul Leader Majid Dar," *J&K Insights*, March 24, 2003. Available at <http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/insights/insight20030324a.html>

New Delhi, was shot at and critically wounded by a gunman believed to be from the HuM, an organization he once helped found.⁷⁸⁵ And most recently, in April 2011, Maulvi Shoukat Ahmad Shah, a leading moderate separatist leader, believed to be close to JKLF leaders, was killed in an explosion in Srinagar.⁷⁸⁶ Shah had been criticized by hardliners for meeting with Indian state officials and for criticizing the common practice of stone throwing against Indian security forces.⁷⁸⁷

State-sponsored Terrorism? The Lashkar-e-Taiba as a Threat to Both India and Pakistan

Pakistan has been accused of sponsoring terrorism against India. It is believed to have engaged several groups to conduct these efforts, but by far the most prolific and sophisticated has been the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Today, the LeT is in many ways symbolic of the wider militant landscape; an increasingly transnational outfit, that is torn between the radicalizing influence of the transnational terrorist groups it increasingly comes into contact with, and the influence of its traditional state patron. At present, the LeT has immense value to Pakistan as one of the few militant groups that has not turned its guns against the Pakistani state, and has consistently demonstrated its ability to reach deep inside the Indian heartland and perpetrate high-profile and complex terrorist attacks.

The LeT was formed in 1986 as the military wing of the Markaz Dawaat ul Irhad (MDI), and it is today headquartered in Muridke.⁷⁸⁸ An India-centric organization, its primary objective continues to be the liberation of Kashmir and the destruction of India, and it devotes much of its resources and manpower this goal, inside India and abroad. Unlike other militant groups, the LeT operates a vast social services network in Pakistan through its political wing, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), making it in some sense more akin to Lebanese Hezbollah, than al-Qaeda. The LeT was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US government in 2001, a move soon repeated on its political arm, the JuD in 2006.⁷⁸⁹

The LeT has also been an integral part of the Kashmiri jihad, and has mounted several high-profile terrorist attacks against the Indian mainland. 2001 was a prime example of its preeminence in both conflicts. In the year, it mounted an attack on J&K's provincial parliament, which it followed up a few months later with an attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, leading to the full-scale mobilization of Indian and Pakistani armed forces. Since 2006, the group has maintained an operational presence in Afghanistan, and has been implicated in several complex high-profile attacks, including dual attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul.⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁵ Praveen Sami, "Patriarch of Jammu and Kashmir jihad turned peacemaker," *The Hindu*, December 5, 2009. Available at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article60248.ece>

⁷⁸⁶ Aijaz Hussein, "Blast kills religious leader in Indian Kashmir," *AP*, April 8, 2011. Available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110408/ap_on_re_as/as_kashmir_blast

⁷⁸⁷ "Srinagar: Mosque blast kills Pakistan cleric," *BBC News*, April 8, 2011. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13009558>

⁷⁸⁸ C Christine Fair, "Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 LeT Attack on Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai," *RAND Corporation*, March 2009. Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT320.pdf

⁷⁸⁹ "Aliases," *US Department of Treasury*, <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/protecting-fto-aliases.aspx>, accessed April 28, 2011.

⁷⁹⁰ Jayshree Bagoria, "The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations," *Council on Foreign Relations*, July 26, 2010.

Despite its leadership in the anti-Indian jihad, and growing participation in the Afghan war, the LeT is distinct in the militant universe. Subscribing to the minority Ahle-Hadith sect, it has an extremely narrow constituent base, made even narrower by its rejection of mainstream Ahle-Hadith interpretations of jihad. The LeT also has antagonistic relations with the Deobandis. It has “criticized the Deobandi groups’ jihad against the Pakistani state and made clear their ideological disdain for these actors”⁷⁹¹ The group has also been largely insulated from broader militant trends. It fought in the Soviet jihad but maintained its own separate infrastructure and pledged no loyalty to the Taliban in the post-war period, and neither did it send fighters to Afghanistan in 2001 to resist the US invasion.⁷⁹²

The LeT’s hallmark modus operandi has been the ‘fidayeen’ attack, which was perfected on the Kashmiri battlefield and was on display during the 2008 Mumbai attacks. As Christine Fair explains, fidayeen attacks are not “suicide operations per se... (But) more akin to high-risk missions in which well-trained commandoes engage in fierce combat during which dying is preferable to being captured.”⁷⁹³

LET recruits are also believed to be better educated than comparable militant groups - the majority are believed to have completed at least secondary school, with many having college education – a trend believed to be a function of the organization’s founding by two engineering professors.⁷⁹⁴ This is not always true, as the sole surviving terrorist from the 2008 Mumbai attack, Mohammad Ajmal Kasab, who was an uneducated young man from the rural Punjabi village of Okara.⁷⁹⁵

The LeT is believed to maintain a privileged working relationship with the ISI, although the level of symbiosis varies depending on the analyst. Some see very high levels of operational symbiosis. Jean-Louis Brugiere, a former French investigating magistrate in charge of counterterrorism operations claimed that even after 9/11 LeT camps were run by the army, including soldiers on detachment serving as instructors and military helicopters dropping off supplies.⁷⁹⁶ Steven Tankel, one of the leading analysts on the LeT believes that the ISI and the LeT are closely linked, and speculates that the LeT’s willingness to toe the state’s line may be derived through coercion; the LeT lacks close allies inside Pakistan, has a narrow constituent base, and its vast infrastructure across Pakistan is highly vulnerable to government crackdowns.⁷⁹⁷

There is uncertainty as to the level of operational interaction. For example in the Mumbai attacks it is uncertain if the ISI truly sanctioned the Mumbai attacks or provided direct support, “but there is no doubt that the Pakistani security apparatus has allowed LET to operate unfettered.

⁷⁹¹ “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” *New America Foundation*, February 2010. Available at <http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/tankel.pdf>

⁷⁹² Ibid.

⁷⁹³ C Christine Fair, “Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 LeT Attack,” *RAND Corporation*, March 2009.

⁷⁹⁴ C Christine Fair, “Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 LeT Attack,” *RAND Corporation*, March 2009.

⁷⁹⁵ Saeed Shah, “Villagers confirm surviving Mumbai killer is Pakistani,” *McClatchy*, December 6, 2008. Available at <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/12/06/57251/villagers-confirm-surviving-mumbai.html>

⁷⁹⁶ Myra McDonald, “French magistrate details Lashka’s global role,” *The Star*, November 13, 2009. Available at <http://bit.ly/kIDShy>

⁷⁹⁷ “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” *New America Foundation*, February 2010. Available

This passive support was essential to enabling Lashkar to plan and train for the Mumbai attacks.”⁷⁹⁸

Regardless of the exact details, the LeT has conscientiously disavowed any attacks inside Pakistan, or against Pakistani targets. This relationship is believed to have been instrumental in its ability to evade law-enforcement. The LeT was officially banned in 2002 by the Pakistani government, in response to which the LeT spun off its political wing, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) although the “actual separation between JuD and LeT was and always remained entirely cosmetic.”⁷⁹⁹

The JuD openly operates in many cities across Pakistan, and was at the forefront of relief efforts after the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 floods. Similarly in response to international pressure LeT leader Hafeez Saeed has occasionally been arrested and detained in largely sham operations. In 2010, he has openly appeared at various rallies across Pakistan.⁸⁰⁰ Neither has the LeT’s funding been drastically affected, judging from the 82.77 million rupees the provincial government of Punjab itself granted the JuD in FY2009-2010!⁸⁰¹

Despite state support, the LeT shares close ideological similarities with al-Qaeda, and is believed to be growing increasingly close to the organization. Steven Tankel described the group as focused on Kashmir with a low profile elsewhere, but under the surface it remains “very much part of AQ’s global jihad.”⁸⁰² The LeT has had decades-long interaction with al-Qaeda, and the founder of its parent organization during the Soviet jihad was Abdullah Azzam, a mentor to Bin Laden, as a result of which LeT militants are believed to have cross-trained in AQ camps.⁸⁰³ The LeT also served as “urban facilitators” during al-Qaeda’s retreat from Afghanistan. It helped exfiltrate fighters during the invasion and assisted with the provision of safe houses, fake passports, guards and fixers.⁸⁰⁴

Some al-Qaeda operatives have been picked up at LeT safe houses, most prominently Abu Zubaydah, a senior AQ leader, who was captured at a LeT facility in Faisalabad.⁸⁰⁵ Collaboration with AQ may have increased post-2006 since the group entered the Afghan jihad, and moved fighters and bases to the FATA.

The LeT also is a highly attractive partner for global jihadis, such as AQ. It has a significant infrastructure base, extending from its headquarters in Muridke in South Punjab, to forward operating bases in Azad Kashmir, including in and around Muzzafarabad, and presumably around the LoC. The group also has a presence in the Gulf, which it utilizes as a “logistical and

⁷⁹⁸ Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai,” *ICSR*, April/May 2009. Available at <http://www.icsr.info/news/attachments/1240846916ICSRTankelReport.pdf>

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁰ “TV9 Gujarat: India Most Wanted Hafeez Saeed Rally in Karachi,” *Youtube*, June 16, 2010. Available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOPcowStOgc>

⁸⁰¹ “Pak’s Punjab govt gave Rs 82.77 million to JuD institutions in 2009,” *PTI*, June 16, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/kHV5WK>

⁸⁰² Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai,” *ICSR*, April/May 2009.

⁸⁰³ Stephen Tankel, “The Long Arm of the Lashkar-e-Taiba,” *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, February 17, 2010. Available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3175>

⁸⁰⁴ Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai,” *ICSR*, April/May 2009.

⁸⁰⁵ “Lashkar-e-Taiba,” *FAS*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/lashkar.htm>, accessed April 28, 2011

recruiting hub, primarily for its jihad against India.”⁸⁰⁶ This presence allows the LeT to more directly tap its donor base, as well as provides good transit points for entrance into India.

The Gulf allows provides the LeT with direct access to recruit Indian Muslims working in the Gulf, and helps maintain its interface with Indian sympathizers and allies, including the Indian Mujahideen.⁸⁰⁷ The group is also believed to maintain an extensive transnational network, including cells in Britain, North America, mainland Europe and Australia, making it in the words of foremost LeT analyst Steven Tankel an “ideal global jihadist facilitator.”⁸⁰⁸

In recent years, the LeT increasingly globalist in its outlook, and has shown a willingness to directly target Westerners abroad, as well as incorporate them into its attacks inside India. Its primary targeting scope continues to be India, but it has also waged a peripheral jihad against Western targets, and has increasingly refocused towards the Afghan jihad since 2006. The 2008 attacks in Mumbai, which included attacks on Western and Jewish targets, marked the LeT’s formal arrival on the global jihadist stage, and its hybridization in terms of targets.⁸⁰⁹ In his annual assessment, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that the LeT is a “special case” that is “becoming more of a direct threat and is placing Western targets in Europe in its sights.”⁸¹⁰

The LeT has been implicated in various global terror plots. Its European members have been suspected of providing financial support for shoe bomber Richard Reid, and the 2008 transatlantic airliner plot.⁸¹¹ A Pakistani American David Headley was also suspected of having conducted surveillance for the Mumbai attacks, there is evidence linking it to an intercepted plot against high-profile targets in Australia, and LeT operatives have been arrested in Iraq by British forces.⁸¹²

The LeT also maintains strong links to transnational criminal groups inside Pakistan, notably the Karachi-based D-Company run by Dawood Ibrahim, which is one of the world’s largest and most organized drug smuggling outfits. Ibrahim, who originated from Mumbai, before fleeing in 1993 after the Bombay Blasts instigated by his network, is believed to continue to have many links inside India, and wider afar in the Gulf, Europe and Africa, including networks, smuggling routes and money laundering channels, all of which can have significant utility for terrorist outfits. It is believed that Ibrahim, who considers himself a protector of Indian Muslims diverts a portion of D-Company’s sizeable profits towards terrorist outfits such as the LeT.⁸¹³ D-Company also controls many sea-routes into India, particularly from Karachi, from where the 26/11

⁸⁰⁶ Stephen Tankel, “The Long Arm of the Lashkar-e-Taiba,” *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, February 17, 2010.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁸ “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat,” *New America Foundation*, February 2010. Available

⁸⁰⁹ Vicky Nanjappa, “The Stephen Tankel Interview,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 11, 2010. Available at <http://vickynanjappa.wordpress.com/2010/12/02/the-stephen-tankel-interview/>

⁸¹⁰ Stephen Tankel, “The Long Arm of the Lashkar-e-Taiba,” *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, February 17, 2010.

⁸¹¹ Ryan Clarke, “Lashkar-i-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India,” *Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College*, March 2010, pg. 25-30.

⁸¹² Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai,” *ICSR*, April/May 2009.

⁸¹³ Ryan Clarke, “Lashkar-i-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India,” *Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College*, March 2010, pg. 25-30.

attackers set out. The nexus between the two can have significant impact on making the LeT more autonomous and independent, and diluting its dependence on the Pakistani state.

In theory, the LeT could be one of the single most dangerous elements in destabilizing South Asia, with unparalleled operational reach and proficiency. Its freeing itself of the constraints imposed by the state and gravitating into the domestic insurgency could wreak havoc on Pakistani stability. Similarly, any attack on the West traced back to Pakistan would be devastating, more so if traced back to militant groups supported by the ISI. Similarly, a high-profile attack against India runs the real risk of escalation into large-scale conventional war, and potentially to nuclear conflict.

Pakistani-Indian Competition in Afghanistan Redux

Growing Indian influence in Afghanistan has deeply alarmed Pakistani strategic planners, who fear ‘strategic envelopment,’ by India on two fronts. India has been the largest regional contributor to Afghanistan, mostly geared towards reconstruction and infrastructure-development projects, and is deeply alarmed by the prospect of premature American and NATO withdrawal and a return of a Taliban regime, fearing spillover into Kashmir.⁸¹⁴ Pakistan has also accused India of using Afghanistan as a staging base to support its internal Baloch separatist insurgency, although no hard evidence has yet materialized.

India currently maintains several consulates across Afghanistan, although it denies that they serve any nefarious purpose. Yet, as Christine Fair puts it, “anecdotal evidence suggests that although Pakistan’s most sweeping claims are ill-founded, Indian claims to complete innocence are also unlikely to be true.”⁸¹⁵

Indian interests in Afghanistan have often been attacked, including dual attacks on its embassy in Kabul, including one, which killed its defense attaché.⁸¹⁶ Various other attacks have targeted its citizens including a February 2010 attack on a UN guesthouse rented out by the Indian embassy that killed nine Indians, as well as two Indian Army personnel.⁸¹⁷

The US has worked to appease Pakistani sensitivities, while the Taliban have staged a significant comeback since 2006, degrading the influence of the India-friendly Karzai government in Kabul. As Christine Fair details, Indian influence continues to be protected largely under a ‘shrinking US security umbrella,’ and at present there is no indication that India has the capability to independently achieve any of its desired objectives in Afghanistan.⁸¹⁸ This is particularly worrying for Indian strategic planners, given that virtually every terrorist group operating in India has trained in Afghanistan, and all have varying degrees of connection to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

⁸¹⁴ Krondstadt, “India-US Relations,” *Congressional Research Service*, October 27, 2010.

⁸¹⁵ Christine Fair, “Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India’s End-Game in Afghanistan?” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 2, Spring 2011. Available at http://www.twq.com/11spring/docs/11spring_Fair.pdf

⁸¹⁶ Tom Coghlan, “Kabul bomb kills Indian military attaché,” *Times Online*, July 8, 2008. Available at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4284698.ece>

⁸¹⁷ “Terrorist Attacks on Indians in Afghanistan,” *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/afghanistanindianattack.htm>, accessed April 28, 2011.

⁸¹⁸ Christine Fair, “Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India’s End-Game in Afghanistan?”

SECTION IX: PAKISTANI-IRANIAN RELATIONS

Iran's primary strategic interests are in the Gulf, and its concerns on its eastern periphery are largely related to security and stability in protecting its flank. With violence increasing in Afghanistan from a resurgent Sunni Taliban insurgency, and from Pakistan's restive Balochs, Iran is likely to be extremely interested stability in both in a manner that does not spill over into its territory. In the post-9/11 era, energy ties between the countries are an important component of the relationship, and Pakistan is a net importer of energy from Iran.

An Uncertain History of Relations

Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan in 1947, and relations were warm during the Shah era, as both countries pursued a pro-West policy, and along with Turkey were among the three main US allies in the region during the period.⁸¹⁹ The 1979 Iranian Revolution changed the equation. Iran, now ruled by Ayatollah Khomeini's Shiite theocracy resented the sectarian persecution of the Shias during and after the Zia era, including the assassination of an Iranian diplomat in Lahore in 1991.⁸²⁰ A continued Pakistani partnership with the US, particularly during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan also rankled.

During the Soviet jihad, both Tehran and Islamabad cultivated anti-Soviet forces, but despite the US leaving the region soon after the Soviet withdrawal, serious differences persisted between their Afghan policies. Iran desired Afghanistan's Shiite minority to be reflected in any post-war power-sharing arrangement, whereas Pakistan soon threw its full support behind the Sunni Taliban, who virulently persecuted Afghanistan's Hazara Shias. The relationship reached its lowest ebb in 1998, after the Taliban took Mazar-e-Sharif, massacred the Hazara Shia populace and executed nine Iranian diplomats.⁸²¹

In 2001, soon after the US invasion, relations began to warm. Iran perceived Pakistan to have ended support for the Taliban. At a joint press conference in December 2001, the Iranian and Pakistani Foreign Ministers announced a "new era of cooperation," which was soon followed by a landmark three-day visit to Pakistan by Iranian President Khatami in December 2002. During the visit both countries pledged to step up support to improve border security, as well as economic cooperation, including in the energy and natural gas sectors.⁸²² In Afghanistan, both Iran and Pakistan pledged support for the Bonn process, and the two countries stepped up their defense cooperation, including the joint production of the Al-Khalid MBT.⁸²³

In recent years, however, relations have been strained by a spillover of violence -- particularly by terrorist group Jundullah that has staged several high-profile attacks against Iranian military targets. The 'Arab Spring' and political unrest in the Gulf unrest has also raised tensions between

⁸¹⁹ Shah Alam, "Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions," *Strategic Analysis*, December 2004. Available at http://www.idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_salam_1204.pdf

⁸²⁰ Shah Alam, "Iran-Pakistan Relations: Political and Strategic Dimensions," *Strategic Analysis*, December 2004.

⁸²¹ "Iran holds Taliban responsible for 9 Diplomat's Deaths," *New York Times*, September 11, 1998. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/11/world/iran-holds-taliban-responsible-for-9-diplomats-deaths.html>

⁸²² Editorial, *Dawn*, December 27, 2002 Available at <http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff88.pdf>

⁸²³ "Pak-Iran Relations Since Islamic Revolution," *Embassy of Islamic Republic of Iran*. Available at <http://www.iranembassy.pk/fa/political-section/pak-iran/592-pak-iran-relations-since-islamic-revolution-genesis-of-cooperation-and-competition.html>, accessed April 23, 2011.

the two countries, particularly over Bahrain. Pakistanis play a key role in the Bahraini security apparatus, and the rumored deployment of further Pakistani support to Bahrain has agitated Iran, which opposes any crackdown on the country's minority Shias.⁸²⁴

Baloch Separatism

Iran and Pakistan share a 700 km common border that separates the Baloch people, who agitate for increased autonomy and freedom in both countries. Baloch grievances in Pakistan have already been detailed, and Iranian Balochs are similarly ethnically distinct from regime elites, and economically and politically disadvantaged. Historically, both Tehran and Islamabad have collaborated on violently suppressing Baloch nationalism, which both perceive to be a threat to regional stability and territorial integrity.⁸²⁵ This was particularly during Iran's Shah era when Iran sent Cobra attack helicopters to help Pakistan put down Baloch dissent during the 1970s.

The rise of virulently anti-Shia group Jundullah has complicated relations in the post-2001 period. Jundullah, a Sunni Baloch group believed to stage out of Pakistani Balochistan, has mounted several high-profile terrorist attacks in Iran's Sistan-Baluchistan, against sectarian and regime targets. In 2005, it was believed to be behind the attempted assassination of President Ahmadinejad during a visit to the province, as well as the kidnappings and executions of Iranian security personnel.⁸²⁶ Hostages were occasionally taken across the border into Pakistan.⁸²⁷ Jundullah's attacks have grown in lethality in recent years, and have particularly centered in Sistan-Baluchistan's provincial capital, Zahedan.

In 2007 a car bomb in the city killed 18 Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC)⁸²⁸ and attacks in 2009 and 2010 targeted mosques in the city, including the Jamia mosque in July 2010, which is believed to have killed some IRGC officers.⁸²⁹ In 2009, Jundullah also assassinated several senior members of the IRGC, including the chief provincial commander, and the deputy commander of the Guard's ground force, General Noor Ali Shooshtari.⁸³⁰ Jundullah is also believed to have heavily involvement in the opium trade between Balochistan and Iran.

Pipelines and Ports

Balochistan is a strategically vital energy and trade transit corridor, and has been subjected to the intrigues of various regional rivalries. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the warming Pakistani-Iranian relationship soon began to manifest in various pipeline projects, particularly the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline that came to be colloquially known as the "peace pipeline."

⁸²⁴ Qaiser Butt, "Middle East Protests: Pakistan tries to pacify Iran over Bahrain aid," *Express Tribune*, April 23, 2011. Available at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/154915/middle-east-protests-pakistan-tries-to-pacify-iran-over-bahrain-aid/>

⁸²⁵ Chris Zambelis, "Violence and Rebellion in Iranian Balochistan," *Jamestown Foundation*, June 29, 2006. Available at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=821&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=181&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=821&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1)

⁸²⁶ Ibid

⁸²⁷ "16 Iranian police taken hostage," *Press TV*, June 14, 2008. Available at <http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/59884.html>

⁸²⁸ Ali Akbar Dareini, "Bomb kills 18 Revolutionary Guardsmen in Iran," *Washington Post*, February 14, 2007. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/14/AR2007021400039.html>

⁸²⁹ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10655900>; "Iran executes three men for mosque bombing," *BBC News*, May 30, 2009. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8074978.stm

⁸³⁰ "Iranian commanders assassinated," *BBC News*, October 18, 2009. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8312964.stm

Pakistan is the lynchpin of the project, serving as both an end-market for Iranian energy, as well as a transit route for Iranian attempts to reach Indian markets. In February 2002, Iran and Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to conduct feasibility studies,⁸³¹ but the project has since stalled, particularly due to American opposition. As a result India has increasingly backed away from the project, and there are rumors that the pipeline could be modified to include China, instead of India as the end-market.⁸³²

Iran and Pakistan are also seeking to expand economic and transport ties with Central Asia, and have used ports and road links to anchor their strategies. Pakistan has invested in the Chinese-built and financed Gwadar port on the Makran coast, which sits a mere 180 miles from the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz.⁸³³ China favors Gwadar as a critical means to reduce its reliance on seaborne energy imports that must transit around India and through the Straits of Malacca, as well as project power into the Indian Ocean. The US has also supported Gwadar, in particular as a means to isolate Iran's attempts to build up its Chabahar port. Chabahar, which is Iran's attempt to alleviate congestion at its Bandar Abbas terminal, is strongly supported and co-developed by India. India hopes to build it up to provide it with access to Afghanistan, and help reduce Kabul's reliance on Pakistan for economic transit routes.⁸³⁴

⁸³¹ "A Report on a Press Conference Addressed Jointly by the Ministers for Petroleum and Natural Resources of Pakistan and Iran," *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, Vol. XXIX, Issue 2-4, Feb-April 2002. Available at <http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff88.pdf>

⁸³² Stephen Blank, "Will China Join the Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline?" *Jamestown Foundation*, March 5, 2010. Available at <http://bit.ly/mTbnL8>

⁸³³ Christian Bleur, "Central Asia' Seaport: Gwadar or Chabahar," *Registan*, August 20, 2007. Available at <http://www.registan.net/index.php/2007/08/20/central-asias-seaport-gwadar-or-chabahar/>

⁸³⁴ Christopher Jaffrelot, "A Tale of Two Ports," *Yale Global*, January 7, 2011. Available at <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/tale-two-ports>

SECTION X: CONCLUSIONS

It is tempting to offer the usual round of policy options for political change, and for dealing with internal security issues. The basic problem Pakistan faces, however, is that it cannot deal with any of its current security problems unless it addresses their underlying causes by carrying out effective reforms that are actually implemented on a large scale.

Pakistan is not yet a failed state, and may be able to muddle through almost indefinitely. It does, however, have a failed, self-seeking elite, and it has with a failed approach to effective governance and the combined impact of massive population growth and an extraordinarily young population.

The Afghan conflict has contributed to these problems – just as the action of the Pakistani government have contributed to the Afghan conflict. The Afghan War, however, is only one part of Pakistan's problems and its internal challenges are far more serious sources of violence and instability.

Pakistan cannot move towards true stability as long as its elite does not come to grips with its own shortcomings, does not stop blaming other for its problems and deficiencies, and relies on rhetoric and repression rather the real reform. Until these changes occur, solving any given security problem will at best buy time in that narrow area while Pakistan's overall situation further deteriorates.